Supreme Court of India
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD.versusSANJAY DALIA&ANR.
- Citation
- 2015 INSC 452
- Decided
- 1 July 2015
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- S KHEHAR
Holding
Sections 62 of the Copyright Act and 134 of the Trade Marks Act provide an additional forum but do not override s.20 CPC; where the plaintiff’s residence or principal place of business coincides with the place where the cause of action arose, the suit must be filed there.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined whether sections 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957 and 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 allow a plaintiff to sue in a district court where it resides or carries on business even when the cause of action has also arisen at its principal place of business. The Court held that these provisions create an additional forum but do not displace the territorial jurisdiction rules of section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, when the plaintiff’s residence or principal office coincides with the place where the cause of action arose, the suit must be filed there and not in a distant court such as Delhi. The Court applied a purposive interpretation, invoking Heydon’s mischief rule to prevent inconvenience to both parties and to avoid counter‑mischief. It concluded that the Delhi court lacked jurisdiction in the present cases and dismissed the appeals.
Issues considered
- The scope of jurisdiction conferred by s.62 of the Copyright Act and s.134 of the Trade Marks Act vis‑à‑vis s.20 CPC.
- Whether the phrase ‘notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure’ ousts the applicability of s.20 CPC.
- How to interpret the statutory provisions – literal versus purposive/mischief rule.
- Whether the Delhi district court had territorial jurisdiction over the suits filed by the plaintiffs.
Legislation cited
Subjects
territorial jurisdictioncause of actionstatutory interpretationmischief ruleCopyright ActTrade Marks ActCPC section 20additional forumprincipal place of businessplaintiff residence
Judgment
[2015] 8 S.C.R. 210
A INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD.
v.
SANJAY DALIA&ANR.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 10643-10644 of 2010)
B
JULY01, 2015
[JAG DISH SINGH KHEHAR AND ARUN MISHRA, JJ.]
Jurisdiction - Territorial jurisdiction - Determination
c of-In view of s.62 of Copyright Act and s.134 of Trade Marks
Act- Held: Accrual of cause of action is sine qua non for a
suit to be filed- s. 20 of CPC provides institution of suit where
the cause of action arises - s. 62 and 134 only provide for an
additional forum - The provisions uls. 62 and 134 have to be
D interpreted in a purposive manner - The interpretation has
to be such which prevents the mischief of causing
inconvenience to parties - The mischief or defect of
inconvenience I deterrence to the plaintiff in the existing law
(s.20 CPC) was sought to be removed bys. 62 and 134 -
E The avoidance of counter mischief to the defendant is also
necessary while giving relief to the plaintiff- Such a counter-
mischief was unforeseen by Parliament- It is court's duty to
mitigate the counter-mischief - Right to approach the legal
remedy cannot be made farce or oppressive - Thus, if the
F plaintiff is residing or carrying on business etc. at a place
where cause of action, wholly or in part, has also arisen, he
has to file suit at that place - In the present case, since the
principal place of business of the plaintiff was Mumbai and
cause of action also arose there, the provisions of ss. 62 and
G 134 would not conferjurisdiction an Delhi Court, just because
the plaintiff had his branch office in Delhi - Copyright Act,
1957-s.62- Trade Marks Act, 1999-s.134- Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 - s.20 - Interpretation of Statutes -
H Administration of Justice.
210
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 211
DALIA&ANR.
lnterprtation of Statutes: A
Heydon's Mischief rule - Discussed.
Words and Phrases - 'Cause of action' - Meaning of
- Discussed.
B
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The provisions of section 62 of the
Copyright Act and section 134 of the Tr.;de Marks Act
have to be interpreted in the purposive manner. No C
doubt that a suit can be filed by the plaintiff at a place
where he is residing or carrying on business or
personally works for gain. He need not travel to file a
suit to a place where defendant is residing or cause of
action wholly or in part arises. However, if the plaintiff is D
residing or carrying on business etc. at a place where
cause of action, wholly or in part, has also arisen, he
has to file a suit at that place. [Para 47] [261-G-H; 262-A]
2. By section 62 of the Copyright Act and section E
134 of the Trade Marks Act, an additional forum has been
provided by including a District Court within whose limits
the plaintiff actually and voluntarily resides or carries on
business or personally works for gain. The object of the
provisions was to enable the plaintiff to institute a suit at F
a place where he or they resided or carried on business,
and not to enable them to drag defendant further away
from such a place. [Para 12] [228-E-F]
ExpharSA &Anr. v. Eupharma Laboratories Ltd. &Anr. G
2004 (3) sec 688 - referred to.
3. The expression "notwithstanding anything
contained in the Code of Civil Procedure" does not oust
the applicability of the provisions of section 20 of CPC H
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 8 S.C.R.
A and it is clear that additional remedy has been provided
to the plaintiff so as to file a suit where he is residing or
carrying on business etc., as the case may be. Section
20 of CPC enables a plaintiff to file a suit where the
defendant resides or where cause of action arose.
B Section 20(a) and section 20(b) usually provides the
venue where the defendant or any of them resides,
carries on business or personally works for gain. Section
20(c) of CPC enables a plaintiff to institute a suit where
the cause of action wholly or in part, arises. [Para 12]
C [228-G-H; 229-A-B]
4. The intendment of the Explanation to section
20 of CPC is that once the corporation has a subordinate
office in the place where the cause of action arises wholly
D or in part, it cannot be heard to say that it cannot be sued
there because it did not carry on business at that place.
The linking of the place with the cause of action in the
Explanation where subordinate office of the corporation
is situated is reflective of the intention of the Legislature
E and such a place has to be the place of the filing of the
suit and not the principal place of business. Ordinarily
the suit has to be tiled at the place where there is principal
place of business of the corporation. [Para 13][229-D-F]
F Code of Civil Procedure by Mui/a, 181h Edn. - referred
to.
5. 'Corporation' in the Explanation would mean not
only the statutory corporation but companies registered
G under the Companies Act. The domicile of the company
is fixed by the situation of its principal place of business.
In the case of companies registered under the
Companies Act, the controlling power is, as a fact,
generally exercised at the registered office, and that
H
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 213
DALIA&ANR.
office is therefore not only for the:purposes:.of:the Act, A
butfor other purposes, the·principal plaee•ofbusiness.
A company may have subordinate or branch offices in
fifty different jurisdictions and it may be sued in any one
of such jurisdictions in respect of a cause of action
arising there. [Para 14] [229·G•H; 230-A·C] B
Pate/Roadways Ltd., Bombay v. Prasad Trading Co.
etc. 1991 (4) SCC270: 1991 (3)SCR 391; New Moga
Transport Co., through its Proprietor v. United India
Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. 2004 (4) SCC 677: 2004 (1) C
Suppl. SCR 623; Peoples' Insurance Co. v. Benoy
Bhushan·AIR 1943 Cal. 190; Home Insurance Co. v.
Jagatjit Sugar Mills Co. AIR 1952 Punj. 142; Prag Oil
. Mils Depot v. Transport Corpn. of India AIR 1978·0ri.
167 - referred to. D
· Jones v. Scottish Accident Insurance Co.. (1886) 17
QBD 421. Watkins v. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co.
(1889) 23 QBD 285- referred to.
E
6. Accrual of cause of action is a sine qua non for
a suit to be filed. Cause of action is a bundle of facts
which· is required to be proved to grant relief to the
plaintiff. Cause of action not only refers to the
infringement but also the material facts on which right is F
founded. Section 20 of the CPC recognises·the territorial
jurisdiction of the courts il'!ter alia where the cause of
action wholly or in part arises. It has to be decided in
each case whether cause of action wholly or in part arises
. at a particular place. [Para 15] [230-D-F] G
Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association v. Union
of India & Ors. AIR 2001 SC 416: 2000 (5) Suppl.
SCR 743 - relied on.
7. In view ofsection.20 of the CPC, section 62 of H
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 8 S.C.R.
A the Copyright Act and section 134 of the Trade Marks
Act, and the object with which the latter provisions have
been enacted, it is clear that if a cause of action has arisen
wholly or in part, where the plaintiff is residing or having
its principal office/carries on business or personally
B works for gain, the suit can be filed at such place/s.
Plaintiff(s) can also institute a suit at a place where he is
residing, carrying on business or personally works for
gain de hors the fact that the cause of action has not
arisen at a place where he/they are residing or any one
C of them is residing, carries on business or personally
works for gain. However, this right to institute suit at
such a place has to be read subject to certain
restrictions. The very intendment of the insertion of
provision in the Copyright Act and Trade Marks Act is
0
the convenience of the plaintiff. The rule of convenience
of the parties has been given a statutory expression in
section 20 of the CPC as well. The interpretation of
provisions has to be such which prevents the mischief
E of causing inconvenience to parties. [Para 16) [230-G-
H; 231-A-D]
8. The interpretation of the provisions has to be
such which prevents mischief. According to the mischief
F rule, four points are required to be taken into
consideration. While interpreting a statute, the problem
or mischief that the statute was designed to remedy
should first be identified and then a construction that
suppresses the problem and advances the remedy
G should be adopted. [Para 22) [233-G-H; 234-A)
Heydon's case 76 ER 637 - referred to.
Interpretation of Statutes by Justice GP. Singh, 12t11
Edn. - referred to.
H 9. The common law which was existing before
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 215
DALIA&ANR.
the provisions of law u/ss. 62 and 134 were passed, was A
section 20 of the CPC. It did not provide for the plaintiff
to institute a suit except in accordance with the
provisions contained in· section 20. The defect in existing
law was inconvenience/deterrence caused to the
authors suffering from financial constraints on account B
of having to vindicate their intellectual property rights at
a place far away from their residence or the place of their
business. The said mischief or defect in the existing law
was sought to be removed. Hence, the remedy was
provided incorporating the provisions of section 62 of C
the Copyright Act. [Para 23] [235-E-G]
10. The Legislature has never intended that the
plaintiff should not institute the suit where he ordinarily
resides or at its Head Office or registered office or where D
he otherwise carries on business or personally works
for gain where the cause of action too has arisen and
should drag the defendant to a subordinate office or
other place of business which is at a far distant place
under the guise of the fact that the plaintiff/corporation E
is carrying on business through branch or otherwise at
such other place also. If such an interpretation is
permitted, the abuse of the provision will take place.
