Holding

The expression "for his own use" under Section 13(3)(a)(ii) must be given a wide, liberal meaning that includes the bona‑fide requirement of a family member or dependent, such as the landlord’s son, and therefore the eviction is justified.

Summary

The landlord, Joginder Pal, filed an eviction petition under Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, claiming the premises were needed for the office of his chartered‑accountant son. The tenant, Naval Kishore Behal, occupied the premises for non‑residential purposes and contested the eviction, arguing that "his own use" should be limited to the landlord’s personal occupation. The Supreme Court examined the statutory language and held that the phrase must be given a liberal, wide meaning that includes the legitimate requirements of a family member or dependent. Relying on a host of rent‑control precedents, the Court formulated tests to determine when a third‑party’s use can be treated as the landlord’s own use. Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the son’s office qualified as the landlord’s own use and dismissed the appeal, ordering the tenant to vacate. The decision underscores a balanced approach to statutory interpretation in rent‑control matters, protecting both tenant rights and genuine landlord needs.

Issues considered

The proper construction of the phrase "for his own use" in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.
Whether the requirement of the landlord's son, a chartered accountant, falls within the meaning of "his own use" for eviction purposes.
The appropriate interpretative methodology for rent‑control statutes when the language is ambiguous.

Legislation cited

Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947s. 13(1)(g)
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 14(1)(e)
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949s. 13(3)(a)(ii)
Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961s. 21(1)(h)
Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960s. 10(3)(c)
Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972s. 21(1)(h)

Subjects

rent controlevictionstatutory interpretationown uselandlord requirementfamily memberEast Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Actlandlord‑tenant law

Judgment

I
~

A JOGINDER PAL
.... ~
v.
NA VAL KISHORE BEHAL

MAY 10, 2002

B [R.C. LAHOTI AND B.N. AGRAWAL, JJ.]

Rent Control and Eviction :
~·

East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949: Section ! 3(3)(a)(ii)-Ground of .....
c eviction-Bonafide requirement of landlord on the ground of "own use"-
Interpretation of-Held, Courts have to adopt a reasonable and balanced
approach based on the assumption that legislatures intended equal treatment
to be meted out to both the parties, viz. Landlord and tenants-It must be
assigned a wider, liberal and practical, meaning and includes the requirement
of the member of the family/person to whom the landlord is dependent or who
D is dependent on landlord.

Statutory Interpretation:
.,...

When an expression not defined by the Legislature, Courts could give
colour and content to the expression based on the subject of legislation and
E the context in which a word or expression is employed. r-

Landlord-Respondent filed an· eviction petition under Section
13(3)(a)(ii) of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act on the ground of
bonafide requirement for the office of his son, who was a Chartered
Accountant residing with him. Tenant-Appellant was in occupation of
F ~
the suit premises for non-residential purpose. Rent Controller dismissed
"'
the petition. Appellate Authority allowed the appeal of the landlord.
Aggrieved, tenant preferred a revision petition which was rejected by the .....
High· Court. Hence this appeal.

G The Court issued notice limited to the question whether the
requirement of the landlord'.s son would fall within the phrase 'his own
use' under Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act.

It was contended for the appellant that the language of the provision JC

is plain and simple and not doubtful, and so the expression "his own use"
H 1078
,.,
I

JOG IN DER PAL v. NAVAL KISHDRE BEHAL 1079
should be interpreted literally according to the settled principles of A
interpretation.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: I. Legislature is fair both to the tenants and the landlords.
Courts have to adopt a reasonable and balanced approach while B
interpreting Rent Control Legislations starting with an assun1ption that
an equal treatment has been meted out to both the s~ctions of the Society.
In spite of the overall balance tilting in favour of the tenants, while
interpreting such of the provisions to take care of the· interest of landlord,
Court should not hesitate in leaning in favour of the landlords. Such
provisions arc en grafted in rent control legislations to take care of thos e
1
c
situations where the landlord too is weak, feeble and feel humble.
11085-G, H; 1086-A, B\

Prabhakaran Nair and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., 1198714
SCC 238; Malpe Vishwanath Acaharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra D
and Anr., 1199812 SCC 1; Arjun Khiamal Makhijani v. .lamnadas C Tu/iani
and Ors., 119891 4 SCC 612; Mst. Bega Begum and Ors .. v. Abdul Ahad
Khan (dead) by lrs. and Ors., 119791 1 SCC 273 and Shiv Sarup Gupta v.
Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, 119991 6 SCC 222, relied on.

2.1. The judicial opinion leans entirely in favour of assigning the E
expression 'his own' requirement of the landlord a liberal, wide and
useful-even an extended-meaning as that would advance the purpose of
enacting the provision, discarding a narrow interpretation. The expression
"for his own use" as occurring in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act cannot
be narrowly construed. The expression must be assigned a wider, liberal
and practical meaning. The requirement is not only the requirement of F
the landlord alone in the sense that the landlord must for himself require
the accommodation and to fulfil the requirement he must himself
physically occupy the premises but also the requirement of a member of
the family or of a person on whom the landlord is dependent or who is
dependent on the landlord, could be considered to be the requirement of G
the landlord for his own use. 11092-A, B, Cl

2.2. In several decisions the pari materia provisions were interpreted
so as to include the requirement of the wife, husband, sister,' children
including son, daughter, a widowed daughter and her son, nephew,
coparceners, members of. family and dependents and kith and kin, the H
I
..A.

