HARSHAVARDHAN CHOKKANIversusBHUPENDRA N. PATEL AND ORS.

                                                                                    A
                        HARSHA VARDHAN CHOKKANI
                                    v.
                       BHUPENDRA N. PATEL AND ORS.

                              FEBRUARY 28, 2002
                                                                                    B
  [SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI AND DORAISWAMY RAJU, JJ.)


          Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960:

         S.10-Shop-Eviction of tenant-Original landlady gave shop on rent C
  to appellant-Landlady permiued appellant to carry on partnership business
  in the premises-Premises sold-Original landlady allorning the tenancy of
  the firm-Firm paying rent to purchasers-Later purchasers filing eviction
  petition against appellant-Appellant contesting the petition on the ground_
  that he was not the tenant and since the firm was tenant; petition was not D
  maintainable-Principal Rent Controller dismissing eviction petition-Held,
  by conduct of parties, firm had already become tenant of the premises before
  ils purchase-After purchase of the premises, the purchasers continued to
  receive rent from the firm and issued receipts in its favour-Eviction petition
  against appellant was not maintainable.
                                                                                    E
        S.22-Revision-Power of High Court-Held, power of High Court u/
  s 22 is wider than the power u/s 115, CPC-But powers of revisional court
  cannot be equated with power of appellate court-Situations wherein
  interference by High Court with finding of/act would be justified, explained-
  ln the instant case the appellate authority, after exhaustive consideration has   F
  rightly confirmed finding recorded by Principal Rent Controller that the firm,
, and not the appellant, was tenant of premises, which finding did not warrant
  interference by High Court-Order of High Court set aside-Eviction petition
  dismissed.

          CIVIL APP ELLA TE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6846 of                 G
  1999.

       From the Judgment and Order dated 19. 7.99 of the Andhra Pradesh
  High Court in C.R.P. No. 2236 of 1997.

          Dhruv Mehta, Ms. Shobha, Ms. Anu Mehta for S.K. Mehta for the             H
                                        133
     134                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A    Appellant.

          L.N. Raq, Jayanth Muthraj, K. Sudharshan and G.R.K. Prasad for S.U.K.
     Sagar for the Respondents.
           The following Order of the Court was delivered :
B         This appeal from the judgment of the High Court ofJudicature. Andhra
    Pradesh at Hyderabad in C.R.P. No. 2236of1997 dated July 19, 1999 is by
    the tenant. The respondents are the landlords of a non-residential building
   bearing No. 4-6-244 (Old No. 1883) Subhas Road, Subrie Street, Secunderabad
   which was earlier owned by one Smt. Pola Rajamaniamma who entered into
C an agreement of lease in regard to the ground floor of that building (for short,
    'the premises') with the appellant. She sold the premises in favour of
   respondent No. 1 and one late Babu Lal Patel whose legal representatives are
   respondent Nos. 2 to 7. After the sale Smt. Pola Rajamaniamma sent letter a
   attorning the tenancy ofM/s. Brij Mohan Chokkhani and Sons (for short, 'the
  ·firm') in favour ofrespondent Nos. 2 to 7. Thereafter the rent was being paid
D by the firm to the said respondents and receipts therefor were being issued
   in favour of the firm. While so the respondents filed eviction petition in the
   Court of the Principal Rent Controller at Secunderabad against the appellant ,
   on various grounds under Section 10 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent &
   Eviction) Control Act, 1960 for short, 'the Act'). The appellant contested the
E eviction petition, inter a/ia, on the plea that he was not the tenant but the firm
   was the tenant of the premises, therefore, the eviction petition of the appellant
   was not maintainable. The learned Principal Rent Controller held that the
   firm was the tenant and dismissed the eviction petition on December 31,
   1992. The respondents challenged the order of the learned Principal Rent
   Controller in the Court of the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, at
p Hyderabad (the Appellate Authority under the Act). That finding of the learned
   Principal Rent Controller was confirmed by the Appellate Authority and the
   appeal was dismissed on February 26, 1997. Dissatisfied with the said
   judgment of the Appellate Authority the respondents filed C.R.P. No. 2236
   of 1997 in the High Court. A learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed
   the civil revision petition by order dated July 19, 1999. It is against that order
G that the appellant is before us in appeal by special leave.
          Mr. Dhruv Mehta, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant
    contends that even before the attornment of the tenancy of the premises, in
    favour of the respondents, the firm alone was the tenant; the firm was paying
    the rent and the erstwhile landlady was accepting the same and passing
H   receipts in its favour. It was the tenancy of the firm but not the appellant that
                   HARSHA VARD HAN CHOKKANI v. BHUPENDRA N. PATEL                       13 5

          was attomed in favour of the respondents, therefore, the High Court has erred         A
          in holding that the appellant is the tenant of the premises. Mr. L.N. Rao, the
          learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents, has argued that merely
          by paying the rent the firm cannot become the tenant of the premises and that
          the letter of attomment does not carry the matter any further; because the
          firm was carrying on the business in the premises, the letter of attomment            B
          was addressed to the firm and that would not make the firm a tenant.

