Holding

An acquittal becomes final when the State's appeal is dismissed for delay, and a later revision cannot be entertained; the revision order must be set aside.

Summary

K. Ramachandran was acquitted by a Sessions Court of murder and related offences. The victim's father filed a criminal revision, while the State later filed an appeal against the acquittal but sought condonation of an 801‑day delay, which the High Court Division Bench rejected, effectively dismissing the appeal. A Single Judge of the High Court then entertained the pending revision and ordered the trial court to re‑appraise the evidence. The accused contended that the dismissal of the State's appeal gave the acquittal finality, barring any revision. The Supreme Court held that once the State's appeal is dismissed for delay, the acquittal attains finality and a subsequent revision cannot be entertained; consequently, the revision order was set aside and the trial court’s acquittal restored.

Issues considered

The effect of the High Court's refusal to condone delay in the State's appeal on the finality of the acquittal.
Whether a criminal revision filed by a private complainant can be entertained after the State's appeal against the same acquittal has been dismissed.
The scope of revision against an acquittal under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 378(2), s. 378(3), s. 378(4), s. 378(6)
Limitation Act, 1963s. Article 114

Subjects

criminal revisionappeal against acquittalcondonation of delayfinality of judgmentCode of Criminal ProcedureLimitation Actprivate complaintevidence appraisal

Judgment

[2009] 10 S.C.R. 216

K. RAMACHANDRAN ..
-
A
v.
V.N. RAJAN & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 485 of 2004)
JULY 7, 2009
8
[V.S. SIRPURKAR AND R.M. LODHA, JJ.)

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973:

c Revision by complainant and appeal by State against the
same order of acquittal - Diverse orders - Effect of- Revision
filed by complainant pending before Single Judge of 2High ....
Court - Later, appeal against acquittal belatedly filed by State
- Division Bench rejecting condonation of delay in filing the
appeal - Order not challenged by State - Subsequently,
D
revision allowed by single Jw,,ge, directing the trial court to
reconsider the matter - Held: By not allowing condonation of
delay, acquittal of accused had atained finality - Once appeal
at the instance of the State has been dismissed, the
complainant or the State cannot ask for revision of the
E judgment - Thereafter, Single Judge could not have reversed
that effect and upset that position - The fact of pendency of
the appeal and the revision should have been brought to the
notice of respective courts by the State counsel and the .r
accused - Both the cases should have been clubbed together
F - Registry of High Court should not have allowed such an
incongruous situation - Order of Single Judge in revision
petition set aside - Practice and Procedure.

REVISION:
G
Revision Petition filed before High Court by complainant _. ...
against order of acquittal - Scope of interference by High
Court - Explained.

H 216
K. RAMACHANDRAN v. V.N. RAJAN & ANR. 217
"
~· The appellant-accused faced trial for offences A
punishable u/ss.302 and 201 IPC on the allegations that
he committed murder of his wife and threw the dead
body in a well. The trial court did not find the acquisition
as proved, and acquitted the accused of the charges.
Initially the State did not file any appeal, but the B
complainant filed a criminal revision before the High
Court. During the pendency of the revision, the State
challenged the acquittal of the accused by filing an
appeal which was delayed by 801 days. The Division
Bench of the High Court dismissed the application for c
r condonation of delay. Subsequently, the revision petition
'

- was allowed by the Single Judge and the trial court was
directed to reconsider of the matter on the basis of the
evidence already on record. Aggrieved, the accused filed
the appeal. D
'
It was contended for 'he accused-appellant that the
Division Bench of the High Court having rejected the
application for condonation of delay, the appeal stood
dismissed and, therefore, the revision also ought to have
been dismissed by the Single Judge. The stand of the E
complainant was that in the appeal the High Court had
no occasion to consider the merits of the matter as it
.. •, merely rejected the application for condonation of delay;
and that un-tenability of the revision was never pointed
out to the Single Judge by showing that the appeal F
against acquittal could not proceed because of rejection
of application for condonation of delay.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. In the instant case, an incongruous G
'.~
... situation has arisen wherein an appeal against the
judgment had failed, though only on the question of
limitation, yet, a revision against the same judgment,
however, continued and was allowed also, and all this '
H
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.

