Holding

The respondent's caveatable interest was deemed extinguished; the notice of motion was allowed, the deposit of Rs.2.40 crore discharges her claim and the civil suit, and exemplary costs were imposed.

Summary

Ila Vipin Pandya, the widow of the deceased Vipin Pandya, filed a testamentary petition for letters of administration which was opposed by Smita Ambalal Patel who filed a caveat claiming creditor status. The High Court dismissed the caveat, but the matter proceeded to a civil suit where Patel quantified a claim of Rs.1,84,80,000 as a creditor. Pandya filed a notice of motion offering to deposit Rs.2.40 crore to settle Patel's claim. The Supreme Court held that Patel's caveatable interest no longer existed, that the deposit would fully discharge her claim and the civil suit, and imposed exemplary costs due to Patel's repeated contemptuous conduct. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the notice of motion was granted, and the suit was deemed disposed of.

Issues considered

Whether the respondent retained a caveatable interest after asserting only creditor status and filing a civil suit.
Whether the appellant's notice of motion to deposit Rs.2.40 crore can discharge the respondent's claim and the pending civil suit.
Whether exemplary costs and contempt sanctions are appropriate in view of the respondent's conduct.
Whether any further applications in these matters may be entertained by any court.

Legislation cited

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 12, s. 2(c)

Subjects

CaveatCaveatrixTestamentary suitLetters of administrationCreditor claimContempt of CourtExemplary costsNotice of motionDepositCivil appeal

Judgment

A ILA VIPIN PANDYA
t-
v.
SMITA AMBALAL PATEL

MAY 17, 2007

B [B.P. SINGH AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ.]

Civil Law: 1--

Testamentary petition filed-Caveat filed opposing grant-Chamber
c summons taken out for dismissal of caveat on the ground that no caveatable
interest disc/osed-Caveatrix filing affidavit in reply to chamber summons
disclosing that she is creditor of estate of deceased-Chamber summons
dismissed-Caveatrix filing suit against legal heirs of deceased and others
quantifying amount allegedly due _as creditor of deceased-Notice of motion
D taken out to seek leave of Court to deposit more than the amount claimed
to the credit of suit to discharge the interest of the caveatrix in the estate
of the deceased-Caveatrix not alleging any interest other than that of
creditor in the estate of the deceased-In the facts, notice of motion allowed
and amount directed to be deposited in full discharge of the said caveatable
interest and also suit filed by caveatrix disposed of
E
Appellant was married to V but the couple divorced and remarried_ before
the Registrar of Marriages. V died as an intestate and a testamentary petition
was filed by his widow-appellant, praying for the grant of letters of
admininstration for the estate of the deceased, V. Respondent, however filed a
Caveat opposing the grant and also filed an affidavit denying that the deceased
F has died intestate and pointing out that he had executed a Will which had +
been deposited by him with an Advocate and Solicitor, M, and further that the
appellant was not the widow of the deceased as no remarriage has taken place
as alleged. The testamentary petition came to be contested by the Caveat and
it was converted into Testamentary Suit No. 17of1996.
G
The appellant thereafter took out Chamber Summons No. 990of1996
praying for the dismissal of the caveat on the plea inter alia that no caveatable
interest had been disclosed in the affidavit and that she as the widow of the
-!-
deceased was bis only heir. The respondent filed an affidavit in reply to the
Chamber Summons for the first time disclosing that she was a creditor of
H 24
ILA VIP IN PANDYAv. SMIT A AMBALAL PATEL 25
the estate of the deceased. Single Judge dismissed the Chamber Summon A
observing that the Caveatrix had disclosed her interest in the estate of the
deceased by stating that she was a creditor ofVand that creditors ofa deceas~
could not be said to have any interest in the estate left by him and the interest
was limited to ensuring that the assets of the estate were sufficient to pay the
debts of the deceased and that the remedy of a creditor of a deceased under B
normal circumstances was to file a suit against the person in whose favour
the grant of probate or letters of administration had been made but tltat in the
peculiar facts of the case an outright dismissal of the caveat would not be
justified. Appellant challenged the rejection before the Division Bench and
also the Supreme Court but the challenge was rejected by both the Courts.
Respondent thereafter filed Suit No. 4892of1998 before the Bombay High C
Court against the appellant and brothers of deceased, V besides others praying
inter alia that as she was a creditor of the estate of the deceased in the sum
of Rs. 1,84,80,000/- this amount alongwith interest@21 % p.a. from the date
of the suit till the payment was released to her and such other sums as were
due to other creditors be also paid to them or secured in such manners as
was deemed appropriate and that to secure the safety of the assets, a Court 'D
Receiver be appointed as well.

The appellant thereupon took out Notice of Motion (No. 1207 of 2004)
seeking leave of the Court to deposit to the credit of Suit No. 4892 of 1998 an
amount of Rs. 1,20,00,000/ or any amount that the Court may determine, or E
in the alternative to furnish a bank guarantee, for the said amount. The
learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court dismissed the notice of motion
holding that as Chamber Summons No. 990of1996 had already been rejected,
the issue as to whether respondent had any caveatable interest was no longer
in dispute. The Single Judge noticed the offer of the appellant who was a
defendant in Civil Suit No. 4892 of 1998 to deposit not only a sum of Rs. F
1,84,20,000/- as claimed in Civil Suit No. 4892of1998 but in fact to make a
deposit of Rs. 2,40,00,000/- which would cover the claim calculating interest
@ 18% p.a. on the principle sum of Rs. 1,20,00,000/- till date. The appeal
preferred by the appellant against the orders of the Single Judge was
dismissed by the Division Bench in limine observing that even if the amount G
was deposited by the appellant it would still not settle the claim of the
respondent or discharge her caveatable interest. Hence, this appeal.

Appellant inter alia contended that in the earlier set of proceedings i.e.
Chamber Summons no. 990of1996, the interest that the respondent claimed
in the estate of the deceased, V had not been spelt out, but subsequently by H
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 7 S.C.R.

