Holding

The power to retire under Rule 3(1)(a) can be exercised only when the employee has completed 25 years of qualifying service (service qualifying for pension) and the authority must be satisfied that retirement is in public interest; the condonation of a break for quasi‑permanent status does not count towards qualifying service, and the order’s silence on public interest invalidates it.

Summary

Hans Raj, a clerk who began service in 1949, was prematurely retired by the Deputy Commissioner of Bhatinda on 20 August 1975 under Rule 3(1)(a) of the Punjab Civil Services (Premature Retirement) Rules, 1975, on the ground that he had completed more than 25 years of service. He challenged the order, arguing that the break in service (30 September 1953 to 22 February 1954) was only condoned for the purpose of issuing a quasi‑permanent certificate and did not count towards qualifying service for pension, and that the order failed to state that the retirement was in public interest. The High Court held that the condonation made the break count as service, thereby satisfying the 25‑year requirement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "qualifying service"—service that qualifies for pension—must be at least 25 years and the condoned break, being for a limited purpose, cannot be counted; moreover, the order’s silence on public interest amounted to non‑application of mind. Consequently, the order was declared illegal, quashed, and the appellant was reinstated with full benefits.

Issues considered

Whether a break in service condoned under the PEPSU Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1955 for the purpose of issuing a quasi‑permanent certificate counts towards qualifying service for pension under the Punjab Civil Services (Premature Retirement) Rules, 1975.
Whether the power to retire a government servant under Rule 3(1)(a) of the Premature Retirement Rules requires an express statement that the retirement is in public interest, and whether omission of such a statement renders the order void for non‑application of mind.
Whether the prerequisite for exercising the power under Rule 3(1)(a) is 25 years of service or 25 years of qualifying service.

Legislation cited

PEPSU Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1955s. Annexure B, sub‑para (iii)
Punjab Civil Services (Premature Retirement) Rules, 1975s. Rule 2(1), s. Rule 3(1)(a)
Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966
State Reorganisation Act, 1956

Subjects

premature retirementqualifying servicecondonation of breakpublic interestnon‑application of mindcivil service rulesreinstatementservice vs qualifying service

Judgment

HANS RAJ
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.
B
October 26, 1984

[D. A. DESAI AND D. P. MADON, JJ.J

Punjab Civil Service (l'remature Retirement) Rules 1975, Rt,/e 3 (1)
(a}-Premature retirement of government servant-QuaHfying service w1ongly
c computed-Whether the order complies with the pri1nary pre-requisites of
the rule.

(ii) Premature Retirement of government servant-Impugned order did
not mention that power was exercised in public interest-Whether amounts to
non-application uf mind and vitiates the order.
D
The appellant joined service as a clerk in the erstwhile Patiala and
East Punjab States Union (PEPSU) on 2nd Sept. 1949. Boing a tempo·
rary employee, he was discharged from service on 30th September 1953.
On 22nd February, 1954, be was again recruited as a clerk and later on
promoted as senior clerk. The PEPS U government sanctioned condonation
of break from Oct. I, 1953 to Pcb, 21, 1954 in the service of the appel-
E lant under Note to sub-para (iii) of para l Aooexure 'B' or the Pepsu
Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1955 for the purpose of issuing
quasi-permanent Certificate only. On the reorganisation or Punjab State
in 1966 the appellant came to be allocated to Punjab State. On 20th
August, 1975 the Deputy Commissioner or Bhatinda, in exercise of the <.
power conferred by Rule 3(1) (a) of the Punjab Civil Services (Premature
Retirement) Rules, 197S passed an order prematurely retiring the appellant
F from service on the ground that he had completed more than 25 years of
service. The appellant cha11enged the said order before the High Court
on the ground {i) That he could not have been retired under Rule 3(1J as
he had not completed 2 S years of service; and (ii) that the impugned
order of premature retirement suffered from the vice of non-application of
mind inasmuch as it did not state that the power of prematurely retiring
the appellant wac; exercised in public interest. The respondent contended
G (j) that the appellant had completed more than 25 years of service
because the break in service was condoned by the PEPSU Govt; and (ii)
that the power of prematurely retiring the appellant was exercised in public
interest. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition holding that once
the break in service was condoned, the appellant had completed 2S years
of service and therefore the pre•requisite for exercise of power under Rule
3( I) (a) was satisfied.