A happened because of the casual attitude on the part of ..
the State Government as also the appellant-accused in
not pointing out the proper facts to the Courts, both to
the Division Bench as well as the Single Judge. When
appeal was filed along with the application for
B condonation of delay against the judgment of acquittal,
the revision pending against the same judgment of
acquittal should have been joined with the appeal. It is
all the result of colossal casualness even on the part of
the Registry of the High Court which has resulted in such
c incongruous situation. Since the appellant-accused had
not raised the question about the continueability of the
revision before the High Court, this Court would not
ordinarily allow the counsel for appellant-accused to raise
that question before it. [Para 9 and 1OJ [226-E-F; 230-G-
-
H; 231-A]
D
1.2. The Division Bench in not allowing the
condonation of delay has effectively dismissed the
appeal in the sense that it has not allowed the State
Government to proceed with the appeal for which there
E was a provision. This was a prosecution not based on
private complaint but on the police report. Therefore, 'the .
State Government had a right u/s 378 (2) Cr. P.C. to file
appeal and very conspicuously the private party did not ·
have that right. The private complainant, therefore, could ,
F only invoke the general powers of revision by the High
Court. [Para 1OJ [227-A-B]
1.3. When the Division Bench considered the
question of condonation of delay in filing the appeal
against acquittal, though technically, it was deciding the
G application u/s 378 (3), Cr.P.C. It was actually the whole
appeal itself which was before it. In this behalf it will have . ...
to be seen that the limitation for filing such appeal at the
instance of the State Government against acquittal is
provided by Article 114 of the Limitation Act. It is
H
K. RAMACHANDRAN v. V.N. RAJAN & ANR. 219

~ undoubtedly true that sub-Section (3) specifically A
provides that the appeal under sub-Sections (1) and (2)
cannot be entertained except with the leave of the High
Court and, therefore, an application for leave in such
appeal filed by the State Government is a must.
Therefore, what was before the High Court was the B
appeal itself and the petitioner prayed the condonation
of delay of 801 days in filing appeal against acquittal.
~
When the Hi.gh Court declined to grant that permission,
it, in effect refused to entertain the appeal against the
order of the trial court, thus, making it final. [Para 10] [227- c
B-F]

.....·' 2.1. There is no review power under the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 to the criminal court including
the High Court. Such a review power exists only in this/
• Court. As such, once the High Court had passed the D
order refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeal
and thereby awarding the finality to the trial court's
judgment, that order could be considered and upset only
~
by this Court on a proper appeal. It is an admitted fact that
such appeal challenging the order passed by the Division E
Bench was never filed and the order of the Division
Bench became final and has remained final till date.
•, Under such circumstances, the revision against the same
....... order could not have been entertained, much less allowed
upsetting the finality of the trial court's judgment. Once F
the appeal at the instance of the State has be_en
dismissed, the complainant or the state could not ask for
the revision of the judgment. In the instant case, since the
trial court's judgment was given the effect of finality by
the Division Bench of the High Court, then Single Judge G
could not have reversed that effect and upset that
_.
position. [Para 10] [227-G-H; 228-A-D; 229-G-H; 230-A]

2.2 The limitation aspect cannot be such as to be
apart or distinct from the merits of the impugned
judgment. Therefore, it cannot be said that the appeal was H
220 SUPREME COURT REPOR rs [2009] 10 S.C.R.

A only disposed of on the question of limitation. The result ..
would, after all, be the same i.e. impugned judgment
gaining finality. In the circumstances, the revision could
not have proceeded with. [Paras 10 and 11] [231-B-C]

3. In a revision against acquittal preferred by a
B
private party, there is a very little scope for interference.
In the instant case, the Single Judge dis-approved of the
appreciation of the evidence by the trial court. It is not as
if the trial court had ignored any important piece of
evidence or it had chosen not to appreciate the same. It
c is again not as if there was any piece of evidence which
was illegally not permitted to come on record. Again, it is

D
also not a case where there was some serious defect in
the trial affecting the merits of the matter. Nor did the court
trying the appellant-accused lack the jurisdiction to try
-
and convict or acquit him. All that the High Court has
observed is that the appreciation of evidence by the trial
court was not correct and it should not have taken the
view that it has taken of the evidence. In the whole
judgment, it is nowhere pointed out as to how and where
E the trial court had gone wrong. The judgment of the trial
court shows that the said court awarded the acquittal as
according to it in a case based on circumstantial
evidence, the chain of circumstances has to be complete
and in the instant case it was not so. The trial court ...
F considered the evidence in detail and came to the finding
that the verdict of conviction was not possible in the case.
The approach of the revisional court was not correct, after
all this was a revision against acquittal, at the instance
of private party. The Single Judge of the High Court has
G directed not even re-trial but re-appraisal of the evidence.
This could not be the course adopted in the matter. The
judgment of the revisional Court is set aside and that of
the trial court restored. [Paras 11 and 20] ]231-D-G; 236-
• -
A-G]
H
K. RAMACHANDRAN v. V.N. RAJAN & ANR. 221

Akalu Ahir & Ors. v. Ramdeo Ram (1973) 2 SCC 583; A
D. Stephens v. Nosibol/a (1951) SCR 284; Logendranath Jha
v. Polaila/ (1951) SCR ·676; K. C. Reddy v. State of Andhra
Pradesh (1963) 3 SCR 412 and Mahendra Pratap Singh v.
Sarju Singh (1968) 2 SCR 287, relied on.
B
Case Law Reference :

(1973) 2 sec 583 relied on Para 11
•
(1951) SCR 284 relied on Para 11

(1951) SCR 676 relied on Para 11 c
(1963) 3 SCR 412 relied on Para 11
'......'
(1968) 2 SCR 287 relied on Para 11

.. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal D
No. 485 of 2004.

