K.KUNHAMBUversusSMT. CHANDRAMMA AND ORS.

                          K.KUNHAMBU                                               A
                               v.
                   SMT. CHANDRAMMA AND ORS.

                           FEBRUARY 10, 2004

        [DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.]                                  B


      Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961:

       Section 2(A) (18); 2(A) (34); 45 and 48A-Tenant-Occupancy rights-
Grant of-lands within municipal limits and subjected to property tax- C
Statutorily notified as industrial Area-Leased out under a registered deed for
purpose of running a saw mill with liberty to carry on any other industry or
business-No specific permission or provision to use any portion of the land
for agricultural purposes-After coming into force of the Act, land Tribunal
granting occupancy rights in favour of lessee holding that they were in lawful D
possession and cultivation of the lands-High Court reversing the order in
revision-Held, lands were .all throughout put to non-agricultural purposes
 only and claims of the lessee to the contrary have been rightly rejected by the
 High Court-Raising paddy in one year without any permission of the owner
 and in contravention of the lease cannot be considered reasonably sufficient
 to characterize or treat the land or the lease to be for cultivation or agricultural E
 purposes.

     Sections 2(A) (18) and 2(A) (34)-land-,-Tenant-Definition of -
Explained.

      Judicial Notice-Judicial notice to some extent can be taken of th.e fact      F
that a Saw Mill requires vast extent as qppurtenant area for stacking wood
and timber before and after sawing.

       First respondent leased out lands belonging to her for a period of
ten years under a Registered lease Deed for the purpose of running a saw
mill. Subsequently, appellant purchased the said mill as a running concern          G
under a Deed of Transfer and entered into possession of the leased out
lands as well. Pursuant thereto, first respondent executed a fresh registered
lease deed in favour of appellant. In the said lease deed, it was specifically
 tated that purpose of lease of land in dispute was for running a saw mill
                                       249                                          H
    250                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2004] 2 S.C.R.

A with liberty to carry on any other industry or business as may be deemed
    fit within the period of lease. There was no specific permission or provision
    to use any portion of land in question for agricultural purposes.

          Appellant and second respondent after coming into force of the
    Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 applied before the Taluk Land
B   Tribunal for grant of occupancy rights under Section 45 thereof in respect
    of lands, which were subject matter of lease. The Land Tribunal granted
    occupancy rights in their favour on the view that claimants were in lawful
    possession and cultivation of the said lands. The first respondent, being
    owner of lands,.moved the High Court against the aforesaid orders. After
C   constitution of Land Reforms District Appellate Forums, the writ petitions
    were transferred to Appellate Authority, which upheld the grant of
    occupancy rights in respect of the lands except a small portion over which
    the saw mill as such stood and therefore used for non-agricultural purpose.
    The High Court in revision held that appellant cannot be conferred with
    occupancy rights, as there was specific stipulation in the lease to use the
D   property only for industrial or commercial purposes. Hence the present
    appeals.

          Dismissing the appeals, the Court

          HELD: 1.1. Absence of any concrete material to show actual and
E regular or continuous personal cultivation confirms the position that the
    lands in question were all throughout being put only to non-agricultural
    purposes for decades and that the claims on behalf of the appellant to the
    contrary have been rightly rejected by the High Court. Instead of usual
    assessment to land revenue, the lands were also found to have been
F   subjected only to Municipal Property Tax and came to be statutorily
    notified as an Industrial Area. That explains the purpose recited in the
    first Registered Lease Deed under which the lands were let only for
    running a Saw Mill and the other terms and conditions also per se wo-1ld
    indicate at any rate that the same was not for any purposes related to
    'Agriculture" or for cultivation. After the appellant purchased the Saw
G   Mill as a going concern also, under yet another Registered Lease Deed
    the appellant obtained the lease once again for running the Saw Mill in
    that place. It is common knowledge and even judi".ial notice to some extent .
    can also be taken of the fact that the_ Saw Mill requires vast extent as i
    appurtenant area also besides the actual mill building for stacking wood
H   and timber etc. before and after sawing. A solitary extract which appear\
              K. KUNl-IAMBU v. CHANDRAMMA [RAJU. J.]                     251

to have been produced relating to one year showing the raising of Paddy          A
on an extent of land without any permission of the owner and that too in
contravention of the lease cannot by any means be considered either
relevant or reasonably sufficient to characterize or treat the land or the
lease to be for cultivation or agricultural purposes.
                                               1256-F-G; 256-D; 256-A-EI         B
    State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Shankara Textiles Mills ltd., 119951 I
SCC 295 and Om Prpkash Agarwal and Ors. v. Batra Behera and Ors., 11999)
3 sec 231, distinguished.

