K. BHASKARANversusSANKARAN VAIDHYAN BALAN AND ANR.

                              K. BHASKARAN                                       A
                                       v.
              SANKARAN VAIDHYAN BALAN AND ANR.

                           SEPTEMBER 29, 1999

                  (K.T. THOMAS AND M.B. SHAH, JJ.)                               B

       Negotiable Instmments Act, 1881

        S.138-Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency of funds-Cognizance of
 offence-Territorial jurisdiction of Court-Determination of-Held, it is dif-     C
 ficult to fix up any particular locality as the place of occu"ence of the
 offence-Offence under S.138 not completed only with the dishonour of
 cheque but with the concatenation of a number of acts-Thus, cognizance
 can be taken by any one of those courts exercising jurisdiction within whose
 limits any one of the acts was done.
                                                                                 D
        S.138, proviso clauses (b) and (c)-Dishonour of cheque-Notice to
 drawe,-.Retumed as 'unclaimed'-Effect of-Held, it can be deemed to have
 been served unless otherwise prove~The reckoning of the period of 15 days
 for the drawer to pay the amount would start from the date the notice was
 returned by the sendee as unclaimed-General Clauses Act, 1897-S.27.             E

       Cn"minal Procedure Code, 1973.

       Ss.177, 178 and 179-Territoria/ jurisdiction of Courts-Scope and
 extent of.
                                                                                 F
        S. 386 second proviso-Power of Appellate Court to impose punish-
. ment-Extent of-Held, cannot impose greater punishment than might have
  been inflicted by the Court passing the order under appeal-Award of sentence
  and fine by High Court set aside.
                                                                                 G
       Ss.29(2) and 357-Power of Magistrate to award fine and compensa-
 tion-Scope and extent of-Dishonour of cheque-Power to award fine not
 exceeding five thousand ntpees-Cheque amount exceeding the amount of
 fine-Held, Magistrate can award any reasonable sum as compensa-
 tion-Thus, matter remitted to Trial Court for awarding compensation.            H
                                     271
    272                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A         Interpretation of statutes.

         Liberal interpretation-Applicability of-Dishonour of che-
  que-Statutory obligation to give notice to drawer of cheque-held, invites
  liberal interpretation as the person who has obligation to give notice is
  presumed to be loser in the transaction and only to protect his interest the
B provision was enacted-Court should not adopt an interpretation which helps
  a dishonest evader and clips an honest payee as that would defeat the very
  legislative measure.

          Wordt and Phrases :
c         'giving a notice'; 'receipt of a notice'-Meaning of in the context of
    S.138(1) of the Negotiable Jnstmments Act, 1881.

          Respondent presented a cheque of rupees one lakh bearing the
    signature of his brother, the appellant before the Bank for encashment.
D   The said cheque bounced due to insufficiency of funds in the account of
    the appellant. Respondent issued a notice to appellant which returned as
    'unclaimed'. Respondent filed a complaint before the Judicial Magistrate,
    Isl Class under S. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Appellant
    raised the plea that Magistrate Court had no territorial jurisdiction to
    try the case as the Bank which dishonoured the cheque was situated in
E   another District; the cheque was not issued by him and signed blank
    cheques snatched from his possession were utilised; no notice regarding
     dishonour of cheque was received by him and hence no cause of action
    arose. The Trial Court, while holding that the cheque was actually issued
    by the appellant to the respondent, acquitted the accused on thP, grounds
F   that it had no territorial jurisdiction to try the case and also that as the
     appellant had not received the notice no cause of action had arisen.
     However, on appeal, the High Court setting aside the order of acquittal,
     convicted and sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for 6 months and
     imposed a fine of Rs. one lakh. Hence the present appeal.

