Holding

The Supreme Court has inherent power under Article 129 (and Article 142) to punish contempt of any lower court or tribunal, and this power is not limited by any statutory provision, allowing it also to suspend an advocate’s licence.

Summary

Senior advocate V.C. Mishra, also Chairman of the Bar Council of India, was alleged to have shouted, threatened and insulted a judge of the Allahabad High Court during a hearing, prompting the judge to write a letter that led the Supreme Court to initiate suo motu contempt proceedings. Mishra contested the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, arguing that Article 129 only allows contempt of the Supreme Court itself and that statutes such as the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and the Advocates Act, 1961 limit its power. The Court held that under Article 129, complemented by Article 142, the Supreme Court possesses inherent authority to punish contempt of any lower court or tribunal, and that this jurisdiction is sui generis and not curtailed by any statute. It further ruled that the Court may suspend an advocate’s licence as part of its contempt powers. Finding Mishra guilty of criminal contempt, the Court imposed a six‑week simple imprisonment (suspended for four years) and a three‑year suspension from legal practice.

Issues considered

Whether the Supreme Court can take cognizance of contempt committed against a High Court under Article 129 of the Constitution.
Whether the jurisdiction conferred by Article 129 is limited by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 or the Advocates Act, 1961.
Whether the Supreme Court may impose suspension of an advocate’s practising licence as a contempt punishment under Article 142.
Whether the summary procedure adopted in the contempt proceedings complied with principles of natural justice.
Whether Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g), 19(2) and 19(6) of the Constitution restrict the Court’s contempt powers.

Legislation cited

Advocates Act, 1961s. 35, s. 36, s. 37, s. 38
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 14, s. 16, s. 2

Subjects

contempt of courtArticle 129Article 142Supreme Court jurisdictioncriminal contemptadvocate disciplinesuspension of licencejudicial dignityfreedom of speechArticle 19summary procedure

Judgment

A IN RE : VINA Y CHANDRA MISHRA
'
(THE ALLEGED CONTEMNER)

MARCH 10, 1995

[KULDIP SINGH, J.S. VERMA AND P.B. SAWANT, JJ.)
B
Constitution of India-Articles 129-Scope of-Whether Supreme Court
can take cognizance of contempt of High Court-Held, power to punish for
contempt of all lower courts and Tribunals inherent in supervisory and appel-
late ju~iction of the Supreme Court-Supreme Court can punish for con-
C tempt o[High Court notwithstanding Article 215.
Constitution of India-Article 129-Jurisdiction under-Sui generis-
Contempt of Courts Act 1971 or Advocates Act 1961 cannot restrict jurisdic-
tian of Supreme Court under--Contempt of Courts Act 1971-Advocates Act
1961. :;,_.
D
Constitution of India-Article 142-Scope of-Cannot be diluted by
statutory provisions.
~-
Constitution of India-Articles 129 and 142-Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court-Whether the Supreme Court can suspend the licence of an
E advocate-Held, yes-such exercise of power not against the provisions of
Advocates Act-Advocates Act, 1961-Section 38.

Constitution of India-Article 129 and 142-Jurisdiction and Power of
the Supreme Court under Article 142-Supplemental in nature-Independent
F of jurisdiction and power under Article 129.

Constitution of India-Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g), 19(2), 19(6), 129
and 21~There is no conflict between Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) read
with 19(2) and 19(6) on the one hand and Articles 129 and 215 on the other
hand.
G
Judiciary-Dignity and authority of-Importance of-Need for protec-

>·
tion-Role in a democracy.

Contempt of court-Criminal contempHn sui generis offence-Proce-
dure to be adopted-Summary procedure can be adopted-Safeguards-
H Charge-Not necessary to frame charge in a specific allegation-Contempt of
638
IN RE: V.C. MISHRA 639

Cow1s Act, 197 I-Section 14. A
Contempt of co1111-C1iminal co11tempr-Pmced11r~Tl1e J11dge before
whom contempt is committed wlites letter to the Chief Justice of his High
Co1ll1-Chief Justice of High Cowt f onvards the letter to Chief Justice of
lndia-Suo motlt contempt proceedings initiated by the Supreme
Court-Held, procedure is valid though it causes some delay. B

Nalllral justice-Nemo judex in sua causa-Not violated in cases of
cn"minal contempt when Judge deals with the contempt himself-Contempt of
y court-Criminal contempt Natural Justice-Examination of Judge in a
Criminal contempt proceeding-Not necessary-Contempt of Courts Act,
1971-Section 14.
c
Practice and procedure-Junior member of a Bench may not be ba"ed
from putting question to the counsel-Counsel or third party cannot object.

Professional Ethic~uty of a lawyer towards client and court- D
Desirable conduct of a lawyer.

Words and phrases-l'Contempt of Court''--Definition under common
law.

The contemner was a senior advocate of the Allahabad High Court. E
He was also the Chairman of the Bar Council of India and the President
of the High Court Bar Association, Allahabad.

A civil suit was filed by client of the contemner against the U.P.
Financial Corporation. By an interim order the trial court restrained the
U.P. Financial Corporation from seizing the factory of the client of the F
contemner and directed the client of the contemner to pay the instalment
of the loan which it had taken from the corporation and also to furnish
security for the disputed amount. An appeal was filed by the client of the
contemner against the order of the trial court contending that the court
did not have jurisdiction to pass the order for payment of instalment and G
that no security could have been ordered.

A letter was written by justice S.K. Keshote of Allahabad High Court
to the then Acting Chief Justice of the High Court stating therein that while
arguing the appeal before a division bench of Justice Anshuman Singh and
Justice Keshote, the contemner had insulted the Judge. According to H
I

640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 2 S.C.R..

A Justice Keshote when he asked the contemner to explain under what
provision the interim order was passed by the Trial Court, the contemner
started shouting and told him that no question could have been put to him
at the admission stage. It was further started that the contemner
threatened to get the judge transferred and to bring impeachment motion
B against him. The contemner, as per the letter of the Judge, created a scene
in the court and insulted the Judge.

The Acting Chief justice forwarded the aforesaid letter of Justice
Keshote to the Chief Justice of India and this Court, initiated suo moto
contempt proceedings against the contemner. In his reply affidavit, the
.C contemner contended that Justice Keshote, even though he was the junior
Judge, took charge of the proceedings and asked him as to under what as
the impugned order was passed. The con.temner's case is that he pointed
out that the order was passed under Order 39, CPC, on which the Judge
allegedly said that he was going to set aside the entire order as the Lower
court was not competent to pass such an order under Order 39, CPC. The
D contemner further stated that he had approached the Hon'ble High Court
only against that part of the order of the Lower Court which directed his
client to pay instalments of loan and to furnish security. The contemner
alleged that, the Judge lost his temper and directed the stenographer to
take down the order setting aside the whole order of the Lower Court. The
E contemner admitted that the exchange between him and the Judge was a
bit heated and that he had told the Judge that "a Judge got himself
transferred earlier on account of his inability to command the goodwill· of
the Bar due to lack of mutual reverence". He, however, alleged that Justice
Keshote showed his displeasure at being transferred to the Allahabad High
F Court against his will. He further alleged that Justice Keshote threatened
to take to goondaism. The contemner denied the contents of the letter
written of Justice Keshote to the Acting Chief Justice of the Allahabad
High Court. The contention of the contemner was that he was being
punished for the fearles's and non-servile stand taken by him as an
advocate. Throughout his reply affidavit, the contemner referred to the
G Judge as the "applicant".

Alongwith the reply affidavit, the contemner filed petitions for dis-
charge of the contempt Notice as well as for inquiry into the incidence and
initiation of contempt proceedings against the Judge on the ground that
H the Judge had committed contempt of his own court punishable under
IN RE: V.C. MISHRA 641

Section 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971. A
The contemner also filed a supplementary/additional affidal<·it chal·
lenging the maintanin ability' of the contempt proceedings initiated by this
court on the ground that the High Court is a court of record having
(
identical and independent power for punishment for contempt of itself and
therefore, contempt jurisdiction of this court should be limited to con- B
tempt committed in respect of itself. The contemner also requested for the
presence of the Judge for cross-examination.

This court gave an opportunity to the contemner to me. any material
in reply or in defence including the affidavits of his witnesses. No affidavits
of any defence witness was filed by the contemner. The affidavits of the
c
contemner were forwarded to justice Keshote and bis comments were
obtained thereon.

Thereafter, the contemner filed an "unconditional written apology"
and sought to withdraw his application for initiation of contempt proceed- D
ings against Justice Keshote as well as the counter affidavits filed by him.

1' Thi~ court during the course of hearing had also indicated that it
may suspend the license of the petitioner to practice as a lawyer in case it
convicted him for contempt. It was contended on behalf of the contemner E
and the UP Bar Council that the court could not suspend the licence of
the contemner as the said power was vested in the Bar Councils under the
Advocates Act, 1961.

Holding the contemner guilty of contempt of Court, this Court
.
~'
F
HELD : 1.1. The Supreme Court is not only the highest court of
record, but under the various provisions of the Constitution, is also
charged with the duties and responsibilities of correcting the lower courts
and tribunals and of protecting them from those whose misconduct tends
to prevent the due performance of their duties. The latter functions and
powers of the Supreme Court are independent of Article 129 of the Con- G
stitution. When, therefore, Article 129 vests the Supreme Court with the
powers of the court of record including the power to punish for contempt
of itself, it vests such powers in the Supreme Court in its capacity as the
highest court of record and also as a court charged with the appellate and
superintending powers over the lower courts and tribunals as detailed in H
,_ -

642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 2 S.C.R.

A the Constitution. To discharge its obligations as the custodian of the
administration of justice in the country and as the highest court imbued
with supervisory and appellate jurisdiction over all the lower courts and
tribunals, it is inherently deemed to have been entrusted with the J>Ower to
see that the stream of justice in the country remains pure, that its course
B are not hindered by or obstructed in any manner, that justice is delivered
without fear or favour and for that purpose all the courts and tribunals
are pr~cted while discharging their legitimate duties. To discharge this
obligation, the Supreme Court has to take cognisance of the deviation from
the path of justice in the tribunals of the land, and also of attempts to
cause such deviations and obstruct the course of justice. To hold otherwise
C would mean that although the Supreme Court is charged with the duties
and responsibilities enumerated in the Constitution, it is not equipped
with the power to discharge them. (661-C-F]

All India Judicial Se1Vice Association, Tees Hazari Court, Delhi v. State
of Gujarat and Ors., (1991) 4 SCC 406, relied on.
D
1.2. When the Constitution vests the Supreme Court with a special
and specific power to take action for contempt not only of itself but also
· of the lower Courts and Tribunals, for. discharging its Constitutional
obligations as the highest custodian of justice in the land, that power is
E obviously coupled with a duty to protect all the units of the administration
of justice from those whose actions create interference with or obstructions
to the course of justice, Failure to exercise the power on such occasions,
when it is invested specifically for the purpose, is a failure to discharge the
duty. (689-H, 690-A·B]

F Chief Controlling Revenue Authority and Superintendent of Stamps v.
Maharashtra Sugar Mills Ltd., (1950) SCR 536, referred to.

1.3. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 129 of the
Constitution is independent of the statutory law of contempt enacted by
the Parliament under Entry 77 of list I of \tll Schedule of the Constitution.
G The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 129 is sui generis.
The jurisdiction to take cognizance of the contempt as well as to award
punishment for it being constitutional, it cannot be controlled by any
statute. Neither, therefore, the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 nor the
>·
Advocates Act, 1961 can be pressed into service to restrict the said juris-
H diction. (682-G, H; 683-AJ
IN RE: V.C. MISHRA 643

2.1. Under the common law definition, "contempt or Court" is defined A
as an act or omission calculated to interfere \\ith the due administration
of justice. This covers criminal contempt (that is, acts which so threaten
the administration or justice that they require punishment) and civil
contempt (disobedience or an order made in a civil case). [671-D]

2.2. The Criminal contempt or court undoubtedly amounts to an B
offence but it is an offence sui generis and hence for such offence, the
procedure adopted both under the common law and the statute law even
in this country has always been summary. However, the fact that the
process is summary does not mean that the procedural requirement, viz.,
that an opportunity of ~eeting the charge, is denied to the contemner. C
r [669-F]
2.3. So long as the contemner's interest are adequately safeguarded
by giving him an opportunity of being heard in his defence, even summary
procedure in the case of contempt in the face of the court is commended
and :1ot faulted. [670-D] D
2.4. In the present case, although the contempt is in the face of the
court, the procedure adopted is not only not summary but has adequately
safeguarded the contemner's interest. [670-E]

2.S. The degree of precision with which the charge may be stated E
depends upon the circumstances. So long as the gist of the specific allega-
tions is made clear or otherwise the contemner is aware of the specific
allegation, it is not always necessary to formulate the charge in a specific
allegation. [669-G]

3. The consensus of opinion among the judiciary and the jurists alike F
is that despite the objection that the judge deals with the contempt himself
and the contemner has little opportunity to defend himself, there is a
residue of cases where not only it is justifiable to punish on the spot but it
is the only realistic way of dealing with certain offenders. This procedure
does not offened against the principle of natural justice, viz. Nemo Judex in G
sua causa since the prosecution is not aimed at protecting the Judge per-
sonally but protecting the administration of justice. The threat of immedi-
ate punishment is the most effective deterrent against misconduct. The
Judge has to remain in full control of hearing of the case and he must be
able to take steps to restore order as early and quickly as possible.
[669-H; 670-A, BJ H
r
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) 2 S.C.R.

