Holding

Rule 9, which bars persons aged 45 years or more from enrolment as advocates, is ultra vires the Advocates Act, 1961 and violative of Article 14, and is therefore invalid.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined writ petitions challenging Bar Council of India's Rule 9, which barred persons aged 45 years or more from enrolment as advocates. The petitioners argued that the rule violated Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution and was inconsistent with Section 24 of the Advocates Act, 1961, which prescribes only a minimum age of 21 years. The Court held that the Act contains no provision for a maximum age and that Section 49(1)(ah) permits conditions only for post‑enrolment practice, not for pre‑enrolment admission. Moreover, Section 49(1)(ag) allows specification of the class of persons entitled to enrol, not a blanket disqualification based on age. Consequently, Rule 9 was deemed ultra vires the Act and discriminatory, violating the principle of equality under Article 14. The petitions were allowed and the rule was struck down.

Issues considered

Whether Bar Council of India has the statutory authority under the Advocates Act, 1961 to impose an upper age limit of 45 years for enrolment as an advocate.
Whether Rule 9 violates Article 14 of the Constitution by being arbitrary and discriminatory.
Whether the rule infringes Articles 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution.
Whether Section 49(1)(ah) and (ag) of the Advocates Act empower the Bar Council to prescribe pre‑enrolment conditions such as an age ceiling.

Legislation cited

Advocates Act, 1961s. 24, s. 24A, s. 49(1)(ag), s. 49(1)(ah)

Subjects

Advocates ActBar Council of IndiaRule 9age limitenrolmentArticle 14discriminationultra viresconstitutional validitylegal profession

Judgment

A INDIAN COUNCIL OF LEQAL AID AND ADVICE, ETC. ETC.
v.
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA AND ANR.

JANUARY 17, 1995

B (AM. AHMADI, CJ, S. MOHAN AND K.S. PARIPOORNAN, JJ.)

Advocate Act, 1961-Sections 24 & 49(1)-Bar Council of India
Rules-Rule 9-Validity of-Enrolment as an advocate-Entry ofpersons who
complete age of 45 years barred-Whether Rule 9 is valid-Held, Ncr-Rule
C strnck down as ultra vires the Act-Rule is discriminatory.
Constitution of India-Art. 14--Bar Council of India Rules-Rule
9-Validity of-Entry of persons who completed the age of 45 years as
advocates barred-Whether Rule 9 is reasonable-Held, Ncr-Rule violates
principle of equality.
D
Writ petitions were filed challenging the legality and validity of Rule
9 added by the Bar Council of India by resolution No. 64/93 dated 22nd
August, 1993 in Chapter 111 of Part VI of the Bar Council of India Rules.
The newly added rule barred the entry of persons who had completed the
E age of 45 years on the date of application for enrolment as an advocate
from being enrolled as such by the concerned State Bar Council.
Petitioners challenged the rule as inconsistent with Articles 14, 19(1)(g)
and 21 of the Constitution and section 24 of the Advocates Act:, 1961.

Th~ Bar Council of India contended that it had acted bonafide within
F' the framework of the Act and the Constitution. According to it the right
to practise as an advocate not being a fundamental right but only a
privilege conferred by the Act could always be withdrawn and in any case
reasonable restrictions could be imposed. It was alleged that the restric·
tion imposed by the newly added rule was to serve a public purpose and
could never be termed as unreasonable, violative of Article 14 of the
G Constitution. Since the upper age limit had been fixed to save the legal
profession from decay and deterior.ation it could not be said to be incon·
sistent with Articles 21 and 14 of the Constitution. According to the
respondent Bar Council of India a person who had already spent the best
years of his life in pursuing some other profession or occupation could not
H be said to have the correct aptitude of a service oriented professional and
304
COUNCIL OF LEGAL AID AND ADVICE v. BAR COUNCIL 305

could not be expected to maintain the high stan~ard of professional A
conduct. It was submitted that persons who retire from various govern· .
ment, semi· government and other institutions when admitted to the legal
profession use their earlier contacts to convass for cases and such be·
haviour leaves a lingering effect on the profession. Such persons being not
inspired by lofty ideals of the profession, their only motive being· money-
making for which they are prepared to stoop to any level.
B

Allowing the petitions, this Court

HELD : 1.1. Section 24 of the Advocates Act, prescribes the minimum
age for enrolment as twenty one years complete. There is no provision in C
the Act which can be said to prescribe the maximum age for entry into the
profession. There is no provision empowering the Bar Council of India to
Craine such a rule. [314-H, 316-B]

