HABIBA KHATOONversusUBAIDUL HUQ AND ORS.

                        HABIBA KHATOON                                            A
                               v.
                      UBAIDUL HUQ AND pRS.

                             AUGUST 5, 1997

             [S.B. MAJMUDAR AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.)                                 B

     Specific Relief Act, 1963.

       Section 15(b}-Agreement of Reconveyance-Construction of-Assign-
ment of right under the Agreement to a third person-Assignee filing Suit for C
Specific performance of Agreement of reconveyance-Suit challenged on the ·
ground that right to repurchase was personal right to persons specified in the
Agreement and was not assignable-Held, normally any interest in a contract
coult:i be assigned to any representative-in-interest who can enforce specific
performance of the contract unless the contract .expressly or by ·necessary
implication, prohibits assignment to third parties-On facts, held, Agreement D
does not prohibit assignment.

      A, original vendor, sold a house to S, original vendee, and along with
the Sale Deed, S. executed an Agreement of reconveyance in favour of A
to reconvey the suit property Within 3 years on return of the sa~e con-           E
sideration. S sold his right, title and interest in the said property in favour
of the appellant. After the death of original vendor, her son became entitled
tO enforce the said right. The son of original vendor assigned under a Sale
Deed his right to repurchase the house in favour of Z, plaintiff and
predecessor-in-interest of respondent nos. 1 to 3. Z filed a suit for Specific
performance of Agreement of reconveyance in respect of the said house             F
against the original v~ndee and the appellant, which was contested by them
on the ground that the right to repurchase was a personal right granted
to the persons ·specified in the document of reconveyance and was_ not
assignable by the said persons.

      Trial Court held that the right of reconveyance was not personal and G
could be validly assigned by the persons mentioned therein and decreed
the suit. Appeal filed by the appellant against the order of the trial court
was dismissed by the first appellate Court. Against the order of the first
appellate Court, appellant preferred Second Appeal in the High Court·
which was also dismissed. Hence this appeal.                                 H
                                     251
    252                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A         The appellant contended that the Courts below had patently erred
    in construing the relevant recitals in the Agreement of Reconveyance as
    the Agreement conferred a personal right to enforce reconveyance of the
    suit property only to the persons specified in the Agreement and impliedly
    prohibited such persons from assigning their right to repurchase to out·
B   siders, by placing great emphasis on the word 'only' used in the document;
    and that the right to enforce reconveyance was linked up with an obligation
    to pay the cost of improvements made by the original vendee and the
    appellant in the suit property and this part of the obligatio'n, which was
    part and parcel of the entire package of contractual right and obligation
C   of the beneficiary under the Agreement of Reconveyance, did not get
    conveyed to the plaintiff and therefore, the suit was liable to fail.

          The respondent contended that the right to get the property recon-
    veyed under the Agreement of Reconveyance was not the personal right of
    anyone and it was not hedged in either expressly or by necessary implica·
D   tion by the recitals in the agreement of reconveyance and was assignable;
    that the obligation to pay the cost of improvements had nothing to do with
    the right of repurchase flowing from the express terms of the Agreement
    between the parties; and alternatively, that there was no evidence regarding
    maintenance of regular accounts regarding repairs by the vendee, and the
E   procedure laid down under the Agreement was not found to be followed by
    the vendee and there were concurrent findings of fact that appellant was
    not able to prove any cost of construction said to have been incurred by
    her in improving the suit house.

          Dismissing the appeal, the Court
F
          HELD : 1. The word 'only' used in the document signified a situation
    wherein on the death of the original vendor within 3 years of the Agreement
    one of her heirs and the children of that heir as contra-distinguished with
                                                                                    c:
    other heirs of the original vendor were given a priority right to enforce
G   their claim to repurchase the suit house from the original vendee or his
    assignee like the appellant and with a view to exclude the other heirs of
    the original vendor from the scheme of priorities that the word 'only' was
    used in the document. That only gave a prior right to purchase this
    property by way of reconveyance to that legal heir and his children and
H   only on the occasion of their non-availability within the three years' period
                 HABIBA KHATOON v. UBAIDUL HUQ                         253

the right to repurchase would get transmitted to the remaining heirs of A
the original vendor. This view taken by the courts below appears to be
plausible. [260-B-D]

