GRAM PANCHAYAT, VILLAGE KANONDA, TEHSIL BAHADURGARH, DISTRICT ROHTAK, THROUGH ITS SARPANCHversusDIRECTOR, CONSOLIDATION OF HOLDINGS, HARYANA, CHANDIGARH AND ORS.

A       GRAM PANCHAYAT, VILLAGE KANONDA, TEHSIL
         BAHADURGARH, DISTRICT ROHTAK, THROUGH
                    ITS SARPANCH
                                        v.
    DIRECTOR, CONSOLIDATION OF HO_LDINGS, HARYANA,
                 CHANDIGARH AND ORS.       -
B
                             OCTOBER 24, 1989

        [K.N. SAIKIA, K. RAMASWAMY AND M. FATHIMA
                           BEEVI, JJ.]

          East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Frag-
c   mentation) Act 1948/East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Preven-
    tion of Fragmentation) Rules 1949-Sections 21(2) and 42/Rule JS--
    Confirmation of Scheme-Whether tantamount to an order under the
    Act-Limitation period provided in Rule 18-Whether attracted.

D         The appellant-Panchayat owned 1200 Bighas of land in Village
    Kanonda Dist!. Rohtak in Haryana. A Scheme of consolidation of Hold-
    ings under Section 20 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and
    Prevention of Fragmentation) Act 1948 was confirmed on 15.1.1974, as
    a result whereof the Panchayat's land was consolidated, repartitioned
    and allotted to persons, allegedly having no right to hold the same with
E   the result, the Panchayat was reduced as a landless person, and finan-
    cially weak. The Panchayat, therefore, on 20.9.1977 moved an applica-
    tion under section 42 of the Act objecting to the utilization of the Land
    of the value of -/2/- (Two annas) and the allotments made to other right
    hoiders.

F        -After hearing the parties, the Director of Consolidation of Hold-
   ings by his order dated 8.2. 79 set aside the scheme and remanded the
   case to the consolidation officer with some directions. The Director took
   the view that even though the application had been made much beyond
   the period of limitation of six months contemplated nnder Rule 18, yet
   in view of the fact that the Panchayat had no other land to cultivate due
CJ to which the Panchayat was unable to develop the agricultural Schemes,
   condoned the delay and allowed the application as aforesaid. Against
   the said orders the Respondents moved the High Court by means of a
   Writ Petition urging inter alia that the Director had condoned the delay
   without there being any ground for the same and thus had acted illeg-
   ally. The High Court held that the Director condoned the delay on
H extraneous -considerations and accordingly quashed the impugned_

                                      576
           GRAM PANCHAYAT v. DIRECTOR CONSOLIDATION                   577

order of 8.2. 79 passed by the· Director. Hence the Panchayat has filed      A
this appeal after obtaining Special Leave.

      Allowing the appeal, this Court,

      HELD: (Per K.N. Saikia & M. Fathima Beevi, JJ.)
                                                                             B
      Section 42 of the Act envisages proceedigs wherein order is
passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made. These .are
the distinct proceedings for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction under
this section. l58SB)

      Applying Rule ·18, the application has to be one under section 42
of the Act, and it has to be against an order and under the first proviso,   C
a certified copy of the order is required to accompany the application
and in computing the period of limitation of six months, the time spent
in obtaining the certified copy is to be excluded. (S8SF]

      Rule 18 has to be interpreted as it is fonnd, and the words of D
the rule ·are simple, precise and unambiguous and no more is neces·
sary than to understand these words in their naturai and ordinary
sense. Two different meanings cannot be given to the same word
"order" namely, that, in section 42 it does not include scheme
prepared or confirmed or repartition made, while in Rule 18, it would
include them. -[586B-C]       -                                       E

