Supreme Court of India
K.V. SUDHARSHANversusA. RAMAKRISHNAPPA & ORS.
- Citation
- 2008 INSC 1039
- Decided
- 15 September 2008
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- TARUN CHATTERJEE
Holding
Inam lands granted under the Mysore (Religious and Charitable Inams) Abolition Act to the tiller or Archak are held for the benefit of the family and remain joint family property, thus subject to partition.
Summary
The appellant, son of the second respondent, sought partition of the joint family property that included inam lands granted to the eldest son (respondent No.1) after the death of their father, who had been the Archak of a temple. The lower courts dismissed the suit, holding that a prior partition had been effected and that the inam lands, granted under the Mysore (Religious and Charitable Inams) Abolition Act, 1955, became the individual property of the Archak under Section 6A. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether such a grant creates a personal right or remains a family right. Relying on the decision in Nagesh Bishto Desai v. Khando Tirmal Desai, the Court held that inam lands granted to the tiller or Archak are held for the benefit of the family and are not alienated as individual property. Consequently, the grant does not bar other family members from claiming their share, and the lands are subject to partition. The Court set aside the High Court judgment and remanded the matter for determination of each party's share.
Issues considered
- Whether inam lands granted under the Mysore (Religious and Charitable Inams) Abolition Act, 1955 to the Archak become individual property, thereby precluding partition.
- Whether Section 6A of the Act confers an exclusive personal right or a right that is held in trust for the family.
- Whether the admission of prior partition by the second respondent bars the appellant's claim for partition of the inam lands.
- Whether the precedent set in Nagesh Bishto Desai v. Khando Tirmal Desai applies to the present facts.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Inam landsMysore Religious and Charitable Inams Abolition ActSection 6APartitionJoint family propertyOccupancy rightsArchakLand reform
Judgment
[2008] 13 S.C.R. 465
K.V. SUDHARSHAN A
v.
A. RAMAKRISHNAPPA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 5646 of 2008)
SEPTEMBER 15, 2008
B
[TARUN CHATTERJEE AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ.]
..
Mysore (Religious and Charitable lnams) Abolition Act,
. 1955:
lnam lands - Granted to· eldest son with the consent of c
brother and other family members - Partition - Held: lnam
lands cannot be regarded as individualproperty-:Of grantee -
In terms of provisions under the 1955 Act, inam lands liable
to be granted to tiller of such lands who may be an archakl
-<(' tenant/office bearer- Such grant is meant for benefit of family D
of tiller and not for his individual benefit - Thus, grant of land
in favour of the eldest son, with the consent of other tnef!lbers
of the family could not disentitle other members to exe(cise
their right to claim share in the property/lands - Moreover,
lands Tribunal granted occupancy right to grantee because E
his father was Archak of the temple and not because the con-
ditions as laid down in s. 6(A) of the Act are fulfilled - Occu-
pancy right, as granted to him, was. not his individual right- '
Hence, the lands in question available for partition.
-.(.
Father of respondent Nos. 1 & 2 was serving as an F
•, Archak in a temple and had been cultivating the inam
lands attached to the temple. After his death, the lands
were granted by the authority to respondent No.1, the el-
dest son, with the consent of other members of the fam-
ily. Respondent No.1 was also acting as the Manager of' G
the ancestral and self-acquired property of his father.
~
Appellant, son of resp.ondent No,2, issued a legal notice
to respondent No.1 demanding partition of the joint fam-
ily properties including inam lands. Respondent No.1 re-
465 H
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.
A fused to partition the immovable properties. The appel-
lant filed a suit for partition claiming his share in the prop-
erties along with mesne profits. The Trial Court dismissed
the suit holding that prior partition was established in view
of the admission by respondent No.2 and as such the
B appellant could not demand partition. Aggrieved, the ap-
pellant filed an appeal, which was dismissed by the High
Court. Review petition was also dismissed by the High
Court. Hence the present appeal.
