Holding

A compromise decree that creates a right over immovable property not the subject‑matter of the suit must be registered; the unregistered decree cannot confer enforceable rights, and the appeal is dismissed.

Summary

The appellants and respondents, who were neighbours, disputed the status of an 80‑yard passage. The original suit for perpetual injunction ended in a compromise decree that allegedly granted the appellants exclusive rights over the passage, which was shown as a public road in municipal plans. The appellants later sued for a declaration of private ownership, while the respondents sought an injunction to continue using the passage. The trial court upheld the appellants' claim, but the first appellate court held that the passage was not part of the compromise and conferred no exclusive right. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the unregistered compromise decree could not be the basis of a claim. The Supreme Court examined Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act, 1908 and held that a compromise creating a right over immovable property that is not the subject‑matter of the suit must be registered; since it was not, the decree could not confer enforceable rights. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The compromise decree concerning the passage, which was not the subject‑matter of the suit, required registration under Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act, 1908.
Whether the appellants could claim exclusive ownership of the passage based on the unregistered compromise decree.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976
Registration Act, 1908s. 17(1), s. 17(2)(vi)

Subjects

Registration ActSection 17Compromise decreeImmovable propertyPrivate passagePublic roadCivil suitPerpetual injunctionProperty rights

Judgment

[2008] 8 S.C.R. 657

K. RAGHUNANDAN AND ORS. A
V.
ALI HUSSAIN SABIR AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 3572 Of 2008)
MAY 14, 2008
B
[S.B. SINHA AND LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, JJ.)

Registration Act, 1940- s.17(2)- Suit for declaration that
suit passage was private property of plaintiff in terms of a com-
promise decree - Decreed - First appellate Court opined that c
suit passage was not subject matter of compromise and thus
did not confer any ex.elusive right over it - LPA dismissed by
High Court holding that compromise decree being not regis-
tered, no claim relying on the basis thereof could form basis
of the suit- Correctness of- Held: Correct- It is admitted by D
plaintiff that in compromise decree there was no mention of
suit passage - Building plan submitted by plaintiff before mu-
nicipality show that suit passage was a public road - Finding
of fact arrived at by CCJurts below that passage was not private
property- In terms of s.17(2), compromise entered into in re-
spect of immovable property comprising other than that which E
was subject matter of suit or proceeding requires registration
-As in this case not only there existed a dispute with regard to
title over the passage and the suit passage having not found
the part of the compromise there is no infirmity in the impugned
iudgment - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Code of Civil F
Procedure Amendment Act, 1976.

The plaintiffs-appellants and defendants-respon-
dents were neighbours. The dispute between them re-
lated to a passage. A suit for perpetual injunction was G
filed, which ended in a compromise. A map was annexed
to the consent terms. All the properties shown in the red
were accepted to be the properties of the plaintiffs and
the defendants had allegedly agreed not to interfere with
657 H
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A their possession. It was stated that a passage was shown i
to be the exclusive property of the plaintiffs.
The respondents fixed a door making an opening on
the purported private passage belonging to the appel-
lants. Respondents contended that the appellants have
8 no exclusive right over the scheduled property i.e. pas-
sage measuring 80 yards and that it was a common pas-
sage.
Appellants filed a suit for declaration that the suit pas-
C sage shown in red in the plaint was their private property.
Respondents filed a suit for perpetual injunction seeking
injunction againstthe appellants from interfering with their
usage of the passage. The trial Court by common judg-
ment decreed the suit filed by appellants and dismissed
the suit of respondents, holding that the compromise
0
decree conferred a right on the appellants in respect of
passage in question. The respondents filed appeals. The
First appellate Court opined that the suit passage was not
.the subject matter of compromise and in any event the
same did not confer any exclusive right, title and interest
E thereto upon the appellants. High Court dismissed the
LPAs on the premise that the compromise decree being
not registered, no claim relying on the basis thereof could
form the basis of the suit. Hence the present appeal.
F Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The portion marked in red was allotted to
the plaintiffs- appellants and that marked in green was al-
lotted to the defendants-respondents. Appellant No. 1, ex-
amined himself as PW-1. He admitted that in the compro-
G mise memo there was no mention about the suit passage.
He also admitted that he had.not claimed the suit passage
. in the said suit. He also admitted that his vendor had pro-
vided the suit passage for his use. A finding .of fact has
been arrived at that the passage was not shown either in
H the areas demarcated in red or green. [Para 14] [665-C,D,E]
K. RAGHUNANDAN v. ALI HUSSAIN SABIR 659
AND ORS.