      The Rule did not come Into play when a petitioner challenged
either the scheme of consolidation including its preparation or confir.
mation or the repartition made in pursuance thereof. The amendment
made this p(Jsition clear. (S86E]  -                                    .
                                                                      F
      Though section 42 envisaged orders, preparation or confirmation
of scheme and repartition separately, Rule 18 provides for limitation
only in respect of an application under that section in a proceeding
where an order was passed. There is the maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius~xpression of one thing implies the exclusion of
another. When mention has been made only of "orders", the inference G
would he that preparation or confirmation of scheme and repartition
are excluded. [588F-G]

      In matters like consolidation of Holdings by a scheme and the_,,.
preparation and confirmation of the scheme and repartition thereafter,
the objections may arise at various stages for various reasons and it will H
     578            SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [1989] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A     not be possible to prescribe any bard and fast rule as to the reasonable
     .period after which an application could be made under section 42 of the
      Act. The Legislature itself did not do so. [589C-D]

           In the instant case, it has not been shown that the Panchayat
     earlier moved an application under section 42 on the same subject
'B   matter. There is no material to hold that the instant order of the
     Director is an order of review of his earlier order. [590A]

     (Per K. Ramaswamy, J.)

            As regards the exercise of the power under sections 19 & 20, the
      statute does not envisage passing any orders. But when exercising the
c     power, the officer is enjoined to pass orders and appeals are provided
      within the prescribed limitation against those orders to the appellate
      forums. This also, is an indication of the fact that the limitation of six
     .months is confmed to the orders to be revised under section 42. [580C-D]

D         The prescription of limitation of six months under Rule 18 would
     be confined only to order passed by an officer under the Act, it would
     not apply to the revision filed against the scheme prepared on con-
     firmed or repartition made in pursuance thereof. [S80F]

           It is undoubted that when there is no limitation prescribed for
E    exercise of the revisional power under section 42 against the schemes
     prepared or confirmed or repartition made, it woul.d be exercised
     within a reasonable time. [580G]

          What is reasonable time is always a question of fact depending
     upon the facts and circumstances of each case. [580G]
F
            When legislature chose not to f'ix a particular period of limitation,
     by judicial dicta it is not permissible to limit to a particular period.
     •While exercising power under Section 42, the revisional authority may
     take into account the long lapse of time as a factor in the light of the
     ,facts and circumstances obtainable in an appropriate. case. No absolute
Q    or precise period of limitation could be predicted or laid. [5808]

           Jagtar Singh v. Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings,
     Jullundar, AIR 1984 Punjab & Haryana 216, approved.

          Haqiqat Singh v. Addi. Director, Consolidation of Holdings, AIR
H    1981 Punjab & Haryana 204; Joginder Singh & Ors. v. The Director,
GRAMPANCHAYATv. DIRECTQRCONSOLIDATION [RAMASWAMY,J.]579

Consolidation of Holdings, [198S] Pun. L.J; 535 and Harbhajan Singh
                                                                             A
v. Karam Singh & Anr., AIR 1966 SC 641, referred to.

      CIVIL APPELLAIB JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 584
of 1982.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 21.9.1979 of the Punjab               B
and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 2247 of 1979.

      A.B. Rohtagi and M.S. Mann for the Appellant.

      Harbans Lal and Ashok K. Mahajan for the Respondents.

      The following Judgment of the Court were delivered by                  c
       K. RAMASWAMY, J. I wholly agree with my learned brother
Saikia, J. with regard to the reasoning and the conclusions. He has
succinctly stated the facts of the case and the relevant provisions of law
and they need no reiteration. I would add only few points which I            D
deem relevant to be dealt with. As regards the applicability of the
limitation of six months period prescribed under Rule 18 for the exer-
cise of the revisional power by the State Govt. under Section 42 of the
Act, assailing legality or propriety of the scheme prepared or confir-
mation thereof or repartition made in pursuance thereof, it could be
angulated from yet another perspective. Indisputably Section 42 was          E
amended by the Amendment Act of 1960 incorporating after the
words any order passed "(Scheme prepared or confirmed or reparti-
tion made)';. Rule 18 was made in exercise of the ru;e making power by
the subordinate legislation. After the amendment of Section. 42 was
made· to exercise the revisional power by the State Govt. against the
schemes prepared or confirmed or repartition made, correspondingly,          F
no amendment to Rule 18 was made bringing within its ambit scheme
prepared or confirmed or repartition made in pursuance thereof. It is
unnecessary to go into the question whether Rule 18 was declared to
be intra vires or not. We proceed on the footing that Rule 18 is .ultra
vires and applies to the exercise of the revisional power by the State
Govt. under Section 42. The OO;iission to amerid_the-Rule is an indica-      G
tion of the legislative animation that the limitation of six months pre-
scribed under the Rule 18 would be confined to be applicable only to
"any order passed"'by any officer under the Act. Thereby, by neces-
sary implication the prescription of the limitation of six months for
filing rqision petition against the scheme prepared or confirmed or
repartition made in pursuance thereof would stand excluded. It is no
    580            SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [1989] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

