JUPUDYPARDHASARATHYversusPENTAPATI RAMA KRISHNA AND OTHERS

                        [2015] 14 S.C.R. 3/4


A                  JUPUDYPARDHASARATHY
                                  v.
           PENTAPATI RAMAKRISHNAAND OTHERS
                   (Civil Appeal No. 375 of 2007)
B
                       NOVEMBER 06, 2015
             [M. Y. EQBALAND C. NAGAPPAN, JJ.]
       Hindu Succession Act, 1956-s.14(1)-Right of Hindu
  female - If in a Will, suit property is given to wife by her
C husband to enjoy and hold the same by way of maintenance
  during her life time then by virtue of s.14(1) her limited right
  becomes absolute right to the suit property.
         Dismissing the appeal, the Court
D       HELD: 1. It is well settled that under the Hindu Law,
  the husband has got a personal obligation to maintain
  his wife and if he is possessed of properties then his
  wife is entitled to a right to be maintained out of such
  properties. It is equally well settled that the claim of
E Hindu widow to be maintained is not a mere formality
  which is to be exercised as a matter of concession,
  grace or gratis but is a valuable, spiritual and moral
  right. The right of a widow to be maintained, although
  does not create a charge on the property of her
F husband but certainly the widow can enforce her right
  by moving the Court and for passing a decree for
  maintenance by creating a charge. The Hindu Married
  Women's Right to Separate, Maintenance and
  Residence Act, 1946 was enacted giving statutory
G recognition of such right and, therefore, there can be
  no doubt that the right to maintenance is a pre-existing
  right. [Paras 15, 16] [388-D-G]
         2. In the instant case, the Will was executed in 1920
    in which 'SR' has mentioned that his first wife died, the
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                                374
    JUPUDYPARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA                       375
                 KRISHNA

second wife got two sons and one daughter. Thereafter,         A
second wife also died. He, then, married to 'V' as a
third wife, who is alive. The executant of the Will also
mentioned the description of the properties owned by
him. He, very specifically mentioned in the Will that his
third wife 'V' shall enjoy for life one tiled house situated   B
in the compound wall. For that enjoyment, it was also
mentioned in the Will that the widow 'V' shall also be
entitled to fetch water from the well situated in the
backyard of a different house. In other words, the
executant of the Will made arrangements for his third          C
wife to maintain her enjoyment in the suit schedule
property till her life. Neither the genuineness of the Will
was disputed nor it was disputed that 'V' was enjoying
the property by way of maintenance. Unless the factum
of bequeathing the property in favour of the wife and          D
her continuous possession are disputed, the question
of pleading and proof does not arise. Further,
indisputably, 'SR', the original owner of the property,
 r.ealized the fact that his wife 'V' was issueless and she
 has a pre-existing right to be maintained out of his          E ·
 property. He further realized that physically he was weak
 and may not' survive for long period. He therefore,
 decided to give his properties to his family members.
Admittedly, no one disputed the arrangements made
 in the Will and 'V' continued to enjoy the said property.     F
 In view of the admitted position; by virtue of Section
 14(1) of the Act, her limited right became absolute right
to the suit property. Though no specific word has been
 mentioned in Exhibit A-2 that in lieu of maintenance
 life interest has been created in favour of 'V', whatever     G
form a limited interest is created in her favour who was
having a pre-existing right of maintenance, the same
has become an absolute right by the operation of Section
14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. [Paras 21, 31 to
 34][394-A-D; 401-B-C, D-E, F-G; 402-B-C]
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376        SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2015] 14 S.C.R.


A         Nirmal Chand vs. Vidya Wanti (1969) 3 SCC 628;
          Thota Sesharathamma vs. Thota Manikyamma
          1991 (3) SCR 717: (1991) 4 sec 312 - relied
          on.
          G. Rama vs. TG Seshagiri Rao 2008 (10)
B         SCR 152 : (2008) 12 SCC 392; Mst Karmi vs.
          Amru & Ors. AIR 1971 SC 745 - held
          inapplicable.
          Sadhu Singh vs. Gurdwara Sahib Narike 2006 (5)
c         suppl. SCR 799 : (2006) 8 sec 75 -
          distinguished.
          V. Tulasamma and others vs. Sesha Reddy
          (dead) by Lrs; AIR 1977 SC 1944 : 1977 (3)
          SCR 261; R.B. S.S. Munnalal and Others vs. S.S.
 D        Rajkumar & Others AIR 1962 SC 1493: 1962
          Suppl. SCR 418; Shakuntala Devi vs. Kam/a and
          Others (2005) 5 SCC 390; Santosh and Others
          vs. Saraswathibai and Another2007 (12) SCR 375
          : (2008) 1 SCC 465; Subhan Rao and Others vs.
 E        Parvathi Bai and Others (2010) 10 SCC 235; Sri
          Ramakrishna Mutt vs. M. Maheswaran and Others
          2010 (11) SCR 1157: (2011) 1 SCC 68; Nazar
          Singh and Others vs. Jagjit Kaur and Others 1995
          (5) Suppl. SCR 162: (1996) 1SCC35-referred
 F        to.
                          Case Law Reference
      1977 (3) SCR 261         referred to.        Para 9
      AIR 1971 SC 745          held inapplicable. Para 9
 G                             held inapplicable    Para 14
      2008 (10) SCR 152
      1962 Suppl. SCR 418      referred to.        Para 22
         -
      (1969) 3 sec 628         relied on.          Para23

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    JUPUDY PARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA                     377
                  KRISHNA

