Holding

The petition is dismissed; the dharna does not amount to contempt, no contempt is found against respondents 1 and 2, and respondent 3 may be proceeded against for prima‑facie contempt.

Summary

The petitioners alleged that three respondents organised a dharna outside the Supreme Court on 30 December 2000, shouted abusive slogans attacking the integrity of the judges and assaulted the petitioners to pressure the Court into favouring their Narmada dam case. The respondents filed affidavits denying that any contemptuous slogans were uttered; two admitted participation in the dharna but claimed it was a legitimate protest, while the third asserted a right to peaceful protest and criticised the judiciary in general terms. The Court examined whether a dharna per se amounts to contempt, whether the alleged slogans constitute criminal contempt, and whether the petition complied with the Rules to regulate contempt proceedings and the Contempt of Courts Act. It held that a dharna is not contempt unless it obstructs court functioning, and no evidence showed such obstruction; the allegations of abusive slogans were unsubstantiated and the respondents' statements either fell within fair criticism (respondent 2) or, in the case of respondent 3, prima‑facie imputed improper motives and could be proceeded against. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, with no contempt action against respondents 1 and 2, and a notice issued to respondent 3.

Issues considered

The holding of a dharna outside the Supreme Court – does it constitute contempt of court?
Do alleged shouted slogans attacking the integrity of judges amount to criminal contempt?
Is the contempt petition procedurally defective under the Rules to regulate proceedings for contempt and Sections 14 and 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971?
Do statements made in affidavits constitute fair criticism or contempt?
Can the Supreme Court act suo motu without the consent of the Attorney General or Solicitor General in contempt matters?

Legislation cited

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 14, s. 15, s. 23, s. 5
Rules to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975s. 3, s. 4, s. 5

Subjects

contempt of courtdharnafair criticismprocedural defectSupreme Courtcriminal contemptfreedom of speechaffidavit publication

Judgment

A
J.R. PRASHAR, ADVOCATE AND ORS.
v.
PRASANT BHUSHAN, ADVOCATE AND ORS.

AUGUST 28, 2001 B
[G.B. PATTANAIK AND RUMA PAL, JJ.]

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: Sections 5, 14, 15 and 23.

Rules to regulate proceedings/or contempt of the Supreme Court 1975:
c
Rules 3, 4 and 5

Contempt Petition-Allegations-Dharna-Protest against judgment-
Shouting ofslogans-Ascribing lack of integrity to Judges-Petition dismissed
for non-compliance with Rules-Propriety and legality of dharna discussed- D
Held allegations of shouting slogans cannot be accepted merely on the basis
of petition-Mere stating that superior courts use power of contempt against
persons criticising courts-No personal motive ascribed-Held such comments
are general in nature-But imputing motives to specific court and alleging
harassment by court prima facie constitutes contempt-Contumacious action
of contempt taking out of courts-Proceedings to be initiated in such a case- E
Procedure for.

Judiciary-Judges-Criticism-Permissibility and extent of

In this Contempt Petition the Petitioners alleged that the respondents
led a huge crowd on 30th December, 2000 and held a dharna in front of this F
Court with a view to protest against the Judgment relating to the building of
the Dam 1in the Narmada River. It was also alleged that respondents shouted
abusive slogans against this Court including slogans ascribing lack of integrity
and dishonesty to the Institution. When the petitioners protested they were
attacked and assaulted by the respondents and consequently an FIR was also G
lodged. The respondents filed their separate affidavits in response to the show
cause notice.

Respondent No. I asserted that though he supported the cause and had
espoused it by appearing as counsel before this court yet he did not approve
of the holding of a dharna. He stated that neither he took part in the dharna H
239
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A nor shouted any slogan against the Court.

Respondent No. 2 admitted participation in the dharna and also to have
made speeches and raised slogans but stated that no slogan was raised or
speech made by her impugning the integrity of the Judges. Justifying the
dharna as a legitimate form of protest against the judgment she stated in her
B affidavit that the superior courts have recently shown a disturbing tendency
to use the power of contempt against persons who have been criticising the
courts and their judgments and that she will continue to help them raise their
voices in protest against this system.

She also contended that as the Contempt Petition was procedurally
C defective for non-compliance with rules it should not have been accepted by
the Registry.