G         Partly allowing the appeal, the Court

           HELD: 1. The High Court was justified in holding the appellant guilty
    of the offence under S.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. [282-A]

          2.1. It is an idle exercise to raise jurisdictional question regarding
H the offence under S. 138 of the Act. The locality where the Bank (which
                     K. BHASKARAN v. S.V. BALAN                            273
dishonoured the cheque) is situated cannot be the sole criteria to deter-         A
mine the place of offence. The offence under S. 138 of the Act is not
completed only with the dishonour of cheque but with the concatenation
of a number of acts. It is not necessary that all the acts should have been
perpetrated at the same locality. If the acts are done in different localities,
the complainant can choose any one of those courts exercising jurisdic·
tion, within whose limits the acts were done. Thus, it is difficult to fix up
                                                                                  B
any particular locality as the place of occurrence for the offence under S.
138 of the Act. [277-H; 278-A-H; 279-B-C-D-E]

       2.2. S. 177 of the· Code providing "every offence shall ordinarily be
inquired into and tried in a Court within whose jurisdiction it was com· C
mitted", is not an unexceptional or unchangeable principle. S. 177 itself
has been framed by the legislature thoughtfully by using the precautionary
word 'ordinarily' to indicate that the rule is not invariable in all cases.
S. 178 of the code provides that if there is uncertainty as to where among
different localities, the offence was committed or if the offence was com-
mitted partly in one local area and partly in another local area, then the D
trial can be held in a Court having jurisdiction over any of those localities.
Further, S. 179 of the code stretches the scope still wider by providing
that an offence is triable where act was d1tne or consequence ensues.
                                                    [277-G-H; 278-C-D-E-F]
      3.1. A notice refused to be accepted by the addressee can be
                                                                                  E
presumed to have been served on him. When a notice is returned by the
sendee as unclaimed such date would be the commencing date in reckon-
ing the period of 15 days contemplated in clause (c) to the proviso of S.
138 of the Act. However, such reckoning would be without prejudice to
the right of the drawer of the cheque to show that he had no knowledge            F
that the notice was brought to his address. In the instant case, the
appellant did not even attempt to discharge the burden to rebut the
                                       0

aforesaid presumption. [281-B-G-H; 282-A]

      Harcharan Singh v. Smt. Shivrani and Ors., [1981] 2 SCC 535; Jagdish        G
Singh v. Natthu Singh, [1992] 1 SCC 647, relied on.

      Black's Law Dictionary, page 621, referred to.

      3.2. The context envisaged in Sec. 138 of the Act invites a liberal
interpretation for the person who has the statutory obligation to give notice H
    274                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. 3S.C.R.

A   because he is presumed to be the loser in the transaction and it is for his
    interest the very provision is made by the legislature. The words in clause
    (b) of the proviso to S. 138 of the Act show that payee has the statutory
    obligation to 'make a demand' by giving notice. The thrust in the clause is
    on the need to "make a demand." It is only the mode for making such
    demand which the legislature has prescribed. A payee can send the notice
B   for doing his part for giving the notice. Once it is despatched his part is
    over and the next depends on what the sendee does. If a strict interpretation
    is given that the drawer should have actually received the notice for the
    period of 15 days to start running no matter that the payee sent the notice
    on the correct address, a trickster cheque drawer would get the premium
C   to avoid receiving the notice by different strategies and he could escape
    from the legal consequences of S. 138 of the Act. Court should not adopt an
    interpretation which helps a dishonest evader and clips an honest payee as
    that would defeat the very legislative measure. [280-E-F-G-H; 281-A]

          Maxwell's "Interpretation of Statutes'~ 12th Edn. page 99, refe"ed to.
D
          4. Under S. 386 second proviso of the Code, an Appellate Court
    cannot impose greater punishment than which might have been inflicted by
    the Court whose order was under appeal. S. 29(2) of the Code provides that
                                                                                    ..
    a Magistrate of first Class may pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term
E   not exceeding three years or of fine not exceeding five thousand rupees or
    of both. In the instant case, the trial was held before a Judicial Magistrate
    of First Class who could not have imposed a fine exceeding Rs. 5,000 besides
    imprisonment. Consequently, the High Court while convicting the appel-
    lant could not impose a sentence or fine exceeding the said limit. However,
    the Magistrate can by making report to S. 357(3) of the Code, can award
F   any sum as compensation and alleviate the grievance of the complainant
    who's cheque amount exceeds the maximum permissible amount of fine.
    But while fixing the quantum of such compensation the Magistrate has to
    consider what would be the reasonable amount of compensation payable to
    the complainant. Thus, in the instant case, the question of sentence and
G   award of compensation must be considered by the Trial Court. Conse-
    quently, sentence awarded by High Court is set aside and matter remitted
    to Trial Court to pass orders on the question of sentence and the compen-
    sation. [282-C-E-F-G; 283-A-B-C-E]

          Hari Krishan and State of Haryana v. Sukhbir Singh & Ors., AIR
H   (1988) SC 2127, referred to.
                   K. BHASKARAN v. S.V. BALAN [THOMAS, J.]                    275

           CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.                      A
     1015 of 1999.

