GURPAL SINGHversusSTATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2005 INSC 271
- Decided
- 10 May 2005
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
The High Court was not justified in entertaining the PIL; the petition lacked proper locus standi and was an abuse of process, so its order setting aside the appointment is set aside.
Summary
The appellant was appointed Auction Recorder of the Patran Market Committee in 1986. A complaint alleged that he was ineligible because of a 1974 conviction under s.61(l)(a) of the Punjab Excise Act, but the Market Committee held the conviction involved no moral turpitude and the appointment was lawful. Respondent No.4 filed a writ petition styled as a public interest litigation (PIL) challenging the appointment; the Punjab and Haryana High Court set aside the appointment on the basis of the conviction. The appellant appealed, contending that the PIL was an abuse of process and that the petitioner lacked locus standi in a service matter. The Supreme Court held that when a PIL targets a specific individual, the court must scrutinise the petitioner’s credentials, the seriousness of the information and the absence of private vendetta; the High Court had not satisfied these requirements and its order was set aside. The appeal was allowed and the appointment stood.
Issues considered
- Whether a writ petition styled as a public interest litigation challenging the appointment of a government servant is maintainable.
- Whether the petitioner has locus standi to challenge a service appointment in a PIL.
- Whether a conviction under s.61(l)(a) of the Punjab Excise Act, absent moral turpitude, disqualifies a person from appointment as Auction Recorder.
- Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the appellant's appointment.
Subjects
Judgment
GURPAL SINGH A
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.
MAY 10, 2005
[ARIJIT PASAYAT AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.] B
Public Interest Litigation:
Service matter-Writ petition by an individual filed under public interest
litigation challenging appointment of another individual-Appointee C
questioning locus standi of writ petitioner and contending that petition filed
because of political and personal rivalry-High Court allowing the writ
petition-Held, when a particular person is the object and target of a petition
styled as PIL, court has to be careful to see whether the attack in the guise
of public interest is really intended to unleash a private vendatta, personal D
grouse or some other mala fide object-On facts, High Court not justified in .
entertaining the writ petition-Judgment of High Court set aside.
Appointment of appellant as Auction Recorder in the year 1986 was
questioned by filing a complaint alleging that he was convicted under
s.61(l)(a) of Punjab Excise Act in 1974. The complaint was looked into E
by the Market Committee which held that the appointment was not
contrary to law. The appellants' appointment was again challenged by
filing a writ petition in the High Court as also a complaint before the
Administrator, Market Committee. Meanwhile respondent No. 4 filed a
public interest writ petition in the year 2000, challenging the appointment F
of the appellant. The Market Committee contended that conviction of the
appellant did not involve any moral turpitude and the appointment was
in accordance with law. The appellant questioned locus standi of the writ
petitioner contending that no public interest was involved and because of
political and personal rivalry the petition was filed. The High Court set
aside the appointment on .the ground of conviction of the appellant. G
Aggrieved, the appellant filed the present appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. While considering the scope of entertaining a petition
215 H
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A styled as a public interest litigation, locus standi of the petitioner
particµIarly in matters involving service of an employee has to be
examined. The Court has to be satisfied. about (a) t,he credentials of the
applicant; (b) the prima facie correctness or nature ·Of information given
by him; (c) the information being not vague and indefinite. The
information should show gravity and seriousness invorved. Court has to
B strike balance between two conflicting interests: (i) nobody should be
allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the
character of others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and to avoid
mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable
executive actions. [219-C-D]
c 1.2. Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with
great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely
careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly
private malice, vested interest and/or publicity seeking is not lurking. It
is to be used as an effective weapon in the armory of law for delivering
D sodaljustice to the citizens. The attractive brand name of public interest I
. litigation should not be allowed to be used for suspicious products of
mischief. Court must be careful to see that a body of persons or member
of public who approaches the court is acting bona fide and not for personal
gain or private motive or political motivation or other oblique
E consideration. [221-D, E, F]
State of Maharasht.ra v. Prabhu, [1994] 2 SCC 481; Andhra Pradesh
State Financial Corporation v. Mis. GAR Re-Rolling Mills and Anr., AIR
(1994) SC 2151; Dr. B.K Subbarao v. Mr. K. Parasaran, (1996) 7 JT 265;
D. Duryodhan Sahu and Ors. v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and Ors., AIR (1999)
p SC 114 and Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State o/W.B., [20Q4] 3 SCC 349, relied
on.
