HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTDversusYASHWANT GAJANAN JOSHI AND ORS.

          HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD.
A
                            v.  0

             YASHWANT G AJANAN JOSHI AND ORS.

                            DECEMBER 5, 1990

B            [S. RANGANATHAN, N.M. KASLIWAL AND
                       S.C. AGRAWAL, JJ.]

          Petroleum and Minerals Pipeline (Acquisition of Right of User In
    Land) Act, 1962-Sections 2(a), 7 to 10--'Competent Authoricy'
    employee of contesting parties-Whether fit for appointment-Whether
    violative of principles of natural justice.
c
          The appellant corporation took steps under the Petroleum and
    Minerals Pipeline (Acquisition of Right of User in land) Act, 1962 for
    laying down pipelines for a project called the Bombay-Pone Pipeline
    Project. One Mrs. A.R. Gadre, Special Land Officer in the office of
D   Competent Authority was appointed as competent authority by the
    Government of India. One of the duties of the Competent Authority was
    to determine the compensation which would be payable to those whose
    proprietary rights were affected by laying down of pipes by the
    Corporation.

E         The respondent who was claiming compensation filed a petition in
    the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the
    appointment of Mrs. Gadre as competent authority on the ground that
    the principles of natural jnstice required a feeling in both the parties
    that justice would be done as between them. The High Court allowed
    the writ petition and directed the Union of India to appoint another
F   competent authority who shall not be an employee of the corporation.

          Two special leave petition~ were tiled agaillst the judgment of lhe
    High Court, one by the Corporation and the other by the Union of
    India.

G         Before this Court it was contended that the special leave petition
    filed by the Union of India was barred hy limitation, and that the
    special leave petition filed hy the Corporation was not maintainable,
    specially when the special leave petition filed by the Union of India
    stood dismissed, because Union of India alone was the interested party.

H         On merits it was contended that (i) there was no question Of the

                                       434
                          H.P. CORPN. v. Y.G. JOSHI                         435

  violation of any principle of natural justice nor there WaS any question         A
  of bias in case any employee of the corporation was appointed as com-
  petent authority under the Act; (ii) that there was no perslinai interest
  of the Competent Authurlty in the subject matter of the litigation;
. namely in the determination of compensation, and as such the printiple
  that no person could be a judge In his own cause was not applicable li1
  the present case; (iii) determination of compensation by the Competent           13
  Authority in the first Instance was purely an administrative act by
  which the rights uf the parties were not determined by the competent
  authority; and (iv) the provisions li1 this Act were analogous iO those
  under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in which case the amount of
  compensation payable by the Government was, li1 the first instance,
  determihed by tbe Officer of the Government itself.

        Ott behalf bf the respondent it was contended that (I) the deter-
 llllnatlM of compensation by the competent authority was a quasi•
 judicial act and not an administrative act; (ii) the persons or authorities
 ap1>ointed under varioils other Acts were appoli1ted by virtue of theif
 holding some office or post and their orders were appealable to the               {j
 higher authorities; (iii) where a discretion was given to the Central
 Government for appointing the competent authority, then such discre-
 tion should nut he exercised by appointing a person or authority who
 111ay he in tbe employment of the body or authority for whose benefit lhe
 pipelines were laid; (iv) while determining the questiori of bias the test
 was hot whether li1 fact bias had affected the judgment but the test              E
 always Was illld must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend
 thnt ii bias might operate against him in the decisiott of the subject
 111att~r lif the dispute.