Asserting her right to participate in any peaceful protest Respondent
No. 3 stated that she had never did cast any aspersions on the court or the
D integrity of Judges. In her affidavit she not only accused the courts of
harassing her but also made contumacious remarks that there was a
disquieting inclination on the part of the Court to silence criticism, muzzle
dissent as well as to harass and intimidate those who disagree with it. She
·also contended that she stood by her statements even if it amounted to
contempt.
E
Disposing of the petition, the Court

HELD: I. The proceedings initiated on the basis of the petition against
all the three respondents are dismissed. [255-C)

2. Holding a dharna by itself may not amount to contempt. But if by
F holding a dharna access to the courts is hindered and the officers of court
and members of the public are not allowed free ingress and egress, or the
proceedings in court are otherwise disrupted, disturbed or hampered, the
dharna may amount to contempt because the administration of justice would
be obstructed. There is no allegation in the petition that the participants in
G dharna had picketed the gates of this court and prevented lawyers or litigants
from entering and leaving the Court premises. Nor is it the petitioners' case
that the dharna disturbed or prevented the courts from functioning.
[252-F-H)

3. While holding that a dharna held to protest a decision of a court may
H not per se amount to contempt, this court must not be understood as
J.R. PRASHAR v. PRASHANT BHUSHAN 241
approving the holding of a dharna before the court. On the other hand it is A
deprecated and must be discouraged, otherwise every disgruntled litigant
could adopt this method of ventilating his grievance. It is, in any case, an

- inappropriate form of protest since the object of holdiiJg a dharna is either
t? raise public opinion or to exhibit the extent of public opinion against a
decision of a court. Neither of these objects weigh with courts when deciding B
a case. Judges are required to decide what they think is right according to
the law applicable and on the material placed before them and not be swayed
by public opinion on any particular issue. (253-A-B, CJ

4. The allegations of shouting of abusive slogans cannot be accepted
merely on the basis of the statements in this petition. There is no allegation C
in the complaint that respondents I and 2 had shouted defamatory statements
against the court. On the other hand, in their affidavits respond.en! Nos. I
and 3 have categorically denied on oath that they shouted any slogans and
the respondent No. 2 has denied shouting any slogan which could be termed
as contumacious. There is no reason why their statements should be rejected.
[253-C, E, F, G) D

5. There can be no doubt that the filing of an .affidavit is publication
within the definition of criminal contempt. An affidavit is not a secret
document. It forms part of the court records and is available to and accessible
by the public. Respondent No. 2 has spoken generally of the superior courts
using the power of contempt against persons who have been criticising the E
courts and their judgments. No personal motive has been ascribed by the
respondent No.2 to any particular Judge. Her comments are general in nature
and may be construed as the expression of a perceived error in the dec~ions
of superior courts in their contempt Jurisdiction. Therefore, according to the
standards of the fair criticism and giving the respondent No.2 the benefit of p
the doubt, this court does not intend to take any further action against
respondent No. 2 for her comments regarding the superior courts in her
affidavit. [254-A-B, F-G; 253-H)

6. Courts like any other institution do not enjoy immunity from
criticism as long as the criticism is fair, reasonable and temperate and does G
not accuse Judges of discharging their duties for improper motives or on
extraneous considerations. Section 5 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 says·
that a person shall not be guilty of contempt of court for publishing any fair
comment on the merits of any case which has been heard and finally decided.
The operative word is "fair". In other words, in the guise of criticising a
judgment, personal criticism of the Judge is impermissible. [248-D-E) H

\
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Andre Paul Terenee Ambard v. The Attorney General of Trinidad and
Tobago, AIR (1936) PC 141; Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, AIR (1953)
SC 75; Rama Dayal Markarha v. State ofMadhya Pradesh, AIR (1978)'SC 921;
(1978) 3 SCR 497; Re. v. Ajay Kumar Pandey, Advocate, JT (1998) 6 SC 571;
Rustom Cawasjee Cooper v. Union of India, AIR (1970) SC 1318; Perspective
B Publications (P.) ltd v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR (1971) SC 221 and Re
: Sanjeev Datta, [1995) 3 SCC 619, referred to.

Regina v. The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, (1967) 2 WLR
1204, 1207, referred to.