A 4.1 In procedure adopted for criminal contempt proceedings there is
not scope for examining the judge or judges of the court before whom the
contempt is committed. Section 14 of the Contempt of Court Act 1971 deals
with the procedure when the action is taken for the contempt in the face of
the Supreme Court or High Court. Sub-Section (3) of the said Section deals
with situation where infacie curiae contempt is tried by a Judge other than
B the Judge or Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to
have been committed. The provision in specific terms and for obvious
reasons, states that in such cases it shall not be necessary for the Judge or
Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been
committed, to appear as a witness and the statement placed before the
. C Chief Justice shall be treated as the evidence in the case.
[671-A-B]
4.2 The Judge or the bench could have itself taken action for the
offence of contempt on the spot. Instead, the Judge probably thought that
it would not be proper to be a prosecutor, a witness and the Judge himself
D in the matter and decided to report the incident to the Acting Chief justice
of his court. There is nothing unusual in the course the Judge adopted,
although the procedure adopted by the Judge has resulted in some delay in
taking action for the contempt. [669-E, F]

Balogh v. Crown Court at St. Albans, [1975) QB 73: [1974) 3 All ER
E 283, referred to.

5.1 Normally, no Judge takes action for in facie curiae contempt
against the lawyer unless he is impelled to do so. It is not the heat generated
in the agruments but the languages used, the tone and the manner in which
it is expressed and the intention behind using it which determine whether it
F was calculated to insult, show disrespect, to overbear and overawe the court .
and to threaten and obstruct the course of justice. [674-G]

5.2 After going through the report of the Judge and the affidavits and
the additional affidavits filed by the contemner and after hearing the coun-
sel appearing for the contemner, it appears that there is every reason that
G notwithstanding his denials, and disclaimers, the contemner had undoub-
tedly tried to browbeat, threaten and insult and show disrespect personally
to the Judge. The Judge's version appears to be correct when he states ·that
the contemner lost his temper when he started asking him questions. The
Judge's statement that the contemner threatened him with transfer and
H impeachment proceedings also gets corroboration from the contemner's
- ~

IN RE: V.C. MISHRA 645

own statement in the additional affidavit. Taking into consideration all the A
circumstances on record, the ve~sion of the incident given by the Judge has
to be accepted as against that of the contemner. The contemner's uncondi-
tional apology is not acceptable because the appology is not a free and frank
admission of the misdemeanor nor is there a sincere regret for the dis-
respect he showed to the Judge and the court, and for the harm that he has
done to the judiciary. (674-H, 675-A, F, G] B

6. Every member of the Bench is on par with the other member or

-.~
members of' the bench and has a right to ask whatever questions he wants
to, to appreciate the merits or demerits of the case. Assuming that there
r is a convention that the junior member of the Bench was not supposed to C
ask any questions and if any question were to be asked, he had to ask them
through the senior member of the bench, it is for the Judges forming the
Bench to observe it inter se. No lawyer or third party can have any right or
say in the matter and can make either an issue of it or refuse to answer
the questions on that ground. The lawyer or the litigant concerned has to
answer the questions put to him by any member of the Bench. [675-C-D] D

7. A Lawyer is not expected to be subservient to the court while
presenting his case and not to put forward his arguments merely because
the court is against him. In fact, that is the moment when he is expected
to put forth his best effort to persuade the court. However, if inspite of it, E
the lawyer finds that the court is against him, he is not expected to be
discourteous to the court or to fling hot words or epithets or use dis·
respectful, derogatory or threatening language or exhibit temper which has
the effect of overbearing the court. [676-A-B]

In the matter of Mr. 'G~ a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court, F
I.,
(1955) 1 SCR 490 and L.M. Das v. Advocate General, Orissa, [1957) SCR
167, referred to.

8.1. The rule of law is the foundation of a democratic society. The
judiciary is the guardian of the rule of law. Hence judiciary is not only the G
third pillars but the central pillar of the democratic state. [678-H]

8.2. If the judiciary is to perform its duties and functions effectively
and true to the spirit with which they are sacredly entrusted to it, the
dignity and authority of the courts have to be respected. Otherwise, the
very comestone of our constitutional scheme will give way and with it will H
r
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 2 S.C.R.

A disappear the rule of law and the civilized life in the society. (679-B-CJ
8.3. To resent the questions asked by a Judge, to be disrespectful to
him, to question his authority to ask the questions, to shout at him, to
threaten him with transfer and impeachment, to use insulting l~nguage
and abuse him, to dictate the order that he should pass, to create scenes
. B in the court, to address him by losing temper, are all acts calculated to
interfere with and obstruct the course of justice. Such acts tend to overawe
the court and to prevent it from performing its duty to administer justice.
Such conduct brings the authority of the court and the administration 9f
justice into disrespect and disrepute and undermines and erodes the very
C foundation of the judiciary by shaking the confidence of the people in the
ability of the court to deliver free and fair justice. (678-D-E]

9.1. The Supreme Court's power under Article 142 (1) of the Con-
stitution to do complete justice is entirely of different level and of a
different quality. Any prohibition or restriction contained in ordinary laws
D cannot act as a limitation on the constitutional powers of the Supreme
Court. Once the Supreme Court is in seisin of a matter before it, it has
power to issue any order or direction to do complete justice in the matter.
The power of the Apex Court under Article 142(1) of the Constitution
cannot be diluted by statutory provisions. (685-C]
·E Harbans Singh v. State of U.P., (1982) 2 SCC 101 and Union Carbide
Corporation v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584, relied on.

All India judicial Services Association, Tees Hazari Cowt, Delhi v.
State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 406, referred to.
F '-_
j
Prem Cha1td Garg v. Excise Commissioner, U.P., Allahabad, (1963)
Supp. 1 SCR 885, disapproved on this aspect.

9.2 In matter of disciplinary jurisdiction under the Advocates Act,
the Supreme Court is constituted as the final appellate authority under
G Section 38 of the Act~ In that capacity the Supreme Court can impose any
of the punishments mentioned in Section 35(3) of the Act including that
of removal of the name of the Advocate from the State roll and of suspend- ,A
ing him from practice. H that be so, there is no reason why the Supreme
Court while exercising its contempt jurisdiction under Article 129 read
)

H' with article 142 of the Constitution cannot impose any of the said punish·
IN RE: V.C. MISHRA 647

ments. 'The punishment so imposed will not only be not against the A
provisions of any statute, but in conformity with the substantive provisions
of the Advocates Act and for conduct which is both a professional miscon-
duct as well as the contempt of court. (688-C-D]

93. The jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court under Article
142 of the Constitution which are supplemental in nature and are provided B
to do complete justice in any matter, are independent of the jurisdiction
and powers of this court under Article 129 which cannot be trammeled in
any way by any statutory provision including the provisions of the Advo-
-·,.,-
\ cates Act or the Contempt of Court Act. [688-E]

10. The contention that the power of the Supreme Court under
c
Article 129 of the Constitution is subject to the provisions of Articles
r 19(l)(a) and 19(l)(g), is unexceptional. The freedom of speech and expres-
sion cannot be used for committing contempt of ceurt nor can the legal
profession be practised by committing the contempt of court. The right
continue to practise, is subject to the law of contempt. Therefore, there is D
no conflict between the provisions of Articles 129 and 215, and Article
19(1) (a) and Article 19(1) (g) read with Articles 19(2) and 19(6) respective-
ly. (689-D-F]

11.1. The contemner is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment
for a period of six weeks. H&Wever, in the circumstances of the case, the E
sentence will remain suspended for a period of four years and may be
activated in case t&e contemner is convicted for any other offence of
contempt of court within the said period. [691-A]

11.2. The contemner shall stand suspended from practising as an F
advocate for a period of three years from the date of this judgment with
the consequence that all elective and nominated offices/posts at present
held by him in his capacity as an advocate, shall stand vacated by him
forthwith. [691-C]

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Contempt Petition G
{Crl.) No. 3 of 1994.

Petition received on behalf of the Applicant/Petitioner for initiating
proceedings for contempt.

D.P. Gupta, Solicitor General, P.N. Duda, P.P. Rao, Rajiv Dhawan, H
r
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS- [1995) 2 S.C.R.

A R.D. Upadhyay, V.C. Misra in person, Parmeswaran, R.B. Misra, Shiv
· Pujan Singh and Anil Kumar Jha for the appearing parties.

By post for the Petitioner.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
SAWANT, J. On 10th March, 1994; Justice S.K. Keshote of the
Allahabad High Court addressed a letter to the Acting Chief Justice of that
Court as follows :

"No. SKK/ALL/8/94 10.3.94
c
Dear brother Actg. Chief Justice,

Though on 9.3.94 itself I orally narrated about the misbehaviour
of Sh. B.C. Misra with me in the Court but I thought it advisable
D to give you same in writing also.

On 9.3.94 I was sitting with Justice Anshuman Singh in Court
No. 38. In the list of fresh cases of9.3.94 at Sr. No.5 FAFO Record
no. 22793 Mis. Bansal Forgings Ltd. v. U.P.F. Corp. filed by Smt.
S.V. Misra was listed. Sh. B.C. Misra appeared in this case when
E the case was called.

Brief facts of that case

M/s. Bansal Forgings Ltd. took loan from U.P. Financial Corpora-
F tion and it made default in payment of instalment of the same.
Corporation proceeded against the Company u/s 29 of the U.P.
Financial Corporation Act. The company filed a Civil Suit against
the Corporation and it has also field an application for grant of
temporary injunction. Counsel for the Corporation suo moto put
appearance in the matter before Trial Court and prayed for time
G for filing of reply. The learned trial court passed an order on the
said date that the Corporation will not seize the factory of the
Company. The company shall pay the amount of instalment and. it
will furnish also security for the disputed amount. The co~t
directed to furnish security on 31.1.94 and case was fixed on
H 15.3.94.
INRE:V.C.MISHRA [SAWANT,J.] 649

Against said order of the trial court this appeal has been filed A
and arguments have been advanced that Court has no jurisdiction
to pass the order for payment of instalment of loan and further no
security could have been ordered.

I put a question to Shri Misra under which provision this order
has been passed. On putting of question he started to shout and B
said that no question could have been put to him. He will get me
transferred or see that impeachment motion is brought against me
in Parliament. He further said that he has turned up many Judges.
He created a good scene in the court. He asked me to follow the
practice of this Court. In sum and substance it is a matter where
r except to abuse me of mother and sister he insulted me like c
anything. What he wanted to convey to me was that admission is
as a course and no arguments are heard, at this stage.

It is not the question of insulting of a Judge of this institution
but it is a matter of institution as a whole. In case dignity of D
Judiciary is not being maintained then where this institution will
stand. In case a senior Advocate, President of Bar and chairman
of Bar Council of India behaves in Court in such manner what will
happen to other advocates.

Since the day I have come here I am deciding the cases on E
merits. In case a case has merits it is admitted but not as a matter
of course. In this court probably advocates do not like the con-
sideration of cases on their merits at the stage of admission. In
case dignity of Judiciary is not restored then it is very difficult for
the Judges to discharge their Judicial function without fear and
favour. F
I am submitting this matter to you in writing to bring this
misshaping in the Court with the hope that you will do something
for restoration of dignity of Judiciary.

Thanking you, G
Yours sincerely,

Sd/-

(Jus. S.K. Keshote)." H
r

650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 2 S.C.R.

A The Acting Chief justice Shri V.K. Khanna forwarded the said letter
to the then Chief Justice of India by his letter of 5th April, 1994. The
learned Chief Justice of India constituted this Bench to hear the matter on
15th April, 1994.

B On 15th April, 1994, this Court took the view that there was a plima
f acie case of criminal contempt of court committed by Shri Vinay Chandra
Mishra [hereinafter referred to as the "contemner"] and issued a noti(:e
against him to show cause why contempt proceedings be not initiated
against him. By the same order, Shri D.P. Gupta, the learned Solicit9r
General of India was requested to assist the Court in the matter. Pursuant
C to the notice, the contemner filed his reply by affidavit dated 10th May,
1994 and also an application seeking discharge of show cause notice, and
in the alternative for an inquiry to be held into the incident referred to by
Justice Keshote in his letter which had given rise to the contempt proceed-
ings. It is necessary at this stage to refer to the material portions of both
D the affidavit and the application filed by the contemner. After referring to
his status a Senior Advocate of the Allahabad High Court and his connec-
tions with the various law organisations in different capacities to impress
upon the Court that he had a deep involvement in the purity, integrity and
solemnity of judicial process, he has submitted in the affidavit that but for
his deep commitments to the norms of judicial processes as evidenced by
E his said status and connections, he would have adopted the usual expedient
of submitting his unconditional regrets. But the facts and circumstances of
this case were such which induced him to "state the facts and seek the
verdict of the Court" whether he had committed the alleged contempt or
.....
whether it could be "a judge committing contempt of his own court". He
F has then stated the facts which according to him form the "genesis" of the
present,,, controversy. !They are as follows :-
-( I

"A. A Private Ltd. Co. had taken an instalment loan from U.P. '-(
Financial Corporation, which provides under its constituent Act
(Sec. 29) for some sort of self help in case of default of instalments.
G

B. A controversy arose between the said Financial Corporation
.1 and the borrower as a result of which, the borrower had to file a
civil suit seeking an injunction against the Corporation for not
H opting for the non-judicial sale of their assets.
IN RE: V.C. MISHRA (SAWANT,J.] 651

C. The Civil Court granted the injuction against putting the assets A
to sale, but at the same time directed furnishing security for the
amount due.