The appellant contended before this court ( 1) that the order sane·
H tioniog the condonatioo of break in service of the appellant was for
HANS RAJ v. PUNiAil 10.jj

the limited purpose of granting quasi-permanent status and issuing A
quasi-permanent certificate only and that the condonation of break
in service did not qualify for pension as observed by the Accountant
General of Punjab in his memo addressed to the S.D.O. Bbutioda and
therefore the High Court was in error in holding that the appe!lant had
put in 25 yenrs of qualifying service on the date of the impugned order;
and (ii) the order suffers from the vice of complete non-application ·or
mind inasmuch as in the impugned order there is not the slightest whisper B
that the power was exercised in public interest.

Allowing the appeal by the a pp ell ant,

HELD : 0) Rule 3(1) (a) of the Premature Retirement Rule•
confers power on the appropriate authority to retire any employee,
if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so, on the
c
date on which he completes 25 years of qualifying service or attained 50
years of age. Therefore, the appropriate authority must first make up its
mind th&t it is in public interest to retire the employee. Once having reached
that satisfaction, it must further find out whether the concerned employee
bas on the rel'.!vant date ·completed 25 years of qualifying service or whether
he has attained the age of 50 years. In the former case it is not 2S years
D
of service but it is 25 years of qualifying service which must have been
completed on the date of premlture retirement. The power can be
exercised on the date on which one of the two alternative fact situation
becomes available or on any date thereafter. The expression cqua1ifying
service, has been defined in rule 2(1) of the Premature Retirement Rules
to mean rservice qualifying for pension•. Condition No. 2 ia para 4.23
of Chapter IV of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, which deal with condona-
tion of interruption or break in service while computing qualifying service
E
for pension, provides that interruption in service may be condoned if
amongst others, service preceding the interruption is not less than five
years. [10460-F; 1047A)

Sub para (iii) of para 3, Annexure B of Pepsu Civil Services (Tempo-
rary Service) Rules, 1955 provides that before a certificate of quasi-perma·
nent capacity can be issued, the Government servant should have on the F
crucial date rendered service for more than three years. Note appended to
the para provides that broken periods of temporary service will not ·count
for purposes of this instruction unless the. breaks are condoned specifically
by the Government in consultation with the Finance Department and the
service thus rendered continues. It further provides that while condoning
break in service for the purpose of issuing quasi-permanent capacity certi-
ficate, it should be made clear to the persons concerned th.at the coodo- G
nation will not entitle them to any benefits regarding the fixatiOn of pay,
seniority, pension, gratuity etc. and that the periods condoned wilf be ignored
• and not counted as service actually rendered. [10490-E]

(2) It thus becomes crystal clear that the certificate issued by Raj-
pramukb 11nder the PBPSU Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 19SS
condoning break in service was for the limitetl purpose of issuing quasi-
permanent capacity certificate. Not only that the codooation was for this H
1042 SUl>RBMB COURT REPORTS (1985] 1 S.C.R.

A limited purpose but the negative is clearly spell out when it is specifically
provided that the condonation will not enable a perso11 in \vhose favour
the certificate is issued to claim any pension or gratuity etc. [n other
words, the condonation will not render the earlier service if it is otherwise
not includiblc in the computation of qualifying service to so claim it. For
the purpose of computing qualifying service for pension the period for
\Vhich there was interruption will remain a bre.\k in s~rvice and as the
earlier service as provided by plra 4.23, condition No. 2. was for a period
less than five years, the same cannot be taken into account for computing
B qualifying service. Thus the conclusion is inescapable that the qualifying
service which the appellant is shown to have rendered commenced from
February 22, 1954. Inevitably, therefore on August 20, 1975 he "had not
completed 25 years of qualifying service and therefore, tbJ- prim1ry pre~
requisite for exercise of power is not satisfied and the appellant could
c not have been compulsory retired from service. The High Court
unfortunately overlooked the basic requirement for exercise of power namely,
completing 25 years of qualifying service and proceeded on the basis that
rendering 25 yoars of service will permit exercise of power. There is a
marked and noteworthy distinction between service and qu·1lfying service.
[1049F·G & H ; IOSOA-C]