Appellant contended that in respect of inam lands
C granted to respondent No. 1, the High Court had commit-
ted an error by holding that since the appellant and the
respondent No.2 had not performed the duties as archak
of the lnamdar Temple and they had not personally culti-
vated the lands, they were not entitled to grant of the inam
D lands.
Counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 3 submitted that
respondent no.1 had got the properties, imam land in
question, vacated from the tenants who had been culti-
E vating it and thereafter he was personally cultivating the
same and after coming into force of the Mysore (Religious
and Charitable lnams) Abolition Act, an application for
grant of occupancy rights was moved on his behalf and
the right was conferred on him by the competent author-
ity after proper inquiry and therefore, the appellant could
F not claim partition of the same; that respondent no.1 was
admittedly the archak of the temple and he was also cul-
tivating the properties personally for a continuous period
of 3 years prior to the date of its vesting with him and
therefore, he was entitled to apply for registration of his
G right in terms of provisions of the Act; and that the grant
of such right is a personal right which cannot be charac-
terized as an ancestral right because in this case, even if
his father was alive, he could not have become entitled to
grant of occupancy rights because he was not cultivat-
H ing the lands.
K.V. SUDHARSHAN v. A. RAMAKRISHNAPPA 467
> & ORS.
Allowing the appeal, the Court A
HELD: 1.1 Under the scheme of the Mysore (Reli-
gious and Charitable lnams Abolition) Act, inam lands are
liable to be granted to the tiller of such lands, be, as it
may, as tenants, archaks or office bearers of the inamdar
.,,{
temple. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that such B
grants are meant for the benefit of the family of the tiller
and not for him individually and for this reason, there can
be no justification to disregard the rights of the junior
members of the family if their eldest member was perform-
ing the duties of archak with the consent of others. For this c
reason and in view of the decision of this court in the case
of Nagesh Bishto, this Court is of the view that grant of
land to archak cannot disentitle the other members of the
family of the right to the land and such granted land, there-
_,, fore, is also available for partition. Furthermore, it also D
emerges from the judgment of the Trial Court that the ten-
ants cultivating the land had stated that respondent no.2
had requested his father to allow him to cultivate the lands
who accordingly gave his consent before the land tribu-
nal also. Such being the position, if other members of the E
family had not objected to his becoming the archak of
the temple because he was the eldest and also allowed
him to cultivate the lands then, if subsequently he was,
by virtue of the fact that he was the archak and also per-
.. sonally cultivating the land$, granted the lands, he can- F
not take away the rights of such other members of the
family in the granted lands. (Para -13) (474-G-H; 475-A-D]
Nagesh Bishto Desai Vs. Khando Tirmal Desai etc.
(1982) 2 sec 79 - relied on.
G
1.2 It is pellucid that respondent No.1 is relying only
on Section 6A of the Act to submit that he was granted
~· the occupancy rights. It is clear from Secti.on 6A of the
Act that respondent No.1 satisfied the conditions enumer-
ated therein and for that reason, he was granted the oc-
H
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008) 13 S.C.R.
~
A cupancy rights. If seen in isolation, conclusion would be
that since respondent No.1 had fulfilled the conditions of
Section GA of the Act, he was granted the occupancy
rights and the question of bringing the other family mem-
bers did not arise. However, this Court is not inclined to
B look at Section GA in isolation. If seen in totality, it is dis- . \.
