Supreme Court of India
JAIPUR SHAHAR HINDU VIKAS SAMITIversusSTATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.
- Citation
- 2014 INSC 288
- Decided
- 17 April 2014
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- P SATHASIVAM
Holding
The Rajasthan Public Trust Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Assistant Commissioner to resolve the trust disputes, and a litigant who has availed the statutory remedy cannot simultaneously approach the courts, rendering the appeals untenable.
Summary
The Jaipur Shahar Hindu Vikas Samiti filed public interest litigations seeking a declaration that the Galta Peeth/Thikana properties are public trust assets, clarification of succession, and a direction for the State to take over its management. The Rajasthan High Court, noting that the same questions were pending before the Assistant Commissioner under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959, ordered the parties to pursue relief through that statutory mechanism and dismissed the writ petitions as infructuous. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Act is a self‑contained statute granting the Assistant Commissioner exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate such trust disputes, and that a party who has availed the statutory remedy cannot simultaneously approach the courts. Consequently, the High Court’s relegation of the matters to the Assistant Commissioner was proper, the appellant was not aggrieved by the dismissal of the writ petition, and the appeals were dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether the High Court was justified in referring the parties to the Assistant Commissioner under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act without deciding the merits.
- Whether the Assistant Commissioner has the authority and jurisdiction under the Act to adjudicate the complex issues concerning the trust’s property and succession.
- Whether the appellant is aggrieved by the order dismissing the writ petition as infructuous.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 2(6)
- Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959s. 16, s. 17, s. 18, s. 19, s. 20, s. 21, s. 22, s. 23, s. 24, s. 38, s. 39, s. 40, s. 41, s. 49, s. 52, s. 53, s. 54, s. 55, s. 56, s. 67
Subjects
Public Interest LitigationRajasthan Public Trust Acttrust propertysuccessioncommittee of managementjurisdictionabuse of processreligious institutionstatutory remedy
Judgment
• [2014] 11 S.C.R. 677
JAIPUR SHAHAR HINDU VIKAS SAMITI A
v.
STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 4593-4594 of 2014)
APRIL 17, 2014
B
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI, RANJAN GOGOi AND
N.V. RAMANA, JJ.]
Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 - ss. 24 and 53 -
Registration of the Peethl Thikana as a Public Trust under C
the Act - Appointment of a Committee uls. 53- Mahant of the
Peeth challenging the appointment of the Committee - Public
Interest Litigations seeking declaration of the properties of the
Peeth as Trust properties, for ascertaining the mode of
succession and for direction to the Government to take over D
the management of the Trust- High Court relegated the PlLs
to the statutory authority in view of the facts that the issues of
right to succession and administration of the properties of the
Pe.eth were pending consideration uls. 24 before Asstt.
Commissioner, Devasthanam Department - The Court, E
however, dismissed the petition challenging the appointment
of the Committee, as infructuous - Held: The Act is a self-
contained Act providing appropriate mechanism - It clearly
demonstrates the power and jurisdiction of the Assistant
Commissioner in deciding the issues pertaining to public trust F
and particularly the issues raised in the present cases - High
Court rightly relegated the issues to be decided by the
statutory authority - The Assistant Commissioner was
empowered under the Act to adjudicate the issues involved .
- The appellant having approached the statutory authority
has availed the alternative remedy available under the Act G
and hence cannot be permitted to avail two remedies
simultaneously by approaching the Supreme Court - The
677 H
A
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R.
appellants also cannot be said to be aggrieved by dismissal
•
of the petition as infructuous.
Public Interest Litigation - Scope of PIL - Held: The
concept of Public Interest Litigation is a phenomenon which
is evolved to rescue the poor and downtrodden - In the realm
8
of PIL, the courls while protecting the larger public interest,
should at the same time have to look at the effective way in
which tiJ.e relief can be granted to the people whose rights are
adversely affected - If the interest can be protected and
controversy can be adjudicated by a mechanism created
C under a parlicular statute, the parlies should be relegated to
the appropriate forum instead of enterlaining the PIL - Scope
of PIL is very limited in the matter of religious institutions -
Public Trusts and religious institutions are governed by
parlicular legislation - It is not proper for the Courl to enterlain
D such litigation under PIL - The forums cannot be misused by
the rival groups in the guise of PIL - The judiciary should deal
with the misuse of PIL with iron hands. ·
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The Rajasthan Public Trusts Act, 1959 is
a self-contained Act. The Act has provided appropriate
mechanism (a) to deal with the registration of a public
trust; (b) making of entries in the register, their correction
and inquiry, if any; (c) duties of auditor and inspection
F of balance-sheet by any person interested in such public
trust; (d) application by any person seeking directions
from the Assistant Commissioner to appoint a new
working trustee on the ground that the properties of the
·trust are not being properly managed or administered; (e)
G power of the Assistant Commissioner to ask for
explanation of the working trustee about the
administration of the trust; and (f) in case of
mismanagement, power of the State Government to
appoint a new committee of management etc: [Para 40]
H [702-B-D]
• JAIPUR SHAHAR HINDU VIKAS SAMIT! v. STATE OF 679
RAJASTHAN
1.2. In the Public Interest Litigation as well as in the A
private civil litigations, the e.ntire issues revolved around
the properties of Galta Peeth and the mode of succession
to the Peeth. Already in respect of these issues, by the
time, these writ petitions were filed, statutory enquiry
application under Section 24 of the Act, were ·pending B
befo.re the Assistant Commissioner. Hence, the High
Court felt that those issues could be effectively decided
by the .Assistant Commissioner, and accordingly,
permitted.the appellant to implead himself in the pending
applications before the authority. [Para 42] [703-E-G] c
1.3. In view of the statutory provisions which give
extensive powers to the Assistant Commissioner and
Commissioner, in some cases the power of the civil Court
to effectively decide the issues of the Public Trust, by
providing effective mechanism, it cannot be said that the D
Assistant Commissioner has no jurisdiction to adjudicate
the disputes involved, because the Act clearly
demonstrates the power and jurisdiction of the Assistant
Commissioner in deciding the issues pertaining to public
trust and particularly the issues raised before this Court. E
[Para 42] [703-G-H; 704-A-B]
1.4. The appellant has impleaded himself in the
applications pending before the Assistant Commissioner
which were disposed of by him vide orders dated F
28.03.2013, and against those orders of the Assistant
Commissioner, the parties have preferred appeals as
provided under the Act. The appellant having availed the
alternative remedy available under the Act, however,
approached this Court by way of the present Civil Appeals. G
The appellant cannot be permitted to avail two remedies
simultaneously, and such conduct of the appellant is
abuse of process of Court. [Para 43] [704-C-D]
1.5. Though mere availability of alternative remedy
H
A
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R.
cannot be a ground to reject the relief in a Public Interest
•
Litigation, but in the facts and circumstances of the case.
adjudication of such disputes is not possible in a Public
Interest Litigation, and the remedy is to get such disputes
adjudicated by a fact finding authority as enumerated
B under the Act, which remedy is not only alternative, but
also effective, because the parties can put a quietus to
the litigation once for all. Hence, the High Court, by the
impugned order, was justified in relegating the parties to
the Assistant Commissioner, . I before wliom the
c applications are pending adjudication. The· appellant
having got impleaded himself in the applications before
the Assistant Commissioner and having invited an order
from the High Court, now cannot be permitted to question
the said order of the High Court. [Para 43) [704-D-H]
D Guruvayoor Deyaswom Managing Committee and Anr.
vs. C.K. Rajan and Ors. (2003) 7 SCC 546: 2003 (2) Suppl.