7. Respondent No. 3 appears primafacie, to have committed contempt.
C She has imputed motives to specific courts for entertaining litigation or passing
orders against her. She has acwsed Courts of 'harassing' her as if the judiciary
were carrying out a personal vendetta against her. The present proceeding
has been cited as an instance. She has brought in matters which were not only
not pertinent to the issues to be decided but has drawn uninformed
D comparisons to make statements about this court which do not appear to be
protected by the law relating to fair criticism. Therefore, notice in the
prescribed form be issued to respondent No. 3 as to why she should not be
proceeded against for contempt for the statements in her affidavit.
(254-H; 255-A, C, DJ

E 8. The submission that the petition was shabbily drafted and
procedurally grossly defective is correct. In fact almost every one of the Rules
framed by this Court have been violated. Under Rule 4(a) of the Rules to
regulate Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975 it is
mandatory that the places of residence of both the petitioners and the
respondents are given. Yet each of the five persons named as petitioners has
F
given the Bar Library or the Lawyers Chamber as his address. The non-
compliance with Rule 4(a) is more shocking when it comes to the Respondents.
The address of respondent No. I has been given as his chamber. Respondent
Nos. 2 and 3 have been described as 'Leader Narmada Bachao Andolan' and
as the 'Booker Prize Winner', respectively. Their addresses have been given
G as Clo the respondent No. I at his legal chambers in the premises of the Court.
Further except for the petitioner No. I no one else has either signed the petition
or affirmed it as required by Rule 4(b). (250-H; 251-B-C-D]

9. Under Rule 5 the matter could have been listed before this Court by
the Registry as a petition for admission only if the Attorney General or
H Solicitor General had granted his consent. In this case, the Attorney General
J.R. PRASHAR v. PRASHANT BHUSHAN 243

had specifically declined to deal with the matter and it does not appear that A
any request was made to t:1e Solicitor General to give his consent. Of course,
this Court could have taken suo motu cognizance had the petitioners prayed
for it. They had not. Even if they had, it is doubtful whether the court would
have acted on the statements of the petitioners had the petitioners been candid
enough to have disclosed that the police had refused to take cognizance of B
their complaint. In any event the power to act suo motu in matters which
otherwise require the Attorney General to initiate proceedings or at least give
his consent must be exercised rarely. Courts normally reserve this exercise
to cases where it either derives information from its own sources, such as from
a perusal of the records, or on reading a report in a newspaper or hearing a
public speech or a document which would speak for itself. Otherwise sub- C
section (1) of Section 15 might be rendered otiose. [251-G-H; 252-A-B)

P.N Duda v. P. Shiv Shankar, (1988) 3 SCC 167, referred to.

10. When a matter is listed before the court, the court assumes that
the formalities in connection with the filing have been scrutinised by the D
Registry of this court that the proper procedure has been followed as it is the
duty of the Registry to scrutinise the petition to see whether it is in order before
placing it before the court for consideration. There is no occasion for this
Court to assume the task of the Registry before considering the merits of each
matter, had the court's attention been drawn to the procedural defects, it
would have had no hesitation in rejecting the application in /imine on this E
ground alone. [252-C-D]

11. Sections 14 and 15 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 deal with
the procedure for taking cognizance in cases of Criminal contempt. In cases
where the contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court or High Court, the F
.. court acts suo motu. In cases of Criminal contempt other than a contempt
referred to in Section 14, the Supreme Court or the High Court may take
action under Section 15(1). The underlying rationale of clauses (a), (b) and
(c) of section 15(1) appears to be that when the Court is not itself directly
aware of the contumacious conduct, and the actions are alleged to have taken
place outside its presence, it is necessary to have the allegations screened by G
the prescribed authorities so that the Court is not troubled with frivolous
matters. [249-E; 250-B]

S.K. Sarkar v. Vinay Chandra Misra, [1981) 1 SCC 436, referred to.

12. The actual proceedings for contempt are quasi-criminal and H
I
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A summary in nature. Two consequences follow from this. First, the acts for
which proceedings are intended to be launched must be intimated to the
person against whom action is proposed to be taken with sufficient particulars
so that the persons charged with having committed the offence can effectively
defend themselves. It is for this reason Section 15 requires that every motion
or reference made under this section must specify the contempt of which the
B person charged is alleged to be guilty. The second consequence which follows
from the quasi-criminal nature of the proceeding is that if there is reasonable
doubt on the existence of a state of facts that doubt must be resolved in favour
of the person or persons proceeded against (250-E-F)

C CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Contempt Petition (CRL.)
No. 2 of 2001.

(Under Article 129 of the Constitution of India)

Altaf Ahmed, Additional Solicitor General, Romy Chacko, P.
D Parmeshwaran and Sanjay Hegde for the Petitioners.

J.R. Parashar In-person for Petitioner.

Ram Jethmalani, Shanti Bhushan, Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, Ms. Shomila
Bakshi and Ms. A ishwarya Rao for the Respondent/ Contemnors. I and 2.

