Holding

The Labour Court may entertain complaints and grant interim relief under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act even before a final dismissal order is issued, because the statute is designed to prevent unfair labour practices at the stage of a firm step toward dismissal.

Summary

The predecessor of Hindustan Lever Ltd. served chargesheets on nine workmen who then filed complaints under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, alleging that the employer was engaging in unfair labour practices by initiating disciplinary proceedings that could lead to their dismissal. The Labour Court initially held the complaints premature, but the Bombay High Court reversed that view, allowing the complaints and granting interim relief. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the statutory language of Sections 28(1) and 30(2) and Item 1 of Schedule IV, concluding that the Act is intended to prevent unfair labour practices even at the stage of a firm step toward dismissal. The Court held that the Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain such pre‑dismissal complaints and to issue interim injunctions. Consequently, the appeal by the employer was dismissed, leaving the High Court’s order in place.

Issues considered

The Labour Court’s jurisdiction to entertain complaints under Section 28(1) of the Maharashtra Act when no final dismissal order has been passed.
Whether Section 30(2) permits the grant of interim relief in such premature complaints.
The proper interpretation of the phrases ‘has engaged’ and ‘is engaging’ in Section 28(1) and their scope under Item 1 of Schedule IV.
Whether unfair labour practice under the Maharashtra Act constitutes a penal offence.
Whether a mere threat of dismissal or a concrete step such as a departmental enquiry falls within the definition of unfair labour practice under Schedule IV.

Legislation cited

Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 25-T, s. 25-U, s. 2(A), s. 2(k)
Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971s. 27, s. 28(1), s. 28(3), s. 30(1), s. 30(2), s. 48, s. 7

Subjects

unfair labour practicelabour court jurisdictionMaharashtra Actinterim reliefpreventive reliefdisciplinary enquirystatutory interpretationsocial welfare legislation

Judgment

A HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD.
v.
ASHOK VISHNU KATE AND ORS.

SEPTEMBER 15, 1995
B
[G.N. RAY AND S.B. MAJMUDAR, JJ.)

Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions. and Prevention of Unfair
Labour Practices Act, 1971-Sections 28(1), 30(2)-Jwisdiction of Labour
Court~nfair Labour Practice-Complaints filed by workmen apprehending
c discharge or dismissal even prior to actual passing of orderr-Whether main-
tainable before Labour Court-Held, Yes.

Interpretation of Statutes-Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions
and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971-Social welfare legi.sla-
D tion-lnterpretation of-Construction.should be placed on relevant provisions
which effectuates the purpose for which such legi.slation is enacted.

The predecessor of the appellant - company served chargesheets on
Respondent Nos. 1 to 9 for certain alleged misconduct. Respondents
instituted complaint before the Labour Court alleging that the company
E has engaged in commission of unfair labour practices referred to in Item
1 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and
Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 and that in pursuance of
the show-cause notices, i~quirywas being conducted and they apprehended
that their services would be terminated. The respondents also filed ap-
F plications for interim relief u/s 30(2), seeking interim injunction restrain-
ing the e1!1ployer - company from continuing the unfair labour practices
complained of and from terminating the services of the respondents. The
Labour Court passed an ex-pmte injunction restraining the employer -
company from terminating the service of the respondents.

G The employer company contended that complaints were not main-
tainable and were premature and the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to
proceed with such complaints as jurisdiction of the Labour Court could
not be invoked under Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act as long as the
proceedings commenced by the employer- company were not terminated by
H orders of discharge or dismissal of the respondents.
702
HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. v. AV. KATE 703

The Labour Court upheld the preliminary objection of the employer A
- company and held that the complaints were not maintainable at that
stage. The respondent workmen filed Writ Petition which was summarily
dismissed by the High Court. On appeal, the High Court held that the
respondents' complaints were not premature and the Labour Court had
jurisdiction to entertain such complaints filed before the actual orders of B
dismissal or termination were passed by the employer. The order passed
by the Labour Court was set aside and proceedings were remitted back to
the Labour Court for disposal of the complaints on merits. This Special
Leave Petition had been filed challenging the decision of the Division of
Bench of the High Court. During the pendency of the appeal, appellant-
company was substituted in place of the petitioner as the original C
petitioner had merged with the appellant-company.

The appellant - company contended that the High Court was in error
in taking the view that the complaints filed by the respondent workmen
were maintainable even prior to the passing of the dismissal or discharge D
order ; that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction under the Ma~arashtra
Act to proceed with such premature complaints; that though the Act deals
with prevention of unfair labour practices nowhere in the Act the word
'prevention' was mentioned; that the High Court was in error in taking the
view that unfair labour practice is not a penal offence under the Act as
Section 48 of the Act made such unfair labour practice penal; that the E
Labour Court u/s 30(2) could pass appropriate interim order restraining
the employer from enforcing or calling upon the employer to withdraw
temporarily the alleged unfair labour practice of dismissal or discharge
of employee and it was not as if after discharge or dismissal, such ap-
propriate relief could not be granted by the Labour Court; that even F
though a chargesheet was served by the employer on the concerned
employee, there was still a possibility that it might not actually culminate
into any discharge or dismissal and, therefore, complaint against
proposed dismissal or dismissal would be premature.

The respondent employees submitted that the Maharashtra Act G
itself was enacted for prevention of unfair labour practices, as enumerated
in the Schedules and such labour practices on the part of the employers
or the trade unions of employees could be prevented in appropriate cases
by the concerned courts functioning under the Act, which would mean that
such complainants could be filed prior to the actual commission of the H
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A final act of the unfair labour practice complained of; that it was social
legislation; hence a liberal interpretation should be placed on the scheme
of the Act, with a view to subserve the purpose for which Maharashtra Act
was enacted; that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act fell short
of the achievement of goal of prevention of unfair labour practices and this
was sought to be achieved by the Maharashtra Legislature.
B
Dismissing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1.1. A conjoint reading of Section 28(1) and Section 30(1) of
the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair
c Labour Practices Act, 1971 clearly shows that complaint can be filed for
the alleged unfair labour practice as contemplated in Item 1 of Schedule
IV on any of the grounds mentioned therein, both at the stage where such
final orders of discharge or dismissal are passed on the concerned alleged
grounds and also at the stages prior to such final orders, __once the
employer is shown to have taken a firm step in that direction by initiating
D departmental enquiries with a view to· ultimately discharge or dismiss the
employee on any of the alleged grounds and such enquiries are presently
in progress or are presently in offing. Then the employer can be said to be
presently engaging in any such unfair labour practice. It becomes obvious
that the twin phrases 'has engaged' and 'is engaging in' indicate not only
E the finished, complete or continuous action but also an incomplete con-
tinuous action. [722-A-C]

Therefore, if an employer is alleged to be engaged in discharging any
employee then even before the actual order of discharge is passed he can
be said to be engaged in such discharge if it is shown that an attempt is
F made towards such a discharge with an intention to ultimately discharge
the employee. [722-G]

1.2. Item 1 of Schedule IV would cover in the sweep of general unfair
labour practice on the part of the employer even the initiation of proceed-
ings or taking any other firm step like suspension, towards discharge or
G dismissal of the employee concerned, which can be challenged on the
grounds mentioned in Item 1 of Schedule IV. Sucli initiation of proceed-
.ings or firm steps themselves would be the occurrence of the alleged unfair
labour practices and would give a cause of action to the complaint to file
the complaint under section 28(1) within the period of limitation as laid
H down therein. [723-D-E]
HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. v. AV. KATE 705

1.3. Once the Labour Court is given the powers in appropriate cases A
of passing interim relief of restraining orders as per Section 30 (2) it would
'. clear~y indicate the legislative intention that complaints regarding the
proposed dismissal or discharge on any of the grounds mentioned in Item
1 of Schedule IV could be filed before the Labour Court. In such com-
plaints the Labour Court in appropriate cases, in exercise of its powers
B
under Section 30(2) can issue interim orders with a view to preventing such
alleged unfair practices from getting fructified. Thus Section 30(2) also
highlights the legislative intent of providing an effective machinery to
prevent the finalisation of the alleged unfair practices which are required
to be nipped in the bud. [725-D-E]
c
1.4. Prevention of commission of unfair labour practice is the very
purpose of the Act. Prevention of unfair labour practice, as per the Act, is
aimed not only against the employers, but also against the employees and
their trade unions, if they are alleged to engage themselves in any of the
unfair labour practice mentioned in Schedule III. [727-E, H, 728-A]
D
1.5. Maharashtra Act is a social welfare legislation and in interpret-
ing such a welfare legislation, such a construction should be placed on the
relevant provisions which effectuates the purpose for which such legisla-
tion is enacted and does not efface its very purpose of prevention of unfair
~abour practice. [728-E]
E
If a wider interpretation is placed on the relevant provisions of Item
1 of Schedule IV, apart from not straining the language which even may
become permissible on the rule of purposive construction, the said con-
struction would fructify the very purpose for which the Maharashtra Act
was enacted. [730-E] F
Workmen of Anwican Express International Banking C01poration v.
Management ofAmelican Express International Bankin~ C01poration, [1985]
4 sec 71, relied on.

Chanan Singh v. Registrar Cooperative Societ es, Punjub & Ors., [1976] G
3 SCR 685, distinguished.

Franchis Bennion, Statutory Interpretati 11 (Sec< nd Edition), referred
to.