    doubt true as contended for respondents that the Consolidation
A
    Officer who has prepared the scheme or confirmed it or modified or
    repartition made ~hen it is objected to by the affected party, has to
    consider the objections and, as a part thereof by necessary implication,
    has to assign reasons and the record must contain reasons. But the
    legislature made a dichotomy between the orders passed and scheme
B   prepared or confirmation thereof or repartition affected in pursuance
    thereof. He is not free to take arbitrary decision. Assigning reasons
    are sine quo non for application of the mind though he does not appear
    to communicate the reasons therefor. But to an order passed assigning
    reasons in its support and communication thereof are necessary con-
    comitants and this was made manifest when Section 19, 20 and 21 are
    looked into. As regards the exercise of the power under Section 19 and
c   20 the statute does not envisage passing any orders. But when exercise
    of the power in Sub-sec. 20 of 21, the officer is enjoined to pass orders
    and appeals are provided within the prescribed limitation against those
    orders to ihe appellate forums. This, also, is an indication of the fact
    that the limitation of six months is confined to the orders to be revised
D   under section 42.

           It is undoubted that the scheme prepared or confirmed or mod-
    ified or repartition made in pursuance thereof are amenable to the
    revisional jurisdiction under section 42. The State Govt. would con-
    sider the legality or propriety of the reasons or the grounds on which
E   the scheme was initially prepared or confirmed or modified or reparti-
    tion made in pursuance thereof. But that does not mean that it is an
    order made and the limitation of six months prescribed under Rule -18
    would get attracted to the revision filed against the scheme prepared
    or modified or repartition made in pursuance thereof. Thus I have
    little hesitation to hold that the prescription of limitation of six months
F   under Rule 18 would be confined only to order passed by any officer
    under the Act; it would not apply to the revision filed against the
    scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made in pursuance
    thereof.

           It is undoubted that when there is no limitation prescribed for
G    exercise of the revisional power under Section 42 against the schemes
     prepared or confirmed or repartition made, it would be exercised
     within a reasonable time. What is a reasonable time is always a ques-
     tion of fact depending upon the facts and circumstances in each case.
     When legislature chose not to fix a particular period of limitation by
     judicial dicta it is not permissible to limit.to a particular period. The
ij · long lapse of time may be a fact for the revisional autllority to take into
GRAMPANCHAYATv. DIRECTOR CONSOLIDATION [RAMASWAMY,J.]581