1.2. By rule 9 of the Bar Council of India Rules, the entry of those
who have completed 45 years at the date of application for enrolment is D
sought to be barred. The rule operates at the pre-enrolment stage and
cannot, therefore, receive the shelter of clause (ah) of section 49(1) of the
Act. Under the said clause conditions applicable to an advocate touching
his right to practise can be laid down. But it does not permit laying down
of conditions for entry into the profession. Therefore, clause (ah) of E
Section 49(1) of the Act does not empower the Bar Council of India to
frame a rule barring persons who have completed 45 years of age from
enrolment as an advocate. The impugned rule is, therefore, ultra vires the
said provision. [315-F-G]

.. 1.3. It is within the exclusive domain of the State Bar Council to F
admit persons as advocates on their rolls or to remove their names from
the rolls. There is no provision dealing with admission and enrolment of
advocates which restricts the entry of those who ha.ve completed 45 years
as advocates. Nor has any State Bar Council made aoy such rule. [317-G]

1.4. There is no basis to accept the interpretation that all those above G
the age group of 45 years constitute a class within the scope of clause (ag)
j1
of Section 49(1) of the Act to permit the Bar Council of India to debar
their entry into the profession for all times. In the guise of making a rule
the Bar Council of India is virtually introducing an additional clause in
Section 24 of the Act prescribing an upper age ceiling of completed age of H
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 1 S.C.R.

A 45 years or ~s inserting an additional clause in Section 24A of the Act
prescribing a disqualification. Therefore, the impugned rule is beyond the
rule making power of the Bar Council of India and is, therefore, ultra vires
the Act. [318-E-H]

B 1.5. The rationale for the rule stated to be is to maintain the dignity
and purity of the profession by keeping out those who retire from various
government, quasi government and other institutions since they on being
enrolled as advocates use their past contacts to canvass for cases and
thereby bring the profession into disrepute and also pollute the minds of
C young fresh entrants to the profession. Thus. the object of the rule is clearly
to shut the doors of the profession for those who seek entry into the ~
I
profession after completing the age of 45 years. In the first place, there is
no reliable statistical or other material placed on record in support of the
inference that ex-government or quasi-government servants or the like
indulge in undesirable activity of the type mentioned after entering the
D profession. Secondly, the rule does not debar only such persons from entry
into the profession but those who have completed 45 years of age on the
dale of seeking enrolment. Thirdly those who were enrolled as advocates
while they were young and had later taken up some job in any government
or quasi-government or similar institution and had kept the sanad in
E abeyance are not debarred from reviving their sanads even after they have
completed 45 years of age. There may· be a large number of persons who
initially entered the profession but later took up jobs or entered any other
gainful occupation who revert to practise at a later date eve· after they
have crossed the age of 45 years and under the impugned ru:.: t.iey are not
debarred from practising. Therefore, in the first place there is no depend·
F able material in support of the rationale on which the rule is foundtc! and
..
secondly the rule is discriminatory as it debars one group of persons who
have crossed the age of 45 years from enrolment while allowing another .
group to revive and continue practice even after crossing the age of 45
years. The rule, therefore, is clearly discriminatory. Thirdly, it is un-
G reasonable and arbitrary as the choice of the age of 45 years is made
keeping only a certain group in mind ignoring the vast majority of other
persons who were in the service of government or. quasi-government or
similar institution at any point of time. Thus, the impugned rule violates
the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.

H (319-B-G]

'·
COUNCIL OF LEGAL AID AND ADVICE v. BAR COUNCIL (AHMADI, CJ.) 307

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (C) No. 786 A
of 1993 etc. etc.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)

V.R. Reddy, Additional Solicitor General, Rajinder Sachar, Soli J.
Sorabjee, G.V. Iyer, AK. Ganguli, R.P. Bhatt, V.N. Ganpule, Sanjay B
Parikh, B:P. Singh, R.K. Karanjawala, Manik Karanjawala, Darshana
Bhogilal, Nandini Gore, Ruby Ahuja, D.A. Dave, N. Seervai, C.N. Sree
Kumar, C. Ravichandran Iyer, Rani Chhabra, Ms. Kiran Suri, P. Parmes-
waran, R.P. Srivastava, H.A. Raichura, U.A. Rana, Rajiv Tyagi, Anand
Prasad, Mohinder Rupal, for Gagrat & Co., R. Mohan, R. Nedumaran, C
V.G. Pragasam, R.B. Misra, V.B. Joshi and B.P. Singh for the appearing
parties.

