Holding

A voluntary resignation accepted by the employer does not constitute retrenchment under Section 2(s), so Section 6N is inapplicable and no compensation is due.

Summary

Ram Singh, employed by J.K. Cotton & WVG Mills since 1960, tendered a voluntary resignation on 1 November 1970 due to family circumstances, which the employer accepted effective 16 November 1970. After receiving his dues and gratuity, Singh filed an industrial dispute seeking reinstatement, alleging his resignation was not voluntary. The Labour Court awarded reinstatement, but the High Court held the resignation voluntary yet classified the termination as "retrenchment" under Section 2(s) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, finding the employer had not complied with Section 6N and set aside the reinstatement. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that when an employee voluntarily resigns and the employer merely accepts, the termination is not at the employer's instance and does not constitute retrenchment; consequently, Section 6N does not apply and no compensation is payable. The appeal was allowed, overturning the lower courts' orders.

Issues considered

Whether termination of service resulting from the employer's acceptance of an employee's voluntary resignation amounts to "retrenchment" under Section 2(s) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Whether the employer is required to comply with the conditions precedent under Section 6N of the same Act in such a case.
Whether the employee is entitled to compensation under Section 6N.

Legislation cited

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act)s. 25F, s. 2(oo)
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946s. 5
Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 2(s), s. 6N

Subjects

retrenchmentvoluntary resignationvoluntary retirementSection 6Ncompensationindustrial disputelabour court awardSupreme Court

Judgment

J.K. COTION SPG. AND WVG MILLS CO. LTD.,
A
KALPI ROAD, KANPUR
v.
STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.

JULY 2TIH, 1990
B
[S. RANGANATHAN AND A.M. AHMADI, JJ.]

U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 2(s) and 6N-
Resignation voluntarily tendered by an employee--Employer accepting
the same:_Services of employee terminated-Whether amounts to
'retrenchment'.
c
One Ram Singh was appointed by the appellant-company on
10.3.1960. On 1.11.1970, he addressed a letter of resignation to the
Manager of the company saying that owing to his family circumstances,
it was no longer possible for him to continue in service and that he was
compelled to sever his connections with the company. He made a D
demand of all his dues. He wrote another letter two days later that
someone should be posted in the section where he was working in order
that he may learn the work re: printing of shares, pay-sheets and pay.
registers etc. The appellant-company conveyed the acceptance of the
resignation with effect from the 16th November, 1970 and paid all his dues
on 22.12.1970. The amount of gratuity was also paid later. Ram Singh E
,Z, thereafter raised an industrial dispute and sought a reference under
Section 4K of the U.P. Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. Initially his
demand was not accepted by the State Government but later the State
Government accepted his demand on 28. ll.1974 whereupon the
appellant-company filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging
the said reference made by the State Government but the High Court F
dismissed the petition. The Labour Court thereafter made an award on
the reference, in favour of the employee. It came to the conclusion that
the employee's resignation was not voluntary and therefore his services
had been wrongly terminated and accordingly he was directed to be
reinstated. The appellant challenged the validity of the said award
under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court. The High G
Court c11me to the conclusion that the employee had tendered his resig-
nation voluntarily but it held that termination of the service of the
employee fell within the definition of 'retrenchment' as contained in
Section 2(s) and as the appellant-company had failed to comply with the·
requirement of Section 6N, the termination of service was invalid. The
High Court accordingly set aside the order of reinstatement passed by H

523
------~~~---------------,

524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 3 S.C.R.

the Labour Court and remanded the matter to the Labour Court for a
A
decision on the question whether there was infraction of the provisions
of Section 6N. Being aggrieved by that order of the High Court, the
_appellant,company has filed this appeal after obtaining specfal leave.