Public Interest Law Litigation, USA, Report published in 1976 by the
Council for. Public Interest Law set up by the Ford Foundation, referred to.
G 1.3. When a particular person is the object and target of a petition
styled as PIL, the court has to be careful to see whether the attack in the
guise of public interest is really intended to unleash' a private vendetta,
personal grouse or some other ma/a fide object. In the instant case, the
High Court was not justified in entertaining the writ petition. The
judgment of the High Court is indefensible and is therefore set aside.
H [222-C-DJ
GURPAL SINGH v. ST ATE OF PUNJAB [PASA YAT, J.] 217
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2802-2803 A
of 2002 .
.From the Judgment and Order dated 14.1.2002 of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in C.W.P. No. 6180 of 2000.
Nidhesh Gupta,. Vinod Shukla and Ms. S. Janani for the Appellant. B
Hardev Singh, Dinesh Kumar Masant and Ms. Madhu Moolchandani,
with him for the Respondent Nos. 2-3.
A.S. Chahil and Ms. Minakshi Vij for the Respondent No. 4.
c
R.K. Rathore, S. Krishnaraj and Arun Kumar Sinha for the Respondent.
· The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. By the impugned judgment a Division Bench
, of the Punjab and Haryana High Court hetd that the appointment of the D
appellant as Auction Recorder of the Market Committee, Patran was invalid
and illegal. The said order came to be passed on the basis of a Writ Petition
filed by respondent No. 4. It is to be noted that the said petition was styled
as a Public Interest Litigation (in short 'PIL').
A brief reference to the factual aspect would be necessary. E
Appellant was appointed as Auction Recorder on 19.11.1986.
Appointment of the appellant was challenged by one Ashok Kumar, clerk of
the Market Committee by filing a complaint before the competent authority
alleging that the appellant having been convicted under Section 61(l)(a) of
Punjab Excise Act in 1974 for alleged commission of offence on 21.5.1973 F
and was therefore ineligible for being considered for appointment. The
complaint was looked into by the Market Conunittee and by order dated
22nd May, 1989 it was held that the appointment was not contrary to law.
The Standing Counsel of the Committee categorically opined that since no
moral turpitude of any kind was involved, there was no ineligibility attached G
to the appellant and his appointment was in accordance with law. For the
aforesaid purpose reliance was placed on a decision of the Punjab and Haryana
High Court in the case of Narain Singh v. N.S. Chima, (1997 SLWR 448).
On 5.9.1989 appellant's services were regularized under the Punjab Market
Committees (Clac;s III) Rules, 1989 which came to be operative after appellant
was appointed. Prior to that no specific Rules were there. A Civil Writ Petition H
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. I S.C.R.
A No. 3451 of 1989 was filed by one Chandra Bhan before Punjab and Haryana
High Court challenging the direct appointment of the appellant. During.
pendency of the said Writ Petition Sukhjinder Singh filed a complaint before
the Administrator, Market Committee questioning appellant's appointment.
Notice was issued by the Administrator to the appellant, who filed his reply.
A revision in terms of Section 42 of the Punjab and Haryana Agricultural
B Produce Markets Act, 1961 (in short the 'Markets Act') was filed before the
Special Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Department of Agriculture
who passed orders to the effect that Administrator should look into the matter
and take a decision as to whether action against the appellant was called for.
While Writ Petition No. 3451 of 1989 was pending, Civil Writ Petition No.
C 6180 of 2000 was filed by the respondent No. 4 challenging appointment of
the appellant and as noted above the petition was stated to be one in public
interest. Counter Affidavit was filed by the Punjab Mandi Board and the
Market Committee taking the stand that since conviction of the appellant did
not involve any moral turpitude the appointment was in accordance with law.
