Holding

The proviso to section 12(3) provides a one‑time benefit; once the predecessor‑tenant has availed it, the heir cannot claim the benefit again, and eviction is permissible.

Summary

The landlord of a shop in Neemuch sued the heirs of the original tenant for eviction after they defaulted on rent. The original tenant, Badri Lal, had previously avoided eviction by invoking the proviso to sub‑section (3) of section 12 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, and paying arrears. After Badri Lal's death, his heirs inherited the tenancy and later defaulted again. The trial court decreed eviction, the High Court set aside that decree, and the matter reached the Supreme Court. The Court examined whether the one‑time benefit of the proviso could be claimed by the heirs when the predecessor had already availed it. It held that the benefit is limited to a single occasion per accommodation and passes with the predecessor’s rights and obligations, so the heirs could not claim it again. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, restored the trial court decree, and ordered eviction, subject to a brief stay.

Issues considered

Whether the heirs of a tenant are entitled to the benefit of the proviso to sub‑section (3) of section 12 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 when the predecessor‑tenant had already availed that benefit.
Whether the proviso confers a one‑time exemption from eviction irrespective of a change in tenant by succession.
Whether the decision in A.S. Sulochana v. C. Dharmalingam is applicable to the present facts.

Legislation cited

Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961s. 12(3), s. 13

Subjects

tenancyevictionrent defaultsuccessionproviso benefitMadhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Actlandlord-tenant lawinheritance of tenancyone‑time exemption

Judgment

!MOAD ALI A
v.
KESHA V CHAND AND ORS.

FEBRUARY 19, 2003

[V.N. KHARE, CJ, S.B. SINHA AND DR. A.R. LAKSHMANAN, JJ.] B

Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961:

s. 12(3), proviso-Shop-Tenant committing default in payment ofrent-
Availing benefit ofproviso to sub-section (3) ofs.12-His heirs who inherited C
the tenancy again committed default-Suit by landlordfor eviction-Decreed--
Held, once the father ofrespondents had availed the benefit ofproviso to sub-
s. (3) of s.12, the said benefit was not available to respondent-tenants on
committing a farther default in payment of rent-When the heirs of a tenant
acquire benefit under the Act, the same would be subject to such limitation D
and liability which has been provided under the Act-A successor-in-interest
holds his tenancy right subject to rights and obligations of his predecessor-
A person by reason of inheritance or assignment does not derive any better
title than his predecessor, and thus, the right which the original tenant did not
possess cannot be passed on to his successor.
E
Gian Devi Anand -v. Jeevan Kumar and Ors., (1985) 2 SCC 683,
followed.
/
Nasiruddin and Ors. v. Sita Ram Agarwal, [2003] 1 Scale 658; Ba/want
Singh and Ors. v. Anand Kumar Sharma and Ors., (2003) 2 Scale 71 and
Damadilal and Ors. v. Parashram and Ors., (1976) 4 SCC 856, referred to. F
A.S. Sulochana v. C. Dharmalingam, AIR (1987) SC 242, held
inapplicable.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 13275 of
1"~ G
From the Judgment and Order dated 1.7.88 of the Madhya Pradesh
High Court in S.A. No. 621 of 1988.

