Holding

The seizure was valid because the officer had sufficient material to form a reasonable belief of smuggling and the petitioners failed to discharge the statutory burden of proof.

Summary

The petitioners, partners of a diamond trading firm, were found by Customs officers to possess over 3,200 carats of diamonds and other valuables after a search based on secret information. The officers seized the goods under Section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962, asserting a reasonable belief that the diamonds were smuggled, invoking Section 123 which places the burden of proof on the possessor. The petitioners claimed they had purchased the diamonds on approval (jangad) and submitted affidavits of other dealers, but no documentary evidence or cash records supported their claim. The Customs Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal upheld the seizure, and the Delhi High Court affirmed that the officer had sufficient material to form a reasonable belief and that the petitioners had not discharged the onus of proof; it also held that a fair hearing was afforded. The Supreme Court concurred, rejecting the petition and confirming the confiscation of the diamonds.

Issues considered

Whether the Customs officer had adequate material to form a reasonable belief under Section 110 read with Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 that the diamonds were smuggled goods.
Whether the petitioners discharged the burden of proof imposed by Section 123 by tendering affidavits of alleged owners.
Whether a presumption of smuggling can be based on mere presumptions without concrete evidence.
Whether the petitioners were afforded a fair hearing in accordance with principles of natural justice.

Legislation cited

Customs Act, 1962s. 110, s. 111, s. 112, s. 123, s. 128, s. 130

Subjects

Customs seizureSmugglingReasonable beliefBurden of proofSection 110Section 123DiamondsNatural justiceFair hearingSpecial Leave Petition

Judgment

':1.··.··.

A
!NDRU RAMCHAND BHARVANJ AND OTHERS
v.
ii
UNION OF !NOIA & OTHERS
i
JULY 22, 1988 I,

6 [SABYASACHI MUKHARJI ANDS. RANGANATHAN, JJ.J
J<.
Customs Act, 1962: Sections I JO, 112 and 123-Seizure ofgoods on
reasonable belief that they are smuggled-Whether reasonable belief
could be based on presumptions-Diamonds have great potential for
smuggling.
c Administrative Law-Statutory authorities and tribunals-Find-
ing on fer:ts based on no evidence-;--Question of law arises2-Courts to
interfere-Whether a person has had a fair hearing-Conscience of
Court to be satisfied.

D On receiving secret information that smuggled diamonds had
been kept by petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 in the premises of M/s Gems
Impex Corporation, Bombay, petitioner No. 3, which firm was being
managed by Petitioners N11s. 1 and 2, the Customs Officers searched the
premises and found large quantities of unaccounted diamonds, precious
stones, pearls, gold manufactures, Indian currency etc. The petitioners
E showed their inability to produce evidence of legal acquisition of the
goods except to state that they had purchased these locally on cash
payment. The cash books however revealed no such payment. Various
,_,_,
incriminating documents were also found. On these facts, the Customs 'l

Officers formed a prima facie belief under section llO read with section
123 of the Customs Act, 1962 that the unaccounted diamonds were
F smuggled goods, and seized them. In his statement recorded under
section 108 of the Act, petitioner No. 2 produced certain notes issued by
four dealers saying that some quantity of diamonds had been given to
the petitioners on approval basis. The said dealers when questioned
under section 108 stated that they had issued anti-dated and fake notes
in order to help the petitioners. The explanation given by the petitioners
G having been found unacceptable, a show cause notice was issued to the t ,~·-
' ·-·
petitioners who were called npon to explain as to why the goods be not
confiscated and penalty imposed. In reply, the petitioners stated that
the goods were lying with them on approval basis and relied on
affidavits of other diamond merchants and persons. These transactions
were however not entered in the books of accounts of the dealers and
H persons who filed the affidavits.
544
;'.
t
J.R. BHARVANI v. U.0.1. .545

The Collector of Customs by his order directed release of jewel-
A
lery but ordered absolute confiscation of various other goods including
the diamonds and also imposed heavy penalties under section 112 of the
Act. An appeal to the Collector of Customs under 128 oftbe Act failed.
The Customs, Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal confirmed
the order of confiscation in respect Of diamonds. The Tribunal held. that
seizure of diamonds was in the reasonable belief that these are smuggled B
goods and consequently the onus of proof, according to section 123 of
the Act, was on the petitioners which they had failed to discharge. The
Tribunal however reduced the penalties imposed under section 112.