1991 (3) SCR 717           relied on.          Para 24        A
(2005) 5 sec 390           referred to.        Para 25
2007 (12) SCR 375          referred to.        Para 26
(2010) 10 sec 235          referred to.        Para 26
                                                              B
2010 (11) SCR 1157         referred to.        Para 26
1995 (5) Suppl. SCR 162 referred to.           Para 29
2006 (5) Suppl. SCR 799 distinguished.         Para 30
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.           C
375of 2007.
     From the Judgment and Order dated 21.09.2006 of the
High Court of Judicature Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad
passed in First Appeal No. 1774 of 1991.
     K.V. Viswanathan, Sr. Adv., A. Ramesh, R. Chandrachud,   D
Ravi Raghunath, Siddhant Buxy, Syed Ahmad Naqvi, Shilpi
Gupta (For Ms. G. Madhavi)Advs. for the Appellants.
     K. Ramamurty, A.T.M. Ranga Ramanujam, Sr. Advs.,
S. Kumar, Hitesh Kumar Sharma, M. Krishnan, V. Adhimoolam     E
(For Ms. Anu Gupta), K. Shivraj Chaudhuri, Advs. for the
Respondents.
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ·
      M. Y. EQBAL, J. 1. This appeal by special leave is
directed against order dated 21.9.2006 passed by learned. F
Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, who allowed
the appeal preferred by Defendant no.1 and set aside the
judgment and decree of the trial Court in the original suit
preferred by the appellant.
                                                              G
      2. The only question that needs consideration in this
appeal is as to whether the· High Court is correct in law in
interpreting the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 (for short 'the Act') in arriving at a
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378        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 14 S.C.R.


A     conclusion that the widow of the deceased P. Venkata Subba
      Rao acquired an absolute interest in the property by the
      operation of Section 14 of the Act.
         3. The undisputed facts are that the said suit property
  originally belonged to one P. Venkata Subba Rao, who had
B three wives. O~ly the second wife was blessed with two sons
  and one daugh~e,. ir.sluding defendant-Narasimha Rao.
  Veeraraghavamma was the third wife of the said P. Venkata
  Subba Rao but she did not have any issues. P. Venkata Subba
  Rao executed a Will in the year 1920 (Exh.A2) in favour of his
C 3'd wife Veeraghavamma who in turn executed a Will dated
  14. 7 .1971 (Exh.B 1) in favour of defendant-Pentapati Subba
  Rao, and thereafter, she died in 1976. The case of the
  defendant is that the said P. Narasimha Rao has no right to
  transfer the suit properties in favour of the plaintiff.
D
         4. The plaintiff's-appellant's case is that he purchased
  the suit property from one P. Nara·simha Roa who was having
  a vested remainder in respect of the said suit property on the
  expiry of life estate of testator's wife Veeraghavamma.
E According to the plaintiff-appellant, during the life time of
  Veeraghavamma she enjoyed the properties and after her
  death the property devolved upon the vendors of the plaintiff.
        5. The trial court noted the undisputed case of both the
  parties that Will (Exh.A2) was executed by late P. Venkata
F Subba Rao in favour of Veeraghavamma but she had limited
  interest to enjoy the property during her life time and thereafter
  the remainder vested with P. Narasimha Rao to enjoy the said
  property as absolute owner after the death of Veeraghavamma.
  However, the trial court held that life estate of Veeraghavamma
G under the Will did not become enlarged into absolute estate
  under Section 14(1) of the Act and the vested remainder in
  favour of P. Narasimha Rao did not get extinguished in respect
  of the scheduled properties. Accordingly, the suit was decreed.

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    JUPUDY PARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA                         379
             KRISHNA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.]

      6. Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court defendant   A
no.1 - P. Subba Rao preferred an appeal before the High Court.
The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment
and decree of the trial court holding that Veeraghavamma
became the absolute owner of the suit property by virtue of
Section 14( 1) and she had every right to bequeath the said       B
property in favour of P. Subba Rao, the first defendant under
Exhibits B.1 and B2.
      7. Hence, the present appeal by special leave by the .
plaintiff. During the pendency of the appeal before the High
Court, first defendant died and his legal representatives were C
brought on record and are arrayed in the present appeal as
respondent nos.1 to 3. Respondent no. 4 is defendant no.3,
and Legal representatives of Respondent no.5, who was
defendant no.4, were brought on record after his death during
pend ency of this appeal. Rest respondents were brought on D
record as legal representatives of second defendant, who died
during pendency of the suit. Since respondent no.4 has vacated
the suit shop and delivered possession to the plaintiff on
6.7.2006, appellanrhas moved before us an application for
deletion of respondent no. 4 from the array of parties. It is E
ordered accordingly.
     8. Before we decide the question involved in this appeal
we would like to reproduce the contents of the Will (Exh.A1)
which is as under:-
                                                                  F
     "!, Purawattli Venkata. Subt>a l<..ao, S/o la~ ffularvathy
     Venkamma Vysya, Business, Rio Rajatimundhry, have
     executed the Will di. 24.08.1920 with good ·
     consciousness and wisdom.
     I am now approximately 53 years. Now I have less G
     physical strength and consequently I may not survive for
     longer period, hence I have proposed to give all my
     properties both movable and immovable mentioned in
     the schedule below by way of this Will.
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380   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015) 148.C.R.


A     My first wife died issueless. My second wife got two sons
      by name Manikyaro and Narasimha Rao and a daughter
      by name Nagarathnamma. My 2nd wife also died.
      Thereafter I married Veeraghavamma my third wife and
      she is alive. She has not begotten any children. I have
B     house property bearing Municipal D.No.6/875, another
      house bearing D.No.6/876 and also 5 shop rooms
      abutting to them with vacant house site covered by
      D.No.6/870 in lnnespeta, Rajahmundry Village,
      Rajahmundry Sub Registry, E.G. Dist.I have wet land of
c     extent ac15.17 cents in Rustumbada village Naraspuram
      Sub Registry, Naraspuram Taluk. The said landed
      property was in the name of my 2nd wife and after her life
      time my two sons mentioned above got the same
      mutated it in their names.
D     I have a policy bearing No. 23232 in Oriental Life
      Insurance Company and I have to receive monies from
      the said policy and also silver, gold, brass articles house
      hold utensils Beeruva, Furniture, iron safe etc., I have
      made the following dispositions which are to take place
E     after my life time.
      My third wife Veeraghavamma shall enjoy for life the tiled
      house with site and compound wall and with half right in
      the well covered by municipal D.No.6/875, Rajahmundry
      and after lifetime of my wife my 2"d son Narasimha Rao
 F
      shall have the property with absolute rights such as gift,
      sale etc. My second son Narasimha Rao shall have
      absolute rights such as gift and sale in respect of the
      tiled house bearing D/no.6/876 and the 5 shop rooms
      covered by D.No.6/870 and the sit abutting the above
 G    two properties with Chavidi and one Big latrine out of
      the two and that my wife Veeraraghavamma shall enjoy
      for life the small latrine covered by D.No.6/870 and after
      .her life time my son Narasimha Rao shall have the
      property with absolute right. The saidVeeraraghavamma
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JUPUDY PARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA                           ,. 381
         KRISHNA [M. Y. EQBAL, J.]