cernible that the father of respondent No.1 gave his con-
sent and allowed respondent no.1 to cultivate the land
after taking the same from the tenants. Even the land tri-
bunal, while passing the order granting occupancy rights,
had not confined itself to the fact that the conditions in
c Section GA were fulfilled. Rather, the land tribunal had
observed that the father of respondent No. 1 was the
archak and anubhavdar of the temple and this was a prime
consideration in granting occupancy rights to the respon-
dent No.1. Therefore, it would be wrong to hold that sim-
D
ply because the conditions in Section GA were fulfilled, r
the respondent no. 1 was granted occupancy rights and
it was his individual rights. The truth is that the respon-
dent No.1 became the Archak after the death of his father
because he was the eldest in the family and only then
E came the question of satisfying the conditions of Section
GA of the Act. (Para - 14) [475-E-H; 476-A-B]
1.3 It is wrong on the part of respondent No.1 to say
that his father, even if he had been alive, would not have
F been granted occupancy rights because the lands at that
time were cultivated by the tenants. For grant of occupancy •
rights, personal cultivation is just one condition. The other
conditions include that if a person is managing the prop-
erties, which his father was doing, would also be entitled
to the grant of occupancy rights. (Para - 15) [476-C-D)
G
1.4 Respondent No. 1 was made archak after the
death of his father because he was the eldest member of
the family. Being the archak, he cultivated the lands and -I
obtained occupancy rights. In such circumstances, it
H would be highly unjust to deprive the other members of
!
K.V. SUDHARSHAN v. A RAMAKRISHNAPPA 469
& ORS.
the family from getting their share in the properties by rely- A
ing only on Section 6A of the Act. Therefore, this Court is
also of the opinion that the granted lands are also avail-
able for partition and grant of occupancy to one member
will not disentitle the other members. (Para - 15) [476-D-F)
J Appi Be/chadthi & Ors. vs. Sheshi Be/chadthi & Ors. B
(1982) 2 Karnataka Law Journal 565 - approved.
Case Law Reference
(1982) 2 sec 79 Relied on Para - 12
~ c
(1982) 2 Karnataka Law
Journal 565 Approved Para - 15
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5646
of 2008
D
From the final Judgment dated 24.7.2006 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bangalore in R.F.A. No. 126of1996
S.B. Sanyal, Rcijesh Mahale for the Appellant.
A.K. Ganguli, S.N. Bhat, N.P.S. Panwar and D.P. E
Chaturvedi for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
TARUN CHATTERJEE, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment F.
and final order dated 24th of July, 2006 of the High Court of
Karnataka at Bangalore in RFA No. 126/2006 whereby the High
Court had affirmed the decision of the Trial Court dismissing
the suit of the appellant for partition and separate possession
along with mesne profits. G
3. The relevant facts leading to the filing of this appeal, as
emerging from the case made out by the appellant in the plaint,
are as under :-
Late Anjanappa had two sons viz., Ramakrishnappa and H
'
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.
A Venkataramachar, arrayed as defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in the
suit. Defendant No.2/respondent No.2 is the father of the plain-
tiff/appellant. Defendant No. 3/respondent No.3 is the wife of
Defendant No. 1/respondent No.1. When Anjanappa was alive,
he was serving as an Archak of Sri Anjaneya Swamy Temple
B situated in Belesivalaya and there were Devadaya inam lands \ ..
attached to the temple, which were cultivated by him. After
Anjanappa's death, the said lands were granted to the respon-
dent No. 1 with the consent of the Tehsildar obtained on the
ground that he was the eldest son of Anjanappa. Apart from
c these inam lands, LateAnjapppa also possessed ancestral and
self acquired properties and after his demise, the respondent
No.1 was acting as the manager of the family but the joint family
of the appellant and the respondents possessed all these prop-
erties as joint family properties described in Plaint Schedule A
D to D of the plaint. Schedule A consisted of ancestral properties
viz., two agricultural lands measuring 4.11 acres and 1.34 acres
respectively and five house sites. Schedule B property was a
vacant site. Schedule C property consisted of two agricultural
lands, which were inam lands, granted subsequently in the name
of respondent No.1. Schedule D properties were moveable
E properties. There was no partition effected by metes and bounds
and the respondent No.1, taking advantage of the simplicity of
respondent.No.2 was managing all the properties and had also
refused to effect partition. On 4th of July, 1988, the appellant
issued a legal notice to the respondent No.1 demanding parti-
F tion of the joint family properties. The respondent No.1 replied
to the said notice alleging that the moveable properties had
already been partitioned on 23rd of April, 1962 and subsequently
on 81h of May, 1996, the immoveable properties were also par-
titioned. Since the respondent No. 1 refused to partition the
G immovable properties, the appellant was constrained to file the
suit for partition and separate possession of his share in Plaint
A to D schedule properties along with mesne profits.