The J udgemnt of the Court was delivered by

.. AHMADI, CJ. The Bar Council of India by Resolution No. 64/93 D
dated 22nd August, 1993 added Rule 9 in Chapter III of Part VI of the
Bar Council of India Rules which resolution was gazetted on 25th Septem-
ber, 1993. The said newly added rule reads as under :

"A person who has completed the age of 45 years on the date on E
which he submits his application for his enrolment as an advocate
to the State Bar Council shall not be enrolled as an advocate."

All the State Bar Councils in the country were duly informed about the
• insertion of the said rule. The legality and validity of the said rule is
questioned in this batch of petitions as inconsistent with Articles· 14, F
19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution and Section 24 of the Advocates Act,
1961, hereinafter called 'the Act'.

The Act came into force with effect from 19th May, 1961. The
dictionary of the Act is to be found in Section 2, clause (a) whereof defines
an Advocate as a person entered in any roll under the provisions of the G
Act as such and the term 'roll' according to clause (k) means a roll of
advocates prepared and maintained under the Act. Section 3 provides that
there shall be a Bar Council for each of the States to be known as the Bar
Council of that State. Section 4 next provides for a Bar Council for the
territories to which the Act extends tp be known as the Bar Council of H
I=

>·
f
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 1 S.C.R.

A India. The functions of the State bar Council and the Bar Council of India l
'Y
have been set out in Sections 6 & 7, respectively. The functions of the State !"'
Bar Council include admission of persons as advocates on its roll, prepara- !-
tion and mainten~e of such roll, safeguarding the rights, pr,ivileges and
interests of advocates on its roll and to do all things necessary for discharg-
I
B ing the above functions. The functions of the Bar Council of India include I
I
the laying down of standards of professional conduct and etiquette for \...
I
advocates and for safeguarding their rights, privileges and interests. Chap- ,..
ter III which deals with 'Admission and Enrollment of Advocates' com-
i-,
prises of Sections 16 to 28. Section 16 provides that there shall be two
'"
classes of advocates, senior advocates and other advocates; Section 17 sets
C out how every State Bar Councils shall p~epare and maintain a roll of
advocates; Section 18 deJls with the transfer of name of an advocate from
one State roll to another; Section 19 enjoins upon every State Bar Council
to send a copy of the roll of advocates to the Bar Council of India; Section
20 makes special provision for enrolment of every advocate who was
D entitled to practice in the Supreme Court immediately before the appoint-
ment day in the roll of a State Bar Council; Section 21 relates to the fixation
of seniority; Section 22 provides for issuance of certificate of enrolment
and Section 23 confers the right of pre-audience on the Attorney General
of India, the Solicitor General of India, the Additional Solicitor General
of India, etc. Section 24 to the extent it is relevant for our purpose provides
E ·as under:
r-'
"24. Persons who may be admitted as advocates on a State roll -
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, and the rules made
thereunder, a person shall be qualified to be admitted as an .
<

advocate on a State roll, if he fulfills the following conditions,
F
namely:-

(a) he is a citizen of India;

(b) he has completed the age of twenty-one years; and
G
(c) he has obtained a degree in law.

Section 24A provides that no person shall be admitted as an advocate on
a State roll, for the period indicated in the proviso, if he is convicted of
H an offence involving moral turpitude, or if he is convicted of an offence
COUNCILOFLEGALAIDANDADVICEv. BARCOUNCIL[AHMADL O.j 309

under the provisio~s of Ontouchability (Offences) Act, 1955 or if he is A
dismissed or removed from employment or office under the State on any
charge involving moral turpitude; Section 25 indicates the authority to
whom applications for enrolment may be made; Section 26 provides for the
disposal of such applications; Section 26A confers powers on the State Bar
Council to remove any name from its roll; Section 27 provides that where
a State Bar. Council has refused the application of any person for admission
B
as an advocate, no other State Bar Council shall entertain his/her applica-
tion for admission on its roll except with the previous consent of the former
and of the Bar Council of India and Section 28 confers power on a State
Bar Council to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Chapter which
may in particular, inter alia, provide for the conditions subject to which a c
person may be admitted as an advocate on its roll. Chapter IV deals with
the 'Right to Practise'. Section 29 says that subject to the provisions of the
Act and any rule made thereunder there shall, as from the appointed day,
be only one class of persons entitled to practise the profession of law,
namely, advocates. According to Section 30 every advocate whose name is D
.... entered in the State roll shall be entitled as of right to practise throughout
the territories to which the Act extends in all courts including the Supreme
Court of India, before any Tribunal or person legally authorised to take
evidence and before any authority or person before whom such advocate
is, by or under any law for the time being in force, entitled to practise.
Section 33 further provides that no person shall, on or after the appointed E
day, be entitled to practise in any court or before any authority or person
unless he is enrolled as an advocate under the Act. Chapter V deals with
'Conduct of Advocates'. Under Section 35 where on receipt of a complaint
or otherwise a State Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate
on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct it shall refer
F
the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee. Section 37 provides for
an appeal to the bar Council of India against an order made by the
disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council. Section 36 provides that
where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise, the Bar Council of India has
reason to believe that any advocate whose name is not entered on any State
roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct, it shall refer the G
case to the disciplinary committee. Any person aggrieved by an order made
by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India under Section 36
or 37 may prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court of India under Section
38 of the Act. The powers of the disciplinary committee have been
H
/
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995U,-S.C.R. l

