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Supreme Court of India

JAGDISH & ORS.versusNATHI MAL KEJRIWAL & ORS.

Citation
1986 INSC 219
Decided
24 October 1986
Disposal
Dismissed

Holding

The expression 'other co‑sharers' in clause 'Fourthly' of s.15(1)(b) refers only to co‑sharers not covered by the 'First', 'Secondly' or 'Thirdly' categories, so the petitioners cannot claim pre‑emption under that clause.

Summary

The petitioners, sons and nephews of vendors who sold joint family land to strangers, claimed a right of pre-emption under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. The Sub‑Judge initially granted them possession, but the decision was reversed by the High Court after the Supreme Court in Atam Prakash declared several clauses of the Act ultra vires. The petitioners then argued that they could rely on clause "Fourthly" of s.15(1)(b), which they said protected non‑alienating co‑sharers. The Supreme Court examined the meaning of "other co‑sharers" and held that it excludes persons who fall within the "First", "Secondly" or "Thirdly" categories. Since the petitioners are covered by those earlier categories, they cannot claim pre‑emption under the "Fourthly" clause, and the petition was dismissed.

Issues considered

  • Whether the phrase 'other co‑sharers' in clause 'Fourthly' of s.15(1)(b) of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, 1913 includes persons who fall under the 'First' or 'Secondly' categories.
  • Whether the petitioners, as non‑alienating co‑sharers, can claim a right of pre‑emption under clause 'Fourthly' after the earlier clauses were declared void.

Legislation cited

Subjects

right of pre-emptionjoint family propertyco‑sharersPunjab Pre-emption Actinterpretation of statutory clausesconstitutional validityspecial leave petition

Judgment

A                           JAGDISH & ORS.
                                  v.
                     NA THI MAL KEJRIW AL & ORS.

                              OCTOBER 24, 1986

B          [E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND M.M. DUTI, JJ.]

          Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, s.15(l)(b) clause 'Fourthly'-
    'Other Co-sharers'-lnterpretation of-Land belonging to joint
    family-Sold-Non-alienating co-sharers-Whether entitled to claim
    right of pre-emption.
c       Respondent Nos. S to 7 were joint owners of the suit land. They
  sold it to respondent nos. I to 4 on 25.10.71. The petitioners, som and
  nephews of the vendors, instituted a suit before the sub-lodge, Palwal .
  for ~on of the snit land on payment of the sale comideratlon on
  the ground that they were entitled to the right of the pre-emption in
D respect of the snit land either under clause "First", or Secondly, of
  s.JS(l)(a) or under clause 'First' or 'Secondly' ofs.lS(l)(b) ofthe Pun-
  jab Pre-emption Act 1913 as in force in the State of Haryana. The
  Sub-Judge decreed the snit for possession. The appeal of Respondent
  Nos. I to 4 against the aforesaid order having been dismissed by the
  District Judge, Ibey filed a second appeal before the High Court.
E
        During the pendency of the second appeal, the Supreme Court            ..   _._
                                                                                          \
  delivered its judgment in Alam Prakash v. State of Haryana & Ors.,
  [1986] 2 SCC 249. The High Court allowed the second appeal and
  dismissed the snit since the provisions under which the petitioners
  claimed the right· of pre-emption had been declared void by the
F Supreme Court in Atam Prakash's case.
                                                                                          --
          Being aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the petition·
    ers in the special leave petition contended that since the suit land be-
    longed to the joint family and it had not been sold by all the sharers,
    they were entitled to claim the right of pre-emption under clause
G   'Fourthly' of s.IS(l)(b) of the Act because they happened to be the
    non-alienating co-sharers.

          Dismis..uig the petition,

           HELD: The expression 'other co-sharers' in clause 'Fourthly' of
H   s.15( l)(b) of the Act refers to only those co-sharers who do not fllll

                                      68
            JAGDISH v. NATH! MAL KEJRIWAL [VENKATARAMIAH, J.J             69

     under clause 'First' or 'Secondly' or 'Thirdly' ofs.IS(l)(b) of the Act .. A
     Since the petitioners admittedly fall either under clause 'First' or under
     clause 'Secondly' of s.IS(l)(b) of the Act, they are clearly out<ide the
     scope of clause 'Fourthly'. Therefore, the petitioners canoot claim the
     right of pre-emption under clause 'Fourthly'. [71D-E]

           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition                B
     (Civil) No. 11015 of 1986.

           From the Judgment and Order dated 2.5.86 of the High Court of
     Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Regular Second Appeal No. 1504
     of 1977.
                                                                               c
           R.K. Jain, D.S. Mehra and Ms. AbhaJain for the Petitioners.