       Dismissing the appelii, this Court,

       HELi): (1) In view of the fact that the High Court bad rembved
 Mrs. Gadre from actli1g as competent authority on the ground that she
 was fin employee of the corporation and further given direction that any
 Suitable person be appointed as competent authority but not an
 ~mployee of the corporation, there was an independent cause of grie-
 vance to the corporation, and therefore the special leave petition collld         o
 be fded by the corporation. [438D]

       (2) No one shall be a judge li1 his own cause only means that he
 should not have personlll li1terest in the cause he bas t<i adjudicilte. [441FJ

       (3) There Is no provision li1 the Act prohibiting the Central               H
    436         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

A   Government to make an appointment of an employee of the Corpora-
    tion as competent authority. [444G I

         (4) The scheme of the Act shows that a competent authority has to
    discharge various and diverse duties under the Act. Such person
B   becomes a better qualified and experienced person equipped with a
    proper back&ronnd to decide the amount of compensation also. [444H-4458]

          (S) A party is entitled to raise the ground of bias against the
    appointment of an Individual omcer as competent authority on suffi-
    cient material placed on record in this regard, but not merely because
    such competent authority was an employee of the Corporation. [44SF]
c
          (6) It would be too broad a proposition to extend the theory of
    bias to exclude a person only because such a person draws salary from
    the bodies like a public corporation, State Government or Central
    Government. It would altogether be a different matter if it was a case of
    a private employer and his employees. [44SG-H]
0
         Metroplitan Properties Co. Ltd. v. Lannon and Ors., [1968] 3 All
    England Reports 304; G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow & Ors.,
    [1977] 1SCR64; International Airports Authority of India v. K.D. &
    Anr., [1988] 2 SCC 360, distinguished.
E          (7) In this case, compensation was decided by the Additional Dis·
    trict Judge in favour of the respondent. Mrs. A.R. Gadre in her own
    name filed a writ petition challenging the legality of the award passed
    by the Additional District Judge.                               -
         (8) Taking in view the entire facts and circumstances of the case,
F the respondent was right in contending that Mrs. A.R. Gadre may have
  bias while determining the amount of compensation as she herself Is a
  litigating party in this very matter in the High Court against the respon-
  dent. An apprehension thus in the mind of the respondent is well
  founded and on this ground there is no justification to interfere with the
  order of the High Court holding that the appointment of Mrs. Gadre
G was not valid. However, it does not mean an agreement with the general
  proposition of the High Conrt that an officer of the corporation cannot
  be appointed as a 'competent authority' because be may be biased in
  favour oftbe corporation by reason of bis employment. [446C, E·G]

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5916
H   of 1990.
              H.P. CORPN. v. Y.G. JOSHI [KASLIWAL, J.]           437

     From the Judgment and Order dated 26.4.1989 of the Bombay
                                                                       A
High Court in Writ Petition No. 5601of1988.

      Shanti Bhushan, K. Lahiri, S.K. Dholakia, R.P. Kapur, Sanjay
Kapur, T.V.S.N. Chari and A.M. Khanwilkar for the appearing
parties.
                                                                       B
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      KASLIWAL, J. Special leave granted in S.L.P. (Civil) No. 10124
of 1989. This appeal by special leave has been filed by Hindustan
Petroleum Corporation Limited (herein referred to as the Corpora-
tion) against the Judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 26th
 April, 1989. The Corporation took steps under the Petroleum and C
Minerals Pipeline (acquisition of right of user in land) Act, 1962
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') for laying down pipelines for a
project called the Bombay-Pune pipeline project. One Mrs. A.R.
Gadre, Special Land Officer in the office of Competent Authority was
appointed as competent authority by the Government of India vide D
Notification No. P-32115/2/87 dated 6.6. 1988. Shri Yashwant Gajanan
Joshi, respondent No. 1 filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitu-
tion of India in the Bombay High Court for removal of Mrs. Gadre as
competent authority on the ground that she was an employee of the
corporation and was biased against him. The Bombay High Court held
that in the instant case the proprietary rights of the petitioner (Shri E
Yashwant Gajanan) were affected by laying down of pipes by the
Corporation. The petitioner was claiming compensation and such com-
pensation has to be determined judicially in which principle of natural
justice must be followed. Principles of natural justice require a feeling
in both the parties that justice will be done as between them. The High
Court thus took the view that it was not proper to appoint Mrs. Gadre F
a competent authority as she was an employee of one of the contesting
parties. The High Court in these circumstances allowed the writ peti-
tion and directed the Union of India to appoint another competent
authority. It was further directed that any suitable person may be
appointed as a competent authority but he shall not be an employee of
the corporation. The High Court further directed that names of certain G
retired District Judge were discussed which according to the High
Court were quite suitable for the purpose. However, it was left to the
Union of India to do the needful expeditiously and in any case not later
than 3 !st July, 1989. During the course of arguments we were
informed that this time was got extended at the request of the Union of
India. S.L.P. (C) No. 10124 of 1989 has been filed by the Corporation H
    43$        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [ 1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