D. Being aggrieved by the condition of furnishing security, which
in law would be tantamount to directing a mortgager to furnish
security for payment of mortgage loan, even when he satisfies the B ·
- .,- Court that a stay is called for - the property mortgaged being a
pre-existing security for its payment.
;r
E. The Company filed an FAFO being No. 229793/94 against the
portion of the order directing furnishing of security.
c
F. The said FAFO came for preliminary hearing before Hon'ble
Justice Anshuman Sing and the Applicant of this petition on 9th
March, 1994. In which I argued for the debtor Company.

G. When the matter was called on Board, the Applicant took D
charge' of the court proceedings and virtually foreclosed attempts
made by the senior Judge to intervene. The Applicant Judge
inquired from me as to under what law the impugned order was
passed to which I replied that it was under various rules of Order
39, CPC. That Applicant therefore conveyed to me that he was
going to set aside the entire order, against a portion of which I E
had come in appeal, because in his view the Lower Court was not
competent to pass such an order as Order 39 did not apply to the
_, facts.
I

ly
H. I politely brought to the notice of the Applicant Judge that
being the appellant I had the dominion over the case and it could F
not be made worse, just because I had come to High Court.

I. The Applicant Judge apparently lost his temper and told me in
no unconcealed term that he would set aside the order in toto,
disregarding what I had said.
G
J. Being upset over, what I felt was an arbitrary approach to judicial
process I got emotionally perturbed and my professional and
institutional sensitivity got deeply wounded and I told the Ap-
plicant Judge that it was not the practice in this Court to dismiss
cases without hearing or to upset judgments or portions of judg- H
I

652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 2 S.C.R.

A ments, which have not been appealed against. Unfortunately the
Applicant judge took it unsportingly and apparently lost his temper
and directed the stenographer to take down the order for setting
aside of the whole order.

K. At this juncture, the Hon'ble Senior Judge intervened,
B whispered something to the Applicant Judge and directed the case
to be listed before some other Bench. It was duly done and by an -,.:r .-_

order of the other Court dated 18th March, 1994 Hon'ble Justices
B.M. Lal and S.K. Verma, the points raised by me before the
Applicant Judge were accepted. A copy of the said order is
c reproduced as Annexure I to this affidavit.

L. I find it necessary to mention that the exchange that took place
between me and the Applicant Judge got a little heated up. In the
moment of heat the Applicant Judge made the following observa-
tions :-
D
"I am from the Bar and if need be I can take to goondaism."

Adding in English -

"I never opted for Allahabad. I had opted for Gujarat and
E Himachal Pradesh. I do not know why the Chief Justice of
India disregarded my options and transferred me to this
place, which I never liked."

Provoked by this I asked him whether he was creating a scene to
create conditions for getting himself transferred as also talked
F earlier."

After narrating the above incident, contemner has gone on to deny
that he had referred to any impeachment, though according to him he did
mention that "a judge got himself transferred earlier on account of his
G inability to command the goodwill of the Bar due to lack of mutual
reverence".

The contemner has further denied the allegations made by Justice
Keshote that as soon as the case was called out, he [i.e., Justice Keshote]
asked him the provision under which the impugned order was passed and
H that he had replied that the Court had no jurisdiction to ask the same and
IN RE: V.C. MISHRA (SAWANT, J.] 653

should admit and grant the stay order. According to him, such a reply could A
only be attributed to one who is "mad" and that considering his practice of
thirty five years at the Bar and his responsible status as a member of the
Bar, it is unbelievable that he would reply in such a "foolish manner". The
contemner has further denied that he had abused the learned judge since
according to him he had never indulged in abusing anybody. With regard
to the said allegations against him, the contemner has stated that the same
B
are vague and, ~herefore, "nothing definite is warranted .to reply".

He has further contended in his affidavit that if the learned Judge
was to be believed that he had committed the contempt, the senior Judge
who was to direct the court proceedings would have initiated proceedings C
under "Article 129 of the Constitution" for committing contempt in f acie
curiae. He has also stated that the learned Judge himself did not d.irect
such proceeding against him which he could have. He has found fault that
instead of doing so, the learned Judge had "deferred the matter for the
next day and adopted a devious way of writing to the Acting Chief Justice D
for doing something about it". He has then expressed his "uncomprehen-
sion" with the learned Judge s~ould have con:ie to the Supreme Court when
he had ample and sufficient legal and constitutional powers to arraign him
at the Bar for what was attributed to him.

The contemner has then gone on to complain that the "language E
used" by the learned Judge "in the Court extending a threat to resort to
goondaism is acting in a way which is professionally perverse and ap-
proximating to creating an unfavourable public opinion about the
awesomeness of judicial process, lowering or tending to lower the authority
of any Court" which amounted to contempt by a Judge punishable under F
Section 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. He has then gone on to
submit "under compulsion of' his "institutional and professional con-
science" and for upholding professional standards expected of both the
Bench and the Bar of this court" that this Court may order '\ thorough
investigation into the incident in question to find out whether a contempt
has been committed by him punishable under "~tide 215" of the Constitu- G
tion or by the Judge under Section 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act.

He has further stated that the entire Bar at Allahabad knows that he
has unjustly "roughed" by the Judge and was being punished for taking a
"fearless and non-servile stand" and that he is being prosecuted for assert- H
I

654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 2 S.C.R.

A ing the right of audience and using ''the liberty lo icxpress his views" when
a ,Judge takes a course ''which in the opinion of the bar is irregular''. He
has al.so contended that any punishment meted out lo the "outspoken
laWyer" will completely emasculate the freedom of the profession and make
the Bar "a subservient Lail wagging appendage lo the judicial branch, which
is an anathema to a healthy democratic judicial system".
B
··~e has made a complaint that he was feeling handicapped in not
being provided with the copy of the letter/report of the Acting Chief Justice
of the Allahabad High Court and he has also been unable to gauge the
"rationale of the applicant in not having initiated proceedings" against him
C eithe.r immediately or a day following, when he chose to address a letter
to th~c-~cting Chief Justice. He has then contended that he wanted to make
it deaf that he was seeking a formal inquiry not for any vindication of any
personal hurt but to make things safe for profession which in a small way
by a quirk of destiny come to his keeping also. He has also stated that he
would be untrue and faithless to his office if he subordinated the larger
'D interests of the profession and dignity of the judicial process for a small
thing of seeking his little safety. The contemner goes on to state that he
did not opt for filing a contempt against the learned judge as in normal
course of arguments, sometimes, altercations take place between a Judge
and the arguing advocate, which may technically be contempt on either side
E but there being no intention, provisions of contempt are not attracted. In
support of his said case, he has reproduced an extract form Oswald's
Contempt of Court, III Edition, By Robertson. The said extract is as
follows:

F "An advocate is at liberty, when addressing the Court in regular
course, to combat and contest strongly any adverse views of the
Judge or Judges expressed on the case during its argument, to
object to and protest against any course which the Judge may take
and which the advocate thinks irregular or detrimental to the
interests of his client, and to caution juries against any interference
G by the Judge with their functions, or with the Advocate when
addressing them, or against any strong view adverse to his client
expressed by the presiding Judge upon the facts of a case before
the verdict of the jury thereon. An advocate ought to be allowed
freedom and latitude both in speech and in the conduct of his
H client's case. It is said that a Scotch advocate was arguing before
IN RE : V.C. MISHRA [SA WANT. J. j 655
a Court in Scotland, when one of the .I udge~, not liking his manner, A
said to him, "It seems lo me, Mr. Blank, that you are endeavoring
in every way to show your contempt for the Court." "No," was the
quick rejoinder, "I am endeavouring in every way ,lo conceal it."

Jn the end, he has stated that he had utmost respect and regard for
B
the courts and he never intended nor intends not to pay due respect to the
courts which under the law they are entitled to and it is for this reason that
instead of defending himself through an advocate, he had left to the mercy
of this court to judge and decide the right and wrong. He has also stated
that it is for this reason that he had not relied upon the provisions of the
Constitution under Articles 129 and 215 and Section 16 of the Contempt c
of Court Act and to save himself on the technicality and jurisdictional
competence.

Lastly, he has reiterated that he had always paid due regard to the
Courts and he was paying the same and will continue to pay the same and D
he "neither intended not intends to commit contempt of any Court".

2. Along with the aforesaid affidavit was forwarded by the contem-
ner, a petition stating therein that he had not gone beyond the legitimate
limits of fearless, honest and independent obligations of an advocate and
E
it was Justice Keshote himself who had lost him temper and extended
threats to him which was such as would be punishable under Section 16 of
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 [hereinafter referred to as the "Act"].
He has prayed that the notice issued to him be discharged and if in any
case, this Court does not feel inclined to discharge the notice, he "seeks
his right to inquiry and production of evidence directly or by affidavits" as F
this Court may direct. He has further stated in that petition that he is
moving an independent application for contempt proceedings to be drawn
against the learned judge and it would be in the interest of justice and
fairplay if the two are heard together. It has to be noted that the contemner
has throughout this affidavit as well as the petition referred to Justice G
Keshote as "applicant", although he knew very well that contempt proceed-
ings had been initiated suo moto by this Court on the basis of the letter
written by Justice Keshote to the Acting Chief Justice of the High Court.
His manner of reference to the learned Judge also reveals the respect in
which he holds the learned Judge. H
I

656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 2 S.C.R.

A The contemner has also filed another petition on the same day as
stated in the aforesaid petition wherein he has prayed that on the facts
staled in the reply affidavit to the show cause notice for contempt proceed-
ings against him, this Court be pleased to draw proceedings under Section
16 of the Act against the learned judge for committing contempt of his own
B court and hold an inquiry. In this petition, he has stated that in his reply
to the contempt notice, he has brought the whole truth before this Court
which according to him was witnessed by the senior judge of the Bench,
Justice Anshuman Singh and a large number advocates. Once again refer-
ring to Justice Keshote as the applicant, he has stated that the learned
Judge in open court conveyed to him [i.e., the contemner] that he can take
·C to goondaism if need arises, that he also talked disparagingly against the --.,i)
Chief justice of India for not transferring him to the place for which he
had opted and in a manner unworthy of a Judge and also attempted to gag
the contemner from discharging his duties as an advocate. The contemner
has further contended that as a common law principle relating to contempt
D of courts; a Judge is liable for contempt of his own Court as much as any
other person associated with judicial proceedings and outside, and that the
aforesaid principle has been given statutory recognition under Section 16
of the Act. He has further contended that the behaviour of the learned
judge was so unworthy that the senior colleague on the Bench apart from
E "disregarding with the desire of the applicant to dismiss the entire order"
against a part of which an appeal had been filed, released the case from
the board and did not think of taking recourse to the obvious and well-
known procedure of initiating contempt proceedings against him for the
alleged contempt committed in the face of the Court. He has further
contended that the adoption of levious way of reaching the Acting Chief
F Justice by letter and reportedly coming to Delhi for meeting meaningful
people" is "itself seeking about the infirmity of the case" of the Judge. He
has in the end reiterated his prayer for an inquiry into the behaviour of the
learned Judge if the notice of contempt was not discharged against him in
view of the denial by him of the conduct alleged against him.
G
3. This Court gave four weeks' time as desired by the contemner to
file an additional affidavit giving more facts and details. The Court also
made clear that the cause title of the proceedings was misleading since
Justice Keshote had not initiated the proceedings. The proceedings were
H initiated suo moto by this Court. A direction was given to the Registry to
IN RE: V.C. MISHRA [SAWANT,J.] 657,

correct the cause title. A

·'( On 30th June, 1994, the C:\>ntemner filed his supplementary/addition-
al counter affidavit. In this .:affidavit, he raised objections to the main-
tainability "of initiating contempt proceedings" against him. His first
objection was to the assumption of jurisdiction by the Court to punish for
an act of contempt committed in respect of another Court of record which
B
is invested with identical and independent power for punishing for con-
tempt of itself. According to him, this Court can take cognisance only of
y- contempt committed in respect of itself. He has also demanded that in view
_, \
of the point of law raised by him, the matter be placed before the Con-
~ stitution Bench and that notice be issued to the Attorney General of India c
and all the Advocate General of the States. He has -then gone on to deny
~ the statemencs made by the learned Judge in the letter written to the Acting
Chief Justice of the High Court and in view of the said denial by him, he
has asked for the presence of the learned Judge in the Court for being
cross-examined by him, i.e., the contemner. He has further stated that if
D
the contempt proceedings are taken against him, the statement of Justice
Anshuman Singh who was the senior Judge on the Bench before which the
incident took place, would also be necessary. He has also taken exception
·~ to Justice Keshote's speaking in the Court except through the senior Judge
on the Bench which, according to him had been the practice in the
Allahabad High Court, and has alleged that the learned Judge did not E
follow the said convention. In the end, he has reiterated that he has utmost
respect and regard for the courts and he has never intended nor intends
not to pay due regard to the Courts.