1080 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A requirement of landlord as "his" or "his own" requirement and user.
Keeping in view the social or socio-religious milieu and practices prevalent
in a particular section of society or a particular region, to which the
landlord belongs, it may be an obligation of the landlord to settle a
person closely connected with him to make him economically independent
B so as to support himself and/or the landlord. To discharge such obligation
the landlord may require the tenancy premises and such requirement
would be the requirement of the landlord. If the requirement is of actual
user of the premises by a person other than the landlord himself the
Court shall with circumspection inquire: (i) whether the requirement of .
such person can be considered to be the requirement of the landlord, and
C (ii) whether there is a close inter-relation or identity nexus between such
person and the landlord so as to satisfy the requirement of the first
query. [l 092-C, D, E, Fl

Mst. Bega Begum and Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by lrs. and
Ors., [1979[ l SCC 273, relied on
D
B. Balaiah v. Chandoor lachaih, AIR (1965) Andhra Pradesh 435;
V.M Deshmukh v. KM Kothari and Ors., (1951) N.L.J. 250; Balabhadra
Beharilal v. Premchand lalchand and Ors., AIR (1953) Nagpur 144; Nand
Rani v. Additional District Judge, Moradabad and Anr., AIR (1980)
Allahabad 148; Nana/al Goverdhandas & Co. and Ors. ·v. Smt. Samratbai
E lilachand Shah, AIR(1981) Born. I; Institute of Radio Technology and Ors.
v. Pandurang Baburao, AIR (1946) Bombay 212; Bidhubhusan Sen v.
Commissioner, Patna Division, Patna and Anr., ( 1955) BLJR 654; Puspa
lata Debi v. Di~ Chandra Das, 85 C.L.J. 74; K. Govindarajulu v.
Savithramma, (1969) 2 RCJ 107; Dr. Syed Sibgathullah v. CM Abdul Aziz
E Khan, (1983) 1 RCJ 516; R. V. Dharmalinga Mudaliar v. K. Annamalai,
(1982) 1 RCJ 699; Smt. Krishna Devi v. Smt. Parmeshwari Devi, (1977) 2
RCJ 529 and J.l. Mehta v. Smt. Hira Devi, (1970) DLT 484, approved.

Ravindra Kumar Pujara v. Gian Chand, AIR (1987) Punjab &
Haryana 31, overruled.
F
3.1. It is true that ordinary rule of construction is to assign the
word a meaning which it ordinarily carries. But the subject of legislation
and t_he context in which a word or expression is ·employed may require
a departure from the rule of literal construction. [1093-F[

G Onkar Nath v. Ve.d Vyas, (1980) 4 SCC 270, held inapplicable.
$

JOGINDER PAL v. NAVAL KISHORE BEHAL 1081

Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, referred to. A
3.2. In providing key to the meaning of any word or expression the
context in which it is set has significance. Colour and content emanating
from context may permit sense being preferred to mere meaning depending
on what is sought to be achieved and what is sought to be prevented by
the legislative scheme surrounding the expression. Requirement of B
landlord for his own use, is an expression capable of attributing an
intention to the legislature that what was intended to be fulfilled is such
requirement as would persuade the landlord to have the premises vacated
by the tenant, to forego the rental income, and to put the premises to
such use as the landl!lrd would deem to be his own use and in the given C
facts and circumstances of a case the Court too would hold it to be so in
contradistinction >Yith a mere ruse to evict the tenant. The legislature
intending to protect the tenant also intends to lift the protection when it
is the requirement of landlord to put the accommodation to such use as
· he intends, away from leasing it out. ( 1095-E, F, G, H(
D
3.3. Purpose of the Act is to restrict increase of rent and the eviction
.. ' of tenants in urban areas. Still the Legislature has taken care to provide
grounds for eviction, one of them being the requirement of the landlord.
The concept of requirement need to be meaningfully construed, otherwise
the provision may suffer from the risk of being branded as unreasonable,
arbitrary or as placing uncalled for and unreasonable restrictions on the E
right of the owner to hold and use his property. A construction on the
expression "for his own use" could not be placed in such a way as to deny
the landlord a right to evict his tenant when he needs the accommodation
for his own son to settle himself well in his life. Court has to give colour
and content to the expression and provide the skin of a living thought to F
the skeleton of the words which the Legislature has not itself chosen to
define. The Indian Society, its customs and requirements and the context
where the provision is set in the legislation are the guides leading to
acceptance of the meaning to be assigned to the words 'for his own use'
in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act (1095-H; 1096-A, B, CJ
G
Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kera/a, (1973( 4 SCC 225, 316 and
Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatla/ Sheth and Anr., 11977( 4 SCC 193,
referred to.

Bidie v. General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance C01poration, (1948(
2 All ER 995, 998, referred to, H
I
~

1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A The Interpretation of Statutes (Twelfth Edition) by Maxwell, referred
to.

4. The phrase 'for his own use' as occurring in Section 13(3)(a)(ii)
of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 must receive a
wide, liberal and useful meaning rather than a strict or narrow
B construction. The expression - landlord requires for 'his own use' - is not
confined in its meaning to actual physical user by the landlord personally.
The requirement not only of the landlord himself but also of the normal,
'emanations' of the landlord is included therein. In order to ascertain the ~
requirement of the landlord and landlord's own occupation or user would
C depend on t.he nature and degree of relationship and/or dependence
between the landlord pleading the requirement as 'his own' and the
person who would actually use the premises, the circumstances in which
the claim arises and is put forward, and the intrinsic tenability of the
claim. Court on being satisfied of the reasonability and genuineness of
claim, as distinguished from a mere ruse to get rid of the tenant, would
D uphold the landlord's claim. While casting its judicial verdict, Court
shall adopt a practical and meaningful approach guided by the realities
of life. In the present case, the requirement of landlord of the suit premises
for user as office of his Chartered Accountant son is the requirement of·
landford· 'for his own use' within the meaning of Sectio~ 13(3)(a)(ii).
11092-B-C-E-Fl
E
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3494
of 2002.

