Holding

The acquisition is integral to the Yamuna Expressway project, the invocation of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) was lawful, and the Kamal Sharma judgment correctly interprets the law, rendering Shyoraj Singh per incuriam.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined land acquisition proceedings undertaken by the Uttar Pradesh government and YEIDA for the integrated development of the Yamuna Expressway and adjoining parcels. The landowners challenged the use of the urgency provisions under Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, arguing that the State had arbitrarily dispensed with the hearing under Section 5‑A. The Court considered whether the acquisition formed part of an integrated development plan, whether the urgency clause was lawfully invoked, and which High Court judgment—Kamal Sharma or Shyoraj Singh—set the correct legal precedent. Relying on the reasoning in Nand Kishore and the earlier High Court decisions upholding the urgency clause for the expressway project, the Court held that the acquisition was integral to the expressway’s development and the urgency provisions were justified. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Kamal Sharma judgment, set aside Shyoraj Singh, upheld the enhanced compensation, dismissed the landowners' appeals and allowed YEIDA's appeals.

Issues considered

Whether the present acquisition is part of the integrated development plan of the Yamuna Expressway undertaken by YEIDA
Whether the application of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was legal and justified, thereby permitting the State to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5‑A
Whether the view in Kamal Sharma (relying on Nand Kishore) is the correct proposition of law, or whether the view in Shyoraj Singh (relying on Radhy Shyam) was justified

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 17(1), s. 17(4), s. 4(1), s. 5-A, s. 6
U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the present acquisition is a part of the integrated development plan of ‘Yamuna Expressway” undertaken by respondent No.3-Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (YEIDA); Whether the application of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land in the instant case, thereby justifying the decision of the State Government to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act; Whether the view taken by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Kamal Sharma validating the questioned acquisition while relying upon Nand

Subjects

Land acquisitionAcquisition proceedingsIntegrated development of lands abutting the Yamuna ExpresswayAcquisition of the abutting landsIntegrated development plan of Yamuna ExpresswayDevelopment of adjoining landsIntegrated project

Judgment

[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1064 : 2024 INSC 898

Kali Charan and Others
v.
State of U.P. and Others
(Civil Appeal No. 13119 of 2024)
26 November 2024
[B.R. Gavai and Sandeep Mehta,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the present acquisition is a part of the integrated
development plan of ‘Yamuna Expressway” undertaken by
respondent No.3-Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development
Authority (YEIDA); Whether the application of Sections 17(1) and
17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was legal and justified
in the instant case, thereby justifying the decision of the State
Government to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A of
the Act; Whether the view taken by the Division Bench of the
Allahabad High Court in Kamal Sharma validating the questioned
acquisition while relying upon Nand Kishore lays down the correct
proposition of law or whether the Division Bench in the case of
Shyoraj Singh was justified in applying the principles laid down
in Radhy Shyam case and quashing the acquisition proceedings
in question.

Headnotes†
Land acquisition – Present acquisition if a part of the integrated
development plan of ‘Yamuna Expressway” undertaken by
respondent No.3-YEIDA:
Held: Yes – Development of land parcels for industrial, residential,
and recreational purposes is complementary to the construction
of the Yamuna Expressway – The objective of the acquisition is
to integrate land development with the Yamuna Expressway’s
construction, thereby promoting overall growth serving the public
interest – Thus, the Expressway and the development of adjoining
lands are considered to be inseparable components of the overall
project – Appeals filed by the landowners dismissed, while that of
the YEIDA are allowed. [Para 38]

* Author
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1065

Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – ss.17 (1), (4) – Application of
ss.17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, if was
legal and justified in the instant case, justifying the decision
of the State Government to dispense with the enquiry under
s.5-A of the Act:
Held: Yes – The invocation of ss.17(1) and 17(4) was legal and
justified in this case – The urgency clause was applied in accordance
with the planned development of the Yamuna Expressway, as held
in the decision of this Court in Nand Kishore. [Para 38]