2. A mere threat to discharge or dismiss an employee if he joins a H
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A union by itself may be an unfair labour practice as per Item l(a) of
Schedule II thought the threat might not have been translated into any
attempt in the direction of discharge or dismissal. For the purpose of
attracting Item 1 of Schedule IV, apart from mere threat, some concrete
step like starting departmental enquiry has to be taken by the employer
before such an action can be brought in challenge by the concerned
B employee on any of the grounds mentioned in Item I of Schedule IV.
Consequently, merely because the legislature has not repeated the ter-
minology of mere threat while enacting Items of Schedule IV it would not
mean that before the final order of discharge or dismissal is passed on
any of the grounds contemplated by Item I of schedule IV, and only first
c step is taken in that direction, the unfair labour practice to discharge or
dismiss such employee on any of these grounds mentioned in Item I of
Schedule IV cannot be said to have taken place, or on that basis the
complaint would be premature. [731-F, 732-C-D]

3. When a contemplated action on the part of the employer to dismiss
D or discharge an employee on any of the grounds mentioned in that item is
firmly taken, the employee can as well show that this type of action on the
part of the employer is a habitual action or by way of a general practice.
But even apart from such a general practice, it can be alleged and
demonstrated that the employer is following such a practice at least for
E the complaint. It is not as if a practice which is not repetitive in character
can never amount to an unfair labour practice as contemplated by
Schedule IV, Item 1. [736-A-B]

Bharat Iron Works v. B.B. Patel, [1976) 2 SCR 280, distinguished.

F 4. Employers have a right to take disciplinary actions and to hold
domestic enquiries against their erring employees. But for doing so, the
standing orders governing the field have to be followed by such employers.
These standing orders give sufficient protection to the concerned employees
against whom such departmental enquiries are proceeded with. If such
G departmental proceedings initiated by serving of.chargesheets are brought
in challenge at different stages of such proceedings by the concerned
employees invoking the relevant clauses of item I of Schedule IV before the
final orders of discharge or dismissal are passed, the Labour Court dealing
with such complaint should not lightly interfere with such pending domes-
tic enquiries against the concerned complainants. The Labour Court con-
H cerned should meticulously scan the allegations in the complaint and it
HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. v. AV. KATE [MATMUDAR, J.] 707·-

necessary, get the necessary investigation made in the light of such com- A
plaint and only when a very strong prim a f acie case is made out by the
complainant appropriate interim orders intercepting such domestic en-
quiries in exercise of powers u~der Section 30 (2) can be passed by the
Labour Courts. Such orders should not be passed for mere askance ~y the
Labour Court. Otherwise, the very purpose of holding domestic enquiries
as per the standing orders would get frustrated. (737-G-H, 738-A-C]
B

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 8338 of
1995.

From the Judgment and Order dated 6.3.92 of the Bombay High
Court in A. No. 952/89 in W.P. No. 2286 of 1989.
c
G.B. Pai, O.C. Mathur, Ritin Rai, Mrs. Meera Mathur for JBD. &
Co. for the Appellant.

N.B. Shtye, O.C. Mathur, Mrs. Meera Mathur, for J.B.D. & Co. Ritin D
Rai for the Intervenor.

Ms. Indra Jai Singh, S.J. Deshmukh and Bharat Sangal for the
Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by E
MAJMUDAR, J. Leave granted.

By consent of learned advocates of the parties, the appeal is finally
heard and is being disposed of by this judgment.
F
The short question involved in this appeal centres round the Juris-
diction of the Labour Court functioning under the Maharashtra Recogni-
tion of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for short) regarding entertaining of
complaints filed under Section 28(1) of the Maharashtra Act .in connection G
with contemplated discharge or dismissal of the employees alleged to be
resorted to by the employer by way of unfair labour practice, as mentioned
in Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Act. The Labour Court in
which the complaints were filed took the view that such complaints were
not maintainable as the actual orders of discharge or dismissal were yet
not passed by the employer. The learned Single Judge of the Bombay High H
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Court confirmed that view, but the appellate Bench of the High Court
allowed the writ appeal filed by the respondent-workmen and took a
contrary view. That is how the employer is before us in this appeal.

BACKGROUND FACTS

B A few relevant facts are required to be noted at the outset. The
predecessor of the present appellant-company, Hindustan Lever Limited,
the Tata Oil Mills Company Limited served chargesheets on Respondent
Nos. 1 to 9 for certain alleged misconduct. Respondent Nos. 1 to 9
instituted Complaint (ULP) Nos. 90 to 98 of 1989 before the Presiding
Officer, First Labour Court, Bombay, alleging therein, inter alia, that the
c appellant's predecessor company had engaged in commission of unfair
labour practices referred to in Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra
Act. It was the case of the respondents in the said complaints that in
pursuance of the show-cause notices, inquiry was being conducted and they
apprehended that their services would be terminated. The respondents also
D filed applications for interim relief under Section 30(2) of the Maharashtra
act seeking interim injunction restraining the employer-company from
continuing the unfair labour practices complained of and from terminating
the services of the respondents. The Labour Court passed an ex-parte
injunction restraining the employer-company from terminating the services
E of the respondents.

The employer-company filed its written statements in these com-
plaints and among others it was ontended that complaints themselves were
not maintainable and were premature and the Labour Court had no
jurisdiction to proceed with such complaints as jurisdiction of the Labour
F Court could not be· invoked under Item 1 of Schedule IV of the
Maharashtra Act as long as the proceedings commenced by the employer-
company were not terminated by orders of discharge or dismissal of the
concerned respondents. The employer-company also resisted the com-
plaints on merits.
G The Labour Court by its order dated August 10, 1989, upheld the
preliminary objection of the employer-company and held that the com-
plaints were not maintainable at that stage. The Labour Court followed the
decision of the learned Single Judge of the High Court sitting at Nagpur
in the case of Divisional Commissione1; M.S.R. T. C. v. Presiding Office1;
H Industfial Cowt of Maharashtra, Nagpur & Anr., (1989) Mah. L.J. 798, which
HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. v. AV. KATE [MATMUDAR,J.] 709

had taken a similar view. A
The respondent-workmen filed Writ Petition No. 2286 of 1989 under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India . The learned Single Judge of the
High Court summarily dismissed the same on August 21, 1989.

The respondents carried the matter before the Division bench of the B
High Court in appeal, being Appeal No. 952 of 1989. The Division Bench
consisting of M.C. Pendse and S.N. Kapadia, JJ. allowed the said appeal
by its decision dated March 6, 1992, wherein Pendse, J. speaking for the
Division Bench, took the view that the respondents' complaints were not
premature and the Labour Court had jurisdiction to entertain such com-
plaints filed before the actual orders of dismissal or termination were
c
passed by the employer. The order dated August 10, 1989, passed by the
Presiding Officer, First Labour Court, Bombay, was get aside and the
proceedings were remitted back to the First Labour Court. Bombay for
disposal of the complaints on merits.
D
The employer-company filed Special Leave Petition (C) No. 9740 of
1992 in this Court challenging the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench
of the High Court. During the pendency of this special leave petition, by
I.A. No. 4of1995, the present appellant-company i.e., the Hindustan Lever
Limited, applied to be substituted in place of the original petitioner, the E
Tata Oil Mills Company Limited, on the ground that the original petitioner
had merged with M/s Hindustan Lever Limited. The said I.A. was allowed
and that is how the present appellant-company has prosecuted this appeal
by special leave. The Employers' Federation of India accompanied by M/s
Blue Star Limited, also filed I.A. No. 3 of 1992 seeking permission of this
Court for intervention as they were interested in supporting the petitioner- F
company in the special leave petition. That application for intervention was
also allowed. The intervenors have filed their written submission in support
of the this appeal. They have also appeared through their learned counsel
who was heard in this appeal.
G
RIVAL CONTENTIONS

Shri Pai, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the appellant- com-
pany and the learned counsel for the intervenors contended that the
Division Bench of the High Court was in error in taking the view that the
complaints filed by the respondent-workmen were maintainable even prior H
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A to the passing of the dismissal or discharge orders, as the case may be, and
that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction under the Maharashtra Act to
proceed with such premature complaints. In this connection, the learned
counsel submitted that a mere look at Item 1 of Schedule IV shows that
the complaints of unfair labour practice in connection with the activities
mentioned therein on the part of the employer necessarily contemplated
B final discharge or dismissal orders. They submitted that Section 28(1) lays
down the period of limited for filing complaints before the Labour Court.
The said period has to run from the date of alleged occurrence and,
therefore, the alleged unfair labour practice must occur by way of dismissal
or discharge before such complaint can be filed. It was next contended that
c though the Act deals with prevention of unfair labour practices, nowhere
in the body of the Act in any of the sections the word 'Prevention' is
mentioned. According to the learned counsel, the Division bench of the
High Court was in error in taking the view that unfair labour practice is
not a penal offence under the Act. Section 48 of the Maharashtra Act
D made such unfair labour practice penal. That the Labour Court under
Section 30(2) could pass appropriate interim order restraining the
employer from enforcing or calling upon the employer to withdraw tem-
porarily the alleged unfair labour practice of dismissal or discharge of
employee and it was not as if after discharge or dismissal, such interim
relief could not be granted in an appropriate case by the Labour Court.
E ·Reliance was also placed on the decision of this Court in the case of
Chanan Singh v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies Punjab & Ors., [1976] 3
SCR 685 for submitted that even though a chargesheet is served by the
employer on the concerned employee, there is still a possibility that it may
not actually culminate into any discharge or dismissal and, therefore,
complaint against proposed dismissal or discharge would be premature.
F
On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent-
employees vehemently submitted that the Maharashtra Act itself is enacted
for prevention of unfair labour practices, as enumerated in the Schedules
and such labour practices on the part of the employers or the trade unions
G of employees, as mentioned in Schedule II, III and IV, could be prevented
in appropriate cases by the concerned Courts functioning under the
Maharashtra Act, which would necessarily mean that such complaints
could be filed prior to the actual commission of the final act of the unfair
labour practice complained of. The submission of the appellant's counsel
H would make the very scheme of preventing unfair labour practice inopera-
HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. v. AV. KATE [MAJMUDAR, J.] 711

tive and otios. That the relevant provisions of the Maharashtra Act clearly A
contemplate filing of complaints not only against the final act of discharge
of dismissal of employees by way of unfair labour practice, but even at

