GURU AMARJIT SINGHversusRATTAN CHAND AND ORS.

                            GURU AMARJIT SINGH                                       A
                                    v.
                           RATTAN CHAND AND ORS.

                                 AUGUST 12, 1993

                    [K. RAMASWAMY AND S. MOHAN, JJ.]                                 B

          Transfer of Property Act, 1882 : Section 111 (g). Lease--F01feiture
     of-Condition precedent for-What are.

           Jamabandi Record-Evidentiary value of-What is.
                                                                                     c
           The appellant filed a suit for ejectment of the respondents from the
     suit land. His case was that the property in question was leased by his
     grand-father to the predecessor interest of the respondents under a lease
     cleed dated October 20, 1905 on an yearly rent of Rs. 2. and since the
     respondents sold the property to third parties claiming themselves as D
     owners of the properties, they had forfeited their lease under Section
     lll(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

            The respondents contested the suit stating that: (i) they had no
     knowledge of execution of any lease deed by their predecessor-in-interest;
     (ii) the land was in possession and enjoyment of their predecessor as           E
     owners even prior to 1905; (iii) they had not paid any rent to the appellant.
     Even if the tenancy was proved, being occupancy tenants they became
     owners by operation of Punjab Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Property
     Right) Act, 1985 and the Punjab Village Common Lands Act,. 1961; and
     (iv) they had become owners by adverse possession.
                                                                    •
                                                                                     F
           The Trial Court dismissed the suit holding that (i) respondents'
     predecessor-in-interest had executed a lease-deed in favour of appellants'
     predecessor-in-interest (ii) there was no relationship of landlord and
     tenants because there was no proof of payment of rent; (iii) the respon-
     dents were holding the land as tresspassers and they became owners by G
     adverse possession.

         On appeal, the first appellate court decreed the suit holding that (i)
 · there was proof of payment of rent of Rs. 2 per year till 1966-67 as per
   Jamabandi Record; (ii) the respondents were continuing as tenants at
     sufference on permissive possession and there was no hosti.Ie assertion of      H
                                       523
·"
    524                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A title to the knowledge of the appellant and so the question of adverse
    possession did not arise.

          The High Court set aside the decree of the appellate court and
    confirmed that of the trial court.

B         On appeal, in this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant
    that the respondents successively denied the title firstly, by claiming title
    in themselves, secondly renouncing their character as tenants and selling
    the lands to third parties and thirdly, setting up adverse possession, each
    of which constituted clearly and separately forfeiture of lease under clause
C   (2) of Section lll(g) of the Act.

          Dismissing the appeal, this <.;ourt

           HELD : 1. The High Court is correct in its view that the plea of
    forfeiture is not available to tl1e appellant. [528-H]
D          l.l. There is no conv~nant in the deed that the respondents have no
    right to sell the property in their occupation and enjoyment or on breach
    thereof right of re-entry was provided for. Therefore, the first clause of
    Section 111 (g) has no application and the foundation of the plaintill's case
    in his pleading of forfeiture by sale ofland to defendants had fallen to the
E   gro"nd, as held by the High Court. [529-B-C]

           2. Under clause (2) of Section lll(g) disclaimer by denial of the
    landlord's title or setting up a title in himself or third party is a ground
    for forfeiture. There must be a renunciation of the character of the lessee
    as such either by setting up a title in himself or in other person or
F   unequivocal plea of adverse possession. But the repudiation must be clear
    and unequivocal and anterior to the issuance of the notice determining the
    lease under Section lll(g) of the Act and the lessor must be put to notice
    of dete~mination of the lease. The disclaimer . my be in the pleading
    anterior to the suit in question or in any other documents, but directly
G   relata.ble to the knowledge of the lessor. An incident~! statement per se does
    not operate forfeiture. [529-E-G]