The petitioners challenged the Tribunal's order before the High
Court of Delhi under Article 226. Moreover, on an application filed by
the petitioners under section 130 of the Act, the Tribunal referred two
c
questions to the Bombay High Court. The reference pending in the
Bombay High Court was transferred by the Supreme Court to the Delhi
High Court, and both the Writ Petition and the reference were heard
and disposed of together.
D
The contentions raised before the High Court and reiterated
before this Court were (1) that there was no material before the
Customs Officer to form the reasonable belief that seized goods were
smuggled goods, and the seizure was bad in law, and therefore the
provisions of section 123 of the Act did not apply, (2) that assuming that
the onus was upon the petitioners, they had amply discharged the said E
burden by tendering affidavits; (3) that there was no profit element in
smuggling the diamonds and, lience, no presumption should be inferred
against the petitioners; and (4) that the conclusions of the fact-finding
body or statutory authority must be arrived at after giving fair
opportunity to the party.
F
Dismissing the Special !,eave Petition, it was,

HELD: (1) Section 123 of the Act itself recognises that diamonds
have great potential for smuggling into India and that is why it is
mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 123 of the Act, and onus placed
on the person from whose possession these are recovered. [SS2CJ G

(2) The High Conrt rightly found that there was evidence to pre-
sume that the goods in question were smuggled. A large quantity of'
diamonds was found in the possession of the petitioners. No trustworthy
evidence, documentary or oral, was produced in favour of the petition-
ers as to its legal acquisition/importation or possession. l55JG l H
••

546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A (3) In this case there was certainly a nexus between the available
material and the formation of the belief that the goods were liable to
confiscation. The existence of the material was justiciable but not the
sufflciency. [553A-B]

(4) The conclusions arrived at by the fact-finding bodies, the Tri-
B
bunals or the statutory authorities, on the facts, cannot be interfered
with where the fact-finding body or authority has acted reasonably
upon the view which can be taken by any reasonable man. Courts will
be reluctant to interfere in such a situation. Where however, the conclu-
sions of the fact-finding authority are based on no evidence, then the ques-
tion of law arises and that may be looked into by the Courts: [553E-F]
c
(5) The High Court rightly found the affidavits as merely bald
statements to come to the conclusion that by filing the affidavits the
burden had not been discharged. [554B I

D (6) A fair opportunity has two justiciable elements. The first is
that an opportunity of hearing must be given and the second is that the
opportunity must be reasonable. Whether a person has a fair hearing
can be gone into by the Court and the Court's conscience must be
satisfied that an Administr11tive Tribunal charged with the duty of de-
ciding a dispute has conformed to the principles of natural justice.
E Judged by the aforesaid two aspects, the High Court was right that a
reasonable and fair hearing was afforded to the petitioners. [555A-C]

Shanti Lal Mehta v. Union of India, [1983] ELT 1715; State of
Gujarat v. Mohan Lal Jitamalji Porwal, [1987] 2 SCR 364; M.A.
Rasheed v. State of Kera/a, AIR 1974 SC 2249; The Barium Chemicals
Ltd. & Anr. v. The Company Law Board and Ors., [1966] Suppl SCR
F
311; Mis Mehta Parikh & Co. v. C.J. T. Bombay, [1956] SCR 626;
Pukhraj v. D.R. Kohli, [1962] Suppl 3 SCR 866; Rabindra Kumar Dev
v. State of Orissa, [1977] l SCR 439; Bal Kissen Kejriwal v. Collector of
Customs Calcutta & Ors., AIR 1962 Cal 460, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition
G (Civil) No. 7799of1988.