[Para 23] [236-C-E]
F
11. In the instant cases, the principal place of
business is, admittedly, in Mumbai and the cause of
action has also arisen in Mumbai. Thus, the provisions
of section 62 of the Copyright Act and section 134 of the
Trade Marks Act cannot be interpreted in a manner so G
as to confer jurisdiction on the Delhi court in the
aforesaid circumstances to entertain such suits. The
Delhi court would have no territorial jurisdiction to
entertain it. [Para 23] [236-F-G]
H
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 8 S.C.R.
A 12. The avoidance of counter mischief to the
defendant is also necessary while giving the remedy to
the plaintiff under the provisions in question." The
provisions of the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act
provide for the authors/trade marks holders to sue at their
B ordinary residence or where they carry on their business.
The said provisions of law never intended to be
oppressive to the defendant. [Para 24] [236-H; 237-A-C]
13. Heydon's rule is not applicable where the
C words of the statute are clear. When the provision is
unambiguous and iffrom the provision legislative intent
is clear, the court need not call into aid the other rule of
construction of statutes such as that of 'mischief'.
However, when two interpretations are possible, the
D court has to adopt the one which furthers the object as
provided in the statute itself. [Para 25] [237-G-H; 238-A-
B]
Mis. Hirata/ Rattan/al etc. etc. v. State of U.P. and Anr.
E etc. 1973 (1) sec 216: 1973 (2) scR 502;
Padmasundara Rao (Dead) & Ors. v. State of Tamil
Nadu and Ors. AIR 2002 SC 1334: 2002 (2) SCR 383;
Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay
2002 (4) SCC 297: 2002 (2) SCR 945 ; Busching
F Schmitz Private Ltd. v. P.T. Menghani 1977 (2) SCC
835: 1977 (3) SCR 312 - relied on.
Bennion on Statutory Interpretation - referred to.
14. Strict construction may be avoided or at least
G reduced by limiting the remedy where a counter mischief
would arise if the remedy provided by the Act was
eschewed widely. It may appear to the court that one of
the opposing construction of the enactment, if adopted,
would operate a mischief of its own. The prospects of
H this would constitute a negative factor in weighing the
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 21·7
DALIA&ANR.
applicability of the construction in question. The court A
also has in mind the consequences for the public welfare.
Such a counter mischief to the defend.ant w.as
unforeseen by Parliament and it is. the court's duty.- fo
mitigate the counter mischief. Right to. approach, the
court/pursuing the legal remedy cannot be mad.ea.farce B
or oppressive as that would not be conduciv.e for the
effective administration of justice. [Para27 and·29) [238-
F-G; 240-F; 241-C]
State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. v. Narmada Bachao C
Ando/an &Anr. 2011 (7) SCC 639: 2011 (6)SCR 443
-relied on.
Justice G.P. Singh in 'Principles of Statutory
Interpretation' by Justice GP. Singh,. 1.21h Edition - o
referred to.
15. It is the court's duty to avoid. hardship,
inconvenience, injustice, absurdity and anomaly while
selecting out of different interpretations. The doctrine E
must be applied with great care and in case absurd
inconvenience is to be caused that interpretation has to
be avoided. Cases of individual. hardship or injustice
have no bearing for enacting the natural construction.
[Para 32] [243-B-D] F
16. It can be presumed that Parliament intends
that while construing an enactment, the court.will avoid
a construction that is unworkable or impracticable,
inconvenient, anomalous or illogical as the same is G
unlikely to be intended by the Parliament. Common
sense construction rule should be taken recourse, in
certain cases. [Para 33] [247-A-C]
17. There will be no violence to section 62 of H
Copyright Act and section 134 of Trade Marks Act by the
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 8 S.C.R.
A interpretation adopted by this Court and the right of the
plaintiff which has been conferred under the provisions,
also remains intact. There is no question of giving
disadvantage to the plaintiff vis-a-vis the defendant, but
both will stand to gain by proper interpretation. [Para
B 43] [260-F-G]
Sonic Surgical v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2010 (1)
SCC 135: 2009 (15) SCR 265; Rosali V. v. Taico Bank
and Ors. 2009 (17) sec 690: 2001 (1) SCR 1169 ;
c Patel Roadways Ltd., Bombay v.Prasad Trading Co.
etc. 1991 (4) sec 270: 2001 (1) SCR 1169; Dhodha
House v. S. K. Maingi 2006 (9) SCC 41: 2005 (5) Suppl.
SCR 751 - relied on.
Daburlndia Ltd. v. KR. Industries 2008 (10) SCC 595:
D 2008 (9) SCR 652 - held inapplicable.
Union of India & Anr. v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal 1992
Supp. (1) SCC 323; Paragon Rubber Industries & Ors.
v. Pragathi Rubber Mills & Ors. 2014 (57) PTC 1(SC);
E New Moga Transport Co., through its Proprietorv. United
India Insurance Co. Ltd. &Ors. 2004 (4) SCC 677: 2004
(1) Suppl. SCR 623; Smithkline Beecham & Anr. v.
Sunil Singhi &Anr. 2000 (1) PTC 321 (Del.); Caterpillar
Inc. v. Kai/ash Nichani &Ors. 2002 (24) PTC 405 (Del.);
F lntas Pfiarmaceuticals Ltd. v. Allergan Inc. 132 (2006)
Delhi Law Times 641; Patel Roadways Ltd., Bombay v.
Prasad Trading Co. 1991 (4) SCC 270: 1991 (3) SCR
391 ; Ford Motor Co. &Anr. v. C.R. Borman &Anr. 2008
(38) PTC 76 (Del.); Wipro Ltd. & Anr. v. Oushadha
G Chandrika Ayurvedic India (P) Ltd. & Ors. 2008 (37)
PTC 269 Mad.; Hindustan Unilever Ltd. v. Ashique
Chemicals & Ors. 2011 (47) PTC 209 (Bom.); Ultra
Tech Cement Ltd. & Anr. v. Shree Balaji Cement
Industries & Ors. 2014 (58) PTC 1 (Bom.) - referred.
H to.
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 219
DALIA&ANR.
- - .,
Case Law Reference A
1991 (3) SCR 391 referred to Para 8
2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 623 referred to Paras 14, 37
AIR 1943 Cal. 190 referred to Para 14
B
AIR 1952 Punj. 142 referred to Para 14
AIR 1978 Ori.167 referred to Para 14
(1886) 17 QBD 421 referred to Para 14
(1889) 23 QBD 285 referred to Para 14 c
2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 743 relied on Para 15
76 ER 637 referred to Para 22
2009 (15) SCR 265 relied on Para 25
D
2009 (15) SCR 265 relied on Para 25
1973 (2) SCR 502 relied on Para 25
2002 (2) SCR 383 relied on Para 26
2002 (2) SCR 945 relied on Para 26 E
1977 (3) SCR 312 relied on Para 31
2011 (6) SCR 443 relied on Para 34
1992 Supp. (1) sec 323 referred to Para 35
F
1991 (3) SCR 391 relied on Para 36
2007 (1) SCR 1169 . relied on Para 36
2004 (1 ) Suppl. SCR 623 referred to Para 37
2004 (3) sec 688 referred to Para 38 G
2005 (5) Suppl. SCR 751 relied on Para 39
2014 (57) PTC 1(SC) referred to Para 40
2008 (9) SCR 652 held•
H
inapplicable Para 41
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 8 S.C.R
A 2000 (1) PTC 321 (Del.) referred to Para42(a)
2002 (24) PTC 405 (Del.) referred to Para 42)b)
132 (200.6) DLT 641 referred to Para42(c)
2008 (38) PTC 76 (Del.) referred to Para 42(d)
B
2008 (37) PTC 269 Mad referred to Para 42(f)
2011 (47) PTC 209 (Born.) referred to Para 42(g)
2014 (58) PTC 1 (Born.) referred to Para42(h)
c CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
10643-10644 OF 2010.
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.11.2008 in
FAO (OS) No. 359 of2007 and order dated 17.12.2008 in the
.D review petition being R. P. No. 14785 of 2008 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi.
WITH
Civil Appeal No. 4912 of2015.
E
T. R. Andhiarujina, Sudhir Chandra, Dhruv Anand,
Lakshmi, Tanvi Misra, Anshuman Upadhyay, Ravin Gargotia,
Soumir Ghosal, Vikas Singh Jangra, Anuradha Salhotra, K.
V. Mohan, SumitWadhwa, Yatin Grover, ManmeetArora, Faria
F Khan, Kavita Wadia, Shashank Tripathi, E. c;. Agarwala for
the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G ARUN MISHRA, J. 1. Leave granted in SLP[C]
No.8253 of 2013.
2. In the appeals, the question arising for consideration
is as to the interpretation of section 62 of the Copyright Act,
H 1957 and section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 with
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 221
DALIA&ANR. [ARUN MISHRA, J:]
regard to the place where a suit can be instituted by the plaintiff. A
3. The plaintiff/appellant in Civil Appeal Nos. 10643-
44/2010 had filed a suit praying for relief against defendant
No.1 so as to prevent infringement of the rights of the plaintiff
without obtaining the licence. The defendant owns cinema halls B
in Maharashtra and Mumbai where infringement is alleged and
the entire cause of action, as alleged in the plaint, has arisen
in Mumbai, Maharashtra.
4. Civil Suit FAQ (OS) No. 359/2007 has been filed in c
the High Court at Delhi, by virtue of the fact that the Branch
Office of the plaintiff is situated at Delhi and the plaintiff is
carrying on the business at Delhi. However, it is not disputed
that the plaintiff's Head Office is situated at Mumbai. The
objection was raised by the defendant with regard to the D
territorial jurisdiction of the court at Delhi. The single Bench
and the Division Bench of the High Courfhave upheld the
objection and held that the suit should have been filed in the
facts of the case, in the court at Mumbai. Hence, the impugned
order has been questioned in the appeals. E
5. In Civil Appeal arising out of SLP {C] No. 8253/2013
- (Advance Magazine Publishers Inc. &Anr. v. Just Lifestyle
Pvt. Ltd.), the suit has been filed with respect to the
infringement of the trademark. The registered office of 'Vogue F
India" is in Mumbai. The magazine is processed and published
in Mumbai. It was submitted that because the plaintiff has
branch office at Delhi, it had sufficient ground for invoking the
jurisdiction under section 134 of the Trade Marks Act. The
plaintiff filed an application seeking an amendment in the plaint G
under0rder6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to
indicate how the court at Delhi would have the jurisdiction. The
magazine is sold and circulated to the subscribers at Delhi.