          2.1. In the instant case, from the copy of the alleged lease, it is clear
    that predecessors of the respondents had already constructed buildings
    and they were in possession and enjoyment of the land and the buildings
H   and they continued to enjoy the property. The statutory operation of law
                 AMARJITSINGH 1·.RATTANCHAND                             525

conferring title was pleaded. The respondents were not parties to the lease A
deed and they had no knowledge of it. There is no proof, that they acknow-
ledged or acted on it. There is no clear proof of finding that they received
any notice under Section lll(g) said to have been issued by the appellant.
Jamabandi entries at best would show of the lease covenanting to pay Rs.2
per annum as ground rent. They do not, therefore, establish any ,iroof of
payment of rent. Admittedly, no iota of evident to prove payment of rent or B
passing of receipts were produced by the appellant. Under those cir-
cumstances and in the light of the statutory operation of the two Acts viz,
Punjab Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Property Right) Act,1958 and tbe
Punjab Village Common Lands Act, 1961, pleadings of the respondents that
they became owners is not a clear and unequivocal disclaimer of title. In c
this background, tbe plea of adverse possession, and particularly in the
face of the non-payment of rent and their direct payment of revenue to the
State, also cannot be said to be unequivocal. Therefore, it does not amount
to unequivocal and clear disclaimer of title but at best denial of relation-
ship of lessor and lessee and does not entail with forfeitnre.
                                                     [531-B-C, F-H; 532-A] D
      Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmed Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur &
Anr., A.LR. (1965) S.C. 1923 and Sada Ram v. Gajjan Shiama, A.LR. (1970)
Punjab & Haryana 511, held inapplicable.

      Abdula v. Mohd. Muslim, A.I.R. (1926) Cal. 1205 at 1206; Bhiwaji v.       E
Tuka Ram, A.I.R. (1916) Nagpur 15; Prag Narain v. Kadir Baksh, I.L.R.
(1913) 35 Alld. 145 (D.B.); Mohammad Mahud Khan v. Laja Mal, A.I.R.
(1934) Lohore 289 and Vithaba & Anr. v. Babu, I.L.R. (1891) Bombay 110
(D.B.), referred to.

      3. The entries in the Jamabandi are not proof of title. They are only     F
statements for revenue purpose. It is for the parties to establish, alluendic
the relationship or title to the property, unless there is unequivocal admis-
sion. [527-D]

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3549 of                  G
1979.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 1.8.79 of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in R.F.A. No. 1962/77.

        V.M. Tarkunde, E.C. Agrawala, Arrant V.Patii Mrs. Purnima Bhat H
    526                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A and Atul Sharma for the appellant.
                                                                  .
         R.C. Gubrele, IV1s. Nanita Sharma, Vivek Sharma and .T.D. Jain for
    the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
         K. RAMASWAMY, J. The appellant-plaintiff laid the suit for eject-
  ment of the respondents pleading that the property in question belongs to
  Guru Naunihal Singh, his grand-father, and he succeeded by inheritenee
  to 5 Kanals 17 Marlas of land in Kartarpur Village. His grandfather had
C leased the same to Sardha Ram and Nar Singh Dass, predecessors of the
  respondent on October 20, 1905 on payment of Rs.2 as yearly rent. They
  constructed the buildings at their own cost, but the 1st respondent sold 30
  Marlas to the defendant 5 to 7 on October 9, 1967 and defendants 2 to 5
  had sold some plots to defendants Nos. 8 on January 4, 1968, which came
D to his knowledge in 1970. A notice of forfeiture under s.llll(g) of the
  Transfer of Property Act, for short 'the Act' was got issued and served on
  June 4, 1917 and the suit laid. The respondents in their written statements
  pleading that the· father of the first defendant and the father of defendant
  Nos. 2 to 5 died in the year 1955. They have no knowledge of execution of
E any lease deed by the predecessor-in-interest. The land was in possession
  and enjoyment of their predecessors as owners even prior to 1905. No lease
  deed was executed. Even if there was any such lease, it was only nominal
   and never intended to be acted upon. They did not pay any rent to the
   appellant. Even if the tenancy is proved, being occupancy tenants they
F became owners by operation of Punjab Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of
   Property Right) Act, 1958. If the respondents are proved to be raiyats, they
   became owners, by operation of Punjab Village Common Lands Act, 1961.
  Alternatively they pleaded that they had prescribed adverse possession as
   they were not paying any rent at any time since 1905, but as owners they
   have been paying property tax to the Govt. On merits they denied the
G allegations made in the plaint. They disclaimed any receipt of notice prior
   to the suit.