U.N. Bachhawat, Alok Bachhawat and Chander Shekhar Ashri for the
259
H
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A Appellant.
S.K. Gambhir, Awanish Sinha, Rijuraj Singh Jamwad, Anil K. Sharma
and Vivek Gambir for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered.
B
The short question that arises for consideration in this case is as to
whether the heirs of a tenant can be deprived of the benefit of proviso to sub-
section (3) of section 12 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control
Act, 1961 (for short "the Act") if the heirs' father from whom they inherited
the tenancy rights had availed of the benefit of provisio of sub-section (3) of
C Section 12 of the Act. This question arises in the following factual background.
It is not disputed that the appellant herein is the landlord of a shop in
the town Neemuch. As far back as in the year 1960, one Badri Lal, father of
respondents took the aforesaid shop on rent at the rate of Rs. 50 per month.
D It appears that Badri Lal committed default in payment of arrears of rent with
the result that the appellant herein brought a suit for eviction on the ground
of _default in payment of arrears of rent. However, father of the respondents
claimed benefit of proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act and
deposited the arrears of rent, for this reason, the decree for eviction could not.
be passed against Badri Lal. It appears subsequently Badri Lal died and the
E respondents herein being the heirs of Badri Lal inherited the statutory tenancy
and they became tenant of the said accommodation of which Badri Lal was
a tenant. It appears that the respondents also committed default in payment
of rent. The appellant herein brought a suit for eviction of the respondents,
inter alia, on the ground of bonafide need of the disputed shop as well as on
the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent. The suit was decreed on
F both the groµnds, and the first appellate court affirmed the trial court's decree.
However, the High Court, in a second appeal, set aside the judgment of
courts below. Consequently, the suit stood dismissed. It is against the said
judgment, the appellant-landlord is in appeal before us.

We have heard the learned senior counsel for the parties.
G
Mr. U.N. Bachhawat, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant
urged that under the scheme of the Act proviso to sub-section (3) of Section
12 of the Act confers one time benefit on the tenant and such benefit is not
available once the tenant already availed of such benefit and it is not open
H to the heirs of the tenant to avail of such benefit for the second time. Learned
!MOAD ALI v. KESHA V CHAND 261
senior counsel relied upon a decision of this court in Gian Devi Anand v. A
Jeevan Kumar and Ors., (1985] 2 SCC 683, in support of this proposition.
We find merit in his submission.

Mr. S.K Gambir, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No.
I, on the other hand urged that the Rent Act is a legislation for the benefit
of the tenant and, therefore the provisio to sub-section (3) of section 12 of B
the Act should be interpreted in such a manner in which the benefit must go
to the tenant. According to him, the benefit is available to the individual
tenant despite the fact this benefit has already been availed of by his
predecessor-in-interest.

Section 2(i) defines 'tenant' which runs as follows: c
"tenant means a person by whom or on whose account or behalf
the rent of any accommodation is, or, but for a contract express or
implied, would be payable for any accommodation and includes any
person occupying the accommodation as a sub-tenant and also any D
person continuing in possession after the termination of his te~ancy
whether before or after the commencement of this Act: but shall not
include any person against whom any order or decree for eviction has
been made."

Sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act reads as under:
E
"12, Restrictions or eviction of tenants. -(1) ..... .

xxx xxx xxx

(3) No order for the eviction of a tenant shall be made on the
ground specified in clause (a) of sub-section (1), ifthe tenant makes F
payment or deposit as required by section 13:

Provided that no tenant shall be entitled to the benefit under this
sub-section if, having obtained such benefit once in respect of any
accommodation .he again makes a default in the payment of rent of
that accommodation for three consecutive months." G
It· is not disputed that the Rent, Act is a beneficial legislation for the
tenant, but it is also for the benefit of the landlord. In Nasiruddin and Ors.
v. Sita Ram Agarwal, [2003] I Scale 658, it was held that the Rent Act is not
only enacted for the benefit of the tenant but also for the benefit of the
landlord and, therefore, the provisions of the Act have to be harmoniously H
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) 2 S.C.R.

A interpreted. It was held thus:
"In a case where the statutory provision is plain and unambiguous,
the court shall not interpret the same in a different manner, only
because of harsh consequences arising therefrom. In E. Pa/anisamy
v. Palanisamy (Dead) by LRs. and Ors., [2003] I SCC 122, a Division
B Bench of this Court observed:

" ...... The rent legislaiion is normally intended for the benefit of
the tenants. At the same time, It is well settled that the benefits
conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed
only on the basis of strict compliance with the statutory provisions.
c Equitable consideration has no place in such matters ...... "

It is also pertinent to note that the Rent Control Act is a welfare
legislation not entirely beneficial enactment for the tenant but also for
the benefit of landlord. [See: Shri La~hmi Venkateshwara Enterprises
Pvt. Ltd. v. Syeda Vajhiunnissa Begum (Smt.) and Ors., [1994] 2
D SCC 671. In that view of the matter, balance has to be struck while
interpreting the provisions of the Rent Act."