A the filing of Civil Suit No. 4892 of 1998, the respondent had himself quantified
the amount allegedly due to her as a creditor of the deceased and as the +
appellant was willing to pay even more than the Sum claimed in the civil suit,
there was absolutely no reason whatsoever to hold that the respondent's
caveatable interest still existed; that the respondent had time and again
referred to a Will executed by V but had not produced the same in Court till
B date; that the respondent had till today not alleged that .she had any interest
in the assets of the deceased other than that if a creditor for the aforesaid
quantified figure; and that the appellant was willing to pay any amount which
this court found adequate so as to the bring the entire set of bitter and -T

acrimonious proceedings between the parties to an end.
c Respondent rejecting any possibility of settlement inter a/ia contended
that the Supreme Court has also declined the appellant's prayer for issuance
of Chamber Summons challenging her caveatable interest and the matter
being res-judicata no further proceedings were justified on account of the
present notice of motion.
D
Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD : l. The Civil Suit No. 4892 of 1998 had been filed subsequent to
dismissal of Chamber Summons No. 990of1996 and it is at this stage that
the notice of motion (No. 1207 of 2004) has been moved by the appellant
E conceding the claim of the respondent and undertaking to deposit all sums
due to her before the Bombay High Court. It is difficult to understand that in
the background that the respondent has claimed only a creditors interest in
the estate of the deceased and on no other relationship or basis in the several
proceedings that have been filed by her, can it be pleaded that her caveatable
interest still continued to survive? It bears repetition that the respondent has
F
time and again referred to a Will allegedly executed by V and had even in the +
arguments repeatedly asserted that she would produce it in the testamentary
suit pending in the Bombay High Court, but has not done so till day though
the suit had been filed in the year 1996 and is at the stage of the recording
of evidence. This Court is thus unable to comprehend or fathom the right
G that the respondent still claims in the estate of the dece~sed so as to maintain
her status as a caveatrix. The written arguments submitted by the respondents
are completely silent on this aspect, and rake up absolutely irrelevant issues.
[Para 8) [32-G-H; 33-A-C)

2. The notice of motion is allowed and it is directed, that the appellant
H
"'--
ILA VI PIN PANDYAv. SMIT A AMBALAL PA TEL 27
shall, within a period of three months from today deposit a sum of Rs. A
2,40,00,000/- in all with the prothonotary of the Bombay High Court (and after
deduction of the costs) the balance to be disbursed to the respondent in full
discharge of her claim as a Caveatrix in the testamentary suit and as a plaintiff
in Civil Suit No. 4892of1998, and that no application of whatever nature in
respect if these two matters will hereinafter be entertained by any Court. As B
a consequence of the above direction and in the interest of justice the
respondent's interest as a caveatrix shall stand discharged and the Civil Suit
filed by her shall also be deemed to be disposed of.
[Para 28) [46-A-C)

3. A litigant appearing in person does not enjoy a status higher than C
that of a lawyer arguing a case for his client. Such a litigant is nevertheless
given extra consideration by the court for several justifiable reasons. There
is a tendency on the part of some litigants to misuse the latitude granted to
them and to deliberately create a situation whereby the functioning of the court
becomes an impossibility thus stultifying the entire judicial process. The
respondent falls eminently within this category. During the course of .D
arguments spread over parts of three days she refused to argue on the merits
of her case and on the issues raised but used foul language for some ·of the
counsel who had been associated with this and other connected matters
dubbing them as criminals closely associated with those who had been
responsible for the Bombay blasts. This Court had at first advised her to be ,£
careful and to refrain from making baseless allegations against those who
were not before the Court as parties and had subsequently cautioned her that
she was over stepping the limits of decency which would compel the Court to
take unpleasant steps against her, but to no avail. On the contrary she shouted
back that the court could do whatever it liked but she would continue to expose
the advocates who were a threat to the safety and security of her country. F
[Para 9) [33-D; F-H; 34-A]

4. This Court has gone through the earlier record of proceedings and
find a very disturbing picture indeed. Despite her conviction for contempt of
Court on two occasions and numerous admonitions and warnings
notwithstanding, the respondent has remained unfazed and has in a most G
unbecoming manner relentlessly and ruthlessly pursued the litigation.
[Paras 10 and 25) [35-B-C; 45-C-D)

5. It is indeed disgusting to see a litigant attempting to intimidate the
Supreme Court and two of its Judges in such a crude and obnoxious manner. H
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 7 S.C.R.

A A resume of the facts clearly reveal the incorrigible and recalcitrant attitude
of the respondent. This Court could perhaps condone her errant conduct if +-
she was merely a highly strung and impetuous lady over-sensitive to her case
and unaware of the nuances of the law and the decorum to be maintained in
Court but this Court is satisfied that no ignorance nor mental imbalance is
discernible which can be pleaded in extenuation of her behaviour.
B (Para 24 and 25) (45-A-C)

6. The detailed history of this litigation has been given'to emphasize
that those who attempt to take court proceedings lightly or try to subvert the
+
judicial process to their advantage, do so at their peril. The imposition of
c exemplary costs must, as a consequence, follow. Cost of Rs. five lakhs is also
imposed to be recovered from the sum awarded. The amount representing the
costs .will be donated to a charity to be identified by the Chief Justice of the
Bombay High Court. [Para 27 and 29) [45-G; 46-C-D)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2455 of2005.
D
From the Final Judgment and Order dated 25.08.2004 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in Appeal No. 524 of 2004 in Notice of Motion No.
1207 of 2004 in Test Suit No .. 17 of 1996 in Testamentary Petition No. 132 of
1996.

E R.F. Nariman, V.A. Bobde, Shyam Diwan and Shrikant Shah, Sr. Adv.,
Mahesh Agarwal, Rishi Agrawala, E.C. Agrawala, Gaurav Goel and Neha
Agarwal for the Appellant.

Smita Ambalal Patel Respondent-In-Person.

F The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
-1
HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J. l. This appeal by special leave is directed
against the order dated 25th August, 2004 of the Division Bench of the
Bombay High Court in notice of motion No. 1207 of2004 in Testamentary Suit
No. 17 of 1996 whereby the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the
G notice of motion by order dated 29th July, 2004 has been confirmed.

2 .. The facts as taken from the appeal and relevant to its disposal are
as under:
-L.