SCR 619; ·Church of North India vs. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai
and Ors. (2005) 10 sec 760: 2005 (3) SCR 1037 - cited.
E 2.1. The appellant cannot be said to be aggrieved by
the orders passed in D.B. (Civil) W.P. No. 6607 of 2004,
which was dismissed as infructuous. The petition was
filed by the father of .Respondent No.4 questioning the
constitution of the Committee. When the Court directed
F the parties to appear before the Assistant Commissioner
for proper adjudication of the issues as the five-year term
of the Committee expired, the 4th' respondent sought
permission of the Court and withdrew the writ petition,
with a liberty to raise all the issues before the authority.
G The appellant who was not a party to this petition, has
. not chosen to implead himself nor objected to the
withdrawing of the writ. petition when the order was
passed in his presence.· He is taking such an objection
and such plea for the first time before this Court. [Paras
. 44 and 45) [705-A, D-F)
H
• JAIPUR SHAHAR HINDU Vll<AS SAMIT! v. STATE OF 681
RAJASTHAN
2.2. In the present case, a Committee was A
constituted pursuant to notification dated 18:09.2004, and
the term of. the Committee expired on 17.Q9.2009, and
even though four years have passed from the date. of
expiry of the term of the Committee, the Government has
not chosen to appoint a fresh Committee. The B
appointment of the Committee· invoking Section 53,
depends upon the satisfaction and necessity felt by the
Government. The notification was issued by the
Government invoking unamended Section 53 of the Act.
The said Section has been amended on 12.10.2007, where c
the Government was given discretion to appoint or not
to appoint the Committee. The Assistant Commissioner
has already passed an order and the same is subject
matter of appeal before the Commissioner. In view of the
same, it cannot be said that a permanent Committee has
0
to be appointed to look after the management of the Galta
Peeth. The order passed by the High Court in the petition
filed by father of respondent No. 4 is perfectly valid.
Therefore, under the circumstances of the case, the
Court cannot give any direction to the Government to
invoke Section 53 for appointment of a Committee of E
Management to the trust. [Para 46) [707-F-H; 708-A-D]
3.1. The scope of Public Interest Litigation is very
limited, particularly, in the matter of religious institutions.
It is always better not to entertain this type of Public F
·interest Litigations simply on the basis of affidavits of the
parties. The public trusts and religious institutions are
gove.rned by particular legislation which provide for a
proper mechanism for adjudication of disputes relating
to the properties of the trust and their management. It is G
not proper for the Court to entertain such litigation and
pass orders. The forums cannot be misused by the rival
groups in the guise of public interest litigation. [Para 47)
[708-D-F]
H
A
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R.
3.2. The concept of Public Interest Litigation is a
•
phenomenon which is evolved to bring justice to the
reach of people who are handicapped by ignorance,
indigence, illiteracy and other down ·trodden people.
Through the Public Interest Litigation, the cause of
B several people who are· not able to approach the Court
is espoused. The Courts have to be very cautious and
careful while entertaining Public Interest Litigation. The
Judiciary should deal with the misuse of Public Interest
Litigation with iron hand. If the Public Interest Litigation
c is permitted to be misused the very purpose for which it
is conceived, will be defeated. The Courts shoulld
discourage the unjustified litigants at the initial stage itsE~lf
and the person who misuses the forum should be made
accountable for it. In the realm of Public lntere1st
Litigation, the Courts while protecting the larger public
0
interest involved, should at the same time have to loc1k
at the effective way in which the relief can be granted to
the people, whose rights are adversely affected or at
stake. When their interest can be' protected and the
controversy or the dispute can be adjudicated by a
E mechanism created under a particular statute, the parties
should be relegated to the appropriate forum, instead of
entertaining the writ petition fifed as Public Interest
Litigation. [Para 49] [710-C-G]
F Seth Badri Prasad vs. Seth Nagarmal and Or.s. (1959)
Supp. 1 SCR 769; Shehla Burney (Dr.) vs. Syed Ali Moosa ·
Raza and Ors. (2011) 6 SCC 529: 2011 (5) SCR 841; Rural
Litigation and Entitlement Kendra vs. State of U.P. (1.989)
Supp 1 SCC 504: 1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 690; Padma vs.
G Hiralal Motilal Desarda and Ors. (2002) 7 SCC 564;
Bangalore Medical Trust vs. B.S. fl{tuddappa and Ors. (1991)
4 SCC 54: 1991 (3) SCR 102 - cited .
. Case Law Reference:
H (1959) Supp. 1 SCR 769 cited Para 15
• JAIPUR SHAHAR HINDU VIKAS SAMITI v. STATE OF 683
RAJASTHAN
2011 (5) SCR 841 cited Para 15 A
1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 690 cited Para 15
(2002) 1 sec 564 ·cited Para 15
1991 (3) SCR 102 cited Para 15
B
2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 619 cited Para 24
2005 (3) SCR 1037· cited Para 24
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.
4593-4594 of 2014. c
From the Judgment and Order dated 04.05.2010 of the
Calcutta High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan at Jaipur in D.
B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2321 of 2006 and S. B. Civil Writ
Petition No. 6607 of 2004. D
P. P. Rao, Puneet Jain, Christy Jain, Shyam Kant Sharma,
Uma Shanker Sharma, Chaya Kirti, Navdeep, Khushbu Jain,
Surajit Bhaduri, Akshat Kulshresta, Swarnendu Chatterjee,
Pratibha Jain, Harin P.. Raval, Shobha, Rajiv K. Garg, Ashish
Garg, Jyoti Rana, Divya Anand, Anando Mukherjee, Prasanna E
Mohan, Annam D. N. Rao, S. S. Shamshery, Sandeep Singh,
Harshvardhan Singh Rathore, Amit Sharma, lrshad Ahmad,
Sarad Kumar Singhania for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by F
N.V. RAMANA, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. The present Civil Appeals arise out of the common order
dated 4th May, 2010 passed by the High Court of Judicature
for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur. The facts as culled out G
from the impugned order dated 4th May, 2010 are - The
appellant herein filed a Public Interest Litigation i.e. D.S. (Civil)
Writ Petition No. 2321/2006 alleging misappropriation of
property of Galla Peeth/Thikana (3rd respondent herein);
whether Mahanth appointed vide order dated 09.06.1943 was H
A
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.
[2014] 11 S.C.R.
to administer the properties during his life time or there was a
•
right of succession. D.B. (Civil) Writ Petition No. 5111 of 2004
was also filed by one Mahanth Rem Saran Das as a Public
Interest Litigation, whereas D.B. (Civil) Writ Petition No. 6607
of 2004 was filed by Mahan! Shri Ramodaracharya challenging
B the notifications dated 17.09.2004 whereby Chapter 10 of the
Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 was made applicable to the
Trust and notification dated 18.09.2904 whereby a Committee
under Section 53 of the Act was appointed in respect cif the
Trust. D.B. (Civil) Writ Petition No. 5650 of 2007 was filed by
c the Mandir Thikana Shri Galtaji. Though D.B. (Civil) W.P. No.