          From the Judgment and Order dated 23.10.98 of the Kerala High
     Court in Crl. A. No. 234 of 1995.

          · E.M.S. Anam for the Appellant.                                           B
           C.N. Sree Kumar for the Respondent No.l.

           G. Prakash for the Respondent No. 2.

           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                                c
           THOMAS, J. Leave granted.

             This is a case where the complainant and the accused are siblings,
     being sons of the same parents. They are fighting over a dishonoured
     cheque. Both must have experienced a roller-coaster ride in this criminal       D
     litigation. Fortune favoured the accused in the first round as he scored an
     acquittal from the Trial Court, but it favoured the complainant in the next
     round when the High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted his
     brother of the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act

-    (for short 'the Act'). Perhaps the accused would have remained quiet by
     then, but for the sentence of imprisonment (six months) which he has now
     to undergo besides a fine of rupees one lakh which the High Court has
                                                                                     E


     imposed on him. So this time it is the turn of the accused to move and
     hence he has filed this appeal.
                                                                                     F
            We thought that the two brothers would settle their disputes over this
     cheque case and we granted sufficient opportunity to both . But the battle
     is destined to continue as the expected settlement eludes like a mirage. We
     do not know at whose fault the parleys went away. We cannot but proceed

-.   with the case and so we heard the counsel for both.

            Before dealing with the two main points on which the counsel argued
                                                                                     G

     in this Court we may set out the facts in brief. The respondent (who will
     hereinafter be referred to as the 'complainant') presented a cheque which
     bears the signature of the appellant (hereinafter referred to as the
     'accused') before the Syndicate Bank's branch office at Kayamkulam H
    276                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A (Kerala) on 29.1.1993 for encashment. The cheque was for an amount of
    rupees one lakh. The bank bounced the cheque due to insufficiency of           •
    funds in the account of the accused. Complainant then issued a notice by
    registered post in the address of the accused on 2.2.1993. The notice was
    returned to the complainant on 15.2.1993 with the following endorsements
B   inscribed thereon:

                3.2.1993       Addressee absent

                4.2.1993       Addressee absent

c               5.2.1993       Addressee absent

                 6.2.1993      Intimation served on addressee's house

    As the postal article remained unclaimed till 15.2.1993 it was returned to
    the sender with a further endorsement 'unclaimed.'
D
           A complaint was filed by the complainant on 4.3.1993 before the
    Court of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Adoor (in Pathanamthitta
    District in Kerala) against the accused under Section 138 of the Act.
    Among the contentions which the accused raised, one was regarding the
E   territorial jurisdiction of the said magistrate Court to try the case as the
    cheque was dishonoured at the Syndicate Bank's Branch office at Kayam-
    kulam (it is situate in another district in Kerala). Accused denied having
    issued the cheque although he owned his signature therein. According to
    the accused, his brother (the complainant) had snatched away some signed
    blank cheque leaves from his possession and utilised one such cheque leaf
F   for the present case. He also contended that he did not receive any notice
    from the complainant regarding dishonour of the cheque and hence no
    cause of action would have arisen in this case. The complaint, according
    to him, is not maintainable on that score also.

G         The complainant examined himself as PW-1 and two more witnesses
    for the prosecution. (PW-2 is the Manager of srdicate Bank's branch
    office and PW-3 Devarajan who claimed to have seen.the accused issuing
    the cheque at his shop). Accused examined his wife as DW-1.