      2.1. On a conjoint reading Gf the relevant terms of the Agreement of
Reconveyance it cannot be held that the persons mentioned in the said        B
document as beneficiaries of the right to repurchase flowing from the said
document were, either expressly or by necessary implication, prohibited
from assigning their right of repurchase once it accrued, to anyone of
their choice even though he might be outside the earmarked, listed
category of persons specified in the document. In other words it must be
held that the person specified in the document could validly assign his      C
right to repurchase the suit house to the plaintiff as rightly held by the
courts below. [264-E-F]

      Sakalagu11a Nayudu and Anr. v. Cl1i1111a Munuswami Nayakar, AIR
(1928) PC 174 relied on.
                                                                             D
     Hazari & Ors. v. Nehi & Ors., [1968] 2 SCR 833; Zita Singh & Ors. v.
Hazmi & Ors., [1979] 3 sec 265; Blwop Alleged SOii of Shea v. Matadi11
Bhardwaj (Dead) by LRs., [1991] 2 SCC 128, distinguished.

       2.2. Section 23(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 which is analogous E
to Section 15 (b) of ~he Specific Relief Act, 1963 lays down that except as
otherwise provided the specific performance of a contract may be obtained
by the representative-in-interest or the principal, of any party thereto.
Thus normally any interest in a contract could be assigned to any repre-
sentative-in-interest who also can enforce the specific performance of the
contract against the contracting party. However if the terms of the con- F
tract, expressly or by necessary implication, prohibited the beneficiary
from transferring his contractual interest to third parties, then only such
an assignee cannot sue for specific performance. [263-D-E]

      Balakrish11a Ma11daliar v. M. Satya11araya11a Rao & Ors., [1993] 2 SCC G
740 relied on.

     3.1. The right to repurchase flowing from the document was inde-
pendent of the obligation of the said beneficiary enforcing the contract of
~epurchase to defray the cost of repair of the house carried out by the
purchaser-executant of the document. That is an independent obligation H
    254                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A which would get attached to the property and consequently whoever is the
    purchaser of the property on the basis of the enforcement of the right of
    repurchase will have to bear that burden. [264-G-H]

          3.2. On the facts found in the present case, the original vendee and/or
    the appellant could not prove any such actual expenditure incurred by
B   them nor had they followed the procedure laid down in the document for
    enforcing such a claim against the beneficiaries under the contract of
    reconveyance. [264-H; 265-A-BJ




         From the Judgment and Order dated 23.12.1976 of the Allahabad
    High Court in S.A. No. 61of1967.

          Dr. Shankar Ghosh, Mrs. M. Qamaruddin, M. Qamaruddin, Feroze
D Ahmed and Altaf Hussain for the Appellant.
          O.P. Rana, T. Mahipal and Pradeep Misra for the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          S.B. MAJMUDAR, J. The appellant on grant of special leave to
E appeal has brought in challenge the judgment and order rendered by the
  High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench dismissing the
  appellant's Second Appeal and in turn confirming the judgment and decree
  passed by the Trial Court against the appellant and as confirmed by the
  Court of the Additional District Judge, Lucknow, U.P. The appellant was .
F original defendant no. 2 in the suit filed by predecessor-in-interest of
  respondent nos.l to 3 herein, one Zahirul Huq, for specific performance
  of an Agreement of Reconveyance of suit property which is a residential
  house. We shall refer to predecessor-in-interest of respondent nos. 1 to 3,
  Zahirul Huq as plaintiff and the appellant, who was original defendant no.
  2, as defendant no. 2 and predecessor-in-interest of respondent nos. 4 and
G 5 as defendant no. 1. A few facts for appreciating the grievance of defen-
  dant no.2, appellant before us in these proceedings, deserve to be noted at
  the outset.

