Holding

Assaulting a superior at the workplace constitutes gross indiscipline, and dismissal for such misconduct is not grossly disproportionate; therefore, the dismissal stands and an extension of time to comply with a lower court order does not preclude filing an appeal.

Summary

A lecturer (Venkappa Gowda) assaulted the principal of a private college with a chappal and used abusive language. The management dismissed him under the Karnataka Private Educational Institutions (Discipline and Control) Act, 1975; he appealed to the Educational Appellate Tribunal, which set aside the dismissal and imposed a lesser penalty of withholding three increments. The High Court upheld the Tribunal but limited back‑wages to 60% on the ground that the lecturer was near superannuation. The management and the State of Karnataka appealed to the Supreme Court, raising questions of proportionality of the dismissal, whether the failure to discipline the principal affected the penalty, and whether an extension of time to comply with the High Court order barred a further appeal. The Court held that assaulting a superior is gross indiscipline, that dismissal in such circumstances is not grossly disproportionate, and that seeking an extension of time does not preclude filing an appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the lower court orders, upheld the dismissal, and allowed the appeals.

Issues considered

Whether dismissal of a lecturer for assaulting the principal under the Karnataka Private Educational Institutions (Discipline and Control) Act, 1975 is a proportionate punishment.
Whether the Tribunal may substitute a lesser punishment for dismissal and the scope of Supreme Court interference.
Whether seeking an extension of time to comply with a High Court order bars filing an appeal before the Supreme Court.
Whether the absence of disciplinary proceedings against the principal affects the quantum of punishment for the lecturer.
Whether the Tribunal's jurisdiction to interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited to cases of gross disproportionality.

Legislation cited

CCS (CCA) Ruless. Rule 14(2)
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 11A

Subjects

service lawdisciplinary dismissalproportionalityeducational institutionsappellate tribunalextension of timeindustrial disputesgross indiscipline

Judgment

HOMBE GOWDA EON TRUST AND ANR. A
v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.

DECEMBER 16, 2005

[S.B. SINHA AND P.P. NAOLEKAR, JJ.] B

Service law:

Karnataka Private Educational Institutions (Discipline and Control) Act,
1975: c
Termination of service-On disciplinary grounds-Dismissal of lecturer
for thrashing principal and using abusive language-Validity of-Held:
Protection of workers' right is no longer the sole avowed object of the justice
delivery system-Discipline at the work place is an equally, if one more,· D
important feature-It is not proper to break discipline with impunity-Assaulting
a superior at a workplace amounts to an act of gross indiscipline-Hence,
dismissal upheld.
Practice and Procedure:
Appeal-Right of-Appeal against High Court Order-Time to comply E
with order of High Court granted-Held: Extension of time by itself does not ·
preclude an aggrieved party to file an appeal before Supreme Court.

Responden.t No. 3-lecturer was subjected to a disciplinary proceeding
on an allegation that he had assaulted the Principal of Appellant No. 2
with 'chappal'. Respondent No. 3 was found guilty of the charge and F
dismissed from service. An appeal was preferred by respondent No. 3 .
before the Educational Appellate Tribunal constituted under Section 10
of the Karnataka Private Educational Institutions (Discipline and Control)
Act, t 975. The Tribunal set aside the order of dismissal and awarded the
punishment of withholding of three increments only and directed payment G
of back wages. High Court while upholding the Tribunal's order directed
payment of back wages to the extent of 60% only. Hence the appeal.

On behalf of respondent No. 3, it was contended that the
Management had sought for time for complying with the order of the High
937 H
938 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A Court which having been granted, the Appellants were estopped and
precluded from filing this appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. Assaulting a superior at a workplace amounts to an act
B of gross indiscipline. The respondent is a teacher. Even under grave
provocation a teacher is not expected to abuse the head of the institution
is a filthy language and assault him with a chappal. Punishment of
dismissal from services, therefore, cannot be said to be wholly
disproportionate so as to shock one's conscience. [944-C]
c 2. Indiscipline in an educational institution should not be tolerated.
Only because the Principal of the institution had not been proceeded
against, the same by itself cannot be a ground for not exercising the
discretionary jurisdiction by this Court. It may or may not be that the
Management was selectively vindicate but no Management can ignore a
D serious lapse on the part of a teacher whose conduct should be an example
to the pupils. (948-F)