E Ms. Arundhati Roy in-person for Respondent/Contemnor. No.3.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RUMA PAL, J. The allegations in this contempt application relate to
an incident which is alleged to have taken place on 30th December, 2000.
F According to the petition, on that day, the respondents led a. huge crowd and
.held a 'dharna' in front of this Court and shouted abusive slogans against this
Court including slogans ascribing lack of integrity and dishonesty to the
Institution. This was done in the presence of the media. The petition alleges
that the petitioners protested but were attacked and assaulted by the respondents
G who called them "brokers" of this Court. The petition goes on to state that
that evening at 6.00 P.M while the petitioners were watching the police
officials trying to disperse the crowd, the respondents again attacked, abused
and assaulted the petitioners. On the n~xt day at 1.00 P.M. the petitioners
lodged a complaint with the Tilak Marg, Police Station. A copy of the
complaint has been annexed to the petition. According to the petition the
H dharna, slogan shouting and assault on the petitioners were designed to compel
J.R. PRASHAR v. PRASHANT BHUSHAN [RUMA PAL, J.] 245

the Court to decide a pending application filed by the respondents before this A
Court in the respondent's favour.

Given the allegations in the petition that the respondents had incited
a crowd by shouting slogans attacking the integrity of the Judges of this
Court, notices were issued to the respondents of the application, so that they
could give their version of the incident, if it had taken place at all. B
Each of the three respondents have filed separate affidavits in response
to the notice. All three respondents have admitted that there was a· dharna
outside the gates of this Court on 30th December, 2000. The dharna had been
organized by the Narmada Bachao Andolan and the gathered crowd were
persons who lived in the Narmada Valley and were aggrieved by the majority C
judgment of this Court relating to the building of the dam on the Narmada
River.

As far as respondent .No. 1 is concerned, he has asserted that while he
supported the cause and had espoused it by appearing as counsel before this D
Court, he did not approve of the holding of a · dhama' as a way of protesting
against the judgment of this Court. He has denied that he took part in the
· dharna' although, he says, he did nothing to stop it. He has also denied that
he shouted any slogan against the Court nor did he assault, abuse or threaten
any of the petitioners.
E
As far as respondent No. 2 is concerned, she has denied that any
incident involving the petitioners, as alleged in the petition, had taken place
and asserted that the allegations that the petitioners were threatened or abused
or assaulted were false and fabricated. She has admitted participation in the
'dharna' and also to have made speeches and raised slogans but has said that
to her knowledge, no slogan was raised or speech made impugning the integrity F
of the Judges of this Court. She has sought to justify the holding of the
'dhama' as a legitimate form of protest against the judgment which had been
delivered by this Court in connection with the building of the dam on the
Narmada river. Apart from giving the background of the Narmada Bachao
Andolan and the merits of the case of the oustees whose case she represents, G
the respondent No. 2 has said in her affidavit:

"The Superior Courts have recently shown a disturbing tendency to
use the power of contempt against persons who have been criticizing
the Courts and their judgments. A judiciary which insulates itself
from criticism by using the power of Contempt, is bound to insensitive H
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A to the people that it is meant to serve. This does not bode well for the
future of our republic ............ I will continue to help them raise their
voices in protest against this system even if I have to do so against
the Judiciary and the Courts. I will continue to do so as long as I can,
even if I have to be punished for contempt for doing that."

B The respondent No. 3 also filed an affidavit in response to the notice.
The respondent No. 3 has denied that she had raised any slogan against the
Court According to the respondent No.3, she had left the 'dhama' at about
6.00 p.m. and that no such incident, as alleged in the petition or the FIR had
taken place. She has asserted her right to participate in any peaceful protest
C that she chose to. She has clarified that she has never, either in writing or in
any public forum, cast aspersions on the Court or the integrity of the Judges.
However, according to the respondent No. 3, she has faced 'legal harassment'
for her writing, the latest incident being the present proceedings. She has
stressed the need for Courts not to be intolerant of criticism or expressions
of dissent as this "would mark the beginning of the end of democracy".
D
This was followed by three paragraphs which are quoted verbatim:

"On the grounds that judges of the Supreme Court were too busy, the
Chief Justice of India refused to allow a sitting judge to head the
judicial enquiry into the Tehelka scandal, even though it involves
E matters of national security and corruption in the highest places."