6607 of 2004 and D.B. (Civil) W.P. No. 5650 of 2007 were filed
before the learned single Judge, as all the issues revolve around
Galla Peeth and properties of Thikana Galla, the writ petitions
before the learned single Judge were called am;l a common
order was passed by the High Court.
0
3. For better appreciation of facts, the relief sought in D.B.
(Civil) W.P. No. 2321 of 2006, which is a Public Interest
Litigation, the order which is impugned in the Civil Appeal @
SLP(C) No. 28021 of 2010 is extracted below:
.E
(i) by an appropriate writ, order or direction in the
nature whereof. this Hon'ble Court may be pleased
to declare that the Galla Peeth I Thikana, its
temples and properties are public properties and
F not private or individual properties and it may be
dealt with in the manner public properties are dealt
with; and
(ii) by an appropriate writ, order or direction in the
nature whereof, the Hon'ble Court may be pleased
G to restrain respondent No. 4 Shri Avadhesh Kumar
or any of the other legal representative of late Shri
Ramodaracharya as well as respondent No: 5 Shri
Raghavacharya in any manner using, managing or
interfering in the temples and properties of the Galla
H Peeth/Thikana and its accompanying temples;
•
JAIPUR SHAHAR HINDU VIKAS SAMIT! v. STATE OF 685
RAJASTHAN [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
(iii) by an appropriate writ, order or direction in the A
nature whereof, the State Government should be
directed to take over control° and management of
the temples and properties of the Galla Peeth/
Thikana and appoint a Board to manage the
properties and temples of the Galla Peeth in line B
with the Vaishno Devi Shrine or Tirupati Balaji
Temple or in any other manner which this Hon'ble
Court may deem fit and proper; and
(iv) by further appropriate writ, order or direction in the
nature whereof, the Hon'ble Court may be pleased C
to direct the State Government to submit a list of
the properties of the Galla Peeth to the Hon'ble
Court as well as the list of properties which had
been sold by . the former Mahant Shri
Ramodaracharya or his family members including D
Shri Avadhesh Kumar and others.
4. The High Court, after taking into consideration the.
material placed before it, disposed of all the four writ petitions
by a common order. E
5. The High Court has framed hvo issues in the Public
Interest Litigation. It summarized the first issue as to whether
the properties of Galla Peeth have to be treated as public
properties or private properties and whether the Mahan! has
right to alienate them? F
The second issue is whether ther.e is any right of
succession to the Galla Peeth and its properties as per order
dated 09-06-1943 appointing Mahan!; and whether the Mahan!
Vl(as to administer the properties during his life time? G
·6. The High Court considered the provisions of Section 24
of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to
as 'the Act') and also the objections filed by the petitioner in
W.P. (Civil) No. 5111 of 2004 which was filed by one Mahan! H
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 11 S.C.R. •
A Ram Saran Das. The Advocate General brought to the notice
of the High. Court that the issue of succession of Mahant and
also the issue of properties of Galta PeethfThikana are pending
befqre the Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan Department, in .
Complaint Nos. 1 of 2004, 1 of 2006 and 1 of 2007.
8 Respondent No. 4 in that writ petition consented for the disposal
and adjudication of these issues by the Assistant
Commissioner. Accordingly, the High Court, passed common
order in the writ petitions in the following terms:
"We have considered rival submissions made by the
c learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
The issues raised in two Public Interest Litigations
have been narrated while dealing with the arguments of
learned counsel for the petitioners. The first issue is
D regarding nature of appointment of Mahant in the year
1943. As to whether the post of Mahant will go in
succession to the legal heirs in view of the fact that late
Mahant Ramodaracharya is no more. The other issue is
that as to whether the property of Galta PeethfThikana is
public property or property belonging to individual.
E
According to us, both the issues are pending
consideration before the Assistant Commissioner,
Devasthan Department as it has been admitted by the
learned counsel for the respondent No. 6 (Avdesh Kumar),
F who is presently holding the post of Mahant. In view of ·
aforesaid, Public Interest Litigations can be disposed of
as one and the same issue cannot be decided in Public
Interest Litigation, when statutory enquiry under Section 24
of the Act of 1959 is pending for consideration before the
G Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan Department. In view
of aforesaid, we are of the opinion that the issues raised
before us would be decided by the Assistant
Commissioner, Devasthan Department after hearing all the
parties and in this regard, the petitioners in the writ petition
H
• JAIPUR SHAHAR HINDU VIKAS SAMIT! v. STATE OF 687 ·
RAJASTHAN [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
No. 2321/2006 would be at liberty to participate in the A
hearing by making a proper application and would further
be at liberty to substantiate their grounds by submitting
. necessary documents. ·
·s
Learned counsel Shri S.R. Bajwa appearing for
Respondent No. 6 in Writ Petition No. 5111 of 2014 further
submits that they have no objection if the issue of
succession of Mahan! so as the issue as to whether the C
property of Galta Peeth/Thikana is individual property or
public property is decided by the Assistant Commissioner
and further if the petitioner in the Writ Petition No. 2312/
2006 makes an application and participate in the hearing,
they have no objection.
D
We expect from the Assistant Commissioner,
Devasthan Department that he will look into the matter
entirely and thereupon record his finding by a speaking E
order while deciding both the issues. It goes without saying
that whatever is the outcome of the order passed by the
Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan Department, the
consequences·will follow.
With the aforesaid observation, both the writ petitions F
by way of Public Interest Litigation are disposed of."
7. The High Court has dismissed D.B. (Civil) W.P. No.
5650 of 2007 .filed by Mandir Thikana Shri Galtaji, as withdrawn
basing on the submission of the learned counsel that in the light G
of the order passed iri Public Interest Litigations, petitioner may
be permitted to withdraw the writ petition with a liberty to take
pleas before the Assistant Commissioner, Devasthanam
Department.
H
. 688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1 [2014] 11 S.CR. ·
•
A 8. D.B. (Civil) W.P. No. 6607 of 2004 was dismissed as
withdrawn basing on the submission made by the counsel for
the petitioner that the term of the Committee concerned was
only five 'years and which has came to an end in the year 2009, ·
and hence the writ petition may be rendered infructuous and
B the petitioners be given liberty to raise other issues about the·
notification which was issued under Chapter "10, if need so
arises.
The High Court observed that - "It is agreed by all the
parties that till the matter is decided by the Assistant
C Commissioner, Devasthan Department, they will maintain
status quo in respect of the office of Mahant as well as
regarding property of Gatta .Peeth!Thikana."
9. Aggrieved by the order passed in D.B. (Civil) W.P. No.
D 2321 of 2006, Civil Appeal@ SLP(C).No. 28021 of 2010 was
filed and Whereas against the order passed in O.B. (Civil) W.P.
No. of 6607 of 2004 which was filed by the father of the 4th
respondent herein, wherein the appellant herein was not a party,
has sought leave of the Court and preferred Civil Appeal @
E SLP(C) No. 28022 of 2010 on the ground that the High Court
without going into the merits, rendered the matter infructuous
and which resulted in miscarriage of justice and irreparable
injury to the public interest. Accordingly, these two appeals are
placed before us, which arise out of a common order of the High
F Court.
