Holding

The disciplinary authority must independently find that the officers committed the gravest acts of misconduct before ordering dismissal, and where the lapse of time makes dismissal disproportionate, compulsory retirement meeting the ends of justice is the proper punishment.

Summary

Harjit Singh and another, constables in the Punjab Police, were dismissed for being absent from guard duty at a hospital where an elderly convict was shackled. They challenged the dismissal, arguing that the disciplinary authority had not complied with Rule 16.2 of the Punjab Police Rules and the principles of natural justice. The trial court dismissed the suit, the first appellate court held that mere absence did not merit dismissal, but the High Court reinstated the dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the disciplinary authority must independently find that the officers committed the gravest acts of misconduct before ordering dismissal, and that, given the long lapse of time since the incident, compulsory retirement better meets the ends of justice. Consequently, the appeal was partly allowed and the punishment was modified to compulsory retirement with entitlement to retirement benefits.

Issues considered

Whether dismissal from police service for absence from duty is permissible under Rule 16.2 of the Punjab Police Rules.
Whether the disciplinary authority must expressly state that the misconduct constitutes the gravest act of misconduct before ordering dismissal.
Whether the disciplinary proceedings complied with the principles of natural justice.
Whether, in view of the lapse of time since the incident, compulsory retirement is a more appropriate punishment than dismissal.
Whether a civil court can interfere with the factual findings of the disciplinary authority.

Legislation cited

General Clauses Act

Subjects

disciplinary proceedingspolice servicedismissalcompulsory retirementRule 16.2natural justicegravest misconductabsence from dutyservice law

Judgment

A HARJIT SINGH AND ANR.
v.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR.

FEBRUARY 23, 2007

B [S.B. SINHA AND MARKANDEY KA TJU, JJ.]

Service Law:

Punjab Police Manual; Rule 16.2:
c
Dismissal of police constables from service on ground of absence from
dutylmisconduct-.Challenged by delinquents-Dismissed by trial Court-
Reversed by first appellate Court-Second appeal allowed by High Court-
On appeal, Held: All the delinquents absented from duty together-Despite
D the fact that delinquents might have committed a grave act of misconf!uct,
the law requires the disciplinary authority to arrive at such a finding-·
Procedure laid down therefor embodying principles of natural justice required
to be complied with by the authorities-Jn the facts and circumstances of the
case, ordinarily, the disciplinary authority would have been asked to consider
the matter afresh-However, having regard to the lapse of time since their
E dismissal from service, punishment of compulsory retirement will meet the
ends ofjustice-If otherwise eligible, delinquents would be entitled to retiral
benefits.

Appellants were appointed as Constables in the Police Department of
the State of Punjab. They had been put on guard duty in a hospital to keep a
F watch on a 'convict', an eighty years old man. He was allegedly shackled to
the bed. At about 9 p.m. on the intervening night of 19th/20th May, 1984, the
appellant-constables were found to be absent by the Inspector of Police. On
enquiries, he came to know that all the three constables were absent from
duty from 9 p.m. onwards. They were charge sheeted and a departmental
G proceedings was initiated against them. The Enquiry Officer found them guilty.
The enqu.iry report was accepted by the Disciplinary Authority. The
Disciplinary authority having found the cause shown by the deli.nquents to be
unsatisfactory, passed orders of dismissal from service against them.
Aggrieved, all the three constables filed a suit, whicb was dismissed by the

H 130
HARJIT SINGH v. ST ATE OF PUNJAB 131

trial Court. Appeal filed against the order of trial Court was allowed by the A
. ,-< first appellate Court observing that absence from duty cannot be taken to be
serious lapse which merits dismissal of the delinquents from service. A
second appeal preferred by the State of Punjab as also the disciplinary
Authority was allowed by the High Court. Hence the present appeal.

Appellants contended that from the impugned order passed by the B
Disciplinary Authority, it appears that the authority had failed to consider
the implication as also the effect and purport of the provisions under Rule
16.2 of the Punjab Police Rules.
----'-

Respondent submitted that it was not necessary for the disciplinary
authority to specifically state in the order of dismissal of services that the
c
delinquents were guilty of gravest acts of misconduct.

