Supreme Court of India
JAGADGURU ANNADANISHWARA MAHA SWAMIJIversusV.C. ALLIPUR & ANOTHER
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 381
- Decided
- 20 March 2009
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
Holding
The Director of Pre‑University Education is not a court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the contempt petition.
Summary
The appellant, a school, appealed an order of the Director of Pre‑University Education granting promotion to an assistant teacher (respondent No.1). The respondent filed a contempt petition under Sections 11 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, alleging wilful disobedience of the Director’s order. The Karnataka High Court took cognizance and directed that a charge be framed. The Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the Director of Pre‑University Education qualifies as a "court" within the meaning of the Act. The Court held that the Director is a statutory authority, not a court, and therefore the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain contempt proceedings. Consequently, the High Court’s orders were set aside and the contempt petition dismissed. The appeal was allowed.
Issues considered
- Whether the Director of Pre‑University Education is a "court" within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
- Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to initiate contempt proceedings against a statutory authority that is not a court.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure
- Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 11, s. 12, s. 2(a), s. 2(b)
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872
- Limitation Act, 1963s. 14, s. 29(2)
Subjects
Contempt of Courts Actcivil contemptstatutory authoritydefinition of courtjurisdictionHigh CourtDirector of Pre‑University Educationpromotion disputenon‑compliance
Judgment
'..--
[2009] 5 S.C.R. 8
A JAGADGURU ANNADANISHWARA MAHA SWAMIJI
v.
V.C. ALLIPUR & ANOTHER
(Civil Appeal No.1798 of 2009)
MARCH 20, 2009
B
[S.B. SINHA A.ND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.]
CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1971:
c ss. 2(a) and 2(b) - Contempt of Court- Civil contempt-
Non-compliance of order of Director, Pre-University Education
- Application before High Court for initiating contempt
proceedings against defaulters - HELD: Not maintainable -
Director. Pre-University Education is not a court within the
provisions of the Act - Taking cognizance of the application
D
by High Court and its order directing to frame charge were
wholly illegal and non est in the eyes of law - Orders of High
Court set aside - Applications dismissed.
Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd.
E 1950 SCR. 459=AIR 1950 :SC 188; P. Sarathy v. State Bank
of India (2000) 5 sec 355 and State of Madhya Pradesh and
another v. Anshuman Shukla (2008) 7 SCC 487, referred to.
Case Law Reference:
F 1950 SCR 459 referred to para 9
c2000) 5 sec 355 referred to para 11
c2oos') 1 sec 487 referred to para 12
G CIVIL APPELLATE JUHISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
1798 of 2009. >-
From the Judgment & Order dated 31.5.2007 & 11.6.2007
of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in CCC No. 341
H 8
JAGADGURU ANNADANISHWARA MAHA SWAMIJI v. 9
V.C.ALLIPUR & ANR.
of 2006. A
Shankar Divate for the Appellant.
Shanth Kr. V. Mahale, Rajesh Mahale, R.J. Goulay and S.
Usha Reddy for the Respondents.
B
The following Order of the Court was delivered:
ORDER
Leave granted.
... c
Appellant is before us, aggrieved by and dissatisfied with
the order dated 31st May, 2007 passed by a Division Bench
of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in CCC No.341
of 2006 and also the order dated 11th June, 2007 .
.J.
D
Respondent No.1 was working as an Assistant Teacher in
a school run by the appellant. In relation to his claim for
promotion as a lecturer as he had obtained M.A. degree, he
approached the school authorities. The management declined
-I his request. Respondent No.1 then made a representation to
- the Deputy Director, Education who in turn asked the
management to consider the case of the respondent No.1 for
promotion. The Director, Pre-University, Education passed an
order on 25th July, 2005 in his favour.
E
1
' Appellant preferred an appeal before the appropriate F
authority which is still pending.
Respondent No.1, however, filed an application purported
to be under Sections 11 & 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971 (for short 'the Act'} before the Karnataka High Court
praying, inter alia, for the following reliefs:
G
--1
"WHEREFORE, the Complainant prays that this Hon'ble
Court be pleased to call for relevant records and initiate
contempt proceedings against the respondents for
disobedience of the order of the D '3ctor, P.U. Edt;i~tion H
10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 5 S.C.R. ....
A made in Appeal PUAP-51/2005 dated 25.7.2005 as per
Annexure-A and to pass any other appropriate and suitable
orders as deemed fit by this Hon'ble Court in the interest
of justice and equity."
The said application was entertained by reason of the
B
impugned judgment and furthermore charges have also been
directed to be framed.
The short question which arises for consideration in this
appeal is as to whether the Director of the Pre-University,
c Education is a Court within the meaning of the provisions of the
Act or not.
Indisputably, the Director of Pre-University, Education is a
statutory authority. Contempt has been defined in Section 2(a)
D of the Act to mean a civil contempt or criminal contempt. ·'
Indisputably, the contempt proceedings initiated by the first
respondent before the High Court was civil in nature. Civil
contempt has been defim~d in Section 2(b) of the Act to mean
wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order,
writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an
E
undertaking given to a court.