The decision of this Court in Ba/want Singh and Ors. v. Anand Kumar
Sharma and Ors., (2003) 2 Scale 71 is also to the aforesaid effect.

E When the heirs of a tenant acquire benefit under the Act. the same
would be subject to such limitation and liability which has been provided
under the Act. In Gian Devi's case (supra), a 5-judge Bench of this Court
held as under:

" .....The heirs of the deceased tenant in the absence of any
F provision in the Rent Act to the contrary will step into the position
of the deceased tenant and all the rights and obligations of the deceased
tenant including the protection afforded to the deceased tenant under
the Act will devolve on the heirs of the deceased tenant. As the
protection afforded by the Rent Act to a tenant after determination of
G the tenancy and to his heirs on the death of such tenant is a creation
of the Act for the benefit of the tenants, it is open to the Legislature
which provides for such protection to make appropriate provisions in
the Act with regard to the nature and extent of the benefit and
protection to be enjoyed and the manner in which the same is to be
enjoyed. If the Le~slature makes any provision in the Act limiting or
H restricting the benefit and the nature of the protection to be enjoyed
!MOAD ALI v. KESHA V CHAND 263
.-
in a specified manner by any particular class of heirs of the deceased A
tenant on any condition laid down being fulfilled, the benefit of the
protection has necessarily to be enjoyed on the fulfilment of the
condition in the manner and to the extent stipulated in the Act. The
Legislature which by the Rent Act seeks to confer the benefit on the
tenants and to afford protection against eviction, is perfectly competent B
to make appropriate provision regulating the nature of protection and
the manner and extent of enjoyment of such tenancy rights after the
termination of contractual tenancy of the tenant including the rights
and the nature of .protection of the heirs on the death of the tenant.
Such appropriate provision may be made by the Legislature both with
regard to the residential tenancy and commercial tenancy. It is, C
however, entirely for the Legislature to decide whether the Legislature,
will make such provision or not. In the absence of any provision
regulating the right of inheritance, and the manner and extent thereof
and in the absence of any condition being stipulated with regard to
the devolution of tenancy rights on the heirs on the death of the
tenant, the devolution of tenancy rights must necessary be in D
accordance with the ordinary law of succession."

In the above cited case, an earlier decision of this Court by a 3-Judge
Bench in Damadilal and Ors. v. Parashram and Ors., [1976) 4 SCC 856
whereupon Mr. Gambhir placed reliance, was also considered.
E
However, in A.S. Sulochana v. C. Dharamlingam, AIR (1987) SC 242,
it was held that :

"Examining the profile of the view taken by the High Court that the
offending sub-letting must be by the tenant sought to be evicted
himself, and not by his predecessor, is concerned, it appears to be F
blemishless. Section 10(2) opens with the words "A Landlord who
seeks to evict his tenant" and provides that if the tenant has created
a sub-tenancy without the written consent of the landlord, he will be
liable to be evicted. Pray, who is the 'tenant' whom the landlord
wants to evict? That tenant is the respondent.. Did he violate S. G
10(2)(ii)(a) and sublet the rented premises? The answer is 'no'. It is
of little use to give the answer, not he, but his predecessor, his late
father, had sublet the premises. When the statute says the tenant who
is sought to be evicted must be guilty of the contravention, the Court
cannot say, will suffice guilt of his predecessor in interest'. The flouting
of the law, the sin under the Rent Act must be the sin of the tenant H
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A sought to be evicted, and not that of his father or predecessor in
interest. Respondent inherited the tenancy, not the sin, if any, of his
father. The law in its wisdom seeks to punish the guilty who commits
the sin, and not his son who is innocent of the rent law offence. It
being a penal provisfon in the sense that it visits the violator with the
punishment of eviction, it must be strictly construed, for it causes less
B misery to be sheltered in a jail, than to be shelterless without. Be that
as it may, the conclusion recorded by the High Court is fault-fee."