From the Judgment and Order dated 16.5.1988 of the Delhi High
Court in C.W. No. 963of1984.

H R. Jagtyani and Miss Kamini Jaiswal, for the Petitioners.
'·,.
,;:
1.K BHARVANI v. U.0.1. {MUKHARJI, J.) 547

'·
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. This is an application under
Article 136 of the Constitution for leave to appeal against the judg-
ment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi,
dated 16th May, 1988. In order to appreciate the contentions urged
before us, it is imperative to state a few facts. B
L•
M/s. Gems Impex Corpn., Bombay, petition No. 3 herein, is a
firm engaged in the business of diamonds and precious . stones.
Ramchand Udhavdas Bharvani, petitioner No. 2 herein, is a partner in
the said.firm. Indru Ramchand Bharvani, petitioner No. 1 herein, is
his son. It is stated that both the father and the son were managing the
business of the firm. The Customs Officers received a secret informa- c
• tion that smuggled diamonds have been kept by the petitioner Nos. 1
and 2 in the said premises. After obtaining necessary search warrant
the Customs Officers searched the business premises on 16th
November, 1979. It may be mentioned that the. day was not very
auspicious for the firm as well as for the people of Bombay. On that D
day a warning had been issued by the Weather Office, Bombay, about
a possible sea storm that night. The entire activities came to a half and
the public had been advised to rush back to their houses early. On
searching the premises of the petitioner No. 3, the Customs Officers
found over 2,800 carats of rough diamonds and over 400 carats of cut
and polished diamonds in addition to a lot of other items of precious E
stones, pearls, gold manufactures ·etc. The books of accounts of the
firm, claimed to be written upto date, however, showed a stock of
11. 96 carats of cut and polished diamonds and the stock of rough
diamonds and other articles was shown as nil. On being asked to
produce evidence of legal acquisition, import and possession of
diamonds, the petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 showed their inability to pro- F
duce any such documents. They replied that they had purchased the
goods locally through brokers and had already made 50% cash pay-
ment. The cash book, however, revealed no such payment nor were
• any purchase vouchers produced before the Officers. When asked to
'name the brokers, the petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 stated that the brokers
would not come forward to confirm the deal. The Customs Officers G
also found various dvcuments which had been described in the initial
Panchanama as "various incriminating documents". In the back-
ground of the secret information and the facts and the circumstances
aforesaid, the Customs Officers formed a prima facie belief under
section 110 read with section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962, (hereinaf-
ter called 'the Act'), that the unaccounted diamonds were smuggled H
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

(\.
goods. They seized various goods including cut and published !

diamonds and rough diamonds in all valued at Rs.54,42,882,02 under
Section 110 of the Act on the reasonable belief that the goods had been
smuggled into India. They also seized Indian currency of Rs.1.40 lakhs
and some other incriminating documents found in the premises. The
only question agitated before the High Court was regarding cut and
B polished diamonds and rough diamonds. In view of the climatic condi-
tions the goods and the documents seizel were put in two cartons in
the presence of witnesses and the cartons were sealed with the
Customs' seal and also with the seal provided by petitioners Nos. 1 and
2 and the signatures were also put on the label of the cartons. A
detailed itemwise inventory of the seized goods and documents was
prepared in the Customs House, Bombay, later on 20th, 21st and 22nd
c of November, 1979. The petitioners Nos. 1 & 2 were asked by the
Department to attend preparation of the detailed itemwise inventories
but they did not attend, rather the petitioner No. 1 replied that the job
could be carried out even in his absence. The petitioners Nos. 1 and 2
were examined and their statements recorded under Section 108 of the
D Act. '