  is entitled to fetch water from the well situated in back A
 yard of house bearing D.No.6/870. My eldest so
  Maniyarao shall have absolute rights such as gift and
  sale etc.• in respect of ac 15.17 cents of Zeroyiti wet land
  of Rustumbada Village Narasapuram Taluk and my eldest
· son Maniyarao shall pay Rs.650/-which I am liable to pay B
  to her and thus either Nagarathnamma or any one has
  got no right in the said property.
The amount receivable from the Insurance Company
referred above shall be recovered and my two sons,
daughter and my wife, all the four shall share the same C
equally and that the ornaments lying with them shall take
the same absolutely and that one shall not claim or
demand for any oweties against another. (Emphasis
given)
                                                                  D
This Will I have executed with full and good
consciousness and the same shall come into force after
my life time. The properties mentioned in this Will are all
my self acquired properties and I did not get any
ancestral properties.                            ·
                                                                  E
 I reserve my right to change the contents of the Will during
 my life time.
                   Signed Pularvati Venkata Subba Rao
Attesting Witnesses
                                                                  F
 Modali Subbarayudu
 Yendi Surayya


                Scribed by Pu.larvati Venkata Subba Rao G
                                 With his own handwriting
The contents of the said will shall come into force after my
                                                   lifetime.
              Signed by Pularvati Venkata Subbarao"
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382         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2015] 14 S.C.R.


A           9. The trial court although noticed the decision of this
      Court in the case of II. Tu/asamma and others vs. Sesha
      Reddy (dead) by Lrs. (AIR 1977 SC 1944) but held that in
      that case on the basis of compromise the Hindu widow was
      allotted immoveable properties expressly in lieu of her
B     maintenance, and hence, Section 14(1) of the Act was readily
      applicable to that case. Whereas, the trial court held that the
      decision of this Court in the case of Mst Karmi vs. Amru &
      Ors., (AIR 1971SC745), is applicable because in that case
      the Hindu widow succeeded the properties of her husband on
c     the strength of Will where under she was given life estate in
      the properties. For better appreciation paragraphs 25, 26 and
      27 of the trial court's judgment are quoted thus:-
           "25. The first defendant's counsel placed heavy reliance
           on the decision reported in Palchuri Hanumayamma vs.
D          Tadikamalla Kotilingam (1986 (1 )ALT.546), it is only in
           that decision it was held that it is not necessary that the
           will or other documents under which property is given to
           a Hindu female should expressly specify that the property
           is given to a Hindu female should expressly specify that
 E         the property is a given in lieu of a pre-existing right or
           right of maintenance and that it is sufficient if only a right
           was in existence in favour of the Hindu female on the
           date when the document was executed. It is a judgment
           rendered by a single judge of the High Court. It is a case
 F         where the High Court was considering the bequest of
           property to a Hindu widow under a will as life estate.
           26. In Vaddeboyina Tulasamma vs. Vaddeboyina Sesha
           Reddi (A.LR. 1977 SC 1944) a l:iindu widow obtained a.
           decree for maintenance against the brothers of her
G          deceased husband and was executing the said decree
           for maintenance. During that time, the Hindu Widow and
           the brothers of her deceased husband entered into a
           compromise where under the Hindu widow was allotted

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JUPUDY PARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA                        383
         KRISHNA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.]

immovable properties to be enjoyed only as limited owner A
power of alienation. It was a case where the Hindu Widow
was allotted properties expressly in lieu of her
maintenance and satisfaction of her maintenance
decree. Therefore, Sec. 14 (1) of the Act is readily
applicable to that case. On the other hand, in the decision B
reported in Mst Karmi vs. Amro (A.LR. 1971 SC 745) a
Hindu widow succeeded to the properties of her husband
on the strength of a Will where under she was given life
estate in the properties. In those circumstances the
Supreme Court held that the Hindu widow having C
succeeded to the properties of her husband on the
strength of that will cannot claim any rights in these
properties over and above that given to her under that
will and that the life estate given to her under the will
cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions        o
 of the Hindu Succession Act. It was a decision rendered
 by three Judges of Supreme Court. This decision was
 not referred to in the subsequent decision of the year ·
 1977 referred to above. The decision of the year 1977
 was also rendered by three judges of the Supreme Court. E
 When the latter decision of the Supreme Court is in all
 fours with the facts in the case on hand, the former
 decision of the Supreme Court of the year 1977 cannot
 be applied to the facts of the present case.'
 27. In Smt. Culwant Kaur vs. MohinderSingh (A.LR. 1987      F
 SC 2251) the provisions of Section 14( 1) of the Act were
 applied because it was a case where the Hindu female
 was put in possession of the property expressly in
 pursuance to and in recognition of the maintenance in
 her. Similarly, in the decision reported in Gurdip Singh    G
 vs.Amar Singh (1991 (1) L.W.15)the Supreme Court
 applied the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act where
 the wife acquired property byway of gift from her husband
 explicitly in lieu of maintenance. In Bai Vajia vs.
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384         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 14S.C.R.