From the Judgment and Order dated 30.5.200 I of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in C.R. No. 2976 of 200 I.
F
S.B. 'Upadhyay for the Appellant.

Sudhir Chandra, Jasbir Malik for S.K. Sabbarwal for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
R.C. LAHOTI, J. Leave granted.

An eviction petition filed by the landlord-respondent urging the ground
for eviction under Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter the Act, for short), was dismissed by the
H Rent Controller but allowed by the Appellate Authority. The decree has been
JOG IN DER PAL v. NAVAL KISHORE BEHAL [R.C. LAl-IOTI. J.)1083

1naintained in civil revision preferred by the tenant in the High Court of A
Punjab & Haryana. The tenant has filed this appeal by special leave.

The finding of fact arrived at, and irn1nune fro1n challenge before this
Court, is that the suit premises situated on the ground floor of the building
owned by the landlord-respondent is in occupation of the tenant-appellant for
non-residential purpose. The same is required by the landlord-respondent for B
the office of his son who is a chartered accountant residing with the landlord-
respondent. On 31.8.200 I Shri S.P. Upadhyay, the learned counsel for the
appellant placed forceful reliance on a Division Bench decision of the High
Court in Ravinder Kumar Pujara v. Gian Chand AIR ( 1987) Punjab & Haryana
31 and successfully persuaded this Court to issue notice limited to the question ·C
whether the require1nent of chartered accountant son of the landlord is relevant
to direct eviction of the tenant under Section l 3(3)(a)(ii) abovesaid. The
provision reads as under :-

13. Eviction of tenants. (I) xxx xxx

(2) xxx xxx xxxx
D

. ' (3) (a)A landlord may ·apply to the Controller for an order directing
the tenant to put the landlord in possession xxx xxx xxxx

(ii) in the case of a non-residential building or rented land, if
E
(a) he requires it for his own use;

Incidentally, it may be mentioned that the East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1956, by Section 2 thereof deleted the words
"a non-residential building or" fro1n the abovesaid provision. However, this
amend1nent \Vas held ultra vires the Constitution in Harbilas Rai Bansal v. F
State of Punjab and Anr., [ 1996] I SCC I, and this Court directed that as a
consequence of the a1nendn1ent having been declared constitutionally invalid
the original provision of the Act as was operating before the Amendment
stands restored and a landlord under the Act can seek eviction of a tenant
from a non-residential building on the ground that he requires it for his own G
use. Presently, the question to be determined is - what construction should be
placed on the phrase 'his own use'? Should it be assigned a narrow meaning
that it is the individual requirement of the landlord or in other words the
requirement of the landlord and the landlord alone which is germane to the
provision or should \Ve assign a wide and liberal n1eaning to the expression
treating it a vibrant one so as to respect the context in which it has been used H
1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A feeling the pulse of the object behind the provision.

It will be useful to state the principles relevant for interpretation of a
provision contained in a Rent Control Law like the one with which we are
dealing. The spurt of provincial rent control legislations is a necessary
consequence of population explosion. In Prabhakaran Nair and Ors. v. State
B of Tamil Nadu and Ors .. [1987] 4 SCC 238, the Court noticed craving for a
home - a natural human instinct, intensified by post-war migration of human-
beings en block place to place, the partition of the country and uprooting of
the people.from their hearth and home as vital factors leading to acute housing
shortage persuading the Legislatures to act and enact Rent Control Laws. The
C Court emphasized the need of making the landlord ~nd tenant laws rational,
humane, certain and capable of being quickly implemented. Benefit of society
at large needs an equalistic balance being maintained between apparently
conflicting interests of the owners of the property and the tenant by inducing
and encouraging the landlords to part with ·available accommodation for
reaso_nable length of time to accommodate tenants without unreasonably
D restricting their right to have the property being restored to them, more so,
when they genuinely require it. Such limited safeguarding of landlords' interest
ensure.s a boost t@ construction activity which in tum results in availability
of more houses to accommodate more human souls with roof on their heads.
Sabyasachi Mukharji, J., as His Lordship then was, articulated the empty
truism in such words as have become an oft quoted quotation "tenants are in
E all cases not the weaker sections. There are those who are weak both among
the landlords as well as the tenants".

In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and
Anr., [1998] 2 SCC I this Court emphasized the need of social legislations
like the Rent Control Act striking a balance between rival interests so as to
F- be just to taw. "The law ought not to be unjust to one and give a
disproportionate benefit or protection to another section of the society". While
the shortage of accommodation makes it necessary to protect the tenants to
save them from exploitation but at the same time the need to protect tenants
is coupled with an obligation to ensure that the tenants are not conferred _with
G a benefit disproportionately larger than the one needed. Socially progressive
legislation must have a holistic perception and not a short-sighted parochial
approach. Power to legislate socially progressive legislations is coupled with
a responsibility to avoid arbitrariness and unreasonability. A legislation
impregnated with tendency to give undue preference to one section, at the
cost of constraints by placing shackles on the other section, not only entails
H miscarriage\()f justice but may also result in constitutional invalidity.
I
~

JOGINDER PAL v. NAVAL KISHORE BEHAL [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] I 085

In Arjun Khiamal Makhijani v. Jamnadas C. Tuliani and Ors., (1989] A
4 SCC 612, this Court dealing with Rent Control Legislation observed that
provisions contained in such legislations are capable of being categorized
into two : those beneficial to the tenants and those beneficial to the landlord.
As to a legislative provision beneficial to landlord, an assertion that even
with regard to such provision an effort should be made to interpret it in
favour of the tenant, is a negation of the very principle of interpretation of B
a be'neficial legislation.