Partly allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. A disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the
delinquents inter-alia on the premise that they were absent from duty from 9
D
p.m. till 2 a.m. on 19th/20th May, 1984. All the three constables were required
to watch a convict It is really a matter of surprise that the patient was shackled
-;
although he was 80 years old and a patient of tuberculosis. Why the human
' right of the prisoner was violated is not known. Absence from duty on the
part of all the delinquent officers constitutes a grave misconduct particularly, E
when the convict was placed on shackles as evidently they knew that he would
not be able to move from his bed. [Paras 9[ (135-G-H]

1.2. All the witnesses examined before the enquiry officer categorically
stated that all the three delinquent officers had absented from duty together.
Their cross-examination was directed only towards the nature of guard duty F
and the facilities and infrastructure available to those who were posted
therefor. The case of the State, however, all along been that the appellants
had not been put on guard duty. They never said that the delinquents were not
absent from duty. They were obligated to keep a watch over the convict,
particularly, when he was an aged patient suffering from tuberculosis.
G
However, despite the fact that the appellants might have committed a grave
act of misconduct, the law requires the disciplinary authority to arrive at such
-~ a finding. [Para 9] [135-H; 136-A-BJ

1.3. It is one thing to say that the disciplinary authority accepted the
finding of the enquiry officer, but, when a second show cause notice was issued H
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R.

A as to why the appellants should not be dismissed, it was obligatory on the part
of the disciplinary authority to arrive at such a positive finding that they have ...
~
.
committed gravest acts of misconduct The opinion formed by the disciplinary
authority is very relevant. Ordinarily a Civil Court would not interfere"\\ ith
the findings of the disciplinary authority. First Appellate Court no doubt
exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its own opinion to that of 1the
B disciplinary authority. [Para II J [136-E, F, GJ

1.4. Though, it is not necessary to repeat the wordings of the relevant
provisions of Law for the purpose of complying with the principles thereolf in
the fact situation obtaining in a given case. But departmental proceeding is

c quasi criminal in nature. The procedures laid down therefor were required
to be complied with, embodying the principles of natural justice. [Para- 12)

Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India
and Ors., AIR (1979) SC 1628, referred to.

Vitarelli v. Seaton, (359 US 535[, referred to.
D
1.5. It is also true that in case of habitual absence, a punishment of
dismissal of service would be just. (Para 14[ (137-Df
...
State of Punjab & Ors. v. Sukhwinder Singh, ( 1999) SCC (L&S) 1234 ;I,

and Maan Singh v. Union of India & Ors., [2003) 3 SCC 464, relied on.
E
2. In the facts and circumstances of the case, ordinarily, the Disciplinary
Authority would have been asked to consider the matter afresh, but the
occurrence has taken place in the year 1984. Appellants-constables had
worked only for a few years, one of them is dead. In such a situation, it would
F be justified to fix the quantum of punishment. Having regard to the passage
of time, punishment of compulsory Retirement will meet the ends of justice.
If otherwise eligible, the delinquents would be entitled to retiral benefits. (Para """"""
15] (138-H; 139-AJ

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 928 of2007.
G
From the Final Judgment/Order dated 16.2.2006 of the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in R.S.A. No. 921/1992.
f~
Jawahar Lal Gupta, Nidhi Gupta, Nidhesh Gupta, Vinod Shukla and S.
Janani for the Appellants.
H
HAR.JITSINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [S.B. SINHA, J.) 133
A
Sarup Singh, A.A.G., Arun K. Sinha for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.