1.2. With a view to determine the issue as to whether A
the passage could have been the subject matter of com-
promise, the parties adduced evidence. The building plan
submitted by the appellants before the Municipality was
brought on record. The passage was shown _as a road
which means a public road. A finding of fact had been B
arrived at that there was nothing on record to show that
the passage was a private one. The High Court, rightly came
to the conclusion that the plan must be read in terms of the
memo filed and as the passage did not form part of the build-
ing plan, prima facie, it was common to both. It has further- c
more been found that the defendants had no other motorable
road for approach to their factory. [Para 15] [665-E-H]
2.1 Sub-section (2) of s.17 of the Registration Act, 1908
carves out an exception therefrom stating that nothing in
clauses (b) and (c) of Sub-section (1) of s.17 would apply D
to "any decree or order of a Court except a decree or or-
der expressed to be made on a compromise and com-
prising immovable property other thah that which is the
subject-matter of the suit or proceeding". Even if the pas-
sage was not the subject matter of the suit, indisputably, E
in terms of the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act,
1976, a compromise decree was permissible. A plain read-
ing of the saic;I provision clearly shows that a property
which is not the subject matter of the suit or a proceeding
would come within the purview of exception contained in F
clause (vi) of Sub-section (2) of s.17 of the Act. If a com-
promise is entered into in respect of an immovable prop-
erty, comprising other than "that which was the subject
matter of the suit or the proceeding, the same would re-
quire registration. The said provision was inserted by Act G
21 of 1929. [Paras 17,18] [667-8-E]
2.2 The Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act,
1976 does not and cannot override the provisions of the
Act. The purported passage being not the subject matter
of the suit, if sought to be transferred by the defendants - H
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A respondents in favour of the plaintiffs- appellants or if by -1
reason thereof they have relinquished their own rights
and recognized the rights of the plaintiffs-appellants, reg-
istration thereof was imperative. The First Appellate Court
held so. The High Court also accepted the said findings.
B Therefore, it was not correct in cont.ending that the High
Court has not gone into the said question. The High Court
clearly affirmed the findings of fact arrived at by the First
Appellate Court. [Paras 19,20] [667-E,F,G]
3.1. Appellants have given up their claim of 150 yards
C of land which was to be on the rear side of the property
and in lieu thereof the passage was exclusively given to
the plaintiffs-appellants. Thus, the appellants have rested
its case on the basis of an exchange of land between the
plaintiffs and defendants. The High Court opined that as
D by reason thereof an inference can be drawn that the de-
fendants who had been in possession of the passage had
given up their rights in lieu of 150 yards of land, the same
would constitute a transfer of property and, thus, neces-
sitated registration.[Para 21] [668-E,F]
E 3.2. If the consent terms create a right for the first
time as contra-distinguished from recognition of a right,
registration thereof would be required, if the value of the
property is Rs.100/- and upwards. [Para 23] [669-8,CJ
F Ramdas Sah and Anr. v: Jagamath Prasad and Ors. AIR
1960 Patna 179; M. Pappu Reddiar (died) and Ors. v.
Amaravathi Ammal and Ors. AIR 1971 Madras 182 - held in-
applicable.
Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major and Ors. (1995) 5 SCC
G 709; Som Dev and Ors. v: Rati Ram and Anr (2006) 10 SCC
788; Tulsan v: Pyare Lal and Ors. (2006) 10 SCC 782; Shankar
Sitaram Sontakke and Anr v: Balkrishna Sitaram Sontakke
and Ors. (1955) 1 SCR 99; Raja Sri Sailendra Narayan Bhanja
Deo v: The State of Orissa (1956) SCR 73; Gurdev Kar::r v.
H Mehar Singfl AIR (1989) P&H 324; Ranbir Singh v. Shri
K. RAGHUNANDAN v. ALI HUSSAIN SABIR 661
AND ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J]