The need for reasonable interpretation of Rent Control Legislations was
emphasized by this Court in Mst. Bega Begum and Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan
(dead) by Lrs. and Ors., [1979] I SCC 273. Speaking in the context of C
reasonable requirement of landlord as a ground for eviction the Court guarded
against any artificial extension entailing stretching or straining of language
so as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a
decree for eviction. The Court warned that such a course would defeat the
very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant
to the landlord on certain specified grounds. In Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti, D
[1980] I SCC 290 this Court has observed, while the rent control legislation
has given a number of facilities to the tenants it should not be construed so
as to destroy the limited relief which it seeks to give to the landlord also. For
instance one of the grounds for eviction which is contained in almost all the
Rent Control Acts in the country is the question of landlord's bona fide E
personal necessity. The concept of bona fide necessity should be meaningfully
construed so as to make the relief granted to the landlord real and practical.
Recently in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999] 6 SCC
222, the Court has held that the concept of bona fide need or genuine
requirement needs a practical approach instructed by realities of life. An

- approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded F
against.

The Rent Control Legislations are heavily loaded in favour of the tenants
treating them as weaker sections of the society requiring legislative protection
against exploitation and unscrupulous devices of greedy landlords. The
Legislative intent has to be respected by the Courts while interpreting the G
laws. But it is being uncharitable to Legislatures if they are attributed with
an intention that they lean only in favour of the tenants and while being fair
to the tenants go to the extent of being unfair to the landlords .. The Legislature
!- is fair to the tenants and to the landlords both. The Courts have to adopt a
reasonable and balanced approach while interpreting Rent Control Legislations H

,
/

1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A starting with an assumption that an equal treatment has been meted out to
both the sections of the society. In spite of the overall baiance tilting in -"'- ...._
favour of the tenants, while interpreting such of the provisions as take care
of the interest of landlord the Court should not hesitate in leaning in favour
of the landlords. Such provisions are engrafted in rent control legislations to
take care of those situations where the landlord too are week and feeble and
B feel humble.

Both the learned counsel for the parties submitted that so far as the
expression 'his own use" as occurring in Section l 3(3)(a)(ii)(a) is concerned
no occasion has hitherto before arisen enabling this Court making an
C authoritative interpretation and pronouncement. The nearest available decision
is Mst. Bega Begum and Ors. (supra) which has been referred to by the High
Court in its impugned judgment and was relied on by Shri Sudhir Chandra,
the learned senior counsel for the landlord-respondent. Section I l(l)(h) of J
& K Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966 provides for the tenant being
evicted if the landlord requires the house for 'his own occupation'. The Court
D held that the provision is meant for the benefit of the landlord and therefore
it must be so construed as to advance the object of the Act. The word "own
occupation" contemplates the actual possession of the landlord whether for
)I "
his own residence or for his business. Furthermore, the provision is wide -
enough to include the necessity of not only the landlord but also of the
E persons who are living with him as members of the same family. The words
'"own occupation" cannot be so narrowly interpreted as to indicate actuai
physical possession of the landlord personally and nothing more than that.

We may refer to a few decided cases of different High Courts wherein
pari materia provisions contained in different legislations were considered by
F different High Courts.

In B. Balaiah v. Chandoor Lachaiah, AIR ( 1965) Andhra Pradesh 435,
Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and
Eviction) Control Act, 1960 came up for consideration of the Division Bench.
The landlord cou Id seek a direction for recovery of possession of the building
G "for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on" or which "the landlord
bona fide proposes to commence". The Division Bench made a review of the
decisions delivered by different High Courts under local Rent Control
Legislations and held that these expressions are not necessarily confined to
the physical requirement of the landlord himself. Such expression ought to be ~
H construed liberally and not in a narrow way. They are susceptible to a wide
JOG IN DER PAL v. NA VAL Kl SHORE BEHAL [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 1087

~
~ meaning and include within the meaning of"own" not only the members of A
the landlord's family but also those persons who are socially or economically
dependent on him and whose responsibilities he has accepted. This is based
on the necessity of realizing that the family in India, whether joint or separate,
is the social unit of Indian civilization and it is of greater public importance
to keep it together. The Division Bench concluded by holding that the
expression ''landlord" or "his"' 111ust include all norn1al e1nanations of the
B
landlord so as to include his wife and children though on a strict construction
of the expression they may not be available to be included within "landlord
' hi1nself'. The require1nent of a 111ajor son and a coparcener in a joint Hindu
family intending to start a business was deemed to be the requirement of
landlord himself. This decision was cited with approval in Mst. Bega Begum c
and Ors. 's case (supra).