":
It is now well settled principle of law and having regard to
the definition of the Court contained in various statutes like
Code of Civil Procedure cir the Evidence Act would mean a
F Tribunal, whose decision shall be final and/or would be entitled
to take evidence in terms of the provisions of the Evidence Act.
It is also well settled that although a Tribunal may exercise some
of its powers in terms of th13 Code of Civil Procedure or Code
of Criminal procedure and have all the trappings of a Court but
G still would not be treated ais a Court. In Bharat Bank Ltd. v.
Employees of the Bharat B.ank Ltd. [AIR 1950 SC 188 : 1950 )-
SCR 459) this court opined:-
"7. Now there can bent) doubt that the Industrial Tribunal
has, to use a well-known expression, "all the trappings of
H
JAGADGURU ANNADANISHWARA MAHA SWAMIJI v. 11
V.C.ALLIPUR & ANR.
a court" and performs functions which cannot but be A
regarded as judicial. [... ]
27.[...] There can be no doubt that to be a Court, the person
or persons who constitute it must be entrusted with judicial
,, functions, that is, of deciding litigated questions according
B
to law. However, by agreement between parties arbitrators
may be called upon to exercise judicial powers and to
decide a dispute according to law but that would not make
the arbitrators a Court. It appears to me that before a
person or persons can be said to constitute a Court it must
be held that they derive their powers from the State and c
are exercising the judicial powers of the State. In R. v.
London County Council [1931) 2 K.B. 215), Saville L.J.
. gave the following meaning to the word "Court" or "judicial
),
authority" :-
D
'It is not necessary that it should be a Court in the
sense that this Court is a Court, it is enough if it is
exercising, after hearing evidence. judicial functions
in the sense that it has to decide on evidence
between a proposal and an opposition; and it is not E
necessary to be strictly a Court if it is a tribunal
which has to decide rightly after hearing evidence
and opposition.'
.. 28. As pointed out in picturesque language by Lord Sankey
LC. in Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner F
of Taxation, (1931) A.C, 275), there are tribunals with
many of the trappings of a Court which, nevertheless, are
not Courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power,
[... ] It was pointed out in the above case that a tribunal is
not necessarily a Court in this strict sense because it gives G
a final decision, nor because it hears witnesse~ on oath.
nor because two or more contending parties appear before
it between whom it has to decide, nor because it gives
decisions which affect the rights of subjects nor because
there is an appeal to a Court, nor because it is a body to H
12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 5 S.C.R.
A which a matter is referred by another body[... )."
In the context of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963
the term ·court' must be held to be of wide import. However,
again there exists a distinction between a court and the civil
court.
8
In P. Sarathy v. Stal'e Bank of India, [ (2000) 5 SCC 355
] this Court has held :-
"12. It will be noticed that Section 14 of the Limitation Act
c does not speak of a "civil court" but speaks only of a
"court". It is not necessary that the court spoken of in
Section 14 should be a "civil court". Any authority or
tribunal having the trcippings of a court would be a "court"
within the meaning of this section. •
D 13.... in order to constitute a court in the strict sense of
·'
the term, an essentia1I condition is that the court should
have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial
tribunal, power to give1 a decision or a definitive judgment
which has finality and authoritativeness which are the
E essential tests of a judicial pronouncement."
We may, however, notice that in the context of applicability
of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in regard to Arbitration
Tribunal which was constituted in terms of a statutory provision,
•
F the matter has been referred to a three Judge Bench in State
of Madhya Pradesh and another v. Anshuman Shukla [(2008)
7 sec 487). Be that as it may, the word 'civil court' vis-a-vis
a court must be construed having regard to the text and context
of the statute.
G As indisputably the Dimctor of Pre-University, Education
is an authority created under a statute and not a Court, by no
stretch of imagination, it can not be described as a Court so
as to enable the first respc>ndent to file an application for
initiation of proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act
H against the appellant herein f1:>r wilful disobedience of the order
JAGADGURU ANNADANISHWARA MAHA SWAMIJI v. 13
V.C.ALLIPUR.& ANR.
)
of the Director, Pre-University, Education, especially when an A
... appeal against the said order is still pending. The order of the
statutory authority, thus, would not alleviate the provisions of the
Contempt of Courts Act. The impugned orders, thus, are wholly
illegal. The High Court, therefore, in our opinion, had no
jurisdiction to initiate any proceeding under the said Act. B
Learned counsel for the first respondent, however, submits that
such a contention had not been raised before the High Court.
Since, the Director, Pre-University, Education was not
functioning as a Court within the provisions of the Act, in our
opinion, the impugned order of the High Court taking c
congnizance of the said application as also directing to frame
charge is wholly without jurisdiction and non est in the eyes of
law and therefore is unsustainable. It was Coram-non-judice.
p Such a contention can be raised at any stage.
D
.l.
For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned orders
cannot be sustained and they are set aside accordingly. The
Contempt Petition filed by the first respondent before the High
Court is dismissed. However, we make it clear that the other
remedies available to the first respondent under any other law E·
for the time being inforce shall .remain open for redressal of his
grievance.
The Appeal is allowed. No costs.
R.P. Appeal allowed F
'.
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