A while S.L.P. (CiviD No. 16035 of 1990 was filed by the Union of India.
  We may mention at this stage that the Special Leave Petition filed by
  the Union of India was barred by limitation by 90 days and we are not
  s11ti~fiecl with the grounds mentioned in the application for condona-
  tion of delay filed by the Union of India. The Special leave Petition
  file.cl by the Union of India stands dismissed as barred by limitation.
B
           So far as the Special Leave Petition filed by the Corporation is
  concerned, an objection was raised on behalf of the learned counsel
  for the respondent No. 1 that Union of India alone was the interested
  party and could nave challenged the impugned order of the High Court
  in as much as the competent authority is appointed by the Union of
  Ind.ia. It was thus contended that the Special Leave Petition filed by
C the corporation is not maintainable specially when the Special Leave
  Petition filed by the Union of India stands dismissed by this Hon'ble
  Court. We find no force in this objecton. In view of the fact that the
  High Cm1rt has removed Mrs. Gadre from acting as competent autho-
  rity .on the ground that she was an employee of the corporation and
D furtlier gave the direction that any suitable person may be appointed
  as mmpetent authority but he shall not be an employee of the corpora-
  tion, tbere is an independent cause of grievance to the corporation and
  the Special Leave Petition can be filed by the corporation. The pre-
  lim.iµary objection thus raised on behalf of the respondent No. 1 is
  rejected.
E
          In order to appreciate the controversy it would be proper to
    consiper some relevant provisions of the Act. Section 2(a) of the Act
    defines competent authority as under:

          (a) "Competent Authority" means any person or authority
F         authorised by the Central Government, by notification in the
          official gazette, to perform the functions of the Competent
          Authority under this Act;

                (i) and different persons or authorities may be authorised
          to perform all or any of the functions of the Competent Autho-
G         rity under this Act in the same area or different area specified in
          the notification.

         According to the above definition any person or authority can be
    appointed by the Central Government by Notification in the Official
    Gazette to perform the functions of the competent authority under this
H   Act. Jt hi1s also been made clear that different persons or authorities
               H.P ..CORPN. Y.G. JOSHI IK;\.SLJWAL, J.l             439

may pe &µthorised to perfQrm all or any of the functions of the compe- A
\ent aut!Jprity unc!er the A.ct. So far as this rjefinition is concerned
there is no restriction on the power of the Central Govermnent (o
appqjnt any employee of the Corporation as the competent aµthority.
Section 3 proviqes for publication pf notification for acqµisitiOf!.
Section 4 prpvjdes for power to enter µpon and survey the laqrj B
througti which pipelines have to be laid for (nmsporting petroleum. pr
any mineral. Section 5 provides for filing any objections by the persons
jq!erested in the l;md and for hearing of sµc)l objections j:ly the cpmpe-
tep( ~uthority. Sectiol] 6 provides fCJf a declaration of ')cquisition of
right of µser. Sectjon 7 provides for the Central Government or State
Government or Corporation to lay pipelines. Section 8 provides for
power to enter over the land for inspection etc. Section 9 provides for C
restrictions regarding the use of land. Section 10 deals with compensa-
tiol) wit)l which we are directly concerned in t)le present case.

