Supreme Court of India
JAICHAND (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. & ORS.versusSAHNULAL & ANR.
- Citation
- [2024] 12 S.C.R. 719
- Decided
- 10 December 2024
- Disposal
- Disposed off
Holding
The High Court erred in framing the substantial question of law and cannot disturb the factual findings of the first appellate court; its order is set aside.
Summary
The case involved a suit for specific performance of a 1996 sale agreement concerning a half‑acre land in Bilaspur. The trial court granted specific performance, but the first appellate court set aside that part of the decree, ordering only a refund of earnest money, citing alleged hardship under Section 20(2)(b) of the Specific Relief Act without any pleading or evidence on that point. The original defendants appealed to the High Court under Section 100 CPC, which framed a substantial question of law questioning the lower appellate court's legality and set aside its order, restoring the trial court's decree. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had improperly framed the substantial question and could not disturb the factual findings of the first appellate court absent a clear error of law or inadmissible evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order, directed the defendants to refund Rs.3,50,000 to the plaintiffs, and warned that failure to do so would reinstate the trial court’s decree. The appeals were therefore allowed, correcting the misapplication of Section 100 CPC.
Issues considered
- Whether the High Court correctly framed a substantial question of law under Section 100 of the CPC in the second appeal.
- Whether the High Court can interfere with the findings of fact of the first appellate court in a second appeal.
- Whether the first appellate court erred in modifying the decree on the ground of hardship under Section 20(2)(b) of the Specific Relief Act without any pleading or evidence.
- Whether the order of the High Court setting aside the first appellate court’s judgment and restoring the trial court decree is sustainable in law.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 100, s. 103, s. 41, s. 96
- Specific Relief Act, 1963s. 20(2)(b)
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Issue arose as regards the sustainability of the order passed by the High Court in second appeal u/s.100 CPC. Headnotes† Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.100 – Second appeal – Framing of substantial question of law – Suit for specific the respondents-plaintiffs against the original defendant-owner of the property alleging defendant’s unwillingness to perform his part of contract – Trial Court allowed the suit in favour of the respondent – Appeal thereagainst, partly allowed – Respondents then filed
Subjects
s.100 CPCsecond appealsubstantial question of lawscope of Section 100 CPCpower to determine issue of factsale agreementspecific performanceSpecific Relief ActSection 20(2)(b)hardship doctrinecivil procedure
Judgment
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 719 : 2024 INSC 996
Jaichand (Dead) Through Lrs. & Ors.
v.
Sahnulal & Anr.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 14138-14139 of 2024)
10 December 2024
[J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose as regards the sustainability of the order passed by
the High Court in second appeal u/s.100 CPC.
Headnotes†
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.100 – Second appeal – Framing
of substantial question of law – Suit for specific performance
of the sale agreement filed by the respondents-plaintiffs
against the original defendant-owner of the property alleging
defendant’s unwillingness to perform his part of contract – Trial
Court allowed the suit in favour of the respondent – Appeal
thereagainst, partly allowed – Respondents then filed Second
Appeal u/s.100 – High Court formulating the substantial question
of law that whether lower appellate court has committed an
illegality by not affirming the finding of the trial court and has
denied the grant of discretionary relief in arbitrary manner, set
aside the judgment and order passed by the appellate court
and restored that of the trial court – Sustainability:
Held: Impugned order passed by the High Court not sustainable
in law – High Court ought not to have disturbed a well reasoned
judgment and order passed by the first appellate court – Manner
in which the High Court framed the so-called substantial question
of law very disturbing – It cannot be termed even a question of
law far from being a substantial question of law – U/s.100, the
High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by
the first appellate court which is the final Court of facts except in
such cases where such findings were erroneous being contrary
to the mandatory provisions of law, or its settled position or
based upon inadmissible evidence or without evidence – High