In his statement recorded on 29th November, 1979 Ramchand
Udhavdas Bharvani gave names of the 4 dealers. The petitioners also
produced certain notes issued ·by the said dealers showing that some
quantity of diamonds had been given by the said dealers to the
E petitioner No. 3 on approval basis. The approval basis was stated to be
known in the business circle as 'Jangad'. Some of these notes bore
dates earlier than 16th November, 1979 but neither these notes nor any
packet of diamonds covered thereby had been found with the firm on
the date of search and seizure. The dealers named by the petitioners
were questioned under Section 108 of the Act to check the veracity of
F the notes. They stated that they had issued anti-dated and fake notes
in order to help the petitioners. The diamonds covered by these
'Jangad Notes' were not found in possession of the firm on the day and
these were not seized. The petitioners gave such explanation for the
absence of these diamonds dealers which were not found acceptable by
the department. A show-cause notice was, thereafter, issued on 9th
G May, 1980 on various persons including the petitioners. By the show-
cause notice the petitioners were called upon to explain to the Col-
lector of Customs (Preventive) Bombay, as to why goods mentioned in
·the notice and the Indian currency of Rs.1.40 lakhs be not confiscated
and the penalty should not be imposed under Section 112 of the Act.
The petitioners duly filed a reply on 5th March, 1981 stating that the
H goods seized from their custody were lying with them on approval basis
l.R. BHARVAN! v. U.0.1. IMUKHARJI, J.) 549

or Janged basis and belonged to various other dealers.
A
The petitioners sougbt reliance upon affidavits of 7 other
diamond merchants, jewellers, customers etc which they filed for the
first time along with their reply to show-cause notice after about 15
months of the seizure. These affidavits, however, covered the entire
quantity of the goods seized. So far as the diamonds are concerned, the B
affidavits of 3 othe1; persons were filed. It was correctly lnentioned by
the Higb Court, if we may say so, that the diamonds were not entered
in the books of accounts of the dealers who filed the affidavits, when
and from whom these were acquired, and whether any jangad notes
"{ere issued and if so, why, these were not mentioned in their
affidavits. The Higb Court has characterised these affidavits in the
judgment as a bald statement about the ownership of diamonds. The
c
High Court was rigbt.

The Collector of.Customs by his order dated 17th April, 1982,
directed release of jewellery but ordered absolute confiscation of vari-
ous other goods including the diamonds in question and also imposed a
penalty of Rs.65 lakhs on the petitioners under Section 112 of the Act.
A penalty of Rs.25 lakhs·each was imposed on the firm and petitioner
No. 1 and a penalty of Rs.15 lakhs was imposed on petitioner No. 2.
Aggrieved thereby, the parties appealed to the Collector of Customs
under Section 128 of the Act but the same was dismissed. The Customs
Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal by its order dated 17th E
. January, 1984 confirmed the mder of confiscation in respect of both
the diamonds. The Tribunal held that seizure of diamonds was in the
reasonable belief that these were smuggled goods, and consequently
the onus of proof, according to Section 123 of the Act, was on the
petitioners and they had failed to discharge it in respect of the seized
diamonds. The Tribunal, however, ordered the release of Indian cur-· F
rency of Rs.1.40 lakhs and of all the confiscated goods except the
diamo]lds. The penalty on petitioner No. 1 was reduced to Rs. 10 lakhs
andon the petitioner No. 2 and the firm, it was reduced to Rs. 5 lakhs
~ach. The result was that the penalty imposed on the petitioners under
Section 112 of the Act was.reduced from Rs.65 lakhs to Rs.20 lakhs.
G
The petitioners challenged the correctness and legality of tlie
Tribunal's order dated 17th January, 1986, before the Higb Court of
Delhi under Article 226 of the Constitution. Moreover, on an applica-
tion filed by the petitioners under Section 130 of the Act, the Tribunal
by its order dated 8th January, 1985 referred to Bombay Higb Court
the following two questions: H
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A 1. "Whetl:~r, in the facts and circumstances of the case the Tri-
bunal was justified in holding that the seizing Customs Officer
had adequate material to form the reasonable belief as contemp-
lated in Section 110 read with Section 123 of the Act, that the
diamonds found in the business premises of M/s. Gems Impex
B Corpn. were smuggled goods?

