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Supreme Court of India

JITENDER ARORA & ORS.versusSUKRITI ARORA & ORS.

Citation
2017 INSC 152
Decided
17 February 2017
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

The welfare of the child is paramount, and a mature 15‑year‑old who clearly prefers to stay with her father and not be sent to the UK must be granted custody with the father.

Summary

The Supreme Court considered a custody dispute between Jitender Arora (father) and Sukriti Arora (mother) over their 15‑year‑old daughter, Vaishali. Both parents had obtained ex‑parte divorce decrees in the UK and India, and the mother filed a habeas corpus petition seeking custody. The High Court had ordered temporary custody to the mother, but the Supreme Court examined the child's wishes, her maturity, and the statutory framework. Relying on the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, the Court held that the welfare of the child is paramount and that a mature minor can express a valid preference. Since Vaishali unequivocally wanted to remain with her father and not be sent to the UK, the Court set aside the High Court order and restored custody to the father. The appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

  • The paramount consideration in child custody disputes under Indian law.
  • Whether a 15‑year‑old child can decide her own custody and be treated as a mature minor.
  • Whether the High Court erred in granting custody to the mother without considering the child's wishes and welfare.
  • Application of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (sections 7, 13, 17) to the present facts.

Legislation cited

Subjects

child custodywelfare of childHindu Minority and Guardianship Actmature minorex parte divorcehabeas corpusSupreme Court of Indiaparental rightsinternational jurisdiction

Judgment

                         12017] 1 S.C.R. 707


                   JITENDER ARORA & ORS.                                A
                                 v.
                    SUKRITI ARORA & ORS.
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 717 of2013)
                         FEBRUARY 17, 2017                              B

            [A.K. SIKRI AND R.K. AGRAWAL, JJ.J
                     4                         :.   ,·;.   ·'

      Custody - Child custody - Matrimonial dispute - Wife
obtained ex parte divorce from U.K. court whereas husband obtained
from Indian court - Husband shifted to India along with the
daughter - Habeas Corpus petition by wife seeking.directions that
                                                                        c
the husband to handover the custody of the daughter to her - Petition
allowed by the High Court - Appeal befor~ this Court - Stay of the
High Court judgment - Held: Paramount consideration is the
welfare of the child - Daughter. is a mature girl of 15 years of age
who can decide what is best for her - In spite of giving ample          D
chances to the mother by giving temporary custody of the daughter
to her, mother was not 'able to win over the confidence of the
daughter - Daughter unequivocally expressed her desire to be with
her father and stated that she did not want to go to U.K. - Court
cannot take the risk of sending her to U.K. against her wishes,
                                                                        E
which may prove to be a turbulent and tormenting experience for
her and would not be in her interest - Thus, the welfare of the
daughter lies in the continued company of her father which appears
to be in her best interest - Thus, the judgment of the High Court is
set aside.
                                                                        F
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
      HELD: 1.1 In cas~s of custody disputes, where a child feels
tormented because of tiie strained relations between her parents
and idenlly needs the com]lany of both of them, It becomes at
times, a difficult choice for the court to decide as to whom th. e ·
custody should be given •. No doubt, paramount consideration Is '·0
the welfare of the child. 'V' Is n mature girl oflS years of age. At
this age, she can fully understand what Is In her best Interest.
She is competent to take a decision for herself. There has been
interaction with her by diffe~ent Bencli.es of this Court fi!nm time
to time, outcome whereof' is reflect~d in the orders passed after    H
                                 707
708           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      (2017] I S.C.R.