Land acquisition – View taken by the Division Bench of
the Allahabad High Court in Kamal Sharma validating the
questioned acquisition while relying upon Nand Kishore, if lays
down the correct proposition of law or whether the Division
Bench in the case of Shyoraj Singh was justified in applying
the principles laid down in Radhy Shyam case and quashing
the acquisition proceedings in question:
Held: Kamal Sharma extensively considered the factual matrix
and also examined the original records of the State Government
to arrive at the satisfaction that the invocation of the urgency
clause was absolutely justified with regard to the acquisition in
question – High Court also exhaustively considered the entire
sequence of judicial pronouncements in respect of the acquisition
in question before arriving at the aforesaid conclusion and acted
in an equitable manner while affirming the acquisition proceedings
and directing the grant of additional compensation – The view of
the Division Bench in Kamal Sharma, which relied upon Nand
Kishore is the correct proposition of law – Judgment of the High
Court in Shyoraj Singh, which relied on Radhy Shyam is not a
correct legal interpretation – Shyoraj Singh set aside as it does
not lay down good law and is per incuriam as it was passed
overlooking the earlier precedents – Kamal Sharma has already
granted additional compensation of 64.7% to the landowners,
to be offered as ‘No Litigation Bonus’ in consonance with the
Government order dated 04.11.15, thus there is no scope for
further enhancement in compensation – 64.7% enhancement
in compensation to apply in rem, ensuring uniform benefits
to all affected landowners under the present land acquisition.
[Paras 38, 43, 44]
1066 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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Case Law Cited
Shyoraj Singh and Others v. State of U.P. Writ-C No. 30747 of
2010 – held not good law; per incuriam.
Kamal Sharma v. State of U.P. thru Special Secretary Industrial
Development and Ors Writ-C No. 26767 of 2010 – held good law.
Kalicharan v. State of U.P. and others SLP(C) No. 15782 of
2023; Nand Kishore Gupta and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh
and Others [2010] 11 SCR 356 : (2010) 10 SCC 282; Radhy
Shyam (dead) through LRs. and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh
and Others [2011] 8 SCR 359 : (2011) 5 SCC 553; Dev Sharan
and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others [2011] 3 SCR
728 : (2011) 4 SCC 769; Devender Kumar Tyagi and Others v.
State of Uttar Pradesh and Others [2011] 15 SCR 641 : (2011) 9
SCC 164; Darshan Lal Nagpal (Dead) by LRs. v. Government of
NCT of Delhi and Others [2012] 2 SCR 595 : (2012) 2 SCC 327;
Anand Singh and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others
[2010] 9 SCR 133 : (2010) 11 SCC 242; Narendra Road Lines
Pvt. Ltd. v. State of UP and Others SLP(C) No. 17808 of 2010 :
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 29682 of 2009; Yogesh Kumar v.
State of U.P. CMWP No.10782/2013; Natthi v. State of U.P. Thru.
Secr. Industrial Devp. & Ors. Writ-C No. 20585 of 2010 : SLP(C)
No. 014705-014710 of 2011; Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana
[2009] 11 SCR 470 : (2009) 8 SCC 539; Savitri Devi v. State of
Uttar Pradesh and Others [2015] 7 SCR 512 : (2015) 7 SCC 21;
Sahara India Commercial Corporation Limited and Others v. State
of Uttar Pradesh (2017) 11 SCC 339; Noida Industrial Development
Authority v. Ravindra Kumar and Others [2022] 1 SCR 1113 :
(2022) 13 SCC 468; Yamuna Expressway Industrial Authority v.
Shakuntla Education and Welfare Society [2022] 5 SCR 1034 :
(2022) SCC OnLine SC 655 – referred to.

List of Acts
Land Acquisition Act, 1894; U.P. Industrial Area Development Act,
1976.