 A         Thakorbhai Chelabhai (A.l.R. 1979 SC 993) also the .
           Hindu widow obtained possession of the property in
           default of payment of maintenance to her. So, the
           Supreme Court applied the provisions of Section 14(1)
           of the Act to that case."
 B          10. On the basis of the ratio decided by this Court in the
      decision quoted hereinabove and also other decisions of the
      High Court, the trial court held that the life estate of
      Veeraghavamma under ExhibitA-2 will not become enlarge
      into absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Hindu
 C    Succession Act and did not extinguish vested remainders
      interest of Narasimha Rao in the suit property.
            11. In appeal, the High Court, after discussing the ratio
     decided by this Court in the decisions noted by the trial court
 0 and also other decisions of this Court, reversed the finding of
     the trial court and held that the case falls under Section 14( 1)
   . of the Act and Veeraghavamma became the absolute owner
     of the suit property and she had every right to bequeath the
     said property in favour of the first defendant P. Subba Rao
 E under Exhibits B-1 and B-2. The High Court held that:-
           "ln view of the aforesaid authoritative judgment of Hon'ble
           Justice Jagannadha Rao following several judgments of
           the Apex Court, I am of the opinion that the reasoning
           given by the trial Court, that as there is no specific wording
 F         in the instrument Ex.A2 that life estate has been given in
           lieu' of a pre-existinQ right or right of maintenance the
           same do not become enlarged into absolute estate, is
           not relevant and is quite contrary to the aforesaid
           judgment.
 G         Merely because Veeraraghavamma was appointed as
           the guardian of P. Narasimha Rao - vendor of the plaintiff
           it could not be said that Veeraraghavamma had no pre-
           existing right or right of maintenance in respect of the
           property in which a limited interest had been created in
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JUPUDY PARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA                        385
         KRISHNA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.]

 her favour. As the vendor of plaintiff was also having A
 properties other than the property in question, after the
 death of his natural father, Veeraraghavamma was
 appointed as his guardian. Immediately after the vendor
 of the plaintiff attained majority the guardianship·was
 discharged and he used to manage his own movable B
 and immovable properties individually. It carinot be said
 that for the first time the life estate has been created under
 Ex.A2 Will in favour of Veeraraghavamma, as
 undoubtedly, she was having a pre-existing right to be
 maintaine'd by her husband, therefore, it is the duty of C
 her husband to maintain her during her lifetime. Though
 no specific words have been mentioned in Ex.A2 that in
 lieu of maintenance the life estate has been created,
 under Section 14(1) in whatever form a limited interest
 is created in favour of a Hindu female, who is having a      o
 pre-existing right of maintenance, it becomes absolute
 right after 1956 Act came into force.··
  As Veeraraghavamma became absolute owner by virtue
  of Section 14( 1) of the Act she had right to bequeath the ·
  said property in favour of the first defendant under Exs.B 1 E
  and B2. Therefore, as the vested remainder of P.
  Narasimha Rao got nullified, he had no right or authority
  to sell the said property under Ex.A 1 sale deed in favour
  of the plaintiff. As the limited interest of
  Veeraraghavamma blossomed into absoh,ite right, F
  bequeathing the said property in favour of the first
. defendant under Exs.B 1 and B2 is legal and valid. In view
  of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, I
  am of the opinion that the limited interest to enjoy the
  property during the lifetime of Veeraraghavamma G
  blossomed into an absolute right in accordance with
  Section 14(1), after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956
  came into force and the vested remainder created in
  favour of the vendor of the plaintiff is nullified."
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    386         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015] 14S.C.R.


    A           12. Mr. K.V. Viswanathan, learned senior advocate
          appearing for the appellant, confined his argument to the
          question of law as to whether the High Court erred in law in
          holding that Section 14(1) of the Act will be attracted and the
          widow Veeraghavamma have acquired absolute interest in
    B     the properties. Learned counsel made the following
          submissions:-
                "(i) Section 14(1) cannot be interpreted to mean that each
                and every Will granting a limited/life interest in a property
                to a widow is deemed/assumed to be in lieu of her
    c           maintenance. If the testator in his Will specifically provides
                that he is granting only life interest in the property to his
              . widow, his right to limit his widow's right in the property
                is recognized by Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession
                Act, 1956. Further, the testator's right to dispose off his
    D           property by will or other testamentary disposition is
                recognized by Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act,
                1956. Therefore, Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession
                Act, 1956 cannot be interpreted in a manner that renders
                Section 14(2) and Section 30 of the same Act otiose.
.   E
               (ii) In Mst. Karmi vs. Amru & Ors. (1972)4 SCC 86), a
               3-Judge Bench of this Court held to the effect that a widow
               who succeeded to the property of her deceased husband
               on the strength of his will cannot claim any rights in the
               property other than those conferred by the will.. "The life
    F
               estate given to her under the Will cannot become an
               absolute estate under the provisions of the Hindu
               Succession Act"
               (iii) In V. Tulsamma vs. Sesha Reddy (1977) 3 SCC
    G          99, this Court clarified the difference between sub-section
               (1) and (2) of Section 14, thereby restricting the right of a
               testator to grant a limited life interest in a property to his
               wife. Learned counsel referred para 62 of the judgment
               in Tulsamma case.
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JUPUDYPARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA                       387
        KRISHNA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.]

(iv) V. Tulsamma's case involved a compromise decree A
arising out of decree for maintenance obtained by the
widow against her husband's brother in a case of
intestate succession. It did not deal with situations of
testamentary succession. Therefore, strictly on facts, it
may not be applicable to cases of testamentary B
succession. However, in terms of law declared therein,
a doubt may arise whether Section 14(1) may apply to
every instance of a Will granting a limited/life interest in
a property to the widow on the ground that the widow
has a ·pre-existing right of maintenance.                    C
 (v) This doubt was resolved by the Supreme Court in
 Sadhu Singh vs. Gurdwara Sahib Narike, (2006) 8
 SCC 75, where it was held at paras 13 and 14 thaHhe
 right under section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956
 cannot be rendered otiose by a wide interpretation of D
 Section 14( 1) and that these two provisions have to be
 balanced.
 (vi) The above view has been subsequently affirmed by
 this Court. In Sharad Subramanayan vs. Soumi E
 Mazumdar & Ors. (2006) 8 SCC 91 (at para 20), this
 Court upheld the contention of the learned counsel for
 the respondents therein that there was no proposition of
 law that all dispositions of property made to a female
 Hindu were necessarily in recognition of her right to F
 maintenance whether under the Shastric Hindu law or
 under the statutory law.
 (vii) Learned counsel referred para 14 in the case of
 Shivdev Kaur vs. R.S. Grewal.· ·
 (viii) The position of law as recorded in Sadhu Singh's G
 case and followed subsequently, therefore, appears to
 be that the question as to whether Section 14( 1) applies
 to a Will granting life interestto a widow hinges on the

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388          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 14S.C.R.