account in the light of the facts and circumstances obtainable in an A
appropriate case. No absolute or precise period of limitation could be
predicated or laid. Take for instance the facts of this case. the previous
Sarpanch is a beneficiary from the impugned order and has chosen not
to take steps to have the scheme impugned by filing a revision under
Section 42 of the Act. The Gram Panchayat, being a juristic person,
                                                                            B
could not by itself except through the executive authority take any
action against the scheme prepared by the Consolidation Officer to
assail its legality or propriety by filing the revision. The revision peti-
tion was filed soon after the new Sarpanch came into office. Take
another instance of a case where the officer concerned and the person
benefitted, in confabulation, have made a scheme and repartition
affected in pursuance thereto and kept it in dark to the knowledge of C
the person affected by the scheme prepared or the partition made.
Until the person affected had actual lglowledge, it is not possible to
become award of it. The limitation begins to run from the date of the
knowledge of the fraud so played. It is always open to the affected
person to come forward and say that for the first time he became aware D
of the scheme prepared or partition made in pursuance thereof only
when his rights are sought to be interfered with or exercise of the
enjoyment of the property is interdicted. Therefore immediately
within a reasonable time thereafter he is to file a revision before the
State Govt. Having had the knowledge of the impugned action if he
stood by without taking any further action, it is always open to the
other party to bring it to the notice of the State Govt. of the ground or E
the circumstances under which the revision petitioner when he became
aware of the scheme prepared or the repartition made and he deli-
berately chose to acquiesce to it and if the State Govt. is satisfied of
the same, unless satisfactory explanation for the delay is given, the
State Govt. may decline to interfere wth the impugned action or may
decline to entertain the revision petition itself. Thus it could be seen F
that each case has to be angulated on its own given facts and cir-
cumstances as to the reasonable period of limitation within which the
revisional power is to be filed. Even though more than 5 years time
had .elapsed from the date of the preparation of the scheme till date of
the filing of the revision under Section 42, there is sufficient ground in G
this case for !he new Sarpanch in not filing a revision within six months
from the date of the original scheme and the State Govt. is well
justifiechn exercising the power under Section 42. The High Court is
unjustified in interfering with the order passed by the Consolidation
Officer. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.
                                                                          H
      No costs.
    582           SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1989] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A         K.N. SAIKIA, J. This appeal by special leave is from the Judg-
    ment of the Higli Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated
    21.9.1979 in Civil Writ Petition No. 2247 of 1979 allowing the petition
    and setting aside the order of the Director, Consolidation of Holdings
    dated8.2.1979.
B
          The appellant Gram Panchayat, hereinafter referred to as the
    'Panchayat', was the owner of 1200 Bighas of land in village Kanonda,
    Tehsil Bahadurgarh, District Rohtak. A Scheme of consolidation of
    holdings, hereinafter referred to as 'the Scheme', of the village was
    confirmed on 15.1.1974 under section 20 of the East Punjab Holdings
    (Cons()lidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (50 of
c   1948), hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. The Panchayat. therefore,
    moved an application under section 42 of-the Act on 20.9.1977 for
    setting aside the Scheme, objecting to the utilisation of the land of
    value of -/2/- (two annas) and allotments made to the other right-
    holders for their benefit. On 24.1.1979 a Mushtehri Mundadi was
D   made for information of all the villagers concerned, but the right-
    holders were absent and ex parte proceedings were taken against them.
    The Panchayat's case was that under the said Scheme the Panchayat
    land was consolidated, repartitioned and allotted to persons who did
    not have any right to hold the land. Besides, the land of Dharat con-
    taining two wells and a big house being religious place of worship was
    also partitioned under the Scheme and consequently the Panchayat has
E   been reduced to a landless person, financially weakened and rendered
    incapable of rendering service in the village.

          After hearing the parties the Director in his order dated 8.2.1979
    observed that it was evident from the perusal of the record that the
    Scheme of Consolidation of the village was confirmed on 15.1.1974
p
    whereas the application had been filed on 20 .9 .1977 and as such the
    application had been filed too late. After the expiry of six months
    period the application was time barred. However, he said in his order:

                "In this case only to benefit some land owners, the land of
                the value of two annas has been allotted due to which the
G               deserving persons have been left over and they have not .
                been given even Abadi plots. Apart from this the Pan-
                chayat had no other land to cultivate, due to which the
                Panchayat is unable to develop the agricultural schemes and
                in these circumstances of the matter I condone the delay in
                filing the present application."
H
         GRAMPANCHAYATv. DIRECTOR CONSOLIDATION (SAIKIA, J.) 583