           The plaintiff filed Regular Civil Suit No. 9 of 1963 in the .Court of
    Civil Judge, Malihabad at Lucknow for specific performance of an Agree-
H   ment of Reconveyance of the suit house. The house originally belonged to
      HABIBAKHATOONv. UBAIDULHUQ[S.B.MAJMUDAR,J.)                      255

Smt. Amir Jehan Begam. It was situated in Mirzaganj Kasha Malihabad in A
Lucknow District of State of Uttar Pradesh. Smt. Amir Jehan Begam sold
the said house to defendant no. 1 Shakir Ahmad Khan who purchased the
said house by a Sale Deed dated 29th January 1960 for a consideration of
Rs. 7480. Along with the Sale Deed an Agreement of Reconveyance was
executed by original defendant no 1 Shakir Ahmad Khan in favour ofSmt.       .a
Amir Jehan Begam agreeing to reconvey the suit property within three
years on return of the same consideration. Thereafter defendant no. 1 sold
his right, title and interest in the said property on 1st March 1960 to
defendant no. 2, appellant herein. It was the case of the plaintiff that the
obligation to reconvey the property as per the Agreement of Reconveyance
executed by her vendor, defendant no. 1 was binding on defendant no. 2. C
In the meantime the original vendor of the property Smt. Amir Jehan
Begam died. Under the Agreement of Reconveyance her son Irfan Hasan
Khan became entitled to enforce the right to repurchase. Said Irfan Hasan
Khan assigned his right to repurchase the suit house from defendant nos.
1 and 2 under a Sale Deed executed by him in favour of the plaintiff Zahirul -n
Huq on 31st May 1962. The plaintiff as assignee of the said right to
repurchase earlier available to Irfan Hasan Khan under the Agreement of
Reconveyance, after service of notices to the concerned defendants filed
the aforesaid suit for getting the property reconveyed in his name by .
enforcing the said Agreement of repurchase. Original defendant nos. 3 to
7 who were the other heirs of original vendor Smt. Amir Jehan E
Begam were also impleaded but they remained proforma defendants.
Besides specific performance the plaintiff also claimed pf'.ndente lite
damage from defendant nos. 1 and 2 for use and occupation at the rate of
Rs. 50 per month.
                                                                             F
       The aforesaid suit was contested by original defendant nos. 1 and 2
alone. Remaining defendant nos.3 to 7 did not appear to contest the suit.
Defendant nos. 1 and 2 by filing separate but concurring written statements
contended, amongst others, that the right of repurchase granted under the
Agreement by defendant no. 1 in favour of original vendor Snit. Amir G
Jehan Begam was a personal right which could be exercised either by Smt.
Amir Jehan Begam or by her son Irfan Hasan Khan but said Irfan Hasan
Khan was not competent to assign the said right of repurchase in favour
of a stranger like the plaintiff. They also raised. other ancillary contentions
with which we are not concerned at this stage. The only dispute, between
defendant no. 2 on the one hand and the plaintiffs heirs on the other, H
    256                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP.3S.C.R.

A which survives for consideration is as to whether the original plaintiff could
    be legally assigned the right to repurchase granted under the Agreement
    to repurchase executed by original defendant no. 1 in favour of the original
    vendor Smt. Amir Jehan Begam and her son Irfan Hasan Khan.

          The learned Trial Judge framed various issues arising from the
B   pleadings of pa'rties. So far as the issue which survives for our consideration
    is concerned it was Issue No. 2 which was to the effect whether the right
    of reconveyance was not transferable by Irfan Hasan Khan. If so, its effect.
    The learned Trial Judge after hearing the parties on this issue in the light
    of the evidence recorded before him came to the conclusion that the right
C   of reconveyance was not personal only to Irfan Hasan Khan and could be
    validly assigned by him in favour of the plaintiff and as the plaintiff had
    filed suit within the period of three yeas as per the said Agreement of
    repurchase as an assignee of the right of lrfan Hasan Khan to get recon-
    veyance of the property, the plaintiff was entitled to succeed and get a
    decree for specific performance directing both defendant nos. 1 and 2 to
D   execute the Deed of Reconveyance as prayed for by him.

          This resulted in Civil Appeal No. 147 of 1964 by defendant nos. l
    and 2 in the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Lucknow. The
    Appellate Court after hearing the contesting parties endorsed the view of
E   the learned Trial Judge on Issue No. 2 and held that the right of recon-
    veyance was validly transferred by Irfan Hasan Khan in favour of the
    plaintiff and consequently the plaintiffs suit was well sustained. The appeal
    accordingly was dismissed.

