Holding

An election petition must disclose a concise statement of material facts and full particulars; the petition in this case satisfied that requirement, so the High Court's dismissal for lack of material facts was erroneous.

Summary

The appellant, an elector from Patiala Town, filed an election petition under Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, alleging that the respondent, Amarinder Singh, committed corrupt practices by using a Class‑I gazetted officer and a police superintendent to further his election campaign. The Punjab & Haryana High Court dismissed the petition on the ground that it failed to disclose "material facts" and therefore did not disclose a cause of action. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the statutory requirement of Section 83 that an election petition must contain a concise statement of material facts and full particulars of any corrupt practice, and clarified the distinction between material facts and particulars. The Court held that the petition did set out material facts with sufficient particulars and that the High Court had wrongly entered the merits of the case at the preliminary stage. Consequently, the High Court order was set aside, the election petition was restored, and the matter was remitted for trial on its merits.

Issues considered

The requirement under Section 83 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, that an election petition must state concise material facts and full particulars of alleged corrupt practice.
Whether the failure to disclose material facts and particulars renders an election petition dismissible at the preliminary stage.
Whether the High Court erred by assessing the evidence and merits of the petition while deciding its maintainability.
Whether a defect in the affidavit (Rule 94‑A of the Conduct of Election Rules) is fatal to the petition.
Whether amendment of particulars under Section 86(5) of the Act can cure deficiencies in the pleading.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 6 Rule 15, s. Order VII Rule 11
Conduct of Election Rules, 1961s. Rule 90, s. Rule 94-A
Representation of the People Act, 1951s. 100, s. 123, s. 77, s. 81, s. 83, s. 86

Subjects

election petitioncorrupt practicematerial factsRepresentation of the People ActSection 83particularshigh courtSupreme Courtpleading requirementscause of action

Judgment

HARKIRA T SINGH A
v.
AMARINDER SINGH

DECEMBER 16, 2005

(Y.K. SABHARWAL, C.J., C.K. THAKKER AND B
P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, JJ.]

Representation of the People Act, 1951: Section 12 3.

Corrupt Practice-Election petition-Material facts-Disclosure of- C
,'
Election to State legislative Assembly--Elector of the constituency filed an
election petition challenging election of the returned candidate on ground
of corrupt practice-Government servant holding Class I gazetted post
allegedly helped the returned candidate immensely during his election
campaign--A Press Conference was allegedly organized for the returned D
candidate for enhancing his election prospects-High Court dismissed the
Elec:tion Petition on the ground that the petitioner had failed to disclose
'material facts' as to corrupt practice constituting the cause of action-
Correctness of-Held: An election petition must contain a concise statement
of 'material facts' on which the petitioner relies-It should also contain 'full
particulars' ofany corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges-It is absolutely E
essential that all basic and primary facts which must be proved at the trial
hy the party to establish the existence of a cause of action or de.fence are
material facts and must be stated in the pleadings by the party-Jn the
present case, 'material facts' of corrupt practice said to have been adopted
hy the returned candidate had been set out in the petition with full F
particulars-It has been expressly stated as to how the named Government
servant assisted the returned candidate by doing several acts, as to complaints
made against him by the authorities and taking of disciplinary action-
hence, High Court was wholly unjustified and rejecting the petition on the
ground that material facts had not been set out in the election petition and
that the election petition did not disclose a cause of action-Code of Civil G
Procedure, 1908, 0. VJ R.2.

Section 83- 'Material facts' and 'Particulars '-Distinction between-
Explained.
. 817 H
818 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A Words and Phrases:

"Material facts "-Meaning of-In the context of S. 83 of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951.

The appellant was an elector in the constituency from which the
B respondent was declared elected to the State Legislative Assembly. The
appellant filed an Election Petition in the High Court under Section 81 of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 questioning the election of the
respondent on the ground of corrupt practice as enumerated in Section 123
of the Act. It was alleged that a Government Servant holding Class I gazetted
post helped the respondent immensely during his election campaign. The said
C Government servant allegedly organized a Press Conference for the
respondent for enhancing his election prospects.

High Court dismissed the Election Petition on the ground that the
petitioner had failed to disclose 'material facts' as to corrupt practice
D constituting the cause of action in the election petition. Hence the appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. An election petition must contain a concise statement of
'material facts' on which the petitioner alleges including a full statement of
E the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and
the date and place of commission of such practice Such election petition shall
be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the verification of pleadings. It should be
accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed from in support of allegation of
such practice and particulars thereof. (835-D, E)
F
2. All material facts, thereof, in accordance with the provisions of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 have to be set out in the election
petition. If the material facts are not stated in petition, it is liable to be
dismissed on that ground as the case would be covered by Section ·83(1)(a) of
the Act read with Rule ll(a) of Order VII of the Code. (835-FJ
G
3. The expression 'material facts' has neither been defined in the Act
nor i~ the Code. According to the dictionary meaning, 'material' means
'fundamental,' 'vital, 'basic', 'cardinal', 'central', 'crucial', 'decisive', .
'essential', 'pivotal', 'indispensable', 'elementary' or primary. The phrase

H .....
HARKIRAT SINGH v. AMARINDER SINGH 819
'material facts', therefore, may be said to be those facts upon which a party A
relies for his claim or defence. In other words, 'material facts, are facts upon
which the plaintifrs defence depends. What particulars could be said to be
'material facts' would depend upon the facts of each case and no rule of
universal application can be laid down. It is, however, absolutely essential that
all basic and p'"imary facts which must be proved at the trial by the party to
establish the existence of a cause of action or defence are material facts and h
must be stated in the pleadings by the party. (835-G. H; 836-A, BJ

Phillips v. Phillips (1878) 4 QBD 127 and Bruce v. Odhams Press Ltd.,
(1936) 1 KB 697, referred to.

Burrton 's Legal Thesaurus, Third Edn. P. 349, referred to.
c
4. A distinction between 'material facts' and 'particulars' however, must
not be overlooked. 'Material facts' are primary or basic facts which must be
pleaded by the plaintiff or by the defendant in support of the case set up by
him either to prove his cause of action or defence. 'Particulars', on the other D
hand, are details in support of material facts pleaded by the party. They amplify,
refine and embellish material facts by giving distinctive touch to the basic
contours of a picture already drawn so as to make it full, clearer and more
informative. 'Particulars', thus, ensure conduct of fair trial and would not
take the opposite party by surprise. (836-F, G)
E
5. All 'material facts' must be pleaded by the party in support of the
case set up by him. Since the object and purpose is to enable the opposite
party to know the case he has to meet with, in the absence of pleading, a party
cannot be allowed to lead evidence. Failure to state even a single material fact,
hence, will entail dismissal of the suit or petition. Particulars, on the other F
hand, are the details of the case which is in the nature of evidence a party
would be leading at the time of trial. (836-H; 837-A)

Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Edn., Vol. 36, para 38, referred to.

6. In the present case, 'material facts' of corrupt practice said to have G
been adopted by the respondent had been set out in the petition with full
particulars, It has been expressly stated as to how a Ga:zetted Officer of Class
I in the State Government assisted the respondent by doing several acts, as to
complaints made against him by the authorities and taking of disciplinary
action. It has also been stated as to how a Police Officer, who was holding the
post of Superintendent of Police, helped the respondent by organizing a H
820 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A meeting and by distributing posters. It was also alleged that correct and_
proper accounts of election expenses have not been maintained by the
respondent. The High Court was wholly unjustified in entering into the
correctness or otherwise of facts stated and allegations made in the election
petition and in rejecting the petition holding that it did not state material facts
and thus did not disclose a cause of 1>ction. The High Court stepped into
B prohibited area of appreciating the evidence and by entering into merits of
the case which would be permissible only at the stage of trial of the election
petition and not at the stage of consideration whether the election petition
was maintainable. (849-E, F, G, H; 850-A]

C Ba/wan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain and Ors., (1960] 3 SCR 91, R.M
Seshadri v. G. Vasantha Pai., (1969] 3 SCC 27, S.N. Balakrishna v. George
Fernandez., [1969] 3 SCC 238, Raj Narain v. Indira Nehru Gandhi., (1972] 3
SCC 850, Pratap Singh v. Rajinder Singh., (1975] 1 SCC 535, D. Venkata
Reddy v. R. Sultan., (1976] 2 SCC 455, K.M Mani v. P.J Antony., (1979] 2
SCC 221, Azar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi., (1986] Supp. SCC 315, S.A. Sapav.
D singore., [1991] 3 SCC 375, Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat v. Dattaji Raghobaji
Meghe., [1995) 5 SCC 347, L.R. Shivaramagowda v. T.M Chandrashekar.,
(1999) I SCC 666, V.S. Achuthanandan v. P.J. Francis., (1999) 3 SCC 737, V.
Narayanaswamy v. C.P. Thirunavukkaras.u., [2000) 2 SCC 294, Hari Shankar
jain v. Sonia Gandhi., (200118 SCC 233, Santosh Yadan v. Narendra Singh.,
E (2002] 1 SCC 160 and Mahadeorao Sukaji Shivankar v. Ramaratan Bapu.,
[2004] 7 sec 181, relied on.