4. The respondent no.1 and 3 entered appearance by fil-
H ing a written statement in which they denied the material alle-
K.V. SUDHARSHAN v. A. RAMAKRISHNAPPA 471
& ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
gations made in the plaint. In the written statement, it was al- A
leged by them that since partition had already been effected
between respondent no.1 and respondent no.3 i.e. the father of
the appellant and that they were separately enjoying the prop-
erties that had fallen to their respective shares. It was further
alleged that after the death of Anjanappa, respondent No.1, B
became the archak of the said temple and he was looking after
and cultivating the lands attached to the said temple i.e. 'C'
schedule properties of the plaint. After coming into force of the
Mysore (Religious and Charitable lnams) Abolition Act, 1955,
(in short 'the Act') the respondent No.1 filed an application for c
grant of occupancy rights in respect of 'C' schedule properties
as the Archak of the temple which was conferred on him.
5. The respondent No.2 supported the plaint case and
deposed that there was no partition of the properties by metes
and bounds and that the respondent No.1 did not allow him to D
·-or· cultivate the lands belonging to the joint family but only a small
portion of the same was allowed to be cultivated. The reason
behind staying under separate mess was stated to be the quarrel
between the women in the family.
6. The Trial Court by the judgment and order dated 251h of E
January, 1996 dismissed the suit filed by the appellant on the
ground that the parties were shown to be in possession of sepa-
rate portion of the lands and having separate mess. Relying on
. the deposition of respondent No.2, it held that prior partition
-.. was established in view of the admission of respondent No.2 F
and as such the appellant could not demand partition. Against
this decision of the trial court, the appellant filed ari appeal be-
fore the High Court, which, however, was dismissed. The ap·
pellant filed a review. petition in the High Court, which was also
dismissed. It is this decision of the High Court, which is Im- G
pugned in this appeal in respe:ct of which leave has already
been granted.
~
7. Before we proceed further, we may note that the notice
in the instant appeal has been issued confined to the claim in
H
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 13 S.C.R.
A relation to Schedule 'C' properties of the plaint and accordingly,
the dispute in the instant appeal also revolves only concerning
Schedule 'C' properties of the plaint.
8. Let us, therefore, look at the rival submissions of the
parties advanced before us. The learned senior counsel for the
8 appellant, Mr. S.S. Sanyal, strongly contended that in respect
of the Schedule C properties (inam properties granted to re-
spondent No. 1), the High Court had committed an error by hold-
ing that since the appellant and the respondent No.2 had not
performed the duties asArchak of the lnamdarTemple and they
c had not personally cultivated the said lands, they were not en-
titled to the grant of the lnam lands. In this regard, he submitted
that the courts below were not justified in holding that lnam lands
were granted to the respondent No.1 in his individual capacity
as Archak of the temple. In support of his contention, he relied
D on a decision of this court in Nagesh Bishto Desai Vs. Khando
Tirmal Desai [(1982) 2 SCC 79]. 'y
9. These submissions of the learned senior counsel for
the appellant were contested by the learned senior counsel for
the respondent Nos. 1 and 3, Mr. A.K. Ganguli. Mr. Ganguli sub-
E mitted that the respondent no.1 had got the Schedule 'C' prop-
erties vacated from the tenants who were cultivating the same
and was personally cultivating them and accordingly, after com-
ing into force of the act, an application for grant of occupancy
rights was moved on his behalf which was conferred on him by
F the competent authority after proper inquiry and therefore, the
'C' schedule properties were the self acquired properties of
the respondent no.1 and accordingly, the appellant could not
claim partition of the same. Mr. Ganguli relied on Section 6A of
the Act and submitted that the respondent no.1 was admittedly
G the archak of the temple and he was also cultivating the proper-
ties personally for a continuous period of 3 years prior to the
date of vesting and therefore, he was entitled to apply for reg is-
tration of his rights under the act to the competent authority. He 4
vehemently contended that the grant of such right is a personal
H right which cannot be characterized as an ancestral right be-
K.V. SUDHARSHAN v. A. RAMAKRISHNAPPA 473
& ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
cause in this case, even if Anjanappa was alive, he could not A
have become entitled to grant of occupancy rights because he
was not cultivating the lands and that the lands were being cul-
tivated by the tenants. He also submitted that the authority re-
lied uponwould not apply to the present case as it pertains to
Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act whose scheme is en- B
tirely different from the present act.
