Holding

An assignment of copyright to make a sound recording does not affect the author’s right to claim an equal share of royalties, and the High Court’s interim injunction is valid.

Summary

The case concerned suits alleging infringement of copyrights in lyrics and musical works where the plaintiffs (copyright societies) sought interim injunctions against the defendants for public performance of sound recordings without proper licences. The Delhi High Court had disposed of the interim applications in favour of the plaintiffs and the Division Bench affirmed that order. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the assignment of copyright to make a sound recording extinguishes the original author’s right to claim an equal share of royalties and whether an interim injunction was appropriate. The Court held that, under the Copyright Act, the assignment of copyright for a sound recording does not affect the author’s entitlement to royalties and that the High Court’s interim order was a reasonable exercise of judicial discretion. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s interim injunction and dismissed the appeals.

Issues considered

The effect of assigning copyright for a sound recording on the original author’s right to royalties
Whether an interim injunction restraining public communication of a sound recording is justified
Interpretation of Sections 13(4), 14, 17, 19(10) of the Copyright Act, 1957 in the pre‑2012 legal regime
Applicability of the 2012 amendment to the case filed in 2006

Legislation cited

Copyright Act, 1957s. 13, s. 13(4), s. 14, s. 14(1)(a)(iii), s. 14(e)(iii), s. 16, s. 17, s. 18, s. 19(10), s. 2(d)(v), s. 30, s. 31

Subjects

copyrightinterim injunctionassignment of copyrightsound recordingroyaltyauthorproducerSection 19(10)Section 13(4)Section 14Berne ConventionTRIPSlicensingderivative work

Judgment

[2016) 6 S.C.R. 728

A INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF SOCIETIES
OF AUTHOR'S AND COMPOSERS (CISAC)
v.
ADITYA PANDEY & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 9412-9413 of2016)
B
SEPTEMBER 20, 2016
(RANJAN GOGOi AND PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.]
Copyright Act, 1957 - ss. 2(d){v), 13, 14(9) and 14(e)(iii)
and 17 - Suit alleging infringement of copyrights in lyrics and
c musical work - Application for interim injunction - Disposed of by
Single Judge and affirmed by Division Bench of High Court - On
appeal, held: Per Prafulla C. Pant: Copyright to the author of literary
work would not mean that such right of the producer of sound
recording [who is author uls. 2(d){v) and has right to communicate
D his work to public uls. 14(e){iii)] is lost - Impugned order of High
Court upheld - Per Ranjan Gogoi: The i11terim order of the Single
Judge, upheld by Division Bench, strikes a reasonable note to find
a workable solution during the pendency of the suit - Therefore,
the same neetl1· to be upheld - Interlocutory injunction.

E Copyright - 'Assignment of copyright of a work' and 'licence
to use the work' - Distinction between.
Interlocutory Injuction - Scope of - Discussed.
Words and Phrases:
Words 'copyright', 'author', 'sound recording',
F
'communication to the public' - Meanings of, in the context of
Copyright Act, 1957.
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD:
G Per Prafulla C. Pant, J.:
1. As per sub-section (10) of s.19 of Copy Rights Act, 1957
"No assignment of the copyright in any work to make a sound
recording which does not form part of any cinematograph film
shall affect the right of the author of the work to claim an equal
H
728
INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF SOCIETIES OF 729
AUTHORS AND COMPOSERS (CISAC) v. ADITYA PANDEY

share of royalties and consideration payable for any utilization of A
such work in any form. Sub-section (10) was inserted with effect
from 21.06.2012 vide Act No. 27 of 2012, on the day the plaint
was filed before trial court in the year 2006. As such rights as
exist w.e.f. 21.06.2012 were not the same prior to it. [Paras 17
and 18) [740-B, E-F)
B
2. There is distinction between assignment of a copyright
of a work and licence to use the work. In the assignment, normally,
ownership of the copyright of the work is transferred but in the
case of licence another person is allowed to use the work by the
author. [Para 20) [742-BJ
c
3. Though each of the seven sub-clauses of clause (a) of
Section 14 of Copyrights Act, 1957 relating to literary, dramatic
or musical work, are independent of one another, but reading
these sub-clauses independently cannot be interpreted to mean
that the right of producer of sound recording, who also comes
under definition of author under Section 2(d)(v), and has a right D
to communicate his work to the public under Section 14(e)(iii) of
the Act is lost. It is· nobody's case that the defendant/respondents
had stolen the lyric or that sound recording is made without licence
from the lyricist or musician. The plea of the appellants that the
permission granted to defendant was S(l11s the right to
E
communicate the sound recording to the public, cannot be
accepted as there appears no such term and condition between
the parties depriving the defendant from communicating his work
of making song to the public. [Para 21) [742-C-E)
Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Eastern Indian
Motion Pictures Association and others 1977 (3) SCR F
206 : (1977) 2 SCC 820; Entertainment Network (India)
Ltd v. Super Cassette lndustriesLtd. 2008 (9) SCR 165
: (2008) 13 sec 30 - relied on.
4. So far as the International Conventions and Treaties are
concerned, the law has been amended by Act 27 of 2012 w.e.f. G
21.06.2012. In the present case the suit was filed in 2006, and
the law as it existed has to be applied, for the period prior to
21.06.2012. [Para 21) [742-E]
5. There is no error in the impugned order passed by the
High Court. However, it is clarified that with effect from H
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 6 S.C.R.