           Appellant-original defendant no. 2 carried the matter in Second
F · Appeal before the High Court. As noted earlier the High Court also agreed
     with the view of the courts below and dismissed appellant's Second Appeal.
     That is how the appellant is before us in these proceedings.

           Learned senior counsel Dr. Shanakar Ghosh for the appellant-
     original defendant no. 2 vehemently contended that the courts below
G    including the High Court had patently erred in law in construing the
     relevant recitals in the Agreement of Reconveyance. In his submission said
     Agreement conferred a personal right to enforce reconveyance of the suit
     property against the original vendee defendant no.1 or even against his
     successor-in-interest defendant no. 2 so far as original vendor Smt. Amir
H    Jehan Begam was concerned and similarly on her demise within the period
                                              •
      HABIBAKHATOONv. UBAIDULHUQ[S.B.MAJMUDARJ]                             257

of three years her son Irfan Hasan Khan could exercise the said right. But         A
that right remained personal to him and he could not have assigned it to
a stranger-purchaser like the plaintiff. Learned senior counsel Dr. Ghosh
further contended that even assuming that Irfan Hasan Khan could assign
his right and interest under the Agreement of Reconveyance to the plaintiff
as a beneficiary of the said contract but as he was also under an obligation       B
to reimburse to defendant nos. 1 and 2 the cost of repair charges incurred
by them for improving the suit house and had not assigned his obligation
flowing from the terms of the Agreement of Reconveyance to the plaintiff,
the plaintiff could not enforce the said right of Reconveyance as in the
submission of Dr. Ghosh the right to enforce Reconveyance was linked up
with an obligation to pay up the cost of improvements made by defendant            C
no. 1 and defendant no.2 in the suit property and as that part of the
obligation, which was a part and parcel of the entire package of contractual
right and obligatio? of the beneficiary under the Agreement of Recon-
veyance, did not get conveyed to the plaintiff, the suit was liable to fail even
on that ground. Learned senior counsel Dr. Ghosh in support of his                 D
contentions placed reliance on some of the judgments o.f this Court to
which we will make a reference hereinafter.

       Learned counsel for respondent nos. 1 to 3, heirs of original plaintiff,
on the other .hand tried to support the judgment under appeal as confirm-
 ing the view of the courts below and contended that on a correct construe- E
 tion of the relevant terms of the Agreement of Reconveyance all the three
 courts had rightly come to the conclusion that the right inhering in the
 estate of Smt. Amir Jehan Begam as inherited by her son to get the
property reconveyed was not a personal right of anyone and it was not so
hedged in either expressly or by necessary implication in the light of F
relevant recitals in the Agreement of Reconveyance. Consequently the
appeal is liable to fail. He also submitted that so far as the obligation of
lrfan Hasan Khan to pay up the cost of improvements made by defendant
nos. 1 and 2 in the suit house was concerned, that had nothing to do with
the right of repurchase flowing from the express terms of the Agreement
between the parties. Even otherwise it was found as a matter of fact by the G
Trial Court on Issue No. 3 in this connection that there was no evidence
regarding maintenance of regular accounts regarding repairs by the ven-
dee, nor was the procedure laid down under the Agreement found to have
been followed by the vendee, and hence no claim on that score survived in
their favour. That there are concurrent findings of fact of both the fact H
                                    •
    258                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A finding courts that defendant no. 2 was not able to prove any cost of
    construction said to have been incurred by her in improving the suit house.
    Hence the question of obligation of Irfan Hasan Khan to pay up this



                                                                                     -
    amount of repairs to defendant no. 2 did not survive. It was also submitted
    that this finding on Issue No. 3 could not be effectively challenged in
B   further appeal by defendant no. 2. Learned counsel for the respondents
    also pressed in service decisions of this Court as well as of Privy Council.
    We will refer to the same at an appropriate stage hereafter.