10. At this stage, we may note the findings of the High
Court as also the trial court with regard to the properties com-
prised in Schedule 'C' only. The High Court arrived at the fol-
lowing findings: - C
"......... once there is division of status, the same is
applicable to the granted or tenanted lands also. It is also
to be noted that Anjanappa died in the year 1964 and
thereafter, admittedly and undisputedly it is defendant no.1
0
who alone was the Archak of the temple. Only after coming
into force of the land reforms act, he has got the occupancy
rights conferred on himself. On perusal of the evidence of
both plaintiff and his father/defendant No.2, it is clear that
there was absolutely no evidence to show that at any point
of time either plaintiff of his father/defendant no.2 acted or E
.performed the archakship of the temple and also enjoyed
the lands ................ If one peruses the Karnakata Land
Reforms Act and the Karnataka Hindu Religious Institution
and Charitable Endowments act, under Section 6(a) of
the Act which came into force on 7.12.1973 two types of F
people were entitled to grant of occupancy
rights ............... As we find that neither plaintiff has
performed the duties of Archak to the temple nor there is
any material to show that along with the defendant no.2,
he cultivated and enjoyed the lands, the grant of occupancy G
rights of these inam lands must be held in the individual
capacity of the Archak viz., defendant no.1 ....... "
11. Having_ heard the learned counsel for the parties and
after examining the judgment of the High Court as well as of the H
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.
A trial court and other materials on record including the deposi-
tions of respondent Nos.1 and 2 before the trial court, we are of
the view that this appeal deserves to. be allowed for the rea-
sons set out hereinafter.
12. Let us first see if the submission of the appellant re-
B garding Schedule C properties, which, as noted herein earlier,
are the inam lands granted to the respondent no.1 holds any
water. In order to ascertain this, we need to see whether the
respondent no.1 had been granted occupancy rights in his indi-
vidual capacity as an Archak under Section 6A of the Act. It is
C clear from the judgment of the High Court that it has proceeded
on the assumption that since only the archak of the religious
institution is entit.led to be granted such inam lands, it becomes
self acquired and individual property of such grantee. In Nagesh
Bishto Desai Vs. Khando Tirmal Desai etc. [(1982) 2 SCC
D 79], it was held that inam lands granted to a member of joi:it
family upon abolition of inams cannot be considered as indvidual
property of such grantee and should be considered as a joint
family property available for partition. In the present case, the
grant in favour of respondent no.1 was made because his fa-
E ther was the archak of the temple and he, being the eldest in
the family, there was no objection expressed for granting the
land to him. In this view of the matter, we are of the considered
opinion that the inam lands cannot be regarded as the indi-
vidual property of the grantee and the High Court has commit-
F ted an error by holding that since the appellant has not per-
formed functions as archak, nor cultivated the land personally,
he was not entitled to seek partition. We are not inclined to ac-
cept the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent
Nos. 1 and 3 that the decision in Nagesh Bishto's case (supra)
G would not apply to the facts of the present case.