Yet, when it comes to an absurd, despicable, entirely unsubstantiated
petition in which all the three respondents happen to be people, who
have publicly - though in markedly different ways - questioned the
policies of the government and severely criticized a recent judgment
F of the Supreme Court, the Court displays a disturbing willingness to
issue notice.

It indicates a disquieting inclination on the part of the Court to silence
criticism and muzzle dissent, to harass and intimidate those who
G disagree with it. By entertaining a petition based on an FIR that even
a local police station does not see fit to act upon, the Supreme Court
is doing its own reputation and credibility considerable harm."

On the returnable date, the respondents appeared in i'erson. Their further
presence was dispensed with. By an order dated 23rd April 200 l, the
H Additional Solicitor General was appointed Amicus Curiae and requested to
J.R. PRASHAR v. PRASHANT BHUSHAN [RUMA PAL, J.] 247
assist the Court. A
At the hearing, the learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that
the paragraphs in the affidavits of the respondents 2 and 3 quoted earlier
appeared to be contumacious. The petitioners, who appeared in person,
addressed the Court in a manner which not only ill became their standing as
Advocates of this Court but ·also belied their claims to be champions of this B
Court's dignity.

The respondent No. 1 submitted that the allegations made in the petition
should not be accepted as the police who were present all along had refused
to register an FIR based on the complaint of the petitioners. Learned counsel C
for the respondent No. 2 contended that the petition was grossly defective
and should not have been accepted by the Registry of this Court at all. Apart
from that, it was contended that what was stated by the respondent No. 2 in
her affidavit was a criticism of the Court's judgment and not contumacious.
The respondent No. 3, appearing in person, stated that she had nothing to add
to her affidavit and if that amounted to contempt then she was prepared to D
face the consequences.

Before considering the merits of the case, it is necessary to highlight
principles relating to the law of contempt which though well settled bear
repetition.
E
A civil society is founded 0n a respect for the law. If every citizen
chose to break the law, we would have no society at all, at least not a civil
one. It is this respect for the law and of the law enforcing agencies that,
somewhat paradoxically, ensures the freedoms recognised in the Constitution.
The respect is at best a fragile foundation. While it is to be built and sustained
by the conduct of the persons administering the law, it has to be shored up F
by sanctions for actual breaches of the law and for actions destroying that
respect. The law of contempt is framed for the second purpose.

That is why although under Article 19(l)(a) of the Constitution, all
citizens are guaranteed the right to freedom of speech and expression, sub- G
Article (2) provides:

"Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (!) shall affect the operation of
any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far
as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the
\
right conferred by the said sub-clause.................... in relation to H
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A contempt of court ...... "

Apart from the power conferred by the Constitution on the Supreme
Court and each High Court to punish contempts of itself, the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 (referred to as the Act) has empowered the Courts to punish
actions which fall within the definition of civil and criminal contempt in that
B Act. If what is alleged in the petition were true then it would be a case of
criminal contempt and "Criminal Contempt" has been defined in the Act as
meaning publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by
visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other
act whatsoever which --

C (i) scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower
the authority of, any court; or
(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course
of any judicial proceedings; or
(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to
D
obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner

This does not mean that a judgment is not open to fair criticism. Section
5 of the Act says that a person shall not be guilty of contempt of court for
publishing any fair comment on the merits of any case which has been heard
E and finally decided.

The operative word is "fair'·. In other words, in the guise of criticizing
a judgment, personal criticism of the Judge is impermissible. The law as it
stands today is what was said by the Privy Council in 1936 1 :

" ........... no wrong is committed by any member of the public who
F
exercises the ordinary right of criticising in good faith in private or
public the public act done in the seat of justice. The path of criticism
is a public way : the wrongheaded are permitted to err therein :
provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper
motives to those taking part in the administration of justice, and are
G
I. Andre Paul TerenceAmbard v. The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago, AIR
(1936) PC 141. See also Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, AIR (1953) SC 75;
Rama Dayal Markarha v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1978) SC 921: [1978] 3 SCR
497 and Re: v. Ajay Kumar Pandey, Advocate, JT (1998) 6 SC 571; Rustom Cawasjee
Cooper v. Union of India, AIR (1970) SC 1318; Perspective Publications (P.) Ltd. v.
H The State of Maharashtra, AIR (1971) SC 221 and Re: Satljiv Datta, [1995] 3 sec 619.
J.R. PRASHAR v. PRASHANT BHUSHAN [RUMA PAL, J.] 249

genuinely exercising a right of criticism and not acting in malice or A
attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune.
Justice is not a cloistered virtue : she must be allowed to suffer the
scrutiny and respectful even though outspoken comments of ordinary
-. men."