Hardwari Lal v. Kamal Singh., (1972] 1 SCC 214, Dau/at Ram Chauhan
v. Anand Sharma., (1984] 2 SCC 64 and Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia.,
(1976] 2 SCR 246, referred to.
F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 845 of2005.

From the Judgment and Order dated 3.11.2004 of the Punjab and Haryana
High Court in E.P. No. 26 of 2002.

G P.S. Mishra, Randhir Singh Jain, Durgainder Singh, Ms. Savita Singh
and Ravi Kataria with him for the Appellant.

R.S. Cheena, D.P. Singh and Sanjay Jain for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H
HARKIRAT SINGH v. AMARINDER SINGH [THAKKER, J.] 821
C.K. THAKKER, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment A
and order dated 3rd November, 2004 passed by the High Court of Punjab &
Haryana in Election Petition No. 26 of2002. By the said Order, the High Court
dismissed the Election Petition filed by the appellant-petitioner upholding
preliminary objection raised by the respondent that the petitioner had failed
to disclose material facts as to corrupt practice constituting the cause of
action in the election petition. B
To appreciate the controversy raised in the present appeal, few relevant
facts may be stated. On December 26, 2001, election for constitution of Punjab
Legislative Assembly was announced. On January 16, 2002, Hon'ble the
President of India issued a notification calling upon the electors in the State C
of Punjab to elect their representatives for Punjab Vidhan Sabha. Various
stages of election were fixed. As per the notification, January 23, 2002 was
the last date for filing nominations by candidates aspiring to be elected to
Punjab Vidhan Sobha. Scrutiny ofnomination papers was fixed as January 24,
2002 and the last date of withdrawal of nomination was January 28, 2002.
Polling was to take place on February 13, 2002 and February 24, 2002 was the D
date of the counting of votes and of declaration of result.

The respondent herein filed his nomination from 76, Patiala Town
Assembly Constituency as the candidate nominated by Congress (I) Party.
The respondent was declared as elected. He was also elected as the leader E
of the Party and became the Chief Minister of Punjab.

The appellant herein-petitioner before the High Court-was an elector in
the constituency from which the respondent contested the election. The

- petitioner filed an Election Petition in the High Court under Section 81 of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') F
questioning the election of the respondent to the Punjab Legislative Assembly
from 76, Patiala Town Assembly Constituency on the ground of corrupt
practice as detailed in the Election Petition. A prayer was, therefore, made to
declare the election of the respondent void and for issuing appropriate
consequential directions.
G
In the Election Petition, it was alleged by the petitioner that the
respondent had committed 'corrupt practice' as enumerated in Section 123 of
the Act. The particulars of corrupt practices committed by the respondent
were mentioned by the petitioner in the petition. ln paras 4 and 5 of the

- Election Petition, the petitioner stated that one Bharat Inder Singh Chahal was H
822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A a Government Servant holding Class I gazetted post as Joint Director,
Information & Public Relations Department, Punjab who helped the respondent
immensely during the election campaign of the respondent and-despite his
being holder of a post under the State Government, had actively been
organizing, conducting and participating personally in the press conferences
addressed by the respondent for the furtherance of respondent's election
B prospects. Particulars of corrupt practices committed by the respondent had
also been stated. It was asserted that on January 29, 2002, Mr. Chahal organized
a Press Conference for the respondent at New Moti Bagh Palace, Patiala along
with the respondent for enhancing the election prospects of the latter. An
audio-video cassette containing about 12 minutes clipping was recorded
.C which news appeared in English dailies 'Tribune', 'Indian Express' and 'Times
of India'. According to the petitioner, he was able to procure a copy of the
cassette from one Mr. Jagdeep Singh Chowhan without any manipulation,
dubbing or interpolation.

It was also stated that Mr. G.S. Cheema, Chief Electoral Officer, Punjab
D during media briefing on 4th February, 2002 at the office of the Chief Electoral
Officer in Sector No. I 7, Chandigarh disclosed that Mr. Chahal had actively
participated in the election process. The Election Commission, therefore,
directed Secretary, Punjab Infonnation & Public Relations to take disciplinary
action against Mr. Chahal for violating the code of conduct and for actively
E participating irt Congress' election campaign. Likewise Mrs. Usha R. Sharma,
Additional Chief Electoral Officer, during media briefing on February 6, 2002
stated that the Election Commission of India had pulled up the Punjab
Government and asked the Chief Secretary. of Punjab to look into the matter
as to why action had not been initiated against Mr. Chahal for the alleged
violation of the Election Code and for as~isting the respondent. According
F to the petitioner, this had gone long way to show that Mr. Chahal actively
participated "to the knowledge of the respondent and with the consent of the
respondent" for the furtherance of his election prospects in violation of the
provisions of Section 123 of the Act. The Secretary, Information & Public
Relations, Government of Punjab issued a show cause notice to Mr. Chahal
G over his reported work for the Congress candidate. Mr. Cheema had also
written to Mr. N.K. Arora, Chief Secretary, Punjab seeking action against Mr.
Chahal for alleged partisan role and for his misconduct. Mrs. Usha R. Sharma
further disclosed that a complaint filed by one Mr. J.S. Chowhan had been
forwarded to the Election Commission of India as also to the Secretary,
Information & Public Relations, Punjab recommending that action should be
H taken against Mr. Chahal as complaint had been prima facie established. A
HARKIRAT SINGH"· AMARINDER SINGH [THAKKER, J.] 823
Committee was constituted to look into the audio-video cassette and to A
examine the role of Mr. Chahal. According to the petitioner, the Committee of
Infonnation & Public Relations Department submitted a report that Mr. Chahal
was present at the Press Conference of the respondent. The Committee
allowed Mr. Chahal to see the cassette following the principles of natural
justice and asked him to submit his reply by February 8, 2002 explaining his
conduct. The Committee forwarded the report to the Chief Electoral Officer, B
Punjab as also to the Election Commission of India. The above facts were
disclosed by Mr. Cheema, Chief Electoral Officer in a media briefing on
February 7, 2002 at Chief Electoral Officer's office at Chandigarh.

On February 8, 2002, the Secretary, lnfonnation & Public Relations C
Department, Punjab recommended to the Cabinet Minister for Information &
Public Relations Department to issue charge-sheet to Mr. Chahal for a major
penalty on his having worked actively for the election campaign of the Chief
of the Punjab Pradesh Congress Committee-respondent herein.

In para 6 of the petition, the petitioner stated that Mr; Chahal played D
a dcminanl, significant and active role during the election campaign of the
respondent which fact was further corroborated from the fact that Mr. Chahal
was suitably rewarded for herculean efforts put up by him with his appointment
on February 28, 2002 as Advisor to the Chief Minister-respoRdent herein.

It was stated that the respondent took oath as Chief Minister of Punjab E
on February 27, 2002. He accepted the resignation of Mr. Chahal as Joint

..
Director, Public Relations Department, Punjab on February 28, 2002. On the
same day, the respondent appointed Mr. Chahal as 'Advisor to the Chief
Minister' and an appointment letter was issued. In the 'Indian Express' dated
March l, 2002, it was reported that Mr. Chahal's career in Public Relations p
Department was marked by 'string of controversies' (para 7).

The petitioner, in the election petition, has also said about other corrupt
practices adopted by the respondent. In paras 8 and 9, it was averred that
the respondent had procured assistance of one Gurnam Singh Mehra,
Superintendent of Police, Patiala for furtherance of the prospects of his G
election. The details of the corrupt practice had also been specified in para
9 of the petition. It was said that Mr. Mehra belonged to Kashyap Rajput
community. Mr. Mehra organized a function on January 26, 2002 in favour of
Congress candidate for 76, Patiala Town Assembly Constituency (of the
respondent) which was presided over by Smt. Preneet Kaur, Member of H
824 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A Parliament, Patiala and wife of the respondent. The meeting was organized at
Marriage Palace near Railway Phatak No.22, Patiala. For the said meeting, Mr.
Mehra used the office of his newly created Mehra Biradri Social Sangathan
in which posters were distributed with a photograph of Mr. Mehra as
Superintendent of Police in police unifonn describing the respondent as
'Garibon Ka Massiha'. The name of the Sangathan was shown at the bottom.
B Mr. Mehra thus canvassed for the respondent in the said meeting. Those
facts appeared as a news item in the English edition of the 'Tribune' dated
February 5, 2002.

