Holding

The Registrar cannot review his own earlier decision under Section 96(2), and the Tribunal has jurisdiction under Section 150(9) to examine the record of proceedings where an appeal lies to it.

Summary

The JAI MAHAVIR Co‑operative Housing Society expelled a founding member, Panchal Keshavlal Narbheram, and the expulsion was approved by the Registrar under Section 36 of the Gujarat Co‑operative Societies Act, 1961. Panchal filed a petition under Section 96(1) to set aside the resolution; the Registrar referred the dispute to his nominee, who dismissed the claim, leading to an appeal to the Tribunal, which remanded the matter for fresh consideration. The Society later sought a revision under Section 96(2), arguing that the Registrar could review his earlier decision, and the District Registrar held that res judicata barred the dispute. The Tribunal held the Registrar had no power to revisit his own decision and that the Tribunal possessed revisional jurisdiction under Section 150(9) to examine the record of proceedings where an appeal lies. The Gujarat High Court affirmed this view and granted special leave to appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, confirming that the Registrar cannot review his earlier order and that the Tribunal’s revisional jurisdiction is valid.

Issues considered

Whether the Registrar, after referring a dispute to his nominee under Section 96, has jurisdiction to review his own earlier decision under Section 96(2).
Whether the Gujarat Co‑operative Tribunal has revisional jurisdiction under Section 150(9) to call for and examine the record of proceedings in which an appeal lies to it.

Legislation cited

Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961s. 150, s. 36, s. 96, s. 97, s. 98
Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960s. 149

Subjects

co-operative societyexpulsiondispute resolutionregistrartribunalrevisional jurisdictionres judicataSection 96Section 150appeal

Judgment

JAi MAHAVIR CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LTD.
A v.
PANCHAL KESHAVLAL NARBHERAM & ORS.

APRIL 10, 1987

B [G.L. OZA AND v: KHALID, JJ: I
,
· Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961-Sections 96 and 150-
0rder passed by the Registrar-Whether subject to revision by
Tribunal-W~ether Registrar competent to review his earlier decision.

The first respondent institnted a proceeding nnder Section 96(1) ---.J"\
c of the Gujarat Cooperative. Societies Act, 1961, for setting· aside .the
Resolution, expelling him . from the membership or the appellant
Siiciety. The said resolution had been duly approved by the Registrar or
··societies under Section 36 or the· Act. The dispute was referred by the ~
Registrar under Section 98(1) or the Act to his nominee for a decision,
D who dismissed the claim. · · ·' ·
·,
. The Tribunal allowed the appeal ·or first respondent and reman·
ded the matter to the Registrar's noninee for a fresh decision. During
the trial, upon an application made by the appellant Society under
sub'section (2) or Section 96 that the dispute <!id not snrvive as the
E expulsion had already been decided in the collateral proceedings and
the Registrar had accorded his approval nnder Section 36 or the Act,
· the District Registrar held that the f"irst respondent was precluded from
contending that the lmpngned Resolution was illegal since he had not ~'-)

preferred any appeal against the approval by the Registrar, that the
doctrine of res' judicata was attracted and, therefore, there was no
F dispnte in existence between the parties.·

This order was taken np in revision under Section 150 sub-clause
(9) of the Act before the Tribunal, which held that the District Registrar
had no jnrisdiction to re-open the question as to whether or not the
matter referred by first respondent was a dispute within the meaning or
G sub-section (1) or Section 96 at the subsequent stage, and having already
decided that the matter constituted a dispnte nnder Section 96(1) at an
earlier stage, the powers under sub-section (2) or Section .96 were
exhausted and he was not competent to review his earlier decision.

In appeal, the High Court held that the Tribnnal was right in
H holding that the Registrar had no jurisdiction to revise or review his

-- 894
JAi MAHAVIR SOCIETY v. PANCHAL 895

earlier decision that the dispute raised by the first respondent fell A

- within the ambit of the description of dispute within the meaning of
sub-section (1) of Section 96, and that it had reYisional jurisdiction; and
also granted special leave to appeal.

In appeal before this Court, it was contended on behalf of the
B
appellant that when a dispute was referred to the Registrar, and he
ultimately gave a decision on merits it was no doubt appealable but
).J,\ when the Registrar entertained the dispute and sent it to his nominee,
(
that was an order against which a revision lay to the Tribunal.
'
-- Dismissing the appeal, this Court,
c
HELD: I. Clause (9) of Section 150 confers jurisdiction on the
;.../, Tribunal to call for and examine the record of any proceeding. The
word 'proceeding' here is qualified by the phrase, in which appeal lies
to it. After final disposal of these proceedings i.e. decision of the dispute
by the Registrar or by his nominee, an appeal will lie to the Tribunal and,
D
therefore, the High Court was right in holding that the Tribunal had juris-
diction to call for and examine the record of such proceedings. [899D-E]