3. The appellant Ila Vipin Pandya was married to Vipin Dalsukhram
H Pandya on 15th December, 1966. The couple, however, divorced on 24th May,
ILA VIPIN PANDYAv. SMITAAMBALALPATEL [H.S. BEDI, J.) 29

t 985 but perfonned a remarriage on t 5th January, t 987 with the marriage being A
registered before the Registrar of Marriages, on 10th February, 1987. Vipin
Pandya aforesaid died as an intestate on 4th November, t 995 on which a
testamentary petition was filed by his widow Ila Vipin Pandya on 9th February,
t 996 praying for the grant of letters of administration for the estate of the
deceased. The respondent Smita Ambalal Patel, however, filed a Caveat on 7th B
March, t 996 opposing the grant and also filed an affidavit on 13th March,
t 996 denying that the deceased had died intestate and pointing out that he
had executed a Will which had been deposited by him with an Advocate and
-/-
Solicitor Markand Gandhi and further that the appellant was not the widow
of the deceased as no remarriage had taken place as alleged. As the
testamentary petition came to be contested by the Caveat it was converted C
into Testamentary Suit No. t 7 of t 996. The appellant thereafter took out
Chamber S~mmons No. 990 of 1996 praying for the dismissal of the caveat
on the plea iner alia that no caveatable interest had been disclosed in the
affidavit and that she as the widow of the deceased was his only heir. The
respondent filed an affidavit on 29th October, 1996 in reply to the Chamber D ,
Summons for the first time disclosing that she was a creditor of the estate of
the deceased. The matter came up before a learned Single Judge of the
Bombay High Court (Dr. (Mrs.) Upasani, J.) who, in her judgment dated 23rd -
December, 1996, observed that the Caveatrix had disclosed her "interest in the
estate of the deceased by stating that she was a creditor of Vipin Pandya to
the knowledge of the petitioner Ila" and that the deceased had apparently E
executed a Will which had probably been deposited with Markand Gandhi,
Advocate. It was also observed that creditors of a deceased could not be said
to have any interest in the estate left by him and the interest was limited to
ensuring that the assets of the estate were sufficient to pay the debts of the
deceased and that the remedy of a creditor of a deceased under normal F
circumstances was to file a suit against the person in whose favour the grant
of probate or letters of administration had been made, but having so held,
further observed that in the particular facts of the case an outright dismissal
of the caveat would not be justified. The challenge made to this order before
the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court and before the Hon 'ble Supreme
Court by way of Special Leave Petition also failed as both matters were G
dismissed vides orders dated 4th March, 1997 and 28th April, 1997 respectively.
Respondent Smita Patel thereafter filed Suit No. 4892 of 1998 on 18th September,
1998 before the Bombay High Court impleading Ila Pandya as defendant No.
1, the brothers of her deceased husband as respondent Nos. 2, 3, 4 and
several other respondents as well, alleging that the deceased had left behind
H·
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 7 S.C.R.

·A huge properties which were being misappropriated by one or the other of the +-
respondents and that the deceased was at the time of his death indebted to
her with respect to large sums of money and that an arbitration attempted
between them at one stage had proved to be unsuccessful. Along with the
plaint she appended a letter dated 25th September, 1995 addressed by Vipin
Pandya to her acknowledging his liability to pay a sum of Rs.20 lacs which
B apparently was due to her and also undertaking to deposit a sum of Rs. I
crore to her"'account and in addition casting aspersions on the appellant and
his brothers and further stating that he had made a Will and had got it
registered and had deposited it with Markand Gandhi. She further pleaded +
that even after Vipin Pandya's death efforts at an infonnal mediation by
c Justice S.K. Desai, a fonner Judge of the Bombay High Court had been made,
but again without success. It was further pleaded that an attempt was being
made to dispose of the huge properties left by the deceased in a surreptitious
manner so that the money could be embezzled by the so-called heirs of the
deceased. It was accordingly prayed inter a/ia that as she was a creditor of
the estate of the deceased in the sum of Rs. l ,84,80,000/-, this amount
D alongwith interest @ 21 % p.a. from the date of the suit till the paymept was
released to her and such other sums as were due to other creditors be also
paid to them or secured in such manner as was deemed appropriate and that
to secure the safety of the assets, a Court Receiver be appointed as well. The
appellant thereupon took out the present Notice of Motion (No. 1207 of2004)
E seeking leave of the court to deposit to the credit of Suit No. 4892 of 1998
an amount of Rs. l ,20,00,000/- or any amount that the court may detennine, or
in the alternative to furnish a bank guarantee, for the said amount. The
respondent in her affidavit in reply dated 16th June, 2004 pointed out inter
alia that the Chamber Summons had been taken out to delay the hearing of
the testamentary suit which was posted for the recording of evidence and that
F the claim preferred by her in the civil suit was not time barred. She also filed ~-

an additional affidavit deposing that the present notice of motion was similar
in tenns to Notice of Motion No. 816 of 2004 which had earlier been taken
in suit No. 4892 of 1998. But an order dated 29th July, 2004 the learned Single
Judge of Bombay High Court dismissed the notice of motion holding that as
Chamber Summons No. 990of1996 had already been rejected by the learned
G
Single Judge which order had been confinned by the Division Bench of the
Bombay High Court on 4th March, l 997 and the Special Leave Petition which
had filed in the Supreme Court had also been dismissed and that the issue -L
as to whether Smita Patel had any caveatable interest had been deleted by
the Court vide order dated 16th August, 200 I in Chamber Summons No. 241
H of 200 I, the question or otherwise of her caveatable interest was no longer
1
ILAVIPINPANDYAv. SMITAAMBALALPATEL[H.S.BEDI,J.] 31
in dispute. The learned Single Judge then noticed the offer of the present A
-\ appellant who was a defendant in Civii Suit No. 4892 of 1998 to depositnot
only a sum of Rs. 1,84,20,000/- as claimed in Civil Suit No. 4892 of 1998 but
in fact to make a deposit of Rs.2,40,00,000/- which would cover the claim
calculating interest @ 18% p.a. on the principal sum of Rs. 1,20,00,000/- till
date, but as no deposit had actually been made nor any bank guarantee
furnished, the notice of motion could not be allowed. B

4. The matter was thereafter taken by the appellant before the Division
+ Bench which (as already referred to above) declined to interfere in the matter
and dismissed the appeal in limine observing that even if the amount was
deposited by the appellant it wou Id still not settle the claim of the respondent
or discharge it would still not settle the claim of the respondent or discharge
c
her caveatable interest. It is in these circumstances that the matter is before
us. by way of special leave.