r Chand (1984) Pun LJ 562; Sumintabai Ramkrishna Jadhav A
v. Rakhmabai Ramkrishna Jadhav AIR (1981) Born 52- re-
ferred to.
3.3. A statute must be construed having regard to the
purpose and object thereof. Sub-section (1) of s.17 of the
• Act makes registration of the documents compulsory. Sub- B
section (2) of s.17 of the Act excludes only the applications
of.Clauses (b) and (c) and not clause (e) of Sub-section (1)
of s.17. If a right is created by a compromise decree or is
extinguished, it must compulsorily be registered. Clause
(vi) is an exception to the exception. If the latter part of C
Clause (vi) of Sub-section (2) of s.17 of the Act applies, the
first part thereof shall not apply. As in this case not only
there exists a dispute with regard to the title of the parties
over the passage and the passage, itself, having not found
the part of the compromise, there is no infirmity in the im- D
pugned judgment. [Para 29] [675-B·D]
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3572
of 2008

From the final Judgment and Order dated 31.3.2001 & E
24.6.2005 of the High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at
Hyderabad in LPA No. 163 & 229 of 2000 & Review CMP No.
591 of 2002 respectively

... H.S. Gururaja Rao, Y. Raja Gopala Rao, Y. Ramesh and Y
Vismai for the Appellants. F

P.S. Narsimha, Somiran Sharma, Aribam Guneshwar
Sharma for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
S.B. SINHA, J : 1. Leave granted.
2. Application of Section 17(2){vi) of the Registration Act,
1908 (for short "the Act") in the facts and circumstances of this
case is in question· in this appeal which arises out of a judg-
ment and order dated 31.03.2001 passed by the High Court of H
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in L.P.A. Nos. 163 and 229 of
2000.

3. Appellants are neighbours. The dispute between the
parties relate to a passage. Plaintiffs·- Appellants claimed to

8
have purchased 590 sq. yards of premises No. 5-4-413 .to 415
at Nampally, Hyderabad from one P.N. Vijaya Lakshmi. Alleg-
edly, another 259 sq. yards of land was also purchased by them
from the said vendor. When they had been proceeding with the
-
construction of the building, allegedly, respondents interfered.

c A suit bearing No. OS No. 76 of 1975 was filed claiming
for a decree for perpetual injunction. The said suit ended in a
compromise, the terms whereof are as under:

"1. That the portion marked Green in the plan shall be
exclusively enjoyed by the Defendant without any
D interference from the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs hereby admit
that this portion of land marked Greer in the plan attached
with the Memo of compromise belongs to the Defendant
No. 1 and his brother Sri Noman Ali son of Sri Abdul
Khader, Defendant No. 2.
E 2. That the portion marked Red will be enjoyed by the
plaintiffs exclusively without any interference with the
Defendants or his agents.

3. That all other claims against Defendant in the suit are
F hereby withdrawn by the plaintiffs."

4. A map was annexed to the consent terms. All the proper-
ties shown in the red were accepted to be the properties of the
plaintiffs and the defendants had allegedly agreed not to inter-
fere with their possession. It was stated that a passage running
G from north to south connecting Mukarrarnjahi Road was shown to
be the exclusive property of the plaintiffs. It was furthermore al- _.
leged that the respondents' father was a tenant in the premises
bearing No. 5-4-412. The said property was purchased by the
respondent No. 1 in a public auction held on 8.11.1957. The
H extent of the land which was the subject matter is in dispute.
K. RAGHUNANDAN v. ALI HUSSAIN SABIR 663
AND ORS. [S.S. SINHA, J]
t-
5. Respondents admittedly had constructed shops on A
Moajamjahi road with a huge opening on the main road. The
defendants despite the said consent terms made attempt to fix
an old door on the eastern side of their wall making an opening
on the purported private passage belonging to the appellants.
Respondents, however, contended that the appellants have B
~ no exclusive right over the scheduled property, i.e., passage
measuring 80 yards situated at Nampally, Hyderabad. Accord-
ing to them, the passage in question was a common passage.
6. Appellants filed a suit which was marked as O.S. No. 341 c
of 1993 for a declaration that the suit passage, as shown in the red
marked A, 8, C and D'in the plaint is their private property.
7. Respondents filed a suit for perpetual injunction which
was marked as O.S. No. 1132 of 1993, and renumbered as
.J. Q,S. No. 769 of 1994, seeking injunction against the appel- D
!ants from interfering with their usage of the passage. It was
alleged that the appellants tampered with the plan by adding
the word "plaintiffs" above the word "passage" in the plan.
8. The said suits were consolidated; the claims of the par-
ties having common issues. The issues framed were: E