A 21.06.2012, in view of snb-section (10) of Section 19, the
assignment of the copyright in the work to make sound recording
which does not form part of any cinematograph film, shall not
affect the right of the author of the work to claim an equal share
of royalties or/and consideration payable for utilization of such
work in any form by the plaintiff/respondent. [Para 24] [744-G-H;
B
745-A]
Per Ranjan Gogoi, J. (Concurring) :
1. Three classes ofworks in which copyright subsists under
Section 13(1) of the Copyright Act are (a) original literary,
dramatic, musical and artistic works, (b) cinematograph films and
c (c) sou~d recording. A reading of the provisions of the Act show
that such copyright co-exists. [Para 2] [745-D]
2.1 The present appeals being against an interim order,
naturally, strong and compulsive reasons exist for exercise of
judicial restraint in the manner and extent of exercise- of
D jurisdiction. The court must refrain from expressing any opinion,
whatsoever, touching upon the merits of the controversy, lest,
the same may prejudice either of the parties in the suit. Though
an order, even interim, sans any reasons, would not be judicially
acceptable, the precise exercise that a court would be required
to undertake at the interim stage must be left to the wise
E discretion of the concerned court itself. It is not only difficult but
also undesirable to lay down the parameters and contours of the
exercise of judicial power at the interim stage by expressly laying
conditions which would be binding under Article 141 of the
Constitution. An elaborate reasoning with the "footnote" that
F the same are primafacie or tentative is hardly an effective remedy
to prevent the imprint of such observations on the human mind
that mans the court at different levels. [Para 3] [745-G-H; 746-
A-B]
2.2 The object of an interim exercise by the court is to find
a reasonable solution to the matter which should govern the
G
parties until disposal of the suit where the main controversy is
required to be decided. The order of the Single Judge which has
been affirmed in appeal by the Division Bench of the High Court,
strikes a reasonable note to find a workable solution during the
pendency of the suit. Therefore, the order of the High Court
H needs to be upheld. [Para 4] [746-C-D]
INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF SOOETIES OF 73 I
AUTHORS AND COMPOSERS (CISAC) v. ADITYA PANDEY

3. Two disturbing trends which have emerged from the A
facts of the present cases. The suits, by now, are over 10 years
old; yet, there has been no substantial progress therein. The
pendency of the suits, for a period of over 10 years with no
progress and the conduct of the plaintiffs in not filing/placing their
evidence before the trial Judge, though vehemently contesting
B
the present appeals (against interim orders) are facts which are
difficult to reconcile. Equally difficult is to accept the fact that the
International Confederation of Societies of Authors and
Composers (ICSAC), though not a party to any of the suits but
have been allowed to contest the interim matter before this Court
on the basis that the order of the High Court adversely affects c
the societies' rights, has chosen not to implead itself as a party
to the suits and pursue the same. [Para 5] [746-E, G-H; 747-A-
B]
Case Law Reference
In the Judgment of Prafulla C. Pant, J.: D
1977 (3) SCR 206 relied on Para 9
2008 (9) SCR 165 relied on Para 22
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 9412-
9413 of2016.
E
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.05.20 I2 of the High Court
. of Delhi in FAO (OS) No. 423-424 of2011
WITH
C.A. Nos. 9414-9415 and 9416 of2016.
Sudhir Chandra, P. Chidambaram, Guru Krishna Kumar, Sr. Advs., F
Parijat Sinha, Ms. Reshmi Rea Sinha, Pravin Anand Dhruv Anand, Ms.
Udita Patro, Shamim Shahin, Sridhar Potaraju, Pragyan Sharma,
Himanshu Bagai, Shikhar Garg,Arjun, Gaichang, Ms. Mandakani Sharma,
Arjun Singh, Gaichang P., Ms. Sindoora, Advs. for the Appellant.
C.A. Sundaram, Sr.Adv.,Abhishek Malhotra,Angad Dugal, Rijul G
Taneja, Aaahan Mehrotra, Ms. Liz Mathew, Neel Mason, Senthil
Jagadeesan, Govind Manoharan, Ms. Shruti Iyer, Ashok Kumar Juneja,
Chand Qureshi, Vijendra Kasana, Nikhil Majithia, Ms. Swathi Sukumar,
Ms, Anu Paarcha, Sai Vinod, Nikhil Nayar, Satish Murthi, Ms. Uma
Devi M., Sanad Ramakrishnan, Advs. for the Respondents.
H
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 6 S.C.R.