The application seeking amendment has also been dismissed
by the High Court as even if allowed, amended pleadings H
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 8 S.C.R.
Ir •
A would not confer jurisdiction upon the court. Merely situation of
branch office is not enough as no cause of action as per the
plaint, has arisen in Delhi. The Division Bench has allowed
the appeal and set aside the order passed by the Single Bench,
allowing the amendment. The said order has been impugned
B in SLP [CJ No.8253/2013.
6. It was submitted by Shri T.R. Andhiarujina, learned
senior counsel representing the appellants, that a special right
has been conferred under section 62(2) of the CopyrightAct
C and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act containing non-obstante
clause to the applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure or
any other law for the time being in force, and the plaintiff has
been conferred a right to file a suit where it carries on its
business. That cannot be whittled down by combining with it
D the cause of action. The impediment of section 20 of the Code
I
of Civil Procedure is not applicable. Section 62(2) of the
Copyright Act and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act have no
co-relation to the cause O'f·action and suit can be filed where
plaintiff resides or carries on his business or personally works
E for gain. The interpretation made by the High Court is contrary
to the aforesaid provisions'."'Convenience of the defendant is
not a relevant consideration. The binding decision of this Court
in Exphar SA & Anr. v. Eupharma Laboratories Ltd. & Anr
F [2004 (3) SCC 688] has been violated. The judgment has not
been taken into consideration though it was decided earlier to
the passing of the impugned decision. Reliance has also been
placed on the decisions of this Court in Dhodha House v. S.K.
Maingi[2006 (9) SCC 41], Daburlndia Ltd. v. KR. Industries
G [2008 (10) SCC 595] and various other decisions of the High
Court of Delhi viz., Smithkline Beecham &Anr. v. Sunil Singhi
& Anr. [2000 (1) PTC 321 (Del.)], Caterpillar Inc. v. Kai/ash
Nichani & Ors. [2002 (24) PTC 405 (Del.)], lntas
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Allergan Inc. [ 132 (2006) Delhi Law
H Times 641] to contend that under the aforesaid provisions
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 223
DALIA&ANR. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
accrual of cause of action wholly or in part is not necessary at A
a place where the plaintiff chooses to file a suit where he is
carrying on business.
7. On behalf of the applicants in C.A. Nos. 10643-44/
2010, Mr. Sudhir Chandra, learned senior counsel, submitted B
that while interpreting section 62 of the Copyright Act and
section 134(2) of the Trademarks Act, the intention of
Parliament is to be gathered from plain and natural meaning.
Heydon's 'rule of mischief is not attracted where the words of
the statute are clear and unambiguous. There is no challenge C
to the vires of section 62 of the Copyright Act. Thus, the court
cannot invoke the doctrine of reading down the provisions.
Section 62 of the Copyright Act is a special legislation and
confers a special right on the plaintiff where it carries on
business or resides. Reading the Explanation to section 20 of D
the Code of Civil Procedure into section 62 will do violence to
the Co(lyright Act. The requirement of cause of action or
Explanation as to the corporaticwi of Section 20 C.P.C. cannot
be added to the aforesaid prpvisions. Facts of few cases
cannot be considered so <1;>to make interpretation of E
provisions. Interpretation of the statute is to be made de hors
the facts of individual cases. Jne intention of legislation is also
clear from the Parliamentary [lebates and where the law has
held the field for a long time it should not be unsettled. The
decision in Dhodha House (supra) holds the field. As such, if F
a different interpretation is to be made, the case should be
referred to a larger Bench of this Court. Non-obstante clause
cannot be diluted.
8. On the other hand, on behalf of the respondents, it G
was submitted that abuse of provisions of section 62 of the
Copyright Act and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act cannot
be permitted at the hands of multi-national corporations to
harass the defendant/s. With respect to the suit being filed by H
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 8 S.C.R.
A the Corporation, section 20 is not inapplicable. 'Carrying on
business' cannot be defined subjectively. Reliance has been
placed upon Patel Roadways Ltd., Bombay v. Prasad Trading
Co. [1991 (4) SCC 270]. The object of the Parliament behind
enacting section 62 of the Copyright Act and section 134 of
B the Trade Marks Act has to be taken into consideration while
interpreting the said provisions. The mischief rule of Heydon
has been pressed into service so as to prevent harassment of
the defendants and abuse of the said provisions. Court is duty-
bound to avoid disproportionate counter mischief while
C interpreting a provision. Public policy and convenience to
parties have to be taken into consideration. The interpretation
of provisions must be such so as to avoid hardship and
absurdity. The decisions relied upon by the appellants have
been sought to be distinguished.
0
9. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 contains the
provisions under section 20 with respect to institution of the
suits where defendant resides or cause of action arose.
Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads thus:
E
"Section 20 - Other suits to be instituted where
defendants reside or cause of action arises. -
Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be
instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose
F jurisdiction -
(a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there
are more than one, at the time of the commencement of
the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on
G business, or personally works for gain; or
(b) any of the defendants, where there are more than
one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually
and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or
H personally works for gain, provided that in such case either
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 225
DALIA&ANR. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do A
not reside, or carry on business, or personally work for
gain, as aforesaid, ac;quiesce in such institution; or
(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.
B
[Explanation]. : A corporation shall be deemed to carry on
business at its sole or principal office in India or, in respect of
any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a
subordinate office, at such place."
10. In order to amend and consolidate the law relating C
to copyrights, the matter was referred to a Joint Committee.
The Joint Committee of the Houses submitted the report which
contained the object of the provisions of section 62 is that many
authors are deterred from instituting infringement proceedings
0
because the court in which the proceedings are to be instituted
are at a considerable distance from the place of their ordinary
residence. Such impediments should be removed and the
proceedings may be institute~"in the local court where the
person instituting the proceedings ordinarily resides, carries E
on business etc. Clause 61 of the Report of the said Committee
is extracted below :
"Clause 61 (Original clause 65)~ -Sub-clause (2) of the
original clause 65 has been omitted and replaced by a
F
new sub-clause. The Committee feels that the provisions
of the original sub-clause (2) would virtually make
registration of copyright compulsory and-.would be an
undue restriction on the owner of the copyright to exercise
his rights. In the opinion of the Committee many authors G
are deterred from instituting infringement proceedings
because the court in which such proceedings are to be
instituted is situated at a considerable distance from the
place of their ordinary residence. The Committee feels
that this impediment should be removed and the new H
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 8 S.C.R.
A sub-clause (2) accordingly provides that infringement
proceedings may be instituted in the district court within
the local limits of whose jurisdiction the person instituting
the proceedings ordinarily resides. carries on business.
etc."
B
(emphasis supplied by us)
Section 62 of the Copyright Act is extracted below :
"62. Jurisdiction of court over matters arising under
c this Chapter. -
( 1) Every suit or other civil proceeding arising under this
Chapter in respect of the infringement of copyright in any
work or the infringement of any other right conferred by
this Act shall be instituted in the district court having
D
jurisdiction.
(2) For the purpose of su,b-section (1 ). a "district court
having jurisdiction" shall, notwithstanding anything
contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
E 1908), or any other law for th~ time being in force, include
a district court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction,
at the time of the institution of the suit or other proceeding,
the person instituting the suit or other proceeding or.
where there are more than one such persons, any of them
F
actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or
personally works for gain."
Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act is also extracted
below:
G
"134. Suit for infringement, etc., to be instituted
before District Court. - (1) No suit-
(a) for the infringement of a registered trade mark; or
H
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 227
DALIA&ANR. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
(b) relating to any right in a r~gist~red trade mark; or A
(c) for passing off arising out of the use by the defendant
of any trade mark which is identical with or deceptively
similar to the plaintiff's trade mark, whether registered
or unregistered, B
shall be instituted in any court inferior to a District Court
having jurisdiction to try the suit. · ·
(2) For the purpose of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section
(1 ). a "District Court having jurisdiction" shall, c
notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5of1908) or any other law for the time
being in force, include a District Court within the local
limits of whose jurisdiction, at the time of the institution of
D
the suit or other proceeding, the person instituting the
suit or proceeding, or, where there are more than one
such persons any of them, actually and voluntarily resides
or carries on business or personally works for gain.
Explanation.- For the purp~s'es of sub-section (2), E
"person" includes the regisr~Ved proprietor and the
registered user."
1tlc
11. Following portion of the Parliamentary Debates as
to Copyright Act has been relied upon : F
"Shri P. Trikamdas: Ordinarily it should fall within the
jurisdiction of the court where the infringing copy was
published. But there is nothing to prevent Parliament
from making a law, as for instance in the case of divorce, G
and saying that the cause of action may also arise at any
place where the author resides or where the original
publication took place, so that you could drag the infringer
to that court. Instead of making the another run all over
the country facing the infringer, the right may be given to H
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 8 S.C.R
A the injured party-the author-to sue the main in the place
where the author resides or where the first copy was
published.
Dr. Raghubir Sinh: So you agree to that?
B
Shri P. Trikamdas: Yes, and I am obliged to you for asking
me that question.
Dr. Raghubir Sinh: Does Mr. Masani also approve of it?
C Shri Masani : Yes.
Shri P. Trikamdas: It is desirable, also because it may
act as a deterrent on the infringer when he knows that he
may have to go a few hundred miles off to a High Court
D where the author lives or where the book got published
first."
12. Considering the very language of section 62 of the
Copyright Act and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, an
E additional forum has been provided by including a District
Court within whose limits the plaintiff actually and voluntarily
resides or carries on business or personally works for gain.
The object of the provisions was to enable the plaintiff to
institute a suit at a place where he or they resided or carried
F on business, not to enable them to drag defendant further away
from such a place also as is being done in the instant cases.
In our opinion, the expression "notwithstanding anything
contained in the Code of Civil Procedure" does not oust the
applicability of the provisions of section 20 of the Code of Civil
G Procedure and it is clear that additional remedy has been
provided to the plaintiff so as to file a suit where he is residing
or carrying on business etc., as the case may be. Section 20
of the Code of Civil Procedure enables a plaintiff to file a suit
where the defendant resides or where cause of action arose.