According to the petitioner, the respondent also committed corrupt
C practice by indirectly interfering with the free exercise of electoral rights by
projecting himself as the 'Maharaja of Patiala' in the posters issued by the
respondent and also by his supporters with his consent.

Finally, the petitioner alleged that the respondent had incurred expenses
far more than the prescribed limit of Rs.6 lakhs under Rule 90 of the Conduct
D of Election Rules, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') and maintainecl
improper and incorrect accounts of the expenditure incum:d and thereby he
violated the provisions of Section 77 of the Act. The respondent had not
shown the expenses of Press Conference held on January 29, 2002 at New
Moti Bagh Palace, Patiala or of the 'heavy tea' served at the said conference
E in his election return (para 11 ).

On the basis of above allegations, the petitioner stated that the election
of respondent to 76, Patiala Town Assembly Constituency was liable to be
declared void under Section 100 of the Act. The election petition was verified
and was filed on April I 0, 2002.
•
F A reply in the form of written statement was filed by the respondent
controverting the avennents made and denying the allegations levelled by the
petitioner in the election petition. Preliminary objections were also raised by
the respondent, inter alia, contending that the election petition was liable to
be dismissed as the petitioner had failed to comply with the mandatory
G requirement of filing an affidavitin .Fonn 25 read with Rule 94-A of the Rules
as required by Section 83 of the Act. According to the respondent, the
affidavit was not legal and valid. An affidavit, under the Rules, was required
to be attested either on oath or on solemn affinnation. The affidavit filed by
the petitioner was neither sworn nor it was on solemn affirmation. Both the
H expressions 'sworn' and 'solemn affirmation' were mentioned mechanically.
HARKIRAT SINGH v. AMARINDER SINGH [THAKKER, J.] 825
The affidavit thus did not conform to the mandatory requirement of Form 25 A
read with Rule 94-A and the petition was liable to be dismissed on that
ground.

It was also stated that the election petition did not contain "material
facts" much less "material particulars" of alleged corrupt practices mentioned
in the election petition. The so called allegations, stated the respondent, were B
vague, bald, unnecessary, irrelevant, frivolous and did not disclose any cause
of action. The averments were intended to prejudice, embarrass and delay fair
trial of the election petition.

Paras 6 and 7 of the election petition were liable to be struck off being C
unnecessary. The averments in those paras did not pertain to the period from
the date of filing of the nomination papers, had no relevance and did not fall
within the ambit and scope of Section 100 read with Section 123 of the Act.
Contents of para 4 Clid not disclose material facts but the language of Section
123(7)(a) of the Act had been mechanically reproduced by the petitioner.
According to the respondent, para 4 did not contain material facts as to how D
and in what manner the help of Mr. Chahal was sought or obtained for
furtherance of the election result of the respondent, in what form the so called
assistance was rendered and how it affected the electoral rights of the voters
of76, Patiala Town Assembly Constituency. Para 5 similarly did not disclose
material particulars required by law. The reference to organizing, conducting E
and participating personally in press conferences by Mr. Chahal addressed
by the respondent was vague, scandalous and frivolous. The contents failed
to disclose essential ingredients of corrupt practice as contemplated by Section
123(7)(a) of the Act. The so called press conference dated January 29, 2002
was organized and addressed by the respondent as President of the Punjab
Pradesh Congress Committee and it had absolutely no connection with his F
election to 76, Patiala Town Assembly Constituency. The respondent has also
stated that it was not disclosed by the petitioner as to who was the author
of the audio-video cassette, how the copy of the cassette came to the hands
of Jagdeep Singh Chowhan and how the said copy was free from any
manipulation, dubbing and interpolation particularly when the original audio-
video cassette was not on record. Even the transcript in English of the G
cassette had not been produced.

Regarding assistance of Mr. Mehra, Superintendent of Police, Patiaia, it
· was contended by the respondent that in the absence of basic ingredients
of Section 123(7)(d) of the Act that the function held on January 26, 2002 was H
826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A with the consent of the respondent or his election agent, there was nothing
to show how it could connect the respondent with the said function.

As to the allegation of respondent projecting himself as 'Maharaja of
Patiala', it was stated that no such poster had been placed on record nor the
contents of the poster had been reproduced. Thus, no material facts had come
B on record of undue influence.

Regarding election expenses, the averments were tot~!ly vague,
unnecessary and frivolous. The avennents had been made with a view to
prejudice and embarrass, with the object of delaying fair trial of the election
C petition. The provisions of Section 77 were not attracted.

On merits also, it was contended by the respondent that no corrupt
practice had been adopted by him and the allegations levelled against him
were incorrect. It was, therefore, submitted that the election petition was liable
to be dismissed.
D
A replication to the written statement of the respondent was filed by
the petitioner contending that the preliminary objections raised by the
respondent were incorrect and false. Regarding affidavit and verification, it
was stated that if the Court comes to the conclusion that there were some
defects in the affidavit, permission may be granted to the petitioner to file a
E fresh affidavit. So far as corrupt practices are concerned, according to the
petitioner, material facts and particulars had already been stated in the election
petition. The allegations were clear, precise and disclosed a cause of action.
The avennents made in the election petition have been reiterated in the
replication by giving several instances. It was repeated that corrupt practice
F had been adopted by the respondent. The election petition was thus required
to be allowed by setting aside the election of the res!Jondent.

On the basis of rival contentions of the parties, the High Court framed
nine issues. It was contended on behalf of the respondent that the election
petition was liable to be dismissed as preliminary objections raised by the
G respondent were well founded. The Court, accordingly ordered to treat issue
Nos. 5 to 8 as preliminary issues which were as under:

5. Whether the election petition is liable to be dismissed as the
allegations of corrupt practice are not supported by a valid and
legal affidavit as mentioned in preliminary objection No. I and 2
H

·•
HARKIRAT SINGH v. AMARINDER SINGH [THAKKER, J.] 827
of the written statement? OPR A
6. Whether the election petition lacks material facts and particulars
and discloses no cause of action as mentioned in preliminary
objection No.3 to I 0 of the written statement? OPR

7. Whether the election petition is liable to be dismissed being B
incomplete as mentioned in para no.11 of the preliminary
objections of the written statement? OPR

8. Whether the election petition is not verified as required under
Order 6 Rule 15 of C.P.C., if so its effect? OPR

Issues 5 and 8 related to the affidavit and verification of election
c
petition. After considering the submissions of both the sides and referring to
the relevant provisions of law in the light of decisions of this Court, the High
Court held that the election petition was not liable to be dismissed on the
ground of defect, if any, in verification and affidavit. Even if there was some
defect, it was 'curable' and not fatal to the election petition. The Court also D
observed thal along with the replication, the petitioner had placed on record
an affidavit which was in conformity with the provisions of Rule 94-A and
From 25 appended to the Rules. The affidavit was allowed to be placed on
record without any objection by the other side. The issues were thus decided
in favour of the election petitioner.
E
So far as issues 6 and 7 are concerned, the Court was called upon to
consider whether the election petition lacked 'material facts' and 'particulars'
and did not disclose a cause of action and was liable to be dismissed being
incomplete as contended by the respondent. The Court stated that it was well
established that an election petition was supposed to disclose all 'material p
facts' to constitute a complete cause of action. According to the Court, an
election petition should contain concise statement of material facts and it was
necessary 'to disclose fullest possible particulars'. The Court stated that the
counsel cited several judgments showing the distinction between 'material
facts' and 'material particulars'. Referring to a decision of the Supreme Court
in Hardwari Lal v. Kamal Singh, [1972] 1SCC214: [1972] 2 SCR 742, the G
Court said that the material facts are facts which if established would give the
petitioner the relief asked for. If the respondent would not appear, the Court
would give verdict in favour of the petitioner. The said view was reiterated
by the Court in subsequent cases also. Then referring to para 4 of the election
petition, the Court observed that the said para only contained 'reproduction H
828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A of the wording of Section l23(7)(a) of the Act'. In the opinion of the Court, .
therefore, para 4 of the petition could not be treated as the statement of
material facts regarding corrupt practice.