       1.2. It could be seen from the definition of 'Land' in the Karnataka
Land Reforms Act 1961 that though it comprehends in the first part land          c
actually cultivated or cultivable, the later exclusionary P.art of the
definition, "but does not includes house site or land used exclusively for
non-agricultural purposes" makes it abundantly clear that the actual and
exclusive user for non-agricultural purposes, even the land otherwise
cultivable or capable of being used for any purposes related to agriculture      D
as enumerated therein, would stand excluded and fall outside the purview
of the said definition in Section 2(A) (18) of the Act. When the land in
question is itself not 'land' as defined for the purposes of the Act, there is
no scope or room for falling back up on the so called object or aim of the
legislation to extend the provisions of the Act to areas specifically left
outside it against the express legislative mandate and will, policy and          E
intention. In addition thereto, the facts specifically disclosed would equally
belie the claim of the appellant being a 'tenant' as defined in Section
2(A)(34) of the Act. 1256-G, H; 257-A-CI

     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 899-900                     p
of 2004.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 21.9.2000 of the Karnataka High
Court in L.R.R.P. Nos. 4033 and 3817 of 1990.

      P. Krishnamoorthy and Romy Chacko for the Appellant.
                                                                                 G
     V.R. Reddy, P.R. Ramasesh and Sanjay R. Hegde for the Respondents.

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      D. RAJU, J. Leave granted.
     n.e above appeals have been filed against the common Order dated            H
    252                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2004] 2 S.C.R.

A 21.09.2000 of a learned Single Judge of the Kamataka High Court made in
    L.R.R.P. No.3817 of 1990 (filed by the appellant herein before the High
    Court) and L.R.R.P. No.4033 of 1990 (filed by the first respondent herein),
    whereunder the learned Single Judge, while affirming that portion of the
    order passed by the Appellate Authority granting partial relief to the I st
B   respondent to which the challenge was made by the appellant, also allowed
    the claim made by the first respondent herein challenging the order of the
    Land Reforms Appell~te Authority wherein that Authority granted relief in
    favour of the appellant, for. the remaining extent covered by the lease under
    consideration.

C       · The salient and relevant factual details necessary for appreciating the
    contentions of the parties in these appeals are as hereunder: -

           The lands in question comprised in Survey No.70/1(2 acres 02 cents);
    Survey No.70/2 (0-72 cents); Survey No.70/8 (I acre 70 cents); Survey No.70/
    9 (22 cents); Survey No.70/10 (19 cents) and Survey No.70/11 (04 ce;nts)
D   situated in Bol"ur Village within the Mangalore Municipal Limits, Dakshina
    Kannada, indisputably belonged to the first respondent and that she leased
    out the said lands in favour of one P.T. Shankaran Nair for a period of ten
    years under a Registered Lease Deed dated 04.03.1958 for the purpose of
    running a Saw Mill under the name and style of "Mysore Saw Mill".
    Subsequently, the appellant appears to have purchased the said Saw Mill as
E   a running concern under a Deed of Transfer dated 16.11.1968 and entered
    into the possession of the leased out lands as well. Since the appellant wanted
    to enter into direct relationship and obtain rent receipts also in his favour, the
    first respondent appears to have executed a fresh Registered Lease Deed
    dated 12.09.1969 in favour of the appellant, in which it appears a specific
p   reference is made to the Deed of Transfer dated 16.11.1968 for a period of
    ten years from 01.09.1969 to 31.08.1979. In the said Lease Deed, it has been
    specifically stated that the purpose of the lease of land in dispute was for
    running a Saw Mill in the name and style of "Gokulam Industries and Saw
    Mills" and secured undisputed possession of the above property with liberty
    to carry on any other Industry or business as may deem fit within the period
G   of lease. Apart from conspicuous omission or any mention to penn it cultivation
    of any portion of the land in dispute by the lessee, one Of the Clauses stipulated
    that the lessees are liable to keep the Coconut Trees in the leasehold property
    in proper condition and use only the usufructs of the trees with permission
    to remove only such of the Coconut Trees, which obstruct the interests of
H   their Industry. The rent fixed also was a monthly rental, only. There is no
               K. KUNHAMBU v. CHANDRAMMA [RAJU, J.]                         253