Sub-Clause (vi) of Clause 13 of C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and
Rent Control Order, 1949 provides one ground for eviction as 'that the landlord
needs the hou~e or a portion thereof for the purpose of his bona fide
occupation'. In V.M Deshmukh v. K.M Kothari and Ors.. (1951) N.L.J. 250, D
.... the Division Bench quoted from Smith v. Penny - ( 1946) 2 All England
Reports 672 - "the family is the unit of our civilization. To keep the family
together is of high public importance" and held that the word "his" must be
interpreted so as to include the family and not in a narrow way and in the
context of business the words - "his own" of the landlord - should be defined E
as m!laning something in which the landlord or his family have pecuniary
interest. The need of the landlord's wife who was a medical practitioner
wanting to run a maternity home was held covered by clause I 3(3)(vi)
abovesaid. On the same principle, in Balabhadra Beharilal v. Premchand
lalchand and Ors., AIR (1953) Nagpur 144, the need of a widowed daughter
... and her children was held to be 'his own' need of the landlord. The Division F
Bench obsefved that no doubt after marriage the daughter passes out of the
father's family and goes into that of the husband but marriage does not sever
the blood relationship which exists between a father and his daughter. The
existence of this relationship does give rise to certain moral obligations and
in pursuance thereof where a father affords support to his daughter and her
G
children, their needs become his needs. It was held that the phraseology
employed by the Legislature could not restrict a landlord's needs to his
personal needs and would include not only the members of the landlord's
, family but also of all those persons who are dependent on him an·d whose
responsibilities he has adopted.
H
1088 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) 3 S.C. R.

A Section 21 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and _,I ..A-
Eviction) Act, 1972 provides for the accommodation being released if bona
fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or members of his
family or for any person for whose benefit it is held by him. In Nand Rani
v. Additional District Judge, Moradabad and Anr., AIR (1980) Allahabad
148, the need was for setting up daughter's son in business. The daughter's
B son was not a member of the family nor the accommodation could be said
to be held for his benefit. The Court held that the provisions of the Act
cannot be read so as to put an end to the ties of affection, friendship, kinship -f
or sheer necessity. In appropriate circumstances the landlord may be.so much
concerned with· and interested in the requirement of or for another person,
c who is not a member of his family as defined in Section 3(g), that the
requirement may be properly regarded as the landlord's own requirement
depending on the extent of landlord's identification with the person concerned
to be determined on the evidence and circumstances of the particular case.

Section l3(1)(g) of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging HC?use Rates
D Control Act, 1947 entitles a landlord to recover possession of any premises
on the Court being satisfied that "the premises are reasonably and bona fide j.
__,,.
required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person for
whose benefit the premises are held". In Nana/al Goverdhandas & Co. and
Ors. v. Smt. Samratbai li/achand Shah, AIR (1981) Born I, the High Court
construed the import of words "by himself' and held that "for occupation by
E
himself' do not restrict the proposed occupation to the occupation of landlord
alone but may include the occupation by member of his family. The
requirement of the landlord for occupation by the dependent of the landlord

.
may be the requirement by the landlord. In a given case the landlord may be
dependent upon a person and it may be the necessity of the landlord that such
F other person should occupy the premises. If emotionally the landlord feels '--
that a relation of his such as daughter or son-in-law should stay with.him, it
can be regarded as the requirement by the landlord of the premises 'for ,,
occupation by himself. This is as regards residential premises. In case of
non-residential premises if the landlord's interests are shown to be linked
with the occupation of those prem.ises by some one for whom he is seeking
G the possession of the suit premises it can be said that the requirement of the
landlord for occupation by himself is established. The High Court also held
that if there is a moral or legal obligation of the landlord to provide
accommodation to a particular person then the requirement by the landlord
..,
for occupation of that person may squarely fall under Section 13(1)(g). Having ~

H taken into consideration the several precedents from different High Courts
'
JOGJNDER PAL v. NAVAL KISHORE 13EHAL [R.C. LAHOTL J.j 1089

the learned Judge held that the detern1inative test underlying the several A
propositions propounded by the High Courts is the basic fact that the
requirement is by the landlord and that there must be a nexus between the
interests of the landlord and the one who would physically occupy the premises
so as to tantamount to occupation of the premises "by himself', i.e., the
landlord. In Institute of Radio Technology and Ors. Vs. Pandurang Baburao B
AIR 1946 Bombay 212, Section 11 of Bombay Rent Restriction Act, 1939
was dealt with by the Division Bench and the words "his own occupation"
were held to include occupation by all persons who are dependent on the
landlord.

A Division Bench of Patna High Court has opined in Bidhubhusan Sen C
v. Commissioner, Patna Division, Patna and Anr., (1955) BLJR 654, that the
expression "his own occupation" as occurring in sub-Section (3)(a) of Section
11 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 does
not mean only the occupation of the landlord himself but includes the
occupation of other persons who live with the landlord and are economically
dependent on him. The requirement of nephew, who's maintenance was D
responsibility of the landlord was held to be covered by the expression 'his
own occupation' of the landlord.

In Puspa lata Debi v. Dinesh Chandra Das, 85 C.L.J. 74, P.B. Mukharji,
J. (as His Lordship then was) observed that the expression "for his own E
occupation" in Section 1 l(l)(t) of W.B. Premises Rent Control (Temporary
Provisions) Act, 1948 does not necessarily mean of the particular individual
alone but must be widely interpreted to include the family and dependents.
The context of social order, the habits and ideas of living and the religious
and socio-religious customs of the community to which the individual
,; concerned belongs are relevant determining factors. F

Section 21 (I )(h) of Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961 contemplates an
•
order of eviction being passed only if the premises are reasonably and bona
fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself. In K. Govindaraj11/u
v. Savithramma, (1969) 2 RCJ 107, the landlady required the tenancy premises, G
non-residential in nature, for her husband, a retired doctor, and her daughter,
who had resigned her job as a house surgeon, both of them wanting to run
a nursing ho1ne and a clinic in the tenancy premises. The husband and the
daughter were living together with the landlady. The Mysore High Court held
that the words "occupation by himself' should be understood to mean not
merely the landlord or the landlady but also the husband or the wife or the H
1090 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) 3 S.C.R.