H
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 229
DALIA&ANR. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
Section 20(a) and section 20(b) usually provides the venue A
where the defendant or any of them resides, carries on
business or personally works for gain. Section 20(c) of the
Code of Civil Procedure enables a plaintiff to institute a suit
where the cause of action wholly or in part, arises. The
Explanation to Section 20 C.P.C. has been added to the effect B
that Corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its
sole or principal office in India or in respect of any cause of
action arising at any place where it has subordinate office at
such place. Thus, 'corporation' can be sued at a place having
its sole or principal office and where cause of action wholly or C
in part, arises at a place where it has also a subordinate office
at such place.
13. Learned author Mu Ila in the Code of Civil Procedure,
181h Edn., has observed that under clauses (a) to (c) of section D
20, plaintiff has a choice of forum to institute a suit. The
intendment of the Explanation to section 20 of the Code of
Civil Procedure is that once the corporation has a subordinate
office in the place where the cause of action arises wholly or in
part, it cannot be heard to say that it cannot be sued there E
because it did not carry on business atthat place. The linking
of the place with the cause of action in the Explanation where
subordinate office of the corporation is situated is reflective of
the intention of the Legislature and such a place has to be the F
place of the filing of the suit and not the principal place of
business. Ordinarily the suit has to be filed at the place where
there is principal place of business of the corporation.
_14. 'Corporation' in the Explanation would mean not
·only the statutory corporation but companies registered under G
the Companies Act, as held by this Court in Patel Roadways
Ltd., Bombay v. Prasad Trading Co. etc. [1991 (4) SCC 270]
and New Moga Transport Co., through its Proprietor v. United
India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. [2004 (4) SCC 677]. The H
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 8 S.C.R.
A domicile of the company is fixed by the situation of its principal
place of business as held in Jones v. Scottish Accident
Insurance Co. (1886) 17 QBD 421. In the case of companies
registered under the Companies Act, the controlling power is,
as a fact, generally exercised at the registered office, and that
B office is therefore not only for the purposes of the Act, but for
other purposes, the principal place of business, as held in
Watkins v. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co. (1889) 23 QBD
285. A company may have subordinate or branch offices in
fifty different jurisdictions and it may be sued in any one of
C such jurisdictions in respect of a cause of action arising there,
has been held in Peoples' Insurance Co. v. Benoy Bhushan
[AIR 1943 Cal. 190]; Home Insurance Co. v. Jagatjit Sugar
Mills Co. [AIR 1952 Punj. 142]; and Prag Oil Mils Depot v.
TransportCorpn. of/ndia [AIR 1978 Ori. 167).
0
15. Accrual of cause of action is a sine qua non for a
suit to be filed. Cause of action is a bundle of facts which is
required to be proved to grant relief to the plaintiff. Cause of
action not only refers to the infringement but also the material
E facts on which right is founded. Section 20 of the CPC
recognises the territorial jurisdiction of the courts inter alia
where the cause of action wholly or in part arises. It has to be
decided in each case whether cause of action wholly or in part
F arises at a particular place. As held by this Court in Rajasthan
High Court Advocates Association v. Union of India & Ors.
[AIR2001 SC 416). Thus, a plaintiff can also file a suit where
the cause of action wholly or in part arises.
16. On a due and anxious consideration. of the
G provisions contained in section 20 of the CPC, section 62 of
the Copyright Act and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, and
the object with which the latter provisions have been enacted,
it is clear that if a cause of action has arisen wholly or in part,
H where the plaintiff is residing or having its principal office/
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 231
DALIA&ANR. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
carries on business or personally works for gain, the suit can A
be filed at such place/s. Plaintiff(s) can also institute a suit at
a place where he is residing, carrying on business or personally
works for gain de hors the fact that the cause of action has not
arisen at a place where he/they are residing or any one of
them is residing, carries on business or personally works for B
gain. However, this right to institute suit at such a place has to
be read subject to certain restrictions, such as in case plaintiff
is residing or carrying on business at a particular place/having
its head office and at such place cause of action has also arisen
wholly or in part, plaintiff cannot ignore such a place under the C
guise that he is carrying on business at other far flung places
also. The very intendment of the insertion of provision in the
Copyright Act and Trade Marks Act is the convenience of the
plaintiff. The rule of convenience of the parties has been given
0
a statutory expression in section 20 of the CPC as well. The
interpretation of provisions has to be such which prevents the
mischief of causing inconvenience to parties.
17. The intendment of the aforesaid provisions inserted
in the CopyrightAct and the Trade Marks Act is to provide a E
forum to the plaintiff where he is residing, carrying on business
or personally works for gain. The object is to ensure that the
plaintiff is not deterred from instituting infringement
proceedings "because the court in which proceedings are to F
be instituted is at a considerable distance from the place of
their ordinary residence". The impediment created to the
plaintiff by section 20 C.P.C. of going to a place where it was
not having ordinary residence or principal place of business
was sought to be removed by virtue of the aforesaid provisions G
of the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act. Where the
Corporation is having ordinary residence/principal place of
business and cause of action has also arisen at that place, it
has to institute a suit at the said place and not at other places .
. The provisions of section 62 of the Copyright Act and section H
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 8 S.C.R.
A 134 of the Trade Marks Act never intended to operate in the
field where the plaintiff is having its principal place of business
at a particular place and the cause of action has also arisen at
that place so as to enable it to file a suit at a distant place
where its subordinate office is situated though at such place
B no cause of action has arisen. Such interpretation would cause
great harm and would be juxtaposed to the very legislative
intendment of the provisions so enacted.
18. In our opinion, in a case where cause of action has
C arisen at a place where the plaintiff is residing or where there
are more than one such persons, any of them actually or
voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works
for gain would oust the jurisdiction of other place where the
cause of action has not arisen though at such a place, by virtue
D of having subordinate office, the plaintiff instituting a suit or
other proceedings might be carrying on business or personally
works for gain.
19. At the same time, the provisions of section 62 of
E the CopyrightAct and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act have
removed the embargo of suing at place of accrual of cause of
action wholly or in part, with regard to a place where the plaintiff
or any of them ordinarily resides, carries on business or
personally works for gain. We agree to the aforesaid extent
F the impediment imposed under section 20 of the CPC to a
plaintiff to institute a suit in a court where the defendant resides
or carries on business or where the cause of action wholly or
in part arises, has been removed. But the right is subject to
the rider in case plaintiff resides or has its principal place of
G business/carries on business or personally works for gain at a
place where cause of action has also arisen, suit should be
filed at that place not at other places where plaintiff is having
branch offices etc.
H 20. There is no doubt about it that the words used in
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 233
DALIA&ANR. [ARUN MISHRA, J.)
section 62 of the Copyright Act and section 134 of the Trade A
Marks Act, 'notwithstanding anything contained in CPC or any
other law for the time being in force', emphasise that the
requirement of section 20 of the CPC would not have to be
complied with by the plaintiff if he resides or carries on business
in the local limits of the court where he has filed the suit but, in B
our view, at the same time, as the provision providing for an
additional forum, cannot be interpreted in the manner that it
has authorised the plaintiff to institute a suit at a different place
other than the place where he is ordinarily residing or having
principal office and incidentally where the cause of action wholly C
or in part has also arisen. The impugned judgments, in our
considered view, do not take away t~e additional forum and
fundamental basis of conferring the right and advantage to the
authors of the CopyrightAct and the Trade Marks Act provided
0
under the aforesaid provisions.
21. The provisions of section 62(2) of the Copyright
Act and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act are pari materia.
Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act is applicable to clauses
(a) and (b) of section 134(1) of the Trade Marks Act. Thus, a E
procedure to institute suit with respect to section 134(1)(c) in
respect of "passing off'' continues to be governed by section
20ofCPC.
22. If the interpretation suggested by the appellant is F
accepted, several mischiefs may result, intention is that the
plaintiff should not go to far flung places than that of residence
or where he carries on business or works for gain in order to
deprive defendant a remedy and harass him by dragging to
distant place. It is settled proposition of law that the G
interpretation of the provisions has to be such which prevents
mischief. The said principle was explained in Haydon's case
[76 ER 637]. According to the mischief rule, four points are
required to be taken into consideration. While interpreting a H
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 8 S.C.R.
A statute, the problem or mischief that the statute was designed
to remedy should first be identified and then a construction
that suppresses the problem and advances the remedy should
be adopted. The Haydon's mischief rule has been referred to
in Interpretation of Statutes by Justice G.P. Singh, 12th Edn ..
B atpp. 124-125thus:
"(b) Rule in Heydon's case; purposive construction:
mischief rule
c When the material words are capable of bearing two
or more constructions the most firmly established rule
for construction of such words "of all statutes in general
(be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of
the common law)" is the rule laid down in Haydon's case
D (76 ER 637) which has "now attained the status of a
classic [Kanai/al Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan AIR
1957 SC 907). The rule which is also known as
'purposive construction' or 'mischief rule' [Anderton v.
Ryan 1985 2 ALL ER 355], enables consideration of
E four matters in construing an Act: (i) What was the law
before the making of the Act, (ii) What was the mischief
or defect for which the law did not provide, (iii) What is
the remedy that the Act has provided, and (iv) What is
the reason of the remedy. The rule then directs that the
F courts must adopt that construction which "shall suppress
the mischief and advance the remedy". The rule was
explained in the Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar
[AIR 1955 SC 661) by S.R. DAS, CJI as follows: "It is a
sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established
G in England as far back as 1584 when Haydon's case
(supra) was decided that for the sure and true
interpretation of all Statutes in general (be they penal or
beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law)
four things are to be discerned and considered:
H
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 235
DALIA&ANR. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
1st - What was the common law before the making of the A
Act?
2"d - What was the mischief and defect .for which the
common law did not provide?
B
3rd - What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and
appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth, and
4th - The true reason of the remedy;
and then the office of all the judges is always to make C
such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and
advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions
and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro
private commodo, and to add force and life to the cure
and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of D
theAct; pro bono publico. [Bengal Immunity Co. v. State
of Bihar(supra)]."
