Holding

An execution application filed beyond one year from the date the Tribunal's final order became final is time‑barred, and the Tribunal was correct in dismissing it.

Summary

The appellant, a government employee, was dismissed after suspension but the Central Administrative Tribunal set aside the dismissal and reinstated him on 13 March 1992, also directing that he receive all consequential benefits. The appellant did not receive those benefits, filed a contempt petition which was dismissed, and subsequently filed an application under Section 27 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 for execution of the Tribunal's order. The Tribunal rejected the application, holding it was barred by the one‑year limitation prescribed in Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. The Supreme Court examined whether the limitation period applied and concluded that the final order became executable only within one year of its date, and the appellant’s application filed on 13 December 1994 was untimely. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Tribunal’s dismissal of the execution application and dismissed the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether an application for execution of a final order of a Tribunal under Section 27 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 is barred by the one‑year limitation period prescribed in Section 21(1)(a).

Legislation cited

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985s. 20(2), s. 21(1)(a), s. 27

Subjects

Administrative Tribunals Actexecution of orderslimitation periodgovernment serviceconsequential benefitscontempt petition

Judgment

HUKAM RAJ KHINVSARA A
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

MARCH 17, 1997

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.T. NANAVATI, JJ.j B

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 :

Ss. 27 read with ss. 20 (2) and 21(1}-Applicatio11 for Execution of
Order passed by Tribu11al-'Limitation-By order dated 13.3.1992 Tribunal C
set aside dismissal of the employee, reinstated him into service and directed
that he would be e11titled to all consequential benefits-On rejection of
employee's representation for conseque11tial be11efits, he filed contempt peti-
tion which was dismissed-011 13.12.1994 employee filed applicatio11 u/s. 27
for executio11 of Tribunal's order dated 13.3.1992-Tribunal dismissed the
applicatio11 as bamd by limitation-Held, final order passed by Tribunal is D
executable u/s. 27 within one year from the date of its becoming
fi11al-Tribunal has rightly held the application as bamd by limitatio11.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2237 of
1997.
E
From the Judgment and Order dated 16.4.96 of the Central Ad-
ministrative Tribunal, Jodhpur, Rajasthan in O.A.No. 466 of 1994.

L.C. Goyal and Ms. Surita Bamezai for the Appellant.
F
Ms. Kamakshi Mehlwal, Ms. Kanupriya and A.K. Sharma for the
Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Delay condoned. Leave granted. G
We have heard learned counsel on both sides.

This appeal, by special leave, arises from the order of the Central
Administrative Tribunal, Jodhpur, made on April 16, 1996 in O.A. No:
466/94. .H
1157
A
1158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] 2 S.C.R.

The appellant was initially suspended and charge-sheet was laid
I
against him on April 29, 1974. His order of dismissal was ultimately set
aside and thereafter he was reinstated into the service by the Tribunal's
order dated March 13, 1992 in 0.A. No. 261/91. It would appear that while
setting aside the order of dismissal the Tribunal had passed the order that
the appellant was entitled to all consequential benefits which he could have
B earned had he been in service. Since in spite of his representations, he was
not given consequential benefits, he filed contempt application on Decem-
ber 11, 1992, which was dismissed by the Tribunal on July 29, 1993.
Thereafter, the appellant filed the present O.A. for a direclfon to imple-
. ment the order dated March 13, 1992. The Tribunal· dismissed the same by
c the impugned order dated April 16, 1996 on the ground th;tt the application
of the appellant was barred by limitation. Thus this appeal by special leave.

The only question is : .whether the application seeking implementa-
_tion of the earlier order of the Tribunal was barred by limitation? Section
D 27 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (for short, 'the Act') envisages
thus:

"27. Execution of orders of a Tribunal. - Subject to the other
provisions of this Act and the rules, the order of a Tribunal finally
disposing of an application or an appeal shall be final and shall
E not be called in question in any court (including a High Court)
and such order shall be executed in the same manner in which any
. final order of the nature referred to in clause (a) of sub-section
(2) of Section 20 (whether or not such final order had actually
been made) in respect of th.e grievance to which the application
-·
relates would have been executed."
F
Relevant part to sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act postulates
that:

"(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1) of Section 20, a person
shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to
G him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances,--

(a) if a final order has been made by Government or other
authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order
under such rules, rejecting any appeal preferred or representation
H made by such person in connection with the grievance."
H.R. KHINVSARA v. U.0.1. 1159

Section 21 prescribes limitation in that behalf. Sub-section (l)(a) of A
Section 21 postulates that :

"(1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,-

(a) in a case where a final order such as.is mentioned in clause
(a) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 has been made in connection B
with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year
from the date on which such final order has been made."

Thus it could be seen that the final order passed by the Tribunal is
executable under Section 27 of the Act within one year fromthe date of
il~ becoming final. Admittedly, the final order was passed on March 13, C
1992. Consequently, the appellant was required to file the execution ap-
plication within one year from the said date unless the order of the
Tribunal was suspended by this Court in a special leave petition/appeal
which is not the case herein. Admittedly, the application came to be filed
by the appellant on· December 13, 1994 which is welI beyond one year. D
Under these circumstances, the Tribunal was right in its conclusion that
the application was barred by limitation.

Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the tribunal would
have condoned the delay in filing the application. It is not his case that he
made an application for condonation of delay and the tribunal had rejected E
the application without examining the grounds for the delay occasioned by
him. Under these circumstances, we need not go into further· question of
refusal to condone the delay by the Tribunal.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.

R.P . Appeal dismissed.

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