Allowing tbe appeal, this Court,
B
HELD: Where a contract of service is determined on the employee
. exercising his right to quit, such termination cannot be said to be at the
instance of the employer to fall within the first P"rt of the definition of
retrenchment in Section 2(s) of the U.P. Industrial D'.sputes Act. [531H; 532A]

. A contract of service can bC determined by either party to the
c contract. If it is determined at the behest of the employer it may amount
to retrenchment unless it is 1'y way of punishment for proved miscon-
duct. But if an employee takes the initiative and exercises his right to
put an end to the contract or service and the employer merely assents to
it, it cannot be said that the employer has terminated the employment.
D In such' cases the employer is merely acceding to the employee's
request; may be even reluctantly. Here the employee's role is active
while the employer's role is passive and formal. The employer cannot
force an unwilling employee to work for him. (53 IE-F]

When an employee resigns hiS office, he formally relinquishes or r
E withdraws from his office; It implies that he has taken a mental decision
to sever his relationship with his employer and thereby put an end to the
contract of service. [533E].

In the present case the employee's request contained in the letter
·, of resignation was accepted by the employer and that brought an end to
'·p -~the contract or service. [534B]
."
-,.This 'was ,;·case or 'voluntary retirement' within the meaning or
the first exception to section 2(s) and therefore the question or grant or
compensation under section 6N did not arise. The employee is not
entitled to any compensation ':'oder section 6N orthe State Act. [SJ.tF]
G
.The State Bank of India v. N. Sundar!l Money, (1976] 1 SCC 822;
Hinaustan Steel Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer;Labour Court, Orissa
~-and Ors., (1976] 4 SCC 222; Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v.
Shambhu Nath Mukherji and others, (1977] 4 SCC 415;Santosh Gupta ?,

--v-State Bank of Patiala, (1980] 3 SCC 340; L. Robert D'Sm;za v.
H • Executive Engineer, Southern Railway and Anr., (1982] 1 SCC 645 ~nil

L __ ·
'
J.K. MILLS v. STATE OF U.P. [AHMADI, J.J 5'0

Corporation of Cochin v. Ja/aji and Ors., [1984] 1LW526, l'.eferred to. A

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3fY7
of 1987.

From the Judgment and Order dated 16.10.1985 of the Allaha-
bad High Court in C.M.W. No. 3689 of 1984. ·a
G.B. Pai, Ms. Urmila Kapoor and S. Janani for the Appellant.

Prithivi Raj, Vishnu Mathur and Ms. S. Dikshit for the
Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c
AHMADI, J. When the service of an employee is terminated
consequent upon the employer accepting the resignation voluntarily
tendered by the employee, does the termination so brought about
amount to 'Retrenchment' within the meaning of Section 2(s) read D
with Section 6N of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is
the question which we are called upon to decide in this appeal by
special leave. The facts relevant to be stated for the disposal of this
appeal are as under:

Ram Singh was employed by the appellant-company on 10th E
March, 1960 and was posted in the Bradma machine section of the
company. His duties were to attend to the ·printing of shares, pay-
sheets, registers, ESI cards etc., relating to the appellant-company.
On 1st November, 1970 he addressed a letter of resignation to the
Manager of the appellant-company in the following words:
F
"R/Sir,

I regret to bring to your kind notice that my family cir-
cumstances do not permit me to continue my service and
hence I am compelled to sever my connections with these
Mills immediately. G

I, therefore, request your goodself kindly to arrange for the
payment of all my dues at an early date."

Two days thereafter he wrote another letter to the Manager of the
company which reads as under: H
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 3 S.C.R.

"R/Sir,
A
Since I have already tendered my resignation from my
services, I request you kindly to depute somebody in the
Bradma Office taking charge and learning the work, so that
the entrusted work may be carried on smoothly.
B
Thanking you so much for making early arrangement as
requested.''

A copy of this letter was endorsed to the Special Executive of the
appellant-company for information and necessary action. On receipt
of the above letters, the Manager of the appellant-company replied as
c under:

"The resignation tendered by you vide your letter dated 1st
instant, is hereby accepted with effect from 16th instant.

D Please hand over charge of the Company's properties in
your possession to Shri R.S. Mathur and collect payment in
full and final settlement from the Mills Pay Office."