3. This Court has come a long way from its earlier view points. The
recent trend in the decisions of this Court seek to strike a balance between
E the earlier approach of the industrial relation wherein only the interest
of the workmen was sought to be protected with the avowed object of fast
industrial growth of the country. In several decisions of this Court it has
been noticed that how discipline at the workplaces/industrial undertaking
received a set back. In view of the change in economic policy of the
country, it may not now be proper to allow the employees to break the
F discipline with impunity. Our country is governed by rule of law. All
actions, therefore, must be taken in accordance with law. Law declared
by this Court in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution of India
categorically demonstr1ttes that the Tribunal would not normally interfere
with the quantum of punishment imposed by the, employers unless an
G appropriate case is made out therefor. The Tribunal, being inferior to that
of this Court, was bound to follow the decisions of this Court which are
applicable to the fact of the present case in question. The Tribunal can
neither ignore the ratio laid down by this Court nor refuse to follow the
same. [948-G-H; 949-A-C]

H Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem heavy Engineering Works (P)
HOMBE GOWDA EON TRUST v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [SINHA, J.] 939

ltd., l199716 SCC 450, Ajay Kumar Bhuyan v. State ofOrissa, 1200311 SCC A
707 and Mis. D. Navinchandra v. Union of India, 119871 3 SCC 707, relied
on.

Management of Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor
Sangh, JT (2004) 7 SC 333, Muriadih Colliery v. Bihar Colliery Kamgar
Union, (200513SCC331, Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd v. N.N. Narawade, B
JT (2005) 2 SC 583, V. Ramana v. A.P. SRTC, (20051 7 SCC 338, Bharat.
Forge Co. Ltd v. Utttam Manohar Nakate, (2005) 2 SCC 489, M.P. Electricity
Boardv. Jagdish Chandra Sharma, (2005) 3 SCC 401, Divisional Controller,
KSRTC (NWKRTC) v. A. T. Mane, (2005) 3 SCC 254 and Municipal Board
of Pratabgarh v. Mahendra Singh Chawla, ll982) 3 SCC 331, referred to. C

4. It is now well-settled that by seeking extension of time to comply
with the order of the High Court by itself does not preclude a party
aggrieved to question the correctness or otherwise of the order of the High
Court as thereby a party to a tis does not waive his right to file an appeal
before this Court. 1943-EI D

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2554 of2003.

From the Judgment and Order dated 28.8.2001 of the Karnataka High
Court in C.R.P. No. 731 of 1999.
E
WITH

C.A. Nos. 2555-2557 of 2003.

R.S. Hegde, Chandra Prakash, Ms. Savitri Pandey for P.P. Singh,/ Sanjay
R. Hegde, Anil Kr. Mishra and A. Rohen Singh for the Appellants. F
S.N. Bhat, N.P.S. Pawar, D.P. Chaturvedi and Ms. Sheela Goel for the
Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
S.B. SINHA, J. One Venkappa Gowda, Respondent No.3 herein, was
at all material times a lecturer in Kuvempu Mahavidyalaya, the Appellant
No.2 herein. The said institution is under the management of the Appellant
No.I.

The private institutions in the State of Karnataka are governed by the H
940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A Kamataka Private Educational Institutions (Discipline and Control) Act, 1975,
(for short, ' the Act').

The Respondent No.3 herein was subjected to a disciplinary proceeding
· on an allegation that he had assaulted the Principal of Appellant No.2 with
a 'chappal'. He was found guilty of the said charge and dismissed from
B service. An appeal was preferred by him before the Educational Appellate
Tribunal (for short, 'the Tribunal') in terms of Section 8 of the said Act. The
said Tribunal is constituted in terms of Section I 0 thereof. The proceeding
before the said Tribunal by a legal fiction is treated to be a judicial proceeding.
It is not in dispute that the Appellant No.2 received grant-in-aid from the
C State of Kamataka in terms of the Grant-in-Aid Code framed by the Kamataka
Collegiate Education Department. Before the Tribunal, the State of Karnataka
as also the Director of Collegiate Education were impleaded as parties. A
preliminary issue was framed as to whether the departmental proceedings
held against the Respondent No.3 was in consonance with the provisions of
Rule 14(2) ofCCS (CCA) Rules. While deciding the preliminary issue, it was
D held that the departmental proceeding was invalid in law. The Appellants,
therefore, adduced evidences before the Tribunal to prove the charges against
Respondent No.3. The Tribunal having regard to the pleading of the parties
formulated the following questions for its determination :

"I . Whether the respondents I and 2 have proved by acceptable
E evidence that allegation that the appellant had absented from duty
unauthorisedly and as to whether his conduct was unbecoming of
lecturer ?