Court in the Second Appeal can interfere with the findings of
the trial court on the ground of failure on the part of the trial as
well as the first appellate Court, as the case may be, when such
720 [2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
findings are either recorded without proper construction of the
documents or failure to follow the decisions of this Court and
acted on assumption not supported by evidence – It is not that
the High Courts are not well-versed with the principles governing
s.100 – It is only the casual and callous approach on the part of
the courts to apply the correct principles of law to the facts of the
case that leads to passing of vulnerable orders like the instant
one – Judgement and order passed by the High Court set aside –
Decree of specific performance not granted in favour of the
respondents – Appellants- legal heirs of the original defendant,
directed to refund the stipulated amount within the given period
and on failure to do the same, the decree passed by the trial court
shall stand restored. [Paras 22, 23, 28, 29, 32-34]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.100 – Second appeal –
Principles governing the scope of a second appeal u/s.100 –
Explained. [Paras 28, 29]
Judicial deprecation – Manner in which the High Court framed
the so-called substantial question of law in second appeal
u/s.100 CPC:
Held: Manner in which the High Court framed the so-called
substantial question of law is very disturbing – By any stretch of
imagination, it cannot be termed even a question of law far from
being a substantial question of law – This Court cannot keep
explaining the scope of a second appeal u/s.100 CPC and how
a substantial question of law should be framed – Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 – s.100. [Para 23]
Case Law Cited
Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal [2006] Supp. 2 SCR 79 : (2006) 5
SCC 545; Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty [1996] Supp. 5 SCR
582 : AIR 1996 SC 3521; Kshitisn Chandra Purkait v. Santhosh
Kumar Purkait [1997] Supp. 1 SCR 201 : (1997) 5 SCC 438);
Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade v. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor (1999) 2
SCC 471; Kondira Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, AIR
1999 SC 2213; Bhagwan Sharma v. Bani Ghosh, AIR 1993 SC
398 – referred to.
List of Acts
Specific Relief Act, 1963; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 721
Jaichand (Dead) Through Lrs. & Ors. v. Sahnulal & Anr.
List of Keywords
s.100, CPC; Second appeal; Framing of substantial question of law;
Principles governing the scope of a second appeal u/s. 100; Power
to determine the issue of fact; Manner in which High Court framed
substantial question of law; Scope of second appeal u/s. 100 CPC;
How substantial question of law to be framed; Sale agreement of
property; Suit for specific performance of sale agreement; Casual
and callous approach; Passing of vulnerable orders; Decree of
specific performance.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s). 14138-
14139 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.03.2021 and 24.06.2022
of the High Court of Chattisgarh at Bilaspur in SA No. 279 of 2011
and RP No. 136 of 2021 respectively
Appearances for Parties
Sameer Shrivastava, Ms. Yashika Varshney, Ms. Palak Mathur,
Advs. for the Appellants.
Abhinav Shrivastava, Adv. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Order
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals arise from the judgment and order passed by the High
Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur in Second Appeal No.279 of 2011
dated 23 March 2021 by which the High Court allowed the second
appeal filed by the respondents herein (original plaintiffs) thereby
setting aside the judgment and order passed by the first appellate
court and restoring the judgment and decree passed by the trial
court in the civil suit instituted by the respondents (plaintiffs herein).
3. The facts giving rise to these appeals may be summarised as under:-
(i) The appellants before us are the legal heirs of the original
defendant and the respondents before us are the original plaintiffs.
722 [2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
(ii) It appears from the materials on record that the parties entered
into an agreement of sale with respect to the suit property bearing
Khasra number 111/3 admeasuring 0.238 hectares situated in
village Parsahi Tehsil District Bilaspur. The original defendant
namely Juglal was the lawful owner of the suit property. He died
during the pendency of the suit instituted by the plaintiff seeking
specific performance of the contract based on an agreement
of sale dated 28 April, 1996.
(iii) In the agreement of sale, the total sale consideration fixed was
Rs.50,000/- per acre. Rs.6000/- was paid to deceased Jugal
by way of earnest money.
There is no dispute to the aforesaid extent.