After the receipt of this letter the charge of the Bradma Section
was handed-over by the employee to the said R.S. Mathur on 15th
~ November, 1970. The amount due to the employee by way of salary,
allowances, etc., upto 16th November, 1970 was worked out but the
actual payment was received by the employee on 22nd December,
1970. He was also paid his service gratuity at the end of February,
1971. It appears that the employee raised an industrial dispute and
sought a reference under Section 4K of the State Act. The employee's
F demand for a reference was initially rejected by the State Government
on 12th November, 1973 but it came to be accepted subsequently on
28th November, 1974. The appellant-company thereupon filed a writ
petition challenging the said reference made by the State Government
but the High Court dismissed the petition on 7th September, 1981.
Pursuant to the reference, the Labour Court made an Award in favour
G of the employee on 25th January, 1984. The Labour Court came to the
conclusion that the employee's resignation was not voluntary and,
therefore, his services had been wrongly terminated with effect from
15th November, 1970. He was ordered to be reinstated. Against this
Award of the Labour Court the appellant approached the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court came to the
H conclusion that the employee had tendered his resignation voluntarily
J.K. MILLS v. STATE OF U.P. !AHMADI, J.] 527

and without any threat or coercion. It also took the view that the claim
A
'.>· for overtime wages was an after-thought. However, considering the
definition of 'retrenchment' in Section 2(s), the High Court came to
the conclusion that the termination of service of the employee fell
within the said definition and as the appellant company had failed to
observe the requirements of section 6N, the termination of service was
clearly invalid. The approach to the High Court is reflected in the B
following passage of ih Judgment:

"The contention raised is that there was no act of the
employer in this connection and hence this may not be said
to be a case of retrenchment of the respondent. To this I do
not find possible to agree. There is no denial that the
respondent had been in continuous service for not less than c
one year within the meaning of Section 6N. According to
Section 2(s), retrenchment covers termination by the emp-
loyer of the service of a workman for any reason what-
soever. To this there are exceptions applicable where the
termination is by way of punishment inflicted as a result of a D
disciplinary action or voluntary retirement of the workman
or retirement of the workman on attaining the age of
superannuation. The provision is in pari materia with sec-
tion 2(oo) of the Central Act. The case does not fall within
)• any of these exceptions. Voluntary retirement of a work-
man may not stand in need of acceptance by the employer; E
this may be hedged in with certain conditions such as those
relating to certain number of years having been put in
service and the like, but resignation may be tendered at any
time though it requires acceptance to be effective. There is
retrenchment under law where the services of a workman
stand terminated for ariy reason whatsoever. This may not F
be a consequence directly flowing from an act of the emp-
loyer. The material factor would be whether there is de-
termination of the relationship of employer and workman
between the parties. If as a consequence this relationship
has ceased or has been brought to an end, there is the
resultant termination of the services of the workman." G

In support of this view reliance was placed on the decisions of this
Court in The State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money, [1976] 1 SCC
822; Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court,
Orissa & Others, [1976] 4 SCC 222, Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd.
v. Shambhu Nath Mukherji and Others. (1977] 4 SCC 415; Santosh H
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990] 3 S.C.R.

A Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala, [1980] 3 SCC 340 and L. Robert
D'Souza v. Executive Engineer, Southern Railway and Another, [1982] ~
1 SCC 645. Reliance was aiso placed o.n the decision of the Kerala
High Court in Corporation of Cochin v. Jalaji & Others, [1984) 1 LU
526.
B Proceeding further the High Court concluded as under:

" ..... the present is a case where there was act of the
employer also before the termination became effective. As
discussed above, the resignation tendered by the respon-
dent could not take effect without the acceptance on the
c part of the employer. The acceptance was accorded on
November 4, 1970, expressly in writing. This clearly is an
act of the employer which put a seal to the matter and
brought about cessation of the relationship of the employer .,
and the workman. Therefore, there is no escape from the
conclusion that it was a case of retrenchment. It remains to
D be seen on relevant material whether in fact there was com-
• pliance made of the requirement of section 6N."