5. We have heard Mr. R.F. Nariman, learned counsel for the appellant
and respondent Smita Ambalal Patel, appearing in person. D
,. 6. It has been urged by Mr. Nariman that the earlier set of proceedings
i.e. Chamber Summons no. 990 of 1996 which had culminated in this court, the
interest that the respondent claimed in the estate of the deceased Vipin
Pandya had not been spelt out, but subsequently by the filling of Civil Suit
No. 4892 of 1998, the respondent had herself quantified the amount allegedly E
due to her as a creditor of the deceased and as the appellant was willing to
pay even more than the sum claimed in the civil suit as had been noticed by
the Learned Single Judge in his order dated 29th July, 2004, there was absolutely
no reason whatsoever to hold that the respondent's caveatable interest still
existed. It has been pleaded that despite of fact that the respondent had time
and again referred to a Will executed by Vipin Pandya and had often threatened
F
to produce the same in court, she had not done so despite the fact that the
testamentary suit had been filed way back in 1996 and she had in this
interregnum fought the proceedings in every possible forum, both civil and
criminal. It was also argued that even assuming that a remarriage had not been
perfonned by Ila Pandya appellant with Vipin Pandya on 15th January, 1987, G
the property left by him would devolve on his siblings, who had in their
affidavits pleaded that a re-marriage had indeed taken place and that Ila
Pandya was the widow and was therefore entitled to all his property and that
--\
they had absolutely no objection if the letters of administration were granted
to her. It has further been contended that the respondent had till today not
H
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 7 S.C.R.

A alleged that she had any interest in the assets of the deceased other than that
of a creditor for the aforesaid quantified figure. He has finally contended that +-
the appellant was willing to pay any amount which this court found adequate
so as to bring the entire set of bitter and acrimonious proceedings between
the parties to an end.

B 7. The respondent appearing in person, however, categorically rejected
any possibility of a settlement and also referred to several letters and
docurnents on record pointing out that the advocates who had been appearing
in these and connected proceedings from time to time had been guilty of -j-
defrauding her to her due and that in the light of fact that the Supreme Court
c had also declined the appellant's prayer for issuance of Chamber Summons
challenging her caveatable interest, the matter being res-judicata no further
proceedings were justified on account of the present notice of motion. On the ·
last date of hearing i.e. on 3rd May, 2007 she had also submitted written
arguments in the form of an affidavit which we have taken on record in which
she at the very outset deposed that Mr. Nariman had on 11th January, 2007 ,
)
.D made an offer to pay a sum of Rs. 4 crore by way of a settlement but that
this amount was not acceptable in view of the huge properties left by the
deceased and that the properties identified in the amended schedule of assets __._

shown at item Nos. 4, 5, 6 and JO (a), (b), l l(a)(b), 12 and 18 in addition to
some amount ~owards counsel fee alone would be acceptable.

E 8. We have considered the arguments advanced before us. It is true, as
has been contended by the respondent, that Chamber Summons No. 990 of
1996 taken out by the appellant had been dismissed on 23rd December, 996
by Upasani, J. with the observation that though the normal procedure for the
recovery of a debt due from a deceased was a suit by the creditor against
F the beneficiaries of the estate but in the particular facts of the case the
respondent did have a caveatable interest. Concededly this order had been -+
confirmed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court and thereafter
by the Supreme Court with the Special Leave Petition being dismissed in
limine. However, we find that Civil Suit No. 4892 of 1998 had been filed
subsequently and it is at this stage that the present notice of motion has been
G moved by the appellant conceding her claim and undertaking to deposit all
sums due to her before the Bombay High Court. We are therefore unable to ~
understand that in the background that the respondent has claimed only a
creditors interest in the estate of the deceased and on no other relationship L
or basis in the several proceedings that have been filed by her, can it be
pleaded that her caveatable interest still continued to survive? It bears
H
ILA VIPINPANDYAv. SMITAAMBALALPATEL [H.S.BEDI,J.] 33

i
repetition that the respondent has time and again referred to a Will allegedly A
executed by Vipin Pandya and had even in the allegedly executed by Vipin
Pandya and had even in the arguments before us repeatedly asserted that she
would produce it in the testamentary suit pending in the Bombay High Court,
but has not done so till day though the suit had been filed in the year 1996
and is at the stage of recording of evidence. On the contrary we find that
Vipin Pandya's siblings have given affidavits identifying Ila Pandya appellant
B
as his widow and legal heir and deposing that they had no objection to the
letters of administration being granted to her. We are thus unable to comprehend
.;
or fathom the right that the respondent still claims in the estate of the
deceased so as to maintain her status as a caveatrix. The written arguments
submitted by the respondent are completely silent on this aspect, and take c
up absolutely irrelevant issues.

9. There is yet another disturbing feature of this case which needs to
be highlighted. We must, at the outset, emphasize that a litigant appearing in
person does not enjoy a status higher than that of a lawyer arguing a case
D
for her client. We are also aware that such a litigant is nevertheless given extra
consideration by the court for several justifiable reasons; first, the torturous
and cumbersome court procedure are truly debilitating and tend to exhaust .•·
and frustrate the most hardened and energetic litigant, often making him bitter
about the entire system; secondly as a layman with limited knowledge of law
he is unable to distinguish between a relevant and an irrelevant argument E
leading to verbosity and finally, being over sensitive to his case with the
opposite counsel and judge often being identified as belonging to a hostile
camp, an oc~asional digression or deviation from established nonns and
mores is tolerated. We have, however, come to notice a growing tendency on
the part of some litigants to misuse the latitude granted to them and to F
deliberately create a situation whereby the functioning of the court becomes
an impossibility thus stultifying the entire judicial process. Smita Patel falls
eminently within this category. During the course of arguments spread over
parts of three days she refused to argue on the merits of her case and on the
issues raised by Mr. Nariman but used foul language for some of the counsel
who had been associated with this and other connected matters dubbing G
them as criminals closely associated with those who had been responsible for
the Bombay blasts. We had at first advised her to be careful and to refrain
from making baseless allegations against those who were not before the Court
as parties and had subsequently cautioned her that she was over stepping
the limits of decency which would compel us to take unpleasant steps against H
her, but to no avail. On the contrary she shouted back that the court could
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 7 S.C.R. )-
\~

A do wh~tever it liked but she would continue to expose the advocates who
were a threat to the safety and security of her country. Finding it impossible +--
to proceed any further we were constrained to record the following order on
3rd May, 2007:

"The respondent, appearing in person, had started her arguments
B in this case on 28.3.2007 at 3.00 p.m. and the matter· remained part-
heard on that day. Thereafter, she resumed her arguments on 12.4.2007
at 3 .15 p.m and did not complete even on that date. Thereafter, the
matter came up for hearing on 19th April 2007 when a telegram sent -\..
I-
by the respondent was placed before us in which she had requested
c for adjournment of the matter till 2nd May, 2007. This is how the
(
matter is before us today. ....t
I

The respondent, appearing in person, resumed her arguments at
10.40 a.m. She has not addressed any argument so far which may be
considered to be relevant to the issue involved in the appeal before
D us. We have repeatedly tried to persua<le her to deal with the
submissions urged on behalf of the appellant. Rather than doing that,
~
she has been reading before us various documents in the different
-+
volumes of the paper book relating to the conduct of certain advocates Iii
J-
and she insisted that she is concerned about the misconduct of the
E advocates who have held this country to ransom and who have
associated in causing bomb blasts in this country. When we tried to t-
explain to her that we are not concerned with only those issues and
we are concerned with only those issues which are relevant to the
dispute before us, she retorted that she is very much concerned with
the misconduct of lawyers and her real fight is against them not the
"
F appellant that_ therefore, we must hear her on those issues. When we
explained to her that those issues are irrelevant and she must confi11e t
herself to the relevant issues she raise(,I her voice and started
addressing the Court in a manner unbecoming of even a party
appearing in person. Having regard to the fact that she is a lady and
G she is appearing in person, and that she may have a grievance, we ')'11
tolerated her to the extent possible. Her conduct is now beyond
tolerance. She has reduced the judicial proceeding to a mockery. Since r-
she is wasting the time of the Court by referring to irrelevant record
li-.
•
and not addressing the Court on the arguments. Since the respondent
persists in raising her voice and making irrelevant comments in a
-L
...."
H manner which completely erodes the sanctity of judicial proceedings,
t,.
r

..
ILA VIPlNPANDYAv. SMITAAMBALALPATEL [H.S.BEDI,J.] 35
we shall only be wasting the time of the Court, if we continue to hear A
i
the respondent further. We shall proceed to pronounce our judgment
in due course.

The respondent who appears in person has handed over to us
written arguments on affidavit and prays that her written· submissions
may be taken into consideration. We shall certainly tak~ into B
consideration the written arguments submitted by her".

10. We have also gone through the earlier record of proceedings and
find a very disturbing picture indeed. It appears that the testamentary suit
was fixed for framing of issues before Deshpande, J., of the Bomy High Court
on 25th August, 2000, when she misbehaved in Court on which a notice to c
show cause as to why action for contempt of Court should not be taken
against her was served on her there and then and eight days time was allowed
to file a reply. The Learned Judge thereafter by his order dated 17th August,
2000 found her guilty under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
and sentenced her to undergo simple imprisonment for three weeks and to a
D
fine of Rs.2000/- in default, to undergo a sentence for one week and also
directed her to pay Rs.5000/- as costs to the counsel for the petitioner. The
observations in the aforesaid order tell their own take and we re-produce
hereunder some paragraphs from it:

"This matter was on board on 25.8.2000 for framing issues, when E
for no reason and without any provocation frt>m the advocate for the
petitioner Ms. Farishte Sethna, contemner lost her temper and started
making accusation against Ms. Sethna, in particular, and advocates in
general calling them Virappan, the dreaded sandal decoit from South,
kidnapping Justice and dictating terms to the judges. She was warned
repeatedly by me of consequences for making such reckless allegations. F
But she continued to make them without taking into account all the
warnings. She lost her temper, sense of propriety and not maintaining
decorum and created chaos in· the court room.

Then and there is a notice was served upon her as to why action
for contempt should not be taken against her. She was given eight G
days time to give reply.

).,
Not affected in the least by contempt notice served upon her, the
contemner Smita Patel came to the court on 2nd or 3rd day with an
affidavit and started asserting that she had said something more
against the advocates and that should be include in the contempt H
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 7 S.C.R.
)

A notice. The affidavit was not taken by me on record with a warning
that she was aggravating the situation and that may lead to trouble +-
for her. However, Smita Patel filed an affidavit in reply to the show
cause notice on 4.9.2000. She also filed thereafter another affidavits
dated 15.9.2000 and 4.10.2000. In the same manner, the petitioner Ila
Vipin Pandya, who was present when the aforesaid incident dated
B 25.8.2000 took place in the Court Room, filed an affidavit dated
27.9.2000. Thereafter, both, the advocate for the petitioner Ms. Farishte
Sethna and the contemner Smita Patel were heard by me on three
occasions at length.

It is necessary to note at this juncture that neither during her oral
c submissions nor in any of her affidavits, Smita Patel expressed her
regrets for her uncalled scandalous allegations and utterances in the
Court against the Advocates, nor she was at any time apologetic
about her behaviour in the Court. She did not express repentance or
remorse about her behaviour, but to the contrary during her argument
D she contended that she does not want any sympathy from the court
or anybody. In- addition, in her affidavit dated 4.9.2000 she repeated
her allegations. When the contempt notice was issued to Smita Paet ·~

'
on 25.8.2000. Ms. Sethna had insisted that Smita Patel also uttered the
words that she has been terrorizing the judiciary. But I had deliberately
omitted to take this as a ground for the contempt notice because of
E the compassionate view which a Court generally has for the litigants
fighting their generally has for the litigants fighting their own cases.
However, Smita Patel in her affidavit dated 4.9.2000 admitting that she
made an oral request to me on 28.8.2000 to include those words in
..
contempt notice and she had prayed that the contempt notice be :

F amended and corrected accordingly and the words uttered by her that
"she has· been terrorizing the judiciary" be inserted therein. i

If the contemn er wants and insists upon making situation difficult
for her, is adamant and has uncalled for recklessness upon such
insistence, then the Court can not have any objection, and therefore,
G while deciding the contempt notice, I am doing to take cognizance of
those words uttered by her on 25.8.2000 to the effect that she has
been terrorizing the judiciaiy.
I
l.., '1
In fact the words uttered by Smita Patel in the Show cause notice
and as now added were uttered by her before Justice R.J. Kochar also
H on 23.8.2000, as submitted and pointed 'Out before me by Ms. Sethna,
ILA VIPINPANDYAv. SMITAAMBALALPATEL [H.S.BEDl,J.] 37
Smita Patel in her affidavit dated 4.9.2000, admitted to have uttered A
those words before Justice R.J. Kochar. However, what happened
before Justice Kochar on 23.8.2000 can not be made subject matter of
the contempt notice because Justice Kochar did not take any action
against contemner Smita Patel.

