Holding

The amendment application for specific performance was barred by limitation and was dismissed.

Summary

The petitioners filed a suit for a permanent injunction to restrain the respondents from dealing with a trust property. After the suit was filed, they discovered that the Charity Commissioner had granted permission to sell the property and sought to amend the plaint under Order 6 Rule 17 to claim specific performance of the alleged sale contract. The trial court and the High Court dismissed the amendment application, and the petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court held that the amendment was barred by the three‑year limitation period under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as more than seven years had elapsed since the original suit. It also observed that the permission for alienation was not a condition precedent to claim specific performance, which should have been pleaded in the original suit. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether an amendment to a plaint for specific performance can be filed after the limitation period has expired.
Whether the permission of the Charity Commissioner constitutes a condition precedent that justifies a later amendment.
Whether Order 6 Rule 17 permits amendment when the original relief sought does not include specific performance.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 6 Rule 17
Limitation Act, 1963s. Article 54

Subjects

amendment of plaintspecific performancelimitation periodOrder 6 Rule 17civil procedureinjunctioncontractcondition precedent

Judgment

A K. RAHEJA CONSTRUCTIONS LTD. AND ANR.
v. (·

ALLIANCE MINISTRIES AND ORS.

MAY 1, 1995

B [K. RAMASWAMY AND B.L. HANSARIA, JJ.]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 :

Order 6 Rule 17-Amendment of plaint-Condition precedent-Fulfill-
c ment of-Not asking for the relief of specific performance in the original
suit-Amendment application flied after limitation period-Held : Barred by
limitation.

The petitioners filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the
respondents from alienating, encumbering, selling, disposing of, or in any
D way dealing with the suit property. Subsequently they filed an application
seeking to amend the plaint for the grant of the relief of specilic perfor-
mance. In support of the amendment application it was averred that
subsequently they discovered that the Charity Commissioner had granted
permission for sale of the Trust Property and therefore, they were entitled
E to the decree of specilic performance. They also relied on certain letters
wherein the petitioner themselves had expressly stated that there was a
concluded contract of sale between the petitioners and the respondents and
that they were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract
paying the balance consideration in terms of the terms and conditions of
the said letters, but in their reply the respondents rejected the order of the
F petitioners. The amendment application was dismissed by the trial Court
as also by the Higb Court.

In the Special Leave Petition, it was contended that the relief was
really founded upon the facts set out in the plaint and it was the sub-
sequent knowledge about permission granted by the Charity Commis-
G
sioner for alienation, which required the amendment and the petitioners
were not precluded from filing an application for amendment or the plaint.

Dismissing the Special Leave Petition, this Court
I
' •
H HELD : 1.1. The application for amendment was barred by limita-
960
K. RAHEJA CONSTS. v. ALLIANCE MINISTRIES 961

tion. (963-E) A
1.2. It is seen that the permission for alienation is not a condition
precedent to file the suit for specific performance. The decree of specific
performance will always be subject to the condition to the grant of the
permission by the competent authority. The petitioners having expressly
admitted that the respondents have refused to abide by the terms of the B
contract, they should have asked for the relief for specific performance in
the original suit itself. Having allowed the period of seven year to elapse
from the date of filing of the suit, and the period of limitation being three
years under Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, any
amendment on the grounds set out, would defeat the valuable right of C
limitation accrued to the respondent. (962-H, 963-A, BJ

A.K Gupta v. D. V.C., (1966] 1 SCR 796, distinguished.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (C)
No. 9397 of 1995. D
From. the Judgment and Order dated 21.2.95 of the Madras High
Court in C.R.P.No. 510 of 1995.