List of Keywords
Land acquisition; Acquisition proceedings; Integrated development
of lands abutting the Yamuna Expressway; Acquisition of
the abutting lands; Integrated development plan of ‘Yamuna
Expressway”; Development of adjoining lands; Integrated project;
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1067

Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others

Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (YEIDA);
Urgency clause; Jewar Airport; Master Plan; Industrial, residential,
and recreational purposes; Objective of the acquisition; Integrate
land development with the Yamuna Expressway construction; Public
interest; Land parcels; Enquiry; ‘in rem’; Additional compensation;
Enhancement in compensation; Landowners; Policy for Planned
Development along the Taj Expressway.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 13119 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.05.2023 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in WC No. 56629 of 2011
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 13120, 13121-13122, 13123-13124, 13125,
13126, 13127, 13128, 13129, 13130, 13131, 13132, 13133, 13134,
13135, 13136, 13137, 13138-13139, 13140-13141, 13142-13143,
13144-13157, 13158-13162, 13163, 13164, 131165, 13166,
13167, 13168, 13169, 13170, 13171, 13172, 13173, 13174
and 13175 of 2024

Appearances for Parties
Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Sharan Dev Singh Thakur, AAG,
Jayant Bhushan, Niranjan Reddy, V.K. Shukla, Chinmoy Pradip
Sharma, Ranjit Kumar, Gopal Jain, Rajive Bhalla, Mohd Shoeb Alam,
Sr. Advs., Anand Mishra-1, Ms. Vandita Nain, Ms. Ayushi Rajput,
Amar Gupta, Divyam Agarwal, Pranav Tanwar, Mohit Sharma,
Ms. Parul Shukla, Ms. Shubhangi Pandey, Ms. Divya Jyoti Singh,
Vineet Nagar, Kshitiz Ahuja, Shekhar Bhatia, Kapil Chaudhary,
Samyak Jain, Rajat Sehgal, Ms. Vandana Anand, Anurag Rawal,
Amit Singh, Akash Nagar, Jaibir Singh Nagar, Suresh Chand Nagar,
Ms. Ruchi B Nagar, Kuldeep Nagar, Nafees Chaudhary, Surender
Kumar, Yashpal Bbhati, Vijender Kumar, Ankit Bhati, Arvind
Tanwar, Siddhartha Jha, Rakesh Mishra, Pankaj Dubey, Ms. Rishu
Mishra, D.N. Dubey, Ambuj Sharma, Sanjay Sarin, Tarun Rana,
Ms. Gagan Deep Kaur, Ms. Lavanya Paul, Dinkar Kalra, Susheel
Tomar, Sanjeev Malhotra, Nischal Kumar Neeraj, Yogesh Tiwari,
Sarthak Nema, Abhinav Singh Parihar, Sanjay K. Agrawal, Syed
Imtiyaz Ali, Aftab Ali Khan, Moazzam Khan, Ms. Sheetal Rawat,
Mumtaz Alam Siddiqui, Ali Safeer Farooqi, Ms. Phaguni Bajpayi,
1068 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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Mansur Ali Khan, Rahat Ali Chaudhary, Ms. Ruchira Goel, Siddharth
Thakur, Adit Jayeshbhai Shah, Sharanya Singh, Mustafa Sajad,
Abhinav Parihar, Ms. Neema, Vikrant Singh Bais, Vikas Upadhyay,
Mrs. Ankita Kashyap, Ms. Nimisha Swarup, Nitin Gaur, Arjun
Singh Tomar, Alok Shankar, Vivek Sharma, Deepesh Srivastava,
Ms. Rachana Sharma, Advs. for the appearing parties.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Mehta, J.

