Holding

The High Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction; a revision cannot re‑appraise evidence or direct a fresh judgment, and therefore the order setting aside the acquittal is invalid.

Summary

The trial court (Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur) acquitted the accused in a murder case under Sections 302 and 34 IPC. The aggrieved party filed a revision under Section 401 of the CrPC before the Patna High Court, alleging that the trial court had wrongly discarded eye‑witness testimony. The High Court set aside the acquittal, directing the trial court to rewrite a fresh judgment after re‑appraising the evidence. The Supreme Court held that a revision cannot re‑appraise evidence or convert an acquittal into a conviction; it is limited to correcting manifest illegality, procedural defect or gross miscarriage of justice. By directing a fresh judgment, the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction and made a significant departure from normal revisional practice. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court order and restored the trial court’s acquittal.

Issues considered

Whether a High Court exercising power under Section 401 CrPC can set aside an order of acquittal and direct a fresh judgment after re‑appraising evidence.
Scope and limits of the revisional jurisdiction of a High Court under Section 401 (and related provisions) in criminal matters.
Whether the High Court’s direction amounted to conversion of an acquittal into a conviction, contrary to Section 401(3)/Section 439(4) CrPC.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 307, s. 386, s. 389, s. 390, s. 391, s. 392, s. 401, s. 439
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 27

Subjects

revision jurisdictionSection 401 CrPCacquittalhigh court power of revisionmiscarriage of justiceevidentiary re‑appraisalcriminal procedureArticle 136judicial discretionfresh judgment

Judgment

A JAGGAN/\TH CHOUDHARY AND ORS.
v.
RAMA YAN SINGH AND ANR.

MAY 9, 2002

B (UMESH C. BANERJEE AND Y.K. SABHARWAL, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

S.401-High Court's power ofrevision-Nature and object of-Revision
C before High Court against order of acquiital-High Court on re-appraisal of
evidence observing that trial Court wrongly discarded evidence of eye-
witnesses-Thaf'reasonings for acquittal given by trial court were not proper
and justifiable on the face of it-High Court directing the trial court to write
a ji-esh judgment by giving proper judicial mind to the evidence on record
D Held_, exercise of power uls, 401 cannot but be ascribed to be discretionwy-
Thisj discretion, however, has to be a judicious exercise of discretion and not
an prbitra1J1 one-Judicial discretion cannot bzit be a discretion which stands
"informed by tradition, methodised by analogy and disciplined by system"-
It is not to be exercised lightly but only in exceptional situations where the
justice delivery system requires interference for correction of a manifest
E illegality or prevention ofa gross miscarriage ofjustice-lt is not an appellate
forum wherein scrutiny ofevidence is possible, neither the revisional jurisdiction
is open for being exercised simply by reason of the factum of another view
being otherwise possible-Jn the instant case, High Court exceeded its revisional
jurisdiction in setting aside the order of acquittal-Administration ofjustice.
F K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr., AIR
T
(1962) SC 1788; D. Stephens v. Nosibo/la, (19511SCR284; Logendranath
Jha v. Shri Polailal Biswas, (19511 SCR 676; Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary
and Ors., (1992( 4 SCC 305 and Thakur Das (Dead) by lrs. v. State of
Madhya Pradesh and Anr., (t'9781 1 SCC 27, relied on.
G
Judgment-High Court-Departureji-om regula,r norm in pronouncement
ofjudgment-Effect of-Revision before High Court-Against order ofacquittal
passed by Additional Sessions Judge-High Court on re-appraisal ofevidence
observing that trial court wrongly disbelieved and discarded evidence of eye-
witnesses and its judgment would affect the system of delivering justice-That
H 936
.IAGGANATH CHOUDHARY v. RAMA YAN SINGH [UMESH C. BANERJEE, J.] 937
reasonings for acquittal given by trial court were not proper and justifiable A
on the face of it-High Court setting aside the judgment of trial court and
sending the matter back to it ''for writing a ji-esh judgment by giving proper
judicial mind to evidence on record"-Held, writing a fresh judgment as
directed by High Court is rather a significant departure in the normal disposal
ofrevisional applications-The judgment of High Court reflects an extremely B
significant departure from the nor111al forn1 qf Court orders-Perusal of the
judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, shows that the comments of the
High Court are not justified-Nor would it be said to be within the jurisdiction
of High Court to pass the impugned order in exercise of revisional jurisdiction
uls. 401-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No.
c
607 of 2002.