        The trial court found that the original lease deed was not produced.
  A copy of more than 30 years old was produced and was admissible in
H evidence which would show that Shardha Ram and Nar Singh Dass had
       AMARJIT SINGH v. RATIAN CHAND [K. RAMASWAMY, J.]                  527

  executed a lease deed on October 20, 1905 in favour of Guru Naunihal A
  Singh. But there is no proof of payment of any rent of Rs. 2 per year.
  J amabandi entries did not show any payment of rent, but only existence of
  terms of lease to pay rent at Rs. 2 per annum. Non-production of the
  receipts of the payment of rent clearly indicates that there was no relation-
  ship of landlord and tenants."There is hardly any evidence if the plaintiff B
  accepted them to be his tenants. In these circumstances it can hardly be
  stated that defendants 1 to 5 are the tenants of the plaintiff'. He concluded
  that from 1955 the respondents were holding the land as trespassers, and
  they had no relationship of tenancy with the appellant and that the suit was
  barred by limitation and the defendants have become owners by adverse
  possession. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the suit. On appeal, the
                                                                               c
  Addi. District Judge assumed several things in favour of the appellant and
/ concluded that there is a proof of payment of rent of Rs. 2 per year till
  1966-67 as per Jamabandi, though Jamabandi only mentioned the lease and
  rent of Rs. 2/- pei year. It is settled law that entries in the Jamabandi are
  not proof of title. They are only statements for revenue purpose. It is for D
  the parties to establish the relationship or title to the property unless there
  is unequivocal admission. Yet the appellate court contrarily deduced in-
  ference and findings in favour of the appellant and thereby it held that the
  respondents are continuing as tenants at sufferance on permissive posses-
  sion and there was no hostile assertion of title to the knowledge of the E
  appellant, so the question of adverse possession does not arise. Therefore,
  he allowed the appeal and decreed the suit.                                     •

       The High Court has rightly placed the case squarely within the
 forecorners of the pleadings of the appellant. The appellant pleaded that
 the respondents forfeited their lease bj' sale of the land to third parties F
 claiming themselves as owners of the property. Admittedly, the sale deeds
 have not been produced. Therefore, in what character the respondents
 have sold the lands is not proved. The copy of the lease-deed was in Urdu
 and the learned Judge got it translated into English. It is part of the record.
 It docs not disclose that there is any covenant prohibiting alienation of the G
 land and for breach thereof, right of re-entry was provided thereunder. The
 only ground on which the right of re-entry by forfeiture was provided
 thereunder was non-payment of annual ground rent of Rs. 2. But that is
 not the ground on which the suit was laid. Section lll(g) of the Transfer
                                                                               H
    528                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A of Property Act provides that a lease of immovable property determines
    by forfeiture, that · is to say - (1) in case the Jessee breaks an express
    condition which provides that, on breach thereof, the lessor may re-enter;
    or (2) in case the Jessee renounces is character as such by setting up a title
    in a third person or by claiming title in himself.. ...... and the lease provide;
B   that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event and in any of
    these cases the lessor or his transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee
    of his intention to determine the lease.

         The High Court held that the first clause has no application to the
  facts of this case as there was no covenant prohibiting sale or on its breach
C providing of the right of re-entry. Accordingly the suit is liable to be
  dismissed on this ground alone. Then it was contended that since the
  respondents had set up title in themselves renouncing their character as
  tenants and also pleaded adverse possession in the written statement, it
  entails forfeiture under clause (2) of s.111 (g) and thereby the appellant
D became entitled to have the respondents ejected in thi> suit. That was
  rejected by the High Court holding that the respondents had not une-
  quivaocably set up adverse possession or title in themselves. In the back-
  ground of facts in this case they would be justified in raising those pleas
  and therefore, clause (2) of s.lll(g) does not apply. Thus the High Court
E in Regular Second Appeal No. 1962of1977 by judgment and decree dated
  July 5, 1979 allowed the appeal, set aside the decree of the appellate court
  and confirmed that of trial court. Thus this appeal by special leave.