-· stages prior to the final stage where the employer completes such an
exercise. That such was the view taken years back by the Full Bench of the
Maharashtra Industrial Court and which was followed by all Courts in
B
Maharashtra Functioning under the Maharashtra Act. That the view taken
by the Division Bench of the High Court was in consonance with the
scheme of the Act and fructified the said scheme. That it is a social
legislation hence a liberal interpretation should be placed on the scheme
of the Act, with a view to s1,1bserve the purpose for which Maharashtra Act
was enacted. That the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act fell short C
of the achievement of goal of prevention of unfair labour practices. This
was sought to be achieved by the Maharashtra Legislature by enacting the
provisions of the Maharashtra Act and consequently the interpretation
placed by the Division Bench of the High Court on the relevant provisions
of the Act and the final conclusion to which it reached deserve to be D
upheld.

OUR CONCLUSIONS AND THE REASONS FOR THE SAME

Having given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions, we
have reached the conclusion that the decision of the Division Bench of the E
Bombay High Court taking the view that complaints could be filed by the
workmen apprehending discharge or dismissal by way of unfair labour
practice as contemplated by the relevant clauses of Item 1 of Schedule IV
of the Maharashtra Act, even prior to the actual passing of orders of
discharge or dismissal is well sustained on the scheme of the Act. We now p
proceed to elaborate our reasons for the aforesaid conclusion.

Before we deal with the relevant provisions of the Maharashtra Act,
it would be necessary to note that in the State of Maharashtra, prior to the
passing of the Maharashtra Act, two Acts governing the relations between G
the employers and the employees in industries were already holding the
field. One Act was the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 ('B.l.R. Act'
for short) which applied to certain notified industries under the Act.
yarious protections were given under the B.I.R. Act to the workmen
covered by the said Act. But there was no provision regarding prevention
of unfair labour practices either on the part of the employers or on the H
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A part of the unions of employees. There was also a Central Act. Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 ('I.D. Act' for short) applicable to industries which
were not covered by the B.l.R. Act. The Maharashtra Act was ·passed by
the legislature on February 1, 1972, being Maharashtra Act 1 of 1972. By
that time industries which were covered by the I.D. Act, which was a
Central Act, also did not have the benefit of any provision regardin~
B prevention of unfair labour practices. Under the I.D. Act provision was
made for reference by an appropriate Government of any industrial dispute
between the employers and the employees for adjudication of competent
Industrial or labour Court, as the case may be. The "Industrial Dispute" as
defined by Section 2(k) of the I.D. Act could be referred for adjudication
c to the competent authority as per Section 10, if the persons applying for
reference represented majority of each party as laid down by Section 10(2).
"Industrial Dispute" as defined by Section 2(k) of the I.D. Act, 1947
provides as under :

'"Industrial Dispute' means any dispute or difference between
D
employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or
between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the
employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or
with the conditions of labour, of any person ;"

E Only with effect from 1.12.1965, Section 2(A) was inserted in the I.D. Act
wherein even an individual workman could raise an industrial dispute in
connection with his discharge or dismissal or otherwise termination of
service. For all other types of industrial disputes, a majority of workmen
had to support the dispute before the appropriate Government could refer
F it for adjudication of competent Court. However, in either case, reference
of such industrial dispute had to be made by the appropriate Government
under Section 10 of the I.D. Act. There was no provision for reference of
any industrial dispute under the Central Act, for preventing any unfair
labour practice, by the time the Maharashtra Act saw the light of the day.
It is, of course, true that by an amendment to the Industrial Disputes Act
G Chapter V(c) was added w.e.f. August 2, 1984, which deals with unfair
labour practice. The :"unfair Labour Practice" as defined by the I.D. Act
in Section 2(ra) means 'any of the practices specified in the Fifth Schedule'.
When we turn to the Fifth Schedule to the I.D. Act, we find the catalogu-
ing of unfair labour practices on the part of the employers, the trade
H unions of the employers and on the part of the wor~men and trade unions ,
HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. v. AV.KATE[MAJMUDAR,J.] 713

of workmen, which are almost pari-mate1ia with lists of unfair labour A
practices on the part of the employers, on the part of the trade unions and
general unfair labour practices on the part of the employers as found in
Schedules II, III and IV of the Maharashtra Act. However, even the
aforesaid amended provisions of the I.D. Act concerning unfair labour
practice nowhere provide for any reference of industrial dispute in connec-
B
tion with such unfair labour practice on the part of the employers which
can entitle the workmen or a body of workmen to seek a reference for
adjudication or for its prevention by any competent Court under the I.D.
Act, and all that a workman can do is to wait till the order of discharge or
dismissal is passed and then he can raise a dispute under Section 2(A) in
connection with his dismissal or discharge and if such dispute is referred c
by the appropriate Government for adjudication of the Labour Court
which is entitled to adjudicate upon such dispute as per the residuary Item
6 of Schedule II to the I.D. Act. then in such a dispute it can be shown by
the workman that his actual dismissal or discharge was a result of unfair
labour practice as laid down by clause 5 of part 1 of the Fifth Schedule to D
the I.D. Act. However, there is no provision for preventing any proposed
discharge of dismissal by way of unfair labour practice on the part of the
employer as per the statutory scheme of the I.D. Act, even after the
insertion of Chapter V(c) in that Act. On the other hand, more than a
decade before the aforesaid amendment was brought in the I.D. Act, which
fell short of providing for prevention of u~fair labour practice, the E
Maharashtra Legislature as early as in 1972 enacted the Maharashtra Act
providing for such prevention. Similarly as noticed earlier the B.LR. Act
also did not offer any remedy to the workmen to raise a dispute regarding
prevention of any unfair labour practice on the part of the employer who
had set in motion machinery for discharging or dismissing workmen by way
F
of alleged unfair labour practice. Thus, in the background of the then
existing lacuna both under the Central Act, i.e. the l.D. Act and the B.I.R.
Act regarding any provision for prevention of unfair labour practice, we
will have to examine the scheme of the Maharashtra Act which seeks to
provide a remedy for prevention of such unfair labour practices and to find
out how it supplies the lacuna and tries to achieve its goal. G

SCHEME OF THE MAHARASHTRA ACT

The preamble of the Act lays down as under : H
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A "An Act to provide for the recognition of trade unions for
facilitating collective bargaining for certain undertakings; to state
their rights and obligations; to confer certain powers on unrecog-
nised unions: to provide for declaring certain strikes and lock-outs
as illegal stricks and lock-outs; to define and provide for the
prevention of certain unfair labour practices; to constitute courts
B (as independent machinery) for carrying out the purposes of ac-
cording recognition to trade unions and for enforcing the
provisions relating to unfair practices; and to provide for matters
connected with the purposes aforesaid.

c WHEREAS, by Government Resolution, Industries and
Labour Department, No. IDA. 1367-LAB-II, dated the 14th
February 1968, the Government of Maharashtra appointed a Com-
mittee Called "the Committee on Unfair Labour Practices" for
defining certain activities of employers and workers and their
organisations which should be treated as unfair labour practices
D
and for suggesting action which should be taken against employers
or workers, or their organisations, for engaging in such unfair
labour practices;

AND WHEREAS, after taking into consideration the report
E of the Committee Government is of opinion that it is expedient to
provide for the recognition of trade unions for facilitating collective
bargaining for certain undertakings; to state their rights and obliga-
tions; to confer certain powers on unrecognised unions; to provide
for declaring certain strikes and lock-outs as illegal strikes and
F lock-outs; to define and provide for the prevention of certain unfair
labour practices; to constitute cour~s (as independent machinery)
for carrying out the purposes or according recognition to trade
unions and for enforcing provisions relating to unfair practices;
and to provide for matters connected with the purposes aforesaid;
It is hereby enacted in the Twenty-~econd year of the Republic of
G India as follows :........ .''

The preamble of the Act clearly indicates that the Maharashtra Act
is brought on the statute book with the avowed purpose of regulating the
activities of trade unions and for preventing certain unfair labour practices
H both on the part of unions of employees as well as the employer. As laid
HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. v. A.V.KATE[MATMUDAR,J.] 715

down by Section 2(3) of the Act, the Act has to apply to the industries to A
which B.l.R. Act, for the time being applies and also to any industry as
defined in clause G) of Section 2 of the l.D. Act and also to the State
Government which in relation to any industrial dispute concerning such
industry is the appropriate Government under that Act. Thus, the Act
sought to supplement and cover the field for which the concerned in- B
dustries governed by the then I.D. Act and B.l.R. Act did not get any
coverage and that field was obviously amongst others the field pertaining
to prevention of unfair labour practices as defined by the Act.