From the Judgment and Order dated 20.6.2001 of the Patna High Court
in Cr!. R. No. 301 of 2000.
D
S,B. Sanyal, Ranjan Mukherjee and Ms. Manita Verma for the
Appellants.

Braj Kishore Mishra, Ms. Aparna Jha and B.B. Singh for the
Respondents.
E
The following Order of the Court was delivered by

BANERJEE, J. Leave granted

A significant departure from the regular norm in the matter of
pronouncement of judgment is the key factor in the present appeal. Mentioned F
hereinbefore a significant departure in the matter of pronouncement of
judgment-but what is it so significant so as to warrant interference of this
Court under Article 136 of the Constitution-Before adverting to the same,
however, a brief factual reference would be convenient and necessary for
appreciation of such a departure-against an order of acquittal recorded by 3rd
Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur in Sessions Trial No. 258 of 1992, G
a revisional application stands filed before the H.igh Court of Judicature at
Patna recording therein that on appreciation of evidence the order, as passed
by the learned Sessions Judge, was totally perverse on the face of the judgment.
It is on the basis aforesaid, the learned Single Judge in the revisional application
in his judgment (impugned before this Court) in three different settings in the H
-~

938 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A body of the judgment stated:

(a) "Be it what it may, I am not going into the merit of the case in
depth but on perusal of the impugned judgment particularly
paragraph 30 and the material on records, I also hold that
reasonings of acquittal given by the learned Sessions Judge are
B definitely not proper and justifiable on the face of it and if not
justifiable then it may go to the extent of perversity."
(b) "But in the present case I find that four eye Witnesses to the
occurrence were found to be present at the scene of occurrent
and their presence at the scene of occurrence could not be
c disbelieved by any plausible or cogent reasons and then discarding
the evidence of eye witnesses' has been done by the learned
Court below on a weak and meek reasons then definitely this
Court can interfere as the impugned judgment would affect in
the system of delivering justice."

D (c) "In that way, without forming an opinion regarding the fate of
the case I find that the impugned judgment should not be sustained
and must be set aside and the matter be quashed for further
consideration in the light of the observation made above. In that
way, the impugned judgment is hereby set aside and the matter
is_ sent back to the Court below for writing a fresh judgment by
E giving properjudicial mind to the evidence on record (Emphasis
Supplied) Opposite party Nos. 2 to 4 are hereby directed to
appear before the learned Court below on 2nd August , 200 I and
they should be allowed to go on bail to the satisfaction of the
learned Sessions Judge and then an opportunity be given for
F further argument to both the parties writing a fresh judgment on
T
the materials on record."

It is this direction as noticed hereinbefore, for writing out a fresh
judgment by giving proper judicial mind to the evidence on record and which
stan·ds very strongly criticised by the learned senior advocate, Mr. S.B. Sanyal,
G appearing in support of the appeal and we do find some justification in
regard thereto.

Before delving on to the principal issue as regards the departure and as
; '
stated above it would be convenient to note that in count I, paragraph 30 of
the trial Court's judgment has been drawn attention of and for convenience
H sake para 30 is reproduced hereinbelow for its true scope and effect. The said
JAGGANJ\Tll CHOUDHARY v. RAMA YAN SINGH [UMESH C BANER.11.'.E, J] 939

paragraph 30 reads as below :- A
"30. Now on the cool consideration of entire facts, evidence oral and
documentary and argument of both the sides, I reach on :he following
conclusion :-

(A) That according to P. W.5 and P.M. Report (Ext. 2) I find that B
the doctor conducted post mortem at II a.m. on 7.10.91 and had
written in the end of post mortem report that the victim died within
24 hours from the time of conduction of post mortem report. This
means that the story of prosecution that Ram Binod was caught and
shot on 6.10.91 and soon he died is not a fact, because according to
medical finding Ram Binod Singh was alive till I 0.59 p.m. on 6.10.91 C
and in such a case the entire story of prosecution becomes unreliable.
As such, the Court has no alternative than to declare that the
prosecution has not succeeded to· prove the case against the accused
persons under Section 302/34 of the I.P.C.