          In view of the aforesaid rival contentions the following point arises
    for our consideration :

            "Whether the Agreement of Reconveyance dated 29th January
            1960 executed by defendant no. 1-original vendee in favour of Smt.
            Amir Jehan Begam, original vendor and her heirs as mentioned in
            the Agreement conferred any personal right to get the property
            Teconveyed on persons mentioned in the said Agreement of
D           Reconveyance as the beneficiaries of the said Agreement of
            Reconveyance or whether the right ~f reconveyance flowing from
            the Agreement in favour of these named persons could be validly
            assigned in favour of a third party or a stranger to the family."

E Consideration of the Point
          We will, therefore, address ourselves to the consideration of this
    question. In order to resolve this controversy, it will be necessary to have
    a look at the express recitals found in the document of reconveyance
    executed by defendant no. 1. An English translation of the said document
F   is found at page 66A of the Paper Book. It reads as under ;

                      "In a sound state of body and mind and of my own accord
                  and pleasure, I declare and put it in writing that if the said
                  Amir Jahan Begam pays me the aforesaid consideration
                  within a period of 3 (three) years, I shall give back to her the
G                 aforesaid property bounded as stated below. At the time of
                  giving back (the property) the said Amir Jahan Begam shall
                  be liable for the costs of the Deed of Sale, God forbid; if the
                  said Amir J ahan Begam dies within this period, then only
                  Irfan Hasan Khan, the son of the said Amir Jahan Begum,
H                 and the children of lrfan Hasan Khan, shall be competent to
      HABIBAKHATOONv. UBAIDULHUQ[S.B.MAJMUDAR,J.]                  · 259

              get (the property) back within the said period, and the other A
              heirs of Amir Jahan Begarn shall no.t be competent, to get it
              back during the life time of Irfan Hasan Khan and his.
              children. Of course,. if during this, period lrfan Hasan Khan
              or the heirs of Irfan Hasan Khan do not remain alive, then
              the other heirs of Amir Jahan Begarn shall be competent to B
            · get back (the property). After the expiry of the aforesaid
              period no right shall subsist for any one whosoever to get (the
              property) back, nor shall lor my heirs be then bound by this
            · declaration. If during the said period I have to spend any
              money for the repairs of the said house, then at the time of
              giving (the property) back I shall be entitled to get that C
              money as well. At the time of effecting repairs I shall be
              giving verbal intimation to Amir Jahan Begam or her son
              Irfan Hasan Khan and shall also be duly keeping with me the
              accounts in respect thereof."
                                                                           D
A mere look at the said relevant recitals in the document shows that the
vendee-defendant no. 1 while taking the Sale Deed in his favoiir on the
same day agreed to reconvey the suit house within a period of three years
from the date of the Agreement to the' original vendor Amir Jehan Begam,
by accepting the same consideration which he had paid to Amir Jehan
Begam when he purchased this house by the Sale Deed of even date in his E
favour. It is not in dispute between the parties that Amir Jehan Begam died
within the aforesaid period of three years. She had, therefore, no occasion
 to enforce her right flowing from the document in her lifetime. But such a
contingency was also contemplated by the Agreement and it recites that if
said Amir Jehan Begam died within that period then only Irfan Hasan F
Khan, son of said Amir Jehan Begam, and~ children wo.uld be competent
to get back the· property by obviously enforcing the right of repurchase
granted under the document and the othe~ heirs of Amir Jehan Begam
would not be so competent. f:Iowever as a last priority they were also
conferred the right to enforce the claim for repurchasing the suit house in G
case Irfan Hasan Khan aad his children did not remain alive within ·the
period of three years. It is trut1-that great emphasis was. lil4! by learned
senior counsel Dr. Ghosh for the appellant on the term 'only' employed by
the document for submitting that Irfan Hasan Khan was given a personal
right to get the property reconveyed if his mother-original vendor, the first
beneficiary under the Agreement of repurchase died within that period. H
    260                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Now we may state that prima facie the said interpretation of the term 'only'
  as submitted by learned senior counsel Dr. Ghosh for the appellant cannot
  be said to be not plausible. However on a closer scrutiny the said inter-
  pretation of the document cannot be sustained. The Trial Court, the
  Appellate Court as well as the High Court while construing this document
  and the aforesaid term have held that the word 'only' signified a situation
B
  wherein on the death of original vendor Amir Jehan Begam within three
  years of the Agreement one of her heirs, namely, lrfan Hasan Khan and
  his own children as contra-distinguished with other heirs of Amir Jehan
  Begam were given a priority right to enforce their claim to repurchase this
  suit house from defendant no. 1 or his assignee like defendant no. 2 and
C with a view to exclude the other heirs of Amir Jehan Begam from the
  scheme of priorities that the word 'only' was used in the document. That
  only gave a prior right to purchase this property by way of reconveyance
  to Irfan Hasan Khan and his own children and only on the occasion of their
  non-availability within the three years' period that this right would get
D transmitted to the remaining heirs of Amir Jehan Begam. This view taken
  by the courts below appears to be plausible. We may now refer to the main
  contentions canvassed by Dr. Ghosh against the said view.