23. Considering the first aspect of aforesaid principle,
the common law which was existing before the provisions of E
law were passed was section 20 of the CPC. It did not provide
for the plaintiff to institute a suit except in accordance with the
provisions contained in section 20. The detect in existing law
was inconvenience/deterrence caused to the authors suffering
from financial constraints on account of having to vindicate their F
intellectual property rights at a place far away from their ·
residence or the place of their business. The said mischief or
defect in the existing law which did not provide for the plaintiff
to sue at a place where he ordinarily resides or carries on
business or personally works for gain, was sought to be G
removed. Hence, the remedy was provided incorporating the
provisions of section 62 of the Copyright Act. The provisions
enabled the plaintiff or any of them to file a suit at the aforesaid
places. But if they were residing or carrying on business or H
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 8 S.C.R.
A personally worked for gain already at such place, where cause
of action has arisen, wholly or in part, the said provisions have
not provided additional remedy to them to file a suit at a different
place. The said provisions never intended to operate in that
field. The operation of the provisions was limited and their
B objective was clearly to enable the plaintiff to file a suit at the
place where he is ordinarily residing or carrying on business
etc., as enumerated above, not to go away from such places.
The Legislature has never intended that the plaintiff should not
institute the suit where he ordinarily resides or at its Head Office
C or registered office or where he otherwise carries on business
or personally works for gain where the cause of action too has
arisen and should drag the defendant to a subordinate office
or other place of business which is at a far distant place under
D the guise of the fact that the plaintiff/corporation is carrying on
business through branch or otherwise at such other place also.
If such an interpretation is permitted, as rightly submitted on
behalf of the respondents, the abuse of the provision will take
place. Corporations and big conglomerates etc. might be
E having several subordinate offices throughout the country.
Interpretation otherwise would permit them to institute
infringement proceedings at a far flung place and at
unconnected place as compared to a place where plaintiff is
carrying on their business, and at such place, cause of action
F too has arisen. In the instant cases, the principal place of
business is, admittedly, in Mumbai and the cause of action
has also arisen in Mumbai. Thus, the provisions of section 62
of the CopyrightAct and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act
cannot be interpreted in a manner so as to confer jurisdiction
G on the Delhi court in the aforesaid circumstances to entertain
such suits. The Delhi court would have no territorial jurisdiction
to entertain it.
24. The avoidance of counter mischief to the defendant
H is also necessary while giving the remedy to the plaintiff under
. ·.,;·
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 237
DALIA&ANR. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
the provisions in question. It was never visualised by the law A
makers that both the parties would be made to travel to a
distant place in spite of the fact that the plaintiff has a remedy
of suing at the place where the cause of action has arisen
where he is having head office/carrying on business etc. The
provisions of the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act B
provide for the authors/trade marks holders to sue at their
ordinary residence or where they carry on their business. The
said provisions of law never intended to be oppressive to the
defendant. The Parliamentary Debate quoted above has to
be understood in the manner that suit can be filed where the C
plaintiff ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally
works for gain. Discussion was to provide remedy to plaintiff
at convenient place; he is not to travel away. Debate was not
to enable plaintiff to take defendant to farther place, leaving D
behind his place of residence/business etc. The rightto remedy
given is not unbriddled and is subject to the prevention of abuse
of the aforesaid provisions, as discussed above. Parliament
never intended that the subject provisions to be abused by the
plaintiff by instituting suit in wholly unconnected jurisdiction. In E
the instant cases, as the principal .place of business is at
Mumbai the cause of action is also at Mumbai but still the place
for suing has been chosen at Delhi. There may be a case where
plaintiff is carrying on the business at Mumbai and ca_use of
action has arisen in Mumbai. Plaintiff is having branch offices F
at Kanyakumari and also at Port Blair, if interpr~tation
suggested by appellants is acceptable, mischief may be
caused by such plaintiff to drag a defendant to Port Blair or
Kanyakumari. The provisions cannot be interpreted in the said
manner devoid of the object of the Act. G
25. It was also submitted that Heydon's rule is not
applicable where the words of the statute are clear. Reliance
has been placed on Mis. Hiralal Rattan/al etc. etc. v. State of
U.P. and Anr. etc. [1973 (1) SCC 216] in which it has been H
.:
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 8 S.C.R.
A observed that when the provision is unambiguous and if from
the provision legislative intent is clear, the court need not call
into aid the other rule of construction of statutes such as that of
'mischief. However, we opine, when two interpretations are
possible, the court has to adopt the one which furthers the object
B as provided in the statute itself.
26. Reliance has been placed on Padmasundara Rao
(Dead) & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. [AIR 2002 SC
1334) in which it has been observed that the intention of the
C Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature
itself. Reliance has also been placed on Grasim Industries
Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay [2002 (4) SCC 297) in
which it has been observed that wherever the language is clear,
the intention of the Legislature is to be gathered from the
D language used. While doing so, what has been said as also
what has not been said, has to be noted. There is no dispute
with the aforesaid proposition. However, the object of the Act
and the intention of the Legislature is clear which is to the
otherwise.
E
'
27. Bennion on Statutory Interpretation in section 318
in Part XXI has mentioned that strict construction may be
avoided or at least reduced by limiting the remedy where a
counter mischief would arise if the remedy provided by the Act
F was eschewed widely. It may appear to the court that one of
the opposing construction of the enactment, if adopted, would
operate a mischief of its own. The prospects of this would
constitute a negative factor in weighing the applicability of the
construction in question. The court also has in mind the
G consequences for the public welfare. Bennion has discussed
thus:
"General presumption against' absurdity' For the general
presumption that an 'absurd' result is not intended, of
H which the present section depicts one aspect, see Code
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 239
DALIA&ANR. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
s.312. "a' A
Mischief As to the 'mischief' to which an enactment is
directed see Code s.289.
Counter-mischief Clearly it would be absurd to suppo~e
that Parliament intended to abolish one mischief only at B
the cost of establishing another which is just as bad, or
even worse. Many legal rules have adverse side-effects,
and the policy of the law is to discard possible rules whose
disadvantages outweigh their benefits. lv
c
Example 318.1 Lord Bingham of Cornhill said:
'My Lords, s.4 of the Statute of Frauds was enacted in
1677 to address a mischief facilitated, it seems, by the
procedural deficiencies of the day .... It quickly became
D
evident that if the seventeenth century solution addressed
one mischief it was capable ofgiving rise to another ... .'
Regulatory Acts Some types of remedy necessarily carry
in their train corresponding drawbacks. One of the most
frequent and inescapable of these is the loss offreedom E
that accompanies a regulatory measure. Such
consequences are manifest, and must be treated 'as part
of Parliament's intention.
Strict construction Where a counter-mischief would F
arise if the remedy provided by the Act were construed
widely, the court may avoid or at least reduce it by limiting
the remedy.
Example 318.2 Section 1 of the Domestic Violence G
and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 (rep'e'aled)
empowered the county court to make orders excluding
a violent husband from the matrimonial home. No limit
was specified for the duration of such exclusion orders.
The courts held that, to reduce the counter-mischief of H
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 8 S.C.R.
A keeping a man out of his own home, exclusion orders
should be made only for a brief period. In one case
Vi~°C?<?unt Dilhorne inferred that the purpose of the 1976
Act was 'immediate relief not permanent resolution'. In
another case Orm rod LJ said the 1976 Act was to be
B regarded as 'a short-term remedy essentially'.
It may appear to the court that one of the opposing
constructions of the enactment, if adopted, would create
' .
a mischief of its own. It is not unusual for a construction
c contended for by one of the parties to have as one of its
consequences the infliction of a serious injustice on the
other party. The prospect of this would constitute a
negative factor in weighing the applicability of the
construction in question. The court also has in mind the
D consequences for the pubUc welfare.
xxxxx
Often it is reasonable to assume that the counter-mischief
that has arisen was quHe unforeseen by Parliament.
E Enacted law suffers by comparison with unwritten law in
that if involves Laying down in advance an untried
remedy..... "
As observed, such a counter mischiefto the defendant
F was unforeseen by Parliament and it is the court's duty to
mitigate the counter mischief.
'11 "-·I
28. Strong reliance has been placed by the appellants
on the discussions made by Bennion on avoiding
G disproportionate counter-mischief at page 1006 thus:
"the Court seeks to avoid a construction that cures the
mischief the enactment was designed to remedy only at
the cost of setting up a disproportionate counter-mischief
since this is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament.
H Sometimes there are overriding reasons for applying
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 241
DALIA&ANR. [ARUN MISHRA, J.] c.
such a construction, for example, where the Parliament A
really intended it or a literal meaning is too strong.:· . ~-
1ot
We find no overriding reasons to apply con~truction
solicited by the appellants a$ tna_t was never intende?1>y the
Parliament. ;ii)"'""'-
, ....· ,, B
29. Bennion has also'observed that public policy must
inform the court's interpretation ..,;
of the relevant statutory
f•~
provision and that public policy ascertained from the Act of the
ii~ ~r~
Parliament. In our opinion, right to approach the court/pursuing c
the legal remedy cannot be made a farce or oppressive ,. as
that would not be conduciv~lRf)~e effective administration of
justice. 1;..
·
30. Justice G.P. Singh. in 'Principles of Statutory
Interpretation', 121h Edition;fias observed that regard be had D
to the subject and object ohh'e Act. The court's effort is to
harmonise the words of tne statute with the subject of enactment
and the object the Legislature has in view. When two
interpretations are feasible, th~.~ourt will prefer the one which E
advances the remedy and-s'uppresses the mischief as
envisioned.The relevant po~ipn is extracted belo'f; ~.
"As stated earlier (Chapter 1, title 2 'Intention of the
Legislature', text and notes 57 to 69, pages 11to17)
F
and as approved by the Supreme Court: 'The w_Qrds of a
statute, when there is doubt about their meaning, are to
be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise
with the subject of the enactment and the objest which
· the Legislature has in view, ;i"heir meaning is found not G
so much in a strict grammatical or etymological l>[oPriety
of language, nor even in its p~pular use, as in ~~1 ~ubject
..... _,
or in the occasion on which.they are used, and tile object
to be attained". [Workmen
\...IVj~.
of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v.
Management of Dimaliuchi Tea Estate, AIR 1958 SC H
~ ~ _(
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 8 S.C.R.