From the Judgment & Order dated 26.08.2003 of the High
Court of Judicature at Madras in Crl. R.C. No. 608 of 1999.

Rahul Nagpal and A.T.M. Sampath for the Appellants. E

.. . J..
Mukul Sharma, Naveen R. Nath, Anitha Shenoy and S.
Thananjayan for the Respondents .

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
V.5. SIRPURKAR, J. 1. By this appeal the appellant-
appellant challenges the revisional judgment of the High Court
whereby the High court has upset the Trial Court's judgment
acquitting the appellant-appellant and has directed
reconsideration of the matter by the Trial Court. The High Court G
has further directed that such reconsideration would be only on
~
the basis of evidence already recorded.

2. The appellant~appellant K. Ramachandran was tried for
the offence under Section 302 as also under Section 201 of
H
-1·
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.

A the Indian Penal Code on the allegation that he, on 18.02.1995, ..
committed murder of his wife Nalini @ Latha by hitting her with
a wooden log on her head. The prosecution's case was that
the marriage of the appellant-accused and the said Nalini took
place in 1992 and right from the beginning their marital life was
B not smooth as the appellant-accJs )d suspected her fidelity.
After their marriage, appellant-accused used to live with his
wife in a rented house at Avadi. It was the prosecution's story
that neighbours used to hear wailing sounds of Nalini and she
had also told PW-5, Belamurthy that her fidelity was suspected
c by the appellant-accused and on that account, the appellant-
accused was not treating her properly. During the pregnancy,
the appellant-accused refused to send Nalini to her parent's
house though he was pressurised by PW-5 to send her to the
house of her father, PW-1. The appellant-accused went on to
suggest that he was not the father of the child which Nalini was
0
bearing and hence she was brought back by PW-1 to his house. •
Later the appellant-accused and his brother, Pandurangan took
Nalini back to the appellant-accused's house. When Nalini was
at the advanced stage of pregnancy, PW-1 wanted to take her
to his house but the appellant-accused did not permit that and
E said that he will take care of the confinement and wanted the
child to be born in his house. However, ultimately, the appellant-
accused relented on account of intervention of Belamurthy, PW-
5.
F 3. Ultimately, a child was born in the house of her father.
But the appellant-accused did not go to see the child. It was
only when the child was seven months old that the appellant-
accused and brother Pandurangam took Nalini and the child
to their house. In the month of May in the year 1994 it is reported
G that the appellant-accused cut the Thali chain (ornament worn
by a married lady) and threw her out of the house. One
Krishnaveni, PW-4 had also seen the ill-treatment by the •
appellant-accused, of his wife. One Girija who was the
household servant of the appellant-accused had also seen that.
H On 02.05.1994, Nalini was brought back by PWs 1 and 2 to
K. RAMACHANDRAN v. V.N. RAJAN & ANR. 223
[VS. SIRPURKAR, J.]

their house and after about two months, the appellant-accused A
and his brother again came and took back her and they
continued to live with each other for about 4-5 months. On
17.02.1995, when PWs 1 and 2 had gone to the house of
appellant-accused on being called by Nalini on phone. Nalini
told them that she was going to Vikravandi. On the next day, B
which was a Saturday, PWs 1 and 2 received the news of
Nalini's death at 12:30 p.m. and went to Vikravandi. They saw
the dead body of Nalini and the injury on her head, on back and
all over the body. The matter was reported to the police. It was
revealed during the investigation that on the night of 17.02.1995, c
when PW-7 was sleeping in the tea shop, the appellant-accused
came to him and asked for the cot. He was then accompanied
by Nalini and her daughter. However, on the next day in the
morning at 7 a.m., PW-7 heard the news of death of Nalini while
lighting stove. Strangely enough, the matter was reported by the D
appellant-accused himself who daimed in the FIR that Nalini
went r.'lissing and ultimately died. On that, the policy registered
Crime No. 75/1995 under Section 174, Criminal Procedure
Code. The police found out the body in the well which was
brought out and post-mortem was conducted in Government
hospital by Assistant Surgeon, Dr. Bhoomadhu, PW-19. As E
many as eight injuries were found on the dead body and it was
found that Nalini had suffered a scull fracture.