2. Appellants were appointed as Constables in the Police Department B
of the State of Punjab. They had been put on a duty to keep a watch on
Bhagu Ram who was admitted in a hospital. He was allegedly shackled to the
bed. At about 9 p.m. on the intervening night of 19th/20th May, 1984, the
appellants alongwith one Parminder Singh (since deceased) were found to be
absent by the Inspector of Police. He made enquiries whereupon, he came to C
know that all the three constables were absent from duty from 9 p.m. onwards.
Other constables from the police lines had to be requisitioned. They reported
to Police Lines at about 3 a.m. on the same day. They were charge sheeted
and a departmental proceedings was initiated against them. The Enquiry
Officer found them guilty. The enquiry report was accepted by the
Superintendent of Police, the Disciplinary Authority. A second Show Cause D
Notice was issued to which all the delinquent officers replied. By an Order
dated 21.1.1985, the disciplinary authority, however, having found the cause
shown by the delinquents to be unsatisfactory, passed orders of dismissal
from service against them. Appellants and said Parminder Singh filed a suit.
One of the contentions raised in the said suit was that in passing the order E
of punishment, the disciplinary authority had not complied with the provisions
of Rule 16.2 of the Punjab Police Rules. It reads as under:-

"16.2 Dismissal - Dismissal shall be awarded only for the gravest acts
of misconduct or as the cumulative effect of continued misconduct
proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service. In F
making such an award regard shall be had to the length of service of
the offender and his claim to pension.

(2) An enrolled police officer convicted and sentenced to imprisonment
on a criminal charge shall be dismissed :
G
"Provided that in case the conviction of a police officer is set
aside in appeal or revision, the officer empowered to appoint him
shall review his case keeping in view the instructions issued by
the Government in this behalf."

3. Whereas the learned Trial Judge was of the opinion that the misconduct H
committed by the delinquents was of grave nature, the first Appellate Court
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R.

A held:
" ... .I find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants
because admittedly all the three constables, who are plaintiff-appellants
because admittedly all the three constables, who are plaintiff-appellants
before me were on duty in the T.B. Hospital, to escort and prisoner,
B where at least one person could have been present because as per
Rule 18.5 and 6 a constable can be on duty for three hours only and
the department had put three persons on duty and therefore, they
could not be present for 24 hours. So they had committed slight
delineation in duty. Thus we can say that one of them was atleast
absent, who was on duty at that time and it has been admitted that
c Parminder Singh alias Bhola was on duty at that time when the
absence of the plaintiff-appellants was marked, but that absence cannot
be taken to be serious lapse which merits dismissal from service. It is

D
well settled that the punishment of dismissal is not proper in case of
absence from duty and I am supported on this point by a case State
ofPunjab v. Ahhar Singh, reported as (1991) 4 SLR 539 wherein it was
-
held as under:-
"Mere absence from duty for a few days does not amount to an
act of gravest misconduct and the cumulative effort of which may
go to prove incorriginiety and complete unfitness of the employees
E for police service and dismissal from service was held illegal."
Even otherwise, I am of the considered view that if a person committed
negligence of being absent from duty that should not go to the root
of his service because in that case it wili be too harsh not only for
him, but for the children who are dependent on him ..... "
F
4. A second appeal preferred by the State of Punjab as also the
Disciplinary Authority was allowed by the High Court by reason of the .-.
impugned judgment.

5. The High Court in its judgment noticed some decisions of this Coun
G including Hombe Gowda Educational Trust v. State of Karnataka, [2006] I
sec 430 where inter-alia it was held:-
"This court has come a long way from its earlier view points. The: {·
recent trend in the decisions of this court seek to strike a balance
between the earlier approach to the industrial relation wherein only
H the interest of the workmen was sought to be protected with the
HARJITSINGHv. STATE OF PUNJAB [S.B. SINHA . .I.] 135

avowed object of fast industrial growth of the country. In several A
.. <' decisions of this court it has been noticed how discipline at the
workplaces/industrial undertakings received a setback. In view of the
change in economic policy of the country, it may not now be proper
to allow the employees to break the discipline with impunity. Our
country is governed by rule of law. All actions, therefore must be B
taken in accordance with law."