In respect of material facts and particulars given in para 5(i) regarding
corrupt practice adopted by the respondent, the Court opined that though it
B had been stated that Mr. Chahal, a Gazetted Officer of the State of Punjab had
helped the respondent immensely during his election and had actively been
organizing and conducting personally, press conferences addressed by the
respondent for the furtherance of his election prospects, no date, time and
place of organizing any press conference had been mentioned by the petitioner.
c The Court then observed;

"Whether by the use of words actively organizing, conducting and
participating in press conferences without any further detail will
constitute a material fact, which may lead towards formation of a
D complete cause of action or not. This Court feels that the answer is
in the negative". (emphasis supplied)

The Court observed that in sub-para (ii) of para 5, one instance of press
conference which was allegedly held on January 29, 2002 by Mr. Chahal had
been given. It was stated that Mr. Chahal organized the press conference in
E New Moti Bagh Palace i.e. residence of the respondent. Mr. Chahal was
personally present with the respondent and meticulously organized each and
every affair for better result with the object of enhancing the prospect of the
respondent. In sub-para (iii), it was stated that the petitioner was able to
procure a copy of the cassette without any manipulation.

F As to the allegations in sub-paras (i), (ii) and (iii) of para 5, this is what
the Court had to say;

"A reading of sub-paras (i), (ii) & (iii) clearly demonstrate that the
petitioner has failed to disclose as to what was the purpose of press
conference, what was agenda for the same, who were the press
G
correspondents invited and who invited them and whether any press
note was prepared at the time of press conference or not, what was
addressed to the press correspondents, it has nowhere been stated
that whether any· voter of the constituency, in dispute, was present .
at the time of press conference".
H
HARKIRAT SINGH v. AMARINDER SINGH [THAKKER, J.] 829
The Court also stated that the petitioner had not stated as to whether A
any proceedings of the press conference were published in the news paper
on the next day, what were the contents of those publications and what was
its eftect on the general electorate in the con tituency. The Court went on
saying that the petitioner had failed to give the name ingle person who
had read the reporting regarding press conference, which llegedly B
conducted on January 29, 2002. It was no where stated as to how thew f
the electorate was affected and how the press conference was an attempt for
the furtherance of electoral prospects of the returned candidate.

It appears that at the time of hearing of arguments, in the presence of
counsel for the parties, video cassette was seen by the Court. The Court C
stated;

"At the time of arguments, in the presence of counsel for the
parties, video cassette was played in Comt. The Press Conference, as
referred to above, was being addressed by the respondent. He along
with Press Correspondents was seen sitting on chairs around a table. D
Bharat lnder Singh Chahal was seen sitting on the back side in second
row. In between, he got up and had a half cifcle of the conference hall
i.e., Library Room of the house of the respondent. At the time of press
conference, as was evident from the video cassette, light snacks were
served to the press correspondents. Shri Chahal was not seen uttering E
a single word either to the respondent or to any of the press
correspondents. At the time of arguments, Shri Saggar read over a
transcript of video cassette, which clearly demonstrated that at the
time of press conference, no appeal was made to the electorate of the
constituency of the respondent. Conference was conducted with
respect to expulsion ofrival candidates from the congress party. It has F
nowhere been pleaded as to what was the object and method of
assistance provided by Bharat lnder Singh Chahal."

Then relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in Dau/at Ram Chauhan
v. Anand Sharma, [ 1984] 2 SCC 64 : AIR ( 1984) SC 62 l, the Court observed
that the allegations made in the election petition could not be said to be in G
the nature of 'material facts' as no details were given. The Court stated that
in the replication, all details were given but they were "material facts" which
the petitioner was required to state in his election petition and not in the
replication which was filed beyond the period of limitation. Since in the
election petition material facts had not been stated, the petition did not H
830 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A disclose a cause of action and was, therefore, liable to be dismissed.
Regarding a complaint made by Jagdeep Singh Chowhan to the Chief
Electoral Officer, the Court observed that in the election petition it was stated
that a Committee was constituted in view of allegation that Mr. Chahal had
violated the code of conduct and disciplinary action was required to be taken
B against him. It was recommended to issue notice to Mr. Chahal for major
penalty, but the petition was silent whether such notice was issued or not.
During the arguments, it transpired that no such notice was issued despite
recommendation made by the Chief Electoral Officer. In connection with news
items, the Court noted that those news items no where indicated as to what
C was the quantum of help sought from and rendered by Mr. Chahal to the
respondent.

In paras 6 and 7 of the petition, a reference was made regarding
acceptance of resignation of Mr. Chahal by the respo~dent and his appointment
as Advisor to the Chief Minister. According to the Court, facts mentioned in
D those paras would have been a 'corroborative piece of evidence' if the
petition was capable to be proceeded with but as the petitioner had failed to
state material facts in that regard, he could not get the benefit of the
subsequent development.

On the allegation of assistance of Mr. Mehra, Superintendent of Police,
E according to the Court, no material fact had been disclosed by the petitioner
in the petition. On the meeting held at the Moti Bagh Palace near Railway
Phatak No.22 in which posters were distributed with photograph of Mr.
Mehra in police unifonn, describing the respondent as "Garibon Ka Massiha"
showing the name of Mehra Biradari Social Sangathan, the Court stated;
F
"This Court feels that avennents made in this paragraph are very
vague. It has not been stated as to what was the purpose of that
meeting, who were participants, whether any voter from the
constituency in dispute had come there, what was said by f\llr. Mehra
and how he tried to influence the voters."
G
The Court went on to observe that it had no where been stated as to
what were the contents of that poster, who published it, whether it was
circulated and who read it. The Court, therefore, felt that the petitioner had
failed to disclose material facts as required by law.

H
HARKIRAT SINGH v. AMARINDER SINGH [THAKKER. J.] 83)

As to allegation of projecting himself as 'Maharaja of Patiala' in a A
poster issued by the respondent, the Court stated that the petitioner had
failed to. disclose material facts as there was nothing to show that the poster
was issued by the respondent or by his supporters with his consent.

Regarding election expenses, the Court observed that mere non
disclosure of expenditure would not be a corrupt practice. It is incurring of .B
expenditure in excess of the prescribed limit which will amount to a corrupt
practice. According to the Court, very vague · averments had been made
simply by stating that the respondent had incurred the expenses more than
the prescribed limit, but no details had been given. According to the Court,
in the election petition, it was stated that the respondent had not shown C
expenses of press conference held on January 29, 2002 in his return of
expenses but nothing had been stated as to what was the total expenditure
and the details had been given only in the replication. Then referring to the
video-cassette, the Court observed that only light snacks, tea and cold drinks
were served to the press corresponqents. The Court stated;
D
"By taking judicial note of the same, it can be said that even if those
expenses are ordered to be included in the election expenses of the
respondent, the total expenses still shall remain much below the
prescribed limit".

In view of the above findings, the Court dismissed the petition by E
passing the following order;

"Despite decision on issues No.5 and 8 in favour of the petitioner,
this petition, in view of findings on issues No.6 and 7, cannot proceed
further as the petitioner has failed to disclose material facts regarding F
corrupt practice, as alleged, to constitute a complete cause of action,
on the basis of which any relief can be granted to him. Accordingly,
this election petition fails and the same is dismissed. No order as to
costs".

On February 28, 2005, after hearing the learned counsel for the appellant, G
the appeal was admitted. In view of the fact that the election petition was
dismissed· at the. threshold on the ground that it did not disclose cause of
action, the matter was placed for final hearing. We have heard Mr. P.S. Mishra,
senior Advocate for the appellant and Mr. R.S. Cheena, Senior Advocate for
the respondent.
H
832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A Before we deal with the respective contentions of the learned counsel
for the parties, it would be appropriate if we refer to the relevant provisions
of the Act. The Preamble of the Act declares that the Act has been enacted
"to provide for the conduct of elections of the Houses of Parliament and to
the House or Houses of the Legislature of each State, the-qualifications and
disqualifications for membership of those Houses, the corrupt practices and
B other offences at or in connection with such elections and the decision of
doubts and disputes arising out of or in connection, with such elections".

Part I is Preliminary. Part II deals with qualifications and disqualifications
for membership of Parliament and of State Legislatures. While Part III provides
C for issuance of notifications for elections, Part IV relates to administrative
machinery for the conduct of elections. Conduct of elections has been dealt
with in Part V. Part VI relates to 'Disputes regarding elections'. Section· 80
requires any election to be questioned only by way of election petition. Under
Section 80A, it is the High Court which can try election petitions. Section 8 l
provides for presentation of election petition and prescribes the period of
D limitation. Section 82 declares as to who shall be joined as respondents to
such election petition. Section 83 deals with contents of petition and reads
thus-

83. Contents of petition. (1) An Election petition

E (a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which
the petitioner relies;

(b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the
petitioner alleges including as full a statement as possible of the
names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt
F practice and the date and place of the commission of each such
practice; and

(c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid
down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) for the
verification of pleadings:
G
provided that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice,
the petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in· the
prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt
practice and the particulars thereof.