"Unfair labour practices" as per Section 3(16) mean unfair labour
practices as defined in Section 26. When we turn to Section 26, we find C
that it occurs in chapter VI dealing with unfair labour practices. It provides
that in this Act, unless the context requires otherwise, "unfair labour
practices" mean any of the practices listed in Schedules II, III and IV. That
takes us to the concerned Schedules.

Schedule II of the Act deals with unfair labour practices on the part D
of the employers. Schedule III of the Act deals with unfair labour practices
of trade unions of employees and then comes Schedule IV which deals with
general unfair labour practices on the part of the employers. As we are
directly concerned with Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act, it is necessary
to reproduce the said item with all its clauses at this stage. E
"SCHEDULE IV

General Unfair Labour Practices on the Part of employers

1. To discharge or dismiss employees- F
(a) by way of victimisation ;

(b) not in good faith, but m colourable exercise of the
employer's rights ;
G
(c) by falsely implicating an employee in a criminal case on.
false evidence or on concocted evidence;

(d) for patently false reasons ;

(e) on untrue or trumped up allegations of absence without H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A leave;

(t) in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice in the
conduct of domestic enquiry or with undue haste :

(a) for misconduct of a minor or technical character, without
B having any regard to the nature of the particular misconduct or
the past record of service of the employee, so as to amount to a
shockingly disproportionate punishment."
)

A mere look at Item 1 of Schedule IV shows that it would be a
c general unfair labour practice on the part of the employer to discharge or
dismiss employees on any of the grounds mentioned in, clause (a) to (g) of
this Item. On this aspect there is no dispute between the parties. The moot
question is whether the sweep of the item can cover any of the alleged
general unfair labour practices on the part of the employer, before the
D employer concerned actually discharges or dismisses the employee on any
of the grounds enumerated in clauses (a) to (g). Let us take an illustration
to see how this item operates. If an employer discharges or dismisses an
employee by way of victimisation it would be a complete unfair labour
practice on his part as contemplated by clause (a) of Item 1 of Schedule
IV. As we have seen above, the Act is enacted with a view to prevent such
E unfair labour practice. Therefore, the question squarely arises as to how
such an unfair labour practice of discharge or dismissal of an employee by
way of victimisation can be prevented. If it is to be prevented, it has to be
prevented from taking effect or getting completed. Therefore, the interven-
tion of the Labour Court can be sought where the concerned general unfair
F labour practice on the part of the employer to discharge or dismiss an
employee by way of victimisation has not resulted into its culmination but
it is in pipeline or process. Under the standing orders governing the
concerned industries, before an employee can be discharged or dismissed
on the ground of any misconduct, departmental enquiry has to be held.
G Consequently, taking the initial step towards the direction of discharging
or dismissing of any employee on the ground of any misconduct by issuing
a chargesheet can be said to be the first action taken by the employer
towards such ultimate discharge or dismissal of an employee. It can then
be said that the process of alleged unfair labour practice on the part of the
employer to discharge or dismiss an employee on ground (a) mentioned in
H Item 1 of Schedule IV is started or has got initiated or is triggered off by
HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. v. AV. KATE [MATMUDAR, J.] 717

the employer. If an employee can make out a strongplima facie case for A
interdiction of such a process, he can legitimately invoke the jurisdiction
of the Labour Court for preventing such an unfair labour practice from
getting fructified or completed. In this connection, it is necessary to note
that the general unfair labour practice on the part of the employers as
mentioned in Item 1 of Schedule IV pertains to different types of objec-
B
tionable actions based on grounds which are indicative of unfair labour
practices and any action based on such grounds with a view to discharge
or dismiss an employee is considered by the Act to be an unfair labour
practice on the part of the employer.

The Division Bench of the High Court for coming to its conclusion C
has heavily relied upon the words "to discharge or dismiss employees" as
found in Item 1 of Schedule VI. We find that the term "to discharge or·
dismiss 11 does indicate even attempted action towards such discharge or
dismissal. In this connection, we may profitably refer to the meaning of the
term "to" as found in various dictionaries as the said term is not defined by
the Maharashtra Act. D
In Concise Oxford Dictionary, New Seventh Edition, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, at page 1124, one of the meanings of the word "to" is mentioned
as under:
11
ln the direction of (place, person, thing, condition, quality, E
etc.; with or without implication of intention or of arrival."

In Collins English Dictionary, at page 1525, one of the meanings of
the word "to" is as under :
F
"used to indicate the destination of the subject or object of an
action: he climbed to the top 11 •

In Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Volume 41A, at page
418, one of the meanings of the word "to 11 is amplified as under :
G
"The word "to" means indicating anythi~g regarded as a ter~
minal point or limit in the direction of which there is movement
and at which there is arrival or in the direction of which there is
movement or tendency without arrival."

In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 5th Edition, volume 5, at page 2646, H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A one of the meanings of the word "to" is mentioned as under :

"(3) "To" wills often mean "towards." The plaintiff effected a
marine policy, subject to rules one of which was that ships were
not to sail from any port on the east coast of Great Britain "to"
any port in the Belts between December 20 and February 15. The
B plaintiffs vessel sailed on February 8 for a port in the Belts, and
was lost; held, that the rule in question was a warranty and not an
exception; and that the word "to" in the rule meant "towards" and
not "arriving at " (Colledge V. Harty 6 Ex. 205)

( 4) "To or towards": see R. v. M'Cmthy, [1903J 2 Ir. R. 156, cited
c INTIMIDATE."

It becomes, therefore, obvious that general unfair labour practice on
the part of the employer to discharge or dismiss the employee on any of
the ground listed in clauses (a) to (g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV would
D include any step towards or in · the direction of ultimate discharge or
dismissal of the employee on that ground and even before such discharge
or dismissal is finally arrived at. It is not possible to accept the contention
of the learned counsel for the appellant that discharge or dismissal of any
employee would only mean the confirmed acf of discharge or dismissal on
any of these grounds and not a penultimate step taken by the employer
E concerned in that direction on that ground. Therefore, on the express
language of Item 1 of Schedule IV the general unfair labour practice on
the part of the employer "to " discharge or dismiss an employee on any of
the listed grounds would include both the final act of discharge or dismissal
of employee on any of these grounds as well as any penultimate step taken
F towards that destination and object by starting the process of disciplinary
enquiry on giving the chargesheet to the employee and/or suspending an
employee pending or in contemplation of such enquiry and all further steps
during such departmental enquiry about which a complaint can be made
on permissible grounds.
G It was next vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the
appellant that if the very attempt on the part of the employer by initiating
departmental proceedings is tried to be covered by a complaint by the
employee on any of the grounds mentioned in clauses (a) to (g) of Item 1
of Schedule IV, then, some of the Clauses themselves would contra-indi-
H cate such a construction as they can be applied only at the final stage where
HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. v. AV. KATE (MAJMUDAR, J.] 719

such discharge or dismissal of the employee takes place. Clause (g) of Item A
1 of Schedule IV was pressed in service by way of illustration. It was
submitted that before this clause can apply it must be shown that the
punishment given is shockingly disproportionate to the charge and that
such an eventuality would arise only when the punishment in question has
already been inflicted. Now it is obvious that at the stage when such a
B
shockingly disproportionate punishment is given, this clause would certain-
ly get attracted, but that does not mean that it could not be demonstrated
even earlier, if there are facts available in a case, that for a trifle or mere
minor or negligible misconduct, the employer proposes to discharge or
dismiss the employee.
c
The learned counsel for the respondents has rightly given an example
where clause (g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV can apply even prior to the final
order of discharge or dismissal of an employee. It was submitted that if the
chargesheet itself alleges that the worker-employee did not get up when
the Officer entered his office and, therefore, it was proposed to discharge
the employee, even mere reading of the chargesheet can be pressed in D
service for submitting that the proposed enquiry is for imposing a punish-
ment shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct alleged in the char-
gesheet. Therefore, it is not as if when such a grievance is made, the Labour
Court cannot be approached for preventing such an unfair labour practice
from getting culminated and that the workman is to wait till such shockingly E
disproportionate punishment actually comes to be imposed. Then there
would be nothing left to be prevented. It would be like bolting the doors
of the stable after the horses have fled. We, therefore, hold that on the
express language of Item 1 of Schedule IV complaint can be filed for the
alleged unfair labour practice which is in the offing and towards which a
firm step is taken by the employer. It is in the light of the aforesaid scheme
F
of Item 1 of Schedule IV that we have to turn to the remaining relevant
sections of the Act.

Section 27 lays down as under :
G
"No employer or union and no employees shall engage in any unfair
labour practice."