2. · Whether the evidence establishes that the appellant had
misbehaved on I 8.1.87 and as to whether he had indulged in physical
F assault upon the Principal?

3. If so, whether the punishment of dismissal imposed upon the
appellant is justified in this case and if not what punishment he
deserves?"

G Upon consideration of the evidence adduced before it, the Tribunal
held that the first charge had not been satisfactorily proved by cogent and
acceptable evidence. As regard the second charge, it was found :

"R. W. I has himself stated that he did not permit appellant to
·sign the attendance register in the morning of I 8.9.87. It led to verbal
H altercation and then turned to heated argument. According to R.W. I
HOMBE GOWDA EON TRUST v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [SINHA, J.]941

appellant abused him in the vulgar language as : A
(Boli magane, Mudi goobe, Neenyaru nnann Jekijethus)

RW. 1 pushed him. This particular part of his evidence is sought
to be corroborated to evidence of C.S Dhanpal. Dhanpal has stated he
was present in the chamber of Principal when appellant arrived. He B
also says that the Principal refused to permit appellant to sign the
attendance register. Dhanpal further stated that R. W. I told appellant
he will not pennit him to sign even morning registers if he does not ·
sign afternoon registers. After hearing such talk Vankappagowda
replied "It is not a proper conduct of Principal" and rushed towards
him. Then Principal took away the register from Venkappagowda At C
that juncture Venkappagowda caught hold of his collar. Simultaneously
Principal R.W. I pushed Venkappagowda down which resulted in his
fall. After falling down Venkappagowda got up and hit the Principal
with a chappal."

It was held : D
Since l am only appreciating facts placed before me, it is but
necessary that the facts so projected should be considered collectively
and not in isolation. Each fact spoken by the witnesses has woven a
web clearly indicating that all was not well between the Principal and E
the appellant and therefore, incident on 18.9.87 took a violent turn.
The evidence has to be weighed according to the norms of reasonable
probabilities, but not in trade mans scale. While doing this exercise
.I have formed an opinion that the incident would not have occurred
had the Principal employed restrained upon his words and action.
Any way even the act of the appellant in using chapels to assault the F
Principal cannot under any circumstances be justified. Both persons
involved are teachers what is taught should be practiced. If what their
action show is any indication an impression is gathered that the
Principal and the appellant have acted in undesirable manner and
unbecoming of academitials to say the least teachers, their acts are
demeaning the profession they have adopted" G
Despite holding that although it could not be said that the Respondent ,
No.3 acted in retaliation to the action of the Principal, but such conduct was
not justifiable, he opined that the assault by the Respondent No.3 on the
Principal was proved. However, he awarded punishment of withholding of , H
942 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A three increments only in plea of the order of dismissal passed by the Appellants.

It was further held :

'The appellant shall be taken back to service and will be entitled
to all pecuniary benefits like salary and allowances retrospectively
B from the date of dismissal minus and subject to withholding of three
increments.

The respondent I and 2 are held liable to make payment of amount
due to the appellant. I also hold respondents 3 and 4 vicariously
liable to discharge the claim of the appellant. ,
c Aggrieved, the Management, the State ofKarnataka also the Respondent
No.3 preferred separate writ petitions before the Karnataka High Court.

The High Court in its judgment came to the following findings :

"When the action of the petitioner in assaulting the Principal with
D
chappal stands proved by the evidence of R. Ws. I to 5, whatever may
be the provocation for such a conduct, the said conduct of the Petitioner
cannot be justified under any circumstances. Therefore the Tribunal
was fully justified in holding that the misconduct alleged against the
Petitioner stands proved partly,"·
E
The High Court noticed that the punishment imposed by the Tribunal
could not be given effect to as Respondent No.3 in the meantime reached the
age of superannuation within three months from the date of the order and,
thus, held that the Appellants should be directed to pay back wages to the
extent 60% only. It was further held that though the primary liability to make
F such payment is that of the Management, when Management could claim the
same by way of advance grant or by way of reimbursement from the
Government, its liability to pay the said amount cannot be disputed.

Both the Management as also the State are, thus, in appeal before us.