     Section 10 reads as !!Oder:
                                                                           D
           COMPENSATION:

           (I) Where in the exercise of the powers conferred by Sec.
           4, Sec. 7, or Sec, 8 by any person, any damage, loss or
           in jury is sustained by any person interested in the land
           unrJer which the pipeline proposed to be, or is being, or has
                                                                           E
           been laid, the Central Government, the State Government
           or the Corporation, as tl)e case may be, shall be liable to
           pay compensation to such person for such damage, loss or
           in jury, the amount of which shall be determined by the
           Competent authority in the first instance.
                                                                           F
           (2) If the amount of compensation determined by the
           Competent Authority under sub-s. (!)is not acceptable to
           either of the parties. the amount of compensation shall, on
           application by either qf tne parties to the District Judge
           wiihin the limits pf whose jurisdiction the land or any part
           thereof is situated, be determined by that District Judge.
                                                                           G
           (3) The Competent Authority or the District Judge while
           determining the compensation under sub-section (1) or
           sµp-5ection (2), as the case may be, shall have due regard
           to the damage or \oss sustained by any person intereste>i in
           the land by reason qf-                                          H
    440        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

              (i) the removal of trees or standing crops, if any, on the
A
              land while exercising the powers under Section 4, Section 7
              or Section 8;

              (ii) the temporary severence of the land under which the
              pipeline has been laid from other lands belonging to, or in
B             the occupation of, such person; or

              (iii) any injury io any other property, whether movable or
              immovable, or the earnings of such persons caused in any
              other manner;

                   Provided that in determining the compensation no
c             account shall be taken of any structure or other improve-
              ment made in the land after the date of the notification
              under sub-s. (i) of Sec. 3.

              (4) Where the right of user of any land has vested in the
D             Central Government, the State Government or the Corpo-
              ration, as the case may be, shall, in addition to the compen-
              sation, if any, payable under sub-s. (!),be liable to pay to
              the owner and to pay any other person whose right or
              enjoyment in that land has been affected in any manner
              whatsoever by reason of such vesting, compensation
E             calculated at ten per cent of the market value of that land
              on the date of the notification under sub-s. (I) of Sec. 3.

              (5) The market value of the land on the said date shall be
              determined by the competent Authority and if the value so
              determined by that authority is not acceptable to either of
F             the parties, it shall on application by either of the parties to
              the District Judge referred to in sub-section (2); be
              determined by that District Judge.

          I   ( 6) The decision of the District Judge under sub-section
              (5) shall be final.
G
         According to the above provision compensation shall be deter-
  mined by the Competent Authority in the first instance. Under sub-
  section (2) of Section 10 if the amount of compensation determined by
  the Competent Authority under sub-section (!) is not acceptable to
  either of the parties, an application by either of the parties may be
H filed to the District Judge and then the amount of compensation would
                H.P. CORPN. v. Y.G. JOSHI [KASL!WAL, J.]               441

be determined by the District Judge. Sub-section (3) of section 10 lays       A
down certain guidelines for determining the compensation taking note
of the damage or loss sustained by any person interested in the land.
Section 11 provides for deposit and payment of compensation. Section
12 provides that the competent authority shall have for the purposes of
this Act all the powers of a Civil Court while trying a suit under the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908, in respect of the following matters, namely:        B

      (a) summoning and enforcing the attendence of any person and
      examining him on oath;

      (b) requiring the discovery and production of any document;

      (c) reception of evidence on affidavits;
                                                                              c

      (d) requisitioning any public record from any court of office;

      (e) issuing commission for examination of witnesses.
                                                                              D
Under Sec. 17 of the Act the Central Government is authorised to
make rules for carrying out the provisions of this Act.