(B) Further I find that all the witnesses, P.Ws. I, 2 and 3 are D
related and P. W. 4 is the informant himself. The independent witnesses
Madan Singh, Rambabu Singh, Raj Kishore Thakur were not examined
and no explanation was given.

(C) Chargesheet witnesses Radha Mohan Singh, Sudistha Singh
and Madan Singh were not exa1nined and no explanation during E
argument was placed by the learned Addi. P.P. Chargesheet witness
Radha Mohan Singh has deposed for the defence as D.W.7 and
supported the defence version of the accused person i.e. occurrence
took place at other place by other person and the dead body was
brought by Rickshaw and on cot to the bathan of Raghubansh Singh. F
(D) The prosecution has miserably failed to establish the P.O. for
the P.O. place darwaja of Raghubansh dean of Ranghuban.sh and
bathan and shan of raghubansh were used. Each places possess
different boundaries and distance from one another.

(E) The prosecution has further failed to establish the weapons G
used in inflicting wound on the deceased. For arms words nalkatua,
deshi revolver, revolver and nalkatua gun were used by different
persons. Each weapon differs from one another. Had the P. Ws. actually
seen the occurrence, the P.O. and weapons used could not have been
deposed differently. H
940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A (F) The stained soil with blood seized by the 1.0. was not produced
to be marked as material exhibits.

(G) The 1.0. (P. W.7) has not seized the cot and the sand smeared
with blood, which were concrete and ;trong proof of murder.

(H) The accused have succeeded to establish through informatory
B
petition (Ext. D) the suspicion on the part of informant and witnesses
and others and also Jagannath Choudhary was a witness in a case
against Sudhistha while Chandra Prakash is son of Sudistha, Ramesh ~
too is inimical with the accused persons. Thus, it comes to finding
that previous enmity has played great part in implication of the accused
C persons while the prosecution has totally failed to prove charge against
the accused persons.

(I) The prosecution story as told by Ramayan Singh is itself
unbelievable because if the accused persons will catch Ram Binod
from back and front portion, no firing on Binod can be done because
D in such circumstances, Ram Binod will not remain like statute, but to
save himself, he will try his best to be immune and thus all the four
might be in an inconsistent position, so a fire on Binod could injure
any accused.

(J) According to the 1.0. in his case diary he opined contact shot
E of Ram Binod, which is the case of prosecution to, but P. W. answered
that the shot of firing might have been done with a distance of 6 to
7 feet away. This also falifies the prosecution case.

(K) According to some of the P.Ws. Ram Binod received fire
wound. When he was freed by accuses persons he fell down on the ,-l
F surface and died soon. When his body was kept on a cot, his pulse
beat stopped, but according to P. W. 7 the nature of injury is such that
· victim might have remained alive for 3 to 4 hours. This also falsify
the prosecution story. 1.

(L) P. Ws. I, 2, 3 and 6 had not seen the alleged story of snatching
G watch and money of Ramayan by Bhav Chandra Choudhary alone or \
in combination with his brother Chunchun and father Jagannath. So,
the motive behind such murder by the alleged accused is not brought.
before the Court. According to 1966 Bl, JR page 786 to 790 "statement
made under Section 164 cannot be used as a substantive evidence. It
H can be used to cross-examine the persons who made it." In this case
•

JAGGJ\NATH CHOUDHARY v. RAMA YAN SINGH [UMESH C. BANERJEE, J.] 941
_,.. P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 have contracted such statement, such statements A
Exts. 7 to. 7/3 have been recorded not in accordance \Vith law and are
defective."

It is on the basis aforesaid that the learned Sessions Judge thought it fit
_to acquit the accused upon recording a finding to that effect. The second
count as noticed above, if read with count (3), the order impugned cannot but B
be stated to be a mockery of justice delivery system.