The phrase 'any proceedings in which an appeal lies to it' in
clause (9) of Section 150 makes it clear that if the proceedings where the
A- final order is appealable, then it could not be said that these are the
E
proceedings where an appeal lies to the Tribunal, and it is in these
proceedings that the jurisdiction has been conferred on the Tribunal to
call for the record and examine the matter. [899E-G I
l

~ 2. When the respondent submitted his dispute to the Registrar
I and the Registrar, after examining the matter, came to the conclusion
F

(
that it was a dispute which could be entertained within the scope of
Section 96 and, therefore, referred it to his nominee for decision, there
is no doubt that the Registrar exercised jurisdiction under Section 96
and, therefore, the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion
that once the Registrar took this decision, he had no power to review his
order. [900A-C]
G
'
~ Krishnarao Bakaramji Hadge v. The State of Maharashtra, [1969]
B.L.R., 150 referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1583
00~Im H
896 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R.

A From the Judgment and Order dated 6.4.1973 of the Gujarat
""*'
High Court in Special Civil Appeal No. 494 of 1971.

Raja Ram Aggarwal, Mr. M.V. Goswami and M.M. Kashatriya
for the Appellant.
-
B Vimal Dave and Mrs. H. Wahi for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the· Court was delivered by }.-,.

OZA, J. This appeal is by certificate granted by the High Court ~·
of Gujarat under Art. 133 of the Constitution of India by its order
C dated 6.4.73. The High Court by its order dated 6.4.73 dismissed the
petition filed by the appellant questioning the correctness of the order
of the Gujarat Co-operative Tribunal. )..--

The facts necessary for disposal of this appeal are that appellant
is a co-operative housing society registered with the Registrar of Co-
D operative Societies Gujarat under the provisions of the Act. It is
alleged that this Society was formed on 2nd May 1961 with the object
of providing housing facilities to its members. Respondent No. 1 Panc-
hal Keshavlal Narbheram was a founder member of this Society along-
wfithdll otbherds. It is alle ged thhat the conducht oSf re~pondednt No. 1 was --4.
oun to e etnmenta1 to t e mterest of t e oc1ety an its working
E and the Society therefore invoked the provisions of Section 36 of the
Act, passed a resolution dated 19.6.65 to expel respondent No. I from
the membership of the Society. A further opportunity to show cause
was given to the respondent and on Nov~mber 28, 1965 the appellant
society passed a resolution expelling respondent No. 1 from the mem-
bership of the Society.
+.
F
This resolution of the Society was duly approved by the Registrar
of Societies as required under Sec. 36 of the said Act on 13.4.66.

On 17.2.66 respondent No. 1 instituted another proceedings un-
der Sec. 96( 1) with the Registrar of Co-operative Societies seeking
G relief of setting aside of the resolution passed by the Society against
respondent No. 1. The Registrar entertaining the dispute and exercis-
ing powers conferred under Sec. 98(1) referred the dispute for decision
to his nominee and out of these proceedings ultimately the present
appeal arises.

H On July 16, 1966 the Registrar's nominee dismissed respondent
JAi MAHAVIR SOCIETY v. PANCHAL [OZA, J.] 897 •

No. l's claim by his order dated 16.7.66. Thereafter.respondent No. I A
carried the matter to the Tribunal by way of an appeal i.e. Appeal No.
119of 1966.

That on August 25, 1967 the Tribunal allowed the appeal of the
respondent and remanded the matter to the Registrar's nominee for a B
fresh decision in accordance with law.

After remand the parties proceeded with the trial and adduced
oral evidence before the Registrar's nominee but during the trial on
16.2. 70 the appellant-society made an application under sub-sec. (2) of
sec. 96 to the District Registrar that the question relating to the expul-
sion of respondent No. 1 had already been decided in the sense that in C
the collateral proceedings the Registrar had recorded his approval
under Sec. 36 of the Act to the action taken by the Society and there-
fore the dispute did not survive. On this application the District
Registrar heard the parties and came to the conclusion that respondent
No. 1 was precluded from contending that the impugned resolution
expelling him from the membership of the society was illegal inasmuch
as he had not preferred any appeal against the decision of the
Registrar according his approval to the action taken by the Society
under sec. 36.

The District Registrar was of the opinion that doctrine of res- E
judicata was attracted and therefore there was no dispute in existence
between the parties. This order passed by the District Registrar on
19.6.70 was taken up in revision under Sec. 150 sub-clause 9 of the Act
to the Tribunal. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the District
Registrar had no jurisdiction to re-open the question as to whether or
not the matter referred by respondent No. 1 was a dispute within the F
meaning of sub·sec. (1) of Sec. 96 at this subsequent stage. The view
taken was that having already decided that the matter constituted a
dispute under Sec. 96(1) at an early stage before he made a reference
to the Registrar's nominee in exercise of powers under Sec. 97. The
powers under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 96 were exhausted and it was not
competent for him to review his earlier decision. Accordingly the Tri· G
bunal by its order dated 6.2. 71 allowed the revision petition, set aside
the order passed by ·the District Registrar on June 25, 1970 and
directed the Registrar's nominee to proceed with the decision of the
matter expeditiously having regard to the fact that the dispute is an old
one having its origin in a resolution passed by the appellant-society on
November 28, 1965.
H
898 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R.