A enumerated in Section 42. Chapter VI deals with 'Miscellaneous' matters.
We are concerned with Section 49 which empowers the Bar Council of
India to make rules for discharging its functions under the Act. Clauses
(ag) and (ah) of sub-section (1) of Section 49 il!ler alia, empower the Bar
Council of India to make rules (i) prescribing the class or category of
B persons entitled to be enrolled as advocates and (ii) laying down the
conditions subject to which an advocate shall have the right to practise and
the circumstances under which a person shall be deemed to practise as an
advocate in a court. These, in brief, are the relevant provisions of the Act
which have a bearing on the question of legality and validity of the newly
added rule 9 in Chapter III of Part VI of the Rules.
c
It will be seen from the above provision!> that unless a person is
enrolled as an advocate by a State Bar Council, he shall have no right to
practise in a court of law or before any other Tribunal or authority. Once
a person fulfills the requirements of Section 24 for enrolment, he becomes
D entitled to be enrolled as an advocate and on such enrolment he acquires
a right to practise as stated above. Having thus acquired a right to practise
he incurs certain obligations in regard to his conduct as a member of the
noble profession. The Bar Councils are enjoined with the duty to act as
sentinels of professional conduct and must ensure that the dignity and
purity of the profession are in no way undermined. Its job is to uphold the
E standards of professional conduct and etiquette. Thus .every State Bar
Council and the Bar Council of India has a public duty to perform, namely,
to ensure that the monopoly of practice granted under the Act is not
misused or abused by a person who is enrolled as an advocate. The Bar
Councils have been created at the State level as well as the Central level
F not only to protect the rights, interests and privileges of its members but
also to protect the litigating public by ensuring that high and noble tradi-_
tions are maintained so that the purity and dignity of the. profession are
not jeopardized. It is generally believed that members of the legal profes-
sion have certain social obligatiqns, e.g., to render 'pro bono publico'
service to the poor and the under-privileged. Since the duty of a lawyer is
G to assist the court in the administration of justice, the practice of law has
a public utility flavour and, therefore, he must strictly and scrupulously ·
abide by the Code of Conduct behaving the noble profession and must not
indulge in any activity which may tend to lower the image of the profession
in society. That is why the functions of the Bar Council include the laying
H down of standards of professional conduct and etiquette which advocates
-{

COUNCIL OF LEGAL AID AND ADVICE v. BAR COUNCIL (AHMADI, CJ.) 311

must follow to maintain the dignity and purity of the profession._ A

In the above background it was contended on behalf of the-Bar
Council of India that the need to uphold standards of professional conduct
and etiquette cannot be over~emphasised. The Act, besides highlighting the
essential functions of the Bar Council of India in this behalf, provides for B
the enforcement of the same and sets up disciplihary authorities to chastise
and, if necessary, punish members of the profession for misconduct. The
punishment may include suspension from practice as well as removal of
the name from the roll of advocates. Section 49(1) confers power on the
Bar Council of India to make rules, illter alia, for discharging its functions
under the Act. Section 49(1)(ag) when read with Section 24 of the Act c
confers wide powers on the Bar Council of India to indicate the class or
catt<gorx of persons who may be enrolled as advocates which power would
include the power to refuse enrolment in certain circumstances. The
obligation to maintain the dignity and purity of the profession and to punish
erring members carries with it the power to regulate entry into the profes- D
..; sion with a view to ensuring that only profession-oriented and service-
oriented people join the Bar and those not so oriented are kept out.
Counsel submitted that a person who has already spent the best years of
his life in pursuing some other profession or occupation cannot be said to
have the correct attitude of a service-oriented professional and cannot be
expected to maintain the high standards of professional conduct. Accord- E
ing to the respondent-Bar Council of India persons who retire from various
government, quasi-government and other institutions when admitted to the
legal profession use their earlie~ contacts to convass for cases; a conduct
which brings ·down the standard of professional ethics expected to be
* maintained by a member of the profession and that has a very adverse F
influence on the minds of young fresh entrants to the profession. It is no
answer to state that disciplinary action can be taken against those who
deviate from the standard of conduct expected of a member of the Bar
because all cases of infraction of the Code of Conduct do not come to the
notice of the Bar Council and behaviour· leaves a lingering effect on the
•
profession. It is in order to uphold the high standards of professional G
morality and integrity that the Bar Council of India was compelled to enact
. J'
' a rule restricting the entry into the legal profession by prescribing the age
limit of 45 years. The Bar Council of India contends that it has acted bona
fide within the framework of the Act and the Constitution. According to it
the right to practise as an advocate not being a fundamental right but only H
·r
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 1 S.C.R.