A The Judgments of the Court were delivered by
PRAFULLA C. PANT, J. I. Leave granted.
2. All these three appeals are directed against the order dated
May 08, 2012 passed by Division Bench ofHigh Court of Delhi in FAO
(OS) Nos. 423-424 of 2011 and FAO (OS) No. 425 of 2011 with CM
B
No. 19128 of 2011, whereby said Court has dismissed the appeals, and
affirmed the order of the learned Single Judge in Suit CS (OS) No. 1185
of 2006 and Copyright Infringement Suit CS(OS) No. 1996 of 2009
disposing of the Interim Applications moved for temporary injunction
and directions.
c 3. Learned Single Judge had disposed of Interim Applications in
above mentioned suits as under:-
"55. In the light of the above conclusions- which are prima facie
in nature, and do not preclude the plaintiffs in both cases, from
establishing and proving their case- the following directions are
D issued:
(i) In the synergy suit, (i.e. CS(OS) 1185/2006) the applications
for temporary injunctions, i.e. IA Nos., 6486/2006, 7027/
2006 and 6487/2006 are disposed of by stating that the
defendants do not have to secure a Iicense from the
E plaintiffs;
(ii) In the CR! suit, (i.e. CS(OS) No. 1996/2009) the application,
i.e. IA Nos. 13691/2009, 13692/2009 are disposed of with
the directions that in case the defendants wish to perform
the sound recording in public, i.e. play them, a license from
F PPRS is essential; in case the musical works are to be
communicated or perfonned in the public, independently,
through an artiste, the license of IPRS is essential. In case
the defendant wishes to hold an event involving
performances or communication of works of both kinds to
G the public, the license or authorization of both IPRS and
PPRS are necessary. The defendant is accordingly restrained
from communicating any of such works to the public, or
performing them, in the public, without such appropriate
authorization, or licensing pending adjudication of the suit."
4. Issue involved in the present appeals is that where lyric written
H
INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF SOCIETIES OF AUTHORS AND 733
COMPOSERS (C!SAC) v. AD!TYA PANDEY [PRAFULLA C. PANT, J.]

by 'X' (lyricist) and music composed by 'Y' (musician) are used to A
make sound recording by 'Z' (Sound Recording Company), whether' A'
(Event Management Company/Event Organizer) is required to seek
licence from 'X' and 'Y' for subsequently playing the song in public
even after 'A' had paid for the broadcasting of the song to 'Z' (Sound
Recording Company)?
B
5. Indian Performing Rights Society Limited (For short "IPRS")
(appellant before us in two of the three appeals) is the Society of authors
ofliterary work, and composers of musical work, is the plaintiff/appellant.
And International Confederation of Societies, is a non-governmental
organization, an association of copyright societies, registered in France,
which was not the party before the trial court, is the appellant in one of c
the above three appeals. Respondent No.2 - Synergy Media
Entertainment is the Event Management Company of which Respondent
No. I is the Senior Manager (Finance).
6. The case of the plaintiff/appellant is that authors of literary
work and composers of musical work are the first owners of copyright D
in lyric and musical work respectively under the Copyright Act, 1957.
As such they have the right to get restrained Respondent Nos. I and 2
from infringing their copyright, and licence given to sound recording
company does not affect the rights oflyricist or the musician. Reference
has been made to the definition of expression "communication to the E
public" defined under Section 2(ff) and that of 'performance' defined in
Section 2(q) of the Act. Further, reference has been made to the
amendment introduced in 1994 in the Copyright Act, 1957 and it is pleaded
that the right created under Section I 4(a)(iv) cannot be read iii derogation
of right created under Section I 4(a)(iii) of the Act.
F
7. The grievance of the International Confederation Society (IFS)/
3rd party appellant is that the petitioner is aggrieved due to the findings
and alleged legal infirmities in the impugned order as it has an immediate
and direct impact on its members and the creative community for their
interest (which the petitioner represents), stai:ids to suffer loss and injury
as the impugned judgment deprives them oftheir exclusive right to collect G
royalty in cases of communication of sound recordings to the public.
8. On behalf of the appel )ants, it is further argued that the erroneous
finding in the impugned judgment denies the members of the appellants
the right recognized under various international conventions to which
H
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R.