          He accordingly set aside the Scheme and remanded the case to
    the Consolidation Officer under section 21(2) of the Act with some A
    directions. Against that order the respondents moved the High Court
    of Punjab and Haryana in Civil Writ Petition No. 2247 of 1979 urging,
    inter alia, that the Director of Consolidation of Holdings had con-
    doned the delay without there being any ground for the same and that,
    in doing so, he had acted illegally and with material irregularity. The B
    High Court held that from the observations of the Director it was
    evident that the delay was condoned on extraneous considerations as
    no reason whatsoever was given by the applicant in the application
    filed before him under section 42 of the Act as to why it was filed after
    the period of limitation. In that view of the matter, holding that the
    Director of Consolidation of Holdings had acted illegally and with
    material irregularity in condoning the delay, the High Court by the c
    impugned order dated 21.9.79 allowed the writ petition and quashed
    the order of the Director of Consolidation of Holdings dated 8.2.1979.

           Mr. A.B. Rohtagi, the learned counsel for the appellant, submits
     that the High Court erred in setting aside the Director of Consolida- D
     tion's order applying to the confirmation of the 'Scheme the period of
     limitation of six months as prescribed in Rule 18 of the East Punjab
     Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules
     1949, hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules', inasmuch as that rule
     speaks only of orders and not of confirmation of the Scheme; and that
     a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Jagtar Singh v. E
     Additional Director; Consolidation of Holdings, Jullunda·r, AIR 1984
     P & H 216, taking the view that the bar of limitation under Rule 18
     does not apply to those petitions under section 42 in which the legality
     or validity of a scheme prepared or confjrmed or repartition made is
     challenged has overruled AIR 1982 Punjab and Haryana-148 and that
     Full Bench decision has since been followed in 1988 Pun. L.J. 535. Mr. F
     Rohtagi further submits that on merits also there was ample justifica-
     tion for the Director to have taken the view it did inasmuch as
     Panchayat lands were taken into consolidation and repartitioned and
     allotted to persons who had no right to obtain the land thereby
     impoverishing the Panchayat and rendering it incapable of giving any
    ·help to the villagers.                                                   G

          Mr. Har bans Lal, learned counsel for the respondents submits
    that the Full Bench decision that the limitation under rule 18 does not
    cover an order confirming a scheme is not tenable inasmuch as confir-
'   mation of a scheme is only by an order as contemplated under rule 18,
    and an _application challenging that order of confirmation has, there- H
    584           SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1989] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

    fore., to be made within six months thereof; and that even assuming
A   that there was no bar of limitation, an application had to be made
    within a reasonable time which, according to learned counsel, would
    be 'about two years'; and that by any standard the appellant's applica-
    tion under section 42 was belated and could not have been allowed.
    Lastly, counsel submits that there were three earlier applications dis-
B   missed by the Director under section 42 of the Act, including one by
    the Panchayat itself, and the Director had no power to review his own
    order.

         The questions to be decided therefore are, whether for the
    purpose of limitation under rule 18 of the Rules confirmation of a
    scheme would be an order as envisaged in the rule; if it was not an
c   order, whether the Director was justified in setting aside the scheme
    and remanding the matter to the Consolidation Officer; and whether
    the Director's order was one of review of his earlier order and as such
    beyond his jurisdiction.

         To decide the first .question we may conveniently refer to the
    provisions of the Act and rule 18 of the Rules.

         Section 42 of the Act empowers the State Government to call for
    proceedings under the Act. It says:

               "42. Power of State Government to call for proceedings:-
               The State Government may at any time for ·the purpose of
               satisfying itself as to the legality oi propriety of any order
               passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made
               by any officer under this Act, call for and examine the
               record of any case pending before or disposed of by such
F              officer and may pass such order in reference thereto as it
               thinks fit:

                      Provided that no order or scheme or repartition shall
                be varied or reversed without giving the parties interested
                notice· to appear and opportunity to be heard except in
G               cases where the State Government is satisfied that the pro-
                ceedings have been vitiated by unlawful consideration."