        The trial magistrate repelled the defence contention that the cheque
H leaf was stolen by the complainant. It was held that the cheque was actually
                                                                                       -
             K. BHASKARAN v. S.V. BALAN [THOMAS, J.]                     277

issued by the accused to the complainant. However, the magistrate upheld        A
the contention that his Court had no territorial jurisdiction to try the case
as the cheque was dishonoured by the Branch office of the bank situated
in a different district. The magistrate further held that as the accused did
not receive the notice no cause of action has arisen. As a corollary thereof
the Magistrate acquitted the accused.                                           B

       The High Court of Kerala, on the appeal preferred by the
complainant, set aside the order of acquittal and convicted him and
sentenced him as aforesaid. Learned single judge of the High Court
accepted the version of the complainant that cheque was issued at the shop
of PW-3 which is situated within the territorial limits of the Trial Court's    C
jurisdiction. Regarding notice, learned single judge relied on the decision
of a Division Bench of the same High Court Kunjan Panicker v. Christudas,
(1997) 2 Kerala Law Times 539 wherein it was held that "refusal and even
failure to claim in circumstances as here will tantamount to service of
notice."                                                                        D

       As the signature in the cheque is admitted to be that of the accused,
the presumption envisaged in Section 118 of the Act can legally be inferred
that the cheque was made or drawn for consideration on the date which
the cheque bears. Section 139 of the Act enjoins on the Court to presume        E
that the holder of the cheque received it for the discharge of any debt or
liability. The burden was on the accused to rebut the aforesaid
presumption. The Trial Court was not persuaded to rely on the interested
testimony of DW-1 to rebut the presumption. The said finding was upheld
by the High Court. It is not now open to the accused to contend differently
                                                                                F
on that aspect.

       Learned counsel for the appellant first contended that the Trial
Court has no jurisdiction to try this case and hence the High Court should
l}Ot have converted the acquittal into conviction on the strength of the
evidence collected in such a trial. Of course, the Trial Court had upheld G
the plea of the accused that it had no jurisdiction to try the case.

      We fail to comprehend as to how the Trial Court could have found
so regarding the jurisdiction question. Under Section 177 of the Code
"every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried in a court within H
    278                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A whose jurisdiction it was committed." The locality where the bank (which
    dishonoured the cheque) is situated cannot be regarded as the sole criteria
    to determine the place of offence. It must be remembered that offence
    under Section 138 would not be completed with the dishonour of the
    cheque. It attains completion only with the failure of the drawer of the
    cheque to pay the cheque amount within the expiry of 15 days mentioned
B   in clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act. It is normally difficult
    to fix up a particular locality as the place of failure to pay the amount
    covered by the cheque. A place, for that purpose, would depend upon a
    variety of factors. It can either be at the place where the drawer resides or
    at the place where the payee resides or at the place where either of them
C   carries on business. Hence, the difficulty to fix up any particular locality as
    the place of occurrence for the offence under Section 138 of the Act.

           Even otherwise the rule that every offence shall be tried by a court
    within whose jurisdiction it was committed is not an unexceptional or
D   unchangeable principle. Section 177 itself has been framed by the legisla-
    ture thoughtfully by using the precautionary word 'ordinarily' to indicate
    that the rule is not invariable in all cases. Section 178 of the Code suggests
    that if there is uncertainty as to where, among different localities, the,
    offence would have been committed the trial can be had in a Court having
    ju;isdiction over any of those localities, The provision has further widened
E   the scope by stating that in case where the offence was committed partly
    in one local area and partly in another local area the Court in either of the
    localities can exercise jurisdiction to try the case. Further again, Section
    179 of the Code stretches its scope to a still wider horizon. It reads thus:

             "179. Offence triable where act is done or consequence ensues. -
F
             When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been
             done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be
             inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction
             such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued."

G         The above provisions in the Code should have been borne in mind
    when the question regarding territorial jurisdiction of the Courts to try the
    offence was sought to be determined.

           The offence under Section 138 of the Act can be completed only with
H the concatenation of a number of acts. Following are the acts 'which are
             K. BHASKARAN v. S.V. BALAN [THOMAS, J.]                      279

components of the said offence : (1) Drawing of the cheque, (2)                  A
Presentation of the cheque to the bank, (3) Returning the cheque unpaid
by the drawee bank, (4) Giving notice in writing to the drawer of the
cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount, (5) failure of the
drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice.