A 353, p.356 ... ] The courts have declined "to be bound by
the letter, when it frustrates the patent purposes of the
statute". [Cabell v. Markham, 148 F 2d 737 92"d cir
1945), (Judge Learned Hand). In the words of SHAH, J.:
"It is a recognised rule of interpretation of statutes that
8 expressions used therein should ordinarily be understood
in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object
of the statute, and which effectuate the object of the
Legislature". [New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1207,
c p. 1213 ... ]. Therefore when two interpretations are
feasible the court will prefer that which advances the
remedy and suppresses the mischief as the Legislature
envisioned. [Carew & Company v. Union of India, AIR
1.975 SC 2260, p. 2270 ... ]. The Court should adopt an
D
object oriented approach keeping in mind the principle
that legislative futility is to· be ruled out so long as
interpretative possibility permits. (Busching Schmitz
Private Ltd. v. P. T. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, pp.
E 1575, 1576... ]. The object oriented approach, however,
cannot be carried to the extent of doing violence to the
plain language used by rewriting the section or
substituting words in place of the actual words used by
the Legislature. [CIT v. Budhraja and Company, AIR
F 1993SC 2529, p. 2535].
Having regard to the object of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna
Act, 1953 to implement the Bhoodan movement, which aimed
at distribution of land to landless labourers who were versed
G in agriculture and who had no other means of subsistence, it
was held that the expression 'landless persons' in section 14,
which made provision for grant of land to landless persons,
was limited to landless labourers as described above and did
not include a landless businessman residing in a city. [U.P.
H Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Braj Kishore, Al R 1988 SC 2239]."
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 243
DALIA&ANR. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
31. In Busching Schmitz Private Ltd. v. P. T. Menghani A
[1977 (2) sec 835], it has been observed that purposive
interpretation may be made having regard to the object C>f the
provisions and to avoid any obvious lacuna. ,.
32. The learned author Justice G.P. Singh in B
Interpretation of Statutes, 121" Edn. has also observed that it
is the court's duty to avoid hardsnip, inconvenience, injustice,
absurdity and anomaly while selecting out of different"
interpretations. The doctrine must be applied with greafcare
and in case absurd inconvenience is to be caused that C
interpretation has to be avoided. ~ases of individual hardship
or injustice have no bearing for enacting the natural
construction. The relevant discussion at pages 132-133 and
140-142 is extracted hereunder:
D
"(a) Hardship, inconvenience, injustice, absurdity
and anomaly to be avoided
"
In selecting out of different interpretations "the court will
adopt that which is just, reasonable and sensible rather E
thari that which is none of those things" [Ho/mes v.
Bradfield Rural District CounCil, (1949) 1 All ER 381, p.
384] as it may be presumed "that the Legislature shoyld
have used the word in that interpretation which least
offends our sense of justice". [Simms v. Registrar of F
Probates, (1900)AC 323, p. 335 CPC] If the grammatical
construction leads to some absurdity or some
repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of. the
instrument, it may be departed from so as to avoid that
absurdity, and inconsistency. [Greyv. Pearson, (1857) 6 G
HLC 61, p. 106]. Similarly, a construction giving rise to
anomalies should be avoided. [Ve/uswami Thevar v.
G.Raja Nainar, AIR 1~59 SC 422, pp. 427, 428). As
approved by VENKATARAMAAIYAR, J., "Where the
language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and H
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 8 S.C.R.
A grammatical construction, leads to a manifest
'
contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment,
or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or
injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may
be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words,
B and even the structure of the sentence." [Tirath Singh v.
Bachittar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 830]."'
xxxxx
"Consideration of hardship, injustice or absurdity as
c avoiding a particular construction is a rule which must be
applied with great care. ''The argument ab inconvenienti",
said LORD MOULTON, "is one which requires to be used
with great caution". [Vacher & Sons v. London Society
of Compositors, (1913) AC 107]. Explaining why great
D caution is necessary LORD MOULTON further observed:
"There is a danger that it may degenerate into a mere
judicial criticism of the propriety of the Acts of Legislature.
We have to interpret statutes according to the language
used therein, and though occasionally the respective
E consequences of two rival interpretations may guide us
in our choice in between them, it can only be where, taking
the Act as a whole and viewing it in connection with
existing state of the law at the time of the passing of the
Act, we can satisfy ourselves that the words cannot have
F
been used in the sense to which the argument points".
[Vacher & Sons v. London Society of Compositors,
(1913) AC 107]. According to BRETT, L.J., the
inconvenience necessitating a departure from the
ordinary sense of the words should not only be great but
G
should also be what he calls an "absurd inconvenience".
Moreover, individual cases of hardship or injustice have
no bearing for rejecting the natural construction, [Young
& Co. v. Leamington Spa Corporation, (1993) SAC 517],
H and it is only when the natural construction leads to some
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 245
DALIA&ANR. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
general hardship or injustice and some other construction A
is reasonably open that the natural construction may be
departed from. It is often found that laws enacted forthe
general advantage do result in individual hardship; for
example laws of Limitation, Registration, Attestation
although enacted forthe public benefit, may work injustice B
in particular cases but that is hardly any reason to depart
from the normal rule to relieve the supposed hardship or
injustice in such cases. (Lucy v. Henleys Telegraph
Works, (1969) 3All ER 456]. "It is the duty of all courts of
justice", said LORD CAMPBELL, "to take care for the c
general good of the community, that hard cases do not
make bad law". [East India Company v. Odichum Paul,
7 Moo PC 85]. 'Absurdity' according to WILLES, J.,
should be understood "in the same sense as repugnance
D
that is to say something which would be so absurd with
reference to the other words of the statute as to amount
to a repugnance''. (Christopherson v. Lotinga, (1864) 33
LJ CP 121]. "Absurdity", said LORD GREENE, M.R.,
"like public policy, is a very unruly horse". [Grundt v. Great E
Boulder Proprietary Gold Mines Ltd., (1948) 1 All ER
21]. He proceeded to add: "There is one rule, I think which
is clear that, although the absurdity or the non-absurdity
of one conclusion as compared with another may be and
very often is, of assistance to the court in choosing F
between two possible meanings of ambiguous words, it
is a doctrine which must be applied with great care,
remembering that judges may be fallible in this question
of an absurdity and in any event it must not be applied so
as to result in twisting language into a meaning which it G
cannot bear. It is a doctrine which must not be used to re-
write the language in a way different from that in which it
was originally framed". (Grundt v. Great Boulder
Proprietary Gold Mines Ltd. (supra)]. The alternative
H
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 8 S.C.R.
A construction contended for must be such which does not
put an undue strain on the words used; [Kanai/al Surv.
Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, AIR 1957 SC 907] and does
not require recasting of the Act or any part of it. It must be
possible to spell the meaning contended for out of the
8 words actually used. [Shamrao \I. Parulekar v. District
Magistrate, ThanaAIR 1952 SC 324].
No doubt in cases of ambiguity that construction which
better serves the ends of fairness and justice will be
c accepted, but otherwise it is for the Legislature in forming
its policy to consider these elements. (/RC v. Mutual
Investment Co. (1966) 3 All ER 265]. If no alternative
construction is open, the court cannot ignore a statutory
provision "to relieve what it considers a distress resulting
D from its operation; a statute has to be given effect to
whether the court likes it or not". [Martin Bum Ltd. v.
Calcutta Corporation, AIR 1966 SC 524]. The function
of the court is to find out what is legal and not what is
right. [Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata
E S.Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447]. It is presumed that a
legislative body intends which is the necessary effect of
its enactments; the object, the purpose and the intention
of the enactment is the same; it need not be expressed
in any recital or preamble; and it is not competent for any
F
. court judicially to ascribe any part of the legal operation
of the statute to inadvertence. [Kariapperv. Wijesinha,
(1967) 3All ER485].
The Courts. should as far as possible avoid a construction
G which results in anomalies. [N. T. Veluswami Thevar v.
G. Raja Nainar, Al R 1959 SC 422]."
33. Bennion on' Statutory Interpretation' has mentioned
law to same effect under section 312 and has observed that
H there is a presumption that absurd result is not intended and
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 247
DALIA&ANR. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
in section 314 it has been' observed thatthe court has to avoid A
an inconvenient result while interpreting a provision. It was
stated that it can be presumed that Parliament intends that
while construing an enactment the courfwill avoid a construction
that is unworkable or impracticable, inconvenient, anomalous
or illogical as the same is unlikely to be intended by the B
Parliament. In Rosali V. v. Taico Bank and Ors. [2009 (17)
SCC 690], this Court referring to Halsbury's Commonsense
construction rule held that it is a well-settled principle of law
that common sense construction rule should be taken recourse
in certain cases. c
34. This Court in Sonic Surgical v. National Insurance
Co. Ltd. [2010 (1) SCC 135] has also laid down law to the
same effect and has discussed the term 'branch office' used
in section 17(2) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 in the D
context of cause of action. Section 17 (2) of the said Act reads
thus:
"17(2) A complaint shall be instituted in a State
Commission within the limits of whose jurisdiction,- E
(a) the opposite party or each of the opposite parties,
where there are more than one, at the time of the
institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily
resides or carries on business or has a branch office F
or personally works for gain; or
(b) any of the opposite parties, where there are more
than one, at the time of the institution of the complaint;
actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on G
business or has a branch office or personally works
for gain, provided that in such case either the
permission of the State Commission is given or the
opposite parties who do not reside or carry on
business or have a branch office or personally works ,H
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 8 S.C.R.
A for gain, as the case may be, acquiesce in such
institution; or
(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.)"
This Court while interpreting the provision held that the
B term 'branch office' as used in the amended section 17(2)(b)
has to be interpreted to mean only that branch office where
the cause of action has arisen. Thus, the court departed from
the plain and literal meaning of the words of section 17(2)(b)
of the Consumer Protection Act in order to avoid absurdity.
C The decision in Somic Surgical (supra) has been approved
by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. v. Narmada
BachaoAndolan &Anr. (2011 (7) SCC 639]inasmuch as this
Court has observed that in case the natural meaning leads to
mischievous consequences, it must be avoided by accepting
0
other permissible construction.
35. Reliance has been placed by the appellants on the
decision in Union of India &Anr. v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal
[1992 Supp. (1) SCC 323) so as to contend that the court
E cannot usurp the legislative intention and cannot supply
omissions to a statute. There is no dispute with the aforesaid
proposition. However, we are simply interpreting the provisions
considering the object of the Act.