To ascribe motives to a Judge is to sow the seed of distrust in the B
minds of the public about the administration of justice as a whole and nothing
is more pernicious in its consequences than to prejudice the mind of the
public against judges of the Court who are responsible for implementing the
law' . Judges do not defend their decisions in public and if citizens disrespect
the persons laying down th~ law, they cannot be expected to respect the law C
laid down by them. The only way the Judge can defend a decision is by the
reasoning in the decision itself and it is certainly open to being criticised by
anyone who thinks that it is erroneous "All we would ask is that those who
criticise us will remember that, from the nature of our office, we cannot reply
to their criticisms. We cannot enter into public controversy. Still less into
political controversy. We must rely on our conduct itself to be its own D
vindication"'.

This, in brief, is the substantive law which is relevant for the purposes
of the case before us.

As far as the procedure is concerned at this stage we note only those E
principles which are relevant for a decision on the issues involved in this case
and start with the initiation of proceedings. Sections 14 and 15 of the 1971
Act both deal with the procedure for taking cognizance in cases of criminal
contempt. In cases where the contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court
or High Court, the Court acts suo motu. In cases of criminal contempt other F
than a contempt referred to in Section 14, the Supreme Court or the High
J Court may under Section 15(1) take action "on its own motion or on a motion
made by -

(a) the Advocate-General, or

(b) any other person, with the consent in writing of the Advocate- G
General,

(c) in relation to the High Court for the Union territory of Delhi,

2. Rama Dayal Markarha v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (ibid) p. 928.
3. Regina v. The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, (1967) 2 WLR 1204, 1207. H
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A such Law Officer as the Central Government may, by notification
in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf, or any other person,
with the consent in writing of such Law Officer.

xxx xxx xxx

B Explanation. - In this section, the expression"Advocate-General"means,-
·(a) In relation to the Supreme Court, the Attorney General or the Solicitor-
General:''

The underlying rationale of clauses (a), (b) and (c) appears to be that
when the Court is not itself directly aware of the contumacious conduct, and
C the actions are alleged to have taken place outside its presence, it is necessary
to have the allegations screened by the prescribed authorities so that the
Court is not troubled with frivolous matters.' The Sanyal Committee which
had been set up in 1961 to consider and suggest reforms to the existing law
of contempt and whose recommendations formed the basis for the present
D Act, explained the need for this screening:

"In the case of criminal contempt, not being contempt committed in
the face of the Court, we are of the opinion that it would lighten the
burden of the court, without in any way interfering with the sanctity
of the administration of justice, if action is taken on a motion by
E some other agency. Such a course of action would give considerable
assurance to the individual charged and the public at large".

The actual proceedings for contempt are quasi-criminal and summary
in nature. Two consequences follow from this. First, the acts for which
proceedings are intended to be launched must be intimated to the person
F against whom action is proposed to be taken with sufficient particularity so
that the persons charged with having committed the offence can effectively
defend themselves. It is for this reason Section 15 requires that every motion
or reference made under this section must specify the contempt of which the
person charged is alleged to be guilty. The second consequence which follows
from the quasi-criminal nature of the proceeding is that if there is reasonable
G doubt on the existence of a state of facts that doubt must be resolved in
favour of the person or persons proceeded against. In addition this Court has
framed Rules under, inter-alia, Section 23 of the Act providing in detail for
the procedure to be followed by the Court and its Registry on the one hand
and the complainant/respondent on the other.
H 4 See S.K Sarkar v. Vinay Chandra Misra. [1981] I sec 436.
J.R. PRASHAR v. PRASHANT BHUSHAN [RUMA PAL, J.] 251
This brings us to the present proceedings. Learned counsel for the A
respondent No.2 was correct when he submitted that the petition was shabbily
drafted and procedurally grossly defective. In fact almost every one of the
Rules framed by this Court have been violated. Rule 4 (a) directs that every
petition under rule 3(b) or (c) shall contain -

(i) the name, description and place of residence of the petitioner or B
petitioners and of the persons charged;

It is, therefore, mandatory that the places of residence of both the
petitioners and the respondents are given. Yet each of the five persons named
as petitioners has given the Bar Library or the Lawyers Chamber as his
address. The non-compliance with Rule 4(a) is more shocking when it comes C
to the Respondents. The respondent No. I's address has been given as his
.· chamber. The respondent No.2 has been described as "Leader Narmda (sic)
Bachao Ando Ian .. and the Respondent No.3 as ' the Booker Prize Winner'.
Both, their addresses have been given as 'Clo' the respondent No. I at his
legal chambers in the premises of this Court.
D
A more serious flaw is the verification of the petition. Rule 4(b) requires
that "The petition shall be supported by an affidavit." There are five named
petitioners yet except for the respondent No. I no one else has either signed
the petition or affirmed it.