         It was submitted that on a conjoint and comprehensive reading of
  the relevant terms of the document it can reasonably be held that the right
E of reconveyance was sought to be conferred only on a select body of
  persons, namely, Amir Jehan Begam failing whom her son Irfan Hasan
  Khan failing whom his own children and then failing all of them on the
  remaining heirs of Amir Jehan Begarn. That this represented a scheme of
  pre-emption and right of pre-emption would remain personally available
F to only specified persons and cannot be enjoyed by strangers. Therefore,
  such a right could not be transferred to a stranger like the plaintiff.
  Consequently according to Dr. Ghosh the relevant recitals in the document
  impliedly prohibited the beneficiaries named in the Agreement from as-
  signing their rights of repurchase to outsiders. Now it must at once be
  stated that nowhere in this document there is an express prohibition
G restricting the right of the named beneficiaries to assign their right of
   repurchase to a third party stranger like the plaintiff. So far as the submis-
  sion of Dr. Ghosh that there is an implied prohibition as the right is
   conferred only on a specified class of persons with a view to retaining the
   suit house in the family of Amir Jehan Begam and her heirs and not to
H outsiders is concerned, it is difficult to appreciate how the persons men-
      HABIBA KHATOON v. UBAIDUL HUQ [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.]                261

tioned in the document of reconveyance as 'beneficiaries of the Agreement A
of repurchase are impliedly prohibited from assigning their right to repur-
chase once it accrued in the scheme of priorities to anyone else. The
reason is obvious. So far as Irfan Hasan Khan is concerned he had
admittedly a right to get reconveyance of the suit house from defendant
no. 1 or his successor-in-interest defendant no. 2 within the period of three B
yeas. If he himself got this right enforced against this defendant nothing
prevented him as the full owner of the reconveyed house from almost
simultaneously selling it to the plaintiff. Even that apart, assuming that
Irfan Hasan Khan did not enforce his right of reconveyance.enuring to him
on the death of Amir Jehan Begam within the period of three years, and
if he unfortunately died within that period his children could enforce that C
right within the same period and so far as they are concerned nothing is
indicated in the document, either expressly or by necessary implication,
that they could not assign the said right once it accrued to them in favour
 of any outsider. Consequently on a conjoint reading of the entire document
 it cannot be said that the word 'only' which was earlier found to have been D
 employed while contra-distinguishing the prior right of Jrfan Hasan Khan
and his children as heirs of Amir Jehan Begam, standing in a scheme of
priorities from that of the other heirs of Amir J ahan Begam made the said
right inhering in the named persons to be purely a personal right which
was inalienable and could not have been assigned to anyone else like the
plaintiff. Reliance placed by Dr. Ghosh on the decision of this Court in E
 the case of Hazari & Ors. v. Nehi & Ors., [1968] 2 SCR 833 cannot be of
 any avail to the appellant for the simple reason that in the said decision
 this Court took the view that statutory right of pre-emption though not
 amounting to an interest in the lanc;l was a right which attached to the land
 and such a right statutorily recognised by Section 15(1)(a) of the Punjab F
Act of 1913 was a personal right ·in the sense that the claim of the pre-
emptor depended upon the nature of his relationship with the vendor. In
that case the plaintiff who was admittedly having a statutory right of
pre-emption had got the suit filed ·for enforcing the said right and that
suit had succeed and a decree for pre-emption was passed in favour of the
plaintiff. The said decree got confirmed in appeal. However during the G
pendency of second appeal filed by the defendants the respondent-plaintiff
died and the question was whether his heirs could be brought on record
under 0.22 R.1, Code of Civil Procedure. This Court took the view that as
the heirs were also entitled lo right of pre-emption and represented the
estate of the deceased plaintiff they could be brought on record. So far as · H
    262                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A the facts of the present case are concerned, as noted earlier, the fate .of
  · this case hinges on a corre.ct construction of the relevant recitals in the
                                                                      of
    Deed of Reconveyance. Such a question was never on the anvil scrutiny
    before this Court in the aforesaid decision. On the same lines are two latter
    decisions'·of this Court relied upon oy Dr. Ghosh. They are - Zita Singh &
B Ors. v. Hazan & Ors., (1979] 3 SCC 265' and Bhoop Alleged son of Shea v.
    Matadin Bhardwaj (Dead) by LRs., [1991] 2 SCC 128. As they deal with the
    right of pre-emption and fall in line with the aforesaid decision of this
    Court in the case of Hazari v. Nehi (supra) we do not dilate on the same.
 · We may also mention that this is not a case of any right of statutory pre-
    emption bur it reflects a scheme of priorities for getting the property
C reconveyed as per the contract entered into between defendant no.l on the
    one hand and original vendor Amir Jehan Begam on the other. It also
    enured for the benefit of the name~ beneficiaries of the said Agreement
    of Reconveyance. It is· a contractual scheme of priorities conferred on
                                                                                    .-•
    specified types of persons mentioned therein and· their right to get the
D property reconveyed will. have· to be adjudicated upon within ·the
    forecorners of the said Agreement and not dehors it. In thi.s connection we
    may refer to two decisions on which strong reliance was placed by learned
    counsel for the respondents, heirs of original plaintiff.