N.S. Hegde, P.P. Singh and G.V. Chandrasekhar for the Petitioners.
E
A.T.M. Sampath for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

The petitioners admittedly filed O.S.No. 213/93 (subsequently num-
bered as O.S. 251/87) for relief of permanent'injunction restraining the F
respondents from alienating, encumbering, selling, disposing of, or in any
way dealing with the said property, more particularly described in Schedule
'A' to the plaint or any portion thereof. In paragraph 13 of the plaint it was
stated thus :

"The said defendants after a lapse of a month, through a letter G
dated 29th April, 1987 sent by defendant No. 4 to pla/ntiff No. 1
blandly intimated that the offers of plaintiff No. 1 were not being
accepted by the trustees of defendant No. 1, a copy of the 4th
defendant's said letter dated 29th April, 1987 is anoexed hereto
and marked as document No. 4. By his letter dated 4th May, 1987 H
962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . (1995]3 S.C.R.

A addressed to defendant No. 4, the plaintiff No. 1 set out the correct
position and reiterated that a definite and concluded contract for
sale of the said property in favour of plaintiff No. 1 had been
confirmed by the said defendants to allege that the offers had not
been accepted. The 1st plaintiff by their said letter also reiterated
their readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract
B and pay the balance purchase price in accordance with the terms
and conditions agreed upon. A copy of the said letter dated 4th
May, 1987 is annexed hereto and marked as document No. S'

Pursuant to the letter dated April 29, 1987 addressed by the plaintiff,
C the defendants in their reply dated 4.5.87 rejected the offer of the
petitioners. Therein the petitioners themselves have expressly set out that
there is a concluded contract of sale between the petitioners and the
respondents and that they are ready and willing to perform their part of
the contract paying the balance consideration in the terms and conditions
D of the said letters. In paragraph 28 of the plaint, April 29, 1987 is one of
the dates set out to give them cause of action. On November 25, 1994
application under Order 6 Rule 17 was filed in I.A. 745/94 seeking to
amend the pliant for the grant of the relief of specific performance. The
averments made in support thereof is that they subsequently, discovered
that the Charity Commissioner had granted permission for the sale of the
E Trust Property and, therefore, the petitioners are entitled to the decree of
specific performance. That application was dismissed by the trial Court on
January 20, 1995 and by the High Court on February 21, 1995 in CRP No.
510/95. Thus, this petition for leave.

F Shri Santosh Hegde, learned senior counsel for the petitioners, has
contended that the petitioners have not come forward with any new plea.
They have set out all the material allegations and' their claims in the plaint.
What they are seeking for is only a formal relief which, though not
originally asked for, the omission does not preclude the petitioners to file
the application under Order 6 Rule 17 seeking fort the amendment of the
G plaint. The relief is really founded upon the facts set out in the plaint and
it is the subsequent knowledge about permission granted by the Charity
Commissio;,er for alienation, which required the amendment. We find that
the contention is not tenable.

H It is seen that the permission for alienation is not a condition prece-
K RAHEJA CONSTS. v. ALLIANCE MINISTRIES 963

dent to file the suit for specific performance. The decree of specific A
-'t performance will always be subject to the condition the grant of the
permission by the competent authority. The petitioners having expressly
admitted that the respondents have refused to abide by the terms of the
contract, they should have asked for the relief for specific performance in
the original suit itself. Having allowed the period of seven years elapsed B
from the date of filing of the suit, and the period of limitation being three
years under Article 54 of the Schedule. to the Limitation Act, 1963, any
amendment on the grounds set. out, would defeat the valuable right of
limitation accrued to the respondent.

Shri Hegde placed strong reliance on the judgment of this Court in C
A.K. Gupta v. D. V. C., reported in [1966] 1 SCR 796. In that case, the
petitioners had expressly reserved the right to claim the amount of Rs.
65,000 in the original plaint, valuing it accordingly. Since, the relief of
injunction was confined to a limited point, subsequently, he filed an ap-
plication for the alternative relief of recovery of the amount of Rs. 65,000.
In that view, this Court held that since the petitioners have already reserved D
the right in the plaint, the relief of injunction, as originally prayed for', did
not preclude the appellant to file the application under Order 6 Rule 17
to claim the relief for the amount which he originally sought for. The ratio
therein has no application to the facts in this case.
E
On the facts, we hold that the application for amendment was barred
by limitation. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed.

G.N. Petition dismissed.

- I