. .
10. We have heard the counsels at length. It is mainly
contended by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant
that the writ petitions were disposed of by the High Court without
considering any of their contentions and particularly the reliefs
G sought in writ petitions, namely (i) a declaration to the effect that
Galla Peeth/Thikana, its temples and properties are public
properties; (ii) a restraint order against legal representatives
of deceased Ha.modaracharya, including Respondent No. 4
(the present Mahan!) from interfering with the management of
H
• JAIPUR SHAHAR HINDU VIKAS SAMITI v. STATE OF 689
RAJASTHAN [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
the Galla Peeth; (iii) a direction to the State Government to take A
over the management of the Galta Peeth; and (iv) call for a list
of its properties and the properties sold by the deceased
Ramodaracharya and his family members.
11. He further contended that even though, the above
8
reliefs were prayed for, but the High Court, without considering
the public interest involved, in a casual manner, has disposed
of the writ petition. The High Court has failed to take into
consideration the material aspect in D.B. (Civil) W.P. No. 6607
of 2004 filed by the father of Respondent No. 4 and without
going into the merits, simply rendered the matter infructuous. C
The reason given by the High Court for its disposal is that the
term of five years of the Committee of Management appointed
by the Government has come to an end arid hence the matter
has become infructuous and no cause survives. In fact, by an
interim order of the Court, the Committee was prevented from D
discharging its duties and it did not function for a period of five
years. In view of Section 53 of the Act, the Managing Committee
shall function till such time permanent arrangement is made for
the management of the Trust in question or in the alternative,
the State Government may be directed to appoint another E
Managing Committee comprising independent persons.
12. Another contention advanced by the counsel was that
the reliefs sought in the writ petition cannot be considered by
the Assistant Commissioner in view of the fact that the Assistant F
Commissioner does not have such jurisdiction to decide the
issues raised.
13. To substantiate his contention, the learned counsel
submitted that as per the provisions of the Act, it is the Court
within the meaning of s.ub-section (6) of Section 2 of t~e Act, G
which has to appoint the members of the Trust But the 4th
respondent, himself, nominated the members of the Trust and
usurped the office of the Trust without any authority of law. Under
Section 41 of the Public Trust Act, he has to apply to the
H
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R. •
A concerned Court and under Section 43 it is the power of the
Court to appoint the trustees with regard to the custom or usage
and, as per the provisions of Section 53(1) of the Act a
committee of management has to be appointed in place of the
Respondent No.4 by the State to protect the properties of the
B Galla Peeth·and the Respondent No.4 cannot appoint his own
trustees and the State Government has to appoint the working
trustee in accordance with the Act.
14. During the pendency of the reconstitution of the
Committee of Management under Section 53 of the Act, a
C direction to the State Government was sought to appoint a
Managing Committee of independent persons to protect the
interests of the trust. He contended that the order of the High
Court disposing of the writ petition was unmindful and has
resulted in serious miscarriage of justice and irreparable injury
D to public interest. Under Section 53 of the Act, the Government
is bound to appoint another Committee or re-appoint the
erstwhile members of the Committee. The High Court has
created a vacuum not contemplated by the Act, which is against
public interest.
E
15. In support of his contentions, learned senior counsel
for the appellant has relied upon the decisions of this Court in
Seth Badri Prasad Vs. Seth Nagarmal & Ors. (1959) Supp.
1 SCR 769; Shehla Burney (Dr.) Vs. Syed Ali Moosa Raza
F
& Ors. (2011) 6 SCC 529; Rural Litigation and Entitlement
Kendra Vs. State of U.P. (1989) Supp 1 SCC 504; Padma
Vs. Hirata/ Moti/al Desarda & Ors. (2002) 7 SCC 564 and
Bangalore Medical Trust Vs. S.S. Muddappa & Ors. (1991)
4 sec 54.
G 16. In addition to the oral submissions, learned senior
counsel for the appellant has also placed before us detailed
written submissions and chronology of events from 15th century
onwards about the formation of the trust to till date and had
taken us through various provisions of the Act and also placed
H the pedigree of the Mahants starting from the founder Mahan!
•
JAIPUR SHAHAR HINDU VIKAS SAMITI v. STATE OF 691
RAJASTHAN [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
and submitted that submission based on statutory provision can A
be raised at any stage.
17. Respondent No. 4 filed an interlocutory application
raising preliminary objections about the maintainability of these
appeals and narrated the earlier litigation. While the D.B. (Civil) B
W.P. No. 2321 of 2006 was pending, the High Court, by an
interim order dated 4th May, 2007, restrained the Respondent
No. 4 herein to deal with the properties of the Galta Peeth as
a working trustee. Aggrieved thereby, Respondent No. 4 filed
a Special Leave Petition before this Court. Consequently it C
became Civil Appeal No. 3746 of 2009.
18. During the pendency of Civil Appeal No. 3746 of 2009,
the Writ Petitions before the High Court were disposed of on
4-5-2010 holding that since the issues raised are already
pending consideration before the Assistant Commissioner, D
Devasthan Department the parties may raise their grievances
before him. Accordingly, Civil Appeal No. 3746 of 2009 filed
against interim order of the High Court, was also dismissed by
this Court on 08.07.2013 as having become infructuous.
E
19. It is contended by the learned counsel for
theRespondent No. 4 that the appellant has misused the
pendency of Civil Appeal No .• 3746 of 2009. Taking advantage
of the pendency of Civil Appeal No. 3746 of 2009, the appellant
has filed the present appeals. The appellant moved an
application before this Court for dismissal of Civil Appeal No. F
3746 of 2009 as it has become infructuous in view of the
impugned.order of the High Court. But, deliberately and
intentionally the appellant did not move any application for
formal dismissal in the present appeals, though they too have
become infructuous. G
20. Relying upon the order of the Division Bench of the
High Court, it is contended that after the disposal of the writ
petition, as per the directions of the High Court, the appellant
H
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692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R.
herein has impleaded himself and filed objections before the
•
Assistant Commissioner in the statutory appeal. Taking into
consideration the provisions of Sections 21, 38 and 41 of t~e
Act, the Assistant Commissioner rejected the same by three
separate speaking orders dated 28th March, 2013. Against,
B those orders, the appellant has already filed appeals before the 1
Commissioner, which are pending for consideration. Hence
these Civil Appeals are not maintainable.
1
21. Apart from preliminary objections, learned counsel
appearing for the respondents addressed on the main issues'
C also and relied upon different provisions of the Act. The counser·.
brought to our notice that in fact as early as on 19-5-1928 itself
a list of properties of Galta Peeth was drawn up, including some'
of the private properties of the Mahant i.e. residential house etc.
Thereafter, a series of legal proceedings have taken place:
D between the Government, private parties and the Galta Peeth.1
and their rights are crystallized in the respective litigations.-;
According to him, the appellants have again raked up the iSSUE!';
in the guise of Public Interest Litigation, which was alreadyi
subject matter of dispute in the earlier round of litigation.