 specific pennission or provision to tise any portion of the land in question for   A
 agricultural purposes. While that be the position, the appellant and the second
 respondent appear to have filed Form No.7 Application under Section 48A
 before the Taluk Land Tribunal, for grant of occupancy rights under Section
 45 of the Karnatak'a Land Reforms Act, 1961 [hereinafter referred as the
 ·Act'] in respect of the lands, which were the subject matter of lease. The        B
 Land Tribunal, after considering the objections of the first respondent and
 holding an Inquiry into the claims, appears to have granted occupancy rights
 in their favour on the view that the claimants were in lawful possession and
 cultivation of the said lands as on 01.03.1974. The first respondent, who is
 the owner of the lands, filed W.P. Nos. 1318/1979 and 1319/1979 before the
 High Court challenging the said orders. After the amendments introduced to         C
 the Act in the year 1986 constituting Land Refonns District Appellate Forums.
 The Writ Petitions seem to have been transmitted to the Appellate Authority,
 Mangalore, and the said Authority, on considering the materials on record,
 upheld the grant of occupancy rights in respect of the lands in question,
 except 25 cents of Survey No.70 over which the Saw Mill as such stood and          D
 therefore used for non-agricultural purpose. Aggrieved, the first respondent,
 as indicated earlier, challenged before the High Cou11 that part of the order
 granting occupancy rights in favour of the appellant and the appellant
 challenged that part of the order which denied such occupancy rights in
 respect of25 cents of lands, noticed above, over which the Saw Mill building
 was located.                                                                       E
        The learned Single Judge, while dealing with both the revisions, by his
  common order under challenge came to the conclusion, keeping in view the
  nature of the lands, the specific object and purpose of the lease, the monthly
  rental provided for, the absence of any specific provision or pennission to
  raise cultivatio.n and positive stipulation contained to use the property only F
· for industrial or commercial purposes as well as the factum of actual user of
  the land only for such industrial and commercial purposes, except as to a
  claim made of cultivation of a portion of the land during one particular year
  only in 1968-69 without any authorization or permission of the owner for
  cultivating or raising Paddy, came to the conclusion that the lands in question G
  do not satisfy the definition 'land' contained in Section 2 (A) (18) and that
  the appellant cannot be held to be a 'tenant' to claim or be conferred with
  occupancy rights as defined under the Act in Section 2(A)(34) of the Act. In
  coming to such conclusion, the learned Judge in the High Court applied the
  principles laid d~wn in some of the earlier decisions of the very Court, H
  which, in his view, squarely applied to the case on hand. Hence, these appeals.
                                                                                       >--
    254                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2004) 2 S.C.R.

A          Shri P. Krishnamoorthy, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant,
    strenuously contended, while reiterating the stand taken for the appellant
    before the Authorities below and the High Court that having regard to the
    relevant provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 and the rules
    made thereunder, the avowed purpose of the Legislation, the original
B classification of land and the alleged cultivation claimed of a portion of the
    demised land, the concurrent findings arrived at by the authorities below are
    well merited and that the learned Single Judge in the High Court committed
    a grave error in interfering with the. orders passed by the authorities in
                                                                                             -
    according occupancy rights. Apart frorlt inviting our attention to the orders
    of the authorities below and the relevant provisions of the Act, strong reliance
C has also been placed on the decisions of this Court reported in ,State of
    Karnataka & Ors. v. Shankara Textiles Mills Ltd., [ 1995] I SCC 295 and Om
    Prakash Agarwal and Ors. v. Batara Behera and Ors., [ 1999] 3 SCC 231 in
    order to substantiate the claims on behalf of the appellant. Per contra, Shri
    V. R. Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the I st respondent,                   '"-
                                                                                                  I
D contesting respondent, with equal force urged that having regard to the patent                  I