A            finding by the Court that the grant was in lieu of
             maintenance. This leads to the second arguments."
            13. Mr. Viswanathan, learned senior counsel. submitted
      the fact that the life interest in property granted to the widow by
      way of a Will was actually in lieu of her maintenance needs to
8     be specifically pleaded, proved and decided by the Court
      based on examination of evidence and material on record.
             14. Further, referring paragraph nos. 17, 22 and 24 of
      the decision in G Rama vs. TG Seshagiri Rao, (2008) 12
c sec       392, learned counsel submitted that issues are reqoired
      to be framed and evidence has to be led to specifically show
      that the Will granted interest in property in lieu of maintenance.
        15. It is well settled that under the Hindu Law, the husband
  has got a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he is
D possessed of properties then his wife is entitled to a right to ·
  be maintained out of such properties. It is equally well settled
  that the claim of Hindu widow to be mC)intained is not a_ mere
  formality which is to be exercised as a matter of concession,
  grace or gratis but is a valuable, spiritual and moral right. From
E the judicial pronouncement, the right of a widow to be
  maintained, although does not create a charge on the property
  of her husband but certainly the widow can enforce her right by
  moving the Court and for passing a decree for maintenance
  by creating a charge.
 F            16. The Hindu Married Women's Right to Separate,
      · Maintenance and Residence Act, 1946 was enacted giving
        statutory recognition of such right and, therefore, there can be
       'no doubt that the right t<;> maintenance is a pre-existing right.
G           1?. In V. Tulsamma and others vs. Sesha Reddy, AIR
       1977 SC 1944, three Judges Bench of this Court has
       elaborately considered the right of a Hindu woman to
       maintenance which is a pre-existing right. My Lord Justice
       Fazal Ali writing the judgment firstly observed:-
H
JUPUDY PARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA                            389
         KRISHNA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.)

"Thus on a careful consideration and detailed analysis _A
of the authorities mentioned above and the Shastric
Hindu law on the subject, the following propositions
emerge with respect to the incidents and characteristics
of a Hindu woman's right to maintenance:
(1) that a Hindu woman's right to maintenance is a               B
personal obligation so far as the husband is concerned,
and it is his duty to maintain her even if he has no property.
If the husband has property then the right of the widow to
maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his
property and any per~on who succeeds to the property             C
carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow;
(2) though the widow's right to maintenance is not a right,
to property but it is undoubtedly a pre-existing right in
property i.e. it is a jus ad rem not jus in rem and it can       0
be enforced by the widow who can get a charge created
for her maintenance on the property either by an
agreement or by obtaining a decree from the civil court;
 (3) that the right of maintenance is a matter of moment
 and is of such importance that even if the joint property       E
 is sold and the purchaser has notice_ of the widow's right
 to maintenance, the purchaser is legally bound to provide
 for her maintenance;
 (4) that the right to maintenance is undoubtedly a pre-
 existing right which existed in the Hindu law long before       F
 the passing of the Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946, and is,
 therefore, a pre-existing right;
(5) that the right to maintenance flows from the social
and temporal relationship between the husband and the            G
wife by virtue of which the wife becomes a sort of co-
owner in the property of her husband, though her co-
ownership is of a subordinate nature; and


                                                                 H
390         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 14 S.C.R.


A          (6) that where a Hindu widow is in possession of the
           property of her husband, she is entitled to retain the
           possession in lieu of her maintenance unless the person
           who succeeds to the property or purchases the same is
           in a position to make due arrangements for her
B          maintenance."
          18. Interpreting the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu
      Succession Act, their Lordships observed: -
           "In the light of the above decisions of this Court the
c          following principles appear to be clear:
                    "(1) that the provisions of Section 14 of the 1956
           Act must be liberally construed in order to advance the
           object of the Act which is to enlarge the limited interest
           possessed by a Hindu widow which was in consonance
D          with the changing temper of the times;
                  (2) it is manifestly clear that sub-section (2) of
           Section 14 does not refer to any transfer which merely
           recognises a pre-existing right without creating or
           conferring a new title on the widow. This was clearly held
 E         by this Court in Badri Pershad case.
                  (3) that the Act of 1956 has made revolutionary
           and far-reaching changes in the Hindu society and every
           attempt should be made to carry out the spirit of the Act
 F         which has undoubtedly supplied a long felt need and tried
           to do away with the invidious distinction between a Hindu
           male and female in matters of intestate succession;
                  (4) that sub-section (2) of Section 14 is merely a
           proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 and has to be
 G         interpreted as a proviso and not in a manner so as to
           destroy the effect of the main provision."
           19. Lastly, His Lordship after elaborate consideration of
      the law and different authorities came to the following
      conclusions:-
 H
JUPUDY PARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA                          391
         KRISHNA[M. Y. EOBAL, J.]

"We would now like to summarise the legal conclusions          A
which we have reached after an exhaustive
considerations of the authorities mentioned above on the
question of law involved in this appeal as to the
interpretation of Sections 14(1) and (2) of the Act of 1956.
These conclusions may be stated thus:                          B
"(1) The Hindu female's right to maintenance is not an
empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a
matter of grace and generosity, but is a tangible right
against property which flows from the spiritual
relationship between the husband and the wife and is C
recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu law and
has been strongly stressed even by the earlier Hindu
jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such a right
may not be a right to property but it is a right against
property and the husband has a personal obligation to D
maintain his wife and if he or the family has property, the
female has the legal right to be maintained therefrom. If
a charge is created for the maintenance of a female, the
 said right becomes a legally enforceable one. At any rate,
even without a charge the claim for maintenance is E
doubtless a pre-existing.. right so that any transfer
declaring or recognising such a right does not confer any
new title but merely endorses or confirms the pre-existing
rights.
                                                            F
(2) Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto have been
couched in the widest possible terms and must be
liberally construed in favour of the females so as to
advance the object of the 1956 Act and promote the
socio-economic ends sought to be achieved by this long G
needed legislation.
 (3) Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of a
 proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with
 the operation of Section 14(1) materially. The proviso
                                                               H
392   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 14S.C.R.