G Mr. R.S. Hegde and Mr. S.R. Hegde, the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the Appellants in their respective appeals, would submit that as a
finding of fact was arrived at both by the Tribunal as also the High Court that
the Respondents committed a misconduct, which is grave in nature, there was
absolutely no justification in directing payment of 60% back wages after
H setting aside the order of punishment of dismissal imposed by the Management.
HOMBE GOWDA EON TRUST v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [SINHA. J.)943

Mr. S.N. Bhatt, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent A
No.3, on the other hand, would contend that a finding of fact has been
arrived at by the Tribunal which has been affirmed by the High Court that
it was the Principal who provoked Respondent No.3. It is not in dispute, Mr:
Bhat, submitted that the Principal was also at fault but curiously enough he
was not proceeded against. Both the Respondent No.3 and the Principal of
the College having been found guilty, it was argued, it was obligatory on the B
part of the Management to initiate a departmental proceeding also against the
Principal. The Management of the Institution being guilty of being selectively
vindictive, Mr. Bhat urged, it is a fit case where this Court should not exercise
its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

It was further submitted that the question should also be considered
c
from the angle that charge no. I framed against the Respondent No.3 was not
proved Our attention was also drawn to the fact that the Management had
sought for time for complying with the order of the High Court which having
been granted, the Appellants are estopped and precluded from maintaining
this appeal. D
It is now well-settled that by seeking extension of time to comply with
the order of the High Court by itself does not preclude a party aggrieved to
question the correctness or otherwise of the order of the High Court as
thereby a party to a lis does not waive his right to file an appeal before this
Court. E
The Respondent No.3 is a teacher. He was charge-sheeted for
commission of a serious offence. He was found guilty by the Tribunal. Both
the Tribunal as also the High Court, as noticed hereinbefore, have arrived at
a concurrent finding of fact that despite grave provocation, the Respondent F
No.3 cannot be absolved of the charges levelled against him. It may be true
that no departmental disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the Principal
of the Institution, but the same by itself would not be a relevant fact for
imposing a minor punishment upon the Respondent. It may further be true
that the Respondent No.3 committed the offence under a grave provocation,
but as noticed hereinbefore, the Tribunal as also the High Court categorically G
held that the charges against him were established.

The Tribunal's jurisdiction is akin to one under Section 11 A of the
Industrial Disputes Act. While exercising such discretionary jurisdiction, no
doubt it is open to the Tribunal to substitute one punishment by another; but
it is also trite that the Tribunal exercises a limited jurisdiction in this behalf. H
944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A The jurisdiction to interfere with the quantum of punishment could be exercised
only when, inter a/ia, it is found to be grossly disproportionate.

This Court repeatedly has laid down the law that such interference at
the hands of the Tribunal should be inter alia on arriving at a finding that no
reasonable person could inflict such punishment The Tribunal may furthermore
B exercises its jurisdiction when relevant facts are not taken into consideration
by the Management which would have direct bearing on the question of
quantum of punishment.

Assaulting a superior at a workplace amounts to an act of gross
indiscipline. The Respondent is a teacher. Even under grave provocation a
C teacher is not expected to abuse the head of the institution in a filthy language
and .assault him with a chappal. Punishment of dismissal from services,
therefore, cannot be said to be wholly disproportionate so as shock one's
conscience.

D A person, when dismissed from serv:ces, is put to a great hardship but
that would not mean that a grave misconduct should go unpunished. Although
the doctrine of proportionality may be applicable in such matters, _but a
punishment of dismissal from service for such a misconduct cannot be said
to be unheard of. Maintenance of discipline of an institution is equally
important. Keeping the aforementioned principles in view, we may hereinafter
E notice a few recent decisions of this Court.

In Management of Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah
Mr;rzdoor Sangh and Anr., JT (2004) 7 SC 333 = [2004] 8 SCC 200],this
Court held :

F "This leaves us to consider whether the punishment of dismissal
awarded to the workmen C<!ncerned dehors the allegation of extortion
is disproportionate to the misconduct proved against them. From the
evidence proved, we find the workmen concerned entered the Estate
armed with deadly weapons with a view to gherao the manager and
others, in that process they caused damage to the property of the
G Estate and wrongfully confined the manager and others from 8.30
p.m. on 12th of October to 3 a.m. on the next day. These charges, in
our opinion, are grave enough to attract the punishment of dismissal
even without the aid of the allegation of extortion. The fact that the
management entered into settlement with some of the workmen who
H were also found guilty of the charge would not, in any manner, reduce
HOMBE GOWDA EON TRUST v. STATE OF KARNATAKA (SINHA, J.] 945

the gravity of the misconduct in regard to the workmen concerned in A
this appeal because these workmen did not agree with the settlement
to which others agreed, instead chose to question the punishment."