D (3) The impugned order merely recites that as the appellant has
completed more than 25 years of service, he is retired from the service
from the date of the order. Silence about recital of public interest is both
conspicuous and glaring probably as the power was exercised by an officer
of the rank of Deputy Commissioner who was blissfully unaware of it.
The argument of the respondent that the appropriate authority exercised
the power to compulsorily retire the appellant in public interest in view
E of an entry made· in the annual confidential report of the appellant for the
year 1971-72 that his conduct was unsatisfactory and his integrity was
doubtful, is not convincing for two reasons: (i) that no record was placed
before the Court to show as to wh~thcr the adverse entry was ever
communicated to the appellant; and (ii) his record previous and subsequent
to the year 1971-72 was not placed before us. Therefore, the impugned
order also suffers from the vice of non-application of mind. Accordingly,
·-
the impugned order compulsorily retiring the appellant from service is
F illegal and invalid and must be quashed and set aside. [IOSOF, G, !OSIA·D]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1251 ·Of
1978. .
Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated
Gi the \st November, 1976 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in
Civil Writ Petition No. 6461 of 1976.

N. D. Garg and R. K. Garg for the Appellant.
S. K. Bagga for the Respondent.

H The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
HANS RAJ v PUNJAB (Desai; J.) 1043

DESAI, J. Appellant joined serviec as a Clerk in the Civil A
Supplies Department of the erstwhile Patiala and East Punjab
States Union ('PEPSU' for short) on September 2, 1949. He was a
temporary employee and he was discharged from service on Septem-
ber 30, 1953. On February 22, 1954, he was again recruited as a
clerk in the Consolidation department of PEPSU. In course of B
time, he was promoted. as senior clerk and came to be allocated to
PUnjab State on the merger of PEPSU with er;twhile Punjab State.
The Deputy Commissioner of Bhatinda transferred the appellant and
posted him as Assistant in his office after ·obtaining concurrence of
the Subordinate Service Selection Board, Punjab with effect from
January 1, 1962. On the reorganisation of Punjab State in 1966, c
the appellant came to be allocated to Punjab State. After declaration
of national emergency, the Governor of Punjab in exercise of the
power conferred by the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution and
all other powers enabling thereto and with the previous approval of
the Central Government under sub-section (7) of sec. 115 of the
State Reorganisation Act, 1956 and sub-sec. (6) of the Sec. 82 of D
the Punjab Reorganisation Act 1966 framed Punjab Civil Services
(Premature Retirement) Rules, 1975 (Premature Retirement Rules
'for short). Rule 3 conferred power on the appropriate authority to
order premature retirement of the Government servant governed by
the rules. It reads is under :
·E
"3 (!)(a) : The appropriate authority shall, if it is of
the opinion that it is in public interest to do so, have the
absolute right, by giving any employee prior notice in wri-
ting, to retire that employee on the date on which he
completes twenty five years of qualifying service or attains
fifty years of age or on any date thereafter to be specified F
in notice.

(b) The period of such notice shall not be less than
three months :

Provided that where at least three months' .notice is
not given or notice for a period less.than three months is G
given, the employee shall be entitled to claim a sum equi-
valent to the amount of his pay and allowances at theJsame
rates at which he was drawing them immediately before
the date of retirement for a period of three months or,
as the case may be, for the period by which· such notice
falls short of three months.
H
1044 SUPREME COUid REPORTS

-
[I985j I s.C.R.
A (2) Any Government employee may, after giving at
least three months' previous notice m writing to the appro-
priate authority retire from service on the date on which
he completes twenty five years of qualifying service or
attains fifty years of age or on any date thereafter to be
specified in the notice;
B
Provided that no employee under suspension shall
retire from service except with the specific approval of the
appropriate authority."

In exercise of the power conferred by rule 3(1) (a), Deputy
c Commissioner, Bhatinda passed an order of the premature retire-
ment of the appellant dated August 20, 197 5. It reads as under :

"No. 173 Dated 20.8. 1975

Under Rule 3(1) (a) of the Punjab Civil Services (Prema-
D
ture Retirement) Rules, 1975, Shri Hans Raj, Sub-Divi-
sional Assistant, S.D.O. (Civil) office, Bhatinda who has
completed more than 25 years service is hereby retired
from service from the date of order.

