Holding

A stay of dispossession is a stay of further proceedings under Section 11‑A, and the period of such stay must be excluded in computing the two‑year limit for making the award.

Summary

The Government of Tamil Nadu acquired 0.87 hectare of land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, publishing a notification on 12‑April‑1988 and a declaration on 29‑April‑1989. The landowner challenged the acquisition in a writ petition; the High Court dismissed the petition but the landowner obtained a stay of dispossession on 19‑October‑1990, which remained in force. The High Court Division Bench later quashed the notification and declaration, holding that the award was not made within the two‑year period prescribed by Section 11‑A and that the stay of dispossession did not count as a stay of further proceedings. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that a stay of dispossession is a stay of further proceedings under Section 11‑A, and the period of such stay must be excluded when computing the two‑year limit for making the award. Consequently, the High Court’s view was reversed and the appeal was allowed, with the matter remitted to the High Court for determination of a separate issue regarding the status of the water board.

Issues considered

Whether a court‑ordered stay of dispossession amounts to a stay of further proceedings under Section 11‑A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, thereby excluding the period of stay from the two‑year period for making an award.
Whether the failure to make an award within the two‑year period, ignoring the effect of the stay, causes the acquisition proceedings to lapse.

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 11-A, s. 4, s. 6
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984

Subjects

Land acquisitionSection 11-Aaward time limitstay of dispossessioncomputation of periodlapse of proceedingsnotificationdeclaration

Judgment

A GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU AND ANR.
v.
VASANTHA BAI

APRIL 7, 1995

B (K. RAMASWAMY AND B.L. HANSARIA, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Sections 4, 6, 11 and 1IA-Explanation.

Land Acquisition-Award-Prescribed period of two years for
C making-Computation of-Exclusion of period during which proceedings are
stayed by Court-Held stay of dispossession amounts to stay of further
proceedings under the Act-Period of stay of dispossession has to be excluded
from the prescribed period.

In land acquisition proceedings, a Notification under Section 4(1) of
D the Land Acqnisition Act, 1894 was pnblished on April 12, 1988 while the
declaration nnder Section 6 was published on April 29, 1980. The
respondent's petition challenging the acquisition proceedings was dis·
)
missed by a Single Judge of the High Conrt on June 18, 1992 against which
a writ appeal was preferred. However, pending the writ petition, the
E respondent obtained stay of dispossession by order dated October 19, 1990
and the same was continning pending the appeal. The Division Bench
allowed the respondent's appeal and qnashed the notification issued under
Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6. It held that the order
restraining dispossession did not amount to stay of further proceedings
nor it prevented the land acquisition officer to take further action in ).._
F pursuance of the declaration under section 6. As under Section 11-A,
award has to be made within a period of two years from the date of
publication of the ~eclaration and since the award was not made within
that period the netilkation issued under section 4(1) and the declaration
stood lapsed.
G Allowing State's appeal, this Court

HELD: 1. Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as brought
on statute by Land Acquisition (Amendment ) Act 68/84 adumbrates that
the Collector shall make an award under Section 11 within a period of two
H years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award
258
6ovr. OFT.N. v. v. BAI 259

is made within that period, the entire proceeding for acquisition of the land A
,,;-. shall lapse. The Explanation amplified that iu computing the period of two
years referred to in the section, the period during which any action or
proceeding to be taken, in pursuance of the said declaration, is stayed by
an order of the court, shall be excluded. The stay of dispossession tau-
tamounts to stay of further proceediugs being taken nuder section 11 aud B
Explanation to Section 11-A covers such an order and the entire period of
stay has to be excluded in computing the period of two years prescribed
by Section 11-A. The Division Bench of the High Court was clearly in error
in taking the contrary view. [260-C, E, 262-H, 263-A, 262-G]

YN. Nendolia v. State of Gujarat, [1991) 4 SCC 531 and Sangappa G. C
Sajjan v. State of Kamataka, [1994] 4 SCC 145, relied on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4608 of
1995.