E
22. It is also stated by the counsel that after the Act has
come into force, the Mahant submitted a list of properties on'
25-10-1962 to the Jagir Commissioner wrongly showing some'
of his personal properties as trust prop_$lrties and this list of
F properties was the same as submitted in 1928. It is also prayedi
before us that on 31st December, 1962 the Mahan! made an,
application for registration of the Mandir Thikana Shri Galtaji
as public trust under the Act and made it clear that the mode
of succession to the office of Trustee will be by way of 'custom
and usage'. The said trust was registered by the Assistant
G Commissioner on 26th April, 1963. It is also contended that in
the list of trust properties which were also submitted along with
the application, and which list became final, the property in
question has not been shown as trust property and the said list
has never been questioned.
H
• JAIPUR SHAHAR HINDU VIKAS SAMIT! v. STATE OF 693
RAJASTHAN [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
23. Relying upon several documents as well as counter A
affidavit and ,provisions of the Act, it is contended that in view
of the fact that the issues are,pending before the competent
authority, subsequent orders passed by the Assistant
Commissioner against which appeals are pending before the
Commissioner, there is no need for this Court to entertain these B
appeals and they have to be dismissed as the appellant cannot
litigate simultaneously before the appellate authority and this
Court. It is also contended that there is no allegation against
Avadesh Kumar (Respondent No.4) who is the present Mahant
and in view of the pendency of the appeals before the c
Commissioner, the appellant cannot come before this Court
and misuse the forum in the guise of Public Interest Litigation.
24. To substantiate his arguments, learned counsel relied
on the Judgments of this Court in Guruvayoor Devaswom
Managing Committee & Anr. Vs. C.K. Rajan & Ors. (2003) D
7 SCC 546 and Church of North India Vs. Lavajibhai
Ratanjibhai & Ors. (2005) 10 SCC 760. A counter affidavit
has been filed by the Assistant Commissioner of behalf of the
State of Rajasthan stating that the appellant is trying to confuse
the issues and supported the judgment of the High Court in all E
respects and further stated that the present appeals are not
maintainable
25. In view of the extensive arguments submitted on behalf
of either side, the following issues fall for consideration before F
this Court:
1. Whether the High Court was right in relegating
the parties to the Assistant Commissioner
without going into the merits and legal issues
involved in the case? G
2. Whether the Assistant Commissioner has got
the authority and jurisdiction under the Act to
deal with complicated issues involved in the
m~~ H
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R. •
A 3. Whether the appellant herein is aggrieved by
the order passed in Writ Petition (C) No. 6607
of 2004, wherein the writ petition was
dismissed as infructuous?
B 26. Before we deal with the above issues, it is necessary
to examine the relevant provisions of the Rajasthan Public Trust
Act, 1959 which came into force w.e.f. 1st July, 1962.
Chapter 5 of the Act covers Sections 16 to 29 and it deals
with Registration process of a public trust. As per Section 16,
C the Assistant Commissioner shall be in charge of the
registration and he maintains a register. Section 17 explains
the procedure for registration bf public trusts which reads thus:
Sec. 17 - Registration of public trust:
D 1. Within three months from the date of the application of
this section to a public trust or from the date on which a
public trust is created whichever is later, the working
trustee thereof shall apply to a Assistant Commissioner
having jurisdiction for the registration of such public trust.
E
2. The Assistant Commissioner may, for reasons to be
recorded in writing, extend the period prescribed by Sub-
Sec. (1) for the making of an application for registration
by not more that two years.
F
3. Each such application shall be accompanied by such
fee if any, not exceeding five rupees, and to be utilised for
such purpose, as may be prescribed.
4. The application shall be in such form as may be
G prescribed and shall contain the following particulars,
namely: -
(i) the origin (so far as knows), nature and object of
the public trust and the 'designation by which the
public trust is or shall be known;
H
• JAIPUR SHAHAR HINDU VIKAS SAMITI v. STATE OF 695
(ii)
RAJASTHAN [N.V. RAMANA, J.)
the place where the principal office or the principal A
place of business of the public trust is situate;
(iii) the name and addresses of the working trustee and
the manager;
(iv) the mode of succession to the office of the trustee; 8
(v) the list of the movable and immovable trust property
and such description and particulars as may be
sufficient for the identification thereof;
(vi) the approximate value of the movable and
c
immovable property;
(vii) the gross average annual income derived form
movable and immovable property and from other
source, if any, based on the actual gross annl.!al D
income during the three years immediately
proceeding the date on which the application is
made or of the period which has elapsed since the
creation of the trust, whichever period is shorter,
and, in the case of a newly created public trust the E
estimated gross annual income from all such
sources;
(viii) the amount of the average annual expenditure in
connection with such public trust estimated on the
F
expenditure incurred within the case of a newly
created public trust, the estimated annual
expenditure in connection with such public trust;
(ix) the address to which and communication to the
working trustee or manager in connection with the G
public trust may be sent;
(x) such other particulars as may be prescribed;
Provided that the rules made may provide that in
the case of any or all public trusts it shall not be H
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696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R.
necessary to give the particulars of the trust
•
property of such value and kind as may be specified
therein.
5. Every application made under sub-section (1) shall be
signed and verified in accordance with the manner laid
B
down in the code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act v
if 1908) for signing and verifying plaints. It shall be
accompanied by a copy of the instrument of trust (if such
instrument has been executed and is in existence) and,
where the trust property includes immovable property
c entered in a record of rights, a copy of the relevant entries
relating to such property in such record of rights shall also
be enclosed.
6. No Assistant Commissioner shall proceed with any
D application for the registration of a public trust in respect
of which an application for .registration has been filed
previously before any other Assistant Commissioner, and
the Assistant Commissioner before whom the application
was filed first shall decide which Assistant Commissioner
E shall have jurisdiction to register the public trust.
7. An appeal against the order of the Assistant
Commissioner before whom the application was filed first,
given under sub-section (6) may be filed within sixty days
before the Commissioner and, subject to the decision on
F such appeal, the orders of the Assistant Commissioner
under sub-section (6) shall be final.
Thus, Section 17 mandates that within three months from the
date of enforcemer-it of this Section to a public trust, the working
G trustee can make an application to the Assistant Commissioner,
in the prescribed form for registration. Sub-Section (4) of
Section 17 prescribes the particulars which shall contain in the
application so made. Clause (v) of sub-Section (4) specifies
that the application shall contain a list of movable and
H immovable trust property. Under sub-Section (7) an appeal shall
• JAIPUR SHAHAR HINDU VIKAS SAMITI v. STATE OF 697
RAJASTHAN [N.V. RAMANA, J.)
lie before .the Commissioner against the order of the Assistant A
Commissioner within a period of sixty days.
27. Section 18 describes the procedure of inquiry to be
undertaken :by the Assistant Commissioner for registration of
the public trust. The said.Section reads thus: 8
Sec. 18 - Inquiry for Registration:
1. On receipt of an application under Sec. 17 or upon an
application made by any person having interest in a public
trust or on his own motion, the Assistant Commissioner c
shall make an inquiry in the prescribed manner for the
purpose of ascertaining:
{i) whether a trust exists and whether such trust is a
public trust:
D
{ii) whether any property is the property of such trust;
{iii) whether the whole or any substantial portion of the
subject matter of the trust is situate within his
jurisdiction; E
{iv) the names and addresses of the working trustee
and the manager of such trust;
{v) the mode of succession to the office of the trustee
of such trust; F
{vi) the origin, nature and objects of such trust;
{vii) the amount of gross average annual income and
expenditure of such trust: and
G
{viii) the correctness or otherwise of any other particulars
furnished under sub-section (4) of Section 17.