4. After the necessary investigation, the charge-sheet
came to be filed against appellant-accused. During F
investigation, the appellant-accused had agreed to discover the
log with which he had hit Nalini. The charges were framed for
offence under Section 302 and 201, IPC. During the trial,
number of witnesses came to be examined. The Sessions
Judge, however, did not accept the evidence of doctor and G
acquitted the appellant-accused of all the offences. The
Sessions Judge held specifically that it was not proved that the
appellant-accused had hit Nalini with a log.

5. This judgment of the Sessions Judge was not appealed H
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.

A against by the State. Instead, father of Nalini filed a criminal
revision. This revision seems to have been filed and was
admitted by the High Court. It was pending when the State
Government filed an appeal against the acquittal of the
appellant-accused which was delayed by 801 days. Strangely
B enough, that condonation of delay application came to be
considered by the Division Bench of the High Court and the
High Court, by its order dated 05.03.2003, dismissed the
condonation application. Thereby the appeal against acquittal
could not proceed. Very strangely, at the time when the
c condontion of delay application in filing the appeal was
considered by the High Court, it was not pointed out by the
Government advocate on criminal, side who appeared for the
State, that a revision had already been and was pending
against the acquittal, at the instance of father of Nalini. Now, in
fact the State Government was very much a party in that revision
D and was also served. After all, the said revision was admitted
by the High Court. However, since the Division Bench was
totally unmindful of the pendency of the said revision it merely
dismissed the condonation of delay application. We have seen
that order. That is an order merely refusing to condone the delay
E and there is nothing in the order to suggest that the High Court
ever considered the merits of the order of the Trial Court.

6. Ultimately, the revision came up before the Single Judge
of the High Court, who allowed the revision and directed
F reconsideration of the matter on the basis of evidence already
on record. In the impugned order, the learned Judge does not
seem to have given any further opportunity to the parties for
leading any further evidence and that is how this judgment of
the learned Single Judge is in challenge before us.
G
7. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant-accused, firstly contended that the effect of dismissal
of the condonation of delay application was the dismissal of
appeal. It was pointed out that the Division Bench which
considered the matter had made an observation in the order
H
K. RAMACHANDRAN v. V.N. RAJAN & ANR. 225
[V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
to the effect that the appellant-accused was already acquitted A
in the year 1999 and, therefore, to condone the delay and to
admit the appeal would cause prejudice him. The counsel,
therefore, urged that this revision should have been dismissed.

8. Learned counsel for the complainant, however, argues
B
that the revision was filed prior in time as compared to the
appeal filed against acquittal and the said revision was also
admitted by the High Court. Further, the High court had no
occasion to consider the merits of the matter as it proceeded
to dismiss the application for -eondonation of delay. If that was
so, there was nothing wrong in learned Judge considering the
c
revision on its merits. Learned counsel further pointed out that
the question of un-tenability of the revision was never pointed
out to the learned Single Judge by showing that the appeal
against the decision could not proceed on account of delay not
.. being condoned by the High Court. Learned counsel urged that D
the complainant had not done any wrong in filing the revision
which was also admitted by the High Court and, therefore, the
revision could not be wiped out merely because the High court,
without considering the merits of the matter, chose to refuse
the delay in filing the appeal by the State. E
9. We cannot find fault with the learned Single Judge in
proceeding ahead with the revision as it was never brought to
... the notice of the learned Single Judge that the appeal against
the same judgment which was impugned in the revision had
F
already been filed. It was for the appellant-accused to point out
that on the date when the revision was heard the fate of the
criminal appeal filed impugning the same judgment was sealed
because of the refusal on the part of the Division Bench to
condone the delay. In fact, it was up to the Government pleader
G
who was a common party in both the revision and the appeal
~ to point out to the learned Single Judge about the dismissal of
the condonation of delay application. Very strangely, the
Government pleader did not do that. Again we are at a loss to
understand as to how the criminal revision was left out and was
not mentioned before the Division Bench deciding the question H
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.