From the aforesaid circumstances it would be clear that utterances B
of Smita Patel in the court that advocates are Virappan, they are
kidnapping Justice and dictating the terms to the Judges and they
have been terrorising the Judiciary are undoubtedly contemptuous
and they are nothing short of criminal contempt which is defined in
Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.. .. ;
c
11. The learned Single Judge also recorded that:

" ..... very rarely persons fighting their own cases in the Courts
behave in the manner in which Smita Patel has been behaving in the
Courts ..... .
D
12. And further

"So far as misbehaviour of Smita Patel is concerned, she has
crossed all he limits. So far as misbehaviour in Court is concerned, she
is in the habit of loosing temper in Court, shouting and raising her .
voice, scorning at he advocates, making faces, and gestures E
contemptuous to the other side, making show to the public, addressing
the huge mob ...... "

13. And yet further

"Even while arguing this show cause notice Smita Patel did not F
stop and did not control her expressions. She was contemptuous
while Ms. Sethna addressing the Court. She was making faces in the
Court, laughing and smiling as if the contempt notice is a prize or
garland offered to her by the whole judicial system for her fighting
against so called corruption and unfair tactics of the advocates ....." G
14. Deshpande, J. also referred to her misbehaviour in other Courts.~
well and to the proceedings before Upasani J., in which she had made the
-\ following order:

"Caveatrix S. Patel is appearing in person is shouting very loudly H
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 7 S.C.R.

A and is disturbing the Court proceedings. Actually she is talking and
\-
screaming in a very high pitch which makes it impossible for the Court
to go on with the hearing of this matter" ...... .

" ..... Mr. D.S. Parikh has agreed to the expeditious hearing of the
petition and the suggestion was made to hear Notice of Motion along
B with pet~tion at an early date. However, the Caveatrix, after hearing
this suggestion, has backed out and has started speaking all sorts of
irrelevant things accusing Advocates, the judicial systems in general,
without giving specific reply to the query made by the Court. In the
commotion caused by the shouting and screaming of Ms. Patel, it is
not possible to go on with the proceedings. The Court is, therefore,
c constrained to adjourn the matter to the next date.

At this stage, Mr. D. S. Parikh, who is appearing for the petitioner,
makes an earnest oral request, in view of the allegations hurled by the
Caveatrix against the Advocates and judicial system and in view of
the commotion which is being created by the Caveatrix and in view
D of he irrelevant speeches obviously intended for playing to the gallery
that the proceeding be tape-recorded so that whatever unwarranted,
irrelevant and almost defamatory remarks are passed by the Caveatrix
would be recorded".

Heard Mr. D. S. Parikh, so also the Caveatrix. The Caveatrix is.
E
shouting loudly to the effect that "why tape recorder, even Video
Camera should be fitted in the Court Room and every thing should
be recorded".

Perused the proceedings. It was informed to this court across the
F bar that even my predecessor Mrs. Baam J, had given directions that
a lady constable should remain present in court obviously in view of
the violent nature and frequel'!t outbursts of the Caveatrix. On this
background, the Caveatrix obviously appears to be out of control and
is in fact disturbing the court proceedings; the suggestion made by
Mr. D. S. Parikh appears to be worth taking notice of it. Hence, the
G following order is passed:

Mr. D. S. Parikh may bring his tape recorder on the next date and
the Court may consider whether the proceedings should be recorded
or not on that day".

H 15. On 24th December, 1997 Upasani, J also passed the following order:
ILA VIPIN PANDY Av. SMITA AMBALAL PATEL [H.S. BED!, J.] 39

" ...... There used to be always heated arguments and outbursts, A
unwarranted remarks; playing to the gallery-attitude on the part of the
defendant, and there used to be always atmosphere of chaos in the
Court Room.· The hearing therefore, could not take place in the
congenial, peaceful and disciplined atmosphere as it should be in any
Court of Law. Very often, the Defendant has gone astray while arguing
the matter and has deviated from the averments made in the Chamber B
Summons, making somt: resJlts and many of the points remained to
be clarified in the utter chaos that ensured".

16. It appears that earlier to these proceedings, Patel, J., on 6th March,
1997 had recorded as follows: ·
c
" ... The Defendant stated that by the draft Chamber Summons she
was seeking urgent reliefs. She insisted that the same could therefore
be taken up for hearing. Accordingly, the Defendant was given a
patient hearing for the plaintiff rose up to make his submission. He
hardly argued for five minutes when he was interrupted by the D
defendant with the result he could not continue the submission. It
was noticed that through out the hearing the Defendant was noisy
and she was talking at the top of her voice. She not only talked
irrelevant things but also made wild allegations against the advocates
as well as the staff of the Court. She was in angry mood and she did
not listen to any advice given by me to be reasonable and relevant. E
On the contrary, she went on shouting that she would not bother
even if she were to be hanged. The behaviour of the Defendant in the
Court Room was highly undignified and objectionable. In fact, it is
found that she has been conducting herself in the same manner
whenever she appears in the Court. This is not only my experience F
but also of he other learned Judges before whom the Defendant
appeared in this matter. My attention was drawn to the order dated
10th December 1997 passed by Dr. Upasani, J. in Chamber Summons
No. 446 of 1997 wherein observations about the objectionable
demeanor of the Defendant are made. Shri Merchant, the learned
Advocate for the plaintiff therefore submitted that the Court should G
take stem action against the Defendant for her misbehaviour. The
Defendant being a lady, not represented by any advocate, was sho'wn
some indulgence and tolerance. However, the Court will have to think
seriously in case the Defendant persists in misusing the indulgence
so as to disturb and obstruct the Court proceedings".
H
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 7 S.C.R.

A 17. Yet later, Datar J., on 27th April, 1998 observed that Mr. Humranwalla
for the petitioner/plaintiff had stated that Mis. Humranwalla & Co. was thinking -t-
of withdrawing from the matter because of the wi Id allegations made by the
Caveatrix, and that Mr. Merchant, learned counsel for the petitioner had also,
refused to appear in the matter.