H
HARKIRAT SINGH v. AMARINDER SINGH [THAKKER, J.) 833
(2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be signed A
by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition.

Section 84 deals with relief that can be claimed by the petitioner in arr
election petition. Section 86 relates to trial of election petitions. It mandates
the High Court to dismiss an election petition which does not comply with
the provisions of Sections 81, 82 or 117. (Section 117 requires the election B
petitioner to deposit certain amount as security for costs of the petition). Sub-
section (5) of Section 86 is an enabling provision and reads as under;

(5) The High Court may, upon such terms as to costs and otherwise
as it may deem fit, allow the particulars of any corrupt practice C
alleged in the petition to be amended or amplified in such manner
as may in its opinion be necessary for ensuring a fair and
effective trial of the petition, but shall not allow any amendment
of the petition which will have the effect of introducing particulars
of a corrupt practice not previously alleged in the petition.

Section 100 enumerates grounds on which election of a returned
D
candidate may be challenged and dedared void. Commission of corrupt practice
by a returned candidate is one of the grounds for declaring an election to be
void. The relevant part of Section I 00 reads thus;

;t 100. Grounds for declaring election to be void--(1) Subject to the E
provisions of sub-section (2) if the High Court is of opinion

{a)

lb) that any corrupt practice has been committed by a returned
candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the F
consent of a returned candidate or his election agent;

the High Court shall declare the election of the returned candidate
to be void.
G

Section 12~ declares certain practices as 'deemed to be corrupt
practices'. The material part of the said section reads as under:-

"123. Corrupt practices. The following shall be deemed to be H
834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A corrupt _practices for the purposes of this Act:

{I)'."" ..... .

(2) Undue influence, that is to say, any direct or indirect interference
B or attempt to interfere on the part of the candidate or his agent, or of
any other person with the consent of the candidate or his election
agent, with the· free exercise of any electoral right:

'Provided that -

C (a) without prejudice to. the generality of the provisions of this
clause any such person as is referred to therein who -

_(i) threate~s any candidate or any elector, or any person in
. whom.a candidate or an elector interested, with injury of
· any kind including social ostr~cism and ex-communication
D or expulsion from any caste or community; or

(ii) an
i.nduces or attempts to induce a candidate or elector to
believe that he, or any person in whom he is interested,
will become or will be rendered an object of divine
· , displeasure or spiritual censure,
E
shall be deemed to interfere with the free exercise of the electoral right
of such candidate or elector within the meaning of this clause;

. -'{b) . adeclitr.ation of public policy, or a promise of publication, or the
- ,~.
rmere-exercise ofa legal right without intent to interfere with an
F _.electoral right, shall not-be.deemed to be interference within the
meaning of this clause.

(3)
I•

(4)
G
{5) ... ... ... ...
(6) The incurring or authorizing of expenditure in contravention of

-
section 77.

(7) The obtaining or procµring or abetting or attempting to obtain
H '
HARKIRAT SINGH v. AMARINDER SINGH [THAKKER, J.) 835
or procure by a candidate or his agent or, by any other person A
with the consent of a candidate or his election agent, any
assistance (other than the giving of vote) for the furtherance of
the prospects of that candidate's election, from any person in
the service of the Government and belonging to any of the
following classes, namely:-
B
(a) gazetted officers;

(b)

(c)

(d) members of the police forces;
c
Section 77 speaks of election expenses and maximum amount which can
be spent. Section 78 enjoins every candidate at an election to lodge account
with the District Election Officer.

From the above provisions, it is clear that an election petition must
D
contain a concise statement of 'material facts' on which the petitioner relies.
It should also contain 'full pa11iculars' of any conupt practice that the petitioner
alleges including a full statement of names of the parties alleged to have
committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of commission of
such practice. Such election petition shall be signed by the petitioner and E
verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter
referred to as "the Code") for the verification of pleadings. It should be
accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of allegation
of such practice and particulars thereof.

All material facts, therefore, in accordance with the provisions of the F
Act, have to be set out in the election petition. If the material facts are not
stated in a petition, it is liable to be dismissed on that ground as the case
would be covered by clause (a) of sub-section (I) of Section 83 of the Act
read with clause (a) of Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code.
G
The expression 'material facts' has neither been defined in the Act nor
in the Code. According to the dictionary meaning; 'material' means
'fundamental', 'vital', 'basic', 'cardinal', 'central', 'crucial', 'decisive',
'essential', 'pivotal', indispensable', 'elementary' or 'primary'. [Burton's Legal
Thesaurus, (Third edn.); p.349]. The phrase 'material facts', therefore, may be
said to be those facts upon which a party relies for his claim or defence. In H
836 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A other words, 'material facts' are facts upon which the plaintiffs cause of
action or the defendant's defence depends. What particulars could be said
to be 'material facts' would depend upon the facts of each case and no rule
of universal application can be laid down. It is, however, absolutely essential
that all basic and primary facts which must be proved at the trial by the party
to establish the existence of a cause of action or defence are material facts
B and must be stated in the pleading by the party.

In the leadings case of Phillips v. Phillips, (1878) 4 QBD 127 : 48 LJ
QB 135, Cotton, L.J. stated:

"What particulars are to be stated must depend on the facts of
c each case. But in my opinion it is absolutely essential that the pleading,
. , not to be embarrassing to the defendants, should state those facts
which will put the defendants on their guard and tell them w·hat they
have to meet when the case comes on for trial."

D In Bruce v. Odhams Press ltd, (1936) I KB 697 : [ 1936] I All ER 287,
Scott, L.J. referring to Phillips v. Phillips observed:

"The cardinal provision in Rule 4 is that the statement of claim
must state the material facts. The word 'material' means necessary for
the purpose of fonnulating a complete cause of action; and if any one
E 'material' statement is omitted, the statement of claim is bad; it is
'demurrable' in the old phraseology, and in the new is liable to be
'struck out' under R.S.C. Order 25 Rule 4 (see Phillips v. Phillips);
or 'a further and better statement of claim' may be ordered under Rule
7."

F A distinction between 'material facts' and 'particulars', however, must
not be overlooked. 'Material facts' are primary or basic facts which must be
pleaded by the plaintiff or by the defendant in support of the case set up by
him either to prove his cause of action or defence. 'Particulars', on the other
hand, are details in support of material facts pleaded by the party. They
G amplify, refine and embellish material facts by giving distinctive touch to the
basic contours of a picture already drawn so as to make it full, more clear and
more informative. 'Particulars' thus ensure conduct of fair trial and wouid not
take the opposite party by surprise.

All 'material facts' must be pleaded by the party in support of the case
H set up by him. Since the object and purpose is to enable the opposite party
HARKIRAT SINGH v. AMARINDER SINGH [THAKKER, J.) 837

to know the case he has to meet with, in the absence of pleading, a party A
cannot be allowed to lead evidence. Failure to state even a single material fact,
hence, will entail dismissal of the suit or petition. Particulars, on the other
hand, are the details of the case which is in the nature of evidence a party
would be leading at the time of trial.

In Halsb!Jry's Laws of England, (4th edn.); Vol.36; para 38, it has been B
stated;

"The function of particulars is to carry into operation the overriding
principle that the litigation between the parties, and particularly the
trial, should be conducted fairly, openly and without surprises, and C
incidentally to reduce costs. This function has been variously stated,
namely either to limit the generality of the allegations in the pleadings,
or to define the issues which have to be tried and for which discovery
is required. Each party is entitled to know the case that is intended
to be made against him at the trial, and to have such particulars of
his opponent's case as will prevent him from being taken by surprise. D
Particulars enable the other party to decide what evidence. he ought
to be prepafed with and to prepare for the trial. A party is t!ound by
the facts included in the particulars, and he may not rely on any other
facts at the trial without obtaining the leave of the court."