A     should not be construed in a manner so as to destroy the
      effect of the main provision or the protection granted by
      Section 14(1) or in a way so as to become totally
      inconsistent with the main provision.           ·
      (4) Sub-section (2) of Section 14 applies to instruments,
B     decrees, awards, gifts, etc. which create independent
      and new titles in favour of the females for the first time
      and has no application where the instrument concerned
      merely seeks to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise
      pre-existing rights. In such cases a restricted estate in
c     favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14(1)
      will not operate in this sphere. Where, however, an
      instrument merely declares or recognises a pre-existing
      right, such as a claim to maintenance or partition or share
      to which the female is entitled, the sub-section has
D     absolutely no application and the female's limited interest
      would automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by
      force of Section 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any,
      under the document would have to be ignored. Thus
      where a property is allotted or transferred to a female in
E     lieu of maintenance or a share at partition, the instrument
      is taken out of the ambit of sub-section (2) and would be
      governed by Section 14(1) despite any restrictions
      placed on the powers of the transferee.
      (5) The use of express terms like 'property acquired by
 F
      a female Hindu at a partition', 'or in lieu of maintenance',
      'or arrears of maintenance', etc. in the Explanation to
      Section 14(1) clearly makes sub-section (2) inapplicable
      to these categories which have been expressly excepted
      from the operation of sub-section (2).
 G
      (6) The words 'possessed by' used by the Legislature in
      Section 14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and
      include the state of owning a property even though the
      owner is not in actual or physical possession of the same.
 H
       JUPUDY PARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA                         393
                KRISHNA [M. Y. EQBAL, J.]

         Thus, where a widow gets a share in the property under A
         a preliminary decree before or at the time when the 1956
         Act had been passed but had not been given actual
         possession under a final decree, the property would be
         deemed to be possessed by her and by force of Section
       . 14( 1) she would get absolute interest in the property. It is B
         equally well settled that the possession of the widow,
         however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right or
         title, because the section does not contemplate the
         possession of any rank trespasser without any right or
   ,     title.                                                        C
        (7) That the words 'restricted estate' used in Section 14(2)
        are wider than limited interest as indicated in Section
        14(1) and they include not only limited interest, but also
        any other kind of limitation that may be placed on the
        transferee."                                                 D
         20. Mr. Vishwanathan put heavy reliance on the decision
  of this Court in the case of Mst. Karmi vs. Amru ( 1972 Vol. 4
  SCC 86). In our considered opinion, the ratio decided in that
  case will not apply in the facts of the present ca~e. In Mst. Karmi E
  case (Supra), one Jaimal, who was the owner of the property,
                 a
  had executed Will directing that on his death, his.entire estate
  would devolve upon his widow Nihali during her life and
  thereafter, the same would devolve upon his collaterals on the
  death of Jaimal. The properties were mutated in the name of F
  Nihali who eventually died in 1960. On her death, the collaterals
  claimed the properties on the basis of Will, but the appellant
  claimed the properties as their sole legatee from Nihali under
  her Will of 1958. On these facts, it was held that Nihali having
  succeeded to the properties of Jaimal on th.e strength of Will
  cannot claim any right in those properties over and above that G
. was given to her under the Will. The Court observed that the
  life estate given to her under the Will cannot become an
  absolute estate under the provisions of Hindu Succession Act,
  1956.
                                                                      H
394        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015) 14 S.C.R.


A         21. The facts in Karmi's case (supra) and that of the
  present case are fully distinguishable. In the instant case, the
  Will was executed in 1920 in which Subba Rao has mentioned
  that his first wife died, the second wife got two sons and one
  daughter. Thereafter, second wife also died. He, then, married
B to Veeraraghavamma as a third wife, who is alive. The
  executant of the Will have also mentioned the description of
  the properties owned by him. He, very specifically mentioned
  in the Will that his third wife Veeraraghavamma shall enjoy for
  life one tiled house situated in the compound wall. For that
c enjoyment, it was also mentioned in the Will that the widow
  Veeraraghavamma shall also be en\itled to fetch water from
  the well situated in the backyard of a different house. In other
  words, the executant of the Will made arrangements for his
  third wife to maintain her enjoyment in the suit schedule property
D till her life. The intention of the executant is therefore clear that
  he gave the suit schedule property to his third wife
  Veeraraghavamma in order to hold and enjoy the suit property
  for her maintenance during her lifetime. It is not a case like
  Karmi case that by executing a Will, the executant directed
E that his entire estate will devolve upon his widow
  Veeraraghavanima.
           22. A three Judges Bench of this Court in the case of
      R.B. S.S. Munnalal and Others vs. S.S. Rajkumar &
      Others, AIR 1962 SC 1493, while interpreting the provisions
 F    of Section 14(1) of the Act observed:-
           " 16. By Section .14(1) the legislature sought to convert
           the interest of a Hindu female which under the Sastric
           Hindu law would have been regarded as a limited interest
           into an absolute interest and by the Explanation thereto
 G
           gave to the expression "property" the widest connotation.
           The expression includes property acquired by a Hindu
           female by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in
           lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift

 H
JUPUDY PARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA                       395
         KRISHNA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.]

 from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or A
 after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by
 purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner
 whatsoever. By Section 14(1) manifestly it is intended to
 convert the interest which a Hindu female has in property
 however restricted the nature of that interest under the B
 Sastric Hindu law may be into absolute estate.
  Pratapmull case undoubtedly laid down that till actual
  division of the share declared in her favour by a
  preliminary decree for partition of the joint family estate
  a Hindu wife or mother, was not recognis19d as owner, C
  but that rule cannot in our judgment apply after the
  enactment of the Hindu Succession Act. The Act is a
  codifying enactment, and has made far reaching changes
  in the structure of the Hindu law of inheritance, and
  succession. The Act confers upon Hindu females full        o
  rights of inheritance, and sweeps away the traditional
  limitations on her powers of dispositions which were
  regarded under the Hindu law as inherentin her estate.
  She is under the Act regarded as a fresh stock of descent
  in respect of property possessed by her at the tiryie of E
   her death. It is true that under the Sastric Hindu law, the
   share given to a Hindu widow on partition between her
· sons or her grandsons was in lieu other right to
  maintenance. She was not entitled to claim partition. But
  the Legislature by enacting the Hindu Womens' Right to F
  Property Act, 1937 made a significant departure in that
  branch of the law; the Act gave a Hindu widow the same
  interest in the property which her husband had at the time
  of his death, and if the estate was partitioned she
  became owner in severalty of her share, subject of course G
  to the restrictions on disposition and the peculiar rule of
  extinction of the estate on death actual or civil. It cannot·
  be assumed having regard to this development that in
  enacting Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, the
                                                             H


    •
396         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2015] 14 S.C.R.