A India is a party, which they hold under copyright law. It is further submitted
that the impugned judgment creates discord between the manner of
exploitation and treatment of same works, in two different countries,
contrary to what the International Conventions and Treaties seek to
achieve. It is contended that the erroneous interpretation of law in the
impugned judgment stands in direct conflict with India's obligations under
B
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works (Paris Act, 1971) and the agreement on Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement, 1994 (TRIPS Agreement),
to which India has acceded. It thus places India out of step with
international copyright norms and practice. Also, it is contended that the
c impugned judgment places the reciprocal agreements between IPRS
and other collecting societies under considerable stress as it makes
impossible for the Indian Performing Right Society Limited to fulfill its
contractual obligations under the reciprocal arrangements, thus affecting
the rights of millions of songwriters, composers and publishers.
D 9. On the other hand, on behalf of the respondent, it is pointed out
that with the amendment made in the Copyright Act, 1957, in the year
2012, the producer of sound recording has an independent copyright of
his work. Relying on the law laid down by this Court in /11dian
Performing Rig/it Society Ltd. v. E<tstern Indian Motion Pictures
Association and otllers', it is contended that once the author of a lyric
E or a musical work parts with a portion of his copyright, by authorizing a
film producer, or producer of sound recording in respect of his work, a
right exists with the latter to exhibit his work to the public. Also, it is
pleaded that the appeals filed by Societies, not registered in India, on
behalf of the lyricists and musicians, under Section 33 of the Act, are not
F maintainable.
I 0. Before further discussion, we think it just and proper to
reproduce the relevant provisions of The Copyright Act, 1957 to
understand the meaning of various words and expressions relevant for
the purposes of this case and to appreciate the rights of the parties.
G Word 'copyright' is defined in Section 14 of the Act which reads as
und.er:
":14.. Meaning of copyright.-
For the purposes of this Act, "copyright" means the .exclusive
1
<1977} 2 sec 820.
H 'Substituted vide Act No. 38 of 1994 w.e.f. l 0.05.1995
INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF SOCIETIES OF AUTHORS AND 735
COMPOSERS (CISAC) v. ADITYA PANDEY [PRAFULLA C. PANT, J.]

right subject to the provisions of this Act, to do or authorise the A
doing of any of the following acts in respect of a work or any
substantial part thereof, namely:-
(a) in the case of a literary, dramatic or musical work, not being a
computer programme, -
(i) to reproduce the work in any material form including the 8
storing of it in any medium by electronic means;
(ii) to issue copies of the work to the public not being copies
already in circulation;
(iii) to perform the work in public, or communicate it t-0 the c
public;
(iv) to make any cinematograph film or sound recording in
respect of the work;
(v) to make any translation of the work;
D
(vi) to make any adaptation of the work;
(vii) to do,- in relation to a translation or an adaptation of the
work, any of the acts specified in relation to the work in
sub-clauses (i) to (vi);
(b) in the case of a computer programme,-
E
(i) to do any of the acts specified in clause (a);
3
[(ii) .to sell or give on commercial rental or offer for sale or for
commercial rental any copy of the computer programme:
Provided that such commercial rental does not apply in respect
of computer programmes where the programme itself is not the F
essential object of the rental.]
(c) in the case of an artistic work,-
'[(i) to reproduce the work in any material form including -
(A) the storing of it in any medium by electronic or G
other means; or
(B) depiction in three dimensions ofa two dimensional
work; or
3
Substituted by Act No. 49of1999 w.e.f. 15.01.2000
4
Substituted by Act No. 27 of 2012 w.e.f. 21.06.2012 H
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R.

A (C) depiction in two dimensions of a three dimensional
work;}
(ii) to communicate the work to the public;
(iii) to issue copies of the work to the public not being copies
already in circulation; · · · ·
B
(iv) to include the work in any cinematograph film;
(v) to make any adaptation of the work;
(vi) to do in relation to an adaptation of the work any of the acts
specified in relation to the work in sub-clauses (i) to (iv);
c (d) In the case of cinematograph film, -
5
[(i) to make a copy of the film, including
(A) a photograph of any image forming part thereof;
or
D (B) storing of it in any medium by electronic or other
means;]
6
{(ii) to sell or give on commercial rental or offer for sale or
for such rental, any copy of the film;]
. E (iii) to communicate the film to the public;
(e) In the case of sound recording, -
(i) to make any other sound recording embodying it
1
[including storing of it in any medium by electronic
or other means];
F 8
[(ii) to sell or give on commercial rental or offer for sale
or for such rental, any copy of the sound recording.[
(iii) to communicate the sound recording to the public.
Explanation: For the purposes of this section, a copy which
G has been sold once shall be deemed to be a copy already in
circulation."

'Substituted by Act No. 27 ·Of 2012 w.e.f. 21.06.2012
•substituted by Act No. 27 of2012 w.e.f. 21.06.2012
'Inserted by Act No. 27 of2012 w.e.f. 21.06.2012
H 'Substituted by Act No. 27 of2012 w.e.f. 21.06.2012
INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF SOCIETIES OF AUTHORS AND 73 7
COMPOSERS(CISAC)v.ADITYAPANDEY[PRAFULLAC.PANT,J.]