   ·mistakes committed by the authorities below in the matter of interpretat.ion
  . of the relevant statutory provisions and total misdirection and misconception
    of vital and relevant facts, the High Court was well justified and necessitated
    to interfere with the orders of the authorities below and as such no exception
    could be taken to the reasons assigned therefor by the High Court and no
E infirmities whatsoever cou Id be substantiated in the ultimate conclusions as
    well, to call for any interference in these appeals. Reference was made to the
    relevant clauses of the Registered Lease Deed between parties as also the
    Mysore Gazette Notification dated 22.12.1960 containing final notification               \.
                                                                                              ·~
    issued by the Commissioner of Mangalore Municipality within whose territorial
    limits the lands in question, situated in the erstwhile Village Bolur, fell
F
   declaring these lands, along with several other items, as Industrial Area No.6.
    In other respects, the reasons, which weighed with the High.Court, have also
    been adopted and reiterated in support of the orders passed in favour of the
    Ist respondent.
                                                                                             \
G          We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel
    appearing on either side, in the light of the materials on record, the relevant
    statutory provisions and the decisions brought to our notice. The Karnataka
                                                                                                  '>
    Land Reforms Act, 1961 has been enacted to be a uniform law in the State                      '
    of Kamataka relating to agrarian relations, conferment of ownership on tenants,
    ceiling on land holdings and certain other incidental and allied matters as
H   envisaged therein. The definition of 'land' as contained in Section 2(A)(l 8)             \
                  K. KUNHAMBU v. CHANDRAMMA [RAJU. J.]                            255

    reads as follows:                                                                     A
           "Land" means agricultural land, that is to say, land which is used or
           capable of being used for agricultural purposes or purposes subservient
           thereto and includes horticttltural land, forest la:1d, garden land, pasture
           land, plantation and tope but does not include house-site or land used
            exclusively for non-agricultural purposes."                                   B
                                                               (Emphasis Supplied)

          Section 2(A)(34) defines 'tenant' as hereunder:


-           "Tenant" means an agriculturist who cultivates personally the land he
            holds on lease from a landlord and includes -                                 C
            (i) a person who is deemed to be a tenant under Section 4;

            (ii) a person who was protected from eviction from any land by the
            Karnataka Tenants (Temporary Protection from Eviction) Act, 1961;

            (iia) a person who cultivates personally any land on lease under a            D
            lease created contrary to the provisions of Section 5 and before the
            date of commencement of the Amendment Act;

            (iii)a person who is a permanent tenant; and

            (iv)a person who is a protected tenant.                                       E
            Explanation: A person who takes up a contract to cut grass or to
            gather the fruits or other produce of any land shall not on that account
            only be deemed to a tenant;

          A perusal of the orders of the Mangalore Taluk First Land Tribunal F
    dated 30.11.1978 and that of the Land Reforms Appel late Authority,
    Mangalore, dated 26.4.1990 shows that they suffer from serious infirmities
    of very grave nature, in their perception and approach as well as proper
    understanding of the issues raised for consideration. That apart, they proceeded
    upon total misdirection of facts relevant for the purpose by going behind
    records and assuming certain facts noticed by them after disputes arose between G
    parties as reflecting the real state of affairs. l"er contra, the learned Single
    Judge seems to have dealt with the factual aspect as well in their proper
    perspective as the case warranted and deserved and found to have applied the
    correct principles of law, as well. There are certain indisputable facts, which
    not only undermine efficacy of the claim of the appellant but also expose its H
    256                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2004] 2 S.C.R.