Again under Rule 3 like Section 15 of the Act, the Court may take
E
action in cases of criminal contempt either

(a) suo motu ; or

(b) on a petition made by Attorney-General, or Solicitor General; or
(c) on a petition made by any person, and in the case of a criminal
F
contempt with the consent in writing of the Attorney-General or
the Solicitor-General.

Rule 5 provides that only petitions under Rules 3(b) and (c) shall be
posted before the Court for preliminary hearing and for orders as to issue of G
notice. It is clear from Rule 5 that the matter could have been listed before
this Court by the Registry as a petition for admission only if the Attorney
General or Solicitor General had granted his consent. In this case, the Attorney
General had specifically declined to deal with the matter and it does not
appear that any request was made to the Solicitor General to give his consent.
H
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Of course, this Court could have taken suo motu cognizance had the
petitioners prayed for it. They had not.' Even if they had, it is doubtful
.whether the Court would have acted on the statements of the petitioners had
the petitioners been candid enough to have disclosed that the police had
refused to take cognizance of their complaint. In any event the power to act
B suo motu in matters which otherwise require the Attorney General to initiate
proceedings or at least give his consent must be exercised rarely. Courts
normally reserve this exercise to cases where it either derives information
from its own sources, such as from a perusal of the records, or on reading
a report in a newspaper or hearing a public speech or a document which
would speak for itself. Otherwise sub-section (I) of Section 15 might be
C rendered otiose. 6

When a matter is listed before the Court, the Court assumes that the
formalities in connection with the filing have been scrutinized by the Registry
.
'

D
of this Court that the proper procedure has been followed as it is the duty of
the Registry to scrutinise the petition to see whether it is in order before
placing it before the Court for consideration. There is no occasion for this
Court to assume the task of the Registry before considering the merits of
•
each matter. Had our attention been drawn to the procedural· defects, we
would have had no hesitation in rejecting the application in limine on this
ground alone.

E As to the merits, we may clarify here that our enquiry is limited to the
alleged contempt of this Court by the respondents. We are not concerned
with any scuffle that may or may not have taken place during the 'dharna'.
That is a matter entirely personal to the petitioners and does not call for an
enquiry in this jurisdiction. But we are concerned with the holding of the
F dharna and the allegation that slogans had been shouted which denigrated the
judiciary.

Holding a dharna by itself may not amount to contempt. But if by
holding a dharna access to the courts is hindered and the officers of court and
members of the public are not allowed free ingress and egress, or the
G proceedings in Court are otherwise disrupted, disturbed or hampered, the
dharna may amount to contempt because the administration of justice would
be obstructed. There is no allegation in the petition that the participants in the

5. See P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shankar, [1988] 3 SCC 167.
H 6. SK. Sarkar v. V.C. Misra (supra)
J.R. PRASHAR v. PRASHANT BHUSHAN [RUMA PAL, J.) 253
dhama had picketed the gates of this Court and prevented lawyers or litigants A
from entering and leaving the Court premises. Nor is it the petitioners' case
that the 'dhama' disturbed or prevented the Courts from functioning.

While holding that a dhama held to protest a decision of a court may
not per se amount to contempt, we must not be understood as approving the
holding of a 'dhama' before the Court. On the other hand it is deprecated and B
must be discouraged otherwise every disgruntled litigant could adopt this
method of ventilating his grievance. It is, in any case, an inappropriate form
of protest since the object of holding a dhama is either to raise public opinion
or to exhibit the extent of public opinion against a decision of a court.
Neither of these objects weigh with courts when deciding a case. Judges are C
required to decide what they think is right according to the law applicable
and on the material placed before them and not be swayed by public opinion
on any particular issue.

