GOVINDA BALA PATIL (D) BY LRS.versusGANPATI RAMCHANDRA NAIKWADE (D) BY LRS.

                     [2013] 8 S.C.R. 461


            GOVINDA BALA PATIL (D) BY LRS.                         A
                               v.
    GANPATI RAMCHANDRA NAIKWADE (D) BY LRS.
            (Civil Appeal No. 1675 of 2004)
                        JULY 29, 2013
                                                                   B
          [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD AND
               V. GOPALA GOWDA, JJ.]

    Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948:
                                                                   c
     s.32G - Proceedings under - Initiated by tenant -
Rejected by Additional Tehsi/dar holding that the land was
leased out for growing sugarcane - Appellate-authority set it
aside holding that landlord failed to prove the specific purpose
of the lease - Revisional Court gave its finding in favour of
                                                                   0
landlord, and held that the land was leased out for growing
sugarcane - High Court, in writ petition set aside the order of
revisional court - Held: The order of the authority was perverse
as its conclusion was without reference to the evidence -
Therefore, High Court erred in setting aside the order of          E
revisional court.
      s. 43A - Applicability of - Whether applicable to single
person - High Court in view of plural expressions in the
provision held that the provision covers only those cases in
which lease is given to more than one person - Held: In view       F
of s. 13 of Bombay General Clauses Act which provides that
singular shall include the plural and vice versa, plural
expression will include singular - Thus, s.43A would be
applicable to single person - Bombay General ClausesAct,
1904- s.13.                                                        G
     Revision - Jurisdiction of revisional court - Scope of -
Held: Revisional court ordinarily does not reappraise the
evidence - But where finding recorded by appellate authority
is perverse, it can upset the finding of appellate authority.
                             461                                   H
    462     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A        Evidence - Nature of evidence - In agricultural tenancy
    case - Held: Such cases are decided on the preponderance
    of probability - Principle of proof beyond reasonable doubt
    does not apply in such proceedings.

B     The respondent-tenant initiated proceedings u/s. 32G
  of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 for
  determination of price of the land on the pela that he shall
  be deemed to have purchased the land. The Additional
  Tehsildar held that the land in question was leased out
  by the appellant land-holder for growing sugarcane and
C accordingly dropped the proceedings. Appellate authority
  allowed the appeal of the tenant on giving finding that the
  landlord failed to prove the specific purpose of the lease.
  Landlord filed revision petition, which was allowed by
  Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal setting aside the order of
D the appellate authority and restoring the order of the
  Additional Tehsildar. Tenant's writ petition was allowed
  by High Court setting aside the order of the Tribunal. It
  was held that the land was not leased out for cultivation
  of sugarcane and further held that s.43A of the Act would
E not govern the field as the lease in question was not given
  to more than one person. Hence the present appeal by
  the landlord.

                Allowing the appeal, the Court
F      HELD: 1.1. The revisional court ordinarily does not
  reappraise the evidence, but in case it is found that the
  finding recorded by the appellate authority is perverse,
  nothing prevents it from upsetting the finding of the
  appellate authority. If the appellate authority records a
G finding without consideration of the relevant material or
  on consideration of irrelevant material or the finding
  arrived at is such that no person duly instructed in law
  can reach at that finding, such finding in law is called
  perverse and in such a contingency, it is within the
H jurisdiction of the revisional court to set aside the said
       GOVINDA BALA PATIL (D) BY LRS. v. GANPATI      463
         RAMCHANDRA NAIKWADE (D) BY LRS.

finding. [Para 6] [467-F-H]                                  A

     1.2. In. the present case, the finding recorded by the
Sub-Divisional Officer (appellate authority) is patently
perverse. The Sub-Divisional Officer fl.as referred to the
statement of the landlord and his witnesses that the land B
was leased out for growing sugarcane but rejected the
evidence on the ground that the "landlord and his
witnesses have not been ab~e to prove the purpose of
lease beyond reasonable doubt" and ultimately held that
"the landlord has failed to prove the specific purpose of C
the lease." While doing so, the Sub-Divisional Officer has
lost sight of the basic principle that the nature of the
proceeding is decided on the preponderance of
probability and the principle of proof beyond reasonable
doubt does not apply in such proceeding. Further,
                                                            01
appellate-authority, without assigning any reason, has
rejected the evidence of the landlord and his witnesses
and jumped to a conclusion without reference to the
evidence. The Tribunal (the revisional court) has recorded
the finding that it was leased out for the purpose of
growing sugarcane. The Tribunal has referred to the E
evidence of the landlord and his witnesses and further
to the record of rights and from that it has come to the
aforesaid conclusion. Thus the Tribunal was well within
its right in setting aside the finding of the appellate-
authority and holding that the land was leased out for the F
purpose of growing sugarcane. That being so, the High
Court erred in setting aside the finding of the Tribunal.
Accordingly, the finding of the Additional Tahsildar as
affirmed by the Tribunal is restored and held that the land
was leased out for cultivation of sugarcane. [Paras 7 and G
8] [468-A-G]