A     such meetings. She has unequivocally and without any
      reservations expressed he.r desire to be with her father. More
      importantly, she has very categorically said that she does not
      want to go to U.K. [Paras 10, 12) [715-E-F; 721-G-H)
            1.2 During the course of arguments, when the respondent
B     was also present, the respondent was asked as to whethe.- she
      could shift to India, even temporarily for a year or so, as in that
      eventuality, the Court could consider giving custody of 'V' to her
      for that period. However, she expressed her inability to do so.
      She wanted custody of 'V' on her own terms. She wanted •v• to
      come to U.K. and live with her. 'V' does not want to go to U.K. at
c     all. This Court cannot take the risk of sending 'V' to a foreign
      country, against the wishes of a mature girl like 'V', as it may
      prove to be a turbulent and tormenting experience for her. That
      would not be in her interest. [Para 14) [722-E-F)
          1.3 There was interaction with 'V' in the Chambers earlier.
D   On the date of hearing also, 'V' was present in the Court and in
    front of her parents, she unequivocally expressed that she was
    happy with her father and wanted to continue in his company and
    did not want to go with her motlter, much less to U.K. Fro1a the
    interaction, it is clearly discernible that she is a mature girl who
E is in a position to weigh the pros and cons of two alternatives and
    to decide as to which course of action is more suited to her. She
    has developed her personality and formed her opinion after
    considering all the attendant circumstances. Her intellectual
    characteristics are adequately developed. She is able to solve
  · problems, think about her future and understands the long term
F effects of the decision which she has taken. She has been brought
    up in a conducive atmosphere. She has achieved sufficient level
    of maturity. Further, in spite of giving ample chances to the
    respondent by giving temporary custody of 'V' to her, respondent
    could not win over the confidence of 'V'. Therefore, it is felt that
G her welfare lies in the continued company of her father which
    appears to be in her best interest. [Para 15) [722-G-H; 723-A-B]
             1.4 The High Court in the impugned judgment had stated
      that since 'V' was a minor girl, she needed company of her mother
      more to understand girly things. The High Court mentioned about
H     the bond between girl child and mother in abstract and from there
    JITENDER ARORA & ORS. v. SUKRITI ARORA & ORS.                          709


only the High Court came to the conclusion that it would be better         A
fo give the custody to the mother. The High Court did not go
into the specific situation and ,circumstances of this case and did
not make any objective assessment about the welfare of'V'. Many
circumstances which are narrated were not taken note of. [Para
16] [723-C-D]
                                                                            B
       1.5 On the facts of the case, the Court is convinced that
custody of the child needs to be with father. She is already 15
years of age and within 3 years, she would be major and all this
custody battle between her parents would come to an ~nd. She
would have complete freedom to decide the course of action she
would like to adopt in her life. The judgment of the High Court is         c
set aside. [Para 17] (723-E]
      Vivek Singh v. Romani Singh 2017 (3) SCC 231 - relied
      on.
      Gaurav Nagpal v. Sumedha Nagpal (2009) 1 SCC 42:                      D
      2008 (16) SCR 396; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union
      of India & Ors. (1997) 10 SCC 549 : 1997 (2) SCR
      379; Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakka/ (1973) 1
      SCC 840 : 1973 (3) SCR 918 - referred to.
                       Case Law Reference                                   E
2011 (3) sec 231                 relied on                Para 10
2008 (16) SCR 396                referred to              Para 10
1997 (2) SCR 379                 referred to              Para 10
1973 (3) SCR 918                 referred to              Para 10           F
      CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
717 of2013.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 25.05.2010 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Writ Petition No. 712
of2010.                                                                     G
      Prabhjit Jauhar, Ms. Ankita, S.S. Jauhar,Advs. for the Appellants.
      Rajat Bhalla, Viresh B. Saharya, Akshay Agarwal, Sanjay Kumar
Visen, Advs. for the Respondents.
                                                                            H
710            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            (2017) I S.C.R.


A           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
              A. K. SIKRI, J, ·I. Marriage between appel !ant No. I (hereinafter
      referred to as the 'appellant') and respondent No. I (hereinafter referred
      to as the 'respondent') was solemnized sometime in the year 1999, which
      was got registered with the Registrar of Marriages, Faridabad on
B      14.12.1999. The parties lived thereafter till March 2000 in Faridabad.
      However, carrying this notion that great future lies forthem out of India,
      the couple shifted to U.K. on 23.03.2000. Ms. Vaishali Arora was born
      out of this wedlock on 14.01.2002. Career-wise or financially, whether
      the couple was better off in' U.K., is not known. However, the soil of
      U.K. certainly did not prove conducive to their matrimonial relationship
c     which, with the passage of time, turned bad to worst and from sweet to
      savoury to bitter. So much so, legal battles started between them.
       Eschewing the details in this behalf which are not needed and can be
      avoided for the sake of brevity, suffice is to mention that respondent has
      taken decree of divorce from the Court in U.K. Likewise, appellant who
D      had shifted to India along with Vaishali in 2010, filed the petition for
      divorce and has obtained decree of divorce a!\ainst the respondent. Both
      the divorce decrees are ex-parte against each other. Fact remains, which
       is to be emphasised, that the appellant and respondent have put an end
      to their matrimonial alliance and the aforesaid move on their part c!early
       depicts that both of them wanted divorce from each other. That is the
E      reason that the aforesaid ex-parte divorce decrees are not questioned
       by any of them.
             2. As it happens in such cases, an acrimonious and charged up
      battle between the appellant and the respondent has got concentrated
      upon the custody of Vaishali Arora. Though the couple had moved to
 F    U.K. on 23.03.2000, Vaishali Was born on 14.01.2002 in Holy Family
      Hospital, Delhi. The respondent had come to India when she was
      pregnant and shortly after her birth, she went back along with the
      appellant and the new born child. Vaishali came to India in July, 2002 to
      stay with her paternal grandparents in Faridabad and went back to U.K.
 G    in January, 2003. Matrimonial discord started erupting between the parties
      thereafter. Since both of them were having their permanent jo~s, the
      services of K'atie Bradbury, a ChiiCi Minder were obtained by them .vhen
      Vaishali was merely 13 months old. In July, 2004, both husband and
      wife and their child were granted perinanent resident status of U.K.
      Thereafter, the parties had been cmniiigtci India off and on quite regularly.
 H
    JITENDER ARORA & ORS. v. SUKRITI ARORA & ORS.                            711
                   fA. K. SIKRI, J.l