F 36. Respondents have placed reliance on Patel
Roadways Ltd., Bombay v. Prasad Trading Co. etc. [1991
(4) SCC 270) in which this Court has considered the provisions
of section 20 of the CPC. This Court has observed thus:
G "12. We would also like to add that the interpretation
sought to be placed by the appellant on the provision in
question renders the Explanation totally redundant. If the
intention of the legislature was, as is said on their behalf,
that a suit against a corporation could be instituted either
H at the place of its sole or princi~al office (whether or not
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 249
DALIA&ANR. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
the corporation carries on business at that place) or at A
any other place where the cause of action arises, the
/
provisions of clauses (a), (b) and (c) together with the
first part of the Explanation would have completely
achieved the purpose. Indeed the effect would have been
wider. The suit could have been instituted at the place of B
the principal office because of the situation of such office
(whether or not any actual business was carried on there).
Alternatively, a suit could have boon instituted at the place
where the cause of action arose under clause (c)
(irrespective of whether the corporation had a subordinate c
office in such place or not). This was, therefore, not the
purpose of the Explanation. The Explanation is really an
Explanation to clause (a). It is in the nature of a
clarification on the scope of clause (a) viz. as to where
D
the corporation can be said to carry on business. This, it
is clarified, will be the place where the principal office is
situated (whether or not any business actually is carried
on there) or the place where a business is carried on
giving rise to a cause of action (even though the principal E
office of the corporation is not located there) so long as
there is a subordinate office of the corporation situated
at such place. The linking together of the place where
the cause of action arises with the place where a
subordinate office is located clearly shows that the F
intention of the legislature was that, in the case of a
corporation, for the purposes of clause (a), the location
of the subordinate office, within the local limits of which a
cause of action arises, is to be the relevant place for the
filing of a suit and not the principal place of business. If G
the intention was that the location of the sole or principal
office as well as the location of the subordinate office
(within the limits of which a cause of action arises) are to
be deemed to be places where the corporation is
H
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 8 S.C.R.
A deemed to be carrying on business, the disjunctive "or"
will not be there. Instead, the second part of the
Explanation would have read "and, in respect of any
cause of action arising at any place where it has a
subordinate office, also at such place".
B
13. As far as we can see the interpretation which
we have placed on this section does not create any
practical or undue difficulties or disadvantage either to
the plaintiff or a defendant corporation. It is true that,
c normally, under clauses (a) to (c), the plaintiff has a choice
of forum and cannot be compelled to go to the place of
residence or business of the corporation and can file a
suit at a place where the cause of action arises. If a
corporation desires to be protected from being dragged
D into litigation at some place merely because a cause of
action arises there it can save itself from such a situation
by an exclusion clause as has been done in the present
case. The clear intendment of the Explanation, however,
is that, where the corporation has a subordinate office in
E the place where the cause of action arises, it cannot be
heard to say that it cannot be sued there because it does
not carry on business at that place. It would be a great
hardship if, in spite of the corporation having a
subordinate office at the place where the cause of action
F
arises (with which in all probability the plaintiff has had
dealings), such plaintiff is to be compelled to travel to the
place where the corporation has its principal place. That
place should be convenient to the plaintiff; and since the
G corporation has an office at such place, it will also be
under no disadvantage. Thus the Explanation provides
an alternative locus for the corporation's place of
business, not an additional one."
H This Court has considered while interpreting the
provision of section 20 CPC that no practical or undue
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 251
DALIA&ANR. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
difficulties or disadvantage either to the plaintiff or the A
defendant corporation could be caused. It has also been
observed that it would be a great hardship if in spite of the
corporation having a subordinate office at a place where the
cause of action arises, such plaintiff is compelled to travel where
the corporation has its principal office. That place should be B
convenient to the plaintiff and the corporation has an office at
such place, will also be under no disadvantage.
37. Under clauses (a) to (c) of section 20 CPC, a plaintiff
has a choice of forum and cannot be compelled to go to a C
place of business or residence of the defendant and can file a
suit where the cause of action arises. The intendment of the
Explanation has also been taken into consideration by this
Court in New Moga Transport Co. (supra) thus:
D
"9. Normally, under clauses (a) to (c) the plaintiff has a
choice of forum and cannot be compelled to go to the
place of residence or business of the defendant and can
file a suit at a place where the cause of action arises. If
the defendant desires to be protected from being
dragged into a litigation at some place merely because
the cause of action arises there it can save itself from
such a .situation by an exclusion clause. The clear
intendment of the Explanation, however, is that where the
corporation has a subordinate office in the place where F
the cause of action arises it cannot be heard to say that
it cannot be sued there because it does not carry on
business at that place. Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 20
inter alia refer to a court within the local limits of whose
jurisdiction the defendant inter alia "carries on business". G
Clause (c) on the other hand refers to a court within the
local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action wholly
or in part arises. .
10. On a plain reading of the Explanation to Section 20 H
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 8 S.C.R.
A CPC it is clear that the Explanation consists of two parts:
(1) before the word "or" appearing between the words
"office in India" and the words "in respect of', and (it) the
other thereafter. The Explanation applies to a defendant
which is a corporation, which term would include even a
B company. The first part of the Explanation applies only to
such corporation which has its sole or principal office at
a particular place. In that event, the court within whose
jurisdiction the sole or principal office of the company is
situate will also have jurisdiction inasmuch as even if the
c defendant may not actually be carrying on business at
that place, it will be deemed to carry on business at that
place because of the fiction created by the Explanation.
The latter part of the Explanation takes care of a case
where the defendant does not have a sole office but has
D
a principal offi..:e at one place and has also a subordinate
office at-another place. The expression "at such place"
appearing in the Explanation and the word "or" which is
disjunctive clearly suggest that if the case falls within the
E latter part of the Explanation it is not the court within whose
jurisdiction the principal office of the defendant is situate
but the court within whose jurisdiction it has a subordinate
office which alone has the jurisdiction "in respect of any
cause of action arising at any place where it has also a
F subordinate office".
38. In Exphar SA (supra), this Court had considered
the provisions contained in section 62 of the Copyright Act
and has observed that the word 'include' shows that the
G jurisdiction for the purpose of section 62 is wider than that of
the court as prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908. This Court has laid down thus:
"12. We would like to emphasise the word "include". This
shows that the jurisdiction for the purposes of
H
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 253
DALIA&ANR. [ARLIN MISHRA, J.]
Section 62 is wider than that ofthe Court as prescribed A
under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The relevant
extract of the report of the Joint Committee published in
the Gazette of India dated 23-11-1956 which preceded
and laid the foundation for Section 62(2) said :
B
"In the opinion of the Committee many authors are
deterred from instituting infringement proceedings
because the court in which such proceedings are to be
instituted is situated ata considerable distance from the
place of their ordinary residence. The Committee feels c
that this impediment should be removed and the new
sub-clause (2) accordingly provides that infringement
proceedings may be instituted in the District Court within
the local limits of whose jurisdiction the person instituting
the proceedings ordinarily resides, carries on business D
etc."
13. It is, therefore, clear that the object and reason for
the introduction of sub-section (2) of Section 62 was not
to restrict the owners of the copyright to exercise their E
rights but to remove any impediment from their doing so.
Section 62(2) cannot be read as limiting the jurisdiction
of the District Court only to casE:ls where t~e person
instituting the suit 0r other proceeding, or where there
are more than one such persons, any of them actually F
and voluntarily resides or carries on business or presently
works for gain. It prescribes an additional ground for
attracting the jurisdiction of a court over and above the
"normal" grounds as laid down in Section 20 of the Code."
G
Thif? Court held therein that th.e Delhi COL!rt had jurisdiction
since the plaintiff had averred that it has its registered office in
Delhi and seize and desist notice was also received by the
appellants at Delhi. The decision in Exphar SA (supra) does
not oust th!'l applicability of the provisions of section 20 of the H
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 8 S.C.R.
A Code of Civil Procedure as this Court has laid down that
section 62 has prescribed an additional ground other than the
normal ground prescribed in section 20 of the CPC. The
question posed before us in the instant cases is different. In
our considered opinion, the decision in Exphar SA (supra)
B buttresses the interpretation adopted by us.
39. Reliance has also been placed on decision in
Dhodha House (supra) in which this Court considered the
question about the maintainability of the composite suit for
C infringement of the Copyright Act, and the Trade and
Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. The Trade Marks Act, 1999
was also considered. This Court has laid down that composite
suit may be maintainable under the CopyrightAct and the Trade
and Merchandise Act, 1958 but that may not be relevant for
D the purpose of determining the question of a forum where a
suit can be instituted. In case the court is not having jurisdiction
under one of the Acts, merely by combining the causes of
action, the jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the court. In
that context, this Court has observed thus :
E
"20. The jurisdiction of the District Court to determine a
lis under the 1957 Act as also the 1958 Act must. thus.
be instituted where the whole or a part of cause of action
arises. Sub-section (2) of Section 62 of the 1957 Act
F provides for an additional forum therefore in the following
terms:
"(2) For the purpose of sub-section (1}, a "district court
having jurisdiction" shall, notwithstanding anything
G contained in the Code of civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908}, or any other law for the time being in force, include
a district court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction,
atthe time of the institution of the suit or other proceeding,
the person instituting the suit or other proceeding or,
H where there are more than one such persons, any of them
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 255
DALIA&ANR. [ARLIN MlSHRf., J.]
actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or A
personally works for gain."
Admittedly, no such additional forum had been created
in terms of the provisions of the 1958 Act.
xxxxx B
44. A cause of action in a given case both under the
1957 Act as also under the 1958 Act may be overlapping
to some extent. The territorial jurisdiction conferred upon
the court in terms of the provisions of the .Code of civil c
Procedure indisputably shall ~pply to a suit or proceeding
under the 1957 Act as also the 1958 Act. Sub-section
(2) of Section 62 of the 1957 Act provides for an
additional forum. Such additional forum was provided
so as to enable the author to file a suit who may not D
otherwise be in a position to file a suit at different places
where his copyright was violated. The Parliament while
enacting the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act in the
year 1958 was aware of the provisions of the 1957 Act. It
still did not choose to make a similar provision therein. E
Such an omission may be held to be a conscious action
on the part of the Parliament. The intention of the
Parliament in not providing for an additional forum in
relation to the violation of the 1958 Act is, therefore, clear
and explicit. The Parliament while enacting the Trade F
Marks Act, 1999 provided for such_an additional forum
by enacting sub-section (2) of Section 134 of the Trade
Marks Act. The court shall not, it is well well-settled, readily
presume the existence of jurisdiction of a court which
was not conferred by the statute." For the purpose of G
attracting the jurisdiction of a court in terms of sub-section
(2) of Section 62 of the 1957 Act, the conditions
precedent specified therein must be fulfilled, the
requisites wherefor are that the plaintiff must actually and
H
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 8 S.C.R.