6. Hombe Gowda (supra) has been noticed by this Court in large
number of cases including the following:-

L.K. Verma v. HMT Ltd, [2006] 2 SCC 269, State of UP. v. SheoShankar
Lal Srivastava, [2006] 3 SCC 276, Maharashtra State Seeds Corp. Ltd v. C
Hariprasad Srupadrai Jadhao, [2006] 3 SCC 690, A. Sudhakar v. Postmaster
General, [2006] 4 SCC 348, Anand Regional Coop. Oil Seedgrowers' Union
Ltd v. Shai/eshkumar Harshadbhai Shah, [2006] 6 SCC 548, North-Eastern
Karnataka RTC v. Ashappa, [2006] 5 SCC 137].
D
7. Mr. Jawaharlal Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
appellants took us through the impugned order passed by the Disciplinary
Authority and submitted that from a perusal thereof, it would appear that it
_,, had failed to consider the implication as also the effect and purport of the
·' provisions of Rule I 6.2 of the Punjab Police Rules.
E
8. Mr. Swarup Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent, on the other hand, submitted that it was not necessary for the
disciplinary authority to specifically state in the order of dismissal of services
that the delinquents were guilty of gravest acts of misconduct. Strong reliance
in this behalf has been placed in State ofPunjab & Ors. v. Sukhwinder Singh,
[1999] sec (L&S) 1234]. F

9. A disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the appellants herein
as also against the said Parminder Singh inter-alia on the premise that they
were absent from duty from 9 p.m. till 2 a.m. on I 9th/20th May, 1984. All the
three constables were required. to watch a convict named 'Bhagu'. It is really G
a matter of surprise that the patient was shackled although he was 80 years
old and a patient of tuberculosis. Why the human right of the prisoner was
.\ violated is not known. Absence from duty on the part of all the delinquent
officers constitutes a grave misconduct particularly, when the convict was
placed on shackles as evidently they knew that he would not be able to move
from his bed. It furthermore appears that all the witnesses examined before H

(
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R.

A the enquiry officer categorically stated that all the three delinquent officer:; '·
had absented from duty together. Their cross-examination was directed only
towards the nature of guard duty and the facilities and infrastructure available
to those who were posted therefor. The case of the State, however, all along
been the appellants had not been put on guard duty. They never said that
they were not absent from duty. They were obligated to keep a watch over
B the convict, particularly, when he was an aged patient suffering from
tuberculosis. However, despite the fact that the appellants might have committed
a grave act of misconduct, the law requires the disciplinary authority to arriv1!
at such a finding. The disciplinary authority held:-

" .... They were also asked to report in my office and submit their
c explanation. The accused constables submitted their replies which is
on record. These accused constables for keeping a strict vigil and
watch on the prisoners which is a very important duty. But the said
accused constables left the prisoners all alone in the night and remained
absent from their duties in the Hospital. Such an absence of important
D duty by the accused constables is a voy big mistake ....."

I 0. The decision of this Court in Sukhwinder Singh (supra) is an
authority for the proposition that it is not necessary to use the words
"gravest act of misconduct" as it can be found out from the factual matrix ,.
obtaining in each case. ;
E
11. It is one thing to say that the disciplinary authority accepted th'!
finding of the enquiry officer, but, when a second show cause notice was
issued as to why the appellants and the said Parminder Singh shou Id not b1!
dismissed, it was obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to arriv•!
at such a positive finding that the respondents have committed gravest acts
F of misconduct. The opinion formed by a disciplinary authority is very relevant.
Ordinarily a Civil Court would not interfere with the findings of the disciplinary
authority. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is limited. The Civil Court in a 'I--
suit would not ordinarily interfere with the findings of fact; its jurisdiction
inter-alia being to find out as to whether the statutory rules respecting th'e
G disciplinary enquiry were complied with or the principles of natural justic·!
have been followed or not. The First Appellate Court no doubt exceeded its
jurisdiction in substituting its own opinion to that of the disciplinary authori!).

12. We are not oblivious of the fact, that it is not necessary to repeat
the wordings of the Section for the purpose of complying with the principles
H thereof in the fact situation obtaining in a given case. But departmental
HARJIT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [S.B. SINHA. J.] 137

~·' proceeding is quasi criminal in nature. The procedures laid down therefor A
were required to be complied with, embodying the principles of natural justice.