    2. ~ection 43A excludes the application of various
provisions of the Act including 33C in respect of "leases"
granted to "any bodies or persons" inter alia for the
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    464      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 8 S.C.R.

A purpose of cultivation of sugarcane. However, in view of
  the plural expression "any bodies" or "persons", the
  High Court has come to the conclusion that it shall cover
  only those cases in which lease has been given to more
  than one person and not singular person. Section 13 of
B the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 inter alia provides
  that words in the singular shall include the plural and vice
  versa. In the plural word· "persons", there is nothing
  repugnant in the subject or context so that it may not be
  read as singular. Sub-section (b) of Section 43A(1) of the
c Act has also used the plural expression "leases" and if
  the reasoning of the High Court is accepted, the aforesaid
  provision shall cover only such cases where there is
  more than one lease. This will defeat the very purpose of
  the Act. [Paras 10 and 11) [469-G-H; 470-A, E-F]

D       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
    1675 of 2004.

       From the Judgment and Order dated 08.01.2002 of the
  High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 3807
E of 1988.
        Dr. Rajeev B. Masodkar, Anil Kumar Jha, for the
    Appellants.

      Kailash Pandey, Ranjeet Singh, K. v, Sreekumar, for the
F Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

       CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J. 1. This appeal
  arises out of a proceeding under Section 32G of the Bombay
G Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. One Govinda Bala
  Patil, since deceased, the predecessor-in-interest of the
  appellants, hereinafter referred to as "the landlord", owned land
  being R.S. No. 51 admeasuring 35 gunthas at Village
  Pandewadi within Taluka Radhanagari in the District of
H
  GOVINDA BALA PATIL (D) BY LRS. v. GANPATI RAMCHANDRA         465
   NAIKWADE (D) BY LRS. [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]


Kolhapur. A proceeding under Section 32G of the Bombay                 A
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, hereinafter referred
to as "the Act", was initiated by one Rama Dattu Naikwade,
predecessor-in-interest of the respondents, for determination
of price of the land on the plea that he shall be deemed to have
purchased the land. The Additional Tahsildar & ALT,                    B
Radhanagari, at the first instance, held that the land in question
was leased out for growing sugarcane and, accordingly,
dropped the proceeding. However, in appeal, the said order
was set aside and the matter ultimately remitted back to him
to hold fresh inquiry. Accordingly, the Additional Tahsildar held      c
fresh inquiry and again by its order dated 10th of December,
1981 reiterated its earlier finding and held that the land was
leased out for growing sugarcane and the proceeding was
dropped. The tenant thereafter preferred appeal which was
heard by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Shahuwadi Division,               D
Kolhapur who allowed the appeal and set aside the order of
the Additional Tahsildar on its finding that the landlord has failed
to prove the specific purpose of the lease. The landlord then
preferred revision before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal,
Kolhapur, hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal'', which set
aside the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer and restored that        E
of the Additional Tahsildar. While doing so, the Tribunal held
as follows:

            "In the instant case as I have stated earlier there is
     sufficient evidence on record to show on the basis of             F
     entries in the "E" Patrak that suit land was continuously
     growing sugarcane crop from the year 1946 and this
     particular fact is also corroborated to some extent by two
     independent witnesses examined by the applicant-
     landlords. So in this case it cannot be said that no              G
     agreement of lease was established between the parties
     and in as much as sugarcane crop was grown in the suit
     land since the year 1946, there are reasons to believe that
     the main purpose of lease was for growing sugarcane
     crop."                                                            H
    466      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A         2. The tenant assailed the aforesaid order before the High
    Court in a writ petition. The High Court by the impugned order
    set aside the order of the Tribunal and held that the Tribunal
    erred in setting aside the finding of the Sub-Divisional Officer
    that the land in question was not leased out for sugarcane
B   cultivation. The High Court, in this connection, has observed as
    follows:

          "12. While toppling the judgment and order passed by the
          Sub-Divisional Officer, Shahuwadi, the learned Member of
          M.R.T. has dislodged the findings of facts recorded by the
c         said authority. After examining the judgment and order
          passed by the S.D.O. Shahuwadi, this Court comes to the
          conclusion that the findings recorded by the S.D.O.
          Shahuwadi were consistent with the evidence on record.
          The approach adopted by him was correct, proper and
D         legal. When that was so, it was beyond the jurisdiction of
          the learned Member of M.R.T. to dislodge it in the revision.
          The findings of facts consistent with evidence and law
          cannot be dislodged by revisional authority."

E        3. The High Court has further held that Section 43A of the
    Act will not govern the field as the lease in question was not
    given to more than one person. At this juncture, we consider it
    appropriate to reproduce the reasoning of the High Court in this
    regard:
F         "11. Section 43A of the Bombay Tenancy Act was
          exempting certain categories of the cultivation of the land
          and the persons cultivating it for growing sugarcane, for
          making improvement in the financial and social status of
          the peasants using the land for growing sugarcane, fruits
G         or flowers or for the breeding of livestock. The words which
          are used in sub-clause (b) of Section 43A(1) clearly
          provide that such exemption was available to the leases
          of land granted by "any bodies" or "persons" other than
          those mentioned in clause (a) for cultivation of sugarcane
H         or the growing of fruits or flowers or for breeding of
   GOVINDA BALA PATIL (D) BY LRS. v. GANPATI RAMCHANDRA      467
    NAIKWADE (D) BY LRS. [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]


    livestock. The words used in sub-clause (b) "any bodies"         A
    or "persons" cannot be made applicable to a single
    person. Such an attempt would be throttling the spirit of
    enacting Section 43A of the Bombay Tenancy
    Act. ............ ."
                                                                     B
     4. We have heard Dr. Rajeev B. Masodkar, learned
counsel for the appellants whereas respondents are
represented by Mr. Kailash Pandey, Advocate.

     5. Dr. Masodkar contends that the finding recorded by the
Tribunal that the lease was for cultivation of sugarcane has been    C
set aside by the High Court without assigning any reason and
it merely stated "that the finding recorded by the SDO
Shahuwadi is consistent with the evidence on record" and "the
approach adopted by him was correct, proper and legal" and
in such circumstances "it was beyond the jurisdiction" of the        D
Tribunal "to dislodge it in the revision". He points out that the
Sub-Divisional Officer had jumped to a finding without assigning
any reason and hence it was open for the Tribunal to upset the
same and record its own finding. Mr. Pandey, however, submits
that the Tribunal, which is a court of revision, cannot act as a     E
court of appeal and, hence, the High Court was right in setting
aside its finding.

      6. We have considered the rival submission and we find
substance in the submission of Dr. Masodkar. True it is that the
                                                                     F
revisional court ordinarily does not reappraise the evidence but
in case it is found that the finding recorded by the appellate
authority is perverse, nothing prevents it from upsetting the
finding of the appellate authority. If the appellate authority
records a finding without consideration of the relevant material
or on consideration of irrelevant material or the finding arrived    G
at is such t'at no person duly instructed in law can reach at that
finding, such finding in law is called perverse and in such a
contingency, in our opinion, it is within the jurisdiction of the
revisional court to set aside the said finding.
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    468     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A         7. Bearing in mind the principles aforesaid, when we
    consider the facts of the present case we are of the opinion
    that the finding recorded by the Sub-Divisional Officer is patently
    perverse. The Sub-Divisional Officer has referred to the
    statement of the landlord and his witnesses that the land was
B   leased out for growing sugarcane but rejected the evidence on
    the ground that the "landlord and his witnesses have not been
    able to prove the purpose of lease beyond reasonable doubt"
    and ultimately held that "the landlord has failed to prove the
    specific purpose of the lease." While doing so, the Sub-
C   Divisional Officer, in our opinion, has lost sight of the basic
    principle that the nature of the proceeding is decided on the
    preponderance of probability and the principle of proof beyond
    reasonable doubt does not apply in such proceeding. Further,
    the Sub-Divisional Officer, without assigning any reason, has
D   rejected the evidence of the landlord and his witnesses and
    jumped to a conclusion without reference to the evidence. We
    have quoted the observations of the Tribunal which has
    recorded the finding that it was leased out for the purpose of
    growing sugarcane. The Tribunal has referred to the evidence
    of the landlord and his witnesses and further to the record of
E   rights and from that it has come to the aforesaid conclusion.