The allegations of shouting of abusive slogans cannot be accepted merely
on the basis of the statements in this petition. The procedural flaws in the D
petition, as noted earlier are not mere technicalities. They are as vital to the
acceptability of the petition and its contents. Where there is no other legally
admissible evidence before the Court and the only material which the Court
can take into account are the statements contained in the petition, the petition
assumes a particular importance. Apart from the defective nature of the petition,
the unexplained reluctance on the part of the four petitioners to affirm an E
affidavit verifying the facts contained in the petition, the failure to even
attempt to obtain the consent of the Solicitor General and most importantly
the refusal of the police station to record an FIR on the basis of the complaint
lodged by the. petitioner No. l are telling circumstances against the case in
the petition. Admittedly, the police personnel were present at the time of the F
incident. Their refusal to record the FIR on the petitioner's complaint is,
therefore, significant. We have also noted that there is no allegation in the
complaint that th<! respondents I and 2 had shouted defamatory statements
against the Court. On the other hand, we have the three affidavits filed by the
respondents where the respondent Nos. I and 3 have categorically denied on
oath that they shouted any slogans and the respondent No. 2 has denied G
shouting any slogan which could be termed as contumacious. There is no
reason why their statements should be rejected. In the circumstances, we are
not prepared to direct any further enquiry into the matter by requiring parties
to lead evidence, particularly when the statements in the complaint filed by
the petitioners are materially discrepant with the allegations in the petition. H
•

254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A This should have concluded the matter in favour of the respondents -
had it not been for the statements made in the affidavits of respondents Nos.
2 and 3 which we have quoted earlier. There can be no doubt that the filing
of an affidavit is publication within the definition of criminal contempt. An
affidavit is not a secret document. It forms part of the Court records and is
B available to and accessible by the public. The question is whether the
statements made in the affidavits of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 could be
termed to be fair criticism or do the comments impute improper motives to
those taking part in the administration of justice?

Respondent No. 2 has spoken generally of the superior Courts using the
C power of contempt against persons who have been criticising the Courts and
their judgments. According to the respondent No. 2's counsel, this reaction
was in response to a statement in the petition which appeared to the respondent
No. 2 to be one of the bases for issuing the notice against her.

It is true that the notice did not specify the contumacious acts with
D which the respondent was charged in terms of Rule 6 read with Form I. Only
a copy of the petition had been served on the respondents along with the
notice. It would not be unreasonable for the respondent No.2 to assume that
every statement contained in the petition formed part of the charge. In the
petition, it has been stated that "the Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court are
pious constitutional authority and are not open for public and press to criticize,
E comment, shout defamatory and derogatory slogans against its verdict". Apart
from the shouting of defamatory slogans, the rest of the sentence does not in
fact correctly state the law. As we have said earlier, Courts like any other
institution do not enjoy immunity from criticism as long as the criticism is
fair, reasonable and temperate and does not accuse Judges of discharging
F their duties for improper motives or on extraneous considerations. 7

No personal motive has been ascribed by the respondent No. 2 to any
particular Judge. Her comments are general in nature and may be construed
as the expression of a perceived error in the decisions of superior Courts in
their contempt jurisdiction. Therefore, according to the standards of fair
G criticism noted earlier and giving the respondent No. 2 the benefit of the
doubt, we do not intend to take any further action against respondent No. 2

7. See Rustom Call'asjee Cooper v. Union of India, AIR (1970) SC 1318; Perspective
Publications (J:) ltd. v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR (1971) SC 221 and Rama Dayal
H Markarha v. Slate of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1978) SC 921.
•

J.R. PRASHAR v. PRASHANT BHUSHAN [RUMA PAL, J.) 255
for her comments regarding the superior Courts in her affidavit. A
However, the respondent No. 3 appears to us, prima-facie, to have
committed contempt. She has imputed motives to specific Courts for
entertaining litigation or passing orders against her. She has accused Courts
of 'harassing' her (of which the present proceeding has been cited as an
instance) as 1f the judiciary were carrying out a personal vendetta against her. B
She has brought in matters which were not only not pertinent to the issues
to be decided but has drawn uninformed comparisons to make statements
about this Court which do not appear to be protected by the. law relating to
fair criticism. We are conscious that the respondent No. 3 has said before us
that she stood by the comments made even if they were held to be C
contumacious. At the same time, ,we are also aware that when the statement
was made, the respondent had not been called on formally to defend herself
against this charge. The prescribed procedure will have to be followed.

For the aforementioned reasons, while dismissing the proceedings
initiated on the basis of the petition against all three respondents, we direct D
that notice in the prescribed form be issued to the respondent No. 3 as to why
the respondent No. 3 should not be proceeded against for contempt for the
statements in the three paragraphs of her affidavit set out earlier in this
judgment.

T.N.A. Petition dismissed. E