11. To appreciate the copyrights of author ofliterary work on one A
hand, and that of the producer of sound recording on the other, it is
necessary to refer to the meaning of "author'', given in clause (d) of
Section 2 of the Act. The same is reproduced below: -
"(2)(d) 'author' means,-
(i) in relation to literary or dramatic work, the author of the work; B
(ii) in relation to a musical work, the composer;
(iii) in relation to an artistic work other than a photograph, the
artist;
(iv) in relation to a photograph, the person taking the photograph; C
[(v) in relation to a cinematograph film or sound recording,
the producer; and
(vi) in relation to any literary, dramatic, musical or artistic
work which is computer-generated, the person who
causes the wor.k to be created;j 9 D

12. The above definition shows that after amendment made in
the definition of"author" by Act No. 38of1994, the producer of sound
recording is also an author. But his right would not affect the separate
right ofany work in respect of which sound recording is made, as provided
in Section ·13(4) quoted below: E
"13(4) The copyright in a cinematograph film or a [sound
in
recording] shall not affect the separate copyright any work in
respect of which or a substantial part of which, the film, or as the
case may be, the [sound recording] 10 is mape".
F
13. It is relevant to mention here that as defined in Section 2(xx),
inserted vide Act No. 27 of2012, "sound recording" means a recording
of sound from which such sounds may be produced regardless of the
medium on which such recording is the method by which the sounds are
produced. And Section 2(ft), inserted by same Amending Act, explains
expression "communication to the public" as under: - G
"(ft) "communication to the public" means making any work or
performance available for being seen or heard or otherwise
•sub clauses (v) and (vi) are added vide Act No. 38of1994 w.e.f. 10.05.1995
w Expression ."sound recording" is substituted for "record" vide Act No. 38 of 1994
w.e.f. 10.05.1995 H
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R.

A "enjoyed by the public directly or by any means of display or
diffusion other than by issuing physical copies of it, whether
simultaneously or at places and times chosen individually,
regardless of whether any member of the public actually sees,
hears or otherwise enjoys the work or performance so made
available. ·
B
Explanation.- For the purposes of this clause,
communication through satellite or cable or any other means
of simultaneous communication to more than one household or
place of residence including residential rooms of any hotel or
hostel shall be deemed to be communication to the public;."
c
14. Section 16 of the Copyright Act, 1957 provides that no person
shall be entitled to copyright otherwise than in accordance of the Act,
and it reads as follows: -
"16. No copyright except as provided in this Act.- No person
D shall be entitled to copyright or any similar right in any work,
whether published or unpublished, otherwise than under and in
accordance with the provisions of this Act or of any other law for
the time being in force, but nothing in this section shall be construed
as abrogating any right or jurisdiction to restrain a breach of trust
or confidence.
,~ E
15. Now, we have to see who is the first owner of copyright and
how to harmonize the copyrights of author ofliterary work and that of
the 'author' of sound recording. Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 17 ofthe
· Copyright Act, 1957 and proviso added to it by Act No. 27of2012, read ·
as under: -
F
"17. First owner of copyright. - Subject to the provisions of
this Act, the author of a work shall be the first owner of the
copyright therein:
Provided that -
G (a) In the case of a literary, dramatic or artistic work made by
the author in the course of his employment by the proprietor
. of a newspaper, magazine or similar periodical under a
contract of service or apprenticeship, for. the purpose of
publication in a newspaper, magazine or similar periodical,
the same proprietor shal I, in the absence of any agreement
H
INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF SOCIETIES OF AUTHORS AND 739
COMPOSERS (CISAC) v. ADITYA PANDEY [PRAFULLA C. PANT, J.]

to the contrary, be the first owner of the copyright in the A
work in so far as the copyright relates to the publication of
the work in any newspaper, magazine or similar periodical,
or to the reproduction of the work for the purpose of its
being so published, but in all other respects the author shall
be the first owner of the copyright in the work;
B
(b) Subject to the provisions of clause (a), in the case of a
photograph taken, or a painting or p011rait drawn, or an
engraving or a cinematograph film made, for valuable
consideration at the instance of any person, such person
shall, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, be
the first owner of the copyright therein;
c

Provided that in case of any work incorporated in a cinematograph
work, nothing contained in clauses (b) and (c) shall affect the
right of the author in the work referred to in clause (a) of sub- D
section (I) of Section 13 ."
Section 13( I )(a) of the Act refers to copyright of original literary,
dramatic, musical and a11istic works."
16. Let us now look into the relevant provisions which govern the
assignment of work by an author of literary or musical work and licenses . · E
in respect thereof to prospective owner of the copyfight or user of the
work. Last proviso to Section 18 with its main part, makes following
reading: -
" 18. Assignment of copyright. - (I) The owner of the copyright
in an existing work or the prospective owner of the copyright in a F
future work may assign to any person the copyright either wholly
or partially and either generally or subject to limitations and either
for the whole of the copyright or any pai1 thereof:

....... Provided also that the author of the literary or musical work G
included in the sound recording but not forming part of any
cinematograph film shall not assign or waive the right to receive
royalties to be shared on an equal basis with the assignee of
copyright for any utilization of such work except to the legal heirs
H
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R.