Vaishali was admitted in a school in Camberley, U.K. fn July, 2007,          A
Vaishali came to India and joined Manav Rachna International School
where she studied upto March, 2008. Thereafter, she again went back
to U.K. where she was admitted in a school. On 07.02.2007, Pushti,
second daughter, was born to the parties. Thereafter, the matrimonial
relationship between the appellant and the respondent became more
                                                                              B
bitter and abusive. Respondent alleged the acts of domestic violence
perpetrated upon her by the appellant. Surrey S.ocial Services Department
investigated into the issues of domestic violence. During this period, the
impact ofadverse relations between the spouses upon their child Vaishali
was also'studied from psychological point of view by the officer of the
said Department and reports given from time to time.                          c
       3. In June, 2007, Vaishali was issued Indian Passport by Indian
High Commission in London. On 04.08.2007, the appellant came to India.
As pointed out above, Vaishali had already come to India and was
admitted in a school in July, 2007. The appellant and Vaishali remained in
India tlil April, 2008. Even the respondent decided to move back to India     D
with her parents. However, on 13.04.2008, the appellant went back to
U.K. The respondent remained in India and went back to U.K. in May,
2009. On reaching U.K., she lodged a complaint with the police on
I 3.05.2009 to trace the whereabouts ofVaishali. Thereafter, she filed a
case in the U.K. Court in which, on 04.06.2009, an ex-parte order was
passed prohibiting the appellant from removing two minor children from        E
England and Wales. Further, restraint order was passed against the
appellant from removing Vaishali from attendance at Alwyn Infants
School where she was studying at that time. The appellant filed cross
application and it led to further legal tussle between the parties wherein
the Court passed orders from time to time. It is in November, 2009 that       F
the respondent filed divorce proceedings against the appellant in a Court
in U.K. wherein she has been granted decree of divorce. On 24.11.2009,
as aforesaid, the appellant shifted to India along with Vaishali. In their
absence, the respondent obtained British Citizenship of Vaishali on
13.07.2010.           .
                                                                              G
      4. Since the appellant had come to India with Vaishali, the
respondent filed Habeas Corpus Petition bearing Criminal Writ Petition
No. 712 of2010 in the High Court of Punjab & Haryana wherein she
impleaded, apart from the appellant, his parents as well as Vaishali, as
respondents. Other parties who were made respondents were State of
                                                                             H
                                                                                   +
712            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 1 S.C.R.