         Sri Tarkunde, the learned senior counsel for the appellant placing
F reliance on the decision of this court in Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad
  Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur & Anr., AIR (1965) SC 1923 and Sada
  Ram v. Gajjan Shiam, AIR (1970) Punjab & Haryana 511, contended that
  the respondents sucessively deined the title firstly by claiming title in
  themselves and secondly renouncing their character as tenants and selling
  the lands to third parties and thirdly setting up adverse possession each of
G which constitute clearly an separately forfeiture of lease under clause (2)
  of s.111 (g) of the Act. Though Prima facie the argument impressed us at
  first instance, but on our probing deep into the facts of the case and
  circumstances surrounding the litigation, we find that the view of the High
  Court is correct and that the plea of forfeiture is not available to the
H appellant. It would aupear from the evidence on record that on October
      AMARJITSINGH v. RATTAN CHAND[K RAMASWAMY,J.]                           529

20, l.905, Sardha Ram and Nar Singh Dass, sons of Bihari appears lo have            A
executed a deed, ryatanama. It was mentioned therein that their predeces-
sors had already constructed permanent house and they were living there-
in. They were also in posse.>sion and enjoyment of the property. They
undertook to pay ground rent at the rate of Rs. 2 per annum and on their
committing default, right of re-entry was provided. There is no covenant
                                                                                    B
therein that they have no right to sc11 the property in their occupation and
enjoyment or on breach thereof right of re-entry was provided for. There-
fore, the first clause of s.lll(g) has no application and the foundation of
the plaintiffs case in his pleading of forfeiture by sale of land lo defendants
Nos. 6 to 8 had fallen to the ground as held by the High Court.
                                                                                    c
       The question then emerges whether setting up a title in themselves
as o\vners or acquisition of title and continuance in possession by operation
of law or plea of adverse possession entails forfeiture, under Clause (2) iu
the background, and circumstances of the case. The right of forfeiture is
founded upon the existence of a lease and the jural relationship of lessor          D
and the lessee a~ contemplated under s.105 of the Act. It is implicit that if
the lease is in o~eration the lessor had been given right to determine such
a lease for committing hreach of a covenant or for disclaimer by the lessee
or for the insolvency of the lessee, and the happening of any of the three
specified events ipso facto docs not put an end to the lease, but it only           E
exposes the lessee to the risk of forfeiting his lease and gives a right to the
lessor, if he so elects, to determine the lease. Under clause (2) disclaimer
by denial of the landlord's title or setting up a title in himself or third party
is a ground for forfeiture, Jn other words, th~re must be a renunciation of
the character of the lessee as such either by setting up a title in himself or
                                                                                    F
in other person or unequivocal plea of adverse possession. But the repudia-
tion must be clear and unequivocal and anterior to the issuance of the
notice determining the lease under s.lll(g) of the Act and must put the
lessor to notice of determination of the lease. The disclaimer my be in the
pleading anterior to the .suit in questi~ii or in any other documents, but i
directly relatable lo the knowledge of the lessor. An incidental statement ·G
per se does not operate forfeiture.

      Jn Abdulla v. Mohd. Muslim, AIR (1926) Calcutta 1205 at 1206, it
was held that a denial of the execution of Kabuliat is not denial of title. So
it would mean only repudiation of jural relationship as lessor and lessee           H
    530                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A and does not touch upon title. In case of proof of lease tenant is estopped
    under s.116 of Evidence Act to deny title of the landlord. In Bhiwaji v.
    Taka Ram, AIR 1916 Nagpur 15 &. 16, it was held that selling or mortgag-
    ing the property by the lessee is not necessarily a denial of the title to the
    lessor. The same view was reiterated in Prag Narain v. Kadir Baksh, !LR
B   (1913) 35 Alld. 145 at 148 (D.B.), Mohammad Mahud Khan v. Laja Mal,
    AIR (1934) Lahore 289 at" 290, and Vithoba & Anr. v. Bapu, !LR (1891)
    Bombay 110 (D.B.). Some State Buildings (Lease and Rent) Acts provides
    for plea of bonafide denial of title and on its being upheld landlord has to
    establish title in a civil court. If the plea of tenant is found not bonafide it
    itself is a ground for eviction. Non-acceptance of the relationship of
c   landlord and the tenant, therefore, docs not amount to disclaimer of title
    as stated earlier. It is implicit that the very existence of the lease and jural
    relationship of lessor and the le.ssee is a pre-condition to invoke forfeiture
    under s.lll(g) of the Act. It is, therefore, necessary to plead and establish,
    if denied, the relationship of landlord and tenant and on proof thereof the
D    condition prescribed in s.lll(g) gets attracted and itself is a ground for
     election by the landlord to determine the lease under s.lll(g) and lay the
     suit for eviction.