Thus there is total embargo on the unions of the employees as well as the
employees and also on the employer on engaging in any unfair labour
practice. Once it is found that Item 1 of Schedule IV covers general unfair H
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A labour practices on the part of the employer consisting of not only final
discharge or dismissal of employee on any of the grounds mentioned in
Item 1 but also any action taken by initiating the process towards 'such
ultimate discharge or dismissal of the employee. Section 27 of the
Maharashtra Act gets attracted even at a prior stage when such unfair
labour practice is sought to be resorted to by the employer by engaging
B
himself in such an unfair labour practice. In other words, to take an
illustration, if it is alleged in a given case that the employer seeks to
discharge or dismiss an employee by way of victimisation and for that
purpose he has initiated the process of departmental enquiry by issuing the
chargesheet to the employee concerned, the employee concerned can
c legitimately urge that the employer is guilty of such unfair labour practice
in which he seeks to engage himself and, therefore, the prohibition
enshrined in Section 27 gets squarely attracted against him. It is not as if
that in such a case the employer can be said to have engaged himself in
any unfair labour practice of discharging or dismissing the employee by
D way of victimisation only after the ultimate stage is reached and the order
of discharge or dismissal sees the light .of the day. The prohibition against
engagement in any unfair labour practice as mentioned in Section 27 will
cover all stages from the beginning to the end, when the process which is
initiated by the concerned employer or the union in connection with the
alleged unfair labour practice starts and ultimately terminates.
E
The next Section which is relevant is Section 28(1) of the
Maharashtra Act. Section 28 was pressed in service by both the sides for
supporting their respective contentions. Section 28(1) contemplates types
of complaints which can be filed under the Act. So far as Item 1 of
Schedule IV is concerned, the competent Court as per Section 7 of the Act
F
will be the Labour Court as the said section provides that it shall be the
duty of the Labour Court to decide complaints relating to unfair labour
practices described in Item 1 of Schedule IV and to try offences punishable
under this Act, and the complaints regarding the rest of the unfair labour
practices can be dealt with by the Industrial Court under Section 5.
G
As per Section 28(1) any complaint regarding the general unfair
labour practice on the part of the employer to discharge or dismiss
employee on the grounds mentioned in Item 1 of Schedule IV can be filed
before the Labour Court. Such a complaint can cover both types· of
H grievances against the empl9yer; (1) that he had engaged in any unfair
HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. v.A.V.KATE(MAfMUDAR,J.) 721

labour practice and (2) or he is engaging in any unfair labour practice. The A
learned counsel for the appellant submitted that though the Act is enacted
with a view to prevent such unfair labour practices, there is no whisper
about such prevention in any of the operative sections of the Act. This
submission cannot be ·accepted in the light of the express language of
section 28(1) and the types of complaints contemplated by it, as aforesaid.
B
As per Section 28(1) of the Maharashtra Act an employee can file a
complaint against the employer on the ground that the employer has
engaged in unfair labour practice to discharge or dismiss employee by way
of victimisation etc. For the purpose of illustration, we may take clause 1
of item 1 of Schedule IV to highlight the scheme of this section. If an
employee files a complaint before the Labour Court alleging that the c
employer has engaged in unfair labour practice to dismiss or discharge him
by way of victimisation, it would contemplate a completed act, namely.an
order of discharge or dismissal that might have been passed, because 'the
term "has engaged" represents a present perfect tense, meaning thereby an
action which has got completed in presenti. The learned counsel for the D
appellant could have submitted with emphasis that the complaint could be
filed on the ground of alleged unfair labour practice on the part of
employer to discharge or dismiss an employee by way of victimisation only
after the action was completed and the discharge or dismissal was effected
on that ground if Section 28(1) would have contained only the word "has
engaged". But the legislature has conferred jurisdiction on the Labour E
Court to entertain the complaints also on the additional ground that the
employer is engaged in any unfair labour practice. This clearly indicates a
\ present continuous action as it reflects a present continuous tense. That
would include a complaint regarding the employer, who at present is
engaging in the alleged unfair labour practice by way of victimisation. That F
would indicate actions which are contemplated and in pipeline but which
are still not finally completed. If the learned counsel for the appellant is
right that only the final act of discharge or dismissal can be covered by the
sweep of Section 28(1), then the terminology used by the Legislation "or is
engaging in any unfair labour practice" would be rendered totally redun-
dant and otios, as such a completed action would already stand covered by G
the earlier phrase "has engaged in any unfair labour practice". Similar
words are found in Section 30(1) which deals with powers of the Courts
and provides that where the Court decides that any person named in the
complaint has engaged in, or is engaging in, any unfair labour practice, it
H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A may by its order give relief as mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of that
sub-section. A conjoint reading of Section 28(1) and Section 30(1) clearly
shows that complaint can be filed for the alleged unfair labour practice as
contemplated Item 1 of Schedule JV on any of the grounds mentioned
therein, both at the stage where such final order of discharge or dismissal
are passed on the concerned alleged grounds and also at the stage prior
B to such final orders, once the employer is shown to have taken a firm step
in that direction by initiating departmental enquiries with a view to ul-
timately discharge or dismiss the employee on any of the alleged grounds
and such enquiries are presently in progress or are presently in offing. Then
the employer can be said to be presently engaging in any such unfair. labour
c practice. It becomes obvious that the twin phrases 'has engaged' and 'is
~ engaging in' indicate not only the finished, complete or continuous action
•but also an incomplete continuous action.

In this connection, we may profitably look at what is said in Black's
Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, at page 528, about the term "Engage", which
D reads as under :

"To employ or involve one's self; to take part in; to embark on."

In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 5th Edition, at page 847, the term
E "engaged in discharging" has been dealt with as under :

"A lighter or craft is "engaged in discharging" ballast or goods,
within an exemption from dock dues, if she goes to the place of
discharge in the dock with the real intention of discharging there,
although, from the place getting too full to .take the ballast or
F goods, the vessel has to depart without making any discharge
London & India Docks Co. v. Thames Steam Tug, Etr;;., Co. (1909)
A.C. 15"

It becomes, therefore, obvious that if an employer is alleged to be
G engaged in discharging any employee then even before the actual order of
discharge is passed he can be said to be engaged in such discharge if it is
shown that an attempt is made towards such a discharge with an intention
to ultimately discharge the employee.

We may also refer to Section 28(3), which empowers the concerned
H Court on receipt of the complaint under Section 28(1) to cause an inves-
HINDUSTAN LEVER LID. v. A.V.KATE[MAJMUDAR,J.] 723

tigation into the said complaint to be made by the investigating officer, if A
thought necessary and direct that a report in the mater may be submitted
by him to the Court, within the period specified in the direction. Therefore,
it is not as if that the moment a complaint is filed the Labour Court can
mechanically pass an order intercepting the proceedings of any departmen-
tal enquiry. It can in appropriate cases even cause a preliminary enquiry
B
about the correctness of the allegations in the complaint through the
investigating officer.

Before parting with Section 28(1) an argument submitted by the
learned counsel for the appellant is required to be noted. It was submitted
that limitation for filing complaints under Section 28(1) is to start from the C
date of occurrence of unfair labour practice and that date of occurrence
of the alleged unfair labour practice could be only the date when the final
orders of discharge or dismissal are passed by the employer and are
challenged on any of the grounds mentioned in Item 1 of Schedule IV. It
is not possible to agree with this contention. As we have already seen
earlier. Item 1 of Schedule IV would cover in the sweep of general unfair D
labour practice on the part of the employer even the initiation of proceed-
ings or taking any other firm step like suspension, towards discharge or
dismissal of the employee concerned, which can be challenged on the
grounds mentioned in Item 1 of Schedule IV. Such initiation of proceedings
or firm steps themselves would be the occurrence of the alleged unfair -E
labour practices and would give a cause of action to the complainant to
file the complaint under Section 28(1) within the period of limitation as
laid down therein. It is not as if that the occurrence of unfair labour
practice can be only of one type, that is, the final order of discharge or
dismissal as assumed by the learned counsel for the appellant. The nature
of the order which the Court can pass on such complaint is indicated by
F
clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 30(1), which read as under:

"30.(1) Where a Court decides that any person named in the
complaint has engaged in, or is engaging in, any unfair labour
practice, it may in its order - G
(a) declare that an unfair practice has been engaged in or is
being engaged in by that person, and specify any other person who
has engaged in, or is engaging in the unfair labour practice :

(b) direct all such persons to cease and desist from such unfair H
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A labour practice, and take such affirmative action (including pay-
ment of reasonable compensation to the employee or employees
affected by the unfair labour practice, or reinstatement of the
employee or employees with or without back wages, or the payment
of reasonable compensation), as may in the opinion of the Court
be necessary to effectuate the policy of the Act :
B
(c) where a recognised union has engaged in or is engaging in,
any unfair labour practice, direct that its recognition shall be
canceled or that all or any of its rights under sub-section (1) of
Section 20 or its right under section 23 shall be suspended."
c Even this provision when read with Item 1 of Schedule IV shows that after
adjudication the Labour Court can declare that the concerned employer
not only has engaged in unfair labour practice, but is being engaged in such
unfair labour practice and such engagement in unfair labour practice
continues and has not ended. This also clearly indicates that the complaint
D can be made regarding the alleged actions of the employer which amount
to unfair labour practice, but which have not yet finally culminated into
ultimate orders but are in the pipeline or are being attempted to be passed
and proceedings are initiated for passing such ultimate orders which are
alleged to be contrary to Item 1 of schedule IV of the Maharashtra Act .
.E
Sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the Maharashtra Act lays down :

"In any proceeding before it under this Act, the Court, may pass
such interim order (including any temporary relief or restraining
order) .as it deems just and proper (including directions to the
F person to withdraw temporarily the practice complained of, which
is an issue in such proceeding), pending final decision:

Provided that, the Court may, on an application in that behalf,
review any interim order passed by it."