      Mr. Shanti Bhushan, Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the
Corporation contented that there was no question of the violation of
any principle of natural justice nor there was any question of bais in        E
case any employee of the Corporation is appointed as competent
authority under the Act. It was submitted that under the provisions of
the Cooperative Societies Act the Registrar is appointed as Arbitrator
to dedcide the claim. Under the Public Premises (eviction of un-
authorised occupants) Act 1971, the fact that the Estate Officer issues
a notice and conducts the proceedings himself will not by itself be           F
violative of principles of natural justice. Such Officer cannot be said to
be a judge in his. own cause. No one shall be a judge in his own cause
only means that he should not have personal interest in the cause he
has to adjudicate. It does not mean that an officer discharging official
functions must not start proceedings in the matter in which he is under
the law competent to adjudicate upon. It was also contended by Mr.            G
Shanti Bhushan that there was no personal interest of the Competent
Authority in the subject matter of the litigation, namely in the
determination of compensation and as such the principle that no
person can be a judge in his own cause is not applicable in the present
case. It was also argued that the determination of compensation by the
Competent Authority in the fitst instance under sub-s. (I) of Section         H
    442         SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

A 10 of the Act is purely an administrative act by which the rights of the
  parties are not determined by the competent authority. Sub-section (2)
  of Section 10 of the Act clearly provided that if the amount of compen-
  sation determinecl by the competent al!thority was not acceptable to
  either of the parties, an application could be filed before the District
  Judge who would then determi11e the compensation. It was also argued
B that if we examine the matter with a practical view point no other
  officer is easily available for such appointment and the Corporation
  would be unnecessarily put to great inconvenience and subject to
  heavy expenses if an officer other than its own employee is appointed
  as competent authority. Learned counsel contended that the provi-
  sions in this Act are analogous to those under the Land Acquisition
  Act, 1894 in which the amount of compensation payable by the
C Government is, in the first instance, determined by the officer of tbe
  Government itself.

        On the other hand it was submitted by Mr. Dholakia Learned
  Senior Advocate appearing for respondent No. 1 that the determina-
D tion of compensation by the competent au\nority was a quasi judicial
  act. Mrs. Gadre had filed the writ petition No. 3606 of 1989 in the
  Bombay High Court against Shri Yashwant Gajanan Joshi and others
  in which in para No. 9 itself it was admitted as under:

               "The petitioner herein is a quasi judicial authority under
               the provision of such Act and as stated above the petitiooer
               was notified to act as competent authority by virtue of
               Notification of the Government of India referred to
               hereinabove".

        It was also argued by Mr. Dholakia that the competent authority
F is given the powers of a Civil Court as contemplated under Section 12
  of the Act and the determination of compensation by him is a quasi
  judicial act and not an administrative act. It was further submitted that
  the persons or authorities appointed under the various other Acts like
  Cooperative Societies Act, Land Acquisition Act, focome Tax Act are
  appointed as authorities by virt11e of holding some office or post an<l
G their orders are appealable to the higher authorities. In the present
  case different competent authorities can be appointed for discharging
  different duties under the Act and it is left to the discretion of the
  Central Government to appoint any person or authority as competent
  authority for determining the compensation under Section 10 of the
  Act. It has been argued that where such discretion is given to the
H Central Government for appointing the competent authority then such
               H ..P. CORPN. v. Y.G. JOSHI [KASLIWAL, J.]             443

discretjon should not be exercised by appointing a person or authority
                                                                             A
who may be in the employment of the body or authority for whose
benefit the pipelines are laid. In other words his contention is that if
the pipelines are laid for corporation then no employee of the corpora-
tion should be appointed as a competent authority but some employee
of the State Government or Central Government should be appointed
as competent authority. Mr. Dholakia placed reliance on the following        B
observ;ttions made in Metropolitan Properties Co. Ltd. v. Lannon and
Ors., [1968] 3 All England Reports 304 at P. 310.

                  "The Court looks at the impression which would be
            given to other people. Even if he (the Chairman of the
            tribunal in that case) was as impartial as could be neverthe-
            less, if right-minded persons would think that, in the           c
            circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his
            part, then he should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision
            cannot stand ....... The Court will not enquire whether
            he did, in fact, favour one side unfairly. Suffice it that
            reasonable people might think he did. The reason is plain        D
            enough. Justice must be rooted in confidence; and confi-
            dence is destroyed when right-minded people go away
            thinking; "The Judge was biased".