Writing of a fresh judgment by giving proper judicial mind to the
evidence on record has been the observation of the High Court - and what
would be the consequences - would the learned trial Judge be ever able to
apply the judicial mind in the matter of dispensation of justice - We are c
afraid, our answer cannot but be in the negative.

Let us now, however, concentrate ourselves on to the procedural aspect
of the matter - and it is in this aspect of the matter, Section 401 be considered
at the initial stage. The Section reads as below :
D
"401. High Court's powers of revision - (1) In the case of any
proceeding the record of which has been called for by itself or which
otherwise comes to its knowledge, the High Court may, in its
discretion, exercised any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal
by Section 386, 389, 390 and 391 or on a Court of Session by Section E
307 and, when the Judges composing the Court ofrevision are equally
divided in opinion, the case shall be disposed of in the manner provided
by Section 392.

(2) No order under this section shall be made to the prejudice of
the accused or other person unless he has had an opportunity of beini;; F
heard either personally or by pleader in his own defence.

(3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise a Higli
Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction.

(4) Where under this Code an appeal lies and no appeal is brought, G
-<
no proceeding by way of revision shall be entertained at the instance
of the party who could have appealed.

... (5) Where under the Code an appeal lies but an application for
revision has been made to the High Court by any person and the High
Court is satisfied that such application was made under the erroneous H
-- '
--t:_

942 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A belief that no appeal lies thereto and that it is necessary in the interests
of justice so to do, the High Court may treat the application for
revision as a petition of appeal and deal with the same accordingly."

More than four decades ago, this Court in K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v.
State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr., AIR (1962) SC 1788 very succinctly
B formulated the extent of jurisdiction by the revisional Court upon reliance on
two oft-cited decisions of this Court as mentioned therein in the manner
following :

"4. The extent of the jurisdiction of the High Court in the matter of
inferring in revision against an order of acquittal has been considered
c by this Court on a number of occasions. In D. Stephens v. Nosibo/la,
[1951) SCR 284: AIR (1951) SC 196, this Court observed -

"The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under S.439
of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not to be lightly exercised when
D it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal,
against which the Government has a right of appeal under s.417. It
could be exercised only in exeptional cases where the interests of
public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest
illegality or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This
jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the
E lower Court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the
evidence on record."

(5) Again in logendrathan Jha v. Shri Polailal Biswas, [1951] SCR
676 : AIR ( 1951) SC 316, this Court observed -

F "Though subs-s. (I) of S.439 of the Criminal Procedure Code
authorises the High Court to exercised in its discretion any of the
powers conferred on a Court of appeal by S.423, yet sub-S. (4)
specifically excludes the power t<) 'convert a finding of acquittal into
one of conviction'. This does not mean that in dealing with a revision
petition by a private party against an order of acquittal, the High
G
Court can in the absence of any error on a point of law reappraise the
evidence and reverse the findings of facts on which the acquittal was
based, provided only it stops short of finding the accused guilty &
passing sentence on him by ordering a re-trial."