          K.K. Jain, P. Dayal, Shiv Kumar and A.O. Sanger for Respon-
     dent No. l

           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                          D

            VENKATARAMIAH, J. Respondents 5 to 7-Aji Ram, Tota
     Ram and Hari Chand are sons of one Kesaria. The suit land belonged
     jointly to Respondents 5 to 7. They sold it to Respondents l to 4-
,L   Nathi Mal Kejriwal, Radhey Shayam Kejriwal, Smt. Daropdi Devi
     and Nagar Mal Kejriwal, who were strangers to their fam~y for a E
     consideration of Rs.33,000 under a sale deed registered on 25.10. 1971..
     The petitioners, who claimed themselves to be the sons and nephews

-    of the vendors, instituted a suit in Civil Suit No. 466 of 1972 on the file
     of the Sub-Judge, !st Class, Palwal for possession of the suit land on
     payment of Rs.33,000 Claiming that they were entitled to the right of
     pre-emption in respect of the suit land either under clause 'First' or F
     'Secondly' of Section 15(i)(a) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913
     (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') as in force in the State of Haryana
     or under clause 'First' or 'Secondly' of Section 15( i)(b) of the Act. The
     learned Sub-Judge upheld the plea of the petitioners and decreed the
     suit for possession of the suit land against Respondents 1 to 4 who had
     purchased the suit land as well as against Respondents 5 to 7 who had G
     sold it subject to the petitioners paying a sum of Rs.36,642. which
     included the consideration of Rs.33,000 and interest thereon at 8 per
     cent per annum. The learned Sub-Judge further directed the petition-
     ers to deposit the sum of Rs.36,642 minus the zare punjam amount on
     or before 3rd May, 197.6 and that on their failure to deposit the said H
     amount, he directed that the suit should be deemed to have been
    70                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [ 1987] 1 S. C.R.

A   dismissed with costs. Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Sub-              ._
    Judge, Respondents l to 4 filed an appeal before the District Judge,
    Gurgaon in Civil Appeal No. 69 of 1976. The appeal .was dismissed.
    Against the judgment of the learned District Judge, Respondents 1 to 4
    filed a second appeal before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in
    Regular Second Appeal No. 1504 of 1977. That second appeal was
B   taken up for hearing on 2nd May, 1986. By that time this Court had
    delivered its judgment in Atam Prakash v. State of Haryana and Others,
    [ 1986] 2 S.C.C. 249 declaring clauses 'First', 'Secondly' and 'Thirdly' of
    Section 15( l)(a), clauses 'First', 'Secondly' and 'Thirdly' of Section
     15( l)(b ), clauses 'First, 'Secondly' and 'Thirdly' of Section 15( l)(c) and (
    the whole of Section 15(2) of the Act .as ultra vires the Constitution. ~.;:.m
C   Following the said decision the High Court allowed the second appeal
    and dismissed the suit since the provisions under which the petitioners
    claimed the right of pre-emption had been declared void by this Court.           )I·
    This petition is filed praying for special leave to prefer an appeal againsi
    the judgment of the High Court in the second appeal.

D         At the hearing of this Special Leave Petition the learned counsel
    for the petitioners contended that even though the petitioners were
    not able to claim the right of pre-emption under clauses 'First', and
    'Secondly' of Section 15{1)(a) or clauses 'First' and 'Secondly' of Sec-
    tion 15( l)(b) by reason of the decision in the Atam Prakash's case
    (supra) they were entitled to claim the right of pre-emption under
E   clause 'Fourthly' in Section 15( l)(b) of the Act. Section 15( l)(b) reads
    thus>

                "15. Persons in whom right of pre-emption vests in respect
                of sales of agricultziral land· and village immovable pro-
                perty-( 1)The right of pre-emption in respect of agricul-
                                                                                    -
F               tural land and village immovable property shall vest-

                (a)

                (b) where the sale is of a share out of joint land or property
                and is not made by all the co-sharers jointly-
G
                First, in the sons or daughters or sons or daughters' sons of
                the vendor or vendors;

                Secondly, in the brothers or brother's sons of the vendor or
                vendors;-
H
             \


                  JAGDISH v. NATH! MAL KEJRIWAL [YENKATARAMIAH, J.]               71

                      Thirdly, in the father's brother or father's brother's sons of   A
                      the vendor or vendor_s;

                      Fourthly, in the other co-sharers;

                      Fifthly, in the tenants who hold under tenancy of the ven-
                      dor or vendors the land or property sold or a part thereof;      B
                                                                                  "
                                 ' learned counsel for the petitioners that since
               It is argued by the
     \. the suit land belonged to the joint family and it had not been sold by all
- - ~the co-sharers they were entitled to claim the right of pre-emption
        under clause 'Fourthly' of Section 15(l)(b) of the Act because they c
        happened to be the non-alienating co-sharers. Although there is no
     ...specific finding that the property is the joint property in this case, we
        shall assume for purposes of this judgment that the suit land was joint
        property. In order to understand the meaning of the· words 'other
        oo-sharers' in Section 15(1)(b) we have to read the Act as it stood
        before the decision in Atam nakash's case (supra). It is seen that the D
        expression 'other co-sharers' in clause 'Fourthly' of Section 15(1)(b) of
        the Act refers to only those oo-sharers ·who do not fall under clause
        'First' or 'Seoondly' or 'Thirdly' of Section 15(1)(b) of the Act . Since
        the petitioners adrnittetlly fall either under clause 'First' or under
        clause 'Secontlly' of.Section 15(1)(b) of the Act they are clearly out-
        side the scope of clause 'Fourthly'. Therefore, the petitioners cannot E
        claim the right of pre-emption under clause 'Fourthly'. We do not,
        therefore, find any substance in this contention which was urged for

-       the first time before the High Court. The suit was, therefore, rightly
        dismissed by the High Court holding that the petitioners were no
        longer entitled to any relief under the Act. This· petition, therefore,
        fails and it is dismissed.                                                 F

           M.L.A.                                              Petition dismissed.
 J




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