GOVINDversusDR. JEETSINGH

                                    GO VIND
                                       v.
                                 DR. JEETSINGH

                            NOVEMBER 25, 1987

B    [SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND S. RANGANATHAN, JJ.]

          M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961: Sec. 12(1)(a)-Bona
    fide need of landlord-To be judged from objective point-Not merely
    by assertion/denial of parties-Interference by High Court in second
    appeal with findings offact of first appellate Court-Permissibility of.
c         The respondent-landlord filed a suit for eviction of the tenant
    from the suit premises on the ground of bona fide requirement under
    s. 12(1)(e) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The appel-
    lant-tenant contended that the respondent-landlord was already in
    occupation of accommodation sufficient to meet his requirement and
D   that the suit was filed in order to extract higher rent. The trial court
    decreed the suit.                                                          •·

          The first appellate court, applying the tests which appeared to it
    to be objective, found that the need in respect of suit accommodation
    was not a bonafide one and allowed the appeal of the appellant-tenant.
E
           In second appeal by the respondent-landlord, the High Court
    held that the first appellate court had drawn wrong inferences, that
    there was no proper appreciation of facts and that all the facts had not
    been borne in mind. It allowed the appeal, restored the order of the
    trial cou~t and ordered eviction.
                                                                               J
F
          Allowing the appeal,

       HELD: The need of the landlord must be reasonable and must
  be bona fide in order to evict the tenant on the relevant provisions of
  the various Acts. Whether in a particular situation the need was
G reasonable or bona fide must be judged from the objective view point,
  not merely by 11ssertion or denial of the parties. [46E-F)

          In second appeal, the scope of interference by the High Court is
    limited. [47Al

H        Mattulalv. Radhe Lal, [1975] 1S.C.R.127, relied on.
                                      44
                    GOVIND v. JEET SINGH [MUKHARJJ, J.I                   45

          In the instant case, prima facie, it might be possible to hold that   A
    the High Court was in error in interfering with the findings of the first
    appellate court. But in view of the fact that subsequent to the decision
    of the High Court, the first wife of the landlord had died and the
    accommodation which was in heI" occupation has become vacant, and
    taking into cautious consideration the subsequent events, it must be
    held that there was no more bona fide need of the landlord to evict the     B
    tenant of the premises in question. Order of eviction has, therefore, ttJ
    be set aside. [47F·H]

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3117
    of 1984.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 16.12.1983 of the Madhya
                                                                                c
    Pradesh High Court in Civil Second Appeal No. 166 of 1980.

          Dr. Shankar Ghosh, V. Gambhir, S. Sarin and S.K. Gambhir
    for the Appellant.
                                                                                D
1       T.S. Krishnamurti Iyer and Shakil Ahmad Syed for the Res-
    pondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          SABYASA CHI MUKHARJI, J. This appeal by special leave is              E
    directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of
    Madhya Pradesh in Second Appeal No. 166 of 1980. By the aforesaid
    judgment, the High Court has reversed the .findings of the first
    appellate court.

          The respondent-landlord had filed a suit for eviction in Septem-      F
    ber, 1977, inter alia, under Section 12(1)(e) of the M.P. Accommo-
    dation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter called 'the Act') alleging that
    the premises in question was required bona fide for the requirement
    of the landlord. It was stated in the written statement filed by the
    petitioner-tenant that the respondent-landlord had already in his
    occupatfun sufficient accommodation and the same was sufficient to          G
    meet his requirement and that the suit was filed in order to extract
    the higher rent. The trial court decreed the suit.

         The appellant went up in appeal. The Additional District
    Judge, lndore which was the first appellate court allowed the appeal
    of the appellant-tenant and set aside the decree passed by the trial        H
    46                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [1988] 2 S.C.R.

A court under section 12(1 )( e) of the Act. The first appellate court
  looked into the evidence and came to .the conclusion that the need in
  respect of suit accommodation was not bona fide one.