A     Haryana, Senior Superintendent of Police, Haryana and Station House.
      Officer, Police Station City Faridabad, Haryana. This petition has been
      allowed by the High Courtvidejudgmentdated 25.05.2010 directing the
      appellant to handover the custody of Vaishali to her mother i.e. the
      respondent. It is this judgment which is impugned in the present
      proceedings.                        ·
B
            5. It would be noticed that in May, 2010, when the petition was
      allowed, Vaishali was almost 8Yi years of age . .Today, she is 15 years
      old.
             6. The Special Leave Petition (which is converted into the instant
c     appeal after the grant of special leave) was filed immediately after the
      passing of the impugned judgment by the High Court, which came up for
      hearing on 02.06.20 I 0 before the Vacation Bench of this Court. While
      issuing notice in the petition, this Court stayed the operation of the
      aforesaid judgment of the High Court. That stay order has remained in
      operation, as a consequence whereof custody of the child continues to
D     be with the father. The respondent, of course, has been granted visitation
      rights from time to time as and when she came to India and moved an
      application in this behalf. Such visitation rights have normally been for
      the entire period of her stay in India on these visits, which range from
      seven days to even two months. This fact is highlighted to show that the
E     respondent is given access to child for long periods as well, the details
      whereof are mentioned hereafter.
             7. When the case came up before this Court on 31.01.2013 (at
      that time, Vaishali was 11 years of age), the Bench (comprisingofAftab
      Alam and RanjanaPrakash Desai,JJ.) decided to meet Vaishali in order
F     to interact with her to ascertain her view point. Thereafter, the matter
      came up for hearing on 02.04.2013 when the following order was passed:
            "In the proceedings held on January 31, 2013, it was agreed
            between the parties and was also noted in the order passed on
            that date that the child Vaishali should stay with respondent
            No. l (Sukriti Arora), the mother of the child at her residence in.
G
            Delhi for one month under monitoring by this Court.
            In continuation of that order, therefore, we direct that Vaishali
            should stay with her mother, tentatively for one month from
            today, subject to any further direction that may be passed by this
            Court in the meanwhile. The address ofrespondent No. l where
H
JITENDER ARORA & ORS. v. SUKRITI ARORA & ORS.                           713
               [A. K. SIKRl, J.]

 she will stay with her daughter Vaishali is 6578, Sector-C, Pocket-     A
 6& 7, Vasant Kunj, Delhi and her contact number
 (mobile)is:996866 l 822.
       Ms. Madhavi Divan, one of the counsel representing the
 petitioner shall hand over the child to her mother-respondent No. I
 outside the court room after we complete the passing of this            B
 order.
       Respondent No. I shall deposit her passport with the
 Registrar (J-II!) of this Court which shall be returned back to
 her after Vaishali goes back to her father on completion of the
 term of her stay with respondent No. I.                                 c
       We are informed that Vaishali's school is reopening from
 April 4, 2013. On behalf of Respondent No. I, it is stated that she
 will ensure that the child reaches the school in time and is brought
 back to her residence after school hours. The child's stay with
 her mother will, in no way, affect her attendance at the school or      D
 her studies.
       During her stay with the mother, the child will be free to
 speak to her father on telephone (Mobile No. 9968661822).
 On behalf of respondent No. I, it was stated that she would not
 create any obstruction in the way of the child speaking to her          E
 father.
       During the child's stay with her mother, we would like some
  responsible and competent person to monitor the arrangement.
 ',We, accordingly, request Mrs. Sadhana Ramachandran, who
  works for the Delhi High Court Mediation and Conciliation Centre,
                                                                         F
  to monitor the arrangement on behalf of this Court. Mrs.
  Ramachandran shall visit the mother and the child at the address
  noted above on a date and time of her convenience. She would
   inform respondent No. I on her mobile phone about the proposed
  date and time of her visit to the respondent's place. She would
  see how the relationship between the child and the mother is           G
   developing and if need be, she would counsel .both the child and
  the mother.
     If the father wants to visit the child while she is staying with
  her mother, he may do so at a time when Mrs. Sadhana
  Ramachandran is also present there. For the purpose of the visit       H
714             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] I S.C.R.


A            he will have to take the necessary permission from Mrs.
             Ramachandran.
                  It is submitted on behalf of Respondent No. I that she would
             like to take the child to some resort or some hill station for a brief
             holiday. We would like the mother and the child to stay in Delhi
B            itself but, in case, both the child and the mother together wish to
             go outside, they may do so subject to the permission in writing
           · taken from ·Mrs. Ramachandran.                                 ,-
                Mrs. Ramachandran would submit a report to this Court
            within ten days from today.
c               Let this matter be listed for further direction along with the
            report from Mrs. Ramachandran on April 12, 2013."'
                    " Sadhana Ramachandran, who monitored the arrangement
              8. Mrs.
      as per the directions contained in the aforesaid order submitted her report.
      On going through that report, further order dated 15.04.2013 was passed
D     in the matter and we reproduce that order as well in its entirety:
           . "Seen the report submitted by Mrs. Sadhana Ramachandran.
                This Court is tha~kful to Mrs. Ramachandran for'giving her
            valuable time and attention and for acting as the counselor and
            the Court's agent in this arrangement.
E
                 We note that under the exigencies of the situation, the
             mother and the child have shifted from the address noted in the
             previous order and are now living at the following address:
                       Ms. Sukriti Arora,
F                      Clo. K.D. Prasher
                       C-2633, Sushant Lok Phase - I,
                       Gurgaon (Haryana).
                The shift has been made with the permission ofMrs.
             Ramachandran and with the consent of the father of the child.