"In O.S. No. 341/93
1) ·Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the relief of
declaration as prayed for?
F
2) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for perpetual
injunction as prayed for?
3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for mandatory
injunction as prayed for?
G
t
4) To what relief?
In O.S. No. 769/1994
1) \/Vhether the plaintiffs are entitled for the relief of
perpetual injunction as prayed for?
H
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

~
A 2) To what relief?"

The learned Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad
by a common judgment decreed O.S. No. 341 of 1993 and dis-
missed the suit filed by the respondents viz. O.S. No.769of1994.

B 9. Appeals were preferred thereagainst by the respon-
dents ..Whereas the learned Trial Judge held that the compro- .._
mise decree conferred a right on the appellants in respect of
the passage in question, the First Appellate Court opined that
the suit passage was no~ the subject matter of compromise and
c in any event the same did not confer any exclusive right, title
and interest thereto U!Jon the appellants.
· 10. Two Letters Patent Appeals were preferred there-
against by the appellants, which have been dismissed by rea-
son of the impugned judgment inter alia on the premise that the
D compromise decree being not registered, no claim relying on )..

or on the basis thereof could form the basis of the suit.
11. Mr. H.S. Gururcija Rao, learned senior counsel appear-
ing on behalf of the appellants, would submit that a consent
decree not only operates as estoppel by judgment, even the
E general principles of res judicata would be applicable.

The High Court, it was submitted, thus, committed a seri-
ous error in relying on the decision of this Cou1i in Bhoop Singh
v. Ram Singh Major and Others [(1995) 5 SCC 709] which ),

F has been distinguished in Som Dev and Others v. Rafi Ram
and Another [(2006) 10 SCC 788] and, thus, the impugned judg-
ment cannot be sustained.
12. Mr. P.S. Narsimha, learned counsel appearing on be-
half of the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the
G First Appellate Court having arrived at a question of fact that
the plaintiffs - appellants did not derive any right, title and inter- i
est in the passage by reason of the said compromise and/ or in .
any event the plaintiffs - appellants having not claimed any right,
title and interest thereupon in the suit, the compromise decree
H required registration.
K. RAGHUNANDAN v. ALI HUSSAIN SABIR 665
AND ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J]

13. O.S. No. 76 of 1975 admittedly was a suit for injunc- A
tion. The plaint of the said suit is not before us. It, however,
appears from the judgment of the First Appellate Court that the
passage was not the subject matter of compromise in the said
O.S. No. 76of1975. This fact is not disputed.
14. The First Appellate Court as also the High Court B
analysed the materials brought on record.