Clauses (a) of sub-section (I) of Section 12 is in the following terms:

"(I) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other
c law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a
tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or
more of the following grounds only namely:-

(a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the whole of the
arrears of the rent legally recoverable from him within two months of
D the date on which a notice of demand· for the arrears of rent has been
served on him by the landlord in the prescribed manner."

The said Section, therefore, does not make any provision like the Tamil
Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act to the effect "a landlord who
E seeks to evict his tenant'.

Under the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act having regard
to the interpretation clauses as noticed hereinbefore, a tenant remains a tenant
so long as the tenancy continues. The thrust, in terms of sul:!-section (3) of
Section 12 is upon ' any accommodation'. Default in payment of rent by a
F tenant, thus, is in respect of any accommodation. A further default would
also be in respect of the same accommodation. Sub-section (3) of Section 12
provides for an exception to the general rule contained in clause (a) of sub-
section (1) of Section 12 that in the event a tenant becomes a defaulter he is
liable to be evicted. An exemption granted in favour of a tenant in terms of
sub-section (3) of Section 12, if read in conjunction with the proviso appended
G thereto, must be held to be for one time only. Proviso appended to sub-
section (3) of Section 12 controls the main provisions. The exemption
contained in sub-section (3) of Section 12, thus, is not extended to a tenant
who becomes a defaulter for more than once. It matters not whether such
default is made by the original tenant or by his successor inasmuch as the
H successor-in-interest of the original tenant continues to be a tenant within the
-*
I

IMD AD ALI v. KESHA V CHAND 265
meaning of the provisions thereof. By reason of death of the original tenant· A
a new tenancy is not created. A successor-in-interest of a tenant holds his
tenancy right subject to rights and obligations of his predecessor. He does not
and cannot claim a higher right than his predecessor. It is now well-settled
that a person by reason of inheritance or assignment does not derive any
better title than his predecessor, and, thus, the right which the original tenant B
did not possess cannot he passed on to his successor.

In view of the aforesaid, we are of the view that once the father of the
respondents had availed of the benefit of proviso to sub-section (3) of Section
12 of the Act, the said benefit was not available to the respondent-tenants on
committing a further default in payment of rent. C
For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that A.S.
Sulochana 's case (supra) is not applicable in the instant case having been
rendered under a different statute wherein the right of the landlord to file a
suit for eviction was, as indicated hereinbefoe, subject to the conditions
mentioned therein. We, however, do not subscribe to the general observations D
made in A.S. Sulachana 's case (supra) and to the said extent, it cannot be
held to have laid down a good law ·and is overruled accordingly.

For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal deserves to be allowed. We,
accordingly, set aside the judgment under challenge and restore the decree
passed by the trial court. The appe11I is allowed. There shall be no order as E
to costs.

After the order was dictated, learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondent stated that in the event the respondent is required to vacate the
.' premises immediately, he shall be put to great hardship and, therefore, some
time may be granted to him to vacate the premises. Learned senior counsel F
appearing for the appellant-landlord ha,s no objection for the prayer being
.granted. We, therefore, direct that the respondent herein shall not be evicted
from the premises in dispute till 31st August, 2003 provided the respondent
files an und~rtaking before this Court within four weeks from today. In the
event the said undertaking is not filed, this part of the order shall stand G
automatically vacated and it will be open to the appellant-landlord to execute
the decree forthwith.

R.P. Appeal allowed.