A children or the other dependents. In the predecessor provision the requirement -*
of members of the landlord's family was also included but the same was
deleted. In the opinion of Mysc,re High Court that amendment did not make
any difference.

Similar provision is contained in Section 21 ( 1)(h) of Karnataka Rent
B Control Act, 1961. In Dr. Syed Sihgathullah v. C. M. Ahdul Aziz Khan, ( 1983)
1 RCJ 516, the Division Bench consisting of M.N. Venkatachaliah and M.
Rama Jois, JJ. (as their Lordships were then) cited with approval the decision
~
of Court of Appeal of England in Riches v. Wilson, 1963 (2) All England
Reports 336, in which Willmer, L.J. interpreting the expression 'himself'
used in paragraph (h) of Schedule-I to the English Rent and Mortgage Interest
c Restrictions (Amendment Act 1933) had held, "quite plainly the expression
"himself' must include all the normal 'emanations of himself', and concluded
to say, - "So, the test by the application of which I should decide this case
is whether it could be said that when the sister lives in the premises, the
landlord himself lives there through his sister. If he does the sisters occupation
D is the occupation of the landlord 'by himself and the household would then
be a common household. If that be the true position, the landlord should get
an order for possession." The Division Bench followed the Bombay and
.. ,• .

Mysore view (which we have already referred to) and held that the submission
that 'himself refers to landlord in person or his dependent who resides with
E him and not separated is too technical and artificial a construction which if
accepted would rob the provision of its real intention and purpose and it does
not merit acceptance. The Court proceeded to note a variety of circumstances
by reference to which the actual occupation of the premises by another has
to be regarded constructively as the occupation by the 'emanation' of the
landlord himself. "It is not possible to state exhaustively all the circumstances
F in which the physical occupation of a person other than the landlord would
have to be registered as occupation by the landlord himself. A few illustrations,
.. ......
however, would bring home the point. For instance, the occupation of the ...
premises by a person who is economically dependent on the landlord, the
occupation of the premises by a major son or daughter including a married
daughter whose residence in the premises is genuinely desired by the landlord,
G the occupation of the premises out of necessity by those who are kith and kin
of the landlord for the purpose of the Dr. (sick) education or medical treatment
as the case may be as genuinely desired by the landlord, would have to be
regarded as occupation by the landlord himself." The Division Bench however ,>,.

sounded a note of caution and clarified - "the Court should be circumspect
H in finding out as to whether having regard to the facts and circumstances of
JOGINDER PAL v. NAVAL K!SHORE BEHAL [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 1091

the case and the evidence adduced such occupation could be regarded as A
occupation by the landlord himself or was only a ruse to get an order of
eviction." The Court further observed that all the relevant factors and attendant
circumstances shall have to be taken into consideration besides (i) the degree
ofrelationship or dependence, (ii) the circumstances under which the landlord's
claim for the premises arises and put forward; (iii) the intrinsic tenability of
the claim having regard to the realities of life and the social mores and the B
like and shall have all to be put into the scales and go into the judicial
verdict

Section 10(3)(c) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control)
Act, 1960 provides for tenant placing the landlord in possession "if he requires C
additional accommodation for residential purpose or for purposes of a business
which he is carrying on". Consistent view of Madras High Court as noted in
RY. Dharmalinga Mudaliar v. K Annamalai, (1982) 1 RCJ 699, is that the
phraseology employed needs a wider interpretation and includes therein the
requirement of either himself or any other opportunity of his or her family
as such an approach stands to reason, justice, equity and good conscience. D
The requirement of the landlord's first wife's son working independently so
as to set up him and his family was held covered by the provision .
•
Two decisions by Delhi High Court though dealing with requirement
for residential purpose may yet be noted for their utility. Section 14{l)(e) of
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 contemplates the landlord requiring the suit E
premises bona fide 'for himself as a ground of eviction. In Smt. Krishna
Devi v. Smt. Parmeshwari Devi, (1977) 2 RCJ 529, the landlady required the
premises for the family of her married daughter to come and live with her as
she was unable to look after herself and thus the requirement which she
pleaded was for herself covered within the meaning of the word "himself'.

- It was held that the relationship was immaterial so long as the requirement
was a genuine one and was meant to serve the need of the landlady.
F

.. In JL Mehta v. Smt. Hira Devi, (1970) DL T 484, it was held that
assigning a restricted meaning to the word 'himself would lead to anomalous
and unreasonable results. The requirement of the sons of the landlady who
were married and earning for themselves was held to be included within the G
requirement of 'himself for the landlady.

The preceding reference to several decisions rendered by different High
Courts under different State Legislations is not intended by any means to be
an exhaustive survey of available case law. We have set out only by way of
illustrations the <:lecision on which we could lay our hands in the plethora of H
1092 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) 3 S.C.R.

A precedents to show the meaning assigned to the words "his own" generally
by the High Courts in the country dealing with different fact-situations. The
judicial opinion leans entirely in favour of assigning the expression 'his own'
requirement of the landlord a liberal, wide and useful-even an extended-
meaning as that would advance the purpose of enacting the provision,

B
discarding a narrow interpretation.