    From a perusal of this section there arises no doubt that under it the
    State Government may for the stated purpose call for proceedings
    wherein any order is passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or reparti-
H   tio_'!__made b:t_ any officer under this Act. Under the proviso the State
      GRAMPANCHAYATv.DIRECIORCONSOLIDATION[SAIKIA, J.] 585

Government shall not vary or reverse any order or scheme or reparti-
                                                                             A
tion wthout giving the interested parties opportunity of being heard
except in cases where the State Government is satisfied that the pro-
ceedings have beeri vitiated by unlawful consideration. There is there-
fore no doubt that this section envisages
                                       . proceedings wherein
                                       .                   .   order is
passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made. These are
the distinct proceedings for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction          B
under this section.

      Rule 18 deals with limitation for application under section 42,
and it reads:

            "18. Limitation for application under section 42:-An
            application under section 42 shall be made within six
                                                                             c
            months of the date of the order against which it is filed:

                  Provided that in computing the period. of limitation,
            the time spent in obtaining certified copies of the orders
            and the grounds of appeal, if any, filed under sub-section       D
            (3) or Sl\b-section(4) of section 21, required to accompany
            the application shall be excluded:

                  Provided further, that an application may be admit-
            ted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor if the
            applicant satisfies the authority competent to take action       E
            under section 42 that he had sufficient cause for not making
            the application within such period."

From a perusal of this rute there arises no doubt that for applying this
rule the application has to be one under section 42 of the Act and it has
to be against an order and under the first proviso a certified copy of the   F
order is required to accompany the application and in computing the
period of limitation of six months, the time spent in obtaining the
certified copy is to be excluded.

       While the Division Bench comprising P .C. Jain and Tewatia, JJ
_of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the instant case applied the        G
 period of limitation to the confirmation of the scheme and in that view
 of the matter set aside the Director's order, the Full Bench comprising
 P.C. Jain, Acting C.J., T_ewatia arid Tiwana, JJ. held:

            "A bare perusal of rule 18 of the Rules would show that.it
          . provides limitation ollly for petitions filed against orders     H
    586           SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [1989] Supp. I S.C.R.

                passed. There is no reference in the Rules to a scheme
A
                prepared or confirmed or repartition made. The fact that in
                section 42 of the Act the words 'scheme prepared or con-
                firmed or repartition made' have been added as a result of
                amendment, cannot justify the conclusion that in Rule 18
                of the Rules these words have also to be read."
B
    We respectfully agree with this view. Rule 18 has to be interpreted as
    we find it and the words of the rule are simple, precise and unam-
    biguous and no more is necessary than to understand these words in
    their natural and ordinary sense. Two different meanings cannot be
    given to the same word 'order' namely, that in section 42 it does not
    include scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made; while in
c   rule 18 it would include them. The Full Bench therefore rightly held
    that rule 18 of the Rules does not apply to those proceedings in which
    the legality or validity of the scheme prepared or confirmed or reparti-
    tion made is challenged. The Full Bench rightly approved the decision
    in Haqiqat Singh v. Addi. Director, Consolidation of Holdings, AIR
D   1981 Punjab & Haryana 204, wherein it was held that a reading of
    section 42 as well as the scheme of the Act unmistakably pointed out
    that the statute made a clear distinction between order passed by an
    officer under the Act and the performance of duties by the authorities
    under the Act in the matter of preparation and confirmation of scheme
    of consolidation and re-partition made in pursuance thereof. So it
E   could not possibly be held that preparation or confirmation of a
    scheme and the repartition carried would fall within the scope of
    'order' as used in rule 18 of the rules. The rule did not come into play
    when a petitioner challenged either the scheme of consolidation
    including its preparation or confirmation of the repartition made in
    pursuance thereof. The amendment made this position clear.
F
          In a subsequent decision reported in 1988 Pun.L.J. 535: Joginder
    Singh and Ors. v. The Director, Consolidation of Holdings, decided on
    August 8, 1988, where the direct holders had not challenged any order
    of the consolidation· authorities but had attacked the validity of the
    scheme and the repartition, it was rightly held that the bar of limitation
G   of six months in rule 18 of the Rules was not attracted to the facts of
    that case.