However, the order of reinstatement passed by the Labour Court,
Kanpur was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Labour
Court for a decision on the question whether there was an infraction of
E section 6N. The High Court, however, made it clear that "the issue of
resignation shall not be open to readjudication". In other words, the
only question which the Labour Court was required to consider was
whether the retrenchment was in conformity with section 6N of the
State Act. Feeling aggrieved by this order the appellant-company has
approached this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.
F
The State Act, i.e., Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ;c
was enacted to provide powers to prevent strikes and lock-outs, to
settle industrial disputes and for other incidental matters. Section 2(s)
defines the term 'Retrenchment' as under:
G "2{s): 'Retrenchment' means the termination by the emp-
loyer of the service of a workman for any reason what-

11 I
soever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of
disciplinary action, but does not include-

(i) voluntary retirement of the workmen; or
-
J.K. MILLS v. STATE OF U.P. \AHMADI, J.J 529

(ii) retirement of the workmen on reaching the age of
';>-
A
superannuation if the contract of employment between the
employer and workman concerned contains a stipulation in
that behalf."

This definition is in pari materia with the definition of 'retrenchment'
B
found in section 2(oo) of the Central Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 as it stood prior to its amendment by Act LIX of 1984. Section 6N
r of the State Act reads as under:

"6N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman.
-No workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an
c
employer shall be retrenched by that employer until-

(a) the workman has been given one month's notice in
writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the
D
period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid
in lieu of such notice wages for the period of the notice;

Provided that no such notice shall be necessary if the
l( retrenchment is under an agreement which specifies a date
for the termination of service; E

..
~
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrench-
ment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen
days' average pay for every completed year of service or
any part thereof in excess of six months; and

(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the State
F

Government.''

This section substantially reproduces section 25F of the Central Act.
G
lrt the Central Act the proviso came to be omitted by Act LIX of 1984
and instead clause (bb) came to be added to section 2( oo).
~~-
The first question which we must consider_ is whether in the
background of facts stated earlier it can be said that the services of the
employee were terminated by way of 'retrenchment' as understood by H
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1990] 3 S.C.R.

A section 2(sJ and, if yes, whether the employer was required to comply
with the provisions of section 6N of the State Act. It becomes clear on ":/
a plain reading of the definition of the term 'retrenchment' that it
comprises of two parts; the first part is the inclusive part which defines
retrenchment whereas the second part is in the nature of an exception
and excludes two types of cases from the scope and ambit of the said
.B definition. Under the first part termination of an employee's service by
the employer for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than by way of
punishment inflicted as a disciplinary measure, amounts to retrench-
ment. Under the second part cases of (i) voluntary retirement & (ii) -"t
retirement on superannuation are excluded from purview of the first
part of the definition. Termination of service can be brought about in
c diverse ways by an employer but every termination is not retrench-
ment, as for example, termination of service by way of punishment for
proved misconduct. The words 'for any reason whasoever' are
undoubtedly words of wide import and hence termination of service by .....~
the employer will attract the definition of retrenchment unless it is
shown to be penal in nature brought about by way of disciplinary
D action or as falling within one of the two exclusion clauses extracted
earlier. In order to counter the employee's contention that he was
retrenched from service on the employer having communicated the
acceptance of his resignation, the employer has placed reliance on the
first clause, namely, that the workman had voluntarily retired from
service. The letter dated !st November, 1970 written by the employee :s._
E to the Manager of the appellant-company expressing his desire to
resign his job shows that it was a voluntary act on the part of the
employee. This was followed by another letter of 3rd November, 1970
whereby the workman requested the company to depute someone to
take charge of the Bradma office so that he gets acquainted with the
work to ensure a smooth take over. It was on this request of the
F employee that the appellant-company accepted his resignation by the
letter of 4th November, 1970 with effect from 16th November, 1970.
From this correspondence it is crystal clear that the employee desired
.. •
to sever his relations with the appellant-company on account of his
family circumstances. But for this request made by the employee there
was no reason for the appellant-company to terminate the contract of
G service on its own. Just as an employer has a right to terminate the
service of an employee, an employee too has a right to put an end to
the contract of employment by informing his employer of his intention
~-
to give up the job. This right is speeifically conferred by clause 21 of ·.
the Standing Orders certified under Section 5 of the Industrial Emp-
loyment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. This clause reads as under:
fl
J.K. MILLS v. STATE OF U.P. [AHMADI, J.] 531