A of condonation of delay in appeal, which was filed against the
same judgment. In this appeal, however, the first question which
has been raised is about the dismissal of the statutory appeal
preferred by the State and its effect on the pending revision.
The appellant-appellant-accused, however, has conveniently
B avoided to state in the special leave petition as to when he
came to know about the dismissal of the condonation of delay
application in filing the appeal and how. We cannot, therefore,
find fault with the learned Single Judge's judgment who was
never appraised of the dismissal of the condonation of delay
c application. Similarly, since the' order refusing to condone the
delay is not challenged before us, it will not be possible for us
to go into that aspect also. But we must observe that it was the
duty of the State counsel to point out that a revision was already
pending against the same judgment which was challenged in
appeal but which appeal was delayed by more than 800 days
0 •
at the time when the application for condonation for delay was
considered by the Division Bench. Since the appellant-accused
had not raised the question about the continueiability of the
revision before the High Court, we would not ordinarily allow
E the counsel for appellant-accused to raise that question before
us. Though, we must say that an awkward situation has arisen
wherein an appeal against the judgment had failed, though only
on the question of limitation, yet, a revision against the same
judgment, however, continued and was allowed also and all this
happened because of the casual attitude on the part of the State
F Government as also the appellant-accused in not pointing out
the proper facts to the Courts, both to the Division Bench as
well as the learned Single Judge.
10. The question is undoubtedly important, and hence,
G though raised for the first time before us, we propose to decide
the same. An incongruous situation has arisen where, though
the appeal against the acquittal has been dismissed by not
allowing the condonation of delay in filing the same, yet, the
revision filed against the said judgment by the private
H complainant has not only survived but such revision has also
K. RAMACHANDRAN v. V.N. RAJAN & ANR. 227
[V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
been allowed. We must observe ,that the Division Bench in not A
allowing the condonation of delay has effectively dismissed the
appeal in the sense that it has not allowed the State
Government to proceed with the ~ppeal for which there was a
provision. This was a prosecytion not based on private
complaint but on the police r'rport. Therefore, the State B
Government had a right under Section 378 (2) Cr. P.C. to file
app~al and very conspicuously the private party did not have
that right. The private complainant, therefore, could only excite
theigeneral powers of revision by the High Court. Firstly, we
mu~t clarify that when the Division Bench considered the c
question of condonation of delay in filing the appeal against
acqiuittal, though technically, it was deciding the application
und~r Section 378 (3), Cr.P.C. It was actually the whole appeal
itself which was before it. In this behalf it will have to be seen
that the limitation for filing such appeal at the instance of the
D
~ State Government against acquittal is provided by Article 114
of th~ Limitation Act. It is undoubtedly true that sub-Section (3)
spedfically provides that the appeal under sub-Sections (1) and
(2) c~nnot be entertained except with the leave of the High
Court. and, therefore, an application for leave in such appeal
filed by the State Government is a must. The limitation for filing E
the appeal is 90 days from the date of the order while the same
Articleiprovides for 30 days of limitation from the date of grant
" of spettial leave. Therefore, what was before the High Court was
the appeal itself and the _petitioner prayed the condonation of
delay' of 801 days in filing appeal against acquittal. When the F
High Court declined to grant that permission, it, in effect refused
to entertain the appeal against the order of the Trial Court, thus,
making it final. Now, obviously, if the judgment was rendered
. final by the Division Bench of the High Court then there could
not be any subsequent order to the contrary by the Single Judge G
, even if the effect of the pend ency of the revision was not brought
to the notice of the Division Bench. There is no review power
under the Criminal Procedure Code to the Criminal Court
including the High Court. Such a review power exists only in
this Court. As such, once the High Court had passed the order H
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.

A refusing the condonation of delay of appeal and thereby
awarding the finality to the Trial Court's judgment, that order
could be considered and upset only by this Court on a proper
appeal having been filed in this Court by the State Government.
As against the State Government, the order of the Trial Court
B acquitting the appellant-accused had become final. Therefore,
the only course left open then in law was to challenge that order
refusing to condone the delay in filing appeal against acquittal.
It is an admitted fact that such appeal challenging the order
passed by the Division Bench was never filed and the order of
c the Division Bench became final and has remained final till
today. Under such circumstances, in our considered opinion,
the revision against the same order could not have been
entertained, much less allowed upsetting the finality of the Trial
Court's judgment, which finality was confirmed by the order of
D the High court by refusing to condone the delay in filing the
appeal against the same Trial Court judgment. That would be
the true import of the appellate powers of the High Court.

An attractive argument is pressed in service by the learned
counsel for the complainant that this is a case where the
E complainant's side was not considered at all.

