JAGDISH DUTT AND ANR.versusDHARAM PAL AND ORS.
- Citation
- 1999 INSC 175
- Decided
- 12 April 1999
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- B N KIRPAL
Holding
A decree in favour of a joint family is a joint decree, and if a coparcener transfers his undivided interest, the decree is extinguished to that extent and execution is permissible only for the remaining share, with execution barred until a partition suit determines undefined shares.
Summary
The appellants filed a suit for ejectment against the respondents for arrears of rent and sub‑letting, and obtained a decree for possession of the premises. In the execution proceedings the second respondent claimed to have purchased the undivided interest of certain coparceners of the Hindu Undivided Family of the decree‑holder, contending that only symbolic possession could be granted to the appellants. The executing court accepted this claim, but the High Court set aside that order and remitted the matter to determine the quantum of the share purchased. The Supreme Court held that a decree in favour of a joint family is a joint decree, and when a coparcener transfers his undivided interest, the decree is extinguished to the extent of that interest, leaving execution possible only for the remaining share. Where the shares of the coparceners are undefined or indeterminate, execution cannot proceed until a partition suit determines the parties' rights. Consequently, the High Court’s remand was justified, and the special leave petitions were dismissed.
Issues considered
- When a decree is passed in favour of a Hindu Undivided Family, is it to be treated as a joint decree for all members?
- What is the effect of the transfer of an undivided interest of a coparcener on the execution of such a joint decree?
- Can execution be granted when the shares of the decree‑holders are undefined or indeterminate?
- Whether the respondent can claim only symbolic possession on the basis of having purchased an undivided interest.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order XXI, Rule 15, s. Section 47
- Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. Section 111(d)
Subjects
Judgment
A JAGDISH DUTT AND ANR.
v.
-
DHARAM PAL AND ORS.
APRIL 12, 1999
B [B.N. KIRPAL ANDS. RAJENDRA BABU, JJ.]
Civil Procedure Code, 1908: Section 47, Order XX!, Rule 15-Hindu
Undivided family-Suit for ejectment-Decree in favour of joint family-
Execution of-Transfer of undivided interest of a coparcener in favour of
C judgment-debtor-Effect of-Held, decree gets extinguished to the extent of
interest so assigned and execution could lie only to the extent of remaining
part of the decree~If the interest of the coparcener. in the property is not
specifically defined; the Judgm_ent debtor cannot be, deprived of possession
unless the .rights are appropriately ascertpined in a par.tition suit.
D Ap~llants instituted a suit for ejectment on the ground of arrears of
rent and sub-letting by respondents No. 1 and 2. The said suit was decreed
by Trial Court and appeals against the decree were dismissed. In the execution
petition, respondent No. 2 claimed that he had purchased the undivided
interest of the coparceners in the Hindu Undivided family of the decree
E holder and therefore, actual physical possession cannot be given but only
symbolic possession can be given to the appellant-decree holder. The Executing
Court upheld the said contention. However, on challenge, the High Court
setting aside the order of Executing Court, remitted the matter to Executing
Court to investigate to quantu01 ofshare purchased by respondent No. 2.
F Aggrieved by the order of High Court, the present appeal was preferred.
The contention of the appellants was that it is not open to the
respondents during the subsistence oftenancy or in the suit for recovery of.
possession of the property after terinination of tenancy to set up title in
himself or in any other person. Respondents bad to surrender.possession
G and seek remedy, if any, separately in case he acquires title subsequently
through some other person.
The contention of the respondent was that a lease of immoveable
property determines in case the interest of lessee and lessor in the whole
of the property becomes v.ested in one person and in the present case such
H an event having taken piace to the extent of the undivided share of the
. 576
JAGDISH DUTT v. DHARAM PAL 577
coparceners of the joint family, decree passed In favour of the appellants A
cannot be executed. Therefore, possession of the entire property cannot be
obtained by the appellants and only symbolic possession can be given.
Dismtssing the appeal, this Court
HELD : 1. When a decree is passed in favour a joint family the same B
has to be treated as a decree in favour of all the members of the joint family
in which event it becomes a joint decree. Where a joint decree for actual
possession of immovable property is passed and one of the coparceners
assigns or transfers his interest in the subject matter of the decree in favour
of the judgment debtor, the decree gets extinguished to the extent of the
interest so assigned and execution could lie only to the extent of remaining C
part of the decree. In case where the interest of the coparceners is undefined,
indeterminate and cannot be specifically stated to be in respect of any one
portion of the property, a decree cannot be given effect to before ascertaining
the right of the parties by an appropriate decree in a partition suit. It is no
doubt true that the purchaser of the undivided interest of a coparcener in an D
immovable property cannot claim to be in joint possession of that property
with all the other coparceners. However, in case where he is already in
possession of the property, unless the rights are appropriately ascertained,
he cannot be deprived of the possession thereof for joint decree holder can
seek for execution of a decree in the whole and not in part of the property.