2. The Assistant Commissioner shall give in the prescribed
manner public notice of the inquiry proposed to be made
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698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R.
under sub-section (1) and invite all person having interest
•
in the public trust inquiry to prefer within sixty days
objection, if any, in respect of such trust.
28. On completion of the inquiry as contemplated under
8 section 18, the Assistant Commissioner shall record his
findings as provided under Section 19 of the Act. Section 20
of the Act makes the provision for Appeal and reads thus:
"Any working trustee or person having interest in a public
trust or in any property found to be trust property aggrieved
C by a finding of the Assistant Commissioner under
Sec. 19 may, within two months from the date of its
publication on the notice board of the Assistant
Commissioner, file an appeal before the
Commissioner to have such finding set aside or
D modified."
29. Section 21 of the Act prescribes that the Assistant
Commissioner shall cause entries to be made in the register
and under sub-section (2) the entries so made shall become
E final and conclusive. As per Section 22, if anyone is aggrieved
by any entry, he may institute a civil suit. If there is any necessity
" · for changes in the entries so recorded in the register, the
working trustee can make an application under Section 23(1)
to the Assistant Commissioner. After holding an inquiry under
Section 23(2) the Assistant Commissioner can change the
F entries: Section 24 enables the Assistant Commissioner to
undertake further inquiry, at any time after the entries are made
under Section 21 or 23. The said Section reads thus:
24. Further inquiry by Assistant Commissioner:
G
If, at any time after the entries or amended .entries are
made in the register under Section 21 or section 23, it
appears to the Assistant Commissioner that any
particulars relating to any public trust, which was not the
subject matter of the inquiry under section 18 or sub-
H
• JAIPUR SHAHAR HINDU VIKAS SAMITI v. STATE OF 699
RAJASTHAN [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
section (2) of section 23, as the case may be, has A
remained to be inquired into, the Assistant Commissioner
may make further inquiry in the prescribed manner, record
his findings and make or amend entries in the register in
accordance with the decision arrived at, and the provisions
of sections 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 shall, so far as may be, B
apply to the inquiry, the recording of findings and the
making or amending of the entries in the register under this
section.
30. It is the duty of the Auditor under Section 34 of the Act, C
to prepare balance sheet of the public trust and to report
irregularities, if any, and the Auditor has to forward a copy
thereof to the Assistant Commissioner. It is further the duty of
the Auditor to mention in the report in case of any irregularity,
illegality or improper expenditure, failure or omission to recovery
moneys or other property belonging to the public trust or of loss D
or waste of money or other property thereof.
31. Chapter 8 of the Act deals with Management of trust
property. Section 38 therein provides for issuing directions by
the Assistant Commissioner on an application filed by any E
person having interest in a public trust or otherwise that (a) the
original object of the public trust has failed; (b) the trust property
is not being properly managed or administered; or (c) the
direction of the Court is necessary for the administration of the
public trust, he can direct inquiry after giving the working trustee F
an opportunity of being heard.
32. Section 39 provides that where the Assistant
Commissioner rejects an application, fails or refuses to make
an application to the Court, an appeal lies to the Commissioner.
On receipt of an application made under Sections 38 or 39, G
the Court shall consider and pass appropriate orders under
Section 40 of the Act. Section 41 envisages that if the present
working trustee of a public trust, for any reasons mentioned
therein, can make an application to the Assistant
Commissioner having jurisdiction seeking permission to apply H
I
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R. •
A to .the Court for appointment of a new working trustee and the
Court under Section 43 of the Act can make inquiry and pass
an order.
33. Section 49 of the Act empowers the Assistant
Commissioner to ask for explanation of the working trustee. If
8
the Assistant Commissioner, on a perusal of the report of the
auditor made under Section 34, is of the opinion that material
defects exist in administration of the public trust, he may require·
the working trustee to submit an explanation thereon within such
C period as he thinks fit.
34. Some special provisions are provided to public trusts
under Chapter 10. Section 52 emphasizes· how this chapter is
applied to a public trust. It provides that this Chapter applies
to every public trust which has a gross annual income of Rs.
D 1.00 lakh or more or is maintained or managed by the State
Government. Sub-section (2) provides that it is the duty of the
State Government to publish in the official gazette a list of the
public trusts to which this chapter applies. The amended sub-
section (3) makes it clear that for the purpose of maintaining
E public order, the State Government may suspend by notification
in the official gazette, the application of this Chapter to any
public trust or the procedure for constitution of committee of
management under this Chapter for such period as may be
specified in such notification.
F 35. Section 53 as amended on 9th May, 2007 provides
that if the State Government is satisfied with the public interest,
it 'may', .by notification in the official gazette, vest the
management of a public trust in a committee of management
to . be constituted by it. Before the said amendment, the old
G Act contained the word 'shall' in place of 'may'. Thus, before
the amendment, it was compulsory for the Government to
constitute a committee which was diluted by introducing the
provision as 'may'.
H 36. Sub-section (5) of Section 53 states that the
• JAIPUR SHAHAR HINDU VIKAS SAMITI v. STATE OF 701
RAJASTHAN [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
Committee of Management which is to be appointed by the A
Government, must include, the hereditary trustee in case of a
public trust whereas in case of a Math, the head thereof as the
Chairman of the Committee of Management.
37. Whenever the State Government decides to appoint 8
a Committee of Management under Section 53, a notice shall
be issued under Section 54 to the hereditary trustee or the head
of the Math, as the case may be, about the intention of the
Government to constitute the committee and shall hear their
objections, if any. Under Section 55 of the Act one can be C
disqualified from being considered as a member of the
Committee of Management. According to Section 56, the term
of office of the committee is five years.
38. Section 67 of the Act provides that the officers holding
enquiries shall have the power of civil Court. The Section reads D
thus:
In holding enquiries under the Act, the Commissioner
or an Assistant Commissioner shall have the same powers
as are vested in civil Courts in respect of the following
E
matters under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central
Act V of 1908) trying a suit -
(a) Proof of facts by affidavits;
(b) Summoning and enforcing the attendance of any F
persons and examining him on oath;
(c) Compelling the production of documents; and
(d) Issuing of Commissions.
G
39. From the above, it is evident that all the officers holding
enquiry under the Act i.e. the Commissioner and Assistant
Commissioner, have the power of a civil Court in respect of
proof of facts by affidavits, for summoning and enforcing the
H
I
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702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R.
attendance of any person and examining ,him on oath and
•
further compelling the production of documents and issue of
Commissions.
40. A detailed examination of the Act reveals that it is a
B self-contained Act. We have thoroughly examined the Sections
and each and every provision of law that is relevant for the
purpose of the case on hand and find that the Act has provided
appropriate mechanism (a) to deal with the registration of a
public trust;
C (b) making of entries in the register, their correction and inquiry,
if any; (c) duties of auditor and inspection of balance sheet by
any person interested in such public trust; (d) application by any
person seeking directions from the Assistant Commissioner to
appoint a new working trustee on the ground that the properties
of the trust are not being properly managed or administered;
D (e) power of the Assistant Commissioner to ask for explanation
of the working trustee about the administration of the trust; and
(f) in case of mismanagement, power of the State Government
to appoint a new committee of management etc.