G                Thearrangementmadebyorder dated April 02, 2013 may
             continue for a period of one month from that date as indicated in
             that order.
                   It is, however, made clear that while staying with her
           · mother, the child Vaishali can speak to her father and to Mrs.
             Ramachandran as and when she wishes.
H
    JITENDER ARORA & ORS. v. SUKRITI ARORA & ORS.                                  715
                   [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

            Both the petitioner and the respondent are directed to pay             A
       heed to the advice of Mrs. Ramachandran and take part in
       mediation, as suggested by her, with an open mind.
            Liston MayOl,2013.
           Before that date, Mrs. Sadhana Ramachandran is requested
       to submit a final report."
                                                                                    B

       9. On 01.05.2013, this Court .took note of the fact that the
respondent was leaving for U.K. In these circumstances, direction was
given to her to return the custody ofVaishal i to her fad1er i.e. the appellant.
                                     to
The aforesaid background needs be kept in mind while decirlingthis
cu~todY. dispute.
                                                                                    c
        I 0. We have gone through the entire record, including iffe orders
·passed by the Courts in V.K. from time to time in various proceedings.
 In a re'~entjudgment pronounced on 13.02.2017 delivered by this Court
 in the case of Vivek Singft v. Romani Singft, of which one of us (A.K.
 Sikri, J.) was the member.of the, Bench, dilemma of the Court and the              D
 iaw on the subject was taken note of. We reproduce the following paras
 of the said judgment in order to make it self-contained in all respects:
       "7. We liave. given our utmost serious consideration to the
       respective submissions which a case of this nature deserves to be
       given. In cases.of this nature, where a child feels tormented                E
       because of the strained relatioils between her parents and ideally
       needs the company of both ofthem, it becomes, at times, a difficult
       choice for the court to decide as to whom the custody should be.
       given. No doubt, paramount con.sideration is the welfare of the
       child. However, at times the prevailing circumstances are so
                                                                                    F
       puzzling that it becomes difficult to weigh the conflicting parameters
       and decide on which side the balance tilts.
       8. The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 lays down the
       principles on which custody disputes are to be decided. Section 7
       of this Act empowers the Court to make order as to guardianship.
       Section 17 enumerates the matters which need to be considered                G
       by the Court'in appointing guardian and among others, enshrines
       the principle of welfare ofth~ miriilr child. This is also stated
       very eloquently in Section 13 wl1ich reads as under:
           "13. Welfare of minor to.be paramount consideration.
           (1) In the appointment or declaration of any person as                   H
716              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2017] 1 S.C.R.


A                 guardian of a Hindu minor by a court, the welfare of the
                  minor shall be the paramount consideration.
                  (2) No person shall be entitled to the guardianship by
                  virtue of the provisions of this Act or ofany law relating
                  to guardianship in marriage among Hindus, ifthe court
B                 is of opinion that his or her guardianship will not be for
                  the welfare of the minor."
              9. The Court in the case of Gaurav Nagpal v. Sumedlta
              Nagpal' stated in detail, the ·law relating to custody in
              England and America and pointed out that even in those .
              jurisdictions, welfare of the minor child is the first and
c             paramount consideration and in order to determine child
              custody, the jurisdiction exercised by the Court rests on its
              own inherent equality powers where the Court acts as
              'Parens Patriae'. The Court further observed that various
              statutes give legislative recognition to the aforesaid
D             established principles. The Court explained the expression
              'welfare', occurring in Section 13 of the said Act in the
              following manner:
                  "51. The word "welfare" used in Section 13 of the Act
                  has to be construed literally and must be taken in its
E                 widest sense. The moral and ethical welfare of the child
                  must also weigh with the court as well as its physical
                  well-being. Though the provisions of the special statutes
                  which govern the rights of the parents or guardians may
                  be taken into consideration, there is nothing which can
                  stand in the way of the court exercising its parens
F                 patriae jurisdiction arising in such cases.
                  52. The trump card in the appellant's argument is that
                  the child is living since long with the father. The argument
                  is attractive. But the same overlooks a very significant
                  factor. By flouting various orders, leading even to
G                 initiation of contempt proceedings, the appellant has
                  managed to keep custody of the child. He cannot be a
                  beneficiary of his own wrongs, The High Court has
                  referred to these aspects in detail in the impugned
                  judgments."
H     1   (2009) 1 sec 42
    JITENDER ARORA & ORS. v. SUKRITI ARORA & ORS.                          717
                   fA. K. SIKRI, J.]