On 15th July, 1994, this Court passed an order wherein it is recorded F
"'!'
that on 15th April, 1994, the court had issued a notice to the contemner

ly to show cause as to why criminal co~tempt proceedings be not initiated
against him and notice was issued on its own motion. The Court heard the
contemner in person as well as his learned counsel. The Court perused the
counter affidavit and the additional affidavit of the contemner and was of
the view that it was a fit case where criminal contempt proceedings be G
initiated against the contemner. Accordingly, the Court directed that the
proceedings be initiated against him. The contemner was given an oppor-
~ tunity to file any material in reply or in defence within another eight weeks.
He was also allowed to file the affidavit of any other person apart from
himself in support of his defence. Shri Gupta, learned Solicitor General H
f
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) ~ S.C.R.

A was appointed as the prosecutor to conduct the proceedings. The affidavits
filed by the contemner were directed to be sent to Justice Keshote making
it clear that he might offer his comments regarding the factual averments
in the said affidavits.

4. In view of the said order, the Court dismissed the contemner's
B application No. 2560/94 praying for discharge of the notice. The contemner
thereafter desired to withdraw his application No. 2561/94 seeking initia-
tion of proceedings against the learned judge for contempt of his own
Court, by stating that he was doing so "at this stage reserving his right to
file a similar application at a later stage". The Court without any comment
C on the statement made by the Contemner; dismissed the said application
as withdrawn.

5. Justice Keshote by a letter of 20th August, 1994 forwarded his
comments on the counter affidavit and the supplementary/additional
· D counter affidavit filed by the contemner. The learned Judge denied that he
took charge of the court proceedings and virtually foreclosed the attempts
made by the senior Judge to intervene, as was alleged by the contemner.
He stated that being a member of the Bench, he put a question to the
contemner as to under which provision, the order under appeal had been
passed by the trial court, and upon that the contemner started shouting
E and ~aid that he would get him transferred or see to it that impeachment
motion was brought against him in Parliament. According to the learned
Judge, the contemner said many more things as already mentioned by him
in his letter dated 10th March, 1994. He further stated that the contemner
created a scene which made it difficult to continue the court proceedings
F and ultimately when it became difficult to hear all the slogans, insulting
words and threats, he requested his learned brother on the Bench to list

G
that case before another Bench and to retire to the chamber. Accordingly,
the order was made by the other learned member of the Bench and both
of them retired to their chambers. f\
The learned Judge also stated that the Contemner has made wrong
statement when he states "that applicant, therefore, con~eyed to me that
he was going to set aside the entire order, against portion of which I had
come in appeal because in his view, the lower court was not competent to
pass such order as Order 39 did not apply to the facts". The learned Judge
H stated that he neither made any such statement nor conveyed to the
INRE:V.C.MISHRA [SAWANT,J.) 659
tontemner as suggested by him. He reiterates that except one sentence, A
viz., "that under which provision this order had been made by the trial
court" nothing was said by him. According to the learned Judge, it was a
case where the contemner did not permit the court proceedings to be
proceeded and both the Judges ultimately had to retire to the chambers.
The learned Judge alleges that the counter affidavit manufactures a
defence. He has denied the contents of paragraph 6 [HJ and [I] of the
B
counter affidavit by stating that nothing of the kind as alleged therein had
happened. According to the learned Judge, it was a case where the
contemner lost his temper on the question being put to him by him, i.e.,
the learned Judge. He has stated that instead of losing his temper and
creating a scene and threatening and terrorising him; tire contemner should C
have argued the matter and encouraged the new junior Judge. The learned
Judge has further denied the following averment, viz., "unfortunately, the
applicant Judge took it unsportingly and apparently lost his temper and
directed the stenographer to take down the order for setting aside of the
whole order" made in paragraph 6 [J] of the counter affidavit, as wrong. D
He has pointed out that in the Division Bench, it is the senior member who
dictates order/judgments. He has also denied the statements attributed to
him in other paragraphs of the affidavit and in particular, has stated that
he did not make the following observations: " I am from the Bar and if
need be I can take to goondaism" and has alleged that the said allegations
are absolutely wrong. He has also denied that he ever made the statements E
as follows : "I never opted for Allahabad. I had opted for Gujarat and
Himachal Pradesh. I do not know why the Chief justice of India dis-
regarded my options and transferred me to this place which I never liked".
According to him, the said allegations are manufactured with a view to
create a defence. He has denied the allegations made against him in the
F
additionaVsupplementary affidavits as wrong and has stated that what
actually happened in the Court was stated in his letter of 10th March, 1994.

On 7th October, 1994, the contemner filed his unconditional written
apology in the following words:
G
"l. In deep and regretful realization of the fact that a situation like
the one which has given rise to the present proceedings, and which
in an ideal condition should never have arisen, subjects me to deep
anguish and remorse and a feeling of moral guilt. The feeling has
been compounded by the fact of my modest association with the H
r
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 2 S.C.R.

A profession as the senior advocate for some time and also being the
President of the High Court Bar Association for multiple terms
(from which I have resigned a week or ten days back), and also
being the Chairman of the Bar Council of India for the third five
- year term. The latter two being elective posts convey with its
holding an element of trust by my professional fraternity which
B expectations of setting up an example of an ideal advocate, which
includes generating an intra- professional culture between the Bar
and the Bench, under which the first looks upon the second with
respect and resignation, the second upon the first with courtesy
and consideration. It also calls for cultivation of a professional
c attitude amongst the lawyers to learn to be good and sporting
losers.
-,,I.
2. Guilty realizing my failure at approximating these standards I

resulting in the present proceedings, nolo contender I submit my
humble and unconditional apologies ,for the happenings in the
D Court of Justice S.K Keshote at Allahabad High Court on March
9, 1994, and submit myself at the Hon. Courts sweet will.

3. I hereby withdraw from record all my applications, petitions,
counter affidavits, and prayers made to the court earlier to the
E presented [sic] of this statement. I, also, withdraw all submissions
made at the bar earlier and rest my matter with the present
statement alone, and any submissions that may be made in support
of or in connection with statement."

On that day, the matter was adjourned to 24th November, 1994 to
F enable the learned counsel for the parties to make further submissions on
the apology and to argue the case on all points, since the Court stated that
it may not be inclined to accept the apology as tendered. The learned
counsel for all the parties including the contemner, Bar Council of India
and the State Bar Council of U.P. [who were allowed to intervene] were
G heard and the matter was reserved for judgment.

6. Thereafter, the State Bar Council of U.P., also submitted its
written submissions on 26th November, 1994 alongwith an application for
intervention. We have perused the said submissions.

H 7. We may first deal with the preliminary objection raised by the
IN RE: V.C. MISHRA [SAW ANT, J.] 661

Contemner and the State Bar Council, viz., that the Court cannot take A
cognisance of the contempt of the High Courts. The contention is based
on two grounds. The first is that Article 129 vests this Court with the power
to punish only for the contempt of itself and not of the High Courts.
Secondly, the High Court is also another court of record vested with
identical and independent power of punishing for contempt of itself.
B
The contention ignores that the Supreme Court is not only the
highest Court of record, but under various provision of the Constitution, is
also charged with the duties and responsibilities of correcting the lower
courts and tribunals and of protecting them from those whose misconduct
tends to prevent the due performance of their duties. The latter functions C
and powers of this Court are independent of Article 129 of the Constitu-
tion. When, therefore, Article 129 vest this Court with the powers of the
court of record including the power to punish for contempt of itself, it vests
such powers in this Court in its capacity as the highest court of record and
also as a court charged with the appellate and superintending powers over D
the lower courts and tribunals as detailed in the Constitution. To discharge
its obligations as the custodian of the administrations of justice in the
country and as the highest court imbued with supervisory and appellate
jurisdiction over all the lower courts and tribunals, it is inherently deemed
to have been entrusted with the power to see that the stream of justice in
the country remains pure, that its course is not hindered or obstructed in E
any manner, that justice is delivered without fear or favour and for that
purpose all the courts and tribunals are protected while discharging their
legitimate duties. To discharge this obligation, this ~ourt has to take

,y
cognisance of"the deviation from the path of justice in the tribunals of the
land, and also of attempts to cause such deviations and obstruct the course
of justice. To hold otherwise would mean that although this Court is
F
charged with the duties and responsibilities enumerated in the Constitu-
tion, it is not equipped with the power to discharge them.

This subject has been dealt with elaborately by this Court in All India
Judicial Service Association, Tees Hazari Courl, Delhi v. State of Gujarat and G
Ors., [1991] 4 SCC 406. We may do no better than quote from the said
decision the relevant extracts :

"18. There is therefore no room for any doubt that this Court has
wide power to interfere and correct the judgment and orders H
I
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] 2 S.C.R.

A passed by any court or tribunal in the country. In addition to the
appellate power, the Court has special residuary power to entertain
appeal against any order of any court in the country. The plenary
jurisdiction of this Court to grant leave and hear appeals against
any order of a court or tribunal, confers power of judicial super-
intendence over all the courts and tribunals in the territory of India
B including subordinate courts of Magistrate and District Judge. This
C~:mrt has, therefore, supervisory jurisdiction over all courts in
India.

19. Article 129 provides that the Supreme Court shall be a cotlrt
c of record and shall have all the power of such a court including
the power to punish for contempt of itself. Article 215 contains
similar provision in respect of High Court. Both the Supreme court
as well as High Courts are courts of record having powers to punish
for contempt including the power to punish for contempt of itself.
The Constitution does not define "Court of Record'. This expres-
D sion is well recognised in juridical world. In Jowitt's Dictionary of
English Law, "Court of record" is defined as :

"A court whereof the acts and judicial proceedings are en-
rolled for a perpetual memorial and testimony, and which has
E power to fine an imprison for contempt of its authority."

In Wharton's Law Lexicon, Court of record is defined as :

"Courts are either of record where their acts and judicial
proceedings are enrolled for a perpetual memorial and tes-
F timony and they have power to fine and imprison, or not of
record being courts of inferior dignity, and in a less proper
sense the King's Courts-and these art not entrusted by law
with any power to fine or imprison the subject of the realm,
unless by the express provision of some Act of Parliament.
These proceedings are not enrolled or recorded"
G
·In words and Phrases (Permanent Edition Vol.IO page 429) "Comt
of Record" is defined as under :

"Court of Record is a court where acts and judicial proceed-
H ings are enrolled in parchment for a perpetual memorial and
IN RE: V.C. MISHRA (SAWANT, J.] 663

testimony, which rolls are called the 'record' of the court, and A
are of such high and supereminent authority that their truth
is not to be questioned."

Halsbury's Law of England, 4th Edn., Vol.10, para 709, page 319,
states :
B
"Another manner of division is into courts of record and
courts not of record. Certain courts are expressly declared by
statute to be courts of record. In the case of courts not
expressly declared to be courts of record, the answer to the
question whether a court is a court of record seems to C
depend in general upon whether it has power to fine or
imprison, by statute or otherwise, for contempt of itself or
other substantive offences; if it has such power, it seems that
it is a court of record..... The proceedings of a court of record
preserved in its archieves are called records, and are con-
clusive evidence of that which is recorded therein." D
xxxxx

23. The question whether in the absence of any express provision
a Court of Record has inherent power in respect of contempt of
subordinate or inferior courts, has been considered by English and E
Indian courts. '

xxxxx

... These authorities show that in England the power of the High
Court to deal with the contempt of inferior court was based not F
so much on its historical foundation but on the High Court's
inherent jurisdiction being a court of record having jurisdiction to
correct the orders of those courts.

xxxxx
G
24. In India prior to the enactment of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1926, High Court's jurisdiction in respect of contempt of subor-
dinate and inferior courts was regulated by the principles of
Common Law of England. The High Courts in the absence of
statutory provision exercised power of provision exercised power H
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 2 S.C.R.

A of contempt to protect the subordinate courts on the premise of
inherent power of a Court of record."

26. The English and the Indian authorities are based on the basic
foundation of inherent power of a Court of Record, having juris-
diction to correct the judicial order of subordinate courts. The
B King's Bench in England and High Courts in India being superior
Courts of Record and having judicial power to correct orders of
subordinate courts enjoyed the inherent power of contempt to
protect the subordinate courts. The Supreme Court being a Court
of Record under Article 129 and having wide power of judicial
c supervision over all the courts in the country, must possess and
exercise similar jurisdiction and power as the High Courts and
prior to contempt Legislation in 1926. Inherent powers of a supe-
rior Court of Record have remained unaffected even after codifica-
tion of Contempt Law."