A voluntarily reside to carry on business or personally work
for gain.
xxxxx
47. A corporation in view of Explanation appended to
B Section 20 of the Code would be deemed to be carrying
on business inter alia at a place where it has a
subordinate office. Only because, its goods are being
sold at a place would thus evidently not mean that it
carries a business at that place."
c (emphasis supplied by us)
In Dhodha House (supra), the question which is posed
before us did not come up for consideration and it has
been observed that the Act provides for an additional
D forum. Such additional forum was provided so as to
enable a plaintiff who may not be otherwise in a position
to file a suit at different places where the copyright was
violated. We have anxiously considered the aforesaid
observations made and the object of the Act, we find that
E the interpretation made by us does not militate against
the observations made by this Court in Dhodha House
(supra), the precise question which is before us, was not .
involved in the aforesaid case. A decision is not to be
construed like a statute nor by inferential process it can
F be assumed that this Court has decided the question
also which is before this Court in the instant cases.
40. This Court in Paragon Rubber Industries & Ors. v.
Pragathi Rubber Mills & Ors. (2014 (57) PTC 1(SC)] held
G that a composite suit would not be maintainable unless the
court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit in relation to both the
Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act. No such question is
involved in the cases.
H 41. In Dabur India Ltd. (supra), the question was
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 257
DALIA&ANR. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
whether composite suit of infringement of copyright and A
passing off could be filed in a court having jurisdiction where
the plaintiff actually and voluntarily resides or carries on
business or personally works for gain as provided under
section 62 of the Copyright Act. This Court answered the
question in the negative, dismissed the appeal and held that B
Order 2 Rules 2 and 3 of the CPC can be exercised only in the
event when the court has otherwise jurisdiction in respect of
the cause of action wherefor the action has been brought. This
Court has observed with respect to section 62 of the Copyright
~fu~: c
"32. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the
Parliament having inserted sub-section (2) in
Section 62 of the 1957 Act, the jurisdiction of the court
thereunder would be wider than the one under D
Section 20 of the Code. The object and reasons for
enactment of sub-section (2) of Section 62 would also
appear from the report of the Committee, as has been
noticed by this Court being a provision which has been
specially designed to confer an extra benefit upon the E
authors who were not in a position to instate copyright
infringement proceeding before the courts. It is in the
aforementioned context the law laid down by this Court
in paragraph 13 of Dhodha House (supra) must be
F
understood ..
xxxxx
34. What then would be meant by a composite suit? A
composite suit would not entitle a court to entertain a suit
in respect whereof it has no jurisdiction, territorial or G
otherwise. Order 2 Rule 3 of the Code specifically states
so and, thus, there is no reason as to why the same
should be ignored. A composite suit within the provisions
of the 1957 Act as considered in Dhodha House (supra),
H
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 8 S.C.R.
A therefore, would mean the suit which is founded on
infringement of a copyright and wherein the incidental
power of the court is required to be invoked. A plaintiff
may seek a remedy which can otherwise be granted by
the court. It was that aspect of the matter which had not
B been considered in Dhodha House (supra) but it never
meant that two suits having different causes of action
can be clubbed together as a composite suit."
(emphasis supplied by us)
c
This Court in Dabur India (supra) with respect to the
maintainability of a compositesuit observed that a composite
suit would not entitle a court to entertain a suit in respect whereof
it has no jurisdiction territorial or otherwise. The decision in
D Dabur India (supra) is of no help to the cause espoused by
the appellants.
42. Now, we advert to various decisions of High Courts:
(a) The decision of the Delhi High Court in Smithk/ine
E Beecham (supra) has been relied upon. As the registered
office was situated in Delhi, it was held that the plaintiffs were
entitled to institute a suit in Delhi court and the questions of
cause of action etc. did not come up for consideration.
F (b) Delhi High Court in Caterpillar Inc. v. Kai/ash Nichani
(supra) has observed that section 62 of the Copyright Act
makes a significant and obvious departure from the norm that
the choice of jurisdiction should primarily be governed by
convenience of the defendants.
G
(c) In the decision in lntas Phannaceuticals Ltd. (supra), Delhi
High Court has considered the provisions of section 20 of the
CPC and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act. The High Court
has observed in para 17 of the report that the court has
H jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions contained in section 20(c)
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 259
DALIA&ANR. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
of the CPC as the defendant is selling the offending drug in A
Delhi.
(d) In Ford Motor Co. &Anr. v. C.R. Borman &Anr. [2008 (38)
PTC 76 (Del.)], Delhi High Court considered that the plaintiff
carried on the business in commercial quantities in Delhi and B
have authorised agents also. The pleadings of plaintiff have to
be taken into consideration at the time of rejection of the plaint
under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. It was observed on averments
made that the Delhi High Court possessed territorial jurisdiction
to entertain the suit as plaintiff carried on business at Delhi. C
(e) In Sap Aktiengesellschaft ..&)Anr. v. Mis. Warehouse
/nfotech [IA No. 11153/2009 in CS(OS) No.623/2009 decided
on 19.11.2009], the question came up for consideration
whether the plaintiff had a right a file a suit if he carries on D
business in the territorial jurisdiction of Delhi. The High Court
held that in the plaint, jurisdiction was invoked on the ground
that the defendants are voluntarily residing and carrying on
business at Delhi. The plaintiff has branch office at Delhi and
plaintiffs authorised partner was offering the products from its E
. office at Delhi. The judgment was delivered considering the
provisions of Order VII Rule 10, C.P.C. taking the plaint
averments to be correct.
(f) In Wipro Ltd. & Anr.· v. Oushadha Chandrika Ayurvedic India F
(P) Ltd. & Ors. [2008 (37) PTC 269 Mad.], the High Court at
Madras has observed that the provisions of section 20 CPC
are not applicable as far as the High Court at Madras is
concerned. Therefore, the scope of section 62 of the Copyright
Act and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, cannot be curtailed G
by reference to section 20 CPC or clause 12 of the Letters
Patent.
(g) In Hindustan Unilever Ltd. v. Ashique Chemicals & Ors.
[2011 (47) PTC 209 (Born.}], the Bombay High Court has dealt H
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 8 S.C.R.
A with the territorial jurisdiction and held that section 134 of the
Trade Marks Act conferred upon the plaintiff the benefit of
bringing an action stipulated therein notwithstanding the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or any other law.
B (h) In the case of Ultra Tech Cement Ltd. &Anr. v. Shree Balaji
Cement Industries & Ors. [2014 (58) PTC 1 (Born.)], the High
Court held that it has the jurisdiction as the plaintiff carries on
business within the jurisdiction of the court and plaintiff No.1
has registered office and plaintiff No.2 has corporate office
C within the jurisdiction of the said court, though the defendants
did not carry on business nor do they have place of business
within the jurisdiction of that court.
The facts of the instant cases and the question posed
o is different which did not come up for consideration in any of
the aforesaid decisions rendered by the High Courts and even
otherwise any observations in any of aforesaid decisions
contrary to our decision cannot hold the field. Interpretation of
provisions cannot be so wide so as to open it to be misused,
E it has to be subject to object of the Act as explained above.
43. Coming to submission that vires of Section 62 has
not been questioned. There is no doubt about it that the
challenge to the vires of section 62 has not been made.
F However, the question is that of interpretation and not that of
vires of the provisions which has been considered by us. There
will be no violence to section 62 of Copyright Act and section
134 of Trade Marks Act by the interpretation adopted by us
and the right of the plaintiff which has been conferred under
G the provisions, also remains intact. There is no question of
giving disadvantage to the plaintiff vis-a-vis the defendant but
both will stand to gain by proper interpretation.
44. We also find the submission to be futile that the law
H as to the otherwise on the basis of aforesaid decisions, has
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 261
DALIA&ANR. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
prevailed for a long time as such there should not be any A
interference. Firstly, the judgments are of recent origin. Even
otheiwise, we have considered each and every decision
threadbare which has been referred to us. It cannot be said
that the precise question involved in the cases before us Was
involved in the aforesaid decisions or came up for B
consideration. In Dhodha House (supra) also, the question
posed for consideration was different and the observations
made therein are not supporting the cause raised on behalf of
the appellants. We are not taking a view contrary to any of the
· said decisions of this Court. Thus, there is no need to refer the C
case to a larger Bench.
45. It was also submitted that as the bulk of litigation of
such a nature is filed at Delhi and lawyers available at Delhi
are having expertise in the matter, as such it would be D
convenient to the parties to contest the suit at Delhi. Such
aspects are irrelevant for deciding the territorial jurisdiction. It
is not the convenience of the lawyers or their expertise which
makes out the territorial jurisdiction. Thus, the submission is
unhesitatingly rejected. E
46. It was also submitted that the suit may be ordered
to be transferred to Delhi. We cannot order transfer of suit in
these proceedings. In case parties so desire, they are free to
file appropriate application but the suit is required to be F
presented in the court of competent jurisdiction only thereafter
the question of transfer would be germane.
47. In our opinion, the provisions of section 62 of the
. CopyrightActand section 134 of the Trade Marks Act have to G
be interpreted in the purposive manner. Nq doubt about it that
a suit can be filed by the plaintiff at a place where he is residing
or carrying on business or personally works for gain. He need
not travel to file a suit to a place where defendant is residing
or cause of action wholly or in part arises. However, if the plaintiff H
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 8 S.C.R.
A is residing or carrying on business etc. at a place where cause
of action, wholly or in part, has also arisen, he has to file a suit
at that place, as discussed above. Thus, for the aforesaid
reasons mentioned by us in the judgment, we are not inclined
to interfere with the orders passed by the High Court. Appeals
B are hereby dismissed. No costs.
Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeals dismissed.
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "territorial jurisdiction"Sign in to search