        It was also contended that under the Land Acquisition Act the
 award given by the Collector is only an offer and does not determine E
  any rights of the parties. Any person interested who does not accept
  the award may move an application to the Collector for making a
  reference to the Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act,
· 1894. After the judgment of the Court in reference an appeal could lie
 to the High Court under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. It was
 thus submitted by Mr. Dholakia that there was a remedy of appeal F
 under the Land Acquisition Act but so far as the provisions of the
 present Act are concerned there is no right of appeal against the
 d.etermination of compensation. by the District Judge. It was also sub-
 mitted that it was a well ·established principle that justice should not
 only be done but seen to be done. In the present case apart from the
 legal aspect of the matter there was a clear bias so far as Mrs. A.R. G
 Gadre is concerned and she was not a fit person to be appointed as a
 competent authority in order to determine the compensation payable
 to the respondent. It was further contended that while determining the
 question of bias the test is not whether in fact bias has affected the
 Judgment but the test always is and must be whether a litigant could
 reas<.mably apprehend that a bias might operate against him in the H
    444          SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

    decision of the subject matter of the dispute. Reliance is placed on the
A
    following observation made in G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow &
    Ors., [ 1977] 1SCR64:

                       "It is needless to emphasise that the principles of
                 natural justice which are meant to prevent miscarriage of
B                justice are also applicable to domestic enquiries and
                 administrative proceedings. (See A.K. Karipak v. Union of
                 India). It cannot also be disputed that one of the fundamen-
                 tal principles of natural justice is that in case of quasi-
                 judicial proceedings, the authority empowered to decide
                 the dispute between opposite parties must be one without
                 bias by which is meant an operative prejudice, whether
c                conscious or unconscious towards one side or the other in
                 the dispute. (See Nageswara Rao v. A.P. State Road Trans-
               . port Corporation and Gullapalli Nageshwar Rao v. State of
                 A.P.)".

D         Mr. Lahiri, Learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the
    Union of India submitted that from 1963 to 1967 liaison officers of
    the corporation have been appointed as competent authority under the
    Act and no objection whatsoever was ever made by any person. He
    further submitted that it is not enough that some party to the proceed-
    ings has a mere apprehension that the authority is biased or is likely to
E   decide against the party. There must be a real likelihood of bias and
    not mere suspicion of bias before the proceedings can be quashed on
    the ground that the person conducting the proceedings is disqualified
    by interest. The apprehension must be judged froin a healthy, reason-
    able and average point of view and not on mere apprehension and
    vagµe suspicions of whimsical, capricious and unreasonable people.
F   Reliance in respect of above contention is placed on International
    Airports Authority of India v. K.D. & Anr., [1988] 2 SCC 360.

          We have given our careful consideration to the arguments
    advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have thoroughly
    perused the record. There is no provision in the Act prohibiting the
G   Central Government to make an appointment of an employee of the
    Corporation as competent authority. Apart from determining the com-
    pensation, many other functions are assigned to the competent autho-
    rity and there may be one competent authority for all the above
    purposes of different persons or authorities may be authorised to
    perform all or any of the functions of the competent authority under
H   the Act. The scheme of the Act shows that a competent authority has
                H.P. CORPN. v. Y.G. JOSHI [KASLIWAL, J.]              445

to discharge various and diverse duties under the Act. He has to attend
                                                                             A
survey of land required for pipeline, verficatiou of land revenue
records of the surveyed area, drawing up of panchnama for land, crop,
plantation, trees or any other agricultural or non agricultural activity
carried on in the surveyed land or the pipeline, issue of notification
under Section 3(1} of the Act, receipt of claims/objections for assess-
mertt of damages, disputes etc., issue of clearance to concerned oil         B
company and deciding all the disputes arising out of the authorised
persons, power to enter notified lands and various other duties. Thus
such person becomes a better qualified and experienced perosn equip-
ped with a proper background to decide the amount of compensation
also. We cannot accept the contention of Mr. Dholakia that merely
because a person is an employee of the corporation, he would have a
bias in deciding the compensation under Section 10(1) of the Act.
                                                                             c