D xxxxx

28 ....The Parliament's. power to legislate in relation to law of
contempt relating to Supreme Court is limited, therefore the Act
does not impinge upon this Court's power with regard to the
contempt of subordinate courts under Article 129 of the Constitu-
E tion."

- 29. Article 129 declares the Supreme Court a court of record and
it further provides that the Supreme Court shall have all the powers
of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself.
F The expression used in Article 129 is not restrictive instead it is
extensive in nature. If the Framers of the Constitution intended
that the Supreme Court shall have power to punish for contempt
of itself only, there was no necessity of inserting the expression
"including the power to punish for contempt of itself''. The Article
confers power on the Supreme Court to punish for contempt of
G itself and in addition, it confers some additional power relating to
contempt as would appear from the expression "including". The
expression "including" has been interpreted by courts, to extend
and widen the scope of power. The plain language of Article 129
clearly indicates that this Court as a court of record has power to
H punish for contempt of itself and also something else also which
'
I

INRE:V.C.MISHRA [SAWANT,J.] 665

could fall within the inherent jurisdiction of a court of record. In A
interpreting the constitution, it is not permissible to adopt a con-
struction which would render any expression superfluous or redun-
dant. The courts ought not to accept any such construction. While
construing Article 129, it is not permissible to ignore the sig-
nificance and impact of the inclusive power conferred on the
Supreme Court. Since the Supreme Court is designed by the
B
Constitution as a court of record and as the Founding Fatl).ers were
aware that a superior court of record has inherent power to indict
a person for the contempt of itself as, well as of courts inferior to
it, the expression "including" was deliberately inserted in the article.
Article 129 recognised the existing inherent power of a court of C
record in its full plenitude including the power to punish for the
contempt of inferior courts. If Article 129 is susceptible to two
interpretations, we would prefer to accept the interpretation which
would preserve the inherent jurisdiction of this Court being the
superior court of record, to safeguard and protect the subordinate D
judiciary, which forms the very backbone of administration of
justice. The subordinate courts administer justice at the grassroot
level, their protection is necessary to preserve the confidence of
people in the efficacy of courts and to ensure unsullied flow of
justice at its base level.
E
xxxxxx

31. We have already discussed a number of decisions holding that
r, the High Court being a court of record has inherent power in
respect of contempt of itself as well as of its subordinate courts F
even in the absence of any express provision in any Act. A fortiori
the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country and
superior court of record should possess the same inherent juris-
diction and power for taking action for contempt of itself as wel}
as for the contempt of subordinate and inferior courts. It was
contended that since High Court has power of superintendence G
over the subordinate courts under Article 227 of the Constitution,
therefore, High Court has power to punish for the contempt of
subordinate courts. Since the Supreme Court has no supervisory
jurisdiction over the High Court or other subordinate courts, it
does not possess powers which High Courts have under Article H
I

666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 2 S.C.R.

A 215. This submission is misconceived. Article 227 confers super-
visory jurisdiction on the High Court and in exercise of that power
High Court may correct judicial orders of subordinate courts, in
addition to that, the High Court has administrative control over
the subordinate courts. Supreme Court's power to correct judicial
orders of the subordinate courts under Article 136 is much wider
B and more effective than that contained under Article 227. Absence
of administrative power of superintendence over the High Court
and subordinate court does not affect this Court's wide power of
judicial superintendence of all courts in India. Once there is power
of judicial Sl\perintendence, all the courts whose orders are
c amenable to corrections by this Court would be subordinate courts
and therefore this Court also possesses similar inherent power a
the High Court has under Article 215 with regard to the contempt
of subordinate courts. The jurisdiction and power of a superior
Court of Record to punish contempt of subordinate courts was not
founded on the Court's administrative power of superintendence,
D instead the inherent jurisdiction was conceded to superior Court
of Record on the premise of its judicial power to correct the errors
of subordinate courts.

x·xx xx x
E
36. Advent of freedom, and promulgation of Constitution have
made drastic changes in the administration of justice necessitating
new judicial approach. The Constitution has assigned a new role
to the Constitutional Courts to ensure rule of law in the country.
F These changes have brought new perceptions. In interpreting the
. Constitution, we must have regard to the social , economic and
· political changes, need of the community and the independence of

\.
judiciary. The court cannot be a helpless spectator, bound by
precedents of colonial days which have lost relevance. Time has
come to have a fresh look at the old precedents and to lay down
G law with the changed perceptions keeping in view tl:ie provisions
of the Constitution. "Law'', to use the words of Lord Coleridge,
"grows; and though the principles of law remain unchanged yet
their application is to be changed with the.-Ch~g circumstances
of the time". The considerations which weighed with the Federal
H Court in rendering its decision in Gauba and laitly case are-na.
. /
INRE:V.C.MISHRA [SAWANT,J.) 667

more relevant in the context of the constitutional provisions. A

37. Since this Court has power of judicial superintendence and
control over all the courts and tribunals functioning in the entire
territory of the country, it has a corresponding duty to protect and
safeguard the interest of inferior courts to ensure the flow of the B
stream of justice in the courts without any interference or attack
from any quarter. The subordinate and inferior courts do not have
adequate power under the law to protect themselves, therefore, it
is necessary that this court should protect them. Under the con-
stitutional scheme this court has a special role, in the administra-
tion of justice and the powers conferred on it under Articles 32, C
r 136, 141 and 142 form part of basic structure of the Constitution.
The amplitude of the power of this Court under these articles of
the Constitution cannot be curtailed by law made by Central or
State legislature. If the contention raised on behalf of the contem-
ners is accepted, the courts all over India will have no protection D
from this£ourt. No doubt High Courts have power to persist for
the contempt of subordinate courts but that does not affect oi
abridge the inherent power of this Court under Article 129. The
Supreme Court and the High Court both exercise concurrent
jurisdiction under the constitutional scheme in matters relating to
fundamental rights under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, E
therefore this Court's jurisdiction and power to take action for
contempt of subordinate courts would not be inconsistent to any
constitutional scheme. There may be occasions when attack on
Judges and Magistrates of subordinate courts may have wide
repercussions throughout the country, in that situation it may not F

1! be possible for a High Court to contain the same, as a result of
which the administration of justice in the country may be paralysed,
in that situation the Apex Court must intervene to ensure smooth
functioning of courts. The Apex Court is duty bound to take
effective steps within the constitutional provisions to ensure a free
and fair administration of justice throughout the country, for that G
purpose it must wield the requisite power to take action for
contempt of subordinate courts. Ordinarily, the High Court would
protect the subordinate court from any onslaught on their inde-
pendence, but in exceptional cases, extraordinary situation may
prevail affecting the administration of public justice or where the H
I

668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 2 S.C.R.

A entire judiciary is affected, this Court may directly take cognisance
of contempt of subordinate courts. We would like to strike a note )J··

of caution that this Court will sparingly exercise its inherent power
in taking cognisance of the contempt of subordinate courts, as
ordinarily matters relating to contempt of subordinate courts must
be dealt with by the High Courts. The instant case is of exceptional
B nature, as the incident created a situation where functioning of the
subordinate courts all over the country was adversely affected, and
the administration of justice was paralysed, therefore, this Court
took cognisance of the matter.

c 38.... It is true that courts constituted under a law enacted by the
Parliament or the State legislature have limited legislature and they
cannot assure jurisdiction in a matter, not expressly assigned to
them, but that is not so in the case of a superior court of record
constituted by the Constitution. Such a court does not have a
limited jurisdiction instead it has power to determine its own
D jurisdiction. No matter is 'beyond the jurisdiction of a superior
court of record unless it is expressly shown to the so, under the
provisions of the Constitution. In the absence of any express
provision in the Constitution the Apex Court being a court of
record has jurisdiction in every matter and if there be any doubt,
E the Court has power to determine its jurisdiction. If such deter-
mination is made by High Court, the same would be subject to
appeal to this Court, but if the jurisdiction is determined by this
Court is would be final.

xxxxxx
F
.... We therefore hold that this Court being the Apex Court and a
superior court of record has power to determine its jurisdiction
under Article 129 of the Constitution and as discussed earlier it
has jurisdiction to initiate or entertain proceedings for contempt
G of subordinate courts. This view does not run counter to any
\
provision of the Constitution." )~

The propositions of law laid down and the observations made in this
decision conclusively negate the contention that this Court cannot take
H cognisance of the contempt committed of the High Court.
IN RE: V.C. MISHRA [SAWANT, J.] 669

8. The contemner has also contended that notwithstanding the A
decision in Delhi Judicial Service Association Case [supra), the matter
should be referred to a larger Bench because according to him, the
decision does not lay down the correct proposition of law when it gives this
Court the jurisdiction under Article 129 of the Constitution to take cog-
nisance of the contempt of the High Court. Neither the contemner nor the B
learned counsel appearing on his behalf has pointed out to us any specific
infirmity in the said decision. We are not only in complete agreement with
the law laid down on the point in the said decision but are also unable to

• see how the legal position to the contrary will be consistent with this
Court's wide ranging jurisdiction and its duties and responsibilities as the
highest Court of the land as pointed out above. Hence, we reject the said C
request.

9. The contemner has further contended that it will be necessary to
hold an inquiry into the allegations made by the learned Judge by summon-
ing the learned judge for examination to verify the version of the incident D
given by him as against that given by the contemner. According to him, in
view of the conflicting versions of the incident given by him and the learned
Judge, it would be necessary for him to cross-examine the learned Judge.
As the facts reveal, the contempt alleged is in the face of the Court. The
learned judge or the Bench could have itself taken action for the offence
on the spot. Instead, the learned Judge probably thought that it would not E
be proper to be a prosecutor, a witness and the judge himself in the matter
and decided to report the incident to the learned Acting Chief Justice of
his Court. There is nothing unusual in the course the learned Judge
adopted, although the procedure adopted by the leaned Judge has resulted
in some delay in taking action for the contempt. (See Balogh v. Crown Court F
at St. Albans, [1975] QB 73, [1974] 3 All ER 283). The criminal contempt
of court undoubtedly amounts to an offence but it is an offence sui generis
and hence for such offence, the procedure adopted both under the com-
mon law and the statute law even in this country has always been summary.
However, the fact that the process is summary does not mean that the
procedural requirement, viz., that an opportunity of meeting the charge, is G
denied to the contemner. The degree of precision with which the change
may be stated depends upon the circumstances. So long as the gist of the
specific allegations is made clear or otherwise the contemner is aware of
the specific allegation, it is not always necessary to formulate the charge in
a specific allegation. The consensus of opinion among the judiciary and the H
I

670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) 2 S.C.R.

A JUnsts alike is that despite the objection that the judge deals with the
contempt himself and the Contemner has little opportunity to defend
himself, t.here is a residue of cases where not only it is justifiable to punish
on the spot but it is the only realistic way of dealing with certain offenders.
This procedure does not offend against the principle of natural justice, viz.,
B Namo judex in sua causa since the prosecution is not aimed at protecting
the Judge personally but protecting the administration of justice. The
threat of immediate punishment is the most effective deterrent against
misconduct. The judge has to remain in full control of the hearing of the
case and h~ must be able to take steps to restore order as early and quickly
as possible. The time factor is crucial. Dragging out the contempt proceed-
C ings. means a lengthy interruption to the main proceedings which paralyses
the court for a time and indirectly impedes the speed and efficiency with
which justice is administered. Instant justice can never be complete satis-
factory yet it does provide the simplest, most effective and least unsatisfac-
•
tory method of dealing with disruptive conduct in Court. So long as the
D contemner's interest are adequately safeguarded by giving him an oppor-
tunity of being heard in his defence, even summary procedure in the case
of contempt in the face of the Court is commended and not faulted.

10. In the present case, although the contempt is in the face of the
court, the procedure adopted is not only not summary but has adequately
E safeguarded the contemner's interest. The contemner was issued a notice
intimating him the specific allegation against him. He was given an oppor-
tunity to counter the allegations by fiiing his counter affidavit and addition-
al counter/supplementary affidavit as per his request, and he has filed the
same. He was also given ~ opportunity to file an. affidavit of any other
F person that he chose or to produce any other material in his defence, which
he has not done. However, in the affidavit which he has filed, he has
requested for an examination of the learned Judge. We have at length dealt I
with the nature of infacie curiae contempt and the justification for adopting ~
summary procedure and punishing the offender on the spot. In such
procedure, there is no scope for examining the Judge or Judges of the court
G before whom the contempt is committed. To give such a right to the
contemner is to destroy not only the raison d'etre for taking action for
contempt committed in the face of the court but also to destroy the very
jurisdiction of the Court to adopt proceedings for such conduct. It is for
these reasons that neither the common law nor the statute law countenan-
H ces the claim of the offender for examination of the Judge or Judges before
INRE:V.C.MISHRA (SAWANT,J.] 671

whom the contempt is committed. Section 14 of our Act, i.e., the Contempt A
of Courts Act, 1971 deals with the procedure when the action is taken for
the contempt in the face of the Supreme Court and the High Court.
Sub-section [3] of the said Section deals with a situation where in f acie
curiae contempt is tried by a Judge other than the Judge or judges in whose
presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been committed. The
provision in specific terms and for obvious reasons, states that in such cases
B
it shall not be necessary for the Judge or Judges in whose presence or
hearing the offence is alleged to have been committed, to appear as a
witness and the statement placed before the Chief Justice shall be treated
as the evidence in the case. The statement of the learned Judge has already
been furnished to the contemner and he has replied to the same. We have, c
therefore, to proceed by treating the statement of the learned Judge and
the affidavits filed by the contemner and the reply given by the learned
Judge to the said affidavits, as evidence in the case.