2. Assuming that Section 123 applied and ·burden of proof was
on the appellants, whether the Tribunal should have held that
the appellants had discharged this burden by tendering affidavits
of persons claiming ownership of the seized diamonds?",

c By this Court's order dated 15th Jul)(, 1987, it was directed that
the reference application pending in the Bombay High Court should
stand transferred to the Delhi High Court and be heard along with the
writ petition.

D The High Court by the impugned judgment dated 16th May,
1988, from which the appeal was sought to this Court, disposed of the
writ petition as well as answered the questions.

Two contentions were raised before the High Court, namely, (1)
there was no material before the Customs Officer to form the reasonable
belief that seized goods were smuggled goods and, hence, the seizure
E
itself was bad in law and, therefore, the provisions of Section 123 of
the Act could not be applied and it was for the Customs Department to
prove that the diamonds in question were smuggled. The Customs
department having fail.ed to prove that the seized diamonds were
smuggled the impugned order cannot be sustained. It was secondly
argued that by assuming that the onus was upon the petitioners to
F
prove that the seized diamonds were not smuggled, they had amply
discharged the said burden by tendering affidavits.

The first question that had to be considered was whether there
was material for forming an opinion as to reasonable belief under
Section 110 read with Section 123 of the Act. Section 110(1) of the Act
G
which deals with seizure of goods, documents and things provides as
follows:

"(l) If the proper officer has reason to believe that any
goods are liable to confiscation under this Act, he may
H seize such goods:
l.R. BHARVANI v. U.0.1. IMUKHARJI, J.) 551

Provided that where it is not practicable to seize any A
such goods, the proper officer may serve on the owner of
the goods an order that he shall not remove, part with, or
otherwise deal with the goods except wi:h the previous
pennission of such officer."

Section 123 which deals with onus of proof provides as follows: B

"( 1) Where any goods to which this section applies are
seized under this Act in the reasonable belief that they are
smuggled goods, the burden of proving that they are not
smuggled goods shall be-

(a) in a case where such seizure is made from the posses-
c
s-ion of any person,-

(i) on the person from whose possession the goods were
seized; and
D
(ii) if any person, other than the person from whose pos-
session the goods were seized, claims to be the owner
thereof, also on such other person;

(b) in any other case, on the person, if any, who claims to
be the owner of the goods so seized. E

(2) This section shall apply to gold, diamonds, manufac-
tures of gold or diamonds, watches, and any other class of
goods which the Central Government may by notification
in the Official Gazette specify."
F
Hence, the gist of these two sections is that there must be materials
to form a reasonable belief that the goods in question are smuggled.
Section 111 deals with confiscation of property. The High Court, in
our opinion, rightly found that there was evidence to presume thaMhe
goods in question were smuggled. A large quantity of diamonds was
found in the possession of the petitioners. No trustworthy evidence, G
documentary or oral, was produced in favour of the petitioners as to its
legal acquisition/importation or possession.

The learned Acting Chief Justice, Chadha, J & Sabharwal, J who
disposed of the matter by the judgment under appeal, found that even
a cursory look at the documents was adequate to show that the transac- H

\.
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

lions were of sale and purchase of diamonds in foreign currencies.
A
While the stock in the books showed a balance of 11.96 carats of cut
and polished diamonds and nil stock of rough diamonds, the stock
found in their possession was much more. In those circumstances the
High Court came to a conclusion that there was reasonable belief that
the diamonds were smuggled and we cannot say that such conclusion
B was unwarranted.