         Mr. Harbans Lal submits that the above decisions require recon-
   sideration. We do not agreed. We have perused the provisions of the
   Act and rule 18. The Act provides for the compulsory consolidation of,
H. and for prevention of fragmentation of, agricultural holdings in the
     GRAMPANCHAYATv. DIRECTOR CONSOLIDATION [SAIKIA, J.] 587

State of Punjab and for the assignment or reservation of land for
                                                                          A
common purposes of the village. It appears· that prior to the Act there
were two methods of consolidation in vogue in the Province, one
through the Revenue Department and the other through the Coopera-
tive Department but the progress of consolidation was very slow and
lengthy and the Act sought to remedy those defects. Section 19 of the
Act provides for publication of draft scheme and on such publication B
any person likely to be affected by such scheme, shall, within 30 days
of such publication, communicate in writing to the Consolidation
Officer any objections relating to the scheme. The Consolidation
Officer, shall, after considering the objections, if any received, submit
the scheme with such amendment as he considers necessary together
with his remarks on the objections to the Settlement Officer (Consoli-
dation). Thus, in this section we do not find any provisions for any c
order being passed. Section 20 deals with confirmation of the scheme.
Under sub-section(2) thereof if any obections are received to the draft
scheme published under sub-sesction ( 1) of section 19 and also if no
written or oral objections to the draftscheme are received under sub-
section (3) of that section by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) he D
shall confirm that scheme. Under sub-section (3) if any objections are
received to the draft scheme published under sub:section ( 1) of sec.lion
19 or if any written or oral objections are received by the Settlement
Officer (Consolidation) before the confirmation of the draft scheme by
him the Settlement Officer( Consolidation) may after taking the objec-
tions into consideration together with the remarks thereon of the E
Consolidation Officer and also after considering the written or oral
objections either confirm the scheme with or without modifications, or
refuse to confirm it. In case of such refusal the Settlement Officer
(Consolidation) shall return the draft scheme, with such directions as
may be necessary to the Consolidation Officer, for reconsideration
and resubmission .. Under sub-section (4) upon the consideration of the F
scheme under sub-section (2) or (3) the scheme as confirmed shall be
published in the prescribed manner in the estate or estates concerned.
Thus, this section also does not. envisage passing of any order with
reference to any person affected by the scheme. It may be true, as
Mr. Harbans Lal submits, that the confirmation may be done in the
form of an order. However, the word 'order' has not been used by the G
le~slature in this section.


      Section 21 deals with repartition. Under sub-section (1) of this
section, the Consolidation Officer shall, after obtaining the advice of
the land owners of the estate or estates concerned, carry out reparti-
tion in accordance with the scheme of consolidation of holdings H
    588           SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1989] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

    confirmed. under section 20 and the boundaries of the holdings as
A
    demarcated shall be shown on the Shajra whi~h shall be published in
    the prescribed manner in the estate or estates concerned. There is no
    provision of passing of any 'order' under this sub-section. Under sub-
    section (2) any person aggrieved by the repartition may file written
    objection within 15 days of the publication before the Consolidation
B   Officer who shall after hearing the objectors pass such orders as he
    considers proper confirming or modifying the repartition. Thus this
    sub-section env_isages passing of orders on the objections after hearing
    the objectors. Sub-section (3) provides that any person aggrieved by
    the order of the Consolidation Officer under sub-section (2) may
    within one month of that order file an appeal before the Settlement
    Officer (Consolidation) who shall after hearing the appellant pass such
c   order as he considers proper. This sub-section also clearly envisages
    passing of an order on appeal by an aggrieved person as above. Sub-
    section (4) provides that any person aggrieved by the order of Settle-
    ment Officer (Consolidation) under sub-section (3) whether made
    before or after the commencement of the East Pun jab Holdings
D   (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Second Amend-
    ment and Validation Act, 1962 may within 60 days of that order appeal
    to the Assistant Director of Consolidation and under sub-section (5)
    any appeal against an order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation)
    pending under sub-section (4) immediately before the commencement
    of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of
E   Fragmentation) Second Amendment and Validation Act, 1962, either
    before the State or any officer to whom the powers <lf the State
    Government_ in this behalf have been delegated, shall be decided by
    the Assistant Director of Consolidation.