A  hollowness besides the inherent illegalities involved in the same. The lands
   in question appear to have formed part of the Municipal Limits for a long
   time.and even in the year 1960 came to be statutorily notified as an Industrial
   Area. That explains the purpose recited in the Registered Lease Deed dated
   4.3. I 958'under which the lands were let only for run~ing a Saw Mill and the
B other terms and conditions also per se would indicate at any rate that the
   same was not for any purposes related to 'Agriculture' or for cultivation.
   After the appellant purchased the Saw Mill as a going concern also, under yet
   another Registered Lease Deed dated 12.9.1969 the appellant obtained the
   lease <:>nce again for running the Saw Mill in that place under the name and
   style of 'Gokulam Industries and Saw Mill'. It is common knowledge and
C even judicial notite to some extent can also be taken of the fact that the Saw
   Mill. requires vast extent as appurtenant area also besides the actual mill
   building for stacking wood and timber etc. before and after sawing. The
   relevant clauses in this lease deed as well, and the fact that monthly rental
   was alone stipulated - not annual or to be payable in kind or a share of the
   produce, go to establish that the purpose of the lease was merely commercial
D and industrial' and not agricultural or even for any cultivation. Instead of
   usual assessment to land revenue, the lands were also found to have been
   subjected only to Municipal Property Tax. A solitary extract which appears
   to have been produced relating to one year - 1969 showing the raising of
   Paddy on an extent of 1-58 acres in Survey No.70/8 and I acre 24 cents in
E Survey No. 7011 without any permission of the owner and that too in
   contravention of the lease cannot by any means be considered either relevant
   or reasonably sufficient to characterize or treat the land or the lease to be for
  ·cultivation or agricultural purposes. The varying and nebulous stand projected
   as to alleged cultivation through 2nd respondent also would belie their claims
   to be more borne out of desperateness to grab the land rather than to be real.
F The consistent and overwhelming material disclosing the continuous use of
   the land at all times for running the Saw Mill notwithstanding a baseless or
   alleged winding up and closure of Saw Mill business, found to be false and
   incorrect and absence of any concrete material to show actual and regular or
   continuous personal cultivation confirms the position that the lands in question
G were all throughout being put to non-agricultural purposes only for decades
   and that the claims on behalf of the appellant to the contrary have been
   rightly rejected by the High Court.

          That apart, it could be seen from the definition of' Land' in the Act that
    though it comprehends in the first part land actually cultivated or cultivable,
H   the later exclusionary part of the definition, "but does not include house site
              K. KUNHAMIJU v. CHANDRAMMA [RAJU. J.]                       257
or land used exclusively for non-agricultural purposes" makes it abundantly A
clear that the actual and exclusive user for non-agricultural purposes, even
the land otherwise cultivable or capable of being used for any purposes
related to agriculture as enumerated therein, would stand excluded and fall
outside the purview of the said definition in Section 2(A)(l 8) of the Act.
When the land in question is itself not 'land' as defined for the purposes of
the Act, there is no scope or room for falling back up on the so called object B
or aim of the legislation to extend the provisions of the Act to areas specifically
left outside it against the express legislative mandate and will, policy and
intention. ln addition thereto, the facts specifically disclosed and categorically
found by the High Court on the basis of the materials on record would
equally belie the claim of the appellant being a 'tenant' as defined in Section C
2(A)(34) of the Act.

       The decision in Shankara Textile Mills Ltd case (supra) has been
rendered in totally different context and circumstances and cannot lend, in
our view, any assistance to support the claims of the appellant in this case.
It could be seen from the facts of that case, the company, which owned an D
extent of 49 acres and 38.25 guntas was able to get only an extent of 13 acres
and 32.25 guntas converted into non-agricultural land under Section 95(2) of
the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, leaving the remaining 36 acres and
6.5 guntas without any such conversion allowing it to continue as agricultural
land. When acquisition proceedings were initiated to acquire the said land for E
purposes of Kamataka Improvement Boards Act, 1996, the Company sought
to claim under Section 798 {2)(a) of the Act exemption on the ground that
the entire extent in its possession was agricultural land and as such was
eligible for exemption relying upon Section 81 (I )(b){ii) the lands having
been mortgaged to Mysore State Financial Corporation. Though the initial
authority countenanced the claim and the Appellate Authority rejected it, the F
Company approached successfully the High Court and obtained relief, which
came to be challenged in this Court, in that c·ontext. The relevant observations
of this Court at Paragraph 9, set out hereinafter, as to the nature and character
of the land that was really the subject matter of consideration and the reasons
which weighed with this Court to interfere with the order of the High Court G
would show that, rather helping the plea of the appellant, it would lend
support to the stand of the 1st respondent in view of the peculiar facts of this
case and the specific factual finding recorded in favour of the Ist respondent
as to the long, continuous and consistent user of the land for non-agricultural
purposes of running Saw Mill Industry. Paragraph 9 of the decision reported
in Shankara Textiles Mills ltd. (supra) reads as follows:                         H
A
    258                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2004] 2 S.C.R.