~-.
"Any permanent clerk desirous of leaving the company's
A
' service shall give one month's notice in writing to the Man-
ager unless he has a specific agreement providing for a
longer or shorter notice. If any permanent clerk leaves the
service of the company without giving noti:e, he shall be
liable to be sued for damages."
B
Similar clause with reduced notice period is also to be found in the
-r certified Standing Orders for operatives. Therefore, one of tbe ways of
terminating the contract of employment is resignation. If an employee
makes his intention to resign his job known to the employer and the

r latter accepts the resignation, the contract of employment comes to an
end and with it stands severed the employer-employee relationship.
Under the common law the resignation is not complete until it is
c
- accepted by the proper authority and before such acceptance an emp-
< loyee can change his mind and withdraw the resignation but once the
resignation is accepted the contract comes to an end and tbe relation-
ship of master and servant stands snappe.d. Merely because the emp-
D
loyer is expected to accept tbe employee's resignation it cannot be said
that the employer has brought about an end to the contract of employ-
ment so as to bring the case within tbe first part of the definition of
retrenchment. A contract of service can be determined by either party
x to the contract. If it is determined at the behest of the employer it may
amount to retrenchment unless it is by way of punishment for proved
E
misconduct. But if an employee takes the initiative and exercises his
right to put an end to the contract of service and the employer merely
assents to it, it cannot be said that the employer has terminated the
employment. In such cases the employer is merely acceding to tbe
employee's request, may be even reluctantly. Here the employee's
role is active while the employer's role is passive and formal. The
~ employer cannot force an unwilling employee to work for him. Under F
clause 21 of the certified Standing Orders all that the employee ·is
required to do is to give the employer a notice to quit and on the expiry
of the notice period his service would come to an end. A formal
acceptance of the employee's desire by the employer cannot mean that
it is the employer who is putting an end to the contract of employment.
It womd be unfair to saddle the employer with the liability to pay
G
compensation even where the service is terminated on the specific
~-
request of tbe employee. Such an intention cannot be attributed to the
legislature. We are, therefore, of the opinion that where a contract of
service is determined on the employee exercising his right to quite,
such termination cannot be said to be at the instance of the employer
H
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 3 S.C.R.

to fall within the first part of the definition of retrench."Ilent in section
2_(s) of the State Act.

The High Court has placed reliance on ,four· decisions 1,;f !zu•
.Court to which we may now advert. In Sundara Money's case the
- einployment was for a fixed duration of 9 days, on the expiry whereof
B the service was to end. This condition was imposed unilaterally. The
employment was to terminate not because the employee did not desire
to serve but because of the unilateral condition imposed by the
employer. The initiative for the termination, therefore, came from the
employer attracting the· wide terminology of section 2(oo). In
Hindustan Steel Ltd. the termination of service was by efflux of time.
·Placing reliance on the law laid down in Sundara Money's case and the
_,. .· C proviso to section 25F(a), this Court held that the termination of
service was by way of retrenchment. In the case of Delhi Cloth Mills
• the· employee's name was taken as automatically removed from the
rolls of the company under the Standing Orders for continued absence
without pjior intimation. The striking off the name was clearly an act
D of the employer resulting in termination of service amounting to re-
trenchment. Santosh Gupta's was a case of termination of service on
·• account of her failure to pass the prescribed test. That was the reason
for terminating her service. All the same· it was the employer's action
which resulted in the tem1ination of her service attracting section
2(00). In the case of Robert D'souza the iermination was founded on
. E the ground of unauthorised absence from duty which clearly was an act
of the employer. In all the above cases on which the High Court placed
reliance_~ no question of termination of serviCe on the employee volun-
tarily tendering his resignation arose for consideration. These cases
are, therefore, not helpful since they tum on their own special facts.
' "'-- None of them deals with a case of voluntaiy resignation tendered by an
p'-employee ..
""'··We may
.
now examine the question from another angle, namely,
whetller an employee whose resignation has been accepted by the
employer falls within the first exclusion clause to the definition of the
. term 'retrenchment'. There can be no d"olibt that aresignation must be
G· voluntarily tendered for if it is tendered on account of duress or coer-
.cion, it ceases to be a voluntary act of the employee expressing a desire
---._to quite service. In the present case the High Court has come to the
conclusion that the employee had tendered his resignation voluntarily.
Does termination of service brought about by the acceptance of resig-
nation fall with the expression 'voluntary retirement'? The meaning' t
H the term 'resign' and '.retire' in different dictionaries is as under.
J.K. MILLS v. STATE OF U.P. [AHMADI. J.] 533
TABLE
I'-· ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ A
Name of the Meaning of 'Resign' Meaning of' Retire'
Dictionary