          Thus, the above sub-sections clearly envisage passing of orders
F   by the respective authorities.

      · We have already extracted section 42 of the Act and Rule 18 of
  the Rules. It would be clear that though section 42 envisaged orders,
  preparation or confirmation of scheme and repartition separately,
  Rule 18 provides for limitation only in respect of an application under
G that section in a proceeding where an order was passed. There is the
  maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius-expression of one thing is
  the exclusion of another. Mention of one thing implies the exclusion of
  another. When certain persons or things are specified in a law an
  intention to exclude all others from its operation may be inferred.
  When mention has been made only of 'Orders'., the inference would be
H that prepar11tion ..."]" confirmation of scheme and repartition are
     CiRAMPANCHAYATv.DIRECTORCONSOL!DATION[SAJKJA, J.] 589

excluded. Again, Ex praecedentibus et consequentibus optima fit
                                                                         A
interpretatio. The best interpretation is made from the context. As we
have seen, while section 19 and 20 did not envisage passing of any
order section 21 envisaged passing of orders. Section 42 deals with
applications against orders, preparation or confirmation of scheme and
repartition. Rule 18 mentions only orders and hence by inference
excludes 'preparation and confirmation of scheme and repartition'.       B
We have accordingly no doubt in approving the Full Bench decision in
Jagtar Singh v. Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings
(supra).

      Mr. Harbans Lal's submission that even if no limitation was
prescribed the application of the Panchayat before the Director was
inordinately delayed is not tenable. According to the learned counsel    c
the period of two years would be reasonable period. We are unable to
agree. In matters like Consolidation of Holdings by a scheme and the
preparation and confirmation of the scheme and repartition thereafter.
the objections may arise at various stages for various reasons and it will
not be possible to prescribe any hard and fast rule as to reasonable D
period after which an application could be made under section 42 of
the Act. The legislature itself did not do so. In the instant case the
Panchayat filed the application on 20th September, 1977 before the
Director of Consolidation under section 42 of the Act praying for the
revocation of the Scheme and for directions for fresh valuation to be
ordered and repartition effected through appropriate authorities E
stating that the Sarpanch was not given any Nishan Debi or demarca-
tion on the spot nor was issued any passbook, and the petition was not
filed earlier because the new Sarpanch came to know all these only a
month ago and so the petition was claimed to be in time. The original
Sarpanch was a beneficiary out of.the Panchayat land and he took no
steps and the present Sarpanch took charge only a few months ago. F
There were lot of complaints about valuation and allotments to right-
holders. Under the above circumstances when the Director himself
considered it fit for granting the prayer, it cannot be said that the
application was unreasonably delayed.

       The next submission of Mr. Harbans Lal is equally untenable. It   G
is true that in Harbhajan Singh v. Karam .Singh andAnr., AIR 1966 SC
641, it has been held that there is no provision in the Act granting
express power of Review to the State Government with regard to an
order made under section 42 of the Act and in-the absence of any such
power the Director, Consolidation of Holdings could not have
reviewed his previous order dismissing an application of the Panchayat   H
    590            SUPREME COURT REPORTS              11989] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A   under section 42 of the Act, and if so done, the review order of the
    Director would be ultra vires and without jurisdiction. In the instant
    case it has not been shown to us that the Panchayat earlier moved any
    application under section 42 on the same subject matter and the
    instant order of the Director amounted to a review of his own order.
    There is no material to hold that the instant or.der of the Director is an
B
    order of review of his earlier order; and Mr. Rohtagi clearly denied
    that it was so.

          In the result we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned order
    of the High Court and restore that of the Director, Consolidation. We,
    however, leave the parties to bear their own costs,
c
    Y. Lal                                                   Appeal allowed.