We are of the opinion that the expression 'for his own use' as occurring
in Section I 3(3)(a)(iii) of the Act cannot be narrowly construed. The expression
-
must be assigned a wider, liberal and practical meaning. The requirement is °"
not the requirement of the landlord alone in the sense that the landlord must
for himself require the accommodation and to fulfill the requirement he must
C himself physically occupy the premises. The requirement of a member of the
family or of a person on whom the landlord is dependent or who is dependent ·
on the landlord can be considered to be the requirement of the landlord for
his own use. In the several decided cases referred to hereinabove we have
found the pari materia provisions being interpreted so as to include the
D requirement of the wife, husband, sister, children including son, daughter, a
widowed daughter and her son, nephew, coparceners, members of family and
dependents and kith and kin in the requirement of landlord as "his" or "his _,
own" requirement and user. Keeping in view the social or socio-religious
milieu and practices prevalent in a particular section of society or a particular
region, to which the landlord belongs, it may be obligation of the landlord
E to settle a person closely connected with him to make him economically
independent so as to support himself and/or the landlord. To discharge such
obligation the landlord may require the tenancy premises and such requirement
would be the requirement of the landlord. If the requirement is of actual user
of the premises by a person other than the landlord himself the Court shall
F with circumspection inquire : (i) whether the requirement of such person can
be considered to be the requirement of the landlord, and (ii) whether there is
a close inter-relation or identity nexus between such person and the landlord
so as to satisfy the requirement of the first query. Applying the abovesaid
tests to· the facts of the present case it is clear that the tenancy premises are
required for the office of the landlord's son who is a chartered accountant.
G It is the moral obligation of the landlord to settle his son well in his life and
to contribute his best to see him economically independent. The landlord is
not going to let out the premises to his son and though the son would run his
office in the premises the possession would continue with the landlord and
in a sense the actual occupation by the son would be the occupation by the
landlord himself. It is the landlord who requires the premises for his son and
H
JOG IN DER PAL v. NAVAL Kl SHORE BEHAL [R.C. LAHOTI . .l.j I093
in substance the user would be by landlord for his son's office. The case A
squarely falls within the scope of Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act.

Rav;nder Ktanar Pujara's case (supra) relied on by the learned counsel
for the tenant-appellant which holds that setting up of independent business
of the son of the landlord is not covered by Section l 3(3)(a)(ii) of the Act
takes too narrow a vie\\' of the proyision; it does not lay do\vn the correct law B
• and is overruled.

Learned counsel for the appellant also invited our attention to Onkar
Nath v. Ved Vyas, (1980] 4 SCC 270, wherein Section 13(3)(a)(i) of this very
Act, which is a provision dealing with requirement of a residential building
for own occupation by the landlord, came up for the consideration of this C
Court. The Court was not called up to interpret the expression 'his own
occupation'. There were inadequacies of pleadings and total absence of proof
as to non-availability of other residential building and as to non-vacating of
any building without sufficient cause by the landlord after the commencement
of the Act. As the landlord failed to allege and prove the latter two out of the D
three requirements of the provision this Court held the landlord not entitled
to any relief and in that context observed that the Statute beneficially designed
to protect tenants fro1n unreasonable evictions has taken car~ to put restrictions
which must be rigorously constructed to fulfil the purpose of the Statute. The
case has no applicability and relevance for resolving the issue arising for our
consideration in the present case and observation made by the Court cannot E
be read divorced from the context.

The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the language of the
provision is plain and simple, not doubtful, and hence the expression 'his
own use' should be interpreted literally according to well settled canon of
interpretation. It is true that ordinary rule of construction is to assign the F
word a meaning which it ordinarily carries. But the subject of legislation and
the context in which a word or expression is employed may require a departure
from the rule of literal construction. The following passage from Statutory
Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh (Eighth Edition, 2001, at pp.81-82) is an
appropriate guide to the case at hand : G
"No word", says Professor H.A. Smith "has an absolute meaning,
for no words can be defined in vacuo, or without reference to some
context". According to Sutherland there is a "basic fallacy" in saying
"that words have meaning in and of th~mselves", and "reference to
the ab'itract 1neaning of words", states Craies, ''if there be any such H
1094 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) 3 S.C.R.

A thing, is of little value in interpreting statutes" ........ .in detennining
the meaning of any word or phrase in a statute the first question to
be asked is ''what is the natural or ordinary meaning of that word or
phrase in its context in the statute? It is only when that meaning leads
to some result which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the
intention of the Legislature, that it is proper to look for some other
B possible meaning of the word or phrase". The context, as already ..
seen, in the construction of statutes, means the statute as a whole, the
previous state of the law, other statutes in para materia the general
scope of the statute and the mischief that was intended to remedy."

C Words cannot be construed in vacuo. Jn Bidie v. General Accident,
Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, ( 1948) 2 All ER 995, 998, Lord Greene
observed" The first thing one has to do, I venture to think, in construing
words in a Section of an Act of Parliament is not to take those words in
vacuo so to speak, and attribute to them what is sometimes called their
natural or ordinary meaning. Few words in the English language have a
D natural or ordinary meaning in the sense that they must be so read that their
meaning is entirely independent of their context. The method of construing
statutes that I prefer is not to take particular words and attribute to them a ..,
sort of prima facie meaning which you may have to displace or modify. It
is to read the statute as a whole and ask oneself the question : 'In this state,
E in this context, relating to this subject-matter, what is the true meaning of that
word?"' In Towne v. Eisner, (1917) 245 US 418m 425, Homes, J. observed
"A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of living
thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which is used." Both these decisions were cited
with approval by Chief Justice Sikri in Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kera/a,
F [1973] 4 sec 225, 316.