(iv) It is the case of the original plaintiff that time was not made the
essence of the contract in the agreement of sale. Although the
agreement is of the year 1996, yet it is only in the year 2001
when the plaintiff realized that the defendant was not ready
and willing to perform his part of the contract, that the suit had
to be instituted.”
4. The trial court framed the following issues:-
Issue Conclusion
1. Whether on 28.04.1996 the Defendant had Affirmative
agreed to sell land Khasra No. 111/3 acre 0.238
hectares located in Village Parsahi P.H. No.20,
Tehsil and District Bilaspur to the plaintiff?
2. Did the defendant get an advance of Rs.6,000/- Affirmative
by executing the agreement on the same date?
3. Whether the Earnest Money Receipt is forged? Negative
4. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? Negative
5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the relief Affirmative
desired from the defendant no.1?
6. Other relief and cost? Suit is allowed
5. The Trial Court upon appreciation of the oral as well as documentary
evidence on record allowed the suit granting specific performance
of contract in favour of the plaintiff. The operative part of the order
passed by the trial court reads thus:-
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 723
Jaichand (Dead) Through Lrs. & Ors. v. Sahnulal & Anr.
“(13) After considering the above issues, this Court come
to the conclusion that the plaintiff has been successful in
proving his claim. Consequently, after accepting the claim
of the plaintiff, an order is passed to the effect that:
(a) The defendants should execute the sale deed of the
suit land, which is situated in Village Parsahi P.H. No.20,
Tehsil and District Bilaspur bearing Khasra No. 111/3
acre 0.238 hectares, 1n favour of the plaintiff after taking
the balance amount from the plaintiff within two months.
Otherwise the plaintiff can get the sale deed of suit land
executed through the court.
(b) The defendants will bear the litigation expenses of the
plaintiff addition to themselves.
(c) If the advocate fee is certified on time, according to
the schedule or according to the certificate, whichever is
less, should be added to the litigation expenses.”
6. The appellants herein (original defendants) being dissatisfied with
the judgment and order passed by the trial court preferred a regular
first appeal before the Court of the District Judge, Balasore being
Civil Appeal No. 29–A of 2010.
7. The First Appellate Court framed the following points for determination :-
“10. In view of the pleadings of the parties and grounds
of appeal, the issues considered for disposal of appeal
are as follows:-
1. Whether on 28/4/1996 the deal was done by the
deceased Jugalal with the Respondent/Plaintiff to
sell the disputed land?
2. Whether earnest money of Rs.6,000/- was paid by
the respondent/plaintiff to the deceased Jugalal on
28/4/1996?
3. Is the suit of the respondent/plaintiff time barred?
4. Relief and cost.”
8. The First Appellate Court looked into two issues. First, whether the
plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract,
and secondly whether hardship would be caused to the defendant,
724 [2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
which could not be foreseen at the time of the execution of the
agreement of sale.
9. The First Appellate Court observed the following in paras 28, 29
and 32 respectively:-
“28. It is to be mentioned that the Exhibit P 1 Agreement was
executed on 28/4/1996 between the Respondent/Plaintiff
and the deceased Jugalal, while the first written notice was
given by him on 13/1/01 i.e. after about 5 years. In Exhibit
P.1, although no time limit was prescribed in relation to the
registration of the sale deed, but even after not registering
the sale deed by the deceased Jugalal for 5 years, no
action is taken by the respondent / plaintiff, which raises
doubts about his readiness. It is also noteworthy that in
December 2001, even after receiving the refusal notice to
register the sale deed by the deceased Jugalal, the second
notice (Exhibit P.2) was not given immediately and it was
sent by the respondents on 23.07.2002 i.e. after 7 months.
29. If the respondent/plaintiff was actually ready to register
the sale deed, the suit should have been filed immediately
after the refusal of registration by the deceased Jugalal
in December, 2001, but by not doing so, after 7 months
the notice Exhibit P.2 was given, even after the reply of
which November, 2002, the suit was not filed till 4/3/03.