A          legislature merely intended to declare the rule enunciated
           by the Privy Council in Pratapmull case. Section 4 of the
           Act gives an overriding effect to the provisions of the Act."
         23. Reference may also be made to a three Judges
  Bench decision of this Court in the case of Nirmal Chand vs.
B Vidya Wanti, (1969) 3 SCC 628. In that case, by a registered
  document of partition, the related right was given to the widow
  - the user of the land with the condition that she will have no
  right to alienate in any manner. This Cour:t holding that the case
  falls under Section 14(1) of the Act held as under:-
C                  .                    .
           "6. If Subhrai Bai was entitled to a share in her husband's
           properties then the suit properties must be held to have
           been allotted to her in accordance with law. As the law
           then stood she had only a life interest in the properties
D          taken by her. Therefore the recital in the.deed in question
           that she would have only a life interest in the properties
           allotted to her share is merely recording the true legal
           position. Hence it is not possible to conclude that the
           properties in question were given to her subject to the
           condition of her enjoying it for a life time. Therefore the
E
           trial court as well as the first appellate court were right in
           holding that the facts of the case do not fall within Section
           14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Consequently
           Subhrai Bai must be held to have had an absolute right
           in the suit properties, in view of Section 14(1) of the Hindu
F
           Succession Act."
         . 24. In the case of Thota Sesharathamma vs. Thota
      Manikyamma, (1991 )4 SCC 312, life estate was granted to
  a Hindu women by a Will as a limited owner and the grant was
G in recognition of pre-exi!?ting right. Following the ratio decided
  in Tulasamma's.case, their Lordships held that the decision
  in Mst. Karmi cannot be considered as an authority on the
  ambit of Section 14(1) and (2) of the Act. The Court held:-

H
JUPUDY PARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA                              397
         KRISHNA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.]

."9. It was clearly held in the above case that Section            A
14(2) of the Act is in the nature of a proviso or an
exception to Section 14( 1) and comes into operation only
if acquisition in any of the methods indicated ther_ein is
made for the first time without there being any pre-existing
right in the female Hindu to the property. The Bench               B
consisted of Hon. J.C. Shah, V. Ramaswamy and A.N.
Grover, JJ.
10. The case of Mst Karmi v. Amru on which a reliance
has now been placed by learned counsel for the appellant
and petitioners was also decided by a bench of three               C
Judges Hon. J.C. Shah, K.S. Hegde and A.N. Grover,
JJ. It may be noted that two Hon'ble Judges, namely, J.C.
Shah andA.N. Grover were common to both the cases.
In Mst Karmi v. Amru, one Jaimal died in 1938 leaving
his wife Nihali. His son Ditta pre-deceased him.Appellant          D
in the above case was the daughter of Ditta and the
respondents were collaterals of Jaimal. Jaimal first
executed a will dated December 18, 1935 and by a
subsequent will dated November 13, 1937 revoked the
first will. By the second will a life estate was given to Nihali   E
and thereafter the property was made to devolve on
Bhagtu and Amru collaterals. On the death of Jaimal in
 1938, properties were mutated in the name of Nihali.
Nihali died in 1960/61. The appellant Mst Karmi claimed
right on the basis of a will dated April 25, 1958 executed         F
by Nihali in her favour. It was held that the life estate given
to a widow under the will of her husband cannot become
an absolute estate under the provisions of the Hindu
Succession Act. Thereafter, the appellant cannot claim
title to the properties on the basis of the will executed by       G
the widow Nihali in her favour. It is a short judgment without
adverting to any provisions of Section 14(1) or 14(2) of
the Act. The judgment neither makes any mention of any
argument raised in this regard nor there is any mention
                                                                   H
398         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 14S.C.R.


A           of the earlier decision in Badri Pershad v. Smt Kanso
            Devi. The decision in Mst Karmi cannot be considered
            as an authority on the ambit and scope of Section 14(1)
            and (2) of the Act."
            25. Reference may also be made to the decision of three
 8    Judges Bench of this Court in the case of Shakuntala Devi
      vs. Kam/a and Others, (2005) $ SCC 390, where a Hindu
      wife was bequeathed life interest for maintenance by Will with
      the condition that she would not have power to alienate the
      same in any manner. As per the Will, after death of the wife,
C     the property was to revert back to his daughter as an absolute
      owner. On this fact their Lordships following the ratio decided
      in Tulasamma's case (supra) held that by virtue of Section
      14(1) a limited right given to the wife under the Will got enlarged
      to an absolute right in the suit property.
D
            26. Mr. K.Ramamurty, learned senior counsel appearing
      for the respondent, also relied upon the decision in the case
      of Santosh and Others vs. Saraswathibai and Another,
      (2008) 1 SCC 465, Subhan Rao and Others vs. Parvathi
E     Bai and Others, (2010) 10 SCC 235 and Sri Ramakrishna
      Mutt vs. M. Maheswaran and Others, (2011) 1 SCC 68.
            27. In Santosh's case (supra), this Court followed the
      decision given in Nazar Singh's case, (1996) 1 SCC 35, and
      held that the pre-existing right of wife was crystallized and her
 F    limited interest became an absolute interest in the property
      possessed by her in lieu of maintenance.
         28. A similar question arose for consideration before this
  Court in Subhan Rao case (supra), where a portion of suit
  property was given to the plaintiff-wife for her maintenance
G subject to restriction that she Will not alienate the land which
  was given to her maintenance. The question arose as to
  whether by virtue of Section 14( 1) of the Act she became the
  owner of the suit property. Considering all the earlier decisions
  of this Court, their Lordships held that by virtue of Section 14( 1)
H
    JUPUDY PARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA                          399
             KRISHNA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.]