H (6) These two cases clearly lay down the limits of the High Court's

...
JAGGANATH CHOUDHARY v. RAMA YAN SINGH [UMESH C. BANERJEE, J_J 943
_.,,.. jurisdiction on interfere with an order of acquittal in revision : in A
particular, logendranath Jim's case (1951] SCR 676: AIR (1951)
SC 316 stresses that it is not open to a High Court to convert a
finding of acquittal into one of conviction in view of the provisions
of S.439(4) and that the High Court cannot do this even indirectly by
ordering retrial. What had happened in that case was that the High
Court reversed pure findings of facts based on the trial court's
B
appreciation of evidence but formally complied with sub-s.(4) by
directing only a retrial of the appellants without convicting them, and
r warned that the court retrying the case should not b_e influenced by
any expression of opinion contained in the judgment of the High
Court. In that connection this court observed that there could be little c
doubt that the dice was loaded against the appellants of that case and
it might prove difficult for any subordinate judicial officer dealing
With the case to put aside altogether the strong views expressed in the
judgment as to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the
circumstances of the case in general.
D
' (7) It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside
~
an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though
the State may not have thought fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction
should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in
exceptional cases, when there is so1ne glaring defect in the procedure
or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there E
has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub-section (4) of S.439
forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one
of the conviction and that makes it all the more incumbent on the
High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into
one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial, when it F
J'.
cannot itself directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of
conviction. This places limitation on the power of the High Court to
set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional
cases that this power should be exercised. It is not possible to lay
down the criteria for detennining such exceptional cases which would
cover all contingencies. We may however indicate some cases of this G
kind, which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering
with a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be where the
• trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the
j.. -Ct.:
accused, or where the trial court has wrongly shut out eviden_ce which
the prosecution \\'ished to produce or where the appeal court has H
944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be
A..-
inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either
by the trial court or by the appeal court or where the acquittal is
based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the
law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to
be cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably
B interfere with an order of acquittal and in such a case it is obvious
that it cannot be said that the High Court was doing indirectly what
it could not do directly in view of the provisions of S.439(4). We
have therefore to see whether the order of the High Court setting i
aside the order acquittal in this case can be upheld ori these principles.
c (8) A perusal of the judgment of the High Court shows that the High
Court '1as gone into the evidence in great detail so far as the case
against the appellant :was concerned. In our opinion, the High Court
should not have death with evidence in such detail when it was going
to order a retrial, for such detailed consideration of evidence, as
D pointed out in Logendranath's case, 1951SCR676 AIR (1951) 316
amounts to loading the dice against the appellant, when the case goes
;..
back for retrial. If the matter stood at this only, we would have no
hesitation in setting aside the order of the High Court directing retrial;
"
....
but theie is one important circumstance in this case to which the High
Comt has adverted in passing, which, in our opinion, was sufficient
E to enable the High Court to set aside the acquittal in this case. It
would then have been unnecessary to consider the evidence in that
detail in which the High Court has gone into it, and thus load the dice
against the appellant, when the case goes back for retrial. That
circumstance is that the Assistant Sessions Judge had admitted in
F evidence that part of the statement of the appellant in which he stated
~
that he would show that place where he had hidden the ornaments
and relying on it he held that the appellant was in possession 6f the
seventeen ornaments, he had dug out from the garden which he owned
along with others. The Sessions Judge however held that part of the
statement of the appellant where he stated that he had hidden the
G ornaments was inadmissible in evidence. The same applies to the
case against the other accused, who had stated that he had given one
ornament to Baba Sab and would get it recovered from him. Though
the Sessions Judge has not in specific terms ruled out that part of the ;>.JJ
other accused's statement where he said that he had given the ornament
H to Baba Sab, he did not consistently with what he said with respect
r-
JAGGANATH CHOUDHARY v. RAMA YAN SINGH [UMESH C. BANERJEE, J.] 945

to the appellant, attach importance to this statement of the other A
accused. If therefore this part of the statement of the appellant and
the other accused which led to discovery of ornaments is admissible,
it must be held that the appeal court wrongly ruled out evidence
which was admissible. In these circumstances, the case would clearly
be covered by the principles we have set out above in as much as
relevant evidence was ruled out as inadmissible and the High Court B
would be justified in interfering with the order of aquittal so that the
evidence may be re-appraised after taking into account the evidence
which was wrongly ruled out as inadmissible. It seems that the High
Court was conscious of this aspect of the matter, for it says in one
part of the judgment that the only possible inference that could be C
drawn was that the appellant was in possession of stolen goods before
they were put in that secret spot, as admitted by the appellant in his
statement part of which is admissible under S.27 of the Indian Evidence
Act. If the High Court had confined itselfonly to the admissibility of
this part of the statement, it would have been justified interfering
with the order of acquittal. Unfortunately, the High Court went further D
and appraised the evidence also which it should not have done, as
held by this Court in Longendranath 's case, 1951 SCR 676 : AIR
(1951) SC 316). However, if admissible evidence was ruled out and
was not taken into consideration, that would in our opinion be a
ground for interfering with the order of acquittal in revision." E
Incidentally the object of the revisional jurisdiction as envisaged under
Section 40 I was to confer upon superior criminal court a kind of paternal or
supervisory jurisdiction, in order to correct miscarriage of justice arising
from misconception of law, irregularity of procedure, neglect of proper
precautions of apparent harshness of treatment which has resulted on the one F
hand in some injury to the due maintenance of law and order, or on the other
hand in some underserved hardship to individuals. (See in this context the
decision of this Court Janata Dal v. HS. Chowdhary and Ors., (1992) 4 SCC
305). The main question which the High Court has to consider in an application
in revision is whether substantial justice has been done. If however, the same G
has been an appeal, the applicant would be entitled to demand an adjudication
upon all questions of fact or law which he wishes to raise, but in revision the
only question is whether the court should interfere in the interests of justice.
~ "'- Where the court concerned does not appear to have committed any illegality
or material irregularity or impropriety in passing the impugned judgment and
order, the revision cannot succeed. If the impugned order apparently is H
946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) 3 S.C.R.