E 41. Now in the light of the above provisions of the
Rajasthan Public Trust Act, we would like to deal with the
submission of the counsel on either side and the legality or
otherwise of the order passed by the High Court.
It appears from the material placed before us that there is
F a long standing dispute with regard to the properties of the Galta
Peethffhikana which was established in the 15th century by one
Mahant Shri Krishnadas Payohari. Later on 06.07.1943,
Ramodaracharya, the father of respondent No.4 herein was
appointed as Mahanth by the ruler. The Rajasthan Public Trusts
G Act 1959 has come into force w.e.f. 01.07.1962. The case of
the appellant is that on 25.10.1962, the Mahant submitted a list
of properties to the Jagir Commissioner showing some of the
properties of the Trust as his personal properties. Then the
Mahanth has executed gift deeds in favour of his wife and sons.
H
•
JAIPUR SHAHAR HINDU VIKAS SAMITI v. STATE OF 703
RAJASTHAN [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
On 31.12.1962, Mahant Ramodaracharya made an application A
for registration of the Mandir Thikana Shri Galtaji as a Public
Trust under the Act. In the application, as regards the mode of
succession of the Office of the Trustee, he stated that it would
be "by custom and usages". On 26.04.1963, the Assistant
Commissioner passed order registering the Trust. Later on, a B
series of litigation went on between the parties with regard to
the properties of the Trust/Math. When the Government
appointed a five-Member Committee for proper management
of the Trust, challenging the same D.B. (Civil) W.P. No.6607
of 2004 was filed. When the Assistant Commissioner re- c
opened the issue of succession, 4th respondent herein filed
D.B. (Civil) W.P. No.5650 of 2007. Two Public Interest
Litigations i.e. D.B. (Civil) W.P. No. 5111 of 2004 and D.B.
(Civil) W.P. No. 2321 of 2006 were filed seeking to declare (a)
the properties are trust properties, (b) the mode of succession, D
(c) direct the Government to take over the management of the
trust and (d) to ~ppoint a Board to manage the properties jn
line with Vaishno Devi Shrine or Tirupati Balaji Temple.
42. The above narrated facts disclose that either in the
Public Interest Litigation or in the private civil litigation, the entire E
issues revolve around the properties of Galla Peeth and the
mode of succession to the Peeth. Already in respect of these
issues, by the time, these writ petitions were filed, statutory
enquiry application Nos. 1/2004, 1/2006 and 1/2007, under
Section 24 of the Act, were pending before the Assistant F
Commissioner. Hence, the High Court felt that those issues can
be effectively decided by the Assistant Commissioner, and
accordingly, permitted the appellant to implead himself in the
pending applications before the authority. In view of the
statutory provisions, as narrated and discussed by us supra, q
which give extensive powers to the Assistant Commissioner
and Commissioner, in some cases the power of the civil Court
to effectively decide the issues of the Public Trust, by providing
effective mechanism, we are unable to agree with the
H
;
'
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R. •
A contentions adva-nced by the learned counsel that the Assistant
Commissioner has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the disputes
involved, because the Act clearly demonstrates the power and
jurisdiction of the Assistant Commissioner in deciding the
issues pertaining to public trust and particularly the issues
B raised before us.
43. Apart from that, the appellant- herein has impleaded
himself in the applications pending before the Assistant
Commissioner which were disposed of by-him vide orders
C dated 28.03.2013, and against those orders of the Assistant
Commissioner, it appears that the parties have preferred
appeals as provided under the Act. The appellant having
availed the alternative remedy available under the Act, however,
approached this Court by way of these Civil Appeals. In our
opinion, the appellant cannot be permitted to avail two
D remedies simultaneously, and such conduct of the appellant is
abuse of process of Court. It is no doubt settled law that mere
availability of alternative remedy cannot be a ground to reject
the relief in a Public Interest Litigation, but in the facts and
circumstances of the case, namely the history of the case, right
E from 15th century, the long standing litigation, the voluminous
record, etc. involving disputed questions of facts and law, we
are of the considered opinion that adjudication of such disputes
is not possible in a Public Interest Litigation, and the remedy
is to get such disputes adjudicated by a fact finding authority
F as enumerated under the Act, which remedy is not only
alternative, but also effective, because the parties can put a
quietus to the litigation once for all. Hence, in view of our above
discussion, we are of the considered opinion·that the High
Court, by the impugned order, was justified in relegating the
G parties to the Assistant Commissioner, before whom the
applications are pending adjudication_ The appellant having got
impleaded himself in the applications before the Assistant
Commissioner and having invited an order from the High Court,
now cannot be permitted to question the said order of the High
H Court. Accordingly, the first and second issues are answered.
• JAIPUR SHAHAR HINDU VIKAS SAMITI v. STATE OF 705
RAJASTHAN [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
44. Third issue that requires our consideration is whether A
the appellant herein is aggrieved by the orders passed in D.B.
{Civil) W.P. No. 6607 of 2004, which was dismissed as
infructuous. The case of the appellant is that the High Court
should not have dismissed the writ petition as withdrawn basing
on the submission that the term of the Committee has expired: B
It ought to have decided the issue on merits. By this order, the
High Court has created a vacuum not contemplated by the Act,
which is against Public Interest, in view of the status quo orders
passed by the Court, the Committee could not function its full
period. Hence, the Committee has to be allowed to function till c
a permanent Committee is appointed by the Government.
45. We are also not able to appreciate the argument
advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant for reason
that D.B. (Civil) W.P. No. 6607 of 2004 was filed by the father
of Respondent No.4 herein questioning the constitution of the D
Committee. When the Court directed the parties to appear
before the Assistant Commissioner for proper adjudication of
the issues as the five-year term of the Committee expired, the
4th respondent sought permission of the Court and withdrew
the writ petition, with a liberty to raise all the issues before the E
authority. The appellant herein who was not a party to D.B.
(Civil) W.P. No. 6607 of 2004 has not chosen to implead
himself nor objected to the withdrawing of the writ petition when
the order was passed in his presence. He is taking such an
objection and such plea for the first time before this Court. He F
relied on Shehla Burney (Dr.) Vs. Syed Ali Moosa Raza &
Ors. (2011) 6 SCC 529; that on technical objection, this Court
cannot reject to grant relief to the appellant in this Public Interest
Litigation. There is no dispute with regard to the legal
proposition that technicalities should not come in the way of the G
Court in granting relief in a Public Interest Litigation, but
application of a legal proposition depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case.
H
A
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 11 S.C.R.
Here we deem it appropriate to extract Section 53 which
•
reads thus:
Sec. 53 - Management of public trusts to which this
chapter applies:
B 1. Notwithstanding anything contained in any provision of
this Act or in any law, custom or usage, if the State
Government is satisfied that it is expedient in public interest
so to do, it may, by notification in the official Gazette, vest
the management of a public trust to which this Chapter
c applies in a committee of management to be constituted
by it in the manner hereinafter provided from such date as
may be appointed by it in this behalf.