In connection with election matters, this Court has considered the E
question in several cases. In Ba/wan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain and Ors.,
[1960] 3 SCR 91 : AIR (1960) SC 770, in an election petition, an allegation of

-
corrupt practice of hiring or procuring vehicles by returned candidate had
been made. It was contended on behalf of the respondent that full particulars
as to contract of hiring vehicles had not been set out in the election petition. F
The petition was, therefore, liable to be dismissed. The.Constitution Bench
of this Court was called upon to consider the requirement of Sections 83 and
123 of the Act in the light of the allegation in the election petition. Speaking
for the majority, Shah, J. (as his Lordship then was) observed that neither in
the petition as originally filed nor as amended, the date and place of hiring
of vehicle alleged to have been used for conveying the voters, and the names G
of the persons between whom the contract of hiring was settled were set out.
The question, however, was whether the election petition was liable to be
rejected because it did not set forth particulars of date and place of hiring the
vehicle alleged to have been used in conveying voters? The Court answered
the question in the negative and stated; H
838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A "The corrupt practice being the hiring or procuring of a vehicle for the
conveyance of the electors, if full particulars of conveying by a
vehicle of electors to or from any polling station are given, Section
83 is duly complied with, even if the particulars of the contract of
hiring, as distinguished from the fact of hiring, are not given. Notmally,
the arrangement for hiring or procuring a vehicle, is within the special
B knowledge of the parties to that agreement and it is difficult to assume
that it as intended to require the petitioner in an election dispute to
set out the particulars of facts within .the special knowledge of the
other party, and expose the petition to a penalty of dismissal if those
particulars could not b given. If particulars in support of the plea of
c the vehicle being hired or procured by the candidate or his agent or
by another person was used for conveying voters to or from the
polling station are set out, failure to set out particulars of the contract
of hiring or arrangement of procuring will not render the petition
defective".

D The Court proceeded to observe;

"The practice to be followed in cases where insufficient particulars of
a corrupt practice are set forth in an election petition is this. An
election petition is not liable to be dismissed in limine merely because
full particulars of a corrupt practice alleged in the petition, are not set
E out. Where an objection is raised by the respondent that a petition
is defective because full particulars of an alleged corrupt practice are
not set out, the Tribunal is bound to decide whether the objection
is well founded. If the Tribunal upholds the objection, it should give
an opportunity to the petitioner to apply for leave to amend or
F amplify the particulars of the corrupt practice alleged; and in the
event of noncompliance with that order the Tribunal may strike out
the charges which remain vague. Insistence upon full particulars of
corrupt practices is undoubtedly of paramount importance in the trial
of an election petition, but ifthe parties go to trial despite the absence
of full particulars of the corrupt practice alleged, and evidence of the
G contesting parties is led on the plea raised by tlie petition, the petition
cannot thereafter be dismissed for want of particulars, because the
defect is one of procedure and not one of jurisdiction of the Tribunal
to adjudicate upon the plea in the absence of particulars". (emphasis
supplied)
H
I
I
HARKIRAT SINGH v. AMARINDER SINGH [THAKKER, J.] 839
In R.M Seshadri v. G. Vasantha Pai, [1969] l SCC 27, allegation as to A
corrupt practice had been made in the election petition. It was alleged that
the returned candidate was responsible for employing cars, hired and procured
for the conveyance of the voters to the polling booths. It was contended by
the returned candidate that the allegation was vague and .the petition was
liable to be dismissed. Rejecting the contention, the Court held that it had
been sufficiently pleaded and. proved that cars were in fact used. The B
connection with the returned candidate with the use of the cars had been
specifically pleaded. In the opinion of the Court, "the rest were matters of
evidence which did not require to be pleaded and that plea could always
be supported by evidence to show the source from where the .. cars were
obtained, who hired or procured them and who used them for ,the conveyance C
of voters." (emphasis supplied)

In S.N. Balakrishna etc. v. George Fernandez & Ors. etc., [1969] 3 SCC
238.: AIR (1969) SC 1201, the Court again considered a similar question.
Referring to the relevant provisions of the Act, the Court held that Section
83 which provides that the election petition must contain a concise statement D
of material facts on which the petitioner relies· and further that he must also
set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges
including as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged
to· have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the
commission of each such practice is mandatory. Then, drawing the distinction E
between 'material facts' and 'particular.s', the Court observed;

"What is the difference between material facts and particulars? The

- ""-... _
word 'material' shows that the facts necessary-to formulate a complete
cause of action must be stated. Omission of a single material fact
leads to an incomplete cause of action and the statement of claim F
"- , becomes bad. The function of particulars is to present as full a picture
o~ the cause of action with such fllrther information in detail as to
ma~e the opposite party understand the case he will have to meet.
\
The1fe may be some overlapping between material facts and particulars
but tf\e two are quite distinct. Thus the material facts will mention that
.
/
a stat«bment of fact (which must be set out) was made and it must be G
allegfd that it refers to the character and conduct of the candidate
(

that' it is false or which the returned candidate believes to be false or
doe~ not believe to be frue and that it is calculated to prejudice the
chan1;es of the petitioner. In the particulars the name of the person
makil~g the statement, with the date, time and place will be mentioned. H
/

,.. -.-
•
840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) SUPP. S S.C.R.
\ 1,

A The material facts thus will show the ground of corrupt practice· and
the complete cause of action and the particulars will give the necessary
information to present a full picture of thecause of action. In stating
the material facts it. will not do merely to quote the words of the
section because then the efficacy of the words 'material facts' will be
lost, The fact which constitutes the· ce>rrupt practice must be stated
B and the fact must be correlated to one of the heads of corrupt practice.
Just as a plaint without disclosing a proper cause of action cannot be
said to be a good plaint, so also an election petition without the
material facts relating to a corrupt practice is no election petition at
all. A petition which merely cites the sections cannot be said to
c disclose a cause of action where the allegation is the making of a false
statement. That statement must appear and the particulars must be full
as to the person making the statement and the necessary information".

Referring to sub-section (5) of Section 86 of the Act which allows the
Court the amendment in the petition, the Court stated;
D
"The power of amendment is given in respect of particulars but there
is a prohibition against an amendment "which will have the effe~t of
introducing particulars if a corrupt practice not previously alleged in ·
the petition." One alleges the corrupt practice in the material facts and
they must show a complete cause of action. If a petitioner has omitted·
E to allege a corrupt practice, he cannot be permitted to give particulars
of the corrupt practice. The argument that the latter part of the fifth
sub-section is directory only cannot stand in view of the contrast in
the language of the two parts. The first part is enabling and the
second part creates a positive bar. Therefore, if a corrupt practice is ...
F not alleged, the particulars cannot be supplied. There is howeveyi('
difference of approach between the several corrupt practices ...ltf for
example the charge is bribery of voters and the particulars $fve a few
I
instances, other instances can be added; if the chargtt is use of I
vehicles for free carriage of voters, the particulars of the eiirs employed /
may be amplified. But ifthe charge is that an agent did]something, it
G cannot be amplified by giving particulars of acts on t~e part of the
candidate or vice versa. In the scheme of election law the"Y are separate
corrupt practices which cannot be said to grow out of~the material
facts related to another person. Publication of false stat~ments by an
agent is one cause of action, publication of false statetilents, by the
H candidate is quite a .different cause of action".
l. ·.

HARKIRAT SINGH v. AMARINDER SINGH [THAKKER, J.] 841

In Raj Narain v. Indira Nehru Gandhi & Anr., [ 1972] 3 SCC 850, some A
of the principles had been elaborated which are relevant and they are as
under;

"(i) While a corrupt practice has got to be strictly proved, it does not
follow that a pleading in an election proceeding should receive a strict
construction. Even a defective charge does not vitiate a criminal trial B
unless .it is proved that the same has prejudiced the accused. If a
pleading on a reasonable construction could sustain the action, the
court should accept that construction. The courts are reluctant to
frustrate an action on technical grounds.

(ii) The charge of corrupt practice in an election petition is a very C
serious charge and has to be proved. It may or may not be proved.
. The allegations may be ultimately proved or not proved. But the
"' question for the courts is whether a petitioner should be refused an
opportunity to prove those allegations merely because the petition
was drafted clumsily. Opportunity to prove should not be refused. D

(iii) If the allegations made in an election petition regarding a corrupt
practice do not disclose the constituent parts of the corrupt practice
alleged, the same will not be allowed to be proved and those allegations
cannot be amended after the period of limitation for filing an election
petition, but the court may allow particulars of any corrupt practice E
alleged in the petition to be amended or amplified.

"Material facts" in Section 83 of the Representation of People Act,
1951 shows that the ground of corrupt practice and the facts necessary
to formulate a complete cause of action must be stated. The function
of the particulars is to present a full picture of the cause of action so F
as to make the opposite party understand the case he has· to meet.
Under Section 86(5) of the Representation of People Act ifthe corrupt
practice is alleged in the petition the particulars of such corrupt
practice may be amended or amplified.
G
(iv) An election petition is not liable to be dismissed in /imine because
full particulars of corrupt practice alleged were not set out. If an
objection was taken and the Tribunal was of the view that full
particulars have not been set out, the petitioner has to be given an
opportunity to amend or amplify the particulars. It is only in the event
of non-compliance with such order to supply the particulars, that the H
842 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

i.A charge which remained vague could be struck down".

The Court stated that rules of pleadings are intended as aids for a fair
trial and for reaching a just decision. An action at law should not be equated
with a game of chess. Provisions of law are not mere formulae to be observed
as rituals. Beneath the words of a provision of law, generally speaking there
B lies a juristic principle. It is the duty of the Court to ascertain that principle
and implement it.