        In the case of Sakalaguna Nayudu and Another v. Chinna Munuswami
E Nayakar, AIR 1928 PC 174 the question posed before the Privy Council
  was whether ·the counterpart document agreeing to reconvey a village
  earlier conveyed to tlie vendee, in favour of one 'A' who was mentioned in
  the counterpart document would ·enable A's heir 'B' to enforce the terms
  of the said counterpart document- by selling the said right to the plaintiff
F of that case. It was held by the Privy Council on the terms of the counter-
  part document that it was a completed contract a1,1d it must be deemed to
  have been executed in favour of both of them, 'A' and his son 'B' and the
  benefit of the contract could be assigned by 'B' in favour of the plaintiff.
  Dr. Ghosh tried to distinguish the aforesaid decision by submitting that in
  that case originally the village was conveyed by 'A' on his behalf as well as
G on behaff of his family members to one 'C' for a consideration of Rs. 10,000
  and on the same day 'C' had executed a counterpart document by which
  it was agreed by 'C' that he would reconvey the said village to 'A' after a
  period of thirty years from that date. Thus the original vendors being 'A'
  and his family the beneficiaries of the Agreement of Reconveyance of the
H even date would naturally be 'A' and his family members including his son
       HABIBAKHATOONv. UBAIDULHUQ [S.B. MAJMUDAR,J.)                     263