All the above facts indicate that the respondent/plaintiff
has not kept any readiness for registration of sale deed.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
32. Therefore, in the present case, in the context of the
above-mentioned case law and on the basis that the
agreement was executed by the respondent / plaintiff in
the year 1996 but no legal action was taken for 7-8 years,
it is not legal to pass the order for the specific performance
of the contract. In the above circumstances, it will be open
specific the sufficient grant alternate relief to refund the
amount of earnest money.”
10. Thus, the first appellate court partly allowed the appeal filed by the
plaintiffs herein and set aside that part of the decree passed by the
trial court directing specific performance.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 725
Jaichand (Dead) Through Lrs. & Ors. v. Sahnulal & Anr.
11. The operative part of the judgment and order passed by the first
appellate court read thus:-
“34. Issue No.4:
In the context of the above discussion, the present Appeal
under Order 41 Rule 1 read with Section 96 of CPC is partly
allowed and the impugned judgment and decree dated
15/2/10 passed by the learned trial court i.e. paragraph
13 (a) is set aside and it is ordered that -
1. Appellants/Defendants should return the Earnest Money
of Rs.6,000/- (Six thousand) to the Respondent/Plaintiff
within 01 month from today i.e. the date of order.
2. Appellants/Defendants will bear the litigation expenses
of their own and of the respondent. Advocate fee should
be given after being certified as per rules.”
12. The respondents herein (original plaintiffs) being dissatisfied with
the judgment and order passed by the appellate court, preferred
second appeal before the High Court under Section 100 of the Civil
Procedure Code, 1908 (for short, the “CPC”).
13. The High Court formulated the following substantial question of law
for its consideration:-
“Whether lower appellate court has committed an illegality
by not affirming the finding of the trial court and has denied
the grant of discretionary relief in arbitrary manner.”
14. The High Court in para 4 of its impugned judgment has observed
as under:-
“4. On appeal being preferred by legal representatives
of original defendant No.1, the first appellate Court
concurred with findings of the trial Court with regard to
valid agreement to sell by defendant No.1 in favour of
the plaintiff and plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his
part of contract and also that the suit is within limitation,
but interfered on the ground that the plaintiff is not
entitled for relief of decree for specific performance
of contract and by partly granting appeal, granted
decree for return/refund of earnest money, against
726 [2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
which, this second appeal under Section 100 of the
CPC has been filed, in which one substantial question
of law has been formulated, which has been set out
in the opening paragraph of this judgment for sake of
completeness.”
15. The High Court allowed the second appeal and thereby quashed
and set aside the judgment and order passed by the appellate court
and restored the judgment and decree passed by the trial court.
16. The High Court while allowing the second appeal, observed the
following in para 17:-
“17. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the
light of aforesaid legal principle of law laid down by their
Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above stated
judgments (supra), it is quite vivid that in the instant case,
though defendant No.1 in his written statement only took
a plea that no agreement to sell was executed in between
him and the plaintiff and took a calculated chance to
proceed the suit without taking a specific plea based on
Section 20(2)(b) of the Act of 1963, in which two Courts
below have clearly reached to the conclusion that there
was valid agreement to sell between defendant No.1 and
the plaintiff and it fulfills the requirement of valid agreement
to sell. Defendant No.1 did not take the plea based on
Section 20(2) (b) of the Act of 1963 that the performance of
the contract would involve some hardship to him and it will
not cause any such hardship to the plaintiff. Consequently,
the trial Court did not frame any issue based on
Section 20(2) (b) of the Act of 1963 and parties also did
not lead any hardship evidence to demonstrate the fact
of hardship to the defendant in performance of contract
and no hardship to the plaintiff in case the contract is not
allowed to be performed and consequently, the trial Court
has not recorded any finding in this regard, but the first
appellate Court without there being any pleading on the
part of defendant No.1 based on Section 20(2)(b) of the
Act of 1963 and without any issue in that behalf and there
being no evidence on said point, proceeded to take-up the
issue of hardship to defendant No.1 in granting decree for
specific performance of contract after affirming all other
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 727
Jaichand (Dead) Through Lrs. & Ors. v. Sahnulal & Anr.