A a privilege conferred by .the Act can always be withdrawn and in any case
reasonable restrictions can be imposed even if it were a fundamental right
under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The restriction imposed by the
newly added rule is to serve a public purpose and can never b~ termed as
unreasonable, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Since the upper
age limit has been fixed to save the legal profession from decay and
' B
deterioration it is, contends the Bar Council, difficult to comprehend how
it can be said to be inconsistent with Article .21 and for that matter Article
14 of the Constitution. The prescription of the higher ·age limit does not y
violate Section 24 of the Act and since Section 49 permits classification and
categorization which even Article 14 per~its, the newly added rule is
-cclearly intravires the Act and the Constitution. That, in brief, is the defence
set up by the Bar Council of India in support of the rule impugned before
us.
,,, I
It is cleW'"ffrom the above averments found in the counter filed on
behalf of the711~'touncil of India that the rationale is that the profession
D
of law being: a pi6'us and honourable profession, its main object being
service of mah~ind by serving the system of administration of justice, it is *
the pious duty of thetBar Council to protect its public image by restricting
the inflow of a large number of retired personnel who seek to enter a legal
profession solelY. for additional gains. Such persons are not inspired by
E loftly ideals of the profession but their only motive is money-making for
which they are prepared to stoop to any levels which has a very negdiive
influence on young minds who join the profession after graduation. Can
the restriction imposed on t-his rationale be sustained? That is the short
question.
.,....
F ""
We have briefly noticed the relevant provisions of the Act in the
earlier part of this judgment. We may now briefly indicate the scheme.
Before we do so it may not be out of place to mention that the profession
of law is one of the oldest professions and was practised in one form or
G the other in the lioary past. After the advent of the British in India, certain
rules in regard to the practise of law were introduced. Before inde-
pendence there were Mukhtars and Vakils who were permitted to practise
law in moffusil courts even though not all of them· were Law graduates.
However, slowly and gradually they were allowed to wither away and their
H place was taken 'by Pleaders who were, after securing a degree in law,
COUNCILOFLEGALAIDANDADVICEv. BARCOUNCIL[AHMADI, CJ.) 313

permitted to practise at the district level. Thos~ who were enrolled as A
advocates could practice in any court ·subordinate to the High Court
including the High Court. The difference between a Pleader and an advo-
cate was merely on account of the fee charged for enrolment. After
independence, came the Act which was enacted 'to amend and consolidate
· the law relating to legal practitioners and to provide for the constitution of B
Bar Councils and an all-India Bar'. The Act creates an all-India Bar with
only one class of legal practitioners, namely, advocates, who of course are
classified as senior advocates and other advocates (Section 16). The
general superintendence of ethics and etiquette of the· profession is the
responsibility of the Bar Councils created under the Act and they have C
been charged with the duty to punish their members for misconduct. The
I .
Act envisages the existence of a Bar Council for every State. The funcion
of admission of persons as advocates is entrusted to every State Bar
Council which is required to prepare and maintain a roll for that purpose.
While disciplinary jurisdiction is conferred on the State Bar Councils to D
punish its members for misconduct, it is at the same time charged with the
duty to safeguard their rights, privileges and interest. They must perform
all the functions conferred- on them by or under the Act and do everything
that is necessary to discharge the functions set out in Section 6. So far as
the Bar Council of India is concerned, its functions are of a more general E
nature, e.g., to lay down standards of professional conduct and etiquette
for advocates, to safeguard their rights; privilege~ and interests, to super-
vise and control the working of the State Bar Council, to promote legal
education, to recognise universities, to organise -~egal aid to the poor and
to perform all other functions conferred by or under the Act and do
F
everything that may necessary to discharge the functions enumerated in
Section 7. Besides the above it too is required to exercise discipline and
control over the members of the profession. Thus the functions are divided
between the State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of India, although for
obvious reasons overlaps are unavoidable. The rule making power has been G
conferred on the State Bar Councils under Sections 15 and 28 and on the
Bar Council of India under Section 49 of the Act.