2. On or before the date so fixed under Sub-Sec. (1) in
respect of a public trust, the State Government shall
D
subject to the provision contained in Sec. 54, constitute by
notification in the official Gazette a Committee of
management thereof under such Committee shall be
deemed to be the working trustee of the said public trust
and its endowment.
E
Provided that upon the combined request of the trustee of
and persons interested in several public trusts representing
the same religion or persuasion, the State Government
may constitute a Committee of management for all of them,
F if their endowments are situated in the same city, town or
locality.
3. Every Committee of management constituted under sub-
sec. (2) shall be a body corporate having perpetual
succession and a common seal, with power to acquire,
G hold arid dispose of property subject to such conditions and
restrictions as may be prescribed and may by the name
specified in the notification under sub-section (2) sue and
be sued.
H 4. A committee of management shall consist of a
• JAIPUR SHAHAR HINDU VIKAS SAMIT! v. STATE OF 707
RAJASTHAN [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
Chairman and such even number of members not A
exceeding ten and not less than two as the State
Government may determine.
5. The Chairman and members of a committee of
management shall be appointed by the State 8
Government by notification in the official Gazette
from amongst -
(a) trustee of public trusts representing the same
religion or persuasion and having the same objects,
and C
(b) person interested in such public trusts or in the
endowments thereof or belonging to the
denomination for the purpose of which or for the
benefit of whom the trust was founded, in o
accordance with the general wishes of the person
so interested so far as such wishes can be
ascertained in the prescribed manner.
Provided that in the case of a public trust having a
hereditary trustee, such trustee, and in the case of a Math, E
the head thereof, shall be the Chairman of the committee
of management, if he is willing to serve as such.
46. In this case, a Committee was constituted pursuant to
notification dated 18.09.2004, and the term of the Committee F
expired on 17.09.2009, and even though four years have
passed from the date of expiry of the term of the Committee,
the Government has not chosen to appoint a fresh Committee.
The appointment of the Committee invoking Section 53,
depends upon the satisfaction and necessity felt by the G
Government. It is brought to our notice that the notification was
issued by the Government invoking unamended Section 53 of
the Act. The said Section has now been amended on
12.10.2007, where the Government was given discretion to
appoint or not to appoint the Committee. We have gone through H
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R. •
A the amended Section 53 of the Act wherein the word 'may" has
been substituted in the place of 'shall'. The Assistant
Commissioner has already passed an order and the same is
subject matter of appeal before the Commissioner. In view of
the same, we are not able to appreciate the contention of the
s counsel that a permanent Committee has to be appointed to
look after the management of the Galla Peeth, and such
contention, deserves no consideration by this Court, and is
accordingly rejected, and further hold that the order passed by
the High Court in D.S. (Civil) W.P. No. 6607 of 2004 is perfectly
c valid. Accordingly, issue No.3 is answered.
Under the circumstances, we cannot give any direction to
the Government to invoke Section 53 for appointment of a
Committee of Management to the trust.
D 47. The scope of Public Interest Litigation is very limited,
particularly, in the matter of religious institutions. It is always
better not to entertain this type of Public Interest Litigations
simply on the basis of affidavits of the parties. The public trusts
and religious institutions are governed by particular legislation
E which provide for a proper mechanism for adjudication of
disputes relating to the properties of the trust and their
management thereof. It is not proper for the Court to entertain
such litigation and pass orders. It is also needless to mention
that the forums cannot be misused by the rival groups in the
F guise of public interest litigation.
48. We feel that it is apt to quote the views expressed by
this Court in Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee
(supra) wherein this Court observed :
G "It is possible to contend that the Hindus in general and
the devotees visiting the temple in particular are interested
in proper management of the temple at the hands of the
statutory functionaries. That may be so but the Act is a self-
contained Code. Duties and functions are prescribed in
H the Act and the rules framed thereunder. Forums have
•
JAIPUR SHAHAR HINDU VIKAS SAMITI v. STATE OF 709
RAJASTHAN [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
been created thereunder for ventilation of the grievances A
of the affected persons. Ordinarily, therefore, such forums
should be moved at the first instance. The State should be
asked to look into the grievances of the aggrieved
devotees, both as parens patriae as also in discharge of
·its statutory duties. B
The Court should be circumspect in entertaining such
public interest litigation for another reason. There may be
dispute amongst the devotees as to what practices should C
be followed by the temple authorities. There may be
dispute as regard the rites and rituals to be performed in
the temple or omission thereof. Any decision in favour of
one sector of the people may heart the sentiments of the
other. The Courts normally, thus, at the first instance would D
not enter into such disputed arena, particularly, when by
reason thereof the fundamental right of a group of devotees
under Articles 25 and 26 may be infringed. Like any other
wing of the State, the Courts also while passing an order
should ensure that the fundamental rights of a group of E
citizens under Articles 25 and 26 are not infringed. Such
care and caution on the part of the High Court would be a
welcome step.
F
When the administration of the temple is within its control
and it exercises the said power in terms of a Statute, the
State, ii is expected, normally would itself probe into the
alleged irregularities. If the State through its machinery as
provided for in one Act can arrive at the requisite finding G
of fact for the purpose of remedying the defects, it may not
find it necessary to take recourse to the remedies
provided for in another statute. It is trite that recourse to a
provision to another statute may be resorted to when the
State finds that its powers under the Act governing the field H
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R. •
A is inadequate. The High Courts and the Supreme Court
would not ordinarily issue a writ of mandamus directing the
State to carry out its statutory functions in a particular
manner. Normally, the Courts would ask the State to
perform its statutory functions, if necessary within a time
B frame and undoubtedly as and when an order is passed
by the State in exercise of its power under the Statute, it
will examine the correctness or legality thereof by way of
judicial review".
49. The concept of Public Interest Litigation is a
C phenomenon which is evolved to bring justice to the reach of
people who are handicapped by ignorance, indigence, illiteracy
and other down trodden people. Through the Public Interest
Litigation, the cause of several people who are not able to
approach the Court is espoused. In the guise of Public Interest
D Litigation, we are coming across several cases where it is
exploited for the benefit of certain individuals. The Courts have
to be very cautious and careful while entertaining Public Interest
Litigation. The Judiciary should deal with the misuse of Public
Interest Litigation with iron hand. If the Public Interest Litigation
E is permitted to be misused the very purpose for which it is
conceived, namely to come to the rescue of the poor and down
trodden will be defeated. The Courts should discourage the
unjustified litigants at the initial stage itself and the person who
misuses the forum should be made accountable for it. In the
F realm of Public Interest Litigation, the Courts while protecting
the larger public interest involved, should at the same time have
to look at the effective way in which the relief can be granted
to the people, whose rights are adversely affected or at stake.
When their inte1·est can be protected and the controversy or the
G dispute can be adjudicated by a mechanism created under a
particular statute, the parties should be relegated to the
appropriate forum, instead of entertaining the writ petition filed
as Public Interest Litigation.
50. In view of the above discussion and the law laid down
H
• JAIPUR SHAHAR HINDU VIKAS SAMIT! v. STATE OF 711
RAJASTHAN [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
by this Court and particularly taking into consideration that the A
appellant has already availed statutory remedies and the
appeals are still pending before the Commissioner, we do not
find any reason to interfere with the impugned order.
51. Accordingly, the appeals fail and are dismissed with B
no order as to costs.
Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeals dismissed.
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