. In Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth and Anr., [1977] 4
SCC 193, Bhagwati, J. held that the words used in Statute cannot be read in
isolation; their colour and content are derived from their context and, therefore,
every word in a statute must be examined in its context. His Lordship explained
G what he meant by the word 'context' and proceeded to say "I mean it in its
widest sense as including not only other enacting provisions of the same
statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari
materia and the mischief which the statute intended to remedy". His Lordship
called upon the courts faced with the task of assigning meaning to a word to
H remember that a statute always has some purpose or object to accomplish
JOG IN DER PAL v. NAVAL KISHORE BEHAL [R.C. LAHOTI, I.] 1095

_. >
,Whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to its meaning.
The literal construction should not obsess the court because it has only prima
A

facie preference. Krishna Iyer, J. in his separate opinion emphasized the need
of keeping in view "the roots of the past, the foliage of the present and the
seeds of the future" while understanding and interpreting a statute and held
that judicial interpretation should not be imprisoned in verbalism and words
lose their thrust when read in vacuo. In Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar
B
Pradesh, [1977] I SCC 155, this Court held that the context would quite
often provide the key to the meaning of the word and the sense it should
carry. Its setting would give colour to it and provide a cue to the intention
of the Legislature in using it.
c
Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes (Twelfth Edition) states, while
dealing with beneficial construction of statute, the Judges "faced with a choice
between a wide meaning which carries out what appears to have been the
object of the legislature more fully, and a narrow meaning which carries it
out less fully or not at all, they will often choose the former" (at page 92).
The rule of construction most agreeable to justice and reason is to presume D
against intending what is inconvenient or unreasonable. "In determining either
' the general object of the Legislature, or the meaning of its language in any
particular passage, it is obvious that the intention which appears to be most
in accord with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles should, in all
cases of doubtful significance, be presumed to be the true one" (at page l 99). E
In providing key to the meaning of any word or expression the context
in which it is set has significance. Colour and content emanating from context
may permit sense being preferred to mere meaning depending on what is
sought to be achieved and what is sought to be prevented by the legislative
scheme surrounding the expression. Requirement of landlord for his own use, F
is an expression capable of attributing an intention to the legisJature that what
was intended to be fulfilled is such requirement as would persuade the landlord
to have the premises vacated by the tenant, to forego the rental income, and
to put the premises to such use as the landlord would deem to be his own use
and in the given facts and circumstances of a case the Court too would hold G
it to be so in contradistinction with a mere ruse to evict the tenant. The
legislature intending to protect the tenant also intends to lift the protection
when it is the requirement of lar.dlord to put the accommodation to such use
as he intends, away from leasing it out.

We have already noticed that the purpose of the Act is to restrict increase H
1096 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20021 3 S.C.R.

A of rent and the eviction of tenants in urban areas. Still the Legislature has
taken care to provide grounds for eviction, one of them being the requirement
of the landlord. We have to strike a balance between the need of protecting
the tenants from unjustified evictions and the need for eviction when ground
for eviction is one such as the requirement of the landlord. If we do not
B meaningfully construe the concept of requirement the provision may suffer
from the risk of being branded as unreasonable, arbitrary or as placing uncalled
for and unreasonable restrictions on the right of the owner to hold and use
his property. We cannot place a construction on the expression 'for his own
use' in such a way as to deny the landlord a right to evict his tenant when
he needs the accommodation for his own son to settle himself well in his life.
C We have to give colour and content to the expression and provide the skin
of a living thought to the skeleton of the words which the Legislature has not
itself chosen to define. The Indian society, its customs and requirements and
the context where the provision is set in the legislation are the guides leading
to acceptance of the meaning which we have chosen to assign to the words
D 'for his own use' in Section l 3(3)(a)(ii) of the Act.

Our conclusions are crystalised as under:

(i) the words 'for his own use' as occurring in Section 13(3)(a)(ii)
of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 must receive
a wide, liberal and useful meaning rather than a strict or narrow
E construction.
(ii) The expression - landlord requires for 'his own use', is not
confined in its meaning to actual physical user by the landlord
personally. The requirement not only of the landlord himself but
also of the normal 'emanations' of the landlord is included therein.
F All the cases and circumstances in which actual physical
o occupation or user by someone else, would amount to occupation
or user by the landlord himself, cannot be exhaustively enumerated.
It will depend on a variety of factors such as inter-relationship
and inter-dependence - economic or otherwise, between the
G landlord and such person in the background of social, socio-
religious and local customs and obligations of the society or region
to which they belong.
(iii) The tests to be applied are : (i) whether the requirement pleaded
and proved may properly be regarded as the landlord's own
H requirement? and, (ii) Whether on the facts and in the
,
.IOGINDER PALv. NAVAL KI SHORE BEHAL [R.C. LAHOTI, l.J 1097

circumstances of a given case actual occupation and user by a A
person other than the landlord would be deemed by the landlord
as 'his own' occupation or user? The answer would, in its turn~
depend on (i) the nature and degree of relationship and/or
dependence between the landlord pleading the requirement as
'his own' and the person who would actually use the premises; B
(ii) the circu111stances in which the clain1 arises and is put forward,
and (iii) the intrinsic tenability of the claim. The Court on being
satisfied of the reasonability and genuineness of claim, as
distinguished from a mere ruse to get rid of the tenant, will uphold
the landlord's claim.
(iv) While casting its judicial verdict, the Court shall adopt a practical C
and meaningful approach guided by the realities of life.
(v) In the present case, the requirement of landlord of the suit premises
for user as office of his chartered accountant son is the requirement
of landlord 'for his own use' within the meaning of Section
t3(3)(a)(ii). D
The appeal is dismissed. The tenant is allowed four months time to
vacate the premises subject to his clearing all the arrears and filing the usual
undertaking in the Executing Court to deliver vacant and peaceful possession

-
over the suit premises to the landlord-respondent on expiry of the time allowed.
Compliance in four weeks. E

S.K.S. Appeal dismissed.

,