From the Judgment and Order dated 6.4.93 of the Madras High D
Court in W .A. No. 1079 of 1992.
j
Niranjana Singh, (Ms. A. Subhashin~) for Arputham, Aruna and Co.
for the Appellants.

R. Mohan, V.G. Pragasam and R. Nedumaran for the Respondent. E

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Leave granted.
---....<'
" Notification under s.4(1) of the Laud Acquisition Act, 1894, (for F
shor~ 'the Act'), as amended by Central Act 68 of 1984 was published in
the gazette on April 12, 1988 acquiring an extent of 0.87.0 hectare of the
land bearing Survey Nos. 84/1-Bl and 85/1-B of Madivilagam village,
Sriperumpudur Taluk, Chengai Anna District in Tamil Nadu State, for
public purpose. After conducting enquiry under s.5-A, declaration under
G
s.6 was published in the gazette on April 29, 1989 and the local publication

- '
was made on May 2, 1989.

Calling in question the validity of the notification and the declaration,
the respondent filed Writ Petition No. 12888/90. On June 18, 1992, the
single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition. Writ Appeal H
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] 3 S.C.R.

A No. 1079/92 was filed. Pending writ petition, the respondent had obtained
stay of dispossession by order dated October 19, 1990 and the same was
continuing pending appeal. when the writ appeal had come up for final
hearing, one of the contentions raised, which persuaded the Division Bench
for acceptance, was that under s.11-A, the award should be made within a
B period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration, and
since the award was not made within that period, notifications under s.4(1)
and 6 stood lapsed. On that finding by order dated April 6, 1993, the appeal
was allowed and the notification under s.4(1) and declaration under s.6
were quashed. Thus this appeal by special leave.

c Section 11-A of the Act, as brought on statute by Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act 68/84 adumbrates that the Collector shall make an
award under s.11 within a period of two years from the date of the
publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period,
the entire proceeding for acquisition of the land shall lapse provided that
D in a case where the said declaration has been published before the com-
mencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984, the award
shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. The
explanation amplified that in computing the period of two years referred
to in the section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be
taken, in pursuance of the said declaration, is stayed by an order of the
E court, shall be excluded. The Division Bench held that the order restraining
dispossession made by the High Court does not amount to stay of further
prQceedings nor it prevented the land acquisition officer to take further
action in pursuance of the declaration under s.6. Since no award was made
within a period of two years from the date on which local publication has
been made, the proceedings stood lapsed.
F
The Parliament enacted s.11-A with a view to prevent inordinate
delay being made by the Land Acquisition Officer in making the award.
The price to be paid for the land acquired under compulsory acquisition
is the prevailing price as on the date of publication of s.4(1) notification.
G The delay in making the award deprives the owner of the enjoyment of his
property or to deal with the land whose possession has already been taken,
and delay in· making the award, would subject the owner of the land to
untold hardship. With a view to relieve hardship to the owner or person
interested in the land and to remedy the lapses on the part of the Land
H Acquisition Officer in making the award, s.llA was enacted which enjoins
GOVf. OFT.N. v. V. BAI 261

ma.king of award expeditiously. So, outer limit of two years from the last A
of the dates of publications, envisaged in s.6 of the Act was fixed If he fails
to do so, all the acquisition proceedings under the Act would stand lapsed
and the owner of the land or person interested in the land is made free to
deal with the land as an unencumbered land. Cognizant to the fact that the
acquisition proceedings are questioned in a court of law, the Parliament B
enacted Explanation to s.11-A declaring that the period during which
action or proceedings taken in pursuance of the declaration under s.6 is
stayed by an· order of the court, the same "shall be excluded".
- Question is whether stay of dispossession is a stay of proceedings
under the Act so as to disable the Land Acquisition Officer to make the C
award? In Y.N. Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat, (1991] 4 SCC 531, the facts
were that declaration under s.6 was questioned by filing a writ petition
under Article 226. Pending its disposal stay of dispossession from the land
was granted. In the meanwhile, when award proceedings were being taken,
objection was raised that since award was not made within two years, the D
officer had no jurisdiction to pass the award. When it was overruled and
an award was made, another writ petition was filed questioning the award.
The Gujarat High Court held that Explanation to s.11-A was not confined
to staying of the award to be made; and since the language was widely
worded it covered within its sweep, the entire period during which any
action or proceeding taken in pursuance of the declaration under s.6 or E
dispossession is stayed by a competent court. When the correctness thereof
was challenged, this Court held that "in order to get the benefit of the said
provision what is required is that the landholder who seeks the benefit must
not have obtained any order from a court restraining any action or
proceeding in pursuance of the declaration under s.6 of the said Act so F
that the Explanation covers only the cases of those landholders who do not
obtain any order from a court which would delay or prevent the making of
the award or taking possession of the land acquired". This court upheld
the view of the High Court as correct.