The question which would arise for our consideration is
as to what would be the effect of admitted case of the parties
that the suit passage was not the subject matter thereof. c
We have noticed hereinbefore that the parties joined is-
sues as to whether the word "plaintiffs" was added before the
word "passage" in the plan annexed to the consent terms or
not. We have also noticed hereinbefore that the portion marked
in red was allotted to the plaintiffs- appellants and that marked D
in green was allotted to the defendants - respondents. Appel-
lant No. 1, examined himself as PW-1. He admitted that in the
compromise memo there was no mention about the suit pas-
sage. He also admitted that he had not claimed the suit pas-
sage in the said suit. He also admitted that his vendor had E
provided the suit passage for his use. A finding of fact has been
arrived at that the passage was not shown either in the areas
demarcated in red or green.
15. With a view to determine the issue as to whether the
passage could have been the subject matter of compromise, F
the parties adduced evidence. The building plan submitted by
the appellants before the Municipality was brought on record.
The passage was shown as a road which means a public road.
A finding of fact had been arrived at that there was nothing on
record to show that the passage was a private one. The High G
Court, in our opinion, rightly came to the conclusion that the plan
must be read in terms of the memo filed and as the passage
did not form part of the building plan, prima facie, it was com-
mon to both. It has furtbermore been found that the defendants
had no other motorable road for approach to their factory which H
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A is being run on premises No. 5-4-412.
16. Sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act specifies the
documents of which registration is compulsory; clauses (b), (c)
and (e) whereof read as under:
B "17 - Documents of which registration is compulsory
(1) The following documents shall be registered, if the
property to which they relate is situate in a district in which,
and if they have been executed on or after the date on
which, Act No. XVI of 1864, or the Indian Registration Act,
C 1866, or the Indian Registration Act, 1871, or the Indian
Registration Act, 1877, or this Act came or comes into
force, namely:-
(a) ***
D (b) other non-testamentary instruments which purport or
operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish,
whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest,
whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred
rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property;
E
(c) non-testamentary instruments which acknowledge the
receipt or p<wment of any consideration on account of the
creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction
of any such right, title or interest; and

F (d) ***
(e) non-testamentary instruments transferring or assigning
any decree or order of a Court or any award when such
decree or order or award purports or operates to create,
declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or
G in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or
contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and
upwards, to or in immovable property:
Provided that the State Gov.ernment may, by order
published in the Official Gazette, exempt from the operation
H
K. RAGHUNANDAN v. ALI HUSSAIN SABIR 667
AND ORS. [S.S. SINHA, J]

of this sub-section any lease executed in any district, or A
part of a district, the terms granted by which do not exceed
five years and the annual rents reserved by which do not
exceed fifty rupees."
17. Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act, however,
carves out an exception therefrom stating that nothing in clauses B
(b) and (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 17 would inte.r alia ap-
ply to "any decree or order of a Court except a decree or order
expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising im-
movable property other than that which is the subject-matter of
the suit or proceeding". Even if the passage was not the sub- c
ject matter of the suit, indisputably, in terms of the Code of Civil
Procedure Amendment. ,_Act, .
1976, a compromise decree was
permissible.
18. A plain reading of the said provision clearly shows that
,( D
a property which is not the subject matter of the suit or a pro-
ceeding would come within the purview of exception contained
in clause (vi) of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act. If a
compromise is entered into in respect of an immovable prop-
erty, comprising other than that which was the subject matter of
the suit or the proceeding, the same would require registration. E
The said provision was inserted by Act 21 of 1929.
19. The Code of Civil ProcedureAmendmentAct, 1976 does
,4
not and cannot override the provisions of the Act. The purported
passage being not the subject matter of the suit, if sought to be F
transferred by the defendants - respondents in favour of the plain-
tiffs- appellants or if by reason thereof they have relinquished their
own rights and recognized the rights of the. plaintiffs - appellants,
registration thereof was imperative. The FirstAppellate Court held
so. The High Court also accepted the said findings.
G
20. Mr:Gururaja Rao is, therefore, not correct in contend-
ing that the High Court has not gone into the said question. The
High Court clearly affirmed the findings of fact arrived at by the
learned First Appellate Court.
H
...

668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

~
A It had, however, gone into the legal question as to whether
insertion of the word "plaintiffs" before the word "passage" was
an act of interpolation on the part of the appellants or not, stating:
"There is also some confusion with regard to the plan .r:;_
~
itself. Whereas the plaintiffs claim that the plan showed
B the passage as plaintiffs' passage the defendants claim I

and submitted a certified copy showing that the passage I
was shown only as 'passage' and the word 'plaintiffs' was "' J~

an act of interpolation. Even without going into that L
controversy and believing that the memo stated the
c passage as plaintiffs' passage could it still be enforced by
this Court would be a question. The case of the plaintiffs
\-
is that they had given up claim to 150 yards of land which
was to the rear side of their property and in lieu of it the
passage was exclusively given to the plaintiffs. This
D assertion in itself would show that even before the .It-
compromise the passage was being used by the
defendants but whether the right over the passage by the
l\ •· defendants was given up by them in lieu of 150 yards of r.~