We must express here that considering the history of
appeal against acquittal and the revisional powers of the High
court, the appeal against acquittal originally was not there. That ·
F was a general rule in England. In Canada, such right was
recognised by Section 584 of the Canadian Criminal Code only
on the point of law to the Court of appeal for an indictable
offence. In New Zealand also vide Sections 380-382 of the
Crimes Act, 1861, there were similar provisions. In comparison
to these strict provisions, in India, however, unlimited and
G general right was given in respect of appeal against acquittals
in favour of the State Government. In its 48th Report, the Law
Commission cautioned against the unlimited nature of the right
and prescribed that it was desirable to put some limitation as
to the nature of cases where the right would be available. It was
H also further provided that regard must be had to the need of
K. RAMACHANDRAN v. V.N. RAJAN & ANR. 229
[V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

putting reasonable limitations on the period for which anxiety A
and tension of a criminal prosecution could be allowed to
torment the mind of the appellant-accused. It was provided that
there is a qualitative distinction between conviction and
acquittal and appeals against acquittals should not be allowed
in the same un-restricted manner as appeal against conviction. B
Before that in its 41 st Report, the Law Commission had
observed that the appeals a_gainst acquittals should be heard
by the High Court to avoid miscarriage of justice and to secure
a uniform standard in dealing with such appeals. It was further
provided that the right of appeal should be confined only to the c
State and the complainant and cannot be given to other
interested persons. Thirdly, it was provided that there no need
for an express provision to the effect that when an appeal by
State has been dismissed no application for special leave by
complainant should be competent since this is a necessary 0
consequence of the dismissal of appeal. (Emphasis supplied).
Forthly, it was provided that an appeal from a Single Judge to
the Bench will not serve any useful purpose, and lastly it was
provided there was no justification for extending the time for
appeals by the State.
E
In the Report of Joint Select Committee also it was
recommended that such appeals shall be entertained by the
High Court only if it grants leave to the State Government in this
behalf. This is necessary to check any arbitrary exercise of
executive power. Section 378, Cr.P.C., as it stood then was F
further amended w.e.f 23.06.2006 by Act No.25 of 2005 vide
Section 32 while for the first time the appeals against acquittals
recorded by a Magistrate in respect of cognizable and bailable
offences could be tried by the Court of Sessions also. But we
are not concerned with that Amendment. G

) All this would clearly suggest that once the appeal at the
instance of the State has been dismissed, the complainant or
the state could not ask for the revision of the judgment. In this
particular case, we are of the clear cut opinion, that since the H
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 10 S.C.R.

A Trial Court's judgment was given the effect of finality by the
Division Bench of the High Court then learned Single Judge of
that Court could not have reversed that effect and upset that
position . In this behalf, even sub-Section (6) would, though not
directly, support this view. Sub-Section (6) provides as under:
8
"(6) If, in any case, the application under sub-section (4)
for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of
acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order of acquittal
shall lie under sub-section (1) or under sub-section (2)."

C This would mean that if a case is instituted by the
complainant and such leave is refused even the State
Government would be unable to pursue any appeal under sub-
sections (1) or (2) against the impugned judgment of acquittal.
In effect by sub-Section (6), the finality attained by the dismissal
D of an application for special leave is confirmed by the Court
then that verdict would operate against the said judgment of
acquittal being challenged even at the instance of the State
Government. If this is the effect of the finality attained by the
judgment, even in case of an offence which was tried on the
E basis of a private complaint, then there would be no reason not
to give the same effect to the finality attained by the judgment
of acquittal by reason of the order passed in appeal, filed by
the State Government.
Again, as we have already pointed out the finality
F confirmed by the Division Bench should not be upset by the
judgment of the Single Bench of the same Court. Such
incongruous results would follow if we allow the revision to be
entertained and decided. In this case, undoubtedly, the revision
was not only entertained but also admitted by the High Court.
G We have only to express that the attitude on the part of the State
Government counsel as also the appellant-accused was
extremely casual. We also do not understand as to why, when
appeal was filed along with the application for condonation of
delay against the judgment of acquittal, the revision pending
H against the same judgment of acquittal was not joined with the
K. RAMACHANDRAN v. V.N. RAJAN & ANR. 231
[V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

.;..
appea). Ordinarily, that should have been done. It is all the result A
of colossal casualness even on the part of the Registry of the
--. High Court which has resulted in such incongruous situation.
We, however, cannot blame the learned Single Judge for
proceeding with the revision as he was never apprised of the
disr;nissal of the appeal. B
, The limitation aspect cannot be such as to be apart or
distinct from the merits of the impugned judgment. Therefore, ·
it cf)nnot be said that the appeal was only disposed of on the
question of limitation. Th~ result would, after all, be the same
i.e. impugned judgment gaining finality. c
11. However, we fin\:l that the revision could nQt hay~
proceeded and the appellant-accused must succeed on this
plea alone. We have alsp considered the judgment of th~
learned Single Judge on !merits of the matter. In a revision D
.,. · against acquittal preferre~ by "l private party, there is a very
little scope to interfere. Here was a case where the learned
Single Judge dis-approveq of the appreciation of the evidence
by the Trial Court. It is not as if the Trial Court had ignored any
important piece of evidence or it had chosen not to appreciate E
the same. It is again not as if there was any piece of evidence
which was illegally not permitted to come on record. Again, it
is also not a case where t~ere was some serious defect in the
~ trial affecting the merits of the matter. Further, the Court trying
~
the appellant-accused did hot lack the jurisdiction also to try and
F
convict or acquit the appellant-accused. All that the High Court
has observed is that the appreciation of evidence by the Trial
Court was not correct and the Trial Court should not have taken
the view that it has taken of the evidence. This question has
been considered· in the celebrated judgment of Akalu Ahir &
G
Ors. v. Ramdeo Ram [(1973) 2 SCC 583], where, after
,. >
considering the judgments of D. Stephens v. Nosibo/la [1951
SCR 284], Logendranath Jha v. Pofailal [1951 SCR 676], K.C.
Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh [(1963) 3 SCR 412] and
Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh [(1968) 2 SCR 287]
this Court came out with categories of case which would justify H
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.