         It was the case of the landlord that three rooms were in his
B possession in the ground floor and one tin shed which the landlord
  was formerly using as a Garage for his car but which was no longer
  with him. Landlord was suffering from Harnia and one of the wives
  was also suffering from Asthama. After analysing the evidence the
  First Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the evidence was
  not such that the plaintiff-landlord found it difficult in climbing the
  stairs and there was no danger of heart-attac~ as he had stated. So far
C as the wife's illness was concerned, this also, the first appellate court
  did not accept the case on the analysis of the evidence. It was             )
  observed by the first appellate court that the wife of the landlord did
  not come to the witness box to say that she was suffering from
  Asthama. Nor the Doctor who was stated to be the family Doctor
D affirmed that fact. It may, however, be mentioned tha! the landlord
  himself is a Doctor. The landlord had stated that six rooms were in
  his possession and he explained how six rooms were being used and the
  accommodation with his wife in the ground floor comprises of three
  rooms; for her residence, kitchen and store and a tin shed for storing
  fuel etc. In the aforesaid background the first appellate court came to
E the conclusion that the requirement of the landlord was not reason-
  able nor bona fide. It is a well-settled law in this branch that the need
  of the landlord must be reasonable and must be bona fide in order to
  evict the tenant on the relevant provisions of the various Acts.
  Whether in a particular situation the need was reasonable or bona
  fide must be judged from the objective view point not merely by
F
  assertion or denial of the parties. The learned Judge of the first
  appellate court applying the tests which appeared to him to be objec-
  tive tests found, that such need is not bona fide or reasonable. He
  accordingly allowed the appeal and set aside the order of eviction.

       The landlord went up in appeal before the High Court in
G Second Appeal. The High Court came to the conclusion that the first
  appellate court had drawn wrong inferences and there was no proper
  appreciation of facts and furthermore the High Court was of the
  opinion that all the facts had not been borne in mind by the first
  appellate court. The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the
  judgment and decree of the first appellate court and restored the
H order of the trial court and ordered eviction.
                    GOVIND v. JEET SINGH (MUKHARJI, J.]                  47

          The tenant has come up here. It is well-settled Jaw that in          A
    Second Appeal the scope of interference by the High Court is
    limited.

          This Court in the case of Mattu/al v. Radhe Lal, [1975] 1 S.C.R.
    127 had occasion to consider the scope of the Second Appeal under          B
    the Madhya Pradesh Act. There this Court held that the High Court
    had exceeded its jurisdiction in Second Appeal in reversing the
    decision of the first appellate court. This Court further observed that
    the issues whether the respondent required the shop in question for
    the purpose of starting new business as a dealer in iron and steel
    materials, and if so, whether his requirement was bona fide were both
    questions of fact. Their determination did not involve the application     c
    of any legal principles to the facts established in the evidence. This
    Court further held in that case that the findings of the first appellate
    court on these issues were no doubt inferences from other basic facts,
    but that did not alter the character of these findings and they re-
    mained findings of facts and therefore, the conclusion of the first
                                                                               D
i
    appellate court that the respondent did not bona fide require a shop
    premises in that case for the purpose of starting new business as a
    dealer in iron and steel materials represented findings of facts and
    could not be interfered with by the High Court in second appeal
    unless it was shown that in reaching it a mistake of law was committed
    or that it was based on no evidence or was such as no reasonable man
                                                                               E
    could reach.

                                                      (Emphasis supplied).

          We are prima facie inclined to take the view that it might have
    been possible in this case to hold that the High Court was in error in
                                                                               F
    interfering with the findings of the first appellate court but in the
    facts of this case we need not rest our decision on that basis, because
    subsequent to the decision of the High Court the first wife of the
    landlord had died and three rooms which were in her occupation
    have become vacant. In that view of the matter and taking into
    cautious consideration to all the subsequent events it must be held        G
    that there was no more bona jide need of the landlord to evict the
    tenant of the premises in question.

          This appeal must, therefore, be allowed and the or!ler of evic-
    tion set aside. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The parties will
    bear their own costs.                                                      H
      48                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [1988] 2 S.C.R.

.i\         This, however, will not prevent the parties from exchanging
      their position by mutual arrangements or agreement by the tenant
                                                                              \
      going upstairs in three rooms, now in occupation of the landlord, and
      the landlord getting three more rooms in the ground floor in the
      occupation of the tenant.
B     N.P.V.                                               Appeal allowed.