G The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that even if the final order
of discharge or dismissal is passed by the employer by v:ay of victimisation
as alleged by the employee, the Labour Court in the complaint regarding
such final order can pass interim orders of temporary relief or restraining
order. Still it would not rtile out the possibility on the part of the Labour
H Court of passing an interim o,rder pending the domestic enquiry if any of
HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. v. AV. KATE [MATMUDAR, J.) 725

the grounds mentioned in Item 1 of Schedule IV is effectively pressed in A
service by the employee against the employer. It is obvious that when the
final order or discharge or dismissal is passed and if it is found to be a
result of unfair labour practice as mentioned in clause (a) to (g) of Item 1
of Schedule IV, it is to be question and reinstatement is to be ordered by
way of mandatory relief. In such a case there would be no occasion of B
granting interim relief by way of prohibitory order or a restraining order,
as contemplated by sub-section (2) of Section 30. Such a restraining order
can be passed in a case where the complaint is filed at a stage where the
final orders of discharge or dismissal are not passed on any of the grounds
mentioned in Item 1 of Schedule IV. If such a complaint is ruled out the
provisions of Section 30 (2) would be rendered redundant and otios. When C
we keep in view the fact that as per Section 7 of the Maharashtra Act, all
the complaints pertaining to Item 1 of Schedule IV can be filed only before
the Labour Court and no other compliant regarding unfair labour practice
can be filed before the Labour Court, and once the Labour Court is given
the powers in appropriate course of passing interim relief of restraining D
orders as per Section 30(2) it would clearly indicate the legislative intention
that complaints regarding the proposed dismissal or discharge on any of
the grounds mentioned in Item 1 of Schedule IV could be filed before the
Labour Court. In such complaints the Labour Court in appropriate cases,
in exercise of its powers under Section 30(2) can issue interim orders with
a view to preventing such alleged unfair practices from getting fructified. E
Thus Section 30(2) also highlights the legislative intent of providing an
effective machinery to prevent the finalisation of the alleged· unfair prac-
tices which are required to be nipped in the bud. It the orders of the Court
whether final or interim are not complied with by the party against whom
such orders are passed, it can be prosecuted under sub-section (1) of F
Section 48, which lays down as under:

"48.(1) Any person who fails to comply with any order or the Court
under clause (b) of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section
30 of this Act shall on conviction, be punished with imprisonment
which may extend to three months or with fine which may extend G
to five thousand rupees."

Having seen the aforesaid relevant provisions, we may now consider
the main contentions canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant.
It was vehemently submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant and H
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {1995) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A also by the learned counsel for the intervenors that the High Court was in
error when it took the view that unfair labour practice is not punishable
under the Maharashtra Act. In this connection, our attention was invited
to Section 25-U of the Industrial Disputes Act which reads as under :

"Penalty for committing unfair labour practices. - Any person who
B commits any unfair labour practice shall be punishable with irc.-
prisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine
which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both."

Our attention was also invited to Section 25-T of the Industrial Disputes
Act which reads as under :
c
"Prohibition of unfair labour practice. - No employer or workman
or a trade union, whether registered under the Trade Unions Act,
1926(16 of 1926), or not, shall commit any unfair labour practice."

D When we keep the relevant provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act
concerning unfair labour practices in view and compare these -provisions
with the provisions of the Maharashtra Act, a clear difference becomes
obvious. Section 25-T of the Industrial Disputes Act prohibits an employer
or workman or a trade union from committing any unfair labour practice.
While so far as Section 27 of the Maharashtra Act is concerned, it prohibits
E an employer or union or employee from engaging in any unfair labour
practice. Consequently the prohibition under the Industrial Disputes Act
is against the commission of unfair labour practice which may include the
final acts of such commission. While Section 27 of the Maharashtra Act
prohibits the concerned party even from engaging in any unfair labour
F practice. The word 'engage' is more comprehensive in nature as compared
to the word 'commit'. But even that apart, Section 25-U provided for
penalty for committing unfair labour practice and mandates that whoever
is guilty of any unfair labour practice can be prosecuted before the com-
petent court on a complaint made by or under the authority of an ap-
propriate Government under Section 34(1) read with Section 25-U of the
G Industrial Disputes Act. So far as the Maharashtra Act is concerned, there
is no direct prosecution against a party guilty of having engaged in any
unfair labour practice. Such a prosecution has first to be preceded by an
adjudication by a competent court regarding such engagement in unfair
labour practice. Thereafter, it should culminate into a direction under
H Section 30(1)(b) or it may be a subject matter of interim relief order under
HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. v. AV. KATE [MATMUDAR, J.] 727

Section 30(2). It is only thereafter that prosecution can be initiated against A
the concerned party disobeying such orders of the Court as per Section
48(1). Consequently, it cannot be said that the Division Bench of the
Bombay High Court was not right when it took the view that the act of
engaging in any unfair labour practice by itself is not an offence under the
Maharashtra Act while such commission of unfair labour practice itself is
B
an offence. under the Industrial Disputes Act. However, this aspect is not
much relevant for deciding the controversy with which we are concerned.

As we have discussed above, the legislation intends to prevent com-
mission of unfair labour practices through the intervention of the com-
petent court and for that very purpose, the Act is enacted. This is clearly C
reflected by the provisions of Section 28(1) and Section 30(1) of the
Maharashtra Act.

As already discussed earlier, it is trite to say that if 'to discharge or
dismiss an employee by way of victimisation' is a general unfair labour D
practice on the part of the employer as laid down by Item l(a) of Schedule
IV and if such an unfair labour practice is to be prevented then action for
such prevention has to be taken prior to the ultimate commission of such
unfair labour practice. It is difficult to agree with the contention of the
learned counsel for the appellant that such prevention can be made only
after the actual order of discharge or dismissal of the employee is passed. E

..
At that stage there is no question of preventing the commission of such
unfair labour practice, but it would be a case of setting aside or quashing
such already committed unfair labour practice. It is difficult to appreciate
how a discharge or dismissal of an employee by way of victimisation can
be prevented after such discharge or dismissal has already taken place. p
Once such an unfair labour practice is completed and if final order is to
be set aside if would amount to curing the melody rather than preventing
it. As the saying goes 'prevention is better than cure', and that is the very
purpose of the Act. Or in other words, prevention of commission of such
unfair labour practice is the heart of the Act. The interpretation tried to
be put by the learned counsel for the appellant on the relevant provisions G
of Item 1 of Schedule IV would result in stultifying the very purpose and
scope of the Act.

We may also keep in view the fact that prevention of unfair labour
practice, as per the Act, is aimed not only against the employers, but also H
7253 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.CR.

A against the employees and their trade unions, if they are alleged to engage
themselves in any of the unfair labour practice menlioned in Schedule III.
Let us take illustrations of unfair labour practice on the part of Lhe trade
unions as mentioned in Items 5 and 6 of Schedule III which read as under:

"5. To stage, encourage or instigate such forms of coercive action:.
-
B as wilful "go slow" squatting on the work premises after working
hours or "gherao" of any of the members of the managerial or other
staff.

6. To stage demonstrations at the residences of the employers or
the managerial staff members."
c
It becomes obvious that if an employer files a complaint before the
Industrial Court under Item 5 or 6 of Schedule III that the Union is seeking
to stage, encourage or instigate such forms of coercive actions as wilful 'go
slow' or seeks to demonstrate at the residence of employers and if such
D an action is to be prevented a complaint has to be filed before the actual
demonstration takes place or actual 'go slow' policy is resorted to. Once
such an action takes place there would remain no occasion to prevent such
an action in good time. Consequently, on the .same lines it cannot be said
that unfair labour practice on the part of the employer also cannot be
prevented till the actual unfair labour practice gets committed by him. We
E have also to keep in view that the Maharashtra Act is a social welfare
legislation and in interpreting such a welfare legislation, such a construc-

-
tion should be placed on the relevant provisions which effectuates the
purpose for which such legislation is enacted and does not efface its very
purpose of prevention of unfair labour practice.

F In this connection, we may usefully turn to the decision of this Court
in Workmen of Anwican Express Intemational Banking C01poration v.
Management of Ameiican Express Intemational Banking C01poration, [1985)
4 SCC 71 :-vherein Chinnappa Reddy, J ., in para 4 of the Report has made
the following observations :
G "The principles of statutory construction are well settled. Words
occurring in statutes of liberal import such as social welfare legis-
lation and human rights' legislation are not to be put in Procrustean
beds or shrunk to liliputian dimensions. In construing these legis-
lations the imposture of literal construction must be avoided and
H the prodigality of its misapplication must be recognised and
HINDUSTANLEVERLTD. v.AV.KATE(MAJMUDAR,J.) 729

reduced. Judges ought to be more concerned with the 'colour', the A
'content' and the context of such statutes (we have borrowed the
words from Lord Wilberforce's opinion in Prenn v. Simmonds). In
the same opinion Lord Wilberforce pointed out that law is not to
be left behind in some island of literal interpretation but is to
enquire beyond the language, unisolated from the matrix of facts
B
in which they are set; the law is not to be interpreted purely on
internal linguistic considerations. In one of the cases cited before
us, that is, Surendra Kumar Venna v. Central Govemment Industrial
T1ibunal-cum-Labour Cowt we had occasion to say.

Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of "bread C
and butter" statutes, Welfare statutes must, or necessity receive a
broad interpretation. Where legislation is designed to give relief
against certain kinds of mischief, the Court is not to make inroads
by making etymological excursions."

Francis Bennion in its 'Statutory Interpretation' Second Edition, has D
dealt with the Functional Construction Rule in Part XV of his book. The
nature of purposive construction is dealt with in Part XX at page 659 thus:

"A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect
to the legislative purpose by -
E
(a) following the literal meaning of the enactment where that
meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose (in this
Code called a purposive-and -literal construction), or

(b) applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is
not in accordance with the legislative purpose (in the Code F
called a purposive-and-strained construction)."

At page 661 of the same book, the author has considered the topic of
Purposive Construction in contract with literal construction. The learned
author has observed as under :
G
"Contrast with literal constmction : Although the term 'purposive
construction' is not new, its entry into fashion betokens a swing by
the appellate courts away from literal construction. Lord Diplock
said in 1975 : 'If one looks back to the actual decisions of the
[House of Lords] on questions of statutory construction over the H
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A last 30 years one cannot fail to be struck by the evidence of a trend
away from the purely literal towards the purposive construction of
statutory provisions'. The matter was summed up by Lord Diplock
in this way-

' ...... .I am not reluctant to adopt a purposive construction where
B to apply the literal meaning of the legislative language used would
lead to results which would clearly defeat the purposes of the Act.
But in doing so the task on which a court of justice is engaged
remains one of construction, even where this involves reading into
the. Act words which are not expressly included in it.
c
Following the aforesaid rule of construction, therefore, we must hold
that the interpretation of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Act
as canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant and the intervenors
would frustrate the very scope and ambit of the Maharashtra Act, in
D effectuating the prevention of the alleged unfair labour practice. While on
the other hand, if a wider interpretation is placed on the relevant provisions
of Item 1 of Schedule IV, as discussed earlier, apart from not straining the
language which even may become permissible on the rule of purposive
construction, the said construction would fructify the very purpose for
which the Maharashtra Act was enacted.
E
Before concluding this discussion, we may refer to the judgment of
this Court in Chanan Singh' case supra on which strong reliance was placed
by the learned counsel for the appellant. Sh. Pai submitted that when.
merely a show cause notice is issued for taking action against an employee,
F if it is challenged in the Court, it would be a premature challenge. We fail
to appreciate how the aforesaid decision can be pressed in service by the
learned counsel for interpreting the relevant provisions of Item 1 of
Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Act. It the aforesaid decision, this Court
held that when a show cause notice is issued against punishment, a Writ
Petition under A~ticles 226 and 227 would be premature as there would be
G no grievance of punitive action which. can be ventilated in the Court. This
decision was based on the general principle that against mere show cause
notice, writ petition would be premature. The ratio of that decision cannot
be of any. assistance for interpreting the express language of Item 1 of
Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Act read with its other relevant provisions,
H which are meant to prevent the commission of unfair labour practice by
HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. v. AV. KATE [MATMUDAR, J.] 731

arming the appropriate Courts with jurisdiction to look into such com- A
plaints. For all these reasons, therefore, it must be held that the Division
Bench of the High Court was perfectly justified in taking the view that a
contemplated action for dismissal or discharge of an employee on any of
the grounds mentioned in Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Act
could be made the subject-matter of complaint before the Labour Court
B
under Section 28(1) of the Maharashtra Act. We have to keep in view the
fact that the Maharashtra Act is in the field since more than two decades
and even a Full Bench of the Industrial Court, Maharashtra by its unani-
mous decision dated September 28, 1984 had taken the same view and on
that basis numerous complaints were entertained by the Labour Courts in
Maharashtra over decades. It was only when a learned Single Judge of the C
High Court sitting at Nagpur, by his decision dated April 27, 1989 struck
a discordant note that the present controversy cropped up. In our view, no
fault can be fo~d with the reasoning adopted by the Division Bench of
the Bombay High Court for overruling the said contrary decision of the
Learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court sitting at Nagpur in Writ D
Petition No. 2607 of 1988.

Mr. Pai, learned senior counsel for the appellant, also argued that
Item 1 of Schedule II refers to the threat given by the employer to
discharge or dismiss the employees if they join the union. Thus, even a
threat is considered to be an unfair labour practice as per this Item. While, E
the unfair labour practice mentioned in Item 1 of Schedule IV does not
cover any threat but actual order of discharge or dismissal. It is not
possible to agree. The reason is obvious. A mere threat to discharge or
dismiss an employee if he joins a union by itself may be an unfair labour
practice as per Item l(a) of Schedule II though the threat might not have F
been translated into any attempt in the direction of discharge or dismissal.
Still, such a threat would constitute unfair labour practice, which can be
prevented by filing appropriate complaint before the Industrial Court
under Section 5 read with Section 28(1). But if the employer takes a
concrete step towards discharging or dismissing an employee on any of the G
grounds contemplated by Item 1 of Schedule IV, then it would not be in
the realr:. -~mere threat but would be translated into an actual action of
taking a calculated step towards such alleged contemplated unfair labour
practice by serving chargesheet and starting departmental enquiry and/or
putting the employee under suspension with the ultimate object in view. At
that stage the alleged unfair labour practice of engaging in discharging or H
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A dismissing the employee on the grounds contemplated in Item 1 of
Schedule IV can be said to have taken place. It is obvious that if an
employer merely threatens the employee to discharge him by way of
victimisation etc. and such a threat is not followed by any attempt by way
of starting departmental enquiry or taking any other concrete step as
aforesaid, such a simplicitor threat would not get cover by Item 1 of
B
Schedule IV. It would also not be covered by item l(a) of Schedule II, as
it is not a threat to discharge or dismiss an employee if he joins a union.
For the purpose of attracting Item 1 of Schedule IV, apart from mere
threat, some concrete step like starting departmental enquiry has to be
taken by the employer before such an action can be brought in challenge
c by the concerned employee on any of the grounds' mentioned in Item 1 of
Schedule IV. Consequently, merely because the legislature has not
repeated the terminology of mere threat while enacting Items of Schedule
IV it would not mean that before the final order of discharge or dismissal
is passed on any of the grounds contemplated by Item 1 of Schedule IV,
D and only first step is taken in that direction, the unfair labour practice to
discharge or dismiss such employee on any of these grounds mentioned in
Item 1 of Schedule IV cannot be said to have taken place, or on that basis
the complaint would be premature, as submitted by Shri Pai, learned senior
'Counsel for the appellant.

E At this stage, we may also briefly note some of the additional con-
tentions found in the written submissions filed on behalf of the appellant
and the intervenors. In the written submissions filed on behalf of the
intervenors it is contended that the infinitive "to", as mentioned in various
clauses of Item 1 of Schedule IV and in other Items of the same Schedule
F and also in other Items of Schedules II and III, would indicate only
completed action done by the concerned party. It is not possible to agree
with this contention. As ~e have discussed earlier, the word "to" would
include any action towards the final goal of the action. Schedule IV, as
noted earlier, speaks about the general unfair labour practice on the part
of employers. Therein barring Item No. 9 everywhere we find the user of
G the Infinitive. Same is the case with the wording of Schedule II barring Item
No. 6 and the wording of Schedule III. While dealing with this aspect, a
Full Bench of Industrial Court of Maharashtra, in its decision in Revision
Application (ULP) No. 2 of 1983, speaking through its learned Member
Gawande, has made the following observations in paras 11 to 13, which we
H wholly approve :
HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. v. AV. KATE [MATMUDAR,J.] 733

"..... The Infinitive with or without adjuncts may be used, like a A
Noun. When the infinitive is thus used, like a Noun, it is called the
Simple Infinitive. To discharge or dismiss merely names the action
denoted by the Verb discharge or dismiss, and is used without
mentioning any subject. The expression is, therefore, not limited
by person and number as a Verb that has a subject, and is, B
therefore, called the Verb Infinite, or simply the Infinitive. The
Infinitive is a kind of noun with certain features of the Verb,
especially that of taking an object (when the Verb is transitive)
and adverbial qualifiers. In short, the Infinitive is a Verb-noun (and
is called a Gerund). A Gerund is that form of the Verb which ends
in-ing, and has the force of a Noun and a Verb: it is a Verbal C
Noun. The word to is frequently used with the Infinitive, but is not
as essential part or sign of it. The Infinitive may be active or
passive. When active, it may have a present and a perfect form,
and may merely name the act, or it may represent pl"ogressive or
continued action. Then comes the question of Tense. Here I wish D
to elaborate by taking an illustration thus: (1) I speak-The Verb
shows that the action is mentioned simply, without anything being
said about the completeness or incompleteness of the action. Here
the Tense is Pre~ent Indefinite. (2) I am speaking -The Verb shows
that the action is mentioned as incomplete or continuous, that is,
as still going on. Here the Tense is Present Continuous. (3) I have E
_spoken-The Verb Shows that the action is mentioned as finished,
complete or perfect at the time of speaking. Here the Tense is
Present Perfect. (4) I have been speaking-The Verb shows that the
action is going on continuously, and not completed at this present
moment. Here the Tense is Present Perfect Continuous. F

12. Against the background of the above when we read Item 1 of
Schedule IV to the Act, text of which has been already reproduced,
it becomes evident that Item 1 starts with the phrase- To discharge
or dismiss employees. Thereafter we get as many as seven sub-
items (a) to (g). If we were to put only the literal Construction on G
the entire wording of Item 1 of Schedule IV, it becomes clear that
in a given case if the alleged unfair labour practice is that of
discharge or dismissal of the employee under all the sub-items i.e.
from (a) to (g) or either of them, the Labour Court has jurisdiction
to entertain such a complaint under Section 28 of the ·Act. In H
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A adverting to the Literal Construction and in accepting the inter-
pretation ·flowing therefrom, it becomes clear that the action con-
templated on the part of the employer here is an action complete
in itself. In other word, if the employer were to discharge or dismiss
an employee under all the aforesaid sub-items or either of them,
the Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain a complaint. Implicit
B in this is the fact that the employer-employee relationship is
severed by an order of discharge or dismissal, before the lodging
of the complaint. That such a complaint will lie, that such a
complaint is competent and that the Labour Court has jurisdiction
to entertain such a complaint are points in respect of which the
c contenders before us do not join issue.