       It may also be pertinent to note that the Legislature has used the
words "the amount of which shall be determined by the competent
authority in the first instance" (emphasis supplied) in sub-section (I)
of Section 10 of the Act. This clearly shows that in the first instance it   D
has to be decided by the competent authority and such determination
shall not attain any finality. Then under sub-section (2) of Section 10
itself it has been provided that if the compensation is not acceptable to
either of the parties then an application can be filed before the District
Judge. No doubt there is a marked difference in this regard between
the provisions of this Act and the provisions contained in the Land          E
Acquisition Act 1894 but in our view under Section 10 (1) the compen-
sation is to be determined by the Competent authority only in the first
instance. A party is entitled to raise the ground of bias against an
appointment of an individual officer as competent authority on suffi-
cient material placed on record in this regard, but not merely because
such competent authority is an employee of the corporation. It cannot        F
be a ground for any disability or disqualificatio_n in appointing such
person as competent authority. If we take the matter to its logical
conclusion the result would be that no employee of the State Govern-
ment or the Central Government as the case may be will be appointed
as competent authority where petroleum and minerals pipelines are to
be laid for a project initiated by the State Government or the Central       G
Government respectively. It would be too broad a proposition to
extend the theory of bias to exclude persons only because such person
draws the salary from the bodies like public corporation, State
Government or Central Government. It would altogether be a diffe-
rent case if it was a case of a private employer and his employee. We
cannot equate the case of person in private employment with that of a        H
     446         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

A   person in public employment. The authorities mentioned above and
    relied upon by Mr. Dholakia are clearly distinguishable.

         Now we shall consider the question of the appointment of Mrs.
  A.R. Gadre as competent authority in the present case. There is a
  clear averment in the affidavit in reply filed by the respondent No. 1 in
B this regard that after the retirement of the competent authority Mr.
  G .S. Parte, Mrs. A.R. Gadre who was special land officer in the office
  of competent authority was appointed as competent authority vide
  Notification dated 6.6.1988. Compensation case was decided by the
  Additional District Judge in favour of the respondent. Mrs. A.R.
  Gadre in her own name filed a writ petition No. 3606 of 1989 challeng-
e ing the legality of the award passed by the Additional District Judge.
  In the said petition she had also prayed for the stay of the further
  acquisition proceedings. The grievance of the present respondent was
  that some interim orders of stay were also obtained in the aforesaid
  writ petition behind the back of the respondent. Even contempt pro-
  ceedings have also been initiated by the respondent against Mrs. A.R.
D Gadre and which are still pending before the Bombay High Court. The
  High Court by the impugned order had removed Mrs. Gadre to func-
  tion as competent authority and thereafter the Union of India
  accepted the above position and sought further time to comply with
  the directions of the High Court. We have already dismissed the
  Special Leave Petition filed by the Union of India. Thus taking in view
E the entire facts and circumstances of the case we are inclined to take
  the view tiiat the respondent was right in contending that Mrs. A.R.
  Gadre may have bias while determining the amount of compensation
  as she hereself is a litigating party in this very matter in the High Court
  against the respondent. An apprehension thus in the mind of the
  respondent is well founded and on this ground we do not find any
F justification to interfere with the order of the Bombay High Court
  holding that the appointment of Mrs. Gadre was not valid. We how-
  ever wish to make it clear that we do not agree with the general
  proposition of the High Court that an officer of the corporation cannot
  be appointed as a 'competent authority' because he may be biased in
  favour of the corporation by reason of his employment. In the result
G we find no force in this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed with no
  order as to costs.

                                                          Appeal dismissed.