2. He shall be entitled to three months pay in lieu of
E
notice as is admissible under proviso below rule 3 (I) (b) of
the Rules ibid.

3. He shall further be entitled to the benefits of retir-
ing pension and death cum retirement sratuity, admissible
nnder the rules.
F
Sd/-
Deputy Commissioner,
Bhatinda."

The appellant was accordingly prematurely retired by tho
G appropriate authority on the ground that he has completed more
than 25 years of service and that even though he was prematurely
retired he was entitled to the benefits of retiring pension and death
cum r:tirement gratuity, admissible under the rules. The appellant
questioned the validity, legality and correctness of the order . of
premature retirement in C.W.P. No. 6461 of 1976 m the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. It was inter alia
H contended before a Division Bench of the High Court that on the
HANS RAJ v. P,\NJAB (Desai, J.) 1045'

relevant date, the appellant had not completed 25 years of quali- A
fying service and therefore, he could not have been retired under
Rule 3(1 ). It was also contended that the impugned order of
premature retirement suffered from the vice of non-application of
mind in as much as it does not state that the power of prematurely
retiring the appellant was exercised in public interest. It was urged
that the power to prematurely retire a Government servant confer- B
red by Rule 3 postulates two pre-requisites (i) that it is in public
interest to prematurely retire the Government servant and (ii) that
either he has completed 2~ years of qualifying service or he has
attained 50 years of age. It was accordingly contenaed that if the
pre-requisites for exercise of power, are not satisfied, the order
would be ab initio void and would not have the effect of bringing
c
about the termination of service. There were other contentions
raised on behalf of the appellant before the High Court with which
we are not concerned in this appeal.

A return was filed on behalf of the respondents by the third
D
respondent-Deputy Commissioner, Bhatinda who has passed the
impugned order. It was stated that the conduct of the applicant in
the year 1971-72 was found unsatisfactory. His integrity was found
doubtful. It .was specifically contended that the appellant was
prematurely retired from service on his completion of more than
25 years of service and the computation that he had completed 25 E
years of service was correct because the break in service from
October I, 1953 to February 21, 1954 was condoned by the PEPSU
Government vide Revenue Department Letter No. RD-13 (25) SS-/
' 56-7101 dated June 28, 1956 and that once the break in service
was condoned, the appellant ou the date of premature retirement
had completed 25 years of qualifying service. A bald statement F
was made that the power was exercised in public interest but the
impugned order is wholly silent on this material point.
A division Bench of the High Court rejected the writ petition
observing that once the break in service from September, 1953 to
February 20, 1954 was condoned, the appellant had completed 25 G
years of service and. after recording the statement of the learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents that the Memo No.
XI/ IN XI/ Misc. file/75-76/1618-19 dated January 1, 1976 issued
by the Accounts Officer attached to the Office of the Accountant
General, Punjab and addressed to the Sub-Divisional Officer (c),
~hatinda stating therein that the services of the appellant for the
period from October 1, 1953 to February 21, 1954 does not qualify
for pension as service prior to the break was for a period less than ff
1046 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985) 1 S.C.R.

A five years, would not be given effect to and thereupon concluded
that the pre-requisite for exercise of power under rule 3(1) (a) was
satisfied. Hence this appeal by special leave.

Mr. N. D . Garg, learned counsel for the appellant convassed
two contentions before us : (I) that the order dated August 28, 1956
B issued in the name of the Raj Pramukh of PEPSU sanctioning the
condonation of break in service of the appellant for the period
October I, 1953 to February 20, 1954 was for the limited purpose
of granting quasi-permanent status and issuing quasi-permanent ".-