                The short question that arises for consideration is : whether the High
          court is right in interfering with the findings of fact recorded by the statutory
          authorities and holding that the appellant is the tenant of the premises.

                The question whether the appellant or the firm is the tenant of the             C
          premises is a question of fact. A perusal of the judgment under challenge,
          passed in exercise of power under Section 22 of the Act, shows that the
          learned Single Judge re-appreciated the evidence. In so doing the High Court
          took note of the factors : that under the terms of the agreement of tenancy
          between the appellant and the previous landlady he was permitted to carry on          D
          the business of a partnership; that the amount of rent was being paid by the
-   ..,   appellant before the constitution of the firm (however, it is also noted that
          thereafter the partnership firm was paying the rent); that the eviction petition
          was not filed on the ground of sub-tenancy; and _that maintainability of the
          application was not put in issue by the respondents.
                                                                                                E
                Taking the last ground first, a perusal of the order of the learned Principal
          Rent Controller shows that issue No. I is the relevant issue and it reads as
          follows :-

                  "(I) whether it is the respondent or the firm Brij Mohan Chokkani &
                  Sons who is the tenant of the suit premises?"                                 F
                 It is clear that the question who the tenant of the premises is, has been
          in issue and has fallen for consideration at all the stages of the case. Therefore,
          the High Court is not correct in proceeding on the assumption that the point
          was not put in issue. In regard to the terms of the rental agreement between          G
          the appellant and the erstwhile landlady, it is true that the appellant was
          permitted to carry on business of a partnership consisting of himself and
          members of his family but there exists a clear distinction between an individual-
          tenant carrying on a business of partnership in the premises and a partnership
          firm being the tenant of the premises. Granting permission to the appellant
          to carry on partnership business does not per se foreclose the question whether       H
    136                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     (2002) 2 S.C.R.

A the partnership firm is the tenant of the premises. It is true that by mere
    paying the rent, a person does not become the tenant and that fact, without
    anything more, will not be the determinative factor to hold that the prayer of
    the rent is the tenant because more often than not an agent, a servant or a
    family member of the tenant also pay the rent for the tenant. Even before the
    purchase of the premises by the respondents the firm was paying the rent to
B   their vendor, receipts for the rent were being issued in favour of the firm by
    her. By the conduct of the parties - the firm and the vender of the respondents
    - the firm had already become the tenant of the premises before purchase of
    the said building. This fact explains as to why the attornment of tenancy of
    the firm and not of the appellant was made in favour of the respondents.
C   Even after the purchase of the premises by the respondents, they continued
    to receive the rent of the premises regularly from and issue receipts in favour
    of the firm. It was nobody's case that the firm was the sub-tenant as such not
    filing eviction petition on the ground of sub-letting is an extraneous factor.

           There can be no controversy about the position that the power of the
D   High Court under Section 22 of the Act is wider than the power under
    Section 115 C.P.C. Nonetheless, the High Court is exercising the revisional
    power which in its very nature is a truncated power. The width of the powers
    of the revisional court cannot be equated with the powers of the appellate
    court. In examining th~ legality and the proprietory of the order under
E   challenge, what is required to be seen by the High Court is whether it is in
    violation of any statutory provision or a binding precedent or suffers from
    misreading of the evidence or omission to consider relevant clinching evidence
    or where the inference drawn from the facts proved is such that no reasonable
    person could arrive at or the like. It is only in such situations that interference
    by the High Court in revision in a finding of fact will be justified. Mere
F   possibility of a different view is no ground to interfere in exercise of revisional
    power. From the above discussion, it is clear that none of the aforementioned
    reasons exists in this case to justify interference by the High Court.

          For these reasons, we are unable to sustain the impugned order of the
G High Court. In our view, the Appellate Authority, after exhaustive
    consideration, has rightly confirmed the finding of the learned Principal Rent
    Controller that the appellant was not but the firm was the tenant of the
    premises, which did not warrant interference by the High Court. That being
    the conclusion, the eviction petition against the appellant is not maintainable.
    In the view we have taken, we consider it unnecessary to go into other
H   aspects of the case.
        HARSHAVARDHANCHOKKANI v. BHUPENDRA N. PATEL                     137

      In the result the order of the High Court, under challenge, is set aside A
and the eviction petition filed by the respondents is dismissod. The Appeal
is accordingly allowed but in the circumstances of the case without costs.

R.P.                                                       Appeal allowed.