A joint decree can be executed as a whole since it is not divisible and it can E
be executed in part only where the share of the decree holders are defined
or those shares can be predicted or the share is not in dispute. Otherwise
the executing court cannot find out the shares of the decree holders and
dispute between joint decree holders is foreign to the provisions of Section
47, CPC. Order XXI, Rule 15, CPC enables a joint decree holder to execute F
a decree in its entirety but if whole of the 'decree cannot be executed, this
provision cannot be of any avail. In that event also, the decree holder will have
to work out his rights in an appropriate suit for partition and obtain necessary
relief thereto. Thus, High Court was justified in remitting the matter to the
Executing Court to investigate the quantum of share purchased by respondent
No. 2 -judgment debtor. [580-F-H; 581-A-C) G
- Sant Lal Jain v. Avatar Singh, (1985] 2 SCC 332, held inapplicable.
Shah Mathuradas Magan/al & Co. v. Nagappa Shankarappa Malage
& Ors., ( 1976] 3 SCC 660; Parmar Kanaksinh Bhagwansinh (Dead) by Lrs.
v. Makwana Shanabhai Bhikhabhai & Anr., (19951 2 SCC 501; H
578 SUPREME COURT RgPORTS [1999] 2 S.C.R.
A Hasimathunnisa Begum v. Vitha/i Rao Gangaji & Anr., AIR (1979) Andhra
Pradesh 273; Milkhi Ram & Ors. v. Raghunandan & Ors., AIR (1982) HP
87 and Bawa Maharaj Singh. v. Bawa Gurmukh Singh & Ors., AIR (1965)
Punjab 166, referred to.
CIVIL AJ;>PELLA TE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (C) No. 2590
B of 1997 Etc.
From the Judgment and Order dated 4.11.96 of the Himachal Pradesh
High Court in C.R.P. No. 61of1993.
C Surlil Kumar Jain, Jitender K. Bhatia, Ms. Jaya Kumari and Ajay Gupta
for Mis Jain Hansaria & Co. for the Petitioners.
Atul Shannar, Vijay Kumar and S. U~y Kumar Sagar for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D RAJENDRA BABU, J. A suit .for ejectment was instituted by the
appellants on t~e grounds of arrears of rent and' sub-letting by Dharam Pal
(Respondent No. 1) and Sat Pal (Respondent No. 2). The suit was decreed
by the trial court on March 31, 1987. Appeal against that decree, second
appeal thereafter and further special leave petition to this Court against the
E decree in second appeal stood dismissed., The appellants herein levied
execution on February 5, 1991 and certain objections thereto were raised that
Judgment Debtor No. I was unnecessarily arrayed as a party in the proceedings
and he was not in possession of the disputed premises. Judgment Debtor No.
2 claimed that he was a tenant in respect of the shop in question and his
tenancy was not terminated in accordahce with I.aw. This contention was
F belied by the finding recorded by the High Court in second appeal that the
said Sat Pal (Respondent No. 2) was not a tenant but a trespasser of the shop.
Hence the ~bjections were overruled. Against that order a revision petition
was filed which was also dismissed, of course, granting some time to vacate
the premises subject to certain conditions.
G
In the execution petition respondent No. 2 claimed that he had purchased
the undivided interest of the coparceners in the Hindu Undivided Family of
the decree holder and, therefore, actual physical possession cannot be given
but only symbolic possession can be given to the appellant-decree holder.
The Executing Court, after inquiry, upheld this contention. That order was
H challenged in the High Court. The High Court set aside the order made by /
0
JAGDISH DUTT v. DHARAM PAL [RAJENDRA BABU, J.] 579
the executing court and remitted the matter to it to ·investigate the quantum A
of share purchased by respondent No. 2. If a good or larger share as opposed
to an insignificant share had been purchased by respondent No. 2 khas
possession cannot be given to the appellant and if only an insignificant
· portion had been purchased by him, the khas possession shall be given to
the appellant. It is against this order the present special leave petitions are B
preferred.
The learned counsel for the appellants contended that it is not open to
the respondents during the subsistence of tenancy or in the suit for recovery
of possession of the property after termination of tenancy to set up title in
himself or in any other person. Respondents had to surrender possession and C
seek remedy, if any, separately in case he acquires title subsequently through
some other person and he placed strong reliance in support of this proposition
on the decision of this Court in Sant Lal Jain v. Avtar Singh. [1985] 2 SCC
332; He also contended that in a case of this nature where only a portion of
the undivided interest had been purchased by the judgment debtor there
would be n<? merger of interest in terms of Section 111 (d) of the Transfer of D
Property Ad, 1882 and submitted that the concept of merger would arise only
if no property remains outside the sale. In the present case only I/3rd
undivided share having been purchased the judgment debtor cannot resist
the recovery of possession and placed· reliance on the decision of this Court
in Shah Mathuradas Magan/al & Co. v. Nagappa Shankarappa Ma/age & E
Ors., [1976] 3 SCC 660 and Parmar Kanaksinh Bhagwansinh (Dead) by LRs
v. Makwana Shanabhai Bhikhabhai & Anr. [1995] 2 SCC 501.