I
land cannot be gone into because the compromise could

,.
' E not be enforced as it was not a registered compromise ... "
21. Appellants have given up their claim of 150 yards of land
which was.to be on the rear side of the property and in lieu thereof
the passage was exclusively given to the plaintiffs - appellants.
Thus, the appellants have rested its case on the basis of an ex- ).
F change of land between the plaintiffs and defendants. The High
Court opined that as by reason thereof an inference can be drawn
that the defendants who had been in possession of the passage
had given up their rights in lieu of 150 yards of land, the same
would constitute a transfer of property and, thus, necessitated reg-
G istration. It was in the aforementioned situation the High Court
relied upon the decision of this Court in Bhoop Singh (supra). ·~

22. Bhoop Singh (supra), inter alia, lays down:
"(1) Compromise decree if bona fide, in the sense that the
H compromise is not a device to obviate payment of stamp
K. RAGHUNANDAN v. Al..J HUSSAIN SABIR 669
AND ORS. [S.S. SINHA, J]

duty and frustrate the law relating to registration, would not A
require registration. In a converse situation, it would require
registration.

(2) If the compromise decree were to create for the first
time right, title or interest in immovable property of the
value of Rs.100 or upwards in favour of any party to the 8
suit the decree or order would require registration."

23. Thus, indisputably, if the consent terms create a right
for the first time as contra-distinguished from recognition of a
right, registration thereof would be required, if the value of the c
property is Rs.100/- and upwards.

Strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Gururaja Rao on
Tulsan v. Pyare Lal and Others [(2006) 10 SCC 782], Som
Dev (supra}, Shankar Sitaram Sontakke and Another v.
Balkrishna Sitaram Sontakke and Others [1955 (1) SCR 99], D
Raja Sri Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Dea v. The State of Orissa
[1956 SCR 73], Ramdas Sah and another v. Jagamath Prasad
and others [AIR 1960 Patna 179] and M. Pappu Reddiar (diedh
and others v. Amaravathi Ammal and others [AIR 1971 Ma- .y
dras182]. ~

24. In view of the point involved in this appeal, we need not
go into the question as to whether a consent decree would at-
tract the principles of res judicata or estoppel by judgment. We
will assume (although there may be some doubt or dispute with
regard to the said proposition that the said principles are appli- F
cable. The question, as indicated hereinbefore, however, is as
to the effect thereof.
. 25. In Ramdas Sah (supra), a Division Bench observed: ...

"2. The first point taken on behalf of the appellants is that
the compromise decree in Title Suit No. 2 of 1948 required.
registration. because plot No. 2240 was outside the scope
of the suit, and in the absence of registration the
compromise decree was not effective with regard to plot
No. 2240. We do not think there is any substance in this H
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A argument. It appears that the plaintiff in the partition suit in
the present case claimed exclusive title to plot No. 2240
but sought a decree for partition with regard to other
properties.

In the compromise decree there was an agreement
B between the parties that plot No. 2240 be exclusively
allotted to the plaintiff and since the title of the plaintiff to
plot No. 2240 was taken as part of the consideration for
the compromise entered into between all the parties and
since it is an integral part of the compromise it is obvious
c that title to plot No. 2240 was within the scope of the
partition suit and the decree is operative even with regard
to plot No. 2240 in the absence of registration. The point
has been fully dealt with in a judgment of this Court in
Miscellaneous Appeal No. 237 of 1953, decided on the
D 27th July, 1955; and also in two other decisions, Ramjanam .It·
Tewary v.· Bindeshwari Bai, AIR 1951 Pat 299 and Jagdish'
Chandra Sinha and another v. Dr. Sir Kameshwar Singh
Bahadur AIR 1953Pat.178.