11. We may now refer to the matter in dispute to examine whether
the contemner is guilty of the contempt of court. under the common law D
definition, "contempt of court" is defined as an act or omission calculated
to interfere with the due administration of justice. This covers criminal
contempt [that is, acts which so threaten the adlninistration of justice that
they require punishment] and civil contempt [disobedience of an order
made in a civil cause). Section 2 [a] [b] and [c] of the Act defines the E
contempt of court as follows :

"2. Definitions. - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-

[a] "contempt of court" means civil contempt or criminal contempt;
F
(b] "civil contempt" means willful disobedience to any judgment,
decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful
breach of an undertaking given to a court;

(c] "criminal contempt" means the publication [whether by words, G
spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or
otherwise] of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever
which-

[i] scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to
lower the authority of any court; or H
I

672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] 2 S.C.R.

A [ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due
course of any judicial proceedings; or

(iii) interferes or tenqs to interfere with, or obstructs or tends
to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other man-
ner;''
B
From the facts which have been narrated above it is clear that the
aliegations against the contemner, if true, would amount to criminal con-
tempt as defined under Section 2[ c] of the Act. It is in the light of this
definition of the "criminal contempt" that we have to examine the facts on
record.
c
The essence of the contents of Justice Keshote's letter is that when
he put a question to the contemner as to under which provision the order
was passed by the lower court, the contemner "started to shout and said
that no question could have been put to him". The contemner further said
D that he would get the learned judge transferred or see that impeachment
motion was brought against him in Parliament. He also said that he had
"turned up many judges". He also created a scene in the Court. The learned
Judge has further stated in his letter that in sum and substance it was a
matter where "except to abuse him of mother and sister", he insulted him
E "like anything". The contemner, according to the learned Judge, wanted to
c:Onvey to him that admission was a matter of course and no argumeJ?.t were
to be heard at that stage. The learned Judge has given his reaction to t_he
entire episode by pointing out that this is not a question of insulting a Judge
but the institution as a whole. In case the dignity of the judiciary was not
maintained then he "did not know where the institution would stand,
F particularly when contemner who is a senior advocate, President of the Bar
and Chairman of the Bar Council of India behaved in the court in such
manner which will have its effect on other advocates as well". He has
further stated that in case the dignity of the judiciary is not restored, it
would be very difficult for the judges to discharge the judicial function
G without fear or favour. At the end of this letter, he has appealed to the
learned Acting Chief Justice for "restoration of dignity of the judiciary".
~-
The contemner, as pointed out above, by filing an affidavit has denied
the version of the eposode given by the learned Judge and has stated that
when the matter was called on, the learned Judge [he has referred to him
H as the 'applicant') took charge of the court proceedings and virtually
IN RE: V.C. MISHRA [SAWANT,J.] 673

foreclosed the attempts made by the senior .Judge to intervene. The learned A
judge inquired from the contemner as to under which law the inipugned
order was passed to which the latter ·replied that it was under \'arious rules
of Order 39, CPC. The learned Judge then conveyed to the contemner that
he was going to set aside the entire order although against a portion of it
only he had come in appeal. According to the contemner, he then politely B
brought to the notice of the learned Judge that being the appellant, he had
the dominion over the case and it could not be made worse just because
he had come to High Court. According to the contemner, the learned
Judge then apparently lost his temper and told him that he would set aside
the order in toto disregarding what he had said. The contemner has then
proceeded to state that "being upset over what" he felt was an arbitrary C
approach to judicial process he "got emotionally perturbed" and "his
professional and institutional sensitivity got deeply wounded" and he told
the applicant-Judge that "it was not the practice" of that Court to dismiss
case without hearing or to upset judgments or portions of judgments which
have not been appealed against. According to the contemner, "unfortunate- D
ly the applicant - Judge took it unsportingly and apparently lost his temper
and directed the Stenographer to take down the order for setting aside the
whole order. The contemner has then stated that he "found it necessary to
mention that the exchange that took place between him and the applicant-
Judge got a little heated up". In the moment of heat the applicant-Judge
made the following observations : "I am from the bar and if need be I can E
take to goondaism. I never opted for Allahabad. I had opted for Gujarat
and Himachal Pradesh. I do not know why the Chief Justice of India
disregarded my options and transferred me to this place, which I never
liked". According to the Contemner, he was "provoked by this" and asked
the learned Judge "whether he was creating a scene to create eonditions F
for getting himself transferred as also talked earlier". The contemner has
denied that he had referred to any impeachment although ·according to
him, he did say that "a Judge got hi~self transferred earlier on account of
his inability to command the goodwill of the Bar due to lack of mutual
reverence". He has also denied that when the learned judge asked him as
to under which provision the order was passed, he had replied that the G
Court had no jurisdiction to ask the same and should admit and grant the
stay order. lie has added that such a reply could only be attributed to one
who is made and it is unbelievable that "he would reply in such a foolish
manner". He has also denied that he had abused the learned Judge and
the allegation made against him in that ·behalf were vague. According to H
I
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 2 S.C.R.

A the contemner, if he had committed the contempt, the senior member of
the Bench would have initiated proceedings undcr"Article 1.29" of the
Constitution for committing contempt in /acie curiae. He has also stated
that even the learned Judge himself could have done so but he did not do
so and deferred the matter for the next day and "adopted a devious way of
writing to the acting Chief Justice for doing something about it" which
B shows that the version of the episode was not correct. The contemner has
also then expressed his "uncomprehension" why the learned Judge should
have come to this Court when he had ample and sufficient legal and
constitutional powers to arraign the contemner at the "Bar for what was
attributed" to him.
c 12. Before we refer to the other contentions raised by the contemner, ~ .. ~

the question is which of the two versions has to be accepted as correct.
The contemner has no doubt asked for an inquiry and an opportunity to
produce evidence. For reasons stated earlier, we declined his request for
'
such inquiry, but gave him ample opportunity to produce whatever material
D he desired to, including the affidavits of whomsoever he desired. Our order
dated 15th July, 1994 is clear on the subject. Pursuant to the said order,
the contemner has not filed his further affidavit or material or the affidavit
of any other person. Instead he tendered a written apology dated 7th
October, 1994 which will be considered at the proper place. In his earlier
E counter additional counter, he has stated that it is not he who had com-
mitted contempt but it is the learned Judge who had committed contempt
of his own court. According to him, the learned Judge had gagged him
from discharging his duties as an advocate and the statement of senior
member of the bench concerned was necessary. He has taken exception to
the learned Judge speaking in the Court except through the senior Judge
F of the Bench which according to him, had been the practice in the said
High Court and has also alleged that the learned judge did not follow the
said convention.

13. Normally, no Judge takes action for in facie curiae contempt
against the lawyer unless he is impelled to do so. It is not the heat
G generated in the arguments but the language used, the tone and the manner
in which it is expressed and the intention behind using it which determine
whether it was calculated to insult, show disrespect, to overbear and
overawe the court and to threate!l and obstruct the course of justice. After
going through the report of the learned Judge and the affidavits and the
H additional affidavits filed by the contemner and after hearing the learned

....
IN RE: V.C. MISHRA [SA WANT, J.] 675

counsel appearing for the contemner, we have come lo the conclusion that A
there is every reason to believe that notwithstanding his denial:.., and
disclaimers, the contemncr had undoubtedly tried to browbc~t. threaten,
insult and show disrespect personally to the learned Judge. This is evident
from the manner in which even in the affidavits filed in this Court, the
contemner has tried to justify his conduct. He has started narration of his
version of the incident by taking exception the learned Judge's taking
B
charge of the court proceedings. We are unable to understand what exactly
he means thereby. Every member of the Bench is on par with the other
member or members of the Bench and has a right to ask whatever ques-
tions he want to, to appreciate the merits or demerits of the case. It is
obvious that the contemner was incensed by the fact that the learned Judge c
r was asking the questions to him. This is clear from his contention that the
learned Judge being a junior member of the Bench, was not supposed to
ask him any question and if any questions were to be asked, he had to ask
them through the senior member of the Bench because that was the
convention of the Court. We are not aware of any such convention in any D
court at least in this country. Assuming that there is such a convention, it
is for the learned Judges forming the Bench to observe it inter se. No lawyer
or a third party can have any right or say in the matter and can make either
an issue of it or refuse to answer the questions on that ground. The lawyer
or the litigant concerned has to answer the questions put to him by any
member of the Bench. The contemner has sought to rely on the so-called E
convention and to spell out his right from it not to have been questioned
by the learned Judge This contention coupled with his grievance that the
learned Judge had taken charge of the proceedings, shows that th contem-
ner was in all probability perturbed by the fact that the learned Judge was
asking him questions. The leaned Judge's version, therefore, appear to be F
correct when he states that the contemner lost his temper when he started

'
asking him questions. The contemner has further admitted that he got
"emotionally perturbed" and his "professional and institutional sensitivity
y got deeply wounded" because the learned Judge, according to him, ap-
parently lost his temper and told him in no unconcealed terms that he
would set aside the order in toto disregarding what he had said. The G
learned Judge's statement that the contemner threatened him with transfer
and impeachment proceedings also gets corroboration from the
contemner's own statement in the additional affidavit that he did tell the
learned Judge that a Judge got himself transferred earlier on account of
his inability to command the goodwill of the Bar due to lack of mutual H
I
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 2 S.C.R.

. A reverence. No one expects a lawyer to be subservient to the Court while
presenting his case' and not to put forward his arguments merely because
the Court is against him. In fact, that is the moment when he is expected
to put forth his best effort to per.;uade the Court. However, if, in spite of
it, the lawyer finds that the court is against him, he is not expected to be
discourteous to the court or to fling hot words or epithets or use disrespect-
B ful, derogatory or threatening language or exhibit temper which has the
effect of overbearing the court. Casf:s are won and lost in the court daily.
One or the other side is bound to lose. The remedy of the losing lawyer or
the litigant is to prefer an appeal against the decision and not to indulge
in a running battle of words with the court. That is the least that is expected
C of a Ja:wyer. Silence on some occasions is also an argument. The lawyer is
not entitled to indulge in unbecoming conduct either by showing his temper
or using unbecoming language.

The incident had undoubtedly created a scene in the court since even
according to the contemner, the exchange between the learned Judge and
D him was "a little heated up" and the contemner asked the learned Judge
"whether he was creating scene to create conditions for getting himself
transferred as also talked earlier". He had also to remind the learned Judge
that "a Judge got himself transferred earlier on account of his inability to
command the goodwill of the Bar due to lack of mutual reverence". He has
E further stated in his affidavit that "the entire Bar at Allahabad" knew that
he was unjustly "roughed" by the Judge and was being punished fortaking
"a fearless and non-servile stand" and that he was being prosecuted °for
"asserting" a right of _audience and "using the liberty to express his views
when a Judge takes a course which in the opinion of the Bar is irregular".
He has also stated that any punishment meted out to the "outspoken"
F lawyer will completely emasculate the freedom of the profession and make
the Bar a subservient tail wagging appendage to the judicial branch which
is an anathema to a healthy democratic judicial system. He has further
stated in his petition for taking contempt action against the learned Judge
that the incident was "witnessed by a large number of advocates".
G
We have reproduced the contents of the letter written by the learned
judge and his reply to the affidavits filed by the contemner The learned
Judge's version is that when he put the question to the contemner as to
under which provision, the lower court had passed the order in question,
H the contemner started shouting and said that no question could have been
IN RE: V.C. MISHRA [SAWANT,J.] 677
put to him. The contemner also stated that he would get him transferred A
or see that impeachment motion was brought against him in Parliament.
He further said that he had "turned up" many .iudges and created a good
scene in the Court. The contemner further asked him to follow the practice
of the Court. The learned Judge has stated that in sum and substance, it
was a matter where except "to abuse of his mother and sister", he had
B
insulted him "like anything". The learned Judge has further stated that the
contemner wanted to convey to him that admission of every matter was as
y a matter of course and no arguments were heard at the admission stage.
He has reiterated the said version in his reply to the affidavits and in
y I
particular, has denied the allegations made against him by the contemner.
He has defended his asking the question to the contemner since he was a C
member of the Bench. The learned judge has stated that the contemner
T I took exception to his asking the said question as if he had committed some
' wrong and started shouting. He has further stated that he had asked only
the question referred to above and the contemner had created the scene
on account of his putting the said question to him, and made it difficult to D
continue the court's proceedings. Ultimately when it became impossible he
hear all the slogans and insulting words and threats, he requested the
senior learned member of the Bench to list the case before another Bench
and to retire to the chamber. Accordingly, an order was made by the senior
member of the Bench and both of them retired to the chamber. The
learned Judge has denied that he had conveyed to the contemner that he E
was going to set aside the entire order against a portion of which the
contemner had come in appeal. He .has stated that it was a case where the
contemner did not permit the court proceedings to be proceeded and both
the members of the Bench had ·uttimately to retire to the chambers. The

••
r
learned Judge has stated that the defence of the conduct of the contemner F
in the counter affidavit "was a manufactured" one. He has then dealt with
each paragraph of the contemner's counter affidavit. He has also stated
that there was no question of his having directed the stenographer to take
down the order for setting aside of the whole order since that function was
performed by the. senior member of the Bench. He has also stated that the G
contemner has made absolutely wrong allegations when he states that he
had made the following remarks : "I am from the bar and if need be I can
take to goondaism". He has also denied that he had said : "I never opted
for Allahabad. I had opted for Gujarat and Himachal Pradesh. I do not
know why the Chief Justice of India disregarded my options and trans-
ferred me to this place, which I never liked". He has stated that the H
I
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 2 S.C.R.