The power conferred by Section 15 is to make rules providing for the
elections of the members of the Bar Council, its Chairman and Vice-Chair-
man and matters incidental thereto. These rules shall not have effect unless H·
'r·
\
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 1 S.C.R.

A approved_ by the Bar Council of India. We are not concerned with the rule
making power under this provision. Section 28 empowers the State Bar
Council to make rules which may, inter alia, provide for the form in which
an advocate must express his intention for entry of his name in the roll of
a State Bar Council, the form in which an application must be made for
B admission as an advocate on its roll and the conditions subject to which a
person may be admitted as an advocate on any such roll. These rules also
must be approved by the Bar Council of India before they come into force.
We have already indicated earlier the matters in regard to which the Bar
Council of India may fl!.ake rules for discharging its functions under the
Act. Besides the State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of India Section
C 34 confers power on the High Courts to make rules laying down the
conditions subj~ct to which an advocate may be permitted to practise in
the High Court and courts subordinate thereto. Power is also conferred on
the Central Government by Section 49-A to make rules by notification in
the Official Gazette for carrying out the purposes of the Act including rules
D with respect to any matter for which the Bar Council of India or a State
Bar Council has power to make rules. Thus the rule making power of the
Central Government is wide enough to embrace matters for which the Bar
Council of India or a State Bar Council has power to make rules. These
rules may, inter alia, lay down the qualifications and disqualifications for
membership of a Bar Council, the manner in which the Bar Council of
E India must exercise supervision and control over State Bar Councils, the
class or category of persons entitled to be enrolled as advocates under the
·Act, the category of persons who may be exempted for undergoing a course
of training and passing an examination prescribed under Section 24(1)(d),
the manner in which seniority among advocates may be determined, the
F procedure to be followed by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council
for hearing cases and any other matter which may be prescribed. These, in
brief, are the rule making powers conferred on various agencies under the
Act.

The newly added rule seeks to bar the entry of persons who have
G .completed the age of 45 years on the date of application for enrolment as
an advocate from being enrolled as such by the concerned State Bar
Council. While Section 24 of the Act prescribes the minimum age for
enrolment as twenty-one years complete, there is no provision in the Act
which can be said to prescribe the maximum age for entry into the
H profession. Since the Act is silent on this point the Bar Council of India
COUNCIL OF LEGAL AID AND ADVICE v. BAR COUNCIL (AHMADI, CJ.) 315

was required to resort to its rule ~aking power. The rules made by the Bar A
Council of India under Section 49(1) of the Act are in seven parts, each ·
'IF part having its own chapters. Part VI is entitled 'Rules Governing
Advocates' and the said part has· three chapters. Chapter I sets out the
restrictions on senior advocates and is relatable to Section 16(3) and
49(1)(g) of the Act, Chapter II lays down the standards of professional B
conduct and etiquette and is relatable to Section 49(1)(c) .read with the
proviso thereto and chapter III deals with 'Conditions for right to practice~
and is stated to be made in exercise of power under clause (ah) of
sub-section (1) of Section 49 of the Act. That clause reads as under :

"(ah) - the conditions subject to which an advocate shall have the C
right to practise and the circumstances under which a person shall
be deemed to practise as an advocate in a court;"

On the plain language of the said clause it seems clear to us that under the
said provision the Bar Council of India can lay down the 'conditions' D
subject to which 'an advocate' shall have the right to practise. These
conditions which the Bar Council of India can lay down are applicable to
an advocate, i.e., a person who has already been enrolled as an advocate
by the concerned State Bar Council. The conditions which can be
prescribed must apply at the post-enrolment stage since they are expected E
to relate to the right to practise. They_ can, therefore, not operate at the
pre-enrolment stage. By the impugned rule, the entry of those who have
completed 45 years at the date of application for enrolment is sought to be
barred. The rule clearly operates at the pre-enrolment stage and cannot,
therefore, receive the shelter of clause (ah) of Section 49(1) of the Act.

- Under the said clause conditions applicable to an advocate touching his F
right to practise can be laid down, and if laid down he must exercise his
right subject to those conditions. But the language of the said clause does
not permit laying down of conditions for entry into the profession. We have,
therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion th'at clause (ah) of
Section 49(1) of the Act does not empower the Bar Council of India to G
frame a rule barring persons who have completed 45 years of age from
enrolment as an advocate. The impugned rule is, therefore, ultra vires the
said provision.