It was contended before the High Court and repeated before us
in support of the petitioners that there was no profit element in
smuggling the diamonds and; hence, no presumption should be infer-
red against the petitioners. There was nothing on record to show that
profit element was lacking. Section 123 of the Act itself recognises that
c diamonds have great potential for smuggling into India and that is why
it is mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 123 of the Act. The onus
has been placed on the person from whose possession such articles are
acquired.

D In that view of the matter the High Court rightly drew the pre-
sumption against the petitioners. However, it was contended on their
behalf that reasonable belief could not be based on presumptions.
Reliance was placed on a Bench decision of the High Court of Delhi in
the case of Shanti Lal Mehta v. Union of India & Ors., [1983] ELT
1715. There it was asserted that the goods in question belonged to
E Queen Mother of Nepal and that they were duly entered in the account
books but the accountant had gone to the Income Tax Department.
The Customs Officer did not wait for the accountant to arrive to exp-
lain the entries in the books of account to him and seized the goods
which in the search list were described as 'appearing to be diamonds'.
Due to these facts the learned Single Judge held that it was not a case
F of reasonable belief but only a case of suspicion. Jn the instant case, as
per the High Court's Order, the Customs Deptt. had definite secret
information. Despite petitioners' assertion that the books of accounts
were written up-to-date it showed a stock of only ·JI. 96 carats of cut
and polished diamonds and that of rough diamonds and other articles
as nil, the diamonds actually found on search were over 2800 carats of
G rough diamonds and over 400 carats of cut and polished diamonds
apart from various other precious stones etc. On being asked to pro-
duce evidence of legal acquisition, the petitioners expressed their ina-
bility. There was good ground accompanied by rational.nexus leading
to formation of the belief that the goods were smuggled. Furthermore,
the petitioners stated that they had purchased the goods locally
H through the brokers and had already made 50% cash payment but the

••
:<

l.R. BHARVANI v. U.0.1. [MUKHARJI, J.]

cash-book showed no such payment. They also ·refused to disclose A
brokers' names saying that the brokers would not come forward to
confirm the deal. Besides, various incriminating documents were also
foulld. The existence of the material is justiciable but not the suffi-
ciency of the material. In this case there is ample ·material, their exist-
ence cannot be disputed. There is certainly a nexus between these
materials and the formation of the belief that the goods are liable tc:> ~
confiscation. In the light of the above Section 110 read with Section
123 has been fully complied with.

The reasonable belief as to smuggled goods, as enjoined in the
Act, had been explained by this Court in State of Gujarat v. Mahon/al
Jitamalji forwal & Anr,, [1987) 2 SCC 364. There this Court observed C.•·
whether or not the officer concerned had seized the article "under the
"reasonable belief' that the goods were smuggled goods, is not a
.ii question on which the court can sit on appeal. The circumstances
under which the officer ctmcemed entertains reasonable belief, have
to be judged from his experienced eye who is well equipped to in-
terpret the suspicious circumstances and to form a reasonable belief. D
See also M.J. Rasheed & Ors. v. State of Kera/a, AIR 1974 SC 2249
and The BariumChem.icdls-Ltd. A.n~. v. The Company Law Board &
a~s,; t1~~6l ~l!PPi se~ :31t.~H·!11usi be reiterated that the conclusions
arrivi:il l!t by the f1!,~Hindit1g bodies, the Tribunal or the statutory
;\Uthorities, On the f1tcts, found that cumulative effect Or preponder-
ance of ~vidence ca11not be interfered with where the fact-finding body E
or authority ha,§ acted re!lsonably ppon the view which can be taken by
any reasmil!1'1e m!lll, €ourts will be reluctant to interfere in such a
situatjon. Where, however, the conclusions of the fact-finding author-
ity are ba~ed on no evidence then the question of law arises and that
may be looked into by the Courts but in the instant case the facts are
entirely different. See the principles enunciated by this Court in-Mis F
Mehta Parikh & Co. v. C.1.T., Bombay, [1956] SCR 626. The same
view was expressed by this Court in Pukhraj v. D.R. Kohli, [1962]
Suppl ·3 SCR 866 where while dealing with the provisions of the
Customs Act, 1878, this Court held that Section 178 of the said Act
imposed the onus of proof that the· gold was not smuggled, ·on the party
if it was seized under the Act. The question whether it wa?itnder the G
reasonable belief or not, was a justiciable one. The facts 'bf'•this case
certainly warrant the formation ·of belief. In any case, once it is held
that there was material relevant and germane, the sufficiency of the
material is not open to judicial review.