A contemner has made false allegations against him.

We have, by referring to the relevant portions of the affidavit and the
counter affidavit filed by the contemner, pointed out the various statements
made in the said affidavits which dearly point to the veracity of the version
given by the learned Judge and the attempted rationalisation of his conduct
B by the contemner. The said averments also lend force and truthfulness to
the cont~nt of the learned Judge's letters. We are, taking into consideration
all the circumstances on record, of the view that the version of the incident
given by the learned Judge has to be accepted as against that of the
contemner.
c To resent. the questions asked by a Judge, to be disrespectful to him,
to question his authority to ask the questions, to shout at him, to threaten
him with transfer and impeachment, to use insulting language and abuse
l
him, to dictate the order that he should pass, to create scenes in the Court,
to address him by loisng temper, are all acts calculated to interfere with
D and obstruct the course of justice. Such act tend to overawe the court and
to prevent it form performing its duty to administer justice. Such conduct
brings the authority of the court and the administration of justice into
disrespect ·and disrepute and undermines and erodes the very foundation
of the judiciary by shaking the confidence of the people in the ability of
E the court to deliver free and fair justice.
The stance taken by the contemner is that he was performing his duty
as an outspoken and fearless member of the Bar. He seems to be labouring
under a grave misunderstanding. Brazenness is not outspookiness and
arrogance is not fearlessness. Use of intemperate language is not assertion
F of right nor is a threat an argument. Humility is not servility and courtesy
and politeness are not lack of dignity. Self-restraint and respectful attitude
towards the Court, presentation of correct facts and law with a balanced
mind and without overstatement, suppression, distortion or embellishment
are requisites of good advocacy. A lawyer has to be a gentlemen first. His
G most valuable asset is the respect and goodwill he enjoys among his
colleagues and in the Court.

The rule of law is the foundation of the democratic society. The
judiciary is the guardian of the rule of law. Hence judiciary is not only the
third pillar, but the central pillar of the democratic State. In a democracy
H like ours, where there is a written Constitution which is above all in-·
INRE:V.C.MISHRA [SAWANT,J.] 679

dividuals and institutions and where the power of judicial review is vested A
in the superior courts, the judiciary has a special and additional duty to
perform, viz., to oversee that all individuals and institutions including the
executive and the legislature act within the framework of not only the law
but also the fundamental law of the land. This duty is apart from the
function of adjudicating the disputes between the parties which is essential B
to peaceful and orderly development of the society. If the judiciary is to
perform its duties and functions effectively and true to the spirit with which
1 they are sacredly entrusted to it, the dignity and authority of the courts

r have to be respected and protected at all costs. Otherwise, the very
cornerstone of our constitutional scheme will give way and with it will
disappear the rule of law and the civilized life in the society. It is for this C
purpose that the courts are entrused with the extra-ordinary power of
punishing those who indulge in acts whether inside or outside the courts,
which tend to undermine their authority and bring them in disrepute and
disrespect by scandalising them and obstructing them from discharging
their duties without fear or favour. When the court exercises this power, it D
does not do so to vindicate the dignity and honour of the individual judge
who is personally attacked or scandalised, but to uphold the majesty of the
law and of the administration of justice. The foundation of the judiciary is
the trust and the confidence of the people in its ability to deliver fearless
and impartial justice. When the foundation itself is shaken by acts which
tend to create disar"!ction and disrespect for the authority of the court by E
creating distrust in its working, the edifice of the judicial system gets
eroded.

It cannot be disputed and was not disputed before us that the acts
indulged into by the contemner in the present case as stated by the learned
Judge per se amount to criminal contempt of court. What was disputed,
F
was their occurrence. We have held above that we are satisfied that the
contemner did indulge in the said acts.

As held by this Court in the matter of Mr. 'G~ a Senior Advocate of
the Supreme Cowt, [1955] 1 SCR 490; G

"......the Court, in dealing with cases of professional misconduct is
not concerned with ordinary legal rights, but with the special and
rigid rules of professional conduct expected of and applied to a
specially privileged class of persons who, because of their H
I

680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 2 S.C.R.

A privileged status, are subject to certain disabilities which do not
attach to other men and which do not attach even to them in a
non-professional character ..... He (a legal practitioner) is bound to
conduct himself in a manner befitting the high and honourable
profession to whose privileges he has so long been admitted; and
if he departs from the high standards which that profession has set
B for itself and demands of him in professional matters, he is liable
to disciplinary action".

In L.M. Das v. Advocate General, Orissa, [1957) SCR 167, this Court ~'
observed :- I

c
"A member of the Bar undoubtedly owes a duty to his client and
must place before the Court all that can fairly and reasonably be
submitted on behalf of his client. He may even submit that a
particular order is not correct and may ask for a review of that
order. At the same time, a member of the Bar is an officer of the
D
Court and owes a duty to the court in which he is appearing. He
must uphold the dignity and decorum of the Court and must not
do anything to bring the Court itself into disrepute. The appellant
before us grossly overstepped the limits of propriety when he made
imputations of partiality and unfairness against the Munsif in open
E Court. In suggesting that the Munsif followed no principle in his
orders, the appellant was adding insult to injury, because the
Munsif had merely upheld an order of his predecessor on the
preliminary point of jurisdiction and Court fees, which order had
been upheld by the High Court in revision. Scandalising the Court
in such manner is really polluting the very fount of justice; such
F
conduct as the appellant indulged in was not a matter between an
individual member of the Bar and a member of the judicial service;
it brought into disrepute the whole administration of justice. From
that point of view, the conduct of the appellant was highly
reprehensible."
G
The contemner has obviously misunderstood his function both as a -~
lawyer representing the interests of his client and as an officer of the court.
Indeed, he has not tried to defend the said acts in either of his capacities.
On the other hand, he has tried to deny them. Hence, much need not be
H said on this subject to remind him of his duties in both the capacities. It
IN RE: V.C. MISHRA [SAWANT, J.) 681

is, however, necessary to observe that by indulging in the said acts, he has A
positively abused his position both as a lawyer and as an officer of the
Court, and has done distinct dis-service to the litigants in general and to
the profession of law and the administration of justice in particular. It pains
us to note that the contemner is not only a senior member of the legal
profession, but holds the high offices of the Chairman of the Bar Council B
of India, Member of the Bar Council of U.P., Chairman and Member,
Executive Council and Academic Council of ·the National Law School
University of India at Bangalore and President of the High Court Bar
Association, Allahabad. Both as a senior member of the profession and as
holder of the said high offices, special and additional duties were cast upon
him to conduct himself as a model lawyer and officer of the court and to C
help strengthen the administration of justice by upholding the dignity and
the majesty of the court. It was in fact expected of him to be zealous in
maintaining the rule of law and in strengthening the people's confidence
in the judicial institutions. To our dismay, we find that he has acted exactly
contrary to his obligations and has in reality set a. bad example to others D
while at the same time contributing to weakening of the confidence of the
people in the courts.

• The contemner has no doubt tendered an unconditional apology on
7th October, 1994 by withdrawing from record all his applications, peti-
tions, counter affidavits, prayers and submissions made at the Bar and to E
the court earlier. We have reproduced that apology verbatim earlier. In the
apology he has pleaded that he has deeply and regretfully realised that the
situation, meaning thereby the incident, should never have arisen and the
fact that it arose has subjected him to anguish and remorse and a feeling
of moral guilty. That feeling has been compounded with the fact that he F
was a senior advocate and was holding the elective posts of the President
of the High Court Bar Association and the Chairman of the Bar Council
of India which by their nature show that he was entrusted by this profes-
sional fraternity to set up an example of an ideal advocate. He has guiltily
realised his failure to approximate to this standard resulting in the present G
proceedings and he was, therefore, submitting his unconditional apology
for the incident in question, we have not accepted this apology, firstly
because we find that the apology is not a free and frank admission of the
misdemeanor he indulged in the incident in question. Is there a sincere
regret for the disrespect he showed to the learned Judge and the Court,
and for· the harm that he has done to the judiciary. On the other hand, the H
I

682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 2 S.C.R.

A apolO'gy is couched in a sophisticated and garbed language exhibiting more
an attempt to justify his conduct by reference to the circumstances in which
he had indulged in it and to exonerate himself from the offence by pleading
that the condition in which the "situation" had developed was not an ideal
one and were it ideal, the 'situation' should not have arisen. It is a clever
and disguised attempt to refurbish his image and get out of a tight situation
B by not only not exhibiting the least sincere remorse for his conduct but by
. trying to blame the so-called circumstances which led to it. At the same
time, he has attempted to varnish and re-establish himself as a valiant
defender of his "alleged duties" as a lawyer. Secondly, from the very
inception his attitude has been defiant and belligerent. In his affidavits and
C applieation, not only he has not shown any respect for the learned Judge,
but has made counter-allegations against him and has asked for initiation
of contempt proceedings against him. He har; even chosen to insinuate that
the learned Judge by not taking contempt action on the spot and instead
writing the letter to the Acting Chief Justice of the High Court, had
D adopted a devious way and that he had also come to Delhi to meet
"meaningful" people. These allegations may themselves amount to con-
tempt of court. Lastly, to accept any apology for a conduct of this kind and
to condone it, would tantamount to a failure on the part of this Court to
uphold the majesty of the law, the dignity of the court and to maintain the
confidence of the people in the judiciary. The Court will be failing in its
•
E duty to protect the administration of justice from attempts to denigrate and
lower the authority of the judicial officers entrusted with the sacred task
of delivering justice. A failure on the part of this Court to punish the
offender on an occasion such as this would thus be a failure to perform
one of its essential duties solemnly entrusted to it by the Constitution and
F the people. For all these reasons, we unhesitatingly reject the said so Called
apology tendered by the contemner.

14. The question now is what punishment should be meted out to the
contemner. We have already discussed the contempt jurisdiction of this
Court under Article 129 of the Constitution. That jurisdiction is inde-
G pendent of the statutory law of contempt enacted by the Parliament under
Entry 77 of List I of VII Schedule of the Constitution. The jurisdiction of
this Court under Article 129. is sui generis. The jurisdiction to take cog-
nisance of the contempt as well as to award punishment for it being ·
constitutional, it cannot be controlled by any statute. Neither, therefore,
H the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 nor the Advocates Act, 1961 can be
IN RE: V.C. MISHRA [SAWANT, J.] 683

pressed into service to restrict the said jurisdiction. We have during the A
course of the proceedings indicated that if we convict the contemner of the
offence, we may also suspend his licence to practise as a lawyer. The
learned counsel for the contemner and the interveners and also the learned
Solicitor General appointed amicus cwiae to assist the Court were re-
quested to advance their arguments also on the said point. Pursuant to it,
it was sought to be contended on behalf of the contemner an the U.P. Bar
B
Association and the U.P. Bar Council that the Court cannot suspend the
licence which is a power entrusted by the Advocates Act, 1961 specially
made for the purpose, to the disciplinary committees of the State Bar
Councils and of the Bar Council of India. The argument was that even the
constitutional power under Articles 129 and 142 was circumscribed by the c
said statutory provisions and hence in the exercise of our power under the
said provisions, the licence of an advocate was not liable either to be
cancelled or suspended. A reference was made in this connection to the
provisions of Sections 35 and 36 of the Advocates Act, which show that the
power to punish the advocate is vested in the disciplinary committees of D
the State Bar Council and the Bar Council of India. Under Section 37 of
the Advocates Act, an appeal lies to the Bar Council of India, when the
order is passed by the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council.
Under Section 38, the appeal lies to the Court when the order is made by
the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India, either under Section
36 or in appeal under Section 37. The power to punish includes the power E
to suspend the Advocate from practice for such period as the disciplinary
committee concerned may deem fit under Section 35 [3) (c) and also to
remove the name of the advocate from the State roll of the Advocates
under Section 35 [3) (d). Relying on these provisions, it was contended that
since the Act has vested the powers of suspending and removing the F
advocate from practice inclusively in the disciplinary committees of the
State Bar Council and the Bar Council of India, as the case may be, the
Supreme Court is denuded of its power to impose such punishment both
under Articles 129 and 142 of the Constitution. In support of this conten-
tion, reliance was placed on the observations of the majority of this Court
in Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commission, U.P., Allahabad, [1963) Supp. G
1 S.C.R. 885 relating to the powers of this Court under Article 142 which
are as follows :

"In this connection, it may be pertinent to point out that the wide
powers which are given to this rourt for doing complete justice H
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 2S.C.R.