          This court in Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad's case held that s.lll(g),
E applies to permanent tenancy and if there is disclaimer of tenancy by denial
   of title of the landlord, it must be clear and unequivocal and must be to
    the knowledge of the landlord. It was held that the background of the case
    and nature of the pleadings must also be looked into. On a construction of
    the pleadings in that case it was held that the denial was not unequivocal
    and the pleas set up in the circumstances emerging from the history of the
  1
F treatment of the land and the nature of the enjoyment and the rights
    emerging therefrom do not constitute forfeiture. This court had considered
    the effect of the enjoyment of lands, lristory of the case and held that the
    plea that property belonged to the appellant therein was merely of substan-
    tial character and the pica cannot be said to be a disclaimer of the right
G of the Govt. Similarly in paragraph 16 also it was held that the statements
    by the appellants claiming to have permanent and heritable interest in the
          11             11                     11      11
    land bi;long to him and that he was the owner of it, etc. did not amount
    to denial of landlord's title. Similarly setting up of the title thus for
    declaratfon of his title or his character in the suit property does not amount
   io unequivocal disclaimer inviting forfeiture under s.lll(g) of the Act.
H
     AMARJITSINGH v. RATTAN CHAND [K.RAMASWAMY,J.]                        531

       In Punjab's decision there is an unequivocal admission of the             A
relationship of landlord and tenant in prior litigation and on the basis
thereof, it was held that the lessee forfeitted his right to lease. This ratio
also is of little assistance to the appellant.


      From the copy of the alleged lease, it is clear that predecessors of
                                                                                 B
Shardha Ram and Nar Singh Dass had already constructed the buildings
and they were in enjoyment of the land and buildings and they continued
to enjoy the property. The statutory operation of law conferring title was
pleaded. The respondents were not parties to the lease deed and they had
no knowledge of it. There is no proof, that they had knowledge of 1905           C
lease or that they acknowledged or acted on it. There is no dear proof or
finding that they received any notice under s.lll(g) said to have been
issued by the appellant. The respondents had no knowledge of the entries
in the Jamabandi. It is common knowledge that the tiller of the land
primarily pre-occupies with cultivation and seldom notices the entries           C
made by the Patwari in revenue records unless he is of litigous mind.
Maintenance and custody of revenue records is the exclusive domain of the
Patwari and it is not uncommon that revenue records are often tinkered
by him to suit the exigencies. Therefore, the entries often are not to the
knowled.ge of the respondents and may not be genuine or accurate. There          E
is no proof that the respondents had such knowledge or brought to their
notice and that they accepted or acquisced. If the entries are made in the
regular course of duty, the entries may furnish presumptive rebutfable
evidence of being correct. Jamabandi entries at best would show of the
lease covenanting to pay Rs.2 per annum as ground rent. They do not,
therefore, establish any proof of payment of rent. Admittedly no iota of         F
evidence to prove payment of rent or passing of receipts were thus
produced by the appellant. Under those circumstances and in the light of
the statutory operation of the aforesaid two Acts pleadings of the respon-
dents that they became owners is not a clear unequivocal disclaimer of title.
The plea cannot be said that it is unequivocal disclaimer. In this back-         G
ground the plea of adverse possession and particularly in the face of the
non-payment of rent and their payment of revenue to the State also cannot
be said to be unequivocal. As seen earlier lease is only unproved document
of 30 years old to which knowledge was disclaimed by the respondents.
Therefore, it does not amount to unequivocal and clear disclaimer of title       H
   532                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A but at best denial of relationship of lessor and lessee and does not entail
    forfeiture. The High Court rightly, in the nature of pleadings and scope of
    the suit, did not go into the plea of adverse possession on merits.

         Under these circumstances, we have no hesitation to hold that the
  findings of the High Court are not beset with any illegality warranting
B interference. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs quantified at
  Rs.2,500.

    T.N.A.                                                 Appeals dismissed.




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