          8. In the face of what we have observed above, the
    Tribunal was well within its right in setting aside the finding of
    the Sub-Divisional Officer and holding that the land was leased
F   out for the purpose of growing sugarcane. That being so, we
    are of the opinion that the High Court erred in setting aside the
    finding of the Tribunal. Accordingly, we restore the finding of the
    Additional Tahsildar as affirmed by the Tribunal and hold that
    the land was leased out for cultivation of sugarcane.
G
      9. Dr. Masodkar, then submits that the High Court
  committed a grave error in coming to the conclusion that
  Section 43A of the Act would not govern the field and cannot
  be made applicable to a single person. He submits that in law,
H the plural covers the singular also. Mr. Pandey, however,
   GOVINDA BALA PATIL (D) BY LRS. v. GANPATI RAMCHANDRA      469
    NAIKWADE (D) BY LRS. [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.)


submits that the High Court is right in holding that in view of     A
the use of the expression "any bodies or persons" in sub clause
(b) of Section 43A(1) of the Act, the same cannot be made
applicable to a single person. He points out that in the present
case, it is an admitted position that the land in question was
given on lease to a single person. In order to appreciate the       B
rival submissions, we deem it expedient to reproduce Section
43A(1)(b) of the Act:

    "43A.Some of the provisions not to apply to leases of land
    obtained by industrial or commercial undertakings, certain      C
    co-operative societies or for cultivation of sugarcane or
    fruits or flowers

    (1) The provision of sections 4B, 8, 9, 9A, 98, 9C, 10, 1OA,
    14, 16, 17A, 178, 18, 27, 31 to 310 (both inclusive), 32
    to 32R (both inclusive), 33A, 338, 33C, 43, 63, 63A, 64         D
    and 65, shall not apply to-

    (a}     xxx                   xxx              xxx
      (b}      leases of land granted to any bodies or persons
             other than those mentioned in clause (a} for the       E
             cultivation of sugarcane or the growing of fruits or
             flowers or for the breeding of livestock;

    (c}     xxx                   xxx
                                                                    F
     10. Section 43A excludes the application of various
provisions of the Act including 33C in respect of "leases"
granted to "any bodies or persons" inter alia for the purpose of
cultivation of sugarcane. However, in view of the plural
expression "any bodies" or "persons", the High Court has come       G
to the conclusion that it shall cover only those cases in which
lease has been given to more than ont! person and not singular
person. It seems that the attention of the Court was not drawn
to Section 13 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 which
inter alia provides that words in the singular shall include the
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    470       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A plural and vice versa. Section 13 of the aforesaid Act reads
  as follows:

          "Section 13 - Gender and number.

          In all Bombay Acts or Maharashtra Acts, unless there is
B         anything repugnant in the subject or context, -

          (a) words importing the masculine gender shall be taken
          to include females; and

          (b) words in the singular shall include the plural, and vice
c         versa."

        11. It is relevant here to state that the High Court has not
  come to the conclusion that there is anything repugnant in the
  subject or context so as to come to the conclusion that the plural
D will not include the singular. We have examined the use of the
  plural word "persons" from that angle and we do not find that
  there is anything repugnant in the subject or context so that it
  may not be read as singular. It is worth mentioning here that
  sub-section (b) of Section 43A(1) of the Act has also used the
E plural expression "leases" and if we accept the reasoning of
  the High Court, the aforesaid provision shall cover only such
  cases where there is more than one lease. This, in our opinion,
  will defeat the very purpose of the Act.

F        12. Thus, the impugned judgment of the High Court is
    vulnerable on both the counts and, hence, cannot be sustained.

       13. In the result, the appeal is allowed, impugned judgment
  of the High Court is set aside and that of the Tribunal is
  restored. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall
G be no order as to costs.

    K.K.T.                                          Appeal allowed.


                                                                         ,