A the High Court in interfering with the finding of acquittal in ....
revision:
........
"(i) Where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the
case, but has still acquitted the appellant-accused;
8 (ii) Where the Trail Court has wrongly shut out evidence
which the prosecution wished to produce;

(iii) Where the appellate Court has wrongly held the
evidence which was admitted by the Trial Court to
be inadmissible;

(iv) Where the material evidence has been overlooked
only (either) by the Trial Court or by the appellate
Court; and

D (v) Where the acquittal is based on the compounding
of the offence whici 1 is invalid under the law."

Of course, these categories were declared by this Court
to be illustrative and this Court observed that other cases of
E similar nature could also be properly held to be exceptional in
nature where the High Court could justifiably interfere with the
order of acquittal. In this very judgment though in paragraph 10,
this Court did not generally approve of the appreciation of
evidence by the Trial Court Judge and held it to be not perfect ~ ,,,.
or free from flaw and further observed "the Court of appeal may
F be justified in disagreeing with the conclusion, but it does not
follow that on revision by a private complainant, the High Court
is not entitled to re-appreciate the evidence for itself as if it is
acting as a Court of appeal and then order a re-trial." The
situation, as we will show further, is identical in the present case.
G
12. In the impugned judgment, learned Single Judge has
pointed out the prosecution case that the Court noticed that
though the appellant-accused was supposed to reach
Vikravandi in the day time on 18.02.1995, he preferred to reach
H on 17.02.1995 at about 2 a.m. and then the appellant-accused
K. RAMACHANDRAN v. V.N. RAJAN & ANR. 233
[V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

-"
took shelter in the tea shop of PW-7. Learned Judge further A
noted that at about 5 a.m. in the morning the deceased wanted
~.

to answer the call of nature and, hence, leaving the child in the
tea shop itself, the appellant-accused took the deceased to his
lands where there is a well and after the deceased answered
the nature's call when she went to wash herself in the nearby B
well she slipped and fell into the well and was drowned. The
learned Judge also noted that the appellant-accused himself
> reported that at about 11 :20 a.m. in the Vikravandi police
station. Thereafter, some villagers and the police came to the
spot of occurrence and the further investigation started. The c
learned Single Judge ,further noted that the prosecution
examined 20 witnesses including the relations of the deceased
as also PWs 1 and 2, who were the parents of the deceased,
PW-3, son-in-law and PW-4 who was the servant maid in the
house of the appellant-accused. The learned Judge has then D
given the whole account of each of the pr6secution witness in
short up to PW-20.

13. While considering the evidence of PW-19, the doctor
who conducted the post-mortem, following observation was
made by the learned Judge: E

"In cross examination a specific question was put that if a
person falls down from a high place into a well where there
~: • was water, would such injury be caused. The doctor has
negatived the suggestion and he was of the opinion that F
the said injury could have been caused only when she had
been hit with some weapon and MO No.1 would be such
a weapon that could have caused the injury."

14. When we see the evidence of Dr. Bhoomadhu, who
was examined as PW-19, we clearly see the following G
....... j
assertions in paragraph 9 of his deposition:

"I opined that the death should have occurred 28 to 30
hours earlier. I opeined the death could have been caused
because of loss of blood due to injuries and shock. Ex.35 H
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.

A is the requisition. Ex.36 is the report I had sent. The ,.._
Inspector showed the MO No. 1 the log and enquired me
with No.1 the injuries over the body 1 to 5 cold have been .~

possible."

B 15. In the cross-examination this witness asserted that "8th
injury is inside and there was no outward injury to that"(sic).