       It is not necessary that all the above five acts should have been         B
perpetrated at the same locality. It is possible that each of those five acts
could be done at 5 different localities. But concatenation of all the above
five is a sine qua non for the completion of the offence under Section 138
of the Code. In this context a reference to Section 178(d) of the Code is
useful. It is extracted below :                                                  C
        "Where the offence consists of several acts done in different local
        areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction
        over any of such local areas."

       Thus it is clear, if the five different acts were done in five different D
localities any one of the courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five
local areas can become the place of trial for the offence under Section 138
of the Act. In other words, the complainant can choose any one of those
courts having jurisdiction over any one of the local areas within the
territorial limits of which any one of those five acts was done. As ·the E
amplitude stands so widened and so expansive it is an idle exercise to raise
jurisdictional question regarding the offence under Section 138 of the Act.

      The more important point to be decided in this case is whether the
cause of action has arisen at all as the notice sent by the complainant to
the accused was returned as 'unclaimed.' The conditions pertaining to the        F
notice to be given to the drawer, have been formulated and incorporated
in clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Section 138(1) of the Act. The said
clauses are extracted below :

        "(b) The payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the         G
        case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount
        of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque,
        within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the
        bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and

        (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the H
    280                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A            said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the
             holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt
             of the said notice."

         On' the part of the payee he has to make a demand by 'giving a notice'
  in writing. If that was the only requirement to complete the offence on the
B failure of the drawer to pay the cheque amount within 15 days from the
  date of such 'giving' the travails of the prosecution would have been very
  much lessened. But the legislature says that failure on the part of the
  drawer to pay the amount should be within 15 days 'of the receipt' of the
  said notice. It is, therefore, clear that 'giving notice' in the context is not
C the same as receipt of notice. Giving is a process of which receipt is the
  accomplishment. It is for the payee to perform the former process by
  sending the notice to the drawer in the correct address.

         In Black's Law Dictionary, 'giving of notice' is distinguished from
  'receiving of the notice.' (vide page 621) "A person notifies or gives notice
D to another by taking such steps as may be reasonably required to inform
  the other in the ordinary course, whether or not such other actually comes
  to know of it." A person 'receives' a notice when it is duly delivered to him
  or at the place of his business.

E       If a strict interpretation is given that the drawer should have actually
  received the notice for the period of 15 days to start running no matter
  that the payee sent the notice on the correct address, a trickster cheque
  drawer would get the premium to avoid receiving the notice by different
  strategies and he could escape from the legal consequences of Section 138
  of the Act. It must be borne in mind that Court should not adopt in
F interpretation which helps a dishonest evader and clips an honest payee as
  that would defeat the very legislative measure.
                                                                  I
          In Maxwell's 'Interpretation of Statues' the learned Juthor has em-
    phasized that "provisions relating to giving of notice often receive liberal
G   interpretation." (vide page 99 of the 12th edn.) The context envisaged in
    Section 138 of the Act invites a liberal interpretation for the person who
    has the statutory obligation to give notice because he is presumed to be
    the loser in the transaction and it is for his interest the very provision is
    made by the legislature. The words in clause (b) of the proviso to Section
    138 of the Act show that payee has the statutory obligation to 'mak~ a
H   demand' by giving notice. The thrust in the clause is on the need to 'make
              K BHASKARAN v. S.V. BALAN [THOMAS, J.]                      281
a· demand'. It is only the mode for making such demand which the legisla-        A
ture has prescribed. A payee can send the notice for doing his part for
giving the notice. Once it is despatched his part is over and the next
depends on whatthe sendee does.

      It is well settled that a notice refused to be accepted by the addressee
can be presumed to have been served on him, (vide Harcharan Singh v.             B
Smt. Shivrani and Ors., (1981) 2 SCC 535, andfagdish Singh v.Natthu Singh,
(1992) I sec 647.J

      Here the notice is returned as unclaimed and not as refused. Will
there be any significant different between the two so far as the presumption     C
of service is concerned? In this connection a reference to Section 27 of the
General Clauses Act will be useful. The Section reads thus :

         "27. Meaning of service by post. - Where any central Act or Regula-
        tion made after the commencement of this Act authorizes or
        requires any document to be served by post, whether the expres- D
        sion 'serve' or either of the expressions 'give' or 'send' or any 0th.er
        expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the
        service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing,
        pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the
        document, and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected
                                                                                 E··
        at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary
        course of post."