findings, modified the decree holding that the plaintiff is
not entitled for decree for specific performance of contract
as it would cause hardship to defendant No.1 and he
would be entitled only decree for return/refund of earnest
money, which is in the considered opinion of this Court
is not correct finding particularly in view of the fact that
no pleading having been raised on behalf of defendant
No.1 before the trial Court based on Section 20(2)(b) of
the Act of 1963 and parties did not lead any evidence on
the instant issue and therefore, the first appellate Court
could not have modified the decree after affirming all other
findings which were required for granting relief of specific
performance of contract.”
17. The appellants (original defendants) being dissatisfied with the
judgment and order passed by the High Court are here before us
with the present appeals.
18. It seems that the appellants herein had preferred a review application
also before the High Court, which was not entertained and rejected.
19. We have heard Mr. Sameer Shrivastava, the learned counsel
appearing for the appellants (original defendants) and Mr. Abhinav
Shrivastava, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents
herein (original plaintiffs).
20. We take notice of the following aspects of the matter:-
(i) The agreement of sale between the parties is dated 24 August,
1996.
(ii) The suit property ad measures half an acre.
(iii) The sale consideration fixed in the agreement of sale is
Rs.50,000/- per acre. Since the land ad-measures about half
an acre, the sale consideration would come to Rs.25,000/-.
(iv) The plaintiffs instituted the suit after a period of eight years that
is in the year 2003.
(v) The High Court seems to have proceeded under a misconception
of fact that the first appellate court reversed the judgment and
decree passed by the trial court only on the issue of hardship,
relying on the provisions of Section 20(2) (b) of the specific
relief act, 1963. Whereas in fact the first appellate court also
728 [2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
expressed its doubt as regards the plaintiffs readiness and
willingness to perform his part of the contract.
21. The High Court has not said a word in so far as the findings recorded
by the first appellate court in regard to the readiness and willingness on
the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract is concerned.
22. In the overall view of the matter, we have reached the conclusion
that the impugned order passed by the High Court is not sustainable
in law. The High Court ought not to have disturbed a well reasoned
judgment and order passed by the first appellate court.
23. We are thoroughly disappointed with the manner in which the High
Court framed the so-called substantial question of law. By any
stretch of imagination, it cannot be termed even a question of law
far from being a substantial question of law. How many times the
Apex Court should keep explaining the scope of a second appeal
under Section 100 of the CPC and how a substantial question of
law should be framed? We may once again explain the well-settled
principles governing the scope of a second appeal under Section 100
of the CPC.
24. In Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty reported in AIR 1996 S.C. 3521,
it was held by this Court that the High Court should not reappreciate
the evidence to reach another possible view in order to set aside the
findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate Court.
25. In Kshitisn Chandra Purkait v. Santhosh Kumar Purkait reported in
(1997) 5 S.C.C. 438), this Court held that in the Second Appeal, the
High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial
question of law and not mere question of law.
26. In Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade v. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor reported
in 1999 (2) S.C.C. 471, this Court held:-
“Keeping in view the amendment made in 1976, the High
Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Section 100, C.P.C.
only on the basis of substantial questions of law which
are to be framed at the time of admission of the Second
Appeal and the Second Appeal has to be heard and
decided only on the basis of such duly framed substantial
questions of law. A judgment rendered by the High Court
under Section 100 C.P.C. without following the aforesaid
procedure cannot be sustained.”
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 729
Jaichand (Dead) Through Lrs. & Ors. v. Sahnulal & Anr.
27. This Court in Kondira Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar
reported in AIR 1999 S.C. 2213 held:-
“The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the
opinion of the first appellate Court unless it is found that
the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate Court were
erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions
of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of
pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based
upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence.”