A between the parties, can be used by this court for instance, in
adding parties to the proceedings pending before it, or in admitting
additional evidence, or in remanding the case, or in allowing an
new point to be taken for the first time. It is plain that in exercising
these and similar other powers, this Court would not be bound by
the relevant provisions of procedure if it is satisfied that a depar-
B ture from the said procedure is necessary to do complete justice
between the parties.

That takes us to the second argument urged by the Solicitor-
General that Art.142 and Art.32 should be reconciled by the
c adoption of the rule of harmonious construction. In this connection,
we ought to bear in mind that though the powers conferred on this
Court by Art. 142(1) are very wide, and the same can be exercised
for doing complete justice in any case, as we have already observed,
this Court cannot even under Art.142(1) make an order plainly
inconsistent with the express statutory provisions of substantive law,
D much less, invonsistent with any Constitutional provisions. There
can, therefore, be no conflict between Art. 142( 1) and Art, 32. In the
case of KM. Nanavati v. The State of Bombay, [1961] 1 S.C.R. 497
on which the Solicitor-General relies, it was conceded, and rightly,
that under Art.142(1) this Court had the power to grant bail in
E cases brought before it, and so, there was obviously a conflict
between the power vested in this court under ~he said Article and
that vested in ~he Governor of the State under Art.161. The
possibility of ·a conflict between these powers necessitated the
application of the rule of harmonious construction. The said rule
can have no application to the present case, because on a fair
F
construction of Art.142(1), this Court has no power to circumscribe '
the fundamental right guaranteed under Art.32. The existence of
the said power is itself in dispute, and so, the present case is clearly
distinguishable from the case of KM. Nanavati."

G 15. Apart form the fact that these observations are made with refer-
ence to the powers of this Court under Article 142 which are in the nature
r
of supplementary powers and not with reference to this Court's pqwer -~
under Article 129, the said observations have been explained by thi{court
in its latter decisions in Delhi Judicial Services Association v. State of
H Gujarat [supra] and Union CadJide Corporation v. Union of India, (1991)_
INRE:V.C.MISHRA (SAWANT,J.] 685

sec 584. In paragraph 51 of the former decision, it has been, with respect, A
rightly pointed out that the said observations were made with regard to the
extent of this Cour,t's power under Article 142 (11 in the context of
fundamental rights. Those observations have no bearing on the present
issue. No doubt, it was further obstrved there that those observations have
no bearing on the question in issue in that case as there was no provision
in any substantive law restricting this Court's power to quash proceedings
B
pending before subordinate courts. But it was also added there that this
Court's power under Article 142 [11 to do complete justice was entirely of
different level and of a different quality. Any prohibition or restriction ·
contained in ordinary laws cannot act as a limitation on the constitutional
power of this Court. Once this Court is in seisin of a matter before it, it C
has power to issue any order or direction to do complete justice in the
r matter. A reference was made in that connection to the concurring opinion
of Justice A.N. Sen in Harbans Singh v. State·of U.P., [1982) 2 SCC 101,
where the learned Judge observed as follows :

"Very wide powers have been conferred on this Court for due and D
proper administration of justice. Apart from· the jurisdiction and
powers conferred on this Court under Articles 32 and 136 of the
Constitution I am of the opinion that this Court retains and must
retain, an inherent power and jurisdiction for dealing with any
extra-ordinary situation in the larger interests of administration of E
justice and for preventing manifest injustice being done. This
power must necessarily be sparingly used only in exceptional cir-
cumstances for furthering the ends of justice."

The Court has then gone on to observe there that no enactment made by
Central or State legislature can limit or restrict the power of this Court F
under Article 142 of the Constitution, though the Court under Article 142
of the Constitution, though the Court must take into consideration the
statutory provisions regulating the matter in dispute. What would be the
need of complete justice in a cause or matter, would depend upon the facts
and circumstance$ of each case. G
In the latter case, i.e., the Union Carbide's case [supra], the Constitu-
tion Bench in paragraph 83 stated as follows:

"It is necessary to set at rest certain misconceptions in the argi·
oients touching the scope of the powers of this Court r·
IN RE: V.C. MISHRA [SAWANT, J.]

matter, the apex Court will take note of the express prohibitions A
in any substantive statutory provision based on some fundamental
principles of public policy and regulate the exercise of its power
and discretion accordingly. The proposition does not relate to the
powers of the Court under Article 142, but only to what is or is
not 'complete justice' of a cause or matter and in the ultimate B
analysis of the propriety of the exercise of the power. No question
of lack of jurisdiction or of nullity can arise."
.,.-
. i
In view of these observations of the latter Constitution Bench on the
r point, the observations made by the majority in Prem Chand Garg's case
[supra) are no longer a good law. This is also pointed out by this Court in C
the case of Mohammed Anis v. Union of India & Ors., [1994] Suppl.1 SCC
145 by referring to the decision of Delhi Judicial Services v. State of Gujarat
(supra) and Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India (supra) by
observing that statutory provisions cannot override the constitutional
provisions and Article 142 [1) being a constitutional power it cannot be D
limited or conditioned by any statutory provision. The Court has then
observed that it is, therefore, clear that the power of the Apex Court under
Article 142 [1) of the Constitution cannot be diluted by statutory provisions
and the said position in law is now well settled by the Constitution_ Bench
decision in Union Carbide's case [supra].
E
16. The consequence of accepting the said contention advanced on
behalf of the contemner and the other parties, will be two-fold. This Court
while exercising its power under Article 142(1) would not even be entitled
to reprimand the Advocate for his professional misconduct which includes
exhibition of disrespect to the Court as per Rule 2 of Section 1 of Chapter p
II of Part VI of the Bar Council of India Rules made under the Advocates
Act, which is also a contempt of court, since the reprimand of the advocate
is a punishment which the disciplinary committees of the State Bar Council
and of the Bar Council of India are authorised to administer under Section
35 of the Advocates Act. Secondly, it would also mean that for any act of
contempt of court, if it also happens to be an act of professional miscon- G
duct under the Bar Council of India Rules, the courts including this Court,
will have no power to take action since the Advocates Act confers exclusive
power for taking action for such conduct on the disciplinary committees of
the State Bar Council and the Bar Council of India, as the case may be.
Such a proposition of law on the face of it deserves rejection for the simple H
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 2 S.C.R.

A reason that the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar Council and the
Bar Council of India to take action for professional misconduct is different
from the jurisdiction of the courts to take action against the advocates for
the contempt of court. The said jurisdiction co-exist independently of each
other. The action taken under one jurisdiction does not bar an action under
B the other jurisdiction.

17. The contention is also misplaced for yet another and equally, if
not more, important reason. In the matter of disciplinary jurisdiction under
the Advocates Act, this Court is constituted as the final Appellate authority
under Section 38 of the Act as pointed out earlier. In that capacity this
C Court can iinpose any of the punishments mentioned in Section 35 {3) of ·
the Act including that of removal of the name of the Advocate from the
State roll and of suspending him from practice. If that be so, there is no
reason why this Court while exercising its contempt jurisdiction under
Article 129 read with Article 142 cannot impose any of the said punish-
ments. The punishment so imposed will not only be not against the
D provisions of any statute, but in conformity with the substantive provisions
of the Advocates Act and for conduct which is both a professional miscon-
duct as well as the contempt of court. The argument has, therefore, to be
rejected.

E 18. What is further, the jurisdiction and powers of this Court under
Article 142 which are supplementary in nature and are provided to do
- complete justice in any matter, are independent of the jurisdiction and
powers of this Court under Article 129 which cannot be trammeled in any
way by any statutory provision including the provisions of the Advocates
F Act or the Contempt of Courts Act. As pointed out earlier, the Advocates
Act has nothing to do with. the contempt jurisdiction of the court including
of this Court and the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 being a statute cannot
denude, restrict or limit the powers of this Court to take action for
contempt under Article 129. It is not disputed that suspension of the
advo.::ate from practice and his removal from the State roll of advocates
G are both punishments. There is no restriction or limitation on the nature
of punishment that this Court may award while exercising its contempt '
jurisdiction and the said punishments can be the punishments the Court ~-
may impose while exercising the said jurisdiction.

H Shri P.P. Rao, learned counsel appearing for the High Court Bar
INRE:V.C.MISHRA [SAWANT,J.) 689
..., -'(
Association of Allahabad contended that Article 19 [1) (a) and 19 (2), and A
19(1) (g) and 19[6) have to be read together and thus read the power to
suspend a member of the legal profession from practice or to remove him
from the roll of the State Bar Council is not available to this Court under
Article 129. We have been unable to appreciate this contention. Article
19(1) (a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression which is subject to
the provisions of Article 19(2) and, therefore, to the law in relation to the
B
contempt of court as well, Article 19 (1) (g) guar!llltees the right to practise
~ any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business and is
T subject to the provisions of Article 19 [6) which empowers the State to
make a law imposing reasonable restrictions, in the interests of general
y
public, on the exercise of the said right and, in particular, is subject to a c
law prescribing technical or professional qualifications necessary for prac-
tising the profession or carrying on the occupation, trade or business. On
our part we are unable to see how these provisions of Article 19 can be
pressed into service to limit the power of this Court to take cognisance of
and punish for the contempt of court under Article 129. The contention
D
that the power of this Court under ~ticle 129 is subject to the provisions
of Articles 19 (1) (a)and 19 [l)(g), is unexceptional. However, it is not
pointed out to us as to how the action taken under Article 129 would be
violative of the said provisions, since the said provisions are subject to the
law of contempt and the law laying down technical and professional
qualifications necessary for practising any profession, which includes the E
legal profession. The freedom of speech and expression cannot be used of
committing contempt of court nor can the legal profession be practised by
committbg the contempt of court. The right to continue to practise, is
subject t.::. the law of contempt. The law does not mean merely the statute

~·
law but also the constitutional provisions. The right, therefore, is subject
F
to the restrictions placed by the law of contempt as contained in the statute
- in the present case, the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 as well as to the
jurisdiction of this Court and of the High Court to take action under
_;7
Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution respectively. We! therefore, do not
see any conflict between the provisions of Articles 129 and 215, and Article
19 (1) (a) and Article 19(1)(g) read with Articles 19(2) and 19(6) respec- G
,JI tively.

19. When the Constitution vests this Court with a special and specific
power to take action for contempt not only of itself but of the lower courts
and tribunals, for discharging its constitutional obligations as the highest H
r

690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 2 S.C.R.

A custodian of justice in the land, that power is obviously coupled with a duty ,.
to'protect all the limbs of the administration of justice from those whose >-
actions create interference with or obstruction to the course of justice.
Failure to exercise the power on such occasions, when it is invested
specifically for the purpose, is ~ failure to ·discharge the duty. In this
connection, we may refer to the following extract from the decision of this
B Court in Chief Controlling Revenue Authority and Superintendent of Stamps
v. Maharashtra Sugar Mills Ltd., [1950) SCR 536.

"..... But when a capacity or power is given to a public authority
there may be circumstances which couple with the power a duty
c to exercise it. To use the language of Lord Cairns in the case of
Julius v.. Bishop of Oxford: 'There may be something in the nature
of the thing empowered to be done, something in the object for
which it is to be done, something in the conditions under which it
is to be done, something in the title of the person or persons for
whose benefit the power is to be exercised, which may couple the
D power with a duty, and make it the duty of the person in whom
the power is reposed to exercise that power when called upon to
do so'."

20. For the reason discussed above, we find the contemner, Shri
E Vinay Chandra Mishra, guilty of the offence of the criminal contempt of
the Court for having interfered with and obstructed the course of justice
by trying to threaten, overawe and overbear the court by using insulting,
disrespectful and threatening language, and convict him of the said offence.
Since the contemner is a senior member of the Bar and also adorns the
F high offices such as those of the Chairman of the Bar Council of India, the
President of the U.P. High Court Bar Association, Allahabad and others,
his conduct is bound to infect the members of the Bar all over the country.
We are, therefore, of the view that an exemplary punishment has to be
meted out to him.

G 21. The facts and circumstances of the present cas~ justify our
invoking the power under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Con-
stitution to award to the contemner a suspended sentence of imprisonment
together with suspension of his practice as an advocate in the manner
directed herein. We accordingly sentence the contemner for his conviction
H · for the offence of criminal contempt as under :
IN RE: V.C. MISHRA [SAWANT, J. J 691

(11.1) The contemner is sentenced to undergo simple imprionment A
for a period of six weeks. However, in the circumstance!> of the
case, the sentence will remain suspended for a period of four years
and may be activated in case the contemner is convicted for any
other offence of contempt of court within the said period,

(11.2) The contemner shall stand suspended from practising as an B
advocate for a period of three years from today with the conse-
quence that all elective and nominated offices/posts at presents
held by him in his capacity as an advocate, shall stand vacated by
him forthwith.

The contempt petition is disposed of in the above terms. c
B.K.M. Petition disposed of.