Appellant also filed counter affidavit before the Market Committee questioning
D locus standi of the Writ Petitioner to challenge his appointment. It was pointed
out that no public interest involved and because of 'political and personal
rivalry the petition had been filed. The High Court by the impugned order
held that since the appellant had been co.nvicted by a Court of competent
jurisdiction under Section 61 of the Punjab Excise Act, his appointment was
E not according 'to rules. Therefore his appointment was set aside and the
Punjab Mandi Board and the Market Committee were directed to start fresh
process of selection for filling up of the post.
In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that Writ Petition filed by the writ petitioner (respondent No. 4) was nothing
F but a sheer abuse of process of court. It was by no stretch of imagination
Public Interest Litigation and it was filed because of personal and political
rivalry and ought to have been dismissed by the High Court. The assertion
that appellant and respondent No.4 were pitted against each other in several
elections has not been denied. Even the Punjab Government has as back as
G on 22.6.1981 issued a Circular that only records of conviction for preceding
five years were to be taken note of.
Learned counsel appearing for the Market Committee supported the
stand of the appellant and submitted that there was nothing irregular in the
H
appointment of the appellant and the same was in terms of the rules of
appointment. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 4, writ petitioner
-
GURPAL SINGHv. STATE OF PUNJAB [PASAYAT, J.] 219
however, submitted that merely because the writ petition was filed after A
fourteen years and because there was some personal differences that cannot
dilute the public interest element involved in the writ petition. It was further
submitted that notwithstanding the clear direction of the High Court to start
the process of selection afresh within four months, nothing has been done
and this amounts to contempt of Court.
B
The scope of entertaining a petition styled as a public interest litigation,
locus standi of the petitioner particularly in matters involving service of an
employee has been examined by this court in various cases. The Court has
to be satisfied about (a) the credentials of the applicant; (b) the prima facie
correctness or nature of information given by him; (c) the information being C
not vague and indefinite. The information should show gravity and seriousness
involved. Court has to strike balance between two conflicting interests; (i)
nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations
besmirching the character of others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and
to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable
executive actions. In such case, however, the Court cannot afford to be liberal. D
It has to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of redressing a
public grievance, it does not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the
Constitution to the Executive and the Legislature. The Court has to act
ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and busy bodies or meddlesome
interlopers impersonating as public-spirited holy men. They masquerade as E
crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico,
though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect.
Courts must do justice by promotion of good. faith, and prevent law
from crafty invasions. Courts must maintain the social balance by interfering
where necessary for the sake of justice and refuse to interfere where it is F
against the social interest and public good. (See State of Maharashtra v.
Prabhu, [1994] 2 SCC 481, and Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation
v. Mis GAR Re-Rolling Mills and Anr., AIR (1994) SC 2151. No litigant has
a right to unlimited draught on the Court time and public money in order to
get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice
should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions. G
(See Dr. B.K. Subbarao v. Mr. K. Parasaran, (1996) 7 JT 265). Today
people rush to Courts to file cases in profu!ion under this attractive name of
public interest. They must inspire confidence in Courts and among the public.
As noted supra, a time has come to weed out the petitions, which H
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. I S.C.R.
A though titled as public interest litigations are in essence something else. It is
shocking to note that Courts are flooded with large number of so called
public interest litigations where even a minuscule percentage can legitimately
be called as public interest litigations. Though the parameters of public interest
litigation have been indicated by this Court in large number of cases, yet
B unmindful of the real intentions and objectives, High Courts are entertaining
such petitions and wasting valuable judicial time which, as noted above,
could be otherwise utilized for disposal of genuine cases. Though in Dr.