Yet again in Muriadih Colliery v. Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union, [2005)
3 SCC 331 = JT (2005) 2 SC 444], the law has been laid down in the
following terms : B
"It is well-established principle in law that in a given circumstance it
is open to the Industrial Tribunal acting under Section 11-A of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has the jurisdiction to interfere with the
punishment awarded in the domestic inquiry for good and valid
reasons. If the Tribunal decides to interfere with such punishment it C
should bear in mind the principle of proportionality between the gravity
of the offence and the stringency of the punishment. In the instant
case it is the finding of the Tribunal which is not disturbed by the
writ courts that the two workmen involved in this appeal along with
the others formed themselves into an unlawful assembly, armed with D
deadly weapons, went to the office of the General Manager and
assaulted him and his colleagues causing them injuries. The injuries
suffered by the General Manager were caused by lathi on the head.
The fact that the victim did not die is not a mitigating circumstance
to reduce the sentence of dismissal."
E
[See also Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd v. NN Narawade etc., JT
(2005) 2 SC 583).

In V. Ramano v. A.P. SRTC and Ors., [2005) 7 SCC 338], relying upon
a large number of decisions, this Court opined :
F
"The common thread running through in all these decisions is
that the court should not interfere with the administrator's decision
unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was
shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in
defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated
in Wednesbury case the court would not go into the correctness of the G
choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should
not substitute its decision for that of the administrator. The scope of
judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process
and not the decision.
H
946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (20051 SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A To put it differently unless the punishment imposed by the
disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience
of the court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further to
shorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose
appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof.
In a normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly
B disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary
authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty
imposed."

In Bharat Forge Co. ltd. v. Uttam Manohar Nakate, [2005] 2 SCC
C 489, it was held :
"Furthermore, it is trite, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal,
as the case may be, in terms of the provisions of the Act, must act 1.,

within the four comers thereof. The Industrial Courts would not sit
in appeal over the decision of the employer unless there exists a
D statutory provision in this behalf. Although its jurisdiction is wide but
the same must be applied in terms of the provisions of the statute and
no other.

If the punishment is harsh, albeit a lesser punishment may be
imposed, but such an order cannot be passed on an irr.ational or
E extraneous factor and certainly not on a compassionate ground.

In Regional Manager, Rajasthan SRTC v. Sohan Lal it has been
held that it is not the normal jurisdiction of the superior courts to
interfere with the quantum of sentence unless it is wholly
disproportionate to the misconduct proved. Such is not the case herein.
F In the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the
past conduct of the respondent as also his conduct during the domestic
enquiry proceedings, we cannot say that the quantum of punishment A
imposed upon the respondent was wholly disproportionate to his act
of misconduct or otherwise arbitrary."

G In M.P. Electricity Board v. Jagdish Chandra Sharma, [2005] 3 SCC
40 I, this Court held :

"In the case on hand, the employee has been found guilty of
hitting and injuring his superior officer at the workplace, obviously
in the presence of other employees. This clearly amounted to breach
H of discipline in the organisation. Discipline at the workplace in an ; '
HOMBE GOWDA EDN TRUST v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [SINHA, J.] 947

organisation like the employer herein, is the sine qua non for the A
efficient working of the organisation. When an employee breaches
such discipline and the employer terminates his services, it is nc•t
open to a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal to take the view that
the punishment awarded is shockingly disproportionate to the charge
proved. We have already referred to the views of this Court. To quote B
Jack Chan,

"discipline is a form of civilly responsible behaviour which helps
maintain social order and contributes to the preservation, if not
advancement, of collective interests of society at large".

Obviously this .idea is more relevant in considering the working of an C
organisation like the employer herein or an industrial undertaking.
Obedience to authority in a workplace is not slavery. It is not violative
of one's natural rights. It is essential for the prosperity of the
organisation as well as that of its employees. When in such a situation,
a punishment of termination is awarded for hitting and injuring a D
superior officer supervising the work of the employee, with no
extenuating circumstance established, it cannot be said to be not
justified. It cannot certainly be termed unduly harsh or
disproportionate. The Labour Court and the High Court in this case
totally misdirected themselves while exercising their jurisdiction. The
Industrial Court made the correct approach and came to the right E
conclusion."