Can the rule be saved under any other provision of the Act? As H
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] 1 S.C.R.

A stated earlier the Act in Section 24(1)(b) provides th~t the person .who
seeks enrolment as an advocate must have completed the age of twenty-one
years. Nowhere does the Act provide the maximum age beyond which a
person shall not be entitled to enrolment as an advocate nor does the Act
make any specific provision empowering the Bar Council of India to frame
B such a rule. Reliance was, however placed on clause (ag) of Section 49(1)
which reads as under :

"(ag) the class or category of persons entitled to be enrolled as
advocates."

C Can persons who have completed 45 years of age be said to constitute a
class or category to entitle the Bar Council of India to debar them from
being enrolled as advocates? Rule 49(1) empowers the Bar Council of
India to make rules for discharging its functions under the Act and in
particular those enumerated in clauses (a) to G) thereof. None of the
D functions under Section 7 specifically provides for laying down such a
condition debarring persons of a certain age group from enrolment as
advocates. The Clause relied upon is couched in positive terms, namely, it
says the rules may prescribe the class or category of persons who may be
admitted to the legal profession. Therefore, under this rule the class or
category of persons 'entitled to be· enrolled' as advocates may be
E prescribed. The r-ule can, therefore, ~ecify the class O£ category of persons
'entitled' to be enrolled as an advocates, but the rule gives no indication
that it can debar persons belonging to a certain age group from being
enrolled as advocates. Where a provision is couched in positive language
and is in the nature of an enabling provision, there is no canon of construc-
F tion which says that by necessary implication the rule making authority can
make a provision disentitling admission or enrolment to the profession.
Such a submission is difficult to countenance. -
But the larger question needs to be answered and that is whether the
said clause applies to persons belonging to a certain age group. Section
G 28(1)(d) of the Act authorises a State Bar Council to make_rules prescrib-
ing the conditions subject to which a person may be admitted as an
advocate. The power to specify the class or category of persons entitled to
be enrolled as advocates is conferred on the Bar Council of India under
Section 49(1)(ag) and on the Central Gove~rull.ent under Section 49A of
H the Act. The role which a State Bar Council has to play under Section. 28
COUNCIL OF LEGAL AID AND ADVICE v. BAR COUNCIL (AHMADI, CJ.) 317

is distinct from that the Bar Council of India has to play under Section A
49(l)(ag) of the Act, in that, after the class or category is identified, they·
do not automatically get admitted or enrolled they still have to abide by
the requirements for admission to the State roll. Therefore, apart from a
class or group being declared 'entitled to enrolment', the other conditions
or norms evolved by the State Bar Council for entry of the individual on B
its role would have to be satisfied.

It seems Parliament while enacting the Act created agencies at the
State level as well as at the Central level in the form of State Bar Councils
and Bar Council of India and invested them with rule making powers on
diverse matters touching the legal profession, presumably because it must C
have realised that matter pertaining to the profession are best left to
informed bodies comprising of members of the said profession. However,
while doing so it provided for basic substantive matters, e.g., eligibility fo~
entry into the profession (Section 24), disqualification for enrolm~nt (Sec-
tion 24A), authority entitled to grant admission (Sections 25 and 26), the D
authority which can remove any name from the roll (Section 26A), etc.,
and placed them within the domain of a State Bar Council. Thus it is the
State Bar Council which alone must decide on the question of enrolment
of an applicant on its roll. Under Section 24 a person who is a citizen of
India and possesses a degree in law becomes qualified to be admitted as E
an advocate if he has completed twenty one years of age, subject of course
to the other provisions of the Act. No doubt he must fulfil the other
conditions specified in the rules made by the State Bar Council (Section
24(1)(e)). Evety person whose name is entered in the list of advocates has
a right to practise in all courts including the Supreme Court, before any F
tribunal or other authority. It is, therefore, within the exclusive domain of
the State Bar Councils to admit persons as advocates on their rolls or to
remove their names from the rolls. There is no provision in Chapter III
dealing with admission and enrolment of advocates which restricts the
entry of those who have completed 45 year~ as advocates. Nor has the State
Bar Council made any such rule under its rule making power. G

There is no specific provision in Section 7 of the Act which
enumerates· the functions of the Bar Council of India empowering it to fix
the maximum age beyond which entry into the profession would be barred.
That is why reliance is placed on the rule making power of the Bar Council H
'r
I

318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 1 S.C.R.