16. He admitted in the cross-examination that the injury
was very minor one and there was no need to cut that. The depth
of injuries 1, 2 and 4 was 1/4th c.ms. and they were ordinary
c external injuries and there was no ne~ed to open them and,
therefore, he did not open them. He further admitted that the
.Inspector enquired him on 12.06.1997 and he did not
'remember whether the Inspector e)(amined him showing the log,
MO No. 1. He also could not say whether the blood was
D beneath would 2, 4 and 5. He then asserted that if an individual
falls from a height there were ch'.nces of bruises and injuries
and open wounds. When falling from a height if head dashes
against a hard substance, injury No. 8 can be caused. He also
admitted that if a blow was given by MO N0.1 on the head,
E external injury can be there. He further tried to explain that if the
hitting was light there would be no external injury.

17. We have examined the evidence of the doctor almost
,:line by line but we do not see any assertion on the part of the •
doctor which has been quoted by the learned Judge in "'"""""
F. paragraph 10 of his judgment which we have quoted above.
Therefore, it is obvious that the High Court has mis-read the
evidence of the doctor. It will be worthwhile to see that the doctor
has specifically said that "there was no corresponding outward
injury to the 8th injury suffered by the deceased"(sic) . If this is
G so, it is not possible to hold that the 8th injury which was only
an internal injury would be caused by MO No.1, a log. The
doctor, on his external examination found an internal fracture.
Injury No.8 was only a Haemorrhage or a blood clot.
-
H
18. After reading the evidence carefully, we are of the
K. RAMACHANDRAN v. V.N. RAJAN & ANR. 235
[V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
> opinion that the evidence of the doctor has been completely A
mis-read by the high Court. 111 paragraph 13 of the judgment,
the learned Judge has referred to the finding by the Trial Court
that the appellant-accused had been ill-treating his wife. In
paragraph 17, learned Judge has commented upon the conduct
of the appellant-accused and has observed that that appellant- B
accused had not come forward with any specific case as to why
he took his wife on the night of 17.2.1995 to Vikravandi and
> as to why at 2 a.m. when appellant-accused.could have gone
to his own house, he preferred to stay in a tea shop. It is then
commented that the story, that he accompanied the deceased c
to the field when she wanted to answer the nature's call, was
difficult to digest. It has also come later on in the judgment that
it was strange that the lady should have gone to the well instead
of a nearby pond to wash herself. In our opinion, these
observations are speculative. If the lady had gone to the well
0
in the dark at 5 O'clock then one wonders how she could have
seen the nearby pond. Again, it has not been proved that the
field belonged to the appellant-accused. There appears to be
·a lot of confusion on that issue. The field has been described
in the R.D.O. report in the Magazar as survey No. 167/5. It is
then further mentioned in paragraph that the said well in the E
Punja survey No. 167/5 in Patta No. 354 to be in the name of
Panduramng s/o Kasilingam. We, therefore, fail to understand
as to how it was mentioned that the field belonged to the
__..,._; •"
appellant-accused.
F
19. Lastly, it is expressed by the High Court in paragraph
19:
"What is more surprising is that there were as many as 8
injuries in the body. The injury on the head makes it
abundantly clear that she has been assaulted by a G
weapon. It is not the case of the accused that there was
any stone or any protruding material in the well which could
have hit on the head. It is nobody's case. Therefore, it is
for the accused to explain as to how all these things
happened." H
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.

....

-
A 20. We do not think that this was a correct approach as
the above observation is not factually correct. In the whole
judgment, it is nowhere pointed out as to how and where the
Trial Court had gone wrong. When we see the judgment of the
Trial Court, it is seen that the Trial Court has awarded the
B acquittal as according to it in a caf:'3 based on circumstantial
evidence, the chain of circumstances has to be complete and
in this case it was not. The only two circumstances which were
held proved according to the Trial Court were that the deceased
was last seen accompanying the appellant-accused herein and
c that her dead body w<11s found near the residential plot of the
appellant-accused. To the Trial court these two circumstances
were not enough to book him much less for an offence under
Section 302, IPC. The learned Sessions Judge also explained •.
the 8 injuries noted by the doctor and has appreciated the
evidence of PW-19 and observed that barring injury No.8, which
D
was an internal injury there were no other outward serious
injuries as those injuries were minor and might have been
caused by some insec::t or biting by fish. He pointed out that
the doctor was not certain whether the injury Nos. 2, 4 and 5
suggested that they were ante-mortem injuries. He also said
E that the post-mortem report was inconclusive. The Trial Court
has, in detail, considered the evidence and came to the finding
that the verdict of conviction was not possible in this case . We
have already pointed out that the approach of the learned
revisional Court was not correct, after all this was a revision
• .
F against acquittal, at the instance of private party.
21. The learned Single Judge of the High Court has
directed not even re-trial but re-appraisal of the evidence which
will be clear from the last paragraph of the impugned judgment
before us. We do not think that this could be the course adopted
G
in the matter. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside
the judgment of the revisional Court and restore that of the Trial
Court.
R.P. Appeal allowed.