13. Justice Frankfurter in Vitarel/i v. Seaton, [359 US 535] stated·

"An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by
which it professes its action to be judged ...... Accordingly, if dismissal B
from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though
generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that
procedure must be scrupulously observed ...... This judicially evolved
rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add,
rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with the
sword." c
(See Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority
of India and Ors., AIR ( 1979) SC 1628)

14. It is also true as was submitted by Mr. Swamp Singh that in case
of habitual absence, a punishment of dismissal of service would be just. [See D
State of Punjab & Ors. v. Sukhwinder Singh, [ 1999] SCC (L&S) 1234 and
-> Maan Singh v. Union of India & Ors., [2003] 3 SCC 464]. We are furthermore
not oblivious of a decision of this Court in State of Punjab v. Ram Singh Ex-
Constable, [ 1992] 4 SCC ,54 wherein interpreting Rule 16.2, this Court stated
the law in the following terms:- E
"7. Rule 16.2(1) consists of two parts. The first part is referable to
gravest acts of misconduct which entails awarding an order of
dismissal. Undoubtedly there is distinction between gravest misconduct
and grave misconduct. Before awarding an order of dismissal it shall
be mandatory that dismissal order should be made only when there F
are gravest acts of misconduct, since it impinges upon the pensionary
rights of the delinquent after putting long length of service. As stated
the first part relates to gravest acts of misconduct. Under General
Clauses Act singular includes plural, "act" includes acts. The
contention that there must be plurality of acts of misconduct to award
dismissal is fastidious. The word "acts" would include singular "act" G
as well. It is not the repetition of the acts complained of but its quality,
insidious effect and gravity of situation that ensues from the offending
"act". The colour of the gravest act must be gathered from the
surrounding or attending circumstances. Take for instance the
delinquent who put in 29 years of continuous length of service and H
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 3 S.C.R.

A had unblemished record; in thirtieth year he commits defalcation of
public money or fabricates false records to conceal misappropriation.
He only committed once. Does it men that he should not be inflicted
with the punishment of dismissal but be allowed to continue in service
for that year to enable him to get his full pension. The answer is
obviously no. Therefore, a single act of corruption is sufficient to
B award an order of dismissal under the rule as gravest act of misconduct.

8. The second part of the rule connotes the cumulative effect of
continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness
for police service and that the length of service of the offender and
his claim for pension should be taken into account in an appropriate
c case. The contention that both parts must be read together appears
to us to be illogical. Second part is referable to a misconduct minor
in character which does not by itself warrant an order of dismissa[ but
due to continued acts of misconduct would have insidious cumulative
effect on service morale and may be a ground to take lenient view of
D giving an opportunity to reform. Despite giving such opportunities if
the delinquent officer proved to be incorrigible and found completely
unfit to remain in service th~n to maintain disciplii1e in the service,
instead of dismissing the delinquent officer, a lesser punishment of
j,
compulsory retirement or demotion to a lower grade or rank or removal
from service without affecting his future chances of re-employment,
E if any, may meet the ends of justice. Take for instance the delinquent
officer who is habitually absent from duty when required. Despite
giving an opportunity to reform himself he continues to remain absent
from duty off and on. He proved himself to be incorrigible and thereby
unfit to continue in service. Therefore, taking into account his long
F length of service and his claim for pension he may be compulsorily
retired from service so as to enable him to earn proportionate pension.
The second part of the rule operates in that area. It may also be made
cle'ar that the very order of dismissal from service for gravest
misconduct may entail forfeiture of all pensionary benefits. Therefore,
the word 'or' cannot be read as "and". It must be disjunctive and
G independent. The common link that connects both clauses is "the
gravest act/acts of misconduct."
{-
15. In the aforementioned situation, ordinarily, we would have asked the
Disciplinary Authority to consider the matter afresh, but the occurrence has
H taken place in the year 1984. Appellants and the said Parminder Singh had
HARJIT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [S.B. SINHA, J.] 139

worked only for a few years, one of them is dead. In the aforementioned A
situation, we are of the opinion that we would be justified to fix the quantum
of punishment. We are of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of
this case and in particular having regard to the passage of time, punishment
of compulsory Retirement will meet the ends of justice. If otherwise eligible,
the delinquents would be entitled to retiral benefits. The appet:I is allowed to B
the aforementioned extent.

16. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order
_.. as to costs.

S.K.S. Appeal partly allowed. C