A:•·· oi..thu.iia enshrined in Section 49. T~at Section empowers the making of
rule by The Bar Council of India 'for discharging its functions' under the
Act, and, in particular, such rules may prescribe the class or category of
persons entitled to be enrolled as advocates. The functions of the Bar
Council of India enumerated in Section 7 do not envisage laying down a
B stipulation disqualifying persons otherwise qualified from entering the legal
profession merely because they have completed the age of 45 years. On the
other hand Section 24A was introduced by Section 19 of Act 60 of 1973
with effect from 31st January, 1974 to disqualify certain persons from
entering the legal profession for a limited period. By the impugned rule
C every person even if qualified but who has completed 45 years of age is '
de~rred for all times from enrolment as an advocate. If it had been
\
. possible to restrict the entry of even those class or category of persons
referred to in Section 24A by a mere rule made by the Bar Council of India,
where was the need for a statutory amendment? That is presumably
D because matters concerning disqualification even for a limited period was
considered to be falling outside the ken of rule making power, being a
matter of public policy. It is difficult to accept the interpretation that all
those above the age group of 45 years constitute a class within the scope
of clause (ag) of Section 49(1) of the Act to permit the Bar Council of
India to debar their entry into the profession for all times. In the guise of
E making a rule the Bar Council of India is virtually introducing an additional
clause in Section 24 of the Act prescribing an upper age ceiling of com-
pleted age of 45 years beyond which no person shall be eligible for
enrolment as an advocate or is inserting an additional clause in Section
24A of the Act prescribing a disqualification. Viewed from either point of
F · view we are clearly of the opinion that the rule making power under clause
(ag) of Section 49(1) of the Act does not confer any such power on the
Bar Council of India. We are unable to subscribe to tht> view that all those
' who have completed the age of 45 years and are otherwise eligible to be
enrolled as advocates constitute a class or category which can be dis-
G qualified as a single block from entering the professioQ. Besides, as stated
above clause (ag) identification and specification of a class or category of
persons 'entitled' to be enrolled and not 'disentitled' to be enrolled as
advocates. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the impugned rule is
beyond the rule making power of the Bar Council of India and is, therefore,
H ultra vires the Act.
COUNCIL OF LEGAL AID AND ADVICE v. BAR COUNCIL (AHMADI. CJ.] 319

The next question is, is the rule reasonble or arbit~ary an<l un- A
reasonable? The rationable for the rule, as stated earlier, is to maintain
the dignity and purity of the profession by keeping out those who retire
from various government, quasi-government and other institutions since
they on being enrolled as advocates use their past contacts to canvass for
cases and thereby bring the profession into disrepute and also pollute the B
minds of young fresh entrants to the profession. Thus the object of the
rule is clearly to shut the doors of the profession for those whc seek entry
into the profession after completing the age of 45 years. In the first place,
there is no reliable statistical or other material placed on record in
support of the inference that ex-government or quasi-government servants C
or the like indulge in undesirable activity of the type mentioned after
entering the profession. Secondly, the rule does not debar only such
persons from entry into the profession but those who have completed 45
years of age on the date of seeking enrolmnent. Thirdly those who were
enrolled as advocates while they were young and had later taken up some D
job in any government or quasi-goverment or similar institution and had
kept the sanad in abeyance are not debarred from reviving their sanads
even after they have completed 45 years of age. There may be a large
number of persons who initially entered the profession but later took up
jobs or entered any other gainful occupation who revert to practise at a
later date even after they have crossed the age of 45 years and under the E
impugned rule they are not debarred from practising. Therefore, in t4e
first place there is no dependable material in support of the rationale on
which the rule is founded and secondly the rule is discriminatory as it
debars one group of persons who have crossed the age of 45 years from
entrolment while allowing another group to revive and continue practi~e F
even after crossing the age of 45 years. The rule, in our view, therefore,
is clearly discriminatory. Thirdly, it is unreasonable and arbitrary as the
choice of the age of 45 years is made keeping only a certain group in
mind ignoring the vast majority of other persons who were in the service
of government or quasi-government or similar institutions at any point of G
time. Thus, in our view the impugned rule violates the principle of
equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.

In the view that we take on the aforesaid points we do not consider
it necessary to examine the larger question whether or not the impugned H
~·
I

320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 1 S.C.R.

A rule violates Article .19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Wei therefore, do not
express any view on the said question.

In the result, these petitions succeed. The new rule 9 inserted in
Chapter m extracted in the opening paragraph ·Of this judgment is struck
down as ultra vires the Act and opposed to Article 14 of the Constitution.
B The Bar Council of India and the State Bar Councils are directed not to
implement the said rule. No order as to costs.

A.G. Petitions allowed.