B 18. Reference was also made to an order of Bamm, J, who had recorded:

"At this stage, when the notice of motion is called out, the
respondent - Ms. Smita Ambalal Patel - appeared in person and re-
agitated the issue of the review petition which has already been
decided on the last Wednesday. When questioned whether she wanted
c to go on with the hearing of the notices of motion, she stated that
she wanted xeox copies of the documents to which the Learned
Advocate for the petitioner stated that every time when an adverse
order is passed, this litigant applies for time to ensure that the matter
is removed from the board of that particular Court. To this statement,
D the litigant started shouting in Court and made scandalous allegations
considerations". This irresponsible behaviour and conduct which the
respondent has been adopting from time to time when adverse orders
are passed tends to prejudice the confidence of the litigants in Courts
who are present in Court for the administration of justice and disturbs
the decorum of the Court.
E
Hence the Prothonotary and Senior Master is directed to issue a
show cause notice to the respondent - Ms. Smita Ambalal Patel -
calling upon her as to why contempt proceedings should not be
adopted against her. Even when I passed the otder of issuance of
show cause notice, the respondent cannot dictate to the presiding
F judge as to what order the Court should pass. The respondent things
that she knows everything and time and again she disturbs the
proceedings in the Court and thereby prejudices the progress of other
matters in the Court. She left the Court in a huff and puff and again
shouted to the effects "the Learned Advocate for the petitioner, Shri
G Humranwalla, should go in jail". This is the attitude adopted by her
from time to time which does not befit a litigant. By this behaviour
which she has been adopting from time to time, by shouting and
screaming in Court, she has been causing nausances and prejudices
the Court proceedings, and every time when the order is contemptuous
atmosphere which not only disturbs the decorum of the Court, but
H
ILA VIPIN PANDYAv. SMITA AMBALAL PATEL [H.S. BEDI, J.] 41
~
also prejudice the progress of the proceedings in the Court". A
1
19. Baam J., thereafter issued a suo moto notice of contempt of court
to the respondent and the matter was transferred to R.J. Kochar, J., who while
holding her guilty, took a lenient view and discharged the notice cautioning
her to keep her balance and not to lose her temper. The learned Judge also
noted that the outbursts of the respondent had compelled several Judges B
including Baam J ., to transfer the case from their Courts.

20. The respondent filed an appeal against the order dated 17th August,
2000 before a Division bench of the Bombay High Court, which in its order
of 16th November 2000 recalled the facts of the case and held as under:
c
"We have patiently ploughed through the long affidavits and we
find them bristling with wholly irrelevant particulars for replying the
Show Cause Notice issued to the contemner. She has also indulged
in bulky correspondence with he Prothonotary and Senior Master by
;-- addressing a number of letters to him and placing on record what
transpired during the course of the hearing according to her. She
D
insisted that the Court should accept the truth of the allegations
i contained in those letters addressed to the Prothonotary and Senior
Master as they were not controverted by any one".

xxxx xxxxx xxxx xxxx xxxxx
E
"At the outset, we felt that the contemner being a lay person was,
perhaps, likely to be impetuous on account of the trauma which she
might have undergone during a series of litigations, which she had to
prosecute in this Court. Though the appeal as such involves very
limited issues of fact and law, we have given the condemner a
F
disproportionately long and patient hearing lasting the whole of
yesterday and virtually half of the morning session today. During her
long rambling arguments, at times incoherent and punctuated by bitter
sobs and impassioned pleas, the contemner made a few points of law,
which we have noted. On one such point, we thought that we should
call upon a natural impartial counsel to address the Court. We, G
therefore, requested the learned Advocate General to address us with
regard to the question of law. We express our grateful appreciation of
the assistance rendered by the learned Advocate - General".
-l
xxxx xxxx xxxxxxxxx
H
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 7 S.C.R.

A "The next question that arises is, whether the learned Judge was
justified in the quantum of punishment imposed on her. In view ofthe
contemner's history that we have narrated, it appeared to the learned
Single Judge, and it appears to us too, that the leniency showed by
different learned Judges was misconstrued as weakness by the
condemner. It may be that the contemner is the victim of circumstances
B where under someone cheaed her and some advocates b(!haved
unprofessionally in connection wrth her litigation. It may also be
possible that she has lost her mental balance because of the said
facts. (Though, considering the manner in which the contemner coolly
argued the appeal before us, we are not inclined to believe that _she
c has really lost her mental balance). The were the circumstances
specifically considered by Kochar, J. when he discharged the contempt
notice issued to the contemner in view of the apology tendered,
undertaking given, and the promise of future good behavior. It appears
to us that the trust and confidence reposed by Kochar, J. in the
contemner stood betayed on account of her conduct before the learned
D Single Judge (Deshpande, J) the details of which we have already
referred to. Considering the different orders passed by the different
learned Judges of this Court and, the_circumstances under which each
of the said learned Judges felt that the contemner was taking undue
advantage of the leniency of he court and behaving in a manner
E obstructive or decorous administration of justice in the court, we are
not in a position to say that the learned Single Judge has imposed a
disproportionate quantum of punishment, in view of the background
of the case".

21. The Division Bench accordingly confirmed the order of the learned
F Single Judge. The· matter was thereafter brought to this Court by way of
Criminal Appeal No. 382 of2001, and on the 'fervent appeal" made by Mr.
V. S. Kotwal, her Counsel that some indulgence be shown to her as she would
hereafter not perpetrate any contempt of court and further observing that as
she was a lady it appeared that the apology was infact genuine, by· order
G dated 26th March, 200 I directed that the sentence imposed would remain
suspended for a period of five years on the following conditions:

I. "Appellant shall give an undertaking before the ~ingle Judge
(before whom the contempt was committed by her) in the form
of an affidavit that she will not commit any act of contempt of
any court hereafter;
H
ILA VIPIN PANDY Av. SMITA AMBALAL PATEL [H.S. BEDI, J.] 43
..;
2 If the said undertaking is violated the sentence of imprisonment A
imposed on her will automatically review and appellant will be
liable to be put in prison for undergoing that part of the sen<ence;
3. The fine part of the sentence as well as the orders to pay cost
would remain undisturbed and appellant shall not apply for refund
of the same; B
4. If the appellant fails to give the said undertaking within four
weeks from today she will forfeit the benefit granted as per this
order; and
s. As to what would be the situation after the period offive years
will be decided by the High Court on a motion made by the c
appellant contemnor.

With these observations this appeal is disposed of'.