Strong reliance was placed by learned counsel for the respondent on
Hardwari Lal before the High Court as well as before us. The High Court also
passed the impugned order on the basis of the said decision. In Hardwari
C Lal, an election petition was filed by the petitioner alleging corrupt practice
against the .successful candidate. The corrupt practice as adopted by the
returned candidate had been set out in paragraph 16 of the petition which
read as under-

D "That the responclent committed the corrupt practice of obtaining
and procuring or attempting to obtain and procure the assistance
for the furtherance of the prospects of his election from the following
persons who are in the service of the Government and belong to the
prohibited classes within the meaning of Section 123 (7) of the Act:

E I. Shri Chand Ram Rathi, Lecturer in Political Science, Government
College, Gurgaon.

2. Shri Guiab Singh, 8.A., B.Ed., Government High Court (School)
Jahlµ'sa (Gurgaon).

F 3. Pt. Bhim Singh, Assistant Sub-Inspector, Police Security Lines,
Lyton Road, New Delhi. ·

4. Ch. Chhattar Singh, M.A., 8.T. Teacher V and P.O. Bharai via
Bahadurgarh, District Rohtak.

5. Ch. Mukhtiar Singh, Inspector of Police, Delhi.
G
6. Ch. Raghbir Singh, M.A., 8.T., Chandigarh.

The respondent has written letters under his own signatures to
the above Government servants soliciting their help and assistance in
furtherarice of the prospects of his election," (emphasis supplied)
H
HARKIRAT SINGH v. AMARINDER SINGH [THAKKER, J.] 843
A preliminary objection was raised by the returned candidate that A
·.paragraph 16 did not give necessary particulars about the nature of assistance,
the place and date where and when such assistance was sought or received
from the persons named in the petition.

Upholding the preliminary objection and reproducing sub-section (7) of
Section 123 Of the Act, the Court stated that 'obtaining', 'procuring', abetting', B
or 'attempting to obtain or procure' assistance are different fonns of corrupt
practice. The Court stated;

"It has to be noticed that the different expressions obtaining, procuring,
abetting or attempting to obtain or procure are various forms of C
corrupt practices. It has to be found as to whether the allegation of
obtaining assistance amounted to an allegation of fact. It is well
settled that general expression like 'fraudulently', 'negligently' or
'maliciously' in pleadings do not amount to any allegation of fact. A
fact is after all not a mere word". (emphasis supplied)
D
According to the Court, the provisions of the section indicate various
heads of corrupt practice, such as, obtaining by a candidate or his agent or
by any other person, any assistance, or procuring such assistance or abetting
of such assistance or attempting to obtain or procure such assistance. The
material facts, therefore, were required to be alleged as to whether the candidate
obtained or procured or abetted or attempted to obtain or procure such E
assistance.

The Court stated;

"Reading Paragraph 16 of the election petition one will search
in vain to find out as to whether the allegations against the appellant F
are in regard to the assistance under both heads or either head from
each of the six persons mentioned there. One will speculate as to
whether the appellant obtained and procured or attempted to obtain
and procure assistance from each or some of the persons mentioned
there. Obtaining or procuring or attempting to obtain or procure G
assistance are separate and independent forms of corrupt practice.
One will guess as to whether the allegations are that the appellant
committed all or one or more of the corrupt practices of obtaining,
procuring, attempting to obtain or procure assistance from each of the
persons mentioned there. One will also conjecture and hazard as to
H
844 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A what assistance was obtained or procured or attempted to obtain or
procure from each of the persons mentioned there, for the furtherance
of the prospects of that candidate's election." (emphasis supplied)

Merely alleging that the respondent obtained or procured or attempted
to obtain or procure assistance are extracting words from the statute and it
B will have no meaning unless and until facts are stated to show what that
assistance was and how the prospect of election was furthered by such
assistance. According to the Court, material facts are ~acts which if established
would give the petitioner the relief asked for. If the respondent had not
appeared could the Court have given a verdict in favour of the election
C petitioner? In the opinion of the Court, the answer was in the negative
because the allegations in the petition did not disclose any cause of action.

Reference was made to another leading decision of this Court in Udhav
Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia, [1976) 2 SCR 246: [1977) l SCC 511. As we
have already seen above, both the Code and the Act employ the expression
D 'material facts'. Whereas Rule 2 of Order VI of the Code uses the term
'particulars', clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 83 of the Act uses the
phrase 'full particulars'. But, neither the Code nor the Act employs the
expression 'material particulars'. Though the phrase 'material particulars' had
been used by this Court in some cases [see Pratap Singh v. Rajinder Singh
& Anr.; [1975) l SCC 535: AIR (1975) SC 1045; D. Venkata Reddy v. R. Sultan
E & Ors.; [1976) 2 SCC 455: AIR (1976) SC 1599, probably for the first time,
distinction was sought to be made between the two in Udhav Singh.

Considering the ambit and scope of Section 83 of the Act in Udhav
Singh, the Court stated;
F "Like the Code of Civil Procedure, this section also envisages a
distinction between material facts and material particulars. Clause (a)
of sub-section (1) corresponds to 0.6, R.2, while clause (b) 257 is
analogous to Order 6 Rules 4 and 6 of the Code. The distinction
between "material facts" and "material particulars" is important because
G different consequences may flow from a deficiency of such facts or
particulars in the pleading. Failure to plead even a single material fact
leads to an incomplete cause of action and incomplete allegations of
such a charge are liable to be struck off under Order 6, Rule 16, Code
of Civil Procedure. If the petition is based solely on those allegations
which suffer from lack of material facts, the petition is liable to be
H
HARKIRAT SINGH v. AMARINDER SINGH [THAKKER, J.] 845

summarily rejected for want of a cause of action. ln the case of a A
petition suffering from a deficiency of material particulars, the court
has a discretion to allow the petitioner to supply the required
particulars even after the expiry of limitation.

All the primary facts which must be proved at the trial by a party
to establish the existence of a cause of action nor his defence, are B
"material facts". In the context of a charge of corrupt practice, "material
facts" would mean all the basic facts constituting the ingredients of
the particular corrupt practice alleged, which the petitioner is bound
to substantiate before he can succeed on that charge. Whether in an
election-petition, a particular fact is material or not, and as such C
required to be pleaded is a question which depends on the nature of
the charge levelled, the ground relied upon and the special
circumstances of the case. In short, all those facts which are essential
to clothe the petitioner with a complete cause of action, are "material
facts" which must be pleaded and failure to plead even a single
material fact amounts to disobedience of the mandate of sec. 83(1) (a). D

"Particulars'', on the other hand, are "the details of the case set
up by the party". "Material particulars" within the contemplation of
clause (b) of s. 83(i) would therefore mean all the details which are
necessary to amplify, refine and embellish the material facts already E
pleaded in the petition in compliance with the requirements of clause
(a). 'Particulars' serve the purpose of finishing touches to the basic
contours of a picture already drawn, to make it full, more detailed and
more informative."

The Court observed that the distinction between 'material facts' and F
'material particulars' was pointed out by the Court in several cases including
Hardwari Lal. We have gone through those cases and in none of those
cases, the distinction was drawn between 'material facts' and 'material
particulars'. What had been done by this Court was drawing of distinction
between 'material facts' and 'particulars' or 'full particulars'.
Q,
In K.M Mani v. P.J. Antony & Ors., [1979] 2 SCC 221, this Court
indicated that while alleging corrupt practice in an election petition, substance
of the allegation alone is material. The allegations ir.ust be read as a whole.
Precise material or contemporaneous record of the averments regarding
allegations should be produced. But, when it comes to proof, since commission H
846 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A of corrupt practice at an election is a very serious matter not only for the
candidate but also for the public at large as it relates to the purity of electoral
process and is in the nature of quasi-criminal proceedings, it must be established
beyond reasonable doubt and not merely by preponderance of probabilities.

In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, [ 1986] Supp SCC 315 : AIR (1986)
B SC 1253, it was observed that the law as to corrupt practice is well settled.
In the context of a charge of corrupt practice, it would mean that the basic
facts which constitute the ingredients of a corrupt practice alleged by the
petitioner must be specific in order to succeed on the charge. Whether in an
election petitiOn, a particular fact is material or not and as such required to
C be pleaded is dependent on the nature of the charge levelled and the
circumstances of the case. All the facts which are essential to clothe the
petition with complete cause of action must be pleaded. Failure to plead even
a single material f~ct would amount to non-compliance with the mandate of
Section 83(1 )(a) of the Act and the election petition is liable to be dismissed.