A of the authors or to a collecting society for collection and
distribution and any assignment to the contrary shall be void. 11
Needless to say that appellants are the collecting societies.
17. Further, sub-sections (3), (4) and (JO) of Section 19, which
are relevant for the purposes of this case, provide as to mode of
B assignment as under: -
"19. Mode of assignment. -

(3) The assignment of copyright in any work shall also specify
c the amount ofroyalty and any other consideration payable, to the
author or his legal heirs during the currency of the assignment
and the assignment shall be subject to revision, extension or
termination on terms mutually agreed upon by the parties.
(4) Where the assignee does not exercise the right assigned
D to him under any of the other sub-sections of this section within
period of one year from the date of assignment, the assignment in
respect of such rights shall be deemed to have lapsed after the
expiry of the said period unless otherwise specified in the
assignment.
E
[(I 0) No assignment of the copyright in any work to make a
sound recording which does not form part of any cinematograph
film shall affect the right of the author of the work to claim an
equal share ofroyalties and consideration payable for any utilization
F of such work in any form."]'~ ·
18. Above quoted sub-section (I 0) of Section 19 is inserted with
effect from 21.06.2012 vide Act No. 27 of2012, which did not exist on
the day the plaint was filed before trial court in the year 2006. As such
rights as exist w.e.f. 21.06.2012 were not the same prior to it.
G 19. In Chapter VI of the Copyright Act, 1957, Section 30 relates
to licence granted by an owner of copyright which reads as under :-
"30. Licences by owners of copyright.- The owner of the

11 Second. third and fourth (Last) provisos are added by Act 27 of2012.
H "Inserted by Act No. 27 of 2012 w.e.f. 21.06.2012
INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF SOCIETIES OF AUTHORS AND 741
COMPOSERS (CISAC) v. ADITYAPANDEY [PRAFULLAC. PANT, J.]

copyright in any existing work or the prospective owner of the A
copyright in any future work may grant any interest in the right by
licence in [writing by him] 13 or by his duly authorised agent:
Provided that in the case of a licence relating to copyright in any
future work, the licence shall take effect only when the work
comes into existence. B
Explanation.- Where a person to whom a licence relating to
copyright in any future work is granted under this section dies
before the work comes into existence, his legal representatives
shall, in the absence ofany provision to the contrary in the licence,
be entitled to the benefit of the licence." C
"31. Compulsory licence in works withheld from public.-
(!) If at any time during the tem1 of copyright in any work which
has been published or performed in public, a complaint is made to
the Copyright Board that the owner of copyright in the work -
(a) .................... . D
(b) has refused to allow communication to the public by broadcast,
of such work or in the case of sound recording the work recorded
in such sound recording, on terms which the complainant considers
reasonable;
E
the Copyright Board, after giving to the owner of the copyright in
the work a reasonable opportunity of being heard and after holding
such inquiry as it may deem necessary, may, if it is satisfied that
the grounds for such refusal are not reasonable, direct the Registrar
of Copyrights to grant to the complainant a licence to republish
the work, perform the work in public or communicate the work to F
the public by [broadcast], as the case may be, subject to payment
to the owner of the copyright of such compensation and subject
to such other terms and conditions as the Copyright Board may
determine; and thereupon the Registrar of Copyrights shall grant
the [licence to such person or persons who, in the opinion of the
G
Copyright Board, is or are qualified to do so] in accordance with.
the directions of the Copyright Board, on payment of such fee as
may be prescribed." 1•
13
Substituted for words 'writing signed by him 'Vide Act 27 of 2012.
"As amended Vi de Act 27 of 2012
H
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 6 S.C.R.

A However, we are not aware if any complaint was made before
Copyright Board in the present matter.
20. At this stage, it is necessary to understand distinction between
assignment of a copyright of a work and Iicence to use the work. In the
assignment, normally, ownership ofthe copyright of the work is transferred
B but in the case of licence another person is allowed to use the work by
the author.
21. A conjoint reading of various provisions of the Act leaves no
doubt that though each of the seven sub-clauses of clause (a) of Section
14 relating to literary, dramatic or musical work, are independent of one
c another, but reading these sub-clauses independently cannot be interpreted
to mean that the right of producer of sound recording, who also comes
under definition of author under Section 2(d)(v), and has a right to
communicate his work to the public under Section I4(e)(iii) of the Act is
lost. It is nobody's case that the defendant/respondents had stolen the
lyric or that sound recording is made without licence from the lyricist or
D musician. Argument advanced on behalf of the appellants that the
permission granted to defendant was sans the right to communicate the
sound recording to the public, cannot be accepted as there appears no
such term and condition between the parties depriving the defendant
from communicating his work of making song to the public. As far as
E the. International Conventions and Treaties are concerned, the law has
been am~nded by Act 27 of2012 w.e.f. 21.06.2012. In the present case
the suit was filed in 2006, and the law as it existed has to be applied, for
the periOd prior to 21.06.2012.
22. We agree with the Division Bench of the High Court that a
Fsong is created by three players namely lyricist, musician and singer.
We have to examine in the present case as to what extent, if any, identities
of above three players break or get diluted when a song is created and
sound recording is done. To understand this and the relevant provisions
of law quoted above, we would like to remind the observations made by
this Court in paragraphs 63, 64 and 69 in Entertainment Network
G (India) Ltd. v. Super Cassette Industries Ltd. 1\ which reads as
under:
"63. A statute as is well known must be read in its entirety. It is
· required to be read chapter by chapter, section by section and
"(2008) 13 sec 30
H
INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF SOCIETIES OF AUTHORS AND 743
COMPOSERS(CISAC)v.AD!TYAPANDEY[PRAFULLAC.PANT,J.]