28. It is thus clear that under Section 100, C.P.C., the High Court cannot
interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the first Appellate Court
which is the final Court of facts except in such cases where such
findings were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions
of law, or its settled position on the basis of the pronouncement
made by the Apex Court or based upon inadmissible evidence or
without evidence.
29. The High Court in the Second Appeal can interfere with the findings
of the trial Court on the ground of failure on the part of the trial as well
as the first appellate Court, as the case may be, when such findings
are either recorded without proper construction of the documents or
failure to follow the decisions of this Court and acted on assumption
not supported by evidence. Under Section 103, C.P.C, the High Court
has got power to determine the issue of fact. The Section lays down:-
“Power of High Court to determine issue of fact: In any
Second Appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on
the record is sufficient to determine any issue necessary
for the disposal of the appeal,-
(a) Which has not been determined by the lower Appellate
Court or both by the Court of first instance and the lower
Appellate Court, or
(b) Which has been wrongly determined by such Court or
Courts by reason of a decision on such question of law
as is referred to in Section 100.”
30. In Bhagwan Sharma v. Bani Ghosh reported in AIR 1993 S.C. 398,
this Court held:-
“The High Court was certainly entitled to go into the
question as to whether the findings of fact recorded by the
730 [2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
first appellate court which was the final court of fact were
vitiated in the eye of law on account of non-consideration
of admissible evidence of vital nature. But, after setting
aside the findings of fact on that ground the Court had
either to remand the matter to the first appellate Court for
a rehearing of the first appeal and decision in accordance
with law after taking into consideration the entire relevant
evidence on the records, or in the alternative to decide
the case finally in accordance with the provisions of
Section 103(b). …… If in an appropriate case the High
Court decides to follow the second course, it must hear the
parties fully with reference to the entire evidence on the
records relevant to the issue in question and this is possible
if only a proper paper book is prepared for hearing of facts
and notice is given to the parties. The grounds which may
be available in support of a plea that the finding of fact by
the court below is vitiated in law does not by itself lead
to the further conclusion that a contrary finding has to be
finally arrived at on the disputed issue. On a reappraisal
of the entire evidence the ultimate conclusion may go in
favour of either party and it cannot be prejudged.”
31. In the case of Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal reported in (2006) 5 SCC 545
this Court explained the concept in the following words:
“It must be tested whether the question is of general public
importance or whether it directly and substantially affects
the rights of the parties.
Or whether it is not finally decided, or not free from difficulty
or calls for discussion of alternative views.
If the question is settled by the highest court or the general
principles to be applied in determining the question are
well settled and there is a mere question of applying those
principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the
question would not be a substantial question of law.”
32. It is not that the High Courts are not well-versed with the principles
governing Section 100 of the CPC. It is only the casual and callous
approach on the part of the courts to apply the correct principles
of law to the facts of the case that leads to passing of vulnerable
orders like the one on hand.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 731
Jaichand (Dead) Through Lrs. & Ors. v. Sahnulal & Anr.
33. In such circumstances, referred to above, we allow these appeals
and set aside the judgment and order passed by the High Court.
34. As we are not granting the decree of specific performance in
favour of the respondents herein (original plaintiffs), we direct the
appellants herein i.e. the original defendants to refund an amount of
Rs.3,50,000/- (Rupees three lakh fifty thousand only) within a period
of eight weeks from today. If the appellants herein fail to deposit this
amount, then in such circumstances, the decree passed by the trial
court shall stand restored.
35. We have thought fit to direct the appellants herein (original defendants)
to refund the amount of Rs.3,50,000/- (Rupees Three lakh fifty
thousand only) to the respondents-original plaintiffs, keeping in mind
that the plaintiffs on their own stated before this Court that the market
value of the suit property as on date is around Rs.3,50,000/- (Rupees
Three lakh fifty thousand only).
36. With the aforesaid, these appeals stand disposed of.
37. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeals disposed of.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
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