The ot~er contel)tion urged on behalf of the petitioners was that H
554 SUPREME COURT REPOR'.fS [1988) Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A the burden that lay upon the petitioners, had been fully discharged to
show that the goods were not smuggled. The High Court on an analysis
of the facts found that the onus was not duly discharged and held that
though the burden on the petitioners was not as high as on the prosecu-
tion but there must be preponderance of probabilities. The High Court
found that by filing the affidavits in this case, the burden had not been
B discharged. We are in agreement with the High Court. The facts that
the affadavits had been filed long afteiwards and the names of the
parties were not disclosed at the time of search, warrant rejection of
the affidavits. These were filed after a gap of 15 months and the same
were examined minutely. The facts and figures given were checked-up
and the credibility of the deponents as well as the credence of their
version examined. Furthermore, the affidavits must be looked on the
C background that those persons who claim that they had given these
diamonds on approval basis, made no claim for all these diamonds.

Reliance was placed on a decision in the case of Rabindra Kumar
Dev v. State of Orissa, [1977) 1SCR439. This Court while considering
D this case under the Prevention of Corruption Act and the nature
and standard of proof required the accused under Section 105 of the
Evidence Act held that the Evidence Act does not contemplate that the
accused should prove the case with same strictness and rigour. But in
this case the nature of the evidence on which the reliance could not be
placed was rightly rejected by the Customs and the High Court held it
E properly that the petitioners had not diseharged the onus to prove that
the goods were not smuggled.

In this case there was no denial of opportunity, the proceedings
followed excluded the possibility of denial of op_portunity. The pro-
ceedings taken were in order and in consonance witb natural justice.
F The High Court was right in answering the first question by saying that
the Tribunal was justified in holding that the seizing Customs Officer
had adequate material to form a reasonable belief as contemplated
under Section 110 read with Section 123 of the Act and it rightly held
that the appellants had failed to discharge the onus,. The High Court
answered the second question in the negative. In our opinion, the High
<'."~.
G Court was right. ,
'""
There is, however, one aspect of the matter which was
emphasised before us, i.e. that the conclusions of the fact-finding body
or statutory authority must be arrived at after giving a fair opportunity
to the party to be effected by the order to be passed. A-s has been
H reiterated by a Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Bal
J.R. BHARVANI v. U.0.1. [MUKHARJI, J.) 555

Kissen Kejriwal v. Collector of Customs,' Calcutta & Ors., AIR 1962 A
Cal. 460 a fair hearing has two justiciable elements. The first is that an
opportunity of hearing must be giveIJ· and the second is that the op-
portunity must be reasonable. Whether a person has a fair hearing, can
be gone into by the Court and the Court's conscience must be satisfied
that an Administrative Tribuanl charged with the duty of deciding a
dispute has confo_rmed to the principles of natural justice. In that B
decision the Calcutta High Court was dealing in respect of a proceed-
ing under the Sea Customs Act, 1878. Counsel for the appellarit sought
to urge before us that a fair bearing had not been given. We have set
out the facts hereinbefore. The High Court had also examined this
aspect and rejected this challenge. In our opinion, the High Court was
right. In our opinion, judged by the aforesaid two aspects a reasonable c
and fair hearing was afforded to the petitioners. Hence, it cannot be
accepted that there was legitimate cause of grievance.

The High Court was right in disposing of the matter in the man-
ner it did. This application, therefore, fails and is rejected. ·
D
R.S.S. Petition Dismissed.