certificate only and for no other purpose and therefore the Accoun-
tant General rightly held that the condonation in break of service
c did not qualify for pemion and therefore the High Court was in
error in holding tnat the appellant had put in 28 years of qualifying
service on the date of the impugned order; and (2) the order suffers
from the vice of complete non-application of mind inasmuch as in
the impugned order there is not the slightest whisper that the power
was exercised in public interest.
D
Rule 3(1) (a) of the Premature Retirement Rules confers
power on the appropriate authority to retire any employee, if it is
of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so, on the date
on which he completes 25 years of qualifying service or attained
50 years of age. This power of premature retirement can be exerci-
E
sed firstly in public interest and secondly, if one of the two condi-
tions is satisfied namely that either the employee who is to be
retired has completed 25 years of qualifying service on the date on
which he is to be retired or he has attained the age of SO on ,
that date. The power can be exercise on the date on which one of
F the two alternative fact situation becomes available or on any date
thereafter. Therefore, the appropriate authority must first make up
its mind that it i; in public ·interest to retire the employee. Once
having reached that satisfaction, it must further find out whether
the concerned employee has on the relevant date completed 25 years
of qualifying service or whether he has attained the age of 50 years.
The respondents in this case assert that the appropriate authority
G has retired the appellant as it was of the opinion that it was in
public interest to do so and on the relevant date the appellant had
completed 25 years of qualifying service.

Taking the second cotention first, it is incumbent upon the
respondents to show that on the date of the impugned order, the
appellant had completed 25 years of qualifying service. Let there
8 be no confusion that is it not 25 years of service but it is 25
HANS RAJ v. PUNJAB (D.'sai, J.) 1047

years of qualifying service which must have been completed before A
the power can be exercised. The expression 'qualifying service'
has been defined in Rule 2(3) of the Premature Retirement Rules to
mean 'service qualifying for pension. The expression 'service quali-
fiying as understood in the rules governing pension in . the Punjab
Civil Services has been given various shedes of meaning. Punjab
B
Civil Services Rules Vol. II, Chapter III para 3.12 provides that
'the service of a Government employee does not qualify for pension

- unless it conforms to the three conditions therein mentioned :

First - The service must be under Government.

Second- The •employment must be substantive and perma- C
nent.

Thrid - The service must be paid by Government.

The rules permit condonation of interruption or break in
service. If there is a break, how the service prior to the break has D
to be dealt with for the purpose of computing qualifying service has
been dealt with in Chapter IV para 4.23 under the heading D-
Condonation of Interruptions and Deficiencies. It provides that
'interruption in service (either between two spells of permanent or
ti;mporary service or between a spell of temporary service and
permanent service or vice versa), in the case of an officer retiring E
on or after the 5th January, 1961, may be condoned, subject to
the following conditions, therein mentioned. The relevant condi-
tion reads as under :

"(2) Service preceeding the interruption should not be
less than five years' dnration. In cases where there are two F
or more interruptions, the total service, pensionary benefits
in respect of which shall be lost if the interruptions are not
condoned should not be less than five years."

The question is whether the service rendered by the appellant
despite the fact that it was temporary for the period September
G
30, 1953 to February 22, 1954 when he was re-inducted in service
can be included in reckoning qualifying service on the date of the
impugned order it is conceded that if the service prior to the break
is ignored, the appellant had not completed 25 years of qualifying
service on the date of the impugned order. To recall a few facts,
the appellant joined service on September 2, 1949. He was dis-
charged on September 30, 1953. Therefore, the service prior to H
••
1048 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 1 s.c.11.

A the break was of roughly four years and 28 days duration. At any
rate it was less than five years in duration. Therefore, Condition
No. 2 in para 4 .23 of the Premature Retitement Rules would be
attracted because it provides that interruption in service may be
condoned if amongst others, service preceeding the interruption is
not less than five years. As the service prior to the break was Jess
B than five years even if the interruption or break in service is
condoned unconditionally, the earlier service would not qualify
for being reckoned as qualifying service for the purpose of pension.
This is exactly what the Accountant General in his order dated
January I, 1976 has opined when he said tbahn the case of the
-
/
appellant service prior to the break being less than five years
c duration, such service does not qualify for pensi<_>n. He accordingly
computed qualifying service from Feb. 22, 1954 till August 20, 19'15 1
I
when the impugned order was passed. An arithmatical computation
would show that the appellant had not completed 25 years of qualify-
ing service on August 20, 1975.
D
It was however, contended on behalf of the respondents that
as the break in service from Sept. 30, 1953 to February 21, 1954 was
condoned, the appellant can be said to be continuously in service
from September 2, 1949 and therefore on August 20, 1975 he had l
completed more than 25 years of qu1!ifying service. Undoubtedly,
the Raj Pramukh of PEPSU had sanctioned condonation of break.
E in service from October I, 1953 to February 21, 1954 in the service
of the appellant, Whether this condonation would make the service
continuous for the purpose of treating earlier service as includible in
computing qualifying service, it is necessary to examine the purpose,
the content and the benefit granted by this order.
F The order of the Raj Pramukh reads as under :