Black's Law Formal renouncement to terminate employment
Dictionary or relinquishment or service upon reaching B
(5th Edn.) of an office . retirement age.
. _.....
t: Shorter Oxford To relinquish, The act ofrefiring
English surrender, give up or withdrawing to
Dictionary or hand over (so.me- or from a place or
(Revised Edn. thing); esp., an position.
of 1973) office, position, c
right, claim. etc.
To give up an office
or position; to
retire.
D
The Random To give up an To withdraw from office,
House Diction- office, position· business or active life
ary (College etc.; to relinquish
Edn.) (right, claim,
)( agreement etc.)
E
From the aforesaid dictionary meanings it becomes clear that
when ah employee resigns his office, he formally relinquishes or
withdraws from his office. It implies that he has taken a mental deci-
sion to sever his relationship with his employer and thereby put an end
to the contract of service. As pointed out earlier just as an employer
F.
can terminate the services of his employee under the contract. So also
an employee can inform his employer that he does not desire to serve
him any more. Albeit, the employee would have to give notice of his
intention to snap the existing relationship to enable tbe employer to
make alternative arrangements so that his work does not suffer. The
period of notice will depend on the period prescribed by the terms of
G
employment and if no such period is prescribed, a reasonable time
must be given before the relationship is determined. If an employee is
not permitted by the terms of his contract to determine the relation-
ship of master and servant, such an employment may be branded as
bonded labour. That is why in Central Inland Water Transport Corpo-
ration v. Brojonath Ganguly, [1986] 3SCC 156 at page 228 this Court H
observed as under:
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 3 S.C.R.

A "By entering upon a contract of employment a person does
··~
not sign a bond of slavery and a permanent employee can-
not be deprived of his right to resign. A resignation by an
employee would, however, normally require to be accepted
by the employer in order to be effective."
B
In the present case the employee's request contained in the letter
of resignation was accepted by the employer and that brought an end
to the contract of service. The meaning of term 'resign' as found in the
Shorter Oxford Dictionary includes 'retirement'. Therefore, when an
employee voluntarily tenders his resignation it is an act by which he
voluntarily gives up his job. We are, therefore, of the opinion that
c such a situation would be covered by the expression 'voluntary retire-
ment' within the meaning of cluase (i) of Section 2(s) of the State Act.
In Santosh Gupta's case Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed as under:

"Voluntary retrenchment of a workman or the retrench-
ment of the workman on reaching the age of superanuation
D can hardly be described as termination, by the employer, of
the service of a workman".

(Here the word 'retrenchment' has reference to 'retirement'.)
I
The above observation clearly supports the view which commends to
E us. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was not right
in concluding that because the employer accepted the resignation offer
voluntarily made by the employee, he terminated the service of the
employee and such termination, therefore, fell within the expression
'retrenchment' rendering him liable to compensate the employee un-
der section 6N. We are also of the view that this was a case of 'volun-
F tary retirement' within the meaning of the first exception to section
2(s) and therefore the question of grant of compensation under section
6N does not arise. We, therefore, cannot allow the view of the High
Court to stand.

For the above reasons we allow this appeal, set aside the orders
G of the Courts below and hold that the employee is not entitled to any

-
compensation under section 6N of the State Act. The appeal is
allowed accordingly. No costs throughout. ·

Y.Lal Appeal allowed.