In Divisional Controller, KSRTC (NWKRTC) v. A. T. Mane, [2005] 3
SCC 254, this Court held :

"From the above it is clear that once a domestic tribunal based on :f
evidence comes to a particular conclusion, normally it is not open to
the Appellate Tribunals and courts to substitute their subjective opinion
in the place of the one arrived at by the domestic tribunal. In the
present case, there is evidence of the inspector who checked the bus
which establishes the misconduct of the respondent. The domestic
tribunal accepted that evidence and found the respondent guilty. But G
the courts below misdirected themselves in insisting on the evidence
of the ticketless passengers to reject the said finding which, in our
opinion, as held by this Court in the case of Rattan Singh is not a
condition precedent. We may herein note that the judgment of this
Court in Rattan Singh has since been followed by this Court in H
948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A Devendra Swamy v. Karnataka SRT."

It was further held :

"Coming to the question of quantum of punishment, one should
bear in mind the fact that it is not the amount of money misappropriated
B that becomes a primary factor for awarding punishment; on the
contrary, it is the loss of confidence which is the primary factor to be
taken into consideration. In our opinion, when a person is found
guilty of misappropriating the corporation's funds, there is nothing
wrong in the corporation losing confidence or faith in such a person
and awarding a punishment of dismissal."
c
In Municipal Board of Pratabgarh and Anr. v. Mahendra Singh Chawla
and Ors., [1982] 3 SCC 331, whereupon reliance has been placed by Mr.
Bhat, the employee concerned, an Overseer, having accepted a paltry amount
of Rs. 200/- was convicted and sentenced under Section 161 161 IPC. Upon
D taking into consideration various circumstances including the fact that he was
advanced in age, this Court modified the sentence of dismissal from
withholding of back wages from 31.08.1965 till the date of reinstatement. No
law had been laid down therein.

It is no doubt true, as has been contended by Mr. Bhat , in some cases,
E this Court may not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of
the Constitution of India, although it may be lawful to do so; but the
circumstances mentioned by Mr. Bhat for not exercising the said jurisdiction
do not appeal to us to accept the said contention.

Indiscipline in an educational institution should not be tolerated. Only
F because the Principal of the Institution had not been proceeded against, the
same by itself cannot be a ground for not exercising the discretionary
jurisdiction by us. It may or may not be that the Management was selectively
vindictive but no Management can ignore a serious lapse on the part of a
teacher whose conduct should be an example to the pupils.

G This Court has come a long way from its earlier view points. The
recent trend in the decisions of this Court seek to strike abalance between
the earlier approach of the industrial relation wherein only the interest of the
workmen was sought to be protected with the avowed object of fast industrial
growth of the country. In several decisions of this Court it has been noticed
H that how discipline at the workplaces/ industrial undettaking received a set
HOMBE GOWDA EON TRUST v. ST ATE OF KARNAT AKA [SINHA, J.] 949

back. In view of the change in economic policy of the country, it may not A
now be proper to allow the employees to break the discipline with impunity ..
Our country is governed by rule of law. All actions, therefore, must be taken
in accordance with law. Law declared by this Court in tenns of Article 141
of the Constitution of India, as noticed in the decisions noticed supra,
categorically demonstrates that the Tribunal would not nonnally interfere B
with the quantum of punishment imposed by the employers unless an
appropriate case is made out therefor. The Tribunal being inferior to that of
this court was bound to follow the decisions of this Court which are applicable
to the fact of the present case in question. The Tribunal can neither ignore
the ratio laid down by this Court nor refuse to follow the same.

In Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem Heavy Engineering Works
c
(P) Ltd. And Anr., [1997] 6 SCC 450], it was held :

"When a position, in law, is well settled as a result of judicial
pronouncement of this Court, it would amount to judicial impropriety
to say the least, for the subordinate courts including the High Courts D
to ignore the settled decisions and then to pass a judicial order which
is clearly contrary to the settled legal position. Such judicial
adventurism cannot be permitted and we strongly deprecaie the
tendency of the subordinate courts in not applying the settled principles
and in passing whimsical orders which necessarily has the effect of
granting wrongful and unwarranted relief to one of the parties. It is E
time that this tendency stops."

[See also Ajay Kumar Bhuyan and Ors. etc. v. State of Orissa and Ors.
etc., [2003] 1 sec 707].

Yet again in Mis D. Navinchandra and Co., Bombay v. Union of India F
and Ors., [1987] 3 SCC 66], Mukharji, J (as His Lordship then was) speaking
for a three-Judge Bench of this Court stated the law in the following tenns:

" ... Generally legal positions laid down by the court would be binding
on all concerned even though some of them have not been made
parties nor were served nor any notice of such proceedings given." G
For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgments cannot be
sustained, which are set aside accordingly. The appeals are allowed. However,
in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

V.S.S. Appeal allowed. H