       10. We understand that the aforesaid principle is aimed at          A
       serving twin objectives. In the first instance, it is to ensure
       that the child grows and develops in the best environment.
       The best interest of the child has been placed at the vanguard
       of family/custody disputes according the optimal groWth and
       development of the child primacy over other considerations.
                                                                           B
       The child is often left to grapple with the breakdown of an
       adult institution. While the parents aim to ensure that the
       child is least affected by the outcome, the inevitability of
       the uncertainty that follows regarding.th~:Child's growth
       lingers on till the new routine sinks in. The effect of
       separation of spouses, on children, psychologically,·                c
       emotionally and even to some extent physically, spans from
       negligible to serious, whiclf could l)e insignificant· to
       noticeably critical. It could also have effects that are inore
       immediate and transitory to long lasting thereby having a
       significantly negative repercussion in the advancement of
                                                                           D
       the child. While these effects don't apply to every child of
       a separated or divorced couple, nor has any child
       experienced all these effects, the deleterious risks of
       maladjustment remains the objective of the parents to evade
       and the comt's intent to circumvent. This right of the child
        is also based on individual di&nity.                                E
        11. Second justification behi~d the 'welfare' principle is
        the public interest that stand served with tbe optimal growth
        of the children. It is. well recognised that children are the
       ·supreme asset of the nation. Rightful place of the child in
        the sizeable fabric has been recognised in many international       F
        covenants, which are adopted in this country as well. Child-
        centric human rights jurisprudence that has been evolved
        over a period oftime is founded on the principle that pµbiic
        good demands proper growth of the child, who are the future
        of the nation. It has been emphasised by this Court also,
        time and again; following observations in Band/ma Mukti             G
        More/ta v. Union of India & Ors.':
               "4. The child of today cannot develop to be a responsible
               and productive member of tomorrow's societY:unless.

           osec 549
' ( t 997) 1                                                                H
718            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [20 I 7] 1 S.C.R.



A               an environment which is conducive to his social and
                physical health is assured to him. Eve!)' nation, developed
                or developing, links its future with the status of the child.
                Childhood holds the potential and also sets the limit to
                the future development of the society. Children are the
                greatest gift to humanity. Mankind has the best hold of
B
                itself. The parents themselves live for them. They
                embody the joy of life in them and in the innocence
                relieving the fatigue and drudge!)' in their struggle of
                daily life. Parents regain peace and happiness in the
                company of the children. The children signify eternal
c               optimism in the human being and always provide the
                potential for human development. If the children are
                better equipped with a broader human output, the society
                will feel happy with them. Neglecting the children means
                 loss to the society as a whole. If children are deprived
                of their childhood- socially, economically, physically
D
                and mentally- the nation gets deprived of the potential
                human resources for social progress, economic
                empowerment and peace and order, the social stability
                and good citizenry. The Founding Fathers of the
                Constitution, therefore, have emphasised the importance
 E              of the role of the child and the need of its be.st
                 development."
            12. Same sentiments were earlier expressed in Rosy Jacob
            v. Jacob A. Clwkramakkal ·'in the following words:
                "15 ... .The children are not mere chattels: nor are they
 F              mere play-things for their parents. Absolute right of
                parents over the destinies and the Jives of their children
                has, in the modern changed social conditions, yielded to
                the considerations of their welfare as human beings so
                that they may grow up in a normal balanced manner to
 G              be useful members of the society..."
            13. It hardly needs to be emphasised that a proper education
            encompassing skill development, recreation and cultural
            activities has a positive impact on the child. The children
            are the most important human resources whose development
 H    ' ( 1973) 1 sec s40
    JITENDER ARORA & ORS. v. SUKRITI ARORA & ORS.                           719
                   fA. K. SIKRI, J.l