  'B'. Dr. Ghosh was right when he submitted that on the question whether A
  the benefit of the contract could be· assigned to the plaintiff or not was not
 gone into by the Privy Council as the beneficiaries themselves had not
  contested the right of the plaintiff to get the assignment of the said right
· The contest was between the receiver appointed on the insolvency of the
  original beneficiary 'B' and the plaintiff. Even leaving aside this question, B
  however, it must be held that the Privy Council did uphold the assignment
  of the right of reconveyance which em.ired in 'B' in favour of the plaintiff
  who was an outsider. It has to be kept in view that in the document which
  fell for consideration of the Privy Council also there was no express
  prc:ihibition against 'A' or 'B' restraining them from assigning their right
  of reconveyance to a third party like the plaintiff. On the terms of the C.
  document no implied prohibition was also discerned by the Privy Council.
  In this connection we have also to keep· in view Section 23(b) of the
  Specific Relief Act, 1877 which is analogous to Section _15(b) of the
  Specific Relief Act, 1963. It lays down that except as otherwise provided
  the specific performance of a contract .may be obtained by the repre- D
  sentative-in-interest or the principal, of any party thereto. Thus normally
  any interest in a contract could be assigned to any representative-in-inter-
  est who also can enforce the 'specific performance of the contract against
  the contracting party. However if the terms of the contract, expressly or
  by necessary implication, prohibited the be.neficiary from transferring his
  c_ontractual interest to third parties, then only such an assignee cannot sue E
  for specific performance. We may jn this connection also usefully refer
  to a decision of this Court in the case of T.M. Balakrishna Muda/iar v. M.
  Satyanarayana Rao & Ors., [1993] 2 SCC 740. Considering the provisions
  of Section 15(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 a Bench of two learned
  Judges of this Court speaking· through Kasliwal, J., endorsed in paragraph F
  10 of the Report the statement · of law flowing froin the decision of
 Sakalaguna Nayudu (supra) as well as the decision of Beaumont, C.J.,
 speaking for the Bombay High Court in the case of Vishweshwar Narsab-
 hatta Gaddada v. Durgappa Irappa Bhatkar, AIR 1940 Bombay 339. The
 statement of law which got imprimatur of this Court in para· 9 of the Report
 runs- as follows : ·                                                            G

            'The Privy Council in Sakalaguna Nayudu v. Chinna Munus-
         wami Naykar, AIR 1928 PC 174 has held that the benefit of a
         contract of repurchase which did not show that it was intended
         only for the benefit of the parties contracting, could be assigned H
    264                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A           and such contract is enforceable. Beaumont, C.J. in Vishweshwar
            Narsabhatta Gaddada v. Durgappa Irappa Bhatkar, AIR (1940)
            Born 339 held that both under the common law as well as under
            Section 23(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, an option given to
            repurchase the property sold would prim a f acie be assignable,
            though it might also be so worded as to show that it was to be
B
            personal to the grantee and not assignable. On the particular facts
            of that case, it was held that the contract was assignable. In
            Sinnakamppa Gounder v. Kamppuswami Gounder, AIR 1965 Mad
            506 it was held :

c              'In our view, generally speaking, the benefits of a contract of
            repurchase must be assignable, unless the terms of the contract
            are such as to show that the right of repurchase is personal to the
            vendor. In the latter case it will be for the person who pleads that
            the contract is not enforceable, to show that the intention of the
            parties thereto was that it was to be enforced only by the persons
D
            named therein and not by the assignee'. (AIR p. 508, para 5)"

    As noted earlier on a conjoint reading of the relevant terms of the Agree-
    ment of repurchase we cannot persuade ourselves to hold that the persons
    mentioned in the said document as beneficiaries of the right of repurchase
E   flowing from the said document were, either expressly or by necessary
    implication, prohibited from assigning their right of repurchase once it
    accrued, to anyone of their choice even though he might be outside the
    earmarked, listed category of persons specified in the document. In other
    words it must be held that lrfan Hasan Khan could validly assign his right
F   to repurchase the suit house to the plaintiff as rightly held by courts below.

        So far as the next contention of learned senior counsel for the
  appellant Dr. Ghosh is concerned it must at once be stated that right to
  repurchase flowing from the document was independent of the obligation
  of the said beneficiary enforcing the contract of repurchase to defray the
G cost of repair of the house, if at all any, carried out by the purchaser-ex-
  ecutant of the document. That is an independent obligation which would
  get attached to the property and consequently whoever is the purchaser
  of the property on the basis of the enforcement of the right of repurchase
  will have to bear that burden. On the facts found in the present case,
H however, as observed earlier, defendant no. 1 and/or 2 could not prove any
      HABIBA KHATOON v. UBAIDUL HUQ [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.]                 265

such actual expenditure incurred by them nor had they followed the A
procedure laid down in the document for enforcing such a claim against
the beneficiaries under the contract of reconveyance. This alternative
contention of Dr. Ghosh also, therefore, fails.

      In the result this appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. However
in the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. B

A.KT.                                                    Appeal dismissed.