            "Thus the High Court has proceeded on the basis that there is no            -
            specific finding regarding the nature and usage of the land as
            agricultural and hence, the Special Deputy Commissioner could not
            treat it to be an agricultural land merely on account of the fact that
            permission for conversion of the land under Section 95(2) of the
            Revenue Act was sought (but admittedly not given). Secondly, it has
B           proceeded on the footing that the land in question does not satisfy
            any of the characteristics as required under the definition of' land' in
            Section 2(18) of the Act, i.e., Karnataka Land Reforms Act, investing
            the authorities with the jurisdiction to take proceedings under Section
            79-B of the Act. We are afraid that the High Court has misread the
c           facts on record. The consistent stand taken by t~.e authorities is that
            the land was never converted for non-agricultural use as required by
            the provisions of Section 95(2) of the Revenue Act. The mere fact
            that at the relevant time, the land was not used for agricultural purpose
            or purposes subservient thereto as mentioned in Section 2(18) of the
            Act or that it was used for non-agricultural purpose, assuming it to
D           be so, would not convert the agricultural land into a non-agricultural
            land for the purposes either of the Revenue Act or of the Act, viz.,
            Karnataka Land Reforms Act. To hold otherwise would defeat the
            object of both the Acts and would, in particular, render the provisions
            of Section 95(2) of the Revenue Act, nugatory. Such an interpretation
E           is not permissible by any rule of the interpretation of statutes. What
            is further, the respondent-Company had itself filed a declaration under
            Section 79-B(2)(a) of the Act stating therein that the entire disputed
            land was agricultural land and had claimed exemption from the
            provisions of the said Section 79-B under Section l 09 of the Act on
            the ground that the land was mortgaged to the Mysore State Financial
F           Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view taken
            by the High Court on the point".

    The land that was the subject matter of consideration by this Court in above
    noted case was indisputa~ly agriculture and in such cases of land, unless
    actual conversion under Section 95(2) of the Revenue Act was sought and
G   obtained, it will not stand excluded from the definition in Section 2(A)(l 8)
    of the Land Reforms Act. The provision for conversion of the user of the
    agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes, as envisaged under the Revenue
    Act, cannot be pressed into aid to deny or deprive the benefit of the later part
    of the definition of 'land' in Section 2(A)( 18) of the Land Reforms Act to
H   a landowner on the basis of its exclusive user for non-agricultural purposes.
                    K. KUNHAMBU v. CHANDRAMMA [RAJU, J.}                      259

      In substance whereas the past exclusive and continuous use for non-agricultural A


---   purposes becomes relevant for extendin'g benefit of later part of Section
      2(A)(l8), Section 95(2) of the Revenue Act becomes relevant only for future
      conversions of an agricultural land for its non-agricultural user. But in this
      case on hand even Jong prior to the coming into force of the Land Reforms
      Act on 2.10.1965 or the Revenue Act, the land was shown to have been used
      for non-agricultural purposes of running Saw Mill Industry and by virtue of B
      the very definition of 'land' in Land Reforms Act which does not seem to
      have been either specifically noticed or considered in the earlier case, no
      exception could be taken to the decision of the High Court, according relief
      to the 1st respondent by sustaining her claim.

            The decision reported in Om Prakash Agarwal and Ors. (supra) also
                                                                                     c
      has no relevance, in that the very issue as to the character of the land and .
      whether the said land answers the description and definition of 'land' in.
      Section 2(14) of the Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960, itself has been remitted
      for consideration afresh by the Competent Authority in the absence of any
      evidence on record to adjudicate the same, with opportunity to lead evidence, D
      and the appeal before this Court was against such a remand order only. The
      general observations made without any particular reference to the meaning or
      ambit of the definition can be of no assistance to the appellant in this case
      when, under the definition of the Karnataka Act, the exclusive user of the
      land for non-agricultural purposes has the inevitable consequence of excluding E
      such land from the purview of the very definition engrafted in Section 2(A)(l8)
      for the purposes of the Act.

           For all the reasons stated above, we see no merit in the above appeals,
      which we direct, shall stand dismissed, with no costs.

      M.P.
                                                                                     F
                                                              Appeals dismissed.