D The Court, however, drew the distinction between 'material facts' and
'particulars'. According to the Court, 'material facts' are facts, if established
would give the petitioner the relief prayed for. The test is whether the Court
could have given a direct verdict in favour of the election petitioner in case
the returned candidate had not appeared to oppose the election petition on
E the basis of the facts pleaded in the petition.

In S.A. Sapa & Ors. etc. v. Singora & Ors. etc., (1991] 3 SCC 375, this
Court held that Section 83(1)(a) stipulates that every election petition shall
contain a concise statement of material facts on which the petitioner relies.
It means that entire bundle of facts which would constitute a complete cause
F of action must be concisely stated in the petition. Clause (b) of the said
section then r~quires an election petitioner to set forth 'full particulars' of any
corrupt practice alleged against a returned can:lidate. According to the Court,
those particulars are obviously different from the 'material facts' on which the
petition is founded and are intended to afford to the returned candidate an
G adequate opportunity to effectively meet with such an allegation. The
underlying idea in requiring the election petitioner to set out in a concise
manner all the 'material facts' as well as 'full particulars', where commission
of corrupt practice is complained of, is to delineate the scope, ambit and limits
of the inquiry at the trial of the election petition.

H The Court also observed that the power of amendment granted by
HARKIRAT SINGH v. AMARINDER SINGH [THAKKER, J.] 847

Section 86(5) of the Act is relatable to clause (b) of Section 83(1) and is A
coupled with a prohibition, namely, that the amendment will not relate to a
corrupt practice not already pleaded in the election petition. The power is not
referable to clause (a) of Section 83(1) as the plain language of Section 86(5)
confines itself to the amendments of 'particulars' of any corrupt practice
alleged in the petition and does not extend to 'material facts'. It is clear from
the trinity of clauses (a) and (b) of Section 83 and sub-section (5) of Section B
86 that there is distinction between 'material facts' referred to in clause (a)
of Section 83 and 'particulars' referred to in clause (b) of the said section and
sub-section (5) of Section 86 aprilks to the latter and not to the former.

In Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat & Anr. v. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe & C
Ors., [1995] 5 SCC 347, the Court stated that Section 83 provides that the
election petition must contain a concise statement of material facts on which
the petitioner relies. He must also set forth full particulars of the corrupt
practice including as full a statement as possible of the name of the parties
alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of
the commission of each of such corrupt practice. The section has been held D
to be mandatory which requires first a concise statement of material facts and
then full particulars of the corrupt practice, so as to present a full picture of
the cause of action.

In L.R. Shivaramagowda, etc. v. TM Chandrashekar etc., [ 1999] I SCC E
666 : JT (1998) 8 SC 278, referring to Udhav Singh, the Court used two
expressions, 'material facts' and 'material particulars' and held that while
failure to plead material facts is fatal to the election petition and no amendment
of the pleading could be allowed to introduce such material facts after the time
limit prescribed for filing the election petition is over, absence of material
particulars can be cured at a later stage by an appropriate amendment. F
. In V.S. Achuthanandan v. P.J. Francis & Anr., [1999] 3 SCC 737, referring
to Udhav Singh, the Court drew the distinction between 'material facts' and
'material particulars'. It was observed that material facts are preliminary facts
·disclosing cause of action and they have to be specifically pleaded. Failure
to do so would result in rejection of the election petition. Defect in material G
particulars, however, can be cured at a later stage by amendment and the
petition· cannot be dismissed in limine on the ground of such defect.

In V. Narayanaswamy v. C.P. Thirunavukkarasu, [2000] 2 SCC 294: JT
(2000) I SC 194, again the Court discussed two phrases 'material facts' and H
848 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A 'material particulars'. Drawing the distinction between the two, the Court held
that while failure to plead material facts was fatal to the petition, absence of
material particulars could be cured subsequently.

In Hari Shanker Jain v. Sonia Gandhi, [200 l] 8 SCC 233, referring to
S.N. Balakrishna, the Court held that quoting the words of the section like
B chanting of a mantra does not amount to stating material facts. Material facts I
would include positive statement of facts as also positive averment of a ·-
negative fact, if necessary. Failure to plead 'material facts' is fatal to the
election petition and no amendment of the pleadings is permissible to introduce
such material facts after the time-limit prescribed for filing the election petition.
C The Court also stated that it is the duty of the court to examine the petition
irrespective of any written statement or denial and reject the petition if it does
not disclose a cause of action. To enable a court to reject a plaint on the
ground that it does not disclose a cause of action, it should look at the plaint
and nothing else.

D In Santosh Yadav v. Narender Singh, [2002] I SCC 160, the Court stated
that an election petition must set out all material facts wherefrom inferences
vital to the success of the election petitioner and enabling the court to grant
the relief prayed for by the petitioner can be drawn subject to the averments
being substantiated by cogent evidence. Concise and specific pleadings
E setting out all material facts and then cogent affirmative evidence being
adduced in support of such averments, are indispensable to the success of
an election petition. An election petition, if allowed, results in avoiding an
election and nullifying the success of a returned candidate. It is a serious step
and, therefore, an election petition seeking relief on the ground of corrupt
practice must precisely allege all material facts on which the petitioner relies
F in support of the plea.

In Mahadeorao Sukaji Shivankar v. Ramaratan Bapu & Ors., [2004]
7 SCC 181, dealing with 'material facts' and 'particulars', one of us (Thakker,
J.) stated;

G "Now, it is no doubt true that all material facts have to be set out
in an election petition. If material facts are not stated in a plaint or a
petition, the same is liable to be dismissed on that ground alone as
the case would be covered by Clause (a) of Rule 11 of Order VII of
the Code. The question, however, is as to whether the petitioner had
set out material facts in the election petition. The expression "material
H

'I
~
HARKIRAT SINGH v. AMARINDER SINGH [THAKKER, J.) 849
facts" has neither been defined in the Act nor in the Code. It may be A
stated that the material facts are those facts upon which a party relies
for his claim or defence. In other words, material facts are facts upon
which the plaintiffs cause of action or defendant's defence depends.
What particulars could be said to be material facts would depend
upon the facts of each case and no rule of universal application can
be laid down. It is, however, absolutely essential that all basic and B
primary facts which must be proved at the trial by the party to
establish existence of cause of action or defence are material facts and
must be stated in the pleading of the party.

But, it is equally well settled that there is distinction between C
"material facts" and "particulars". Material facts are primary or basic
facts which must be pleaded by the party in support· of the case set
up by him either to prove his cause of action or defence. Particulars,
on the other hand, are details in support of material facts pleaded by
the party. They amplify, refine and embellish material facts by giving
finishing touch to the basic contours of a picture already drawn so D
as to make it full, more clear and more informative. Particulars ensure
conduct of fair trial and would not take the opposite party by surprise."

As we have already observed earlier, in the present case, 'material facts'
of corrupt practice said to have been adopted by the respondent had been
set out in the petition with full particulars. It has been expressly stated as to E
how Mr. Chahal who was a Gazetted Officer of Class I in the Government of
Punjab assisted the respondent by doing several acts, as to complaints made
against him .by authorities and taking of disciplinary action. It has also been
stated as to how a Police Officer, Mr. Mehra, who was holding the post of
Superintendent of Police helped the respondent by organizing a meeting and F
by distributing posters. It was also alleged that correct and proper accounts
of election expenses have not been maintained by the respondent. Though
at the time of hearing of the appeal, the allegation as to projecting himself as
'Maharaja of Patiala' by the respondent had not been pressed by the learned
counsel for the appellant, full particulars had been set out in the election
petition in respect of other allegations. The High Court, in our opinion, was G
wholly unjustified in entering into the correctness or otherwise of facts stated
and allegations made in the election petition and in rejecting the petition
holding that it did not state material facts and thus did not disclose a cause
of action. The High Court, in our considered view, stepped into prohibited
area of appreciating the evidence and by entering into merits of the case H
850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A which would be pennissible only at the stage of trial of the election petition
and not at the stage of consideration whether the election petition was
maintainable.

We, therefore, hold that the High Court was wrong in dismissing the
election petition on the ground that material facts had not been set out in the
B election petition and the election petition did not disclose a cause of action.
The order passed by the High Court, therefore, deserves to be quashed and
set aside.

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal deserves to be allowed and is,
C accordingly, allowed. The order passed by the High Court is set aside. The
Election Petition No. 26 of2002 is restored to file, and is remitted to the High
Court to decide the same on merits. Since the election took place in the
beginning of 2002 and the petition was dismissed on preliminary ground as
not maintainable and is required to be decided ~n merits, the High Court is
requested to give priority :ind dispose it of expeditiously. In the facts and
D circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.

v.s.s. Appeal allowed.