of the Act, the pre-existing. right in lieu of her right to        A
maintenance transformed into absolute estate.
     29. In the case of Nazar Singh and Others vs. Jagjit
Kaur and Others, (1996) 1.SCC 35, this Court following the
decision in Tulasamma's case held as under:-
                                                                     B
      "9. Section 14 and the respective scope and ambit of
      sub-sections (1) and (2) has been the subject-matter of
      a number of decisions of this Court, the most important
      of which is the decision in II. Tulasainma v. Sesha
      Reddy. The principles enunciated in this decision have c
      been reiterated in a number of decisions later but have ·
      never been departed from. According to this decision,
      sub-section (2) is confined to cases where property is
      acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant
      without any pre-existing right under a gift, will, instrument, D
    · decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a·
      restricted estate in the property. It has also been held
      that where the property is acquired by a Hindu female in
      lieu of right of maintenance inter alia, it is in virtue of a
       pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be E
       within the scope and ambit of sub-section (2) even if the
       instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property
       to her prescribes a restricted estate in the property.
       Applying this principle, it must be held that the suit lands,
       which were given to Harmel Kaur by Gurdial Singh in F
       lieu of her maintenance, were held by Harmel Kaur as
       full owner thereof and not as a limited owner
     · notwithstanding the several restrictive covenants
       accompany-ing the grant. [Also see the recent decision
       of this Court in Mangat Mal v. Punni Devi where a right G
       to residence in a house property was held to attract sub-
       section (1) of Section 14 notwithstanding the fact that
       the grant expressly conferred only a limited estate upon
       her.] According to sub-section ( 1), where any property is
       given to a female Hindu in lieu of her maintenance before.
                                                                    H
400        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015) 14 S.C.R.


A          the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, such
           property becomes the absolute property of such female
           Hindu on the commencement of the Act provided the said
           property was 'possessed' by her. Where, however, the
           property is given to a female Hindu towards her
 B         maintenance after the commencement of the Act, she
           becomes the absolute owner thereof the moment she
           is placed in possession of the said property (unless, of
           course, she is already in possession) notwithstanding
           the limitations and restrictions contained in the
c          instrument, grant or award whereunder the property is
           given to her. This proposition follows from the words in
           sub-section (1 ), which insofar as is relevant read: "Any
           property possessed by a f~male Hindu ... after the
           commencement of this Act shall be held by her as full
o          owner and not as a limited owner." In other words, though
           the instrument, grant, award or deed creates a limited
           estate or a restricted estate, as the case may be, it stands
           transformed into an absolute estate provided such
           property is given to a female Hindu in lieu of maintenance
 E         and is placed in her possession. So far as the expression
           'possessed' is concerned, it too has been the subject-
           matter of interpretation by several decisions of this Court
           to which it is not necessary to refer for the purpose of
           this case."
 F       30. In Sadhu Singh's case, (2006) 8 SCC 75, the facts
   of the case were quite different to that of the present case. In
   Sadhu Sing h's case, this Court proceeded on the basis that
   the widow had no pre-existing right in the property, and
   therefore, the life estate given to her in the Will cannot get
 G enlarged into absolute estate under Section 14( 1) of the Act.
           31. Mr. Vishwanathan, learned senior counsel for the
      appellant's last contention was that in the absence of any
      pleading and proof from the side of the appellant to
      substantiate the plea that Veeraraghavamma was occupying
 H
    JUPUDY PARDHASARATHYv. PENTAPATI RAMA                           401
             KRISHNA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.]

the propertx in lieu of maintenance, Section 14 will not be A
automatically attracted. We do not find any substance in the
submission made by the learned counsel. Indisputably, Exhibit
A-2 is a document which very categorically provided that the
property in question was given to Veeraraghavamma to enjoy.
the same till her life. Neither the genuineness of the said Exhibit B
A-2 was disputed nor it was disputed that Veeraraghavamma
was enjoying the property by way of maintenance. In our
considered opinion, unless the factum of bequeathing the
property in favour of the wife and her continuous possession
are disputed, the question of pleading and proof does not arise. C
In other words, no one disputed the arrangement made in the
Will and Veeraraghavamma continued to enjoy the said
property in lieu of maintenance. Hence, the ratio decided in G
Rama's case (supra) does not apply.
       32. Further, indisputably, Mr. P. Venkata Subba Rao, the D
original owner of the property, realized the fact that his wife
Veeraraghavamma was issueless and she has a pre-existing
right to be maintained out of his property. He further realized
that physically he was weak and may not survive for long period.
He therefore, decided to give his properties to his family E
members. For the maintenance of his third wife
Veeraraghavamma, he gave the tiled house with site and
compound wall with the stipulation that she shall enjoy the
property for life in lieu of maintenance. She will also be entitled
to fetch water from the well and use other facilities. Admittedly, F
no one disputed the arrangements made in the Will and
Veeraraghavamma continued to enjoy the said property. In view
of the admitted position, we have no doubt to hold that by virtue
of Section 14(1) of the Act, her limited right became absolute
right to the suit property.                                         G
      33. In the impugned judgment, the High Court has
elaborately discussed the facts of the case and the law
applicable thereto and came to the conclusion that the trial
court committed serious error of law in holding that by virtue of
                                                                    H
402          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2015] 14S.C.R.


A     Section 14(2) of the Act, her limited right has not become
      absolute.
           34. Though no specific word has been mentioned in
      ExhibitA-2 that in lieu of maintenance life interest has been
      created in favour of Veeraraghavamma, in our opinion in
 8    whatever form a limited interest is created in her favour who
      was having a pre-existing right of maintenance, the same has
      become an absolute right by the operation of Section 14(1) of
      the Hindu Succession Act.                                   ·

c           35. After giving our anxious consideration to the matter
      and the judicial pronouncements of this Court in a series of
      decisions, we hold that the impugned judgment of the High
      Court is perfectly in accordance with law and needs no
      interference by this Court.
D          36. For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal has no merit
      and dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.


      Devika Gujral                                 Appeal dismissed.