       No doubt Section 138 of the Act does not require that the notice
should be given only by 'post'. Nonetheless the principle incorporated in
Section 27 (quoted above) can profitably be imported in a case where the         F
sender has despatched the notice by post with the correct address written
on it. Then it can be deemed to have been served on the sendee unless he
proves that it was not really served and that he was not responsible for
such non-service. Any other interpretation can lead to a very tenuous
position as the drawer of the cheque ,who is liable to pay the amount would      G
resort to the strategy of subterfuge by successfully avoiding the notice.

     Thus, when a notice is returned by the sendee as unclaimed such date
would be the commenci~g date in reckoning the period of 15 days con-
templated in clause (c) to the proviso of Section 138 of the Act. Of course
such reckoning would be without prejudice to the right of the drawer of H
    282                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A the cheque to show that he had no knowledge that the notice was brought
    to his address. In the present case the accused did not even attempt to
    discharge the burden to rebut the aforesaid presumption.

          The High Court is, therefore, right in holding the accused guilty of
    the offence under Section 138 of the Act. Still there is one more aspect,
B   though neither side has argued about it before us, which requires elucida-
    tion. We will deal with that aspect now.

        The High Court has imposed a sentence of imprisonment for 6
  months and a fine of Rs. one lakh on the accused. Section 138 of the Act
C provides punishment with "imprisonment for a term which may extend to
  one year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of cheque or
  with both". But the court cannot obviate the jurisdictional· limit prescribed
  in Section 386 of the Code. Though the said provision confers power on
  the Coi.irt of appeal to reverse an order of acquittal and find the accused
  guilty and pass sentence on him according to law, even the High Court
D when it is the Court of appeal has to conform to the second proviso to the
  Section 386 of the Code. It reads thus :

            "Provided further that the Appellate Court shall not inflict greater
            punishment for the offence which in its opinion the accused has
            committed, than might have been inflicted for that offence by the
E           Court passing the order or sentence under appeal".

           In this context a reference to Section 29(2) of the Code is necessary
    as it contains a limitation for the magistrate of first class in the matter of
    imposing fine as a sentence or as a part of the sentence. Section 29(2) reads
F   thus:

            "The court of a Magistrate of the first class may pass a sentence
            of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or of fine
            not exceeding five thousand rupees, or of both."

          The trial in this case was held before a Judicial Magistrate of first
G
    class who could not have imposed a fine exceeding Rs. 5,000 besides
    imprisonment. The High Court while convicting the accused in the same
    case could not impose a sentence of fine exceeding the said limit.

          It is true, ·if a judicial magistrate of first class were to order compen-
H sation to be paid to the complainant from out of the fine realised the
             K BHASKARAN v. S.V. BALAN (THOMAS, J.]                     283

complainant will be the loser when the cheque amount exceeded the said         A
limit. In such a case a complainant would get only the maximum amount
of Rupees five thousand.

       However, the magistrate in such cases can alleviate the grievance of
the complainant by making report to Section 357(3) of the Code. It is well
to remember that this Court has emphasized the need for making liberal         B
use of that provision, (Hari Kishan and State of Haryana v. "Sukhbir Singh
and Ors., AIR (1988) SC 2127). No limit is mentioned in the sub-section
and therefore, a magistrate can award any sum as compensation. Of course
while fixing the quantum of such compensation the Magistrate has to
consider what would be the reasonable amount of compensation payable           C
to the complainant. Thus, even if the trial was before a court of magistrate
of first class in respect of a cheque which covers an amount exceeding Rs.
5,000 the· Court has "power to award compensation to be paid to the
complainant.

      The question of sentence and award of compensation must be con-          D
sidered by the Trial Court. We deem it feasible that the magistrate shall
hear the prosecution and the accused on those aspects. Of course, if the
complainant and accused settle their disputes regarding this cheque, in the
meanwhile, that fact can certainly be taken into consideration in determin-
ing the extent or quantum of sentence.
                                                                               E
      We, therefore, uphold the conviction of the offence under Section
138 of the Act, but we set aside the sentence awarded by the High Court
for enabling the trial court to pass orders on the question of sentence and
the compensation, if any payable.

S.V.K.                                              Appeal partly allowed.