13. There is another aspect of the matter. Under the
scheme of the Act, inam lands are liable to be granted to the
tiller of such lands, be, as it may, as tenants, archaks or office
bearers of the inamdar temple. Accordingly, wr= are of the view
H that such grants are meant for the benefit of the family of the
KV. SUDHARSHAN v. A. RAMAKRISHNAPPA 475
& ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
tiller and not him individually and for this reason, there can be A
no justification to disregard the rights of the junior members of
the family if their eldest member was performing the duties of
archak with the consent of others. For this reason and in view ·
of the decision of this court in Nagesh Bishto's case [supra],
J we are of the view that grant of land to archak cannot disentitle B
the other members of the family of the right to the land and such
granted land, therefore, is also available for partition. Further-
more, it also emerges from the judgment of the Trial Court that
the tenants cultivating the land had stated that respondent no.1
had requested his father, Anjanappa to allow him to cultivate C
the lands who accordingly gave his consent before the land tri-
bunal also. Such being the position, if other members of the
family had not objected to his becoming the archak of the temple
because he was the eldest and also allowed him to cultivate
the lands then, if subsequently he was, by virtue of the fact that
0
he was the archak and also personally cultivating the lanqs,
granted the lands, he cannot take away the rights of such other
members of the family in the granted lands.
14. We may look at this case from yet another angle. It is
pellucid that respondent no.2 is relying only on Section 6A to E
submit that he was granted the occupancy rights. When we look
at Section 6A, it is clear that the respondent no.1 satisfied the
conditions enumerated therein and for that reason, he was
granted the occupancy rights. If we look at this in isolation, we
may well come to the conclusion that since respondent no.2 F
had fulfilled the conditions of Section 6A, he was granted the
occupancy rights and the question of bringing the other family
members did not arise. However, we are not inclined to look at
Section 6A in isolation. If seen in totality, it is discernible that
the father of respondent no.1 gave his consent and allowed re- G
spondent no.1 to cultivate the land after taking the same from
the tenants. Even the land tribunal, while passing the order grant-
ing occupancy rights, had not confined itself to the fact that the
conditions in Section 6A were fulfilled. Rather, the land tribunal
had observed that the. father of respondent no. 1 was the archak H
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.
A and anubhavdar of the temple and this was a prime consider-
ation in granting occupancy rights to the respondent no.1. There-
fore, it would be wrong to hold that simply because the condl•
tions in Section 6A were fulfilled, the respondent no. 1 wai
granted occupancy rights and it was his individual rights. The
B truth is that the respondent No.1 became the Archak after the
death of his father because he was the eldest in the family and
only then came the question of satisfying the conditions of Sec-
tion 6A.
15. Apart from this, it is wrong on the part of the respori-
C dent no.1 to say that his father, even if he had been alive, wou:d
not have been granted occupancy rights because the lands <it
that time were cultivated by the.tenants. For grant of occupancy
rights, personal cultivation is just one condition. The other con-
ditions include that if a person is managing the properties, which
D his father was doing, would also be entitled to the grant of occu-
pancy rights. We are, therefore, clearly of the view that the re-
spondent no. 1 was made archak after the death of his father
because he was the eldest member of the family. Being the
archak, he cultivated the lands and obtained occupancy rights.
E In such circumstances, it would be highly unjust to deprive the
other members of the family from getting their share in Sched-
ule 'C' properties by relying only on Section 6A. Therefore, we
are also of the opinion that the granted lands are also available
for partition. In our view, grant of occupancy to one member will
F not disentitle the other members. This principle can also be found
in the case of Appi Belchadthi & Ors. vs. Sheshi Be/chadthi ·&
Ors. (1982) 2 Karnataka Law Journal 565.
16. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned Judgment is
set aside and the appeal is remanded back to the High Court
G to decide the share of each party in respect of Schedule 'C'
properties within 3 months from the date of supply of a copy of
this judgment to it. The appeal is thus allowed to the extent indi-
cated above. There will be no order as to costs.
S.K.S. Appeal allowed.
H
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