A presentable, without any such infirmity which may render it completely
perverse or unacceptable and when there is no failure of justice, interference
cannot be had in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

While it is true and now well-settled in a long catena of cases that
exercise of power under Section 40 I cannot but be ascribed to be discretionary
B - this discretion, however, as is popularly informed has to be a judicious
exercise of discretion and not an arbitrary one. Judicial discretion cannot but
be a discretion which stands "informed by tradition, methodised by analogy
and disciplined by system" - resultantly only in the event of a glaring defect
in the procedural aspect or there being a manifest error on a point of law and
C thus a flagrant miscarriage of justice, exercise ofrevisional jurisdiction under
this statute ought not to be called for. It is not to be lightly exercised but only
in exceptional situations where the justice delivery system requires interference
for correctio_n of manifest illegality or prevention of a gross miscarriage of
justice. In Nosibolla : Logendranath Jha and Chinnaswamy Reddy (supra) as
also in Thakur Das (Thakur Das (Dead) by Lrs. v. State of Madhya Pradesh
D and Anr., [1978] I SCC 27 this Court with utmost clarity and in no uncertain
terms recorded the same. It is not an appellate forum wherein scrutiny of
evidence is possible neither the revisional jurisdiction is open for bein&_
exercised simply by reason of the factum of another view being other wise
possible. It is restrictive in its application though in the event of there being
E a failure of justice there ca" said to be no limitation as regards the applicability
of the revisional power.

The High Court possesses a general power of superintendence over the
actions of court subordinate to it. On its administrative side, the power is
known as the power of superintendence. On the judicial side, it is known as
F the duty of revision. The High Court can at any stage even on its own
motion, if it so desires, and certainly when illegalities or irregularity resulting
in injustice are brought to its notice call for the records and examine them.
This right of the High Court is as much a part of the administration of justice
as its duty to hear appeals and revisions and interlocutory applications - so
G also its right to exercise its powers of administrative superintendence. Though
however, the jurisdictional sweep of the process of the High Court, however,
under the provisions of Section 40 I is very much circumscribed, as noticed
hereinbefore.

Having regard to the aforesaid, we do feel it expedient to record that
H in the contextual facts presently under consideration before this Court, the
JAGGANATH CHOUDHARY L RAMA YAN SINGH [UMESH C. BANERJEE, J.] 947

High Court cannot but be said to have exceeded its revisional jurisdiction in A
setting aside the order of acquittal.

In any event, writing of a fresh judgment as directed by the Court is
rather a significant departure in the normal disposal ofrevisional applications.
Opportunities have been given for further argument but would that by itself
tilt the scale - this aspect of the matter has already been noticed earlier, as B
such we need not diiate thereon excepting recording that an extremely
significant departure from the normal form of Court orders stands challenged
in this Court.

We have had the opportunity of going through the judgment of the
learned Sessions Judge and paragraph 30 thereof has already been noticed in C
extenso and a perusal thereof would not justify the comments of the learned
Single Judge of the High Court, neither it world be said to be within the
jurisdiction of the High Court to pass the order impugned in exercise of
revisional jurisdiction under Section 40 I of the Code.
D
In the view as above, the order impugned cannot be sustained and as
such the appeal is allowed. The order impugned is set aside and the order of
the learned Sessions Judge stands restored. The bail bonds, if any, stand
discharged.

-- R.P. Appeal allowed. E

1