"His Highness the Rajpramukh has been pleased to sanc-
tion the condonation of break from 1.10.1953 to 21.2.1954
in the service of Shri Hans Raj, under note to sub-para (iii)
of para 3, Annexure 'B' of the Pepsu Civil Services (Tem-
G
porary Service) Rules, 1955 for the purpose of issuing
quasi-permanent Certificate only, provided that his service
was not discontinued as a result of resignation or h;s
employment elsewhere and further provided that the incum-
bent has not been confirmed already."

This order has been made in e)lercise of the powers conferred
R
HANS RAJ v. PUNJAB (Desai, J.) 1049

by sub-para (iii) or para 3 of Aunexure 'B' to the PEPSU Civil A
Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1955. Sub Rule 2 (b) of the
aforementioned rules defines 'quasi-permanant service' to mean
'temporary service commencing from the date on which a declaration
issued under rule 3 takes effects and consisting of periods of duty
and leave (other than extra-ordinary leave) after that date. Rule 3
provides that Government servant shall be deemed to be in quasi- B
permanent service ; (i) if he has been in continuous Government
service for more than 3 years, and (ii) if the appointing authority, .
being satisfied as to his character for employment in a quasi-perma-
nent capacity, has issued a declaration to that effect, in accordance
with such instruction as the Rajpramukh may issue from time to c
time. Annexure 'B' sets out instructions regulating the issue of
declaration of quasi-permanent eligibility to temporary employees
under the PEPSU Civil Services (Temporary service) Rules, 1955-
Para (III) of sub-para (3) provides that before a certificate of quasi-
permanent capacity .can be issued, the Government servant should
have on the crucial date rendered service for more than three years. D
Note · appended to the para provides that 'broken periods of
temporary service will not count for purposes of this instruction
unless the breaks are condoned specifically ;by the Government in
consultation with the Finance Department and the service thus
rendered continues.' It further provides that while condoning break
in service for the purpose of issuing quasi-permanent capacity E
certificate, 'it should be made clear to the persons concerned that the
condonation will not entitle them to any benefits regarding the fixa-
tion of pay, seniority, pension, gratuity etc. and that the periods coh- ·
doned will be ignored and not counted as service actually rendered.'
It thus becomes crystal clear \that the certificate issued by Rajpra-
mukh under the PEPSU Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, F
1955 condoning break in service was for the limited purpose of
. issuing quasi-permanent capacity certificate. Not only that the
condonation was for this limited purpose but the negative is clearly
spell out when it is specifically provided that the condonation will
..• not enable a person in whose favour the certificate is issued to claim
any pension or gratuity etc. In other words, the condonation will
G
not render the earlier service if it is otherwise not includible in
the computation of qualifying service to so claim it. Therefore,
there is no substance in the submission made on behalf of the
respondents and which unfortunately found favour with the High
Court that because the Rajpramukh of PBPSU had condoned break
in service, the appellant was in continuous uninterrupted service
from September 2, 1949. For the purpose of !computing qualifying H
1050 SUPREME COURi REPORTS [1985] l s.c.R.

A service for pension the period for which there was interruption
will remain a break in service and as the ear!iar service as rrovided
by para 4.23, condition No. 2, was for a period less'than five years,
the same cannot be taken into account for computing qualifying
service. Thus the conclusion is inescapable that the qualifying
service which the appellant is shown to have rendered commenced
B from February 22, 1954. Inevitably, therefore on August 20, 1975
.
he had not completed 25 years of qualifying service and therefore
the primary pre-requisite for exercise of power is not satisfied and
.
the appellant could not have been compulsory retired from service.
The High Court unfortunately overlooked the basic requirement
c for exercise of power namely completing 25 years of qualifying service
and preceded on the basis that rendering 25 years of service will
permit exercise of power. 1herc·is a marked and noteworthy dis·
tinction between service and qualifying service.