22. We find that in the light of the above directions we could send her
to jail to serve out her sentence, but we desist from doing so. D
23. The matter does not end here. We had, as already indicated, closely
arguments on 3rd May 2006 by a speaking order. On the very next day some
applications on affidavit dated 4th May 2007 tendered apparently by the
respondent were sent to us, again referring to some of the proceedings that
had been going on and again raking up irrelevant issues. We reproduce E
hereunder the verbatim some extracts therefrom:

"Thereafter, in the midst of the arguments of the respondent, the
learned Senior Counsel Mr. R. F. Nariman got up and stated that they
were J>repared to offer anything for settlement. The respondent had F
at this juncture, furnished two sets of "written arguments on affidavit
of the respondent dated 02.05.2007" to the court and one to the
learned Senior Counsel Mr. R. F. Nariman and prayed for the say of
the Learned Counsel as well as the appellant. The Court read the •
entire affidavit. The respondent states that the appellant who is the
front/ostensible party of the advocates on record engaged by the G
underworld who are the real parties and have been repeatedly violating
the orders/undertaking/status quo orders of the Bombay High Court,
tempering with judicial order of the court as well as the courts record
with the connivance of the court staff. These advocates have no
regard for truth and the courts of law. The respondent states that it H
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007) 7 S.C.R.

A is untrue and incorrect to record by Your Lordships that the
respondent does not want to argue on points raised by the learned
Senior Counsel Mr. R. F. Nariman for the appellant and therefore the
court is closing the respondent's arguments. In fact he had completed
his argument on 11.4.2007 and the responden.t had started her argument
on 11.42007 from 2.15 p.m. to 4.00 p.m. and on 12.4.2007 from 3.15 p.m.
B to 4 p.m. and on 03.05.2007 from 10.45 a.m. to 12.15 p.m. and has
partially dealt with the learned Senior Counsel Mr. R. F. Nariman's
argument".

XW( xxxx xxxx xxxx
c "The application dated 26.04.2007 (without annexures) made to
the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court by the
respondent and inter-alia prayed that the only way to weed out the
cancer of corruption from the judiciary and prevent the unholy nexus
between the few corrupt advocates and the court staff is "To hang
the victim Smita Patel from the strong hook kept in the Central Court
D of the Bombay High Court instead from a lamp post on 15th August
2007 on the Independence Day under the directions of the coming
Chief Justice Shri Swatanter Kumar.

In the light of the above submissions, the respondent states that
she has not said anything that would attract contempt of courts
E
action against her. However, if this Hon'ble Court still inclined to
initiate contempt notice, the respondent prays as under:-

(A) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to order that from the Platform
Plaza (in the front of the Hori'ble Chief Justice Court Room No. 1) the
F respondent be shot from a cannot and killed like "Rani Laxmibai-The
Jhansi Ki Rani" who was shot and killed by the Britishers as was the
practice.

(B) A dynamid be directed to be kept and the respondent is
willing to sit on the lap of the statue of Mahatma Gandhi situated in
G front of the garden lawn of the Supreme Court and light the fuse
herself."

Note Bene: Some of the extracts in the preceding paragraphs have
spelling and grammatical errors, but we have reproduced them verbatim from
the record before us.
H
ILA VIPIN PANDYA v. SMITA AMBALAL PA TEL [H.S. BEDI, J.) 45
;,
24. It is indeed disgusting to see a litigant attempting to intimidate the A
i
Supreme Court and two of its Judges in such a crude and obnoxious manner.

25. A resume of the facts clearly reveal the incorrigible and recalcitrant
attitude of the respondent. We could perhaps condone her errant conduct if
she was merely a highly strung and impetuous lady over-sensitive to her case
and unaware of the nuances of the law and the decorum to be maintained in B'
Court but we are satisfied that no ignorance nor mental b~lance is discernible
which can be pleaded in extenuation of her behaviour. The record reveals that
she is well aware of the conduct of the judicial process and the law and facts
relating to her case, but she has evolved a strategy which has thus far kept
her in good stead as it has been designed to filibuster the proceedings in case
she finds that they are not taking the direction that she has chalked out and
c
that despite her conviction for contempt of court on two occasions and
numerous admonitions and warnings notwithstanding, she has remained
unfazed and has in a most unbecoming manner relentlessly and ruthlessly
purused the litigation. We also quote yet again from the judgment of the
Division Bench dated 16th November, 2000: D
1 "It may also be possible that she has lost her mental balance
because of the said facts. (Though, considering the manner in which
the contemner coolly argued the appeal before us, we are not inclined
to believe that she has really lost her mental balance)".
E
We completely endorse this observation.

26. We must emphasize that a Court is not a forum which can be used
for spewing venom and vitriol on the opposite party, and even more alarmingly,
on the judge hearing the case and the counsel representing that party. The
written arguments that the respondent has filed in court betray her purpose. f'
The new demands clearly reveal her intention to extort as much as she can
from the appellant, who, it must be presumed, is exhausted and drained by
the huge number of court proceedings that have been going on for the last
11 years.

27. We have advisedly given the detailed history of this litigation to G
emphasize that those who attempt to take court proceedings lightly or try to
subvert the judicial process to their advantage, do so at their peril. The
~· imposition of exemplary costs must, as a consequence, follow.

28. In this view of the matter we allows this appeal and set aside the
H
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 7 S.C.R.

A order dated 29th July, 2004 of the learned Single Judge and 25th Augu~, 2004 :,_
of the Division Bench and allow the notice of motion and direct that the
appellant shall, within a period of three months from today deposit a sum of
Rs.2,40,00,000/- in all with the prothonotary of the Bombay High Court (and
after deduction of the costs) the balance to be disbursed to the respondent
in full discharge of her claim as a Caveatrix in the testamentary suit and as
B a plaintiff in Civil Suit No: 4892 of 1998, and that no application of whatever
nature in respect of these two matters will hereinafter be entrained by any
Court. We are also of the opinion that as a consequence of the above
direction and in the interest of justice the respondent's interest as a caveatrix
.shall stand discharged and the Civil Suit filed by her shall also be deemed
C to be disposed of.

29. We also impose costs of Rs. five lakhs to be recovered from the sum
awarded as above. The amount representing the costs will be donated to a
charity to be ·identified by the Chief Justice of Bombay High Court. ·

D A.K.T. Appeal allowed.