Dwyodhan Sahu dnd Ors. v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and Ors., AIR (1999)
SC 114, this Court held that in service matters PILs should not be entertained,
the inflow of so-called PILs involving service matters continues unabated in
C the Courts and strangely are entertained. The least the High Courts could do
is to throw them out on the basis of the said decision. The other interesting
aspect is that in the PILs, official documents are being annexed without even
indicating as to how the petitioner came to possess them. In one case, it was
noticed that an interesting answer was given as to its possession. It was stated
that a packet was lying on the road and when out of curiosity the petitioner
D opened it, he found copies of the official documents. Whenever such frivolous
pleas are taken to explain possession, the Court should do well not only to
dismiss the petitions but also to impose exemplary costs. It would be desirable
for the Courts to filter out the frivolous petitions and dismiss them with costs
as afore-stated so that the message goes in the right direction that petitions
E filed with oblique motive do not have the approval of the Courts.
The aforesaid position was highlighted in Ashok Kumar Pandey v.
State of W.B., [2004] 3 SCC 349.
It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery proceedings
F initiated before the Courts, innumerable days are wasted, which time otherwise
could have been spent for the disposal of cases of the genuine litigants.
Though we spare no efforts in fostering and developing the laudable concept
of PIL and extending our long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the
oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights are infringed and violated
and whose grievance go unnoticed, un-represented and unheard; yet we cannot
G avoid but express our opinion that while genuine litigants with legitimate
grievances relating to civil matters involving properties worth hundreds of
millions of rupees and substantial rights and criminal cases in which persons
sentenced to death facing gallows under u~told agony and persons sentenced
to life imprisonment and kept in incarceration for long years, persons suffering
H from undue delay in service matters - government or private, persons awaiting
GURPAL SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [PASAYAT, J.] 221
the disposal of tax cases wherein huge amounts of public revenue or A ·
unauthorized collection of tax amounts are locked up, detenu expecting their
release from the detention orders etc. etc. are all standing in a long serpentine
queue for years with the fond hope of getting into the Courts and having their
grievances redressed, the busy bodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or
officious interveners having absolutely no real public interest except for B
personal gain or private profit either of themselves or as a proxy of others or
for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity break the queue
muffing their faces by wearing the mask of public interest litigation and get
into the Courts by filing vexatious and frivolous petitions of luxury litigants
who have nothing to loose but trying to gain for nothing and thus criminally
waste the valuable time of the Courts and as a result of which the queue C
standing outside the doors of the court never moves, which piquant situation
creates frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants.
Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great
care and circumspection and· the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see
that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private !11alice, vested D
interest and/or publicity seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective
weapon in the armory of law for delivering social justice to the citizens. The
attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be allowed to be
used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of
genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity oriented or founded E
on personal vendetta. As indicated above, Court must be careful to see that
a body of persons or member of public, who approaches the court is acting
bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or political motivation
or other oblique consideration. The Court must not allow its process to be
abused for oblique considerations by masked phantoms who monitor at times
from behind. Some persons with vested in.terest indulge in the pastime of F
meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper
motives and try to bargain for a good deal as well to enrich themselves. Often
they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions
of such busy bodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold,
and in appropriate cases with exemplary costs.
G
The Council for Public Interest Law set up by the Ford Foundation in
USA defined the "public interest litigation" in its report of Public Interest
· Law, USA, 1976 as follows:
"Public Interest Law is the name that has recently been given to H
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A efforts provide legal representation to previously unrepresented groups
and interests. Such efforts have been undertaken in the recognition
that ordinary market place for legal services fails to provide such
services to significant segments of the population and to significant
interests. Such groups and interests include the proper
environmentalists, consumers, racial and ethnic minorities and others."
B (See : Dr. B. Singh v. Union of India and Ors., (2004] 3 SCC 363)
When a particular person is the object and target of a petition styled as
PIL, the court has to be careful to see whether the attack in the guise of
public interest is really intended to unleash a private vendetta, personal grouse
C or some other ma/a fide object. Since in service matters public interest litigation
cannot be filed there is no scope for taking action for contempt, particularly,
when the petition is itself not maintainable. Jn any ev~nt, by order dated
15.4.2002 this Court had stayed operation of the High Court's order.
Judged in the above _said background the High Court was not justified
D in entertaining the Writ Petition. The judgment of the High Court is
indefensible and is therefore set aside.
The appeals 'are allowed with no orders as to costs.
R.P. Appeal allowed.
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