A The appellant-society feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision
invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 'llllll
of the Constitution of India. In this petition the appellant raised W
mainly two contentions: (i) that the Tribunal was in error in holding
that Registrar was not competent to review his earlier decision that the
matter referred to by the respondent No. 1 was a 'dispute' within the
B meaning of sub-section (l) of Sec. 96 of the Act; (ii) that the Tribunal
had no revisional jurisdiction against an order passed under Sec. 96(2) i.._
of the Act. (

On the first question the High Court came to the conclusion that ---'· ·
the Tribunal was right in holding that Registrar had no jurisdiction to
c revise or review his earlier decision wherein the Registrar came to the
conclusion that the dispute raised by respondent No. 1 fell within the
ambit of the description of dipsute (within the meaning of sub-sec. (I) y
of Sec. 96). On the second question the High Court took the view that
the Tribunal had revisional jurisdiction.

D The High Court considered the question of leave to appeal to
this Court and granted leave and framed following question for
decision:

"In an order passed by the Registrar in exercise of the
powers under sub-section (2) of Sec. 96 of Gujarat Co-
E operative Societies Act, 1961 subject to revision by the
Tribunal in exercise of the powers under Section 150(9) of
the Act?"

In pursuance to the certificate granted by the High Court the present
appeal has been filed by the appellant.
F
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that
although when a dispute is referred to the Registrar and he ultimately
gives decision on merits that is no doubt appealable but when the
Registrar entertains the dispute and sends it to his nominee that is not
an order against which a revision can lie to the tribunal. Learned
G counsel placed reliance on the decisi~n in Krishnarao Bakaramji
Hadge v. The State of Maharashtra, [1969] B.L.R. 150 and contended
that the Tribunal had no revisional jurisdiction.

The High Court in the impugned judgment after considering this
decision and the provisions contained in Sec. 97 came to the conclu-
H sion that when a dispute is referred to the Registrar under sec. 96 and
JAi MAHAVIR SOCIETY v. PANCHAL [OZA, J.) 899

the Registrar entertains the i:lispute under Sec. 96 and ultimately
finally disposes it of against the decision on the merits there is an A
appeal to the Tribunal according to Sec. 97 which is similar to Sec. JO 1
of the present Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 and in view of
this the learned Judges of the High Court came to the conclusion that
under clause 9 of Sec. 150 the Tribunal has revisional jurisdiction in a
matter an appeal lies to it. Clause (9) of Sec. 150 reads: B

"{9) The Tribunal may call for and examine the record of
any proceeding in which an appeal lies to it, for the purpose
of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any
decision or order passed. If in any case, it appears to the
Tribunal that any such decision or order should be
modified, annulled or reversed,, the Tribunal may pass, c
such oi:der thereon as it may deem just."

This confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal to call for and examine the
record of any proceeding. The word 'proceeding' here is qualified by
the phrase m which an appeal lies to it. It is not disputed that after final D
disposal of these proceedings i.e. decision of the dispute by the
Registrar or by his nominee an appeal will lie to the Tribunal and
therefore in the impugned judgment the Division Bench of the Gujarat
High Court took the view that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to call for
and examine the record· of such proceedings. The judgment of the
Bombay High Court on which reliance is placed refers to Sec. 149 E
sub-clause 9 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. It is
no doubt true that the phrase 'any proceedings in which an appeal lies
to it' is identical in the two statutes i.e. Sec. 150 clause 9 of the Gujarat
Co-operative Societies Act and sub-clause 9 of Sec. 149 of the
Maharashtra Co-operative Societies, Act, 1960. This language makes
it clear that if the proceedings where the final order is appealable then F
it could not be said that these are the proceedings where an appeal lies
to the Tribunal and it is in these proceedings that the jurisdiction has
b\)en conferred on the Tribunal to call for the record and examine the
matter. In this view of the matter, in our opinion, the view taken by
the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the present case
appears to be correct and the High Court was right in coming to the. G
conclusion that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to call for and examine
the record i.e. exercise revisional jurisdiction. Although this was the
only question which was stated in the certificate issued by the High
Court, learned counsel also attempted to contend that the view taken
by the High Court on the first question as to whether the Registrar is
not competent to review his earlier decision but in our opinion even on H
900 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R.

A that ground the view taken by the High Court appears to be correct.

When the respondent submitted his dispute to the Registrar and
the Registrar after examining the matter came to the conclusion that it
was a dispute which could be entertained within the scope of Sec. 96
and therefore referred it to his nominee for decision. It could not be
B doubted that the Registrar exercised jurisdiction under Sec. 96 and
came to the conclusion and therefore the High Court was right in
coming to the conclusion that once the Registrar takes this decision he
has no power to review his order. In this view of the matter we see no
reason to entertain this appeal. The appeal is therefore dismissed. In
the circumstances of the case parties are directed to bear their own
C costs.

N.P.V. Appeal dismissed.

'