The question whether a particular term of a compromise
E relates to the subject-matter of the suit is obviously a
question to be answered on the frame of the particular
suit, the relief claimed in the suit and the matters arising
for decision on the pleadings of the parties. The term is
comprehensive enough, and if the compromise relates to
F all the matters which fall to be decided in the case, it
cannot be said that any part of the compromise is beyond
the subject-matter of the suit."
It was clearly held that the subject matter of the suit was
G the subject matter of compromise. Having held so, it was opined:
"In other ·words where the compromise is really an
adjustmerit of the rights and differences in respect of all
matters in dispute between the parties and the
compromise purports to be a final settlement and
H adjustment,of these disputes on a fair and satisfactory
\
K. RAGHUNANDAN v. ALI HUSSAIN SABIR 671
AND ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J]

basis acceptable to all, it must be held to relate to the suit. A
Applying the principle to the present case we hold that the
title to plot No. 2240 was the subject-matter of the
compromise and adjustment between the parties and so
it falls within the scope of the suit and the compromise
decree does transfer title to plot No. 2240 even without it B
being registered."
26. The said decision was followed by the Madras High
Court in M. Pappu Reddiar (supra). In the fact situation obtain-
ing therein, it was held that the subject matter of the compro-
mise was inseparable from the other provisions of the com pro- c
mise decree and constituted. part of the consideration for the
compromise holding that the subject matter of the suit is not
synonymous with subject matter of the plaint. It was in the pecu-
liar facts of the said case, the Court opined:
D
"... If the consent decree or order in the suit or proceeding
covered the property, although it was not in the plaint or Jn
dispute, such property constituting, as it does, an
inseparable part of the consideration for the compromise,
may well, in our view, be regarded as the subject-matter of
=ii... the suit. This is because of the decree passed on the basis E
"""""" of the compromise cannot stand without that property. If by
the amendment it was intended that if the property was not
in the plaint schedule, the consent decree should not be
exempted from registration, we are afraid the phraseology
actually employed by Section 17(2)(vi) has failed to achieve F
the objective. We are aware that the extended scope we
have given to the expression "subject-matter of the suit"
may narrow down the scope of the exclusion from exemption
from registration under that provision ... "
G
The said decisions, therefore, cannot be said to have any
application in the present case.
27. In Bhoop Singh (supra), this Court referring to Gurdev
Kaur v. Mehar Singh [AIR 1989 P&H 324) and Ranbir Singh v
Shri Chand [1984 Pun LJ 562) as also a decision of the Bombay H
672 [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A High Court in l>umintabai Ramkrishna Jadhav v. Rakhmabai
Ramkrishna Jadhav [AIR 1981 Born 52] held:

"13. In other words, the court must enquire whether a
document has recorded unqualified and unconditional
. words of present demise of right, title and interest in the
B property and included the essential terms of the same; if
the document, including a compromise memo,
extinguishes the rights of one and seeks to confer right,
title or interest in praesenti in favour of the other, relating
to immovable property of the value of Rs 100 and
c upwards, the document or record or compromise memo
shall be compulsorily registered."
•
It was further observed:
"16. We have to view the reach of clause (vi), which is an
D exception to sub-section (1 ), bearing all the aforesaid in
mind. We wop Id think that the exception engrafted is meant
to cover that.£1.' ecree or order of a court, includin~ a decree
or order expressed to be made on a compromise, which

E
declares the~re-existing right and does not by itself create
new right, tiff~ or interest in praesenti in immovable property
of the valu_e.'bf Rs 100 or upwards. Any other view would
find the m~chief of avoidance of registration, which
...
'

requires payment of stamp duty, embedded in the decree
or order.
F 17. It would, therefore, be the duty of the court to examine
in each case whether the parties have pre-existing right to
the imr:nov~bl~ property, or whether under the orde.,r or
decree oftbe court one party having right, title or interest
therein agreed or suffered to ~xtinguish the same and
G created right, title or interest in praesenti in immovable
property of the value of Rs 100 or upwards in favour of
other party for the first time, either by compromise or
pretended consent. If latter be the position, the document
·.
is compulsorily registrable." •·
}
H ~'