In Sangappa G. Sajjan v. State of Kamataka, (1994] 4 SCC 145, the G

--· same question in relation to the period of delay under Explanation 1 to s.6
and Explanation 1to1st proviso to s.4(1) came up for consideration. When
the proceedings under s.4(1) was stayed and the declaration under s.6 also
was stayed, whether the period during which the stay operated has to be
excbded was considered and it was held that: H
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] 3 S.C.R

A "In other words, under the pre-Amendment Act the declaration
under Section 6(1) shall not be published after the expiry of three
years from the date of Section 4(1) publication and after the
commencement of the Amendment A.ct, the State has no power
to proceed with the matter and publish the declaration under
Section 6(1) after the expiry of one year from the date of publica-
B tion of the notification. Explanation 1 thereto provides the method
or mode of computation of the period refereed to in the first
proviso, namely, the period during which "any action or proceed-
ing" be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under sub-
section(!) of Section 4 being "stayed by an order of a court shall
c be excluded". In other words, the period occupied by the order of
stay made by a court shall be excluded. Admittedly, pending writ
petition on both the occasions the High Court granted "stay of
dispossession". Admittedly, the validity or tenability of the notifica-
tion issued and published under Section 4(1) is subject of adjudica-
tion before the High Court. Till the writ petitions are disposed of
D
or the appeals following its heels, the stay of dispossession was in
operation. Though there is no specific direction prohibiting the
publication of the declaration under Section 6, no useful purpose
would be served by publishing Section 6(1) declaration pending
adjudication of the legality of Section 4(1) notification. If any
E action is taken to pre-empt the proceedings, it would be stig-
matised either as 11 undue haste" or action to 11 overreach the court's
judicial process". Therefore, the period during which the order of
dispossession granted by the High Court operated, should be
excluded in co!llputation of the period of three years covered by
clause (1) of the first proviso to the Land Acquisition Act. When
F
it is so computed, the declaration published on the second occasion
is perfectly valid. Under these circumstances, we do not find any
justification to quash the notification published under Section 6
dated May 17, 1984. The review petitions are accordingly dis-
missed. No costs.''
G
The ratio in the above cases would squarely apply to the facts in this
case. The Division Bench of the High Court was clearly in error in taking
the contrary view. We, therefore, hold that the stay of dispossession would
tantamount to stay of further proceedings being taken under s.11 and
H Explanation to s.11-A covers such an order and the entire period of stay
GOVf.OFT.N.v. V.BAJ 263

has to be excluded in computing the period of two years prescribed by A
s.llA.

It is next contended by Shri R. Mohan, learned senior counsel, that
other points have been raised in the writ appeal and that they need to be
decided by the Division Bench as noted by it. From the record, it would
appear that the only point argued before the single Judge and negatived B
was whether Madras Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewage Board is not
a local authority? That question was also canvassed before the Division
Bench. Therefore, since the High Court had not decided that point, it
requires to be decided according to law.

The appeal is accordingly alluwed. The matter is remitted to the C
High Court for decision of the aforesaid point in accordance with law. No
costs.

T.N.A. Appeal allowed.

'