clause by clause. The definitions of the term "broadcast" as also A
"sound recording" must be given a wide meaning. Clause (a) of
Section 13 protects original work whereas clauses (b) and (c)
protect derivative works. It provides for commercial manifestation
of original work and the fields specified therein. Clause (a) of
sub-section (I) of Section 14 deals with original work. It is
B
extremely broad. In contrast thereto, the copyright on films or
sound recording work operates in restrictive field; they provide
for a restrictive right as would appear from the provisions contained
in Section 14( 1)(e) of the Act.
64. For a proper construction of the provisions, will it be necessary
to keep in mind the difference between the right of the original c
work and right of sound recording? Should we also bear in mind
that there are various forms of intellectual property rights. Section
16 provides that a right, inter alia, in respect of any work must be
claimed only under and in accordance with the provisi011s of the
Act unlike trade mark and passing off rights can be enforced D
even though they are not registered. It must also be noticed that
whereas the term of a copyright in original literary, dramatic,
musical and artistic works not only remains protected in the entire
lifetime of the author but also until 60 years from the beginning of
the calendar year next following the year in which the author
dies, the term of copyright in sound recording subsists only for 60 E
years, but as indicated hereinbefoL_e, the same would not mean
that the right of an owner of sound re~ording is in any way inferior
to that ofright of an owner ofcopyright on original literary work,
etc.
F

69. If the right of an author/society is so pervasive, is it necessary
to construe the provisions under Section 31 of the Act having
regard to the international covenants and the laws operating in
the other countries? The answer to the said question must be
rendered in affirmative. Interpretation of a statute cannot remain G
static. Different canons and principles are to be applied having
regard to the purport and object of the Act. What is essential
therefor is to see that the expanding-area in which the copyright
will have a role to play is covered. While India is a signatory to
the international covenants, the law should have been amended in H
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R.

A terms thereof. Only because laws have not been amended, the
same would not by itself mean that the purport and object of the
Act would be allowed to be defeated. If the ground realities change,
the interpretation should also change. Ground ·realities would not
only depend upon the new situations and changes in the societal
conditions vis-a-vis the use of sound recording extensively by a
B
large public, but also keeping in view of the fact that the
Government with its eyes wide open have become a signatory to
international conventions".
23. In b1dim1 Performi11g Rig/tis Society Ltd. vs. Eastem
l11dia11 Motio11 Pictures Associatio11 (111(/ Other (supra) (Which was
c decided long before 2012 Amendments) in paragraph 15, this Court has
made following observations: -
" 15 ............................. Though a conflict may at first sight
seem to exist between Section 13(4) and Section 14(1 )(a)(iii) on
the one hand and Section 14( 1Xc)(ii) on the other, a close scrutiny
D and a harmonious and rational instead of a mechanical construction
of the said provisions cannot but lead to the irresistible conclusion
that once the author of a lyric or a musical work parts with a
portion of his copyright by authorising a film producer to make a
cinematograph film in respect of his work and thereby to have his
E work incorporated or recorded on the sound track of a
cinematograph film, the latter acquires by virtue of Section 14( 1)(c)
of the Act on completion of the cinematograpil film a copyright
which gives him the exclusive right inter alia of performing the
work in public i.e. to cause the film insofar as it consists of visual
images to be seen in public and insofar as it consists of the acoustic
F portion including a lyric or a musical work to be heard in public
without securing any further permission of the author (composer)
of the lyric or musical work for the performance of the work in
public .......................... "
24. In view of the above settled principles of law, and for the
G reasons discussed by us, we are unable to find any error in the impugned
order passed by the High Court in a suit filed in 2006. However, we
would like to clarify, that with effect from 21.06.2012, in view of sub-
section (1 O~ of Section 19, the assignment of the copyright in the work to
make sound recording which does not form part of atiy cinematograph
H"' .
film, shall not affect the. right bf the author of the work to claim an equal
INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF SOCIETIES OF AUTHORS AND 745
COMPOSERS (CISAC) v. ADITYAPANDEY