13. However, the question posed for the determination of the Full
Bench is wide. After taking into consideration the interpretation
-aspect as also the grammar-aspect, I am of the view that it will
not be proper to put a mere Literal Construction on the wording
D of Item 1 of Schedule IV to the Act. I have no doubt in my mind
in observing that here the language is not plain. It does not admit
to but one meaning. Therefore, one would be justified in adverting
to the Mischief Rule also the Golden Rule while interpreting the
words appearing in Item 1 of Schedule IV. I may further observe
E that in doing so, if the choice is between two interpretations, the
narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of
the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce
the legislation to futility. In such a situation we should rather accept
the bolder construction based on the view that the legislature
would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective
F result. Further, as observed earlier, where alternative constructions
are equally open, that alternative is to be chosen which will be
consistent with the smooth working of the system which the Statute
purports to b e regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected
which will introduce uncertainly, friction or confusion into the
working of the system. Lastly, it cannot be forgotten that the
G Statute shall have to be read as a whole".

The aforesaid observations in Full Bench judgment of Maharashtra
Tribunal arc well sustained on the scheme of the Act, which we have
discussed earlier. Consequently, it is not possible to agree with the written
H · submission on behalf of the intervenors that only completed actions are

t I
HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. v. AV. KATE [MAJMUDAR, J.] 735

contemplated by the concerned clauses of Item 1 of Schedule IV. They, on A
the contrary, suggest that complaint can be filed not only when the final
act of unfair labour practice is committed, but even at a stage where any
firm action is taken towards reaching the final goal of discharging or
dismissing an employee on any of the grounds mentioned in clauses (a) to
(g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV. So far as the other items of Schedule IV are
B
concerned, it is difficult to appreciate how a complaint cannot be filed if
the concerned employer has taken a firm step towards the ultimate object
of completing the alleged unfair labour practice as mentioned in Items 2
to 10 of the said Schedule.

Reliance placed on the Whisper University Law Dictionary defining C
the term "dismiss" also is of no avail as though the word "dismiss" may
indicate performance of a completed action, any unfair labour practice to
dismiss, as discussed earlier, would include any firm step or attempt made
towards the ultimate goal of dismissing the concerned workman.
D
Submission made on the scheme of Section 30(2) to the effect that
interim order can be passed in connection with the practice complained
of, also cannot advance the case of the appellant for the simple reason that
if the practice complained of is of any firm step taken by the employer
towards the ultimate object of dismissing or discharging the employee on
any of the grounds covered by clauses (a) to (g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV, E
interim relief can be granted in connection with such practice complained
of and would not mean that till the practice gets fructified and translated
into final act of dimissal or discharge, the Labour Court cannot pass
appropriate interim relief orders under Section 30(2) as submitted in the
written submissions. p

We may also briefly refer to the summary of arguments by Shri G.B.
Pai on behalf of the appellant as filed on 4.9.1995.Most of the submissions
contained therein are already dealt with by us in the earlier part of this
judgment. However, some additional aspects mentioned therein are re-
quired to be considered. In paragraph IV (i) it is submitted that the term G
"unfair labour practice" denotes a habitual practice by the employer, and
not isolated events. For that purpose, emphasis is placed on the dictionary
meaning of the words "practice" which means often, customarily or
habitually. It is true that the word "practice" connotes repeated events but
that will not affect the construction to be placed on the words "unfair H
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A labour practice to dismiss or discharge" as implied in Item 1 of Schedule
IV. When a contemplated action on the part of the employer to dismiss or
discharge an employee on any of the grounds meQ.tioned in that item is
firmly taken, the employee can as well show that this type of action on the
part of the employer is a habitual action or by way of a general practice.
But even apart from such a general practice, it can be alleged and
B
demonstrated that the employer is following such a practice at least for the
complainant. It is not as if a practice which is not repetitive in character
can never amount to an unfair labour practice as contemplated by Schedule
IV, Item 1. In fact, whether such an alleged practice should be based on
repetitive ·acts or a single act is strictly not relevant for deciding the·
c question whether an attempt towards commission of such a practice, when
the final order of dismissal or discharge has not been passed, can be made
subject-matter of the complaint under the Maharashtra Act.

Similarly, contention found in paragraph IV(ii) that the words "dis-
D charge or dismissal" mean the final order of sending away or removing a
person also cannot be of any assistance to the appellant for the simple
reason that we are not concerned with the connotation of the words
"dismiss or discharge". The question is whether an attempt towards ul-
timate dismissal or discharge by way of taking a firm step towards it can
be the subject-matter of a complaint under the Maharashtra Act. For
E deciding that question the entire scheme of the Act becomes relevant
including its preamble, as discussed earlier. No conclusion can be based
only on the meaning of the words "discharge or dismissal" as tried to be
suggested. Similarly, contention in sub-paragraph (vii) of paragraph IV
relying on a decision of this Court in Bharat Iron Works v. B.B. Patel, [1976]
F 2 SCR 280 is also of no assistance to the appellant as the said decision
refers to the nature of proof required for proving the allegation of mala
fide or victimisation. That stage would come once the complaint on the
ground of victimisation is taken up for consideration on merits at final
hearing stage or at stage of interim relief, as the case may be.

G The submission made in paragraph V(i) on the construction of the
words "is engaging in" as found in Section 28 also cannot be countenanced
for the simple reason that even in the said paragraph, it is mentioned that
some of the unfair labour practices may b.e of continuing nature and for
that purpose emphasis is placed on some of the items mentioned in
H Schedules II, III and IV. However, even from the scheme of the schedules
HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. v. AV. KATE [MAfMUDAR, J.] 737

it becomes clear that any present continuous act of engaging in the alleged A
unfair labour practice would be covered by the term "is engaging in". We
have already discussed in detail the correct connotation of these words in
the earlier part of this judgment. For the reasons recorded by us therein,
this submission is found to be devoid of any substance. In sub-paragraph
(iii) of paragraph V. it is submitted that the aim of prevention is achieved
B
by:

(a) directing the employer as an interim measure to withdraw the
practice complained of and if the complaint is proved, in the final
order of quashing the order of dismissal, and also.

(b) by prescribing a penalty which penalty is to act as a deterrent
c
and prevent the commission of unfair labour practice.

We fail to appreciate how this will affect the correct connotation of the
word "prevention". If the alleged unfair labour practice of discharge or
dismissal of an employee is to be prevented, then as discussed earlier, it D
must necessarily contemplate an intervention of the competent Labour
Court at a stage prior to the actual commission of such unfair labour
practice.

Reference made in paragraph VI to the Bombay High Court's judg- E
ments also cannot be of any avail as they were based on the view which
was accepted by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay at
Nagpur which has rightly been overturned by the Division Bench of the
Bombay High Court in the Judgment under appeal on a correct interpreta-
tion of the relevant provisions of the Act. Therefore, the earlier view taken
by the learned single Judges of the Bombay High Court cannot be said to F
be well- sustained. For all these reasons, the '1ppellant has made out no
case for our interference in this appeal.

Before parting with this case, however, we must strike a note of
caution, as has been done by the Division Bench of the Bombay High
Court. It could not be gainsaid that the employers have a right to take G
disciplinary actions and to hold domestic enquiries against their erring
employees. But for doing so, the standing orders governing the field have
to be followed by such employers. These standing orders give sufficient
protection to the concerned employees against whom such departmental
enquiries are proceeded with. If such departmental proceedings initiated H
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A by serving of chargesheets are brought in challenge at different stages of
such proceedings by the concerned employees invoking the relevant clauses
of item I of schedule IV before the final orders of discharge or dismissal
are passed, the Labour Court dealing with such complaint should not
lightly interfere with such pending domestic enquiries against the con-
cerned complainants. The Labour Court concerned should meticulously
B
scan the allegations in the complaint and if necessary, get the necessary
investigation made in the light of such complaint and only when a very
strongprima facie case is made out by the complainant appropriate interim
orders intercepting such domestic enquiries in exercise of powers under
Section 30(2) can be passed by the Labour Courts. Such orders should' not
C be passed for mere askance by the Labour Courts. Otherwise, the very
purpose of holding domestic enquiries as per the standing orders would
get frustrated.
/
'In the r~sult, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

RA. Appeal ~smissed.

•