      has a direct impact on the development of the nation, for             A
      the child of today with suitable health, sound education and
      constructive environment is the productive key member of
      the society. The present of the child links to the future 0f
      the nation, and while the children are the treasures of their
      parents, they are the assets who will be responsible for
                                                                            B
      governing the natiQn. The tools of education, environment,
      skill and health shape the child thereby moulding the nation
      with the child equipped to play his part in the different
      spheres aiding the public and contributing to economic
      progression. The growth and advancem.ent of the child with
      the personal interest is accompanied by a significant public.          c
      interest, which arises because of the crucial role they play
      in nation building."
       11. In the case of Vivek Singh, the girl was 8 years ofage. There
also, the child had remained with father for most of the period. It was
decided to give the custody to the mother. Among others, two weighty         D
reasons which prevailed with this Court were the age of the child, i.e. 8
years, and that during this period, custody had remained with the father
because of no fault of the mother. This is clear from the following
discussion in the said judgment:
      "14. In the instant case, the factors which weigh in favour
      of the appellant are that child Saesha is living with him from         E
      tender age of21 monfhs. She is happy in his company. In
      fact, her desire is to continue to live with the appellant.
      Normally, these considerations would have prevailed upon
      us to hold that custody ofSaesha remain with the appellant.
      However, that is only one side of the picture. We cannot,              F
      at the same time, ignore the other side. A glimpse, nay, a
      proper glance at the other side is equally significant. From
      the events that took place and noted above, following
      overwhelming factors in favour of respondent emerge.
      (a) For first 21 months when the parties were living together,
                                                                             G
      it is the respondent who had nursed the child. The appellant
      cannot even claim to have an edge over the respondent
      during this period, when the child was still an infant, who
      would have naturally remained in the care and protection
      of the respondent - mother, more than the appellant-father.
      Finding to this effect has been arrived at by the High Court           H
720      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] I S.C.R.



A     as well. This position even otherwise cannot be disputed.
      (b) The respondent was forcibly deprived by the custody
      of Saesha from August 04, 20 I 0 when she was forced to
      leave the matrimonial house. As per the respondent, on that
      date the appellant in a drunken state gave beatings to her
B     and threw her out of the house. The respondent had called
      the police. The police personnel called the military police
      and a complaint was lodged. The.respondent had also called
      her parents who had come to.her house from NOIDA. Her
      parents took hold of the child and the appellant and when
      they were about to leave, the appellant pulled out the child
c     from the hands of her mother and went inside the hou;e
      and locked himself. He was drunk at th~t time. The police
      suggested not to do anything otherwise appellant would harm ·
      the child. It was assured that the child would be retunied
      to her in the morning. In any case, the respondent and the
D                                        to
      appellant were instructed to come t11e pdli~e afong with
      the child, next morning. The appellant did not bring t_he
      child and threatened that he would not give the child to her.
      Since then, she had been running from pillar to post to get
      the child back but respondent had been refusing.
           The respondent, therefore, cannot be blamed at all, if
E     the custody of the child remained with the appellant, after
      the separation of the parties.
      (c) Within the few days, i.e. on August 26, 2010, the
      respondent filed the petition seeking custody of the child
      and for appointment of her guardian. She did not lose any
 F    time making her intentions clear that as a natural mother
      she wanted to have the custody of the child. It was her
      mis-fortune that the trial court vide its judgment dated
      December 07, 2011 dismissed her petition. Though, she
      filed the appeal against the said judgment immediately, but
      during the pendency of the appeal, the custody remained.
G
      with the appellant because of the dismissal of the petition
      by the Family Court. The High Court has, by impugned
      judgment dated April 02, 2013 granted the custody to the
      respondent. However, the respoiltlent has not been able to
      reap the benefit thereof because of the interim orders passed
H
    JITENDER ARORA & ORS. v. SUKRITI ARORA & ORS.                               721
                   fA. K. SIKRI, J.l

      in the instant appeal. It is in these circumstances that child             A
      Saesha from the tender age of 21 months has remained
      with the appellant and today she is 8 years and 3 months.
      Obviously, because of this reason, as of today, she is very
      much attached to the father and she thinks that she should
      remain in the present envirorni1ent. A child, who has not
                                                                                 B
      seen, experienced or lived the comfort of the company of
      the mother is, naturally, not in a position to comprehend that
      the grass on the other side may turn out to be greener.
      Only when she is exposed to that environment ofliving with
      her mother, that she would be in a posiiionto properly
      evaluate as to whether her welfare lies more in the company                c
      of her mother or in the company of her father. As of today,
      the assessment and perception are one sided. Few years
      ago, when the High Court passed the impugned judgment,
      the ground realities were different.
                 xxx                xxx               xxx
                                                                                 D
       16. The aforesaid observations, contained in para 31 of the
      order of the High Court extracted above, apply with greater
      force today, when Saesha is 8 years' old child. She is at a
      crucial phase when there is a major shift in thinking ability
      which may help her to understand cause and effect better
      and think about the future. She would need regular and                     E
      frequent contact with each parent as well as shielding from
      parental hostility. Involvement of both parents in her life
      and regular school attendance are absolutely essential .at
      this age for her personality development. She would soon
      be able to establishJ1er individual inte.rests and preferences,            F
       shaped by her own individual personality as well as
         -   .
       experience  ...'"
        12. The circumstances, in the present case, however, are materially
different. Vaishali is a mature girl of 15 years bf age. At this age, she
can fully understand what is in her best interest. She is com!Jetent to
take a deci§ion for herself: There has been interaction with her by different    G
Benches of this Court from time to time, outcome whereof is reflected
in the orders passed after such meetings. She has unequivocally and
without any reservations expressed her desire to be with her father.
More importantly, she has very categorically said that she does not want
t9 go to U.K.                                                                    H
              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           (20 I 7] I S.C.R.