share of royalties or/and consideration payable for utilization of such A
work in any form by the plaintiff/respondent.
25. Therefore, all the appeals stand disposed of with the
observations as above. No order as to costs.
PER RANJAN GOGOi, J.
B
I. I have had the privilege of going through the judgment prepared
by my learned brother (Prafulla C. Pant, J.). While agreeing with the
conclusions reached by my learned brother, I would like to very briefly
indicate the reasons for the same which are somewhat different.
2. The relevant provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957, as amended, c
have been set out in detail in the judgment of my learned brother. I,
therefore, need not extract the same all over again. Suffice it to notice
that three classes of works in which copyright subsists under Section
13(1) of the Act are (a) original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic
works, (b} cinematograph films and (c) sound recording. A reading of
the provisions of the Act show that such copyright co-exists. The question D
in the suit in which the impugned order has been passed by the High
Court is one of determination of the precise extent of such co-existence
and the interplay between the rights in the three classes of works
enumerated under Section 13. The said question has been identified in
Para 35 of the impugned order of the Division Bench which is as follows: E
"The area of dispute is: what happens to the copyright in
an underlying work (literary and musical works) when the
derivative work (sound recording) is exploited. Does he
who obtains a permission from the copyright owner of the
derivative work to broadcast by way of communicating to F
the public said derivative work, additionally requires a
similar permission from the owner of the underlying works
i.e. the literary and musical works?"
3. The present appeals being against an interim order, naturally.
strong and compulsive reasons exist for exercise of judicial restraint in
G
the manner and extent of exercise of jurisdiction. Though it is too
elementary it must be said that the court must refrain from expressing
any opinion, whatsoever, touching upon the merits of the controversy,
lest, the same may prejudice either of the parties in the suit. While there
can be no doubt that an order, even interim, sans any reasons, would not
H
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R.

A be judicially acceptable, the precise exercise that a court would be required
to undertake at the interim stage must be left to the wise discretion of
the concerned court itself. It is not only difficult but also undesirable to
lay down the parameters and contours of the exercise ofjudicial power
at the interim stage by expressly laying conditions which would be binding
under Article 141 of the Constitution. But it needs to be reminded that an
B
elaborate reasoning with the "footnote" that the same are prima facie or
tentative is hardly an effective remedy to prevent the imprint of such
observations on the human mind that mans the court at different levels.
This is what appears to have happened in the present case.
4. The object of an interim exercise by the court is to find a
c reasonable solution to the matter which should govern the parties until
disposal of the suit where the main controversy is required to be decided.
Having perused the order of the learned Single Judge as well as the
Division Bench, I am of the view that the order of the Single Judge, set
out in opening part of the judgment of my learned brother (which has
D been affirmed in appeal by the Division Bench of the High Court), strikes
a reasonable note to find a workable solution during the pendency of the
suit. I therefore fully agree with the views expressed by my learned
brother that the order of the High Court needs to be upheld.
5. However, while saying so I would like to take note of two
E disturbing trends which have emerged from the facts of the present
cases. The suits, by now, are over I0 years old; yet, there has been no
substantial progress therein. Parties to the suits seem to have lost all
interest in prosecuting the same, perhaps, because the exhaustive orders
at the interim stage had virtually foreclosed the issues in the suits. It is
evident from the order dated 241h August, 2016 passed by the Joint
F Registrar of the High Court in O.S No. 1185 of2006 that due to repeated
adjournments sought on behalf of the plaintiff and on account of the
failure of the plaintiff to file affidavit evidence of witnesses, the right of
the plaintiff to lead evidence has been closed. In the other suits i.e. O.S.
No.666 of 2006 and O.S. No.1996 of 2009 there has, again, been
G persistent defaults on the part of the plaintiffs and the said suits now
stand transferred to the competent Ci vi I Court from the Delhi High Court.
The pendency of the suits, for a period of over I 0 years with no progress
and the conduct of the plaintiffs in not filing/placing their evidence before
the learned trial Judge, though vehemently contesting the present appeals
(against interim orders) are facts which are difficult to reconcile. Equally
H
INTERNATIONAL CON FEDERATION OF SOCIETIES OF AUTHORS AND 747
COMPOSERS (CISAC) v. ADITYAPANDEY [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]

difficult is to accept the fact that the International Confederation of A
Societies of Authors and Composers (ICSAC), though not a party to
any of the suits but have been allowed to contest the interim matter
before this Court on the basis that the order of the High Court adversely
affects the societies' rights, has chosen not to imp lead itself as a party to
the suits and pursue the same.
B
6. Having said what was felt required and necessary we dispose
of all the appeals by holding all observations, findings and views expressed
by the High Court in the ·original as well as appellate proceedings before
it to be of no legal effect, whatsoever, in so far as the merits of the suits
are concerned which will now be expedited and heard and disposed of
within a year from today. c
K!!lpana K. T~ipat)ly Appeals disposed of.

"