On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted
that a lease of immovable property determines in case the interests of lessee
and lessor in the whole of the property becomes vested in one person and F
in the present case such an event having taken place to the extent of the
undivided share of the coparceners of the joint family, decree passed in
favour of the appellants cannot be executed. If that is so, the possession of
the entire property cannot be obtained by the appellants and, therefore, only
symbolic possession can be given and placed reliance on the decisions in G
Hasimathunnisa Begum v. Vitha/ Rao Gangaji & Anr., AIR (1979); Andhra
Pradesh 273; Milkhi Ram & Ors. v. Raghunandan & Ors., AIR (1982) H.P.
87; and Bawa Maharaj Singh v. Bawa Gurmukh Singh & Ors., AIR (1965)
Punjab 166.
We will first deal with the contention that a judgment debtor has to H
•
580 SUPREME COURT REPOp.rs [1999] 2 S.C.R.
A surrender his possession and thereafter .seek his remedy in case he acquires
any subsequent right in the· disputed property is attracted or not. A careful
reading of the decision in Sant la/ Jain case (supra) would reveal that during
the tenn of tenancy or in the suit for recovery of possession thereof after
termination of such tenancy the 'tenant cannot set up title in himself and he
has to surrender possession on tenancy being terminated and he has to seek
B his remedy separately in case he acquires title subsequent to the decree
through some other·person. It is also made ciear therein that he need not do
so ifhe had acquired title to the property from the lessor or some one claiming
through him in which case there would be a merger of two rights. In that case,
the facts were that the original· owner had leased the property which was held
C by the licensee through the lessee; that a sale had been effected in favour
of the licensee but the lease in favour of the original lessor was continued;
that his interest was different from. that of the original owner which was
transferred to the licensee and thus there would be n~ merger of interests.
In that view of the matter the decision in Sant Lal Jain\ case [supra] will not
be of al}y assistance to the appellants.
D
We need not.examine the scope of Section 111 (d) of the Transfer of
Property Act inasmuch as respondent No. 2 is held to be a trespasser and
not a lessee. We have to find out the effect of the purchase of undivided
interest of some of the coparceners in family of the decree holder in respect
E of the property which is the subjet:t-matter of execution.
When a decree is passed in favour of a joint family the same has to be
treated as a decree in favour of all the nietrrbers of the joint family in which
event it becomes a joint decree. Where a joint decree for actual possession
.of immovable property is passed and one ortite coparceners assigns or
F transfers his interest in the subject matter of the decree in favour of the
judgment debtor, the decree gets extinguished to the extent of the interest so
assigned and execution could lie on'ly to the extent of remaining part of the
decree. In case where the interest of the coparceners is undefined, indeterminate
and cannot be specifically stated fo be in respect of any one portion of the
G property, a decree cannot be given· effect to before ascertaining the rights of
the parties by an appropriate decree in a partition suit. It is no doubt true that
the purchaser of the undivided interest of a coparcener in· an immovable
property cannot claim to be_ in joint possession of that property with all the
other coparceners. However, in case where he is already in possession of the
property, unless the rights are appropriately ascertained, he cannot be deprived
H of the possession thereof for a joint decree holder can seek for execution of
JAGDISH DUTT v. DHARAM PAL [RAJENDRA BABU, J.] 581
a decree in the whole and not in part of the property. A joint decree can be A
executed 'as a whole since it is not divisible and it can be executed in part
only where the share of tne decree holders are defined or those shares can
be predicted or the share is not in dispute. Otherwise the executing court
cannot find out the shares of the decree holders and dispute between joint
decree holders is foreign to the provisions of Section 47, CPC. Order :XXI,
Rule 15, CPC enables a joint decree holder to execute a decree in its entirety B
but if whole of the decree cannot be executed, this provision cannot be of
any avail. In that event also, the decree holder will have to work ~ut his rights
in an appropriate suit for partition and obtain necessary relief thereto. Various
decisions cited by either side to which we have referred to do not detract us
from the principle stated by us as aforesaid. Therefore, a detailed reference C
to them is not required.
In this view of the matter, we think the High Court was justified in
making the order under appeal. Hence the special leave petitions stand
. dismissed. No orders as to costs.
D
S.V.K.I. Petition dismissed.
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