Incidentally, it may be pointed out that the concession made
by the respondents before the High Court that the memo issued by
D the Accountant General shall not be given effect .to is hardly of
any legal consequence. It is the duty of the Accountant General
to compute the qualifying service for pension. He was satisfied
that under the relevant rules the appellant had not completed 25
years of qualifying service on the date of the impugned order. He
clearly pointed out that condonation in break in service is of no
E legal consequence as far as computation of qualifying service is
concerned. Therefore, that concession has to be ignored as of no
consequence.
"'
Mr. Garg next urged that the impugned order made by the
competent authority suffers from the vice of non-application of mind
F inasmuch as it has not been stated in the impugned order that the
power was exercised in public interest. There is substance in this
contention. The impugned order merely recites that as the appellant
has completed more than 25 years of service, he is retired from the
service from the date of the order. Silence about recital of public
interest is both conspicuous and glaring probably as the power was
G exercised by an officer of the rank of Deputy Commissioner who
was blissfnllv nnaware of it. The return is also filed by the same
officer. In . the return filed in this court, the only contention worth-
noting is that as the High Conrt Judgment is clear, convincing and
unassailable this Court should not interfere in exercise of its
traordina;y jurisdiction b~ClU>~ UJ c~se of injustice is made out.
e~ para 5 (c) of the return filed in the High Court, it h11s been st11ted
H
HANS RAJ v. PUNJAB (Desai;}.) " 1051

that the impugned order is legal and Jhe appellant W!15 retired on A
completion of bis 25 years of service. In ·para . (d) it is stated
that the order retiring the petitioner prematurely was passed in
public interest. The attempt •eems to be to mer~ly reproduce
the language of the rule without any attempt at bringing the case
within the parameters of the relevant rule. If the power was
exercised in public interest, one would have expected some whisper B
about it in the impugned order, However when a specific contention
was taken that the power was not exercised in public interest, a
routine aver~ent was made that it was exercised in public interest.
When this contention was canvassed before this Court, the respon-
dents tried to ~repel it by saying that in the annual confidential c
report for the year 1971-72, an entry has been made that the conduct
of tho appellant was unsatisfactory and his integrity was found
doubtful. This is the only entry relied upon to substantiate the
charge that as the appellant had rendered himself undesirable for
further continuance in service and therefore power to compulsorily
retire him was exercised in public interest, We remain unconvinced D
for two reasons : (1) that no record was placed before us to show
as to whether the adverse entry was ever communicated to the
appellant and (2) his record previous and subsequent to the year
1971-72 was not phced before us. Thus there remains a stray
entry only. The material for making the entry 3 years prior to the
date of the impugned order has not been placed before us. And the E
more disturbing part is that the entries in the subsequent years have
not been shown to us. It therefore, appears that reference to public
interest in the return was an attempt at paying lip sympathy to the
provision of the relevant rule rather than a serious application of
mind while dealing with the career and the consequent starvation
heaped upon the appellant by the impugned order. We are therefore, F
satisfied that the order also suffers from the vice of non-application
of mind.

However, we propose to rest this judgment on the finding that
the pre-requisite for the exercise of power was not satisfied inasmuch G
as the appellant was not shown to have completed 25 years of
qualifying service on the date of the impugned order. Therefore,
the impugned order compulsorily retiring the appellant from service
is illegal and invalid and must be quashed and set aside. In this
view of the matter, we find it difficult to agree with the view taken
by the High Court.
H
1052 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985) t s.c.R.

A Accordingly, this appeal succeeds and is allowed and the
judgment of the High Court is quashed and set aside and it is hereby
declared that the impugned order dated AugUst 20, 1975 compul-
sorily retiring the appellant from service of the Punjab Government
B is illegal and invalid and is hereby quashed. A necessary declaration
must follow that the appellant continues iu service uninterruptedly
and is entitled to all the benefits to which he would have been
entitled, had he continued in service. The respondents shall pay the
C costs of the appellant.
'

M.L.A.· Appeal allowed.

"