. I
K. RAGHUNANDAN v. ALI HUSSAIN SABIR 673
AND ORS. [S.B. SfNHA, J]
)>.
28. The decision of this Court in Som Dev (supra) did not A
lay down any law which runs contrary to or inconsistent with the
law laid down in Bhoop Singh (supra). Bhoop Singh (supra)
was distinguished on fact stating:
"18. Therefore, it was a case of the right being created by
the decree for the first time unlike in the present case. In B
para 13 of that judgment it is stated that the Court must
enquire whether a document has recorded unqualified and
unconditional words of present demise of right, title and
interest in the property and if the document extinguishes
that right of one and seeks to confer it on the other, it c
requires registration. But with respect, it must be pointed
out that a decree or order of a court does not require
registration if it is not based on a compromise on the
ground that clauses (b) and (c) of Section 17 of the
Registration Act are attracted. Even a decree on a D
compromise does not require registration if it does not
take in property that is not the subject-matter of the suit. A
decree or order of a court is normally binding on those
who are parties to it unless it is shown by resort to Section
44 of the Evidence Act that the same is one without E
.., jurisdiction or is vitiated by fraud or ·collusion or that it is
"!
avoidable on any ground known to law. But otherwise that
decree is operative and going by. the plain language of
Section 17 of the Registration Act, particularly, in the
context of sub-clause (vi) of sub-section (2) in the F
background of the legislative history, it cannot be said that
a decree based on admission requires registration. On
the facts of that case, it is seen that their Lordships
proceeded on the basis that it was the decree on
admission that created the title for the first time. It is obvious
G
that it was treated as a case coming under Section
• 17(1 )(a) of the Act, though the scope of Section 17(2)(v1)
of the Act was discussed in detail. But on the facts of this
case, as we have indicated and as found by the courts,
it is not a case of a decree creating for the first time a
H
"""""""'(
. 674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A right, title or interest in the present plaintiff and his brother.
The present is a case where they were putting forward in
the suit a right based on an earlier transaction of
relinquishment or family arrangement by which they had
acquired interest in the property scheduled to that plaint.
B Clearly, Section 17(1)(a) is not attracted ... "

(emphasis supplied}

In Som Dev (supra}, the plaintiff claimed half share in
the property. The defence was that the right of the plaintiff hav-
e ing been created under a compromise and the same having
not been registered the same could not be enforced as against
the contesting defendants or their assignor, the other co-owner.
The High Court opined thatthe suit was based on a family settle-
ment which did not require registration and, thus, would come
within the purview of Section 17(2}(vi} of the Act. It was on the
0
basis of the said finding of fact, the law was laid down stating:
"... Of course, we are not unmindful of the line of authorities
that say that even if there is inclusion of property that is not
the subject-matter of the suit, if it constitutes the
.E consideration for the compromise, such a compromise
decree would be considered to be a compromise relating
to the subject-matter of the suit and such a decree would
also not require registration in view of clause (v1) of Section
17(2) of the Registration Act Since we are not concerned
F with that aspect here, it is not necessary to further deal
with that question. Suffice it to say that on a plain reading
of-clause (vt) of Section 17(2) all decrees and orders of
the court including a compromise decree subject to the
exception as regards properties that are outside the
subject-matter of the suit, do not require registration on
G
the ground that they are hit by Sections '17(1 )(b) and (c) of
the Act. But at ·the same time, there is no exemption or
exclusion, in respect of clauses (a), (d) and (e} of Section
17(1) so that if a decree brings about a gift of immovable
properly, or lease of immovable property from yea( to year
H
K. RAGHUNANDAN v. ALI HUSSAIN SABIR 675
AND ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J]

or for a term exceeding one year or reserving an early rent A
or a transfer of a decree or order of a court or any award
creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing
rights to and in immovable property, that requires to be
registered."

29. A statute must be construed having regard to the pur- 8
pose and object thereof. Sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the
Act makes registration of the documents compulsory. Sub-sec-
tion (2) of Section 17 of the Act excludes only the applications
of Clauses (b) and (c) and not clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of
Section 17. If a right is created by a compromise decree or is C
extinguished, it must compulsorily be registered. Clause (vi) is
an exception to the exception. If the latter part of Clause (vi) of
Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act applies, the first part
thereof shall not apply. As in this case not only there exists a
dispute with regard to the title of the parties over the passage D
and the passage, itself, having not found the part of the com-
promise, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned judgment.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel's
fee assessed at Rs. 25,000/-.
E
D.G. Appeal dismissed