A          13. On 31.01.2013, this Court had noted that when her mother
    came to India, she was not even willing to meet her. However, with the
    intervention of the Court, a meeting was arranged between Yaishali and
    her mother. Even after the said meeting, she was not willing to live with
    the respondent, her mother. Fully realising that it may be due to the
    reason that all this period, she had Jived with her father. the Court deemed
B
    it proper to give opportunity to the respondent to win lo,e, confidence
    and trust of Vaishali. The mother was allowed to stay for one month
    with Vaishali. This order was continued on 02.04.20 I 3 by extending the
    period by another month. This time the arrangement that was made
    was to be monitored by Mrs. Sadhana Ramachandran who was appointed
c   for this purpose. Specific job given to Mrs. Sadhana Ramachandran
    was to see how the relationship between the child and the mother is
    developing. In case ofneed she was to counsel both the child as well as
    the mother. Thus, an opportunity was given to the respondent by allowing
    her the access of Vaishali for significant period i.e. till 01.05.2013,
    where after the child was restored back to her father, since the respondent
D
    had decided to go back to U.K. It is unfortunate that even during this
    period, she was not able to influence the thought process of Yaishali
    who is determined to remain with her father.
           14. In fact, during the course of arguments before us, when the
    respondent was also present, we asked the respondent as to whether
E   she could shift to India, even temporarily for a year or so, as in that
    eventuality, the Court can consider giving custody of Vaishali to her for
    that period. However, she expressed her inability to do so. She wants
    custody of Yaishali on her own terms. She wants Yaishali to come to
    U.K. and live with her. Vaishali does not want to go to U.K. at all. This
F   Court cannot take the risk of sending Vaishali to a foreign country, against
    the wishes of a mature girl like Vaishali, as it may prove to be a turbulent
    and tormenting experience for her. That would not be in her interest.
           I 5. We also had interaction with Vaishali in the Chambers earlier.
    On the date of hearing also, Yaishali ~as present in the Court and in
    front of her parents, she unequivocally expressed that she was happy
G
    with her father and wanted to continue in his company and did not want
    to go with her mother, much less to U.K. From the interaction, it is
    clearly discernible that she is a mature girl who is in a position to weigh
    the pros and cons of two alternatives and to decide as to which course
    of action is more suited to her. She has developed her personali~ and
H   formed her opinion after considering all the attendant circumstances.
     JITENDER ARORA & ORS. v. SUKRITI ARORA & ORS.                             723
                    [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

Her intellectual characteristics are adequately developed. She is able to       A
solve problems, think about her future and understands the long term
effects of the decision which she has taken. We also find tha• she has
been brought up in a conducive atmosphere. It, thus, becomes apparent
that in the instant case, we are dealing with the custody ofa child who is
15 years of age and has achieved sufficient level of maturity. Fu1iher. in
                                                                               B
spite of giving ample chances to the respondent by giving temporary
custody ofYaishali to her, respondent has not been able to win over the
confidence ofVaishali. We, therefore, feel that her welfare lies in the
continued company of her father which appears to be in her best imcrest.
       16. The High Court in the impugned judgment had stated that
since Yaishali was a minor girl, she needed company of her mother               c
more to understand girly things. The High Court mentioned about the
bond between girl child and mother in abstract and from there only the
High Court came to the conclusion that it would be better to give the
custody to the mother. The High Court did not go into the specific
situation and circumstances of this case and did not make any ubjective         D
assessment about the welfare of Vaishali. Many circumstances which
we have narrated above were not taken note of.
       17. On the facts of the present case, we are convinced that custody
of the child needs to be with father. She is already 15 years of age and
within 3 years, she would be major and all this custody battle between          E
her parents would come to an end. She would have complete freedom
to decide the course of action she would like to adopt in her life. We,
thus, allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court.
        No costs.
                                                                                F
N.idhi Jain                                                  Appeal allowed.


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