Table of Contents*

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 4
BATCH NO. 1 – LANDOWNERS’ APPEALS @ SPECIAL
LEAVE PETITIONS ..................................................................... 5
BATCH NO. 2 – YEIDA APPEALS @ SPECIAL LEAVE
PETITIONS ................................................................................ 6
BRIEF FACTS ............................................................................. 6
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF LANDOWNERS
(APPELLANTS IN BATCH NO. 1) .............................................. 15
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF YEIDA (RESPONDENT NO.
3 IN BATCH NO. 1) .................................................................... 26
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS ................................................. 38
CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 44

1. Delay in filing application(s) for setting aside of abatement is
condoned.
2. Abatement is set aside.
3. Delay in filing the application(s) for substitution is condoned.
4. Application(s) for substitution is allowed.

* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1069

Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others

5. Application(s) for transposition is allowed.
6. Application(s) for intervention/impleadment is allowed.
7. Leave granted.

INTRODUCTION
8. The present batch of civil appeals @ special leave petitions arise out
of the land acquisition proceedings initiated by respondent No.1-State
of Uttar Pradesh1 for planned development in the District Gautam
Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh, through respondent No.3-Yamuna
Expressway Industrial Development Authority2 by invoking ‘urgency
provisions’ incorporated in Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 18943.
9. Arguments on all the appeals @ special leave petitions have been
heard analogously and are being disposed of vide this common
judgment.
10. In total, 35 civil appeals @ special leave petitions are preferred
both by landowners and YEIDA which can be categorized into two
batches as mentioned below:

BATCH NO. 1 - LANDOWNERS’ APPEALS @ SPECIAL LEAVE
PETITIONS
11. A total of 29 civil appeals @ special leave petitions have been filed
by the landowners challenging the decision of the Division Bench
of the Allahabad High Court in “Kamal Sharma v. State of U.P.
thru Special Secretary Industrial Development and Ors4”. The
appeal @ special leave petition titled “Kalicharan v. State of U.P.
and others5” is being treated as the lead matter in this batch.

BATCH NO. 2 - YEIDA APPEALS @ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITIONS
12. The YEIDA has filed 6 appeals @ special leave petitions challenging
various decisions of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court

1 hereinafter being referred to as ‘State’
2 hereinafter being referred to as ‘YEIDA’
3 hereinafter being referred to as “the Act”
4 Writ-C No. 26767 of 2010; hereinafter referred to as ‘Kamal Sharma’
5 SLP(C) No. 15782 of 2023
1070 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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invalidating the self-same land acquisition proceedings for integrated
development of notified areas including the decision in “Shyoraj
Singh and Others v. State of U.P.6”. The appeal @ special leave
petition titled “YEIDA v. Shyoraj Singh and Ors.7” is being treated
as the lead matter in this batch.

BRIEF FACTS
13. The chronology of events leading to the filing of these civil appeals
are as follows.
14. For the sake of convenience, we shall refer to the factual context as
noticed in Writ-C No. 26767 of 2010 titled as “Kamal Sharma v. State
of U.P. thru Special Secretary Industrial Development and Ors.8
(lead matter in Batch No.1)filed before the Allahabad High Court.
15. Upon receipt of a proposal from the Director, Land Acquisition
Directorate, Rajswa, Uttar Pradesh, with prior approval of the State
Government, a notification dated 26th February, 2009 was issued
under Section 4(1)9 read with Sections 17(1)10 and 17(4)11 of the
Act for the acquisition of the tracts of lands in question for planned
development in the District Gautam Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh. The
relevant portion of the aforesaid notification is extracted below: -
“Under sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (Act No. 1 of 1894), the Governor hereby

6 Writ-C No. 30747 of 2010; hereinafter referred to as ‘Shyoraj Singh’
7 SLP(C) Nos. 19512-19513 of 2023
8 Supra, Note 4
9 4. Publication of preliminary notification and power of officers thereupon. –
(1) Whenever it appears to the [appropriate Government] the land in any locality [is needed or] is likely to
be needed for any public purpose [or for a company], a notification to that effect shall be published in the
Official Gazette [and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least one shall be in
the regional language], and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to
be given at convenient places in the said locality [(the last of the dates of such publication and the giving
of such public notice , being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of the notification)].
10 17. Special powers in case of urgency. –
(1) In cases of urgency, whenever the [appropriate Government], so directs, the Collector, though no
such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice
mentioned in section 9, sub-section (1). [take possession of any land needed for a public purpose]. Such
land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the [Government], free from all encumbrances.
11 17. Special powers in case of urgency. –
(4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the [appropriate Government], the provisions
of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the [appropriate Government] may direct that the
provisions of section 5A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under section
6 in respect of the land at any time [after the date of the publication of the notification] under section 4,
sub-section (1).
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1071

Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others

notifies for the information of the general public that the
land mentioned in the Schedule below shall be earmarked
for public purposes, namely, the Yamuna Expressway
Industrial Development Authority in District Gautam Budh
Nagar for Planned Development.
Because the Governor is of the opinion that the
provisions or sub-section (1) of section 17 of the said
Act apply to the said land, because the said land is
urgently needed for planned development in district
Gautam Buddha Nagar through Yamuna Expressway
Industrial Development Authority and in view of this
urgency, it is also necessary that the possible delay in
conducting the Investigation under Section 5-A of the
said Act should be avoided. Therefore, the Governor
also directs under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the
said Act that the provisions of Section 5-A of the said
Act shall not apply.”
(emphasis supplied)

16. Since the land was sought to be acquired by invoking urgency
provisions under Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act, the landowners
made representations to the Chief Executive Officer(‘CEO’) of
YEIDA requesting that their land may not be acquired because the
status of the land was ‘Abadi Bhoomi’ which was being used by
the landowners as dwelling units and for rearing their cattle. The
functionaries/authorities concerned did not accede to the request
of the landowners and the State Government issued the notification
dated 19th February, 2010 under Section 6 of the Act.
17. The landowners challenged the acquisition of their lands by filing
numerous writ petitions before the Allahabad High Court, primarily
seeking the relief of quashing the acquisition proceedings undertaken
by invoking Sections 4 and 6 read with Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of
the Act on several grounds which may be broadly categorized as
below:-
(i) That the State Government arbitrarily invoked Section 17(1) and
Section 17(4) of the Act and deprived the landowners of their
valuable right to raise objections under Section 5-A of the Act.
1072 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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(ii) That a bare reading of the notification issued under Section
4 would reflect that there was no material with the State
Government for invoking the urgency clause in the matter of
acquisition of land for planned development.
(iii) That there was no genuine public purpose behind the acquisition
and thus, the impugned action was illegal, arbitrary and
unjustified.
18. These writ petitions were decided by the Allahabad High Court
taking divergent views which are assailed in these appeals by
special leave.
19. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court vide judgment dated
24th April, 2017 allowed the Writ-C No. 30747 of 2010 titled Shyoraj
Singh and quashed the land acquisition notifications in question
holding that the grounds being taken in the impugned notifications
for invocation of the urgency clause were arbitrary and bad in law.
The learned Division Bench in Shyoraj Singh summoned the original
records from the State Government and perused the same to arrive
at the following conclusions: -
(i) The Division Bench referred to two letters issued by the
authorities of the District Gautam Budh Nagar, the details of
which are as follows:
(a) A letter justifying the invocation of the urgency clause
signed by the Additional Chief Executive Officer of Yamuna
Expressway, Tehsildar, Naib Tehsildar, and Lekhpal. The
relevant extract from the said letter is as below: -
“Yamuna expressway urgently needs the
proposed land for planned industrial development.
In the event of delay in the acquisition, there is a
strong possibility of increasing encroachment on
the proposed land, due to which public interest
project of planned industrial development will
adversely be affected.”
“Hearing and disposal of written/oral objections
will definitely take years and there will be
unexpected delays which will stall the planned
development.”
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1073

Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others

(b) A letter issued in 2010 by the District Magistrate, recording
a satisfaction that the prevailing facts and circumstances
justified the invocation of the powers under Section 17 of
the Act for dispensing with the hearing of objections under
Section 5-A of the Act. The relevant extract from the said
letter is as below:
“Due to the need to complete the project without
delay in the acquisition of the said land, it is
necessary to take possession of the proposed
land with immediate effect. In the case of using
Section 17 of LAA, the provisions of Section
5-A of the Act become extinct and I fully agree
with the justification of ending the opportunity
of hearing to the land owners.”
With reference to the aforesaid letters, the Division Bench
observed that the two grounds mentioned for invoking urgency
clause were: (1) That there are chances of unauthorized
construction/encroachment on the said land. (2) Large number
of landowners would be affected by the acquisition and hearing
such large number of landowners would delay the project.
The Division Bench in Shyoraj Singh held that the above-noted
factors did not furnish legally acceptable justification for the
exercise of power under Section 17(1) of the Act by the State
Government because the acquisition was primarily meant to
cater to private interests in the name of industrial development
of the District and no material was produced on record to show
that the State Government and/or agencies/instrumentalities
of the State were intending to establish industrial units on the
acquired tracts of land. Further, the justification for invoking
urgency provisions, that the land will be encroached on, had
no substance as the land was already in possession of the
recorded tenure holders.
(ii) The Division Bench also observed that the notification under
Section 4 of the Act was published on 26th February, 2009
but thereafter, the State Government took nearly one year to
publish the notification under Section 612 of the Act. The time

12 Published on 19th Feb, 2010.
1074 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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of one year consumed by the State Government in publishing
the notification under Section 6 of the Act was by itself sufficient
to infer that there was absolutely no urgency that could have
justified the invocation of the urgency clause, thereby depriving
the landowners of an opportunity of hearing under Section 5-A
of the Act.
20. However, another Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court while
dealing with a batch of 73 writ petitions challenging the very same
land acquisition proceedings took a different view from Shyoraj
Singh and dismissed the writ petitions filed by the landowners, the
lead matter being Writ-C No. 26767 of 2010 titled “Kamal Sharma
v. State of U.P.”. The Division Bench while upholding the acquisition
proceedings held that it could not be accepted that the entire exercise
for invocation of urgency clause was mechanical or there was no
material with the State for recording the subjective satisfaction to
this effect. The reasons assigned by the Division Bench in Kamal
Sharma were as follows: -
(i) A perusal of the Master plan and the facts established that
the land required for development of Yamuna Expressway
[‘Planned development through Yamuna Expressway’] was
for an integrated project. The land was initially acquired for
the Yamuna Expressway and, thereafter, for developing land
parcels alongside the Expressway as townships.
(ii) The original record of the State contains a categorical statement
that the State Government, after scrutinizing the record had
accepted the proposal applying mind to the fact that, in case
the objections under Section 5-A of the Act were invited, it would
adversely affect and cause delay in execution of the project
of public importance. The said decision was made looking at
the enormity of the project which required the acquisition of
the lands spread over a large area of 18,000 hundred acres
(approx.) comprising 16 villages. The development of the village
‘Abadi Bhoomi’s by YEIDA was also linked to the development
of the land alongside the Expressway. It was not the case of
non-application of mind and no fault in the decision-making
process could be demonstrated.
(iii) There was no post-notification delay, inasmuch as, in two or
three acquisition notifications, which were the subject matter of
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1075

Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others

challenge in the present writ petitions, wherein one year time
has been consumed in the issuance of the Section 6 notification,
the delay has beenduly explained by the State.
21. In Kamal Sharma, the Division Bench distinguished Shyoraj Singh
noting that the said judgment failed to consider the fact that the
acquisition was proposed for an integrated project and that the
Division Bench did not deal with the argument that looking at the
large number of tenure holders, the hearings would have resulted
into the project of tremendous importance being delayed. Further,
it was noted that the reasons given for justifying the invocation of
the urgency clause had not been examined in the context in which
they were made, and also the decision of this Court in the case of
Nand Kishore Gupta and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Others.13 was not considered.
22. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court while delivering the
judgment in Kamal Sharma, validated the acquisition proceeding in
question and granted an enhanced compensation of 64.7% to the
landowners.
23. During the course of arguments, this Court was apprised of the fact
that out of total 410 writ petitioners(landowners) before the High
Court, only 96 have challenged the judgment in Kamal Sharma by
filing civil appeals @ special leave petitions in Batch No. 1.
24. It is in this backdrop of the conflicting decisions rendered by the
Division Benches of the Allahabad High Court, that the two batches
of civil appeals @ special leave petitions i.e. Batch No.1 and Batch
No.2, have been preferred by the landowners and YEIDA before
this Court.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF LANDOWNERS (APPELLANTS
IN BATCH NO. 1): -
25. Learned counsel representing the landowners implored the Court to
grant relief in favour of the appellants as prayed for in Batch No.1
wherein lead matter is “Kalicharan and others v. The State of Uttar
Pradesh and others14” and negate the challenge to the judgment in

13 [2010] 11 SCR 356 : (2010) 10 SCC 282; hereinafter referred to as ‘Nand Kishore’
14 supra
1076 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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Shyoraj Singh. They advanced the following pertinent submissions
for assailing the questioned land acquisition proceedings:-
(i) That the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court, while
rendering the judgment dated 26th May, 2023 in Kamal Sharma,
in effect sat in appeal over the judgment dated 24th April, 2017
in Shyoraj Singh rendered by a coordinate bench of the same
High Court which dealt with an identical controversy both in
facts and law. It was fervently contended that the Division Bench
of Allahabad High Court, while dealing with the subsequent
batch of writ petitions in Kamal Sharma should have followed
the judgment passed in Shyoraj Singh as a matter of judicial
discipline.
(ii) That if at all the Division Bench in Kamal Sharma was of a
view that Shyoraj Singh did not lay down the correct position
of law, then the question of law should have been referred to
a larger Bench rather than taking a divergent view in a Bench
with a composition of same number of Judges.
(iii) That the land acquisition notifications under Sections 4
and 6 of the Act were dated 26th February, 2009 and 19th
February 2010, respectively. The above-mentioned dates
demonstrate that about one years’ time was taken by the State
Government for issuance of the final declaration notification
under Section 6 after the proposal under Section 4 of the
Act was issued and thus, there was pre and post notification
delay which could not have been ignored and had to be taken
into account. In this background there could not have been
any justification for the dispensation of few weeks’ time to the
landowners to file objections under Section 5-A of the Act, on
the ground of urgency. On this aspect, reliance was placed upon
Radhy Shyam (dead) through LRs. and Others v. State of
Uttar Pradesh and Others,15 wherein this Court observed as
follows: -
“82. In this case, the Development Authority sent the
proposal sometime in 2006. The authorities up to the
level of the Commissioner completed the exercise of

15 [2011] 8 SCR 359 : (2011) 5 SCC 553; hereinafter referred to as ‘Radhy Shyam’
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1077

Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others

survey and preparation of documents by the end of
December 2006 but it took one year and almost three
months for the State Government to issue notification
under Section 4 read with Sections 17(1) and 17(4).
If this much time was consumed between the receipt
of proposal for the acquisition of land and issue of
notification, it is not possible to accept the argument
that four to five weeks within which the objections
could be filed under sub-section (1) of Section 5-A
and the time spent by the Collector in making enquiry
under sub-section (2) of Section 5-A would have
defeated the object of the acquisition.”
Reliance in this regard was also placed on Dev Sharan and
Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others,16 wherein this
Court observed as below: -
“37[Ed.: Para 37 corrected vide Official Corrigendum
No. F.3/Ed.B.J./16/2011 dated 16-3-2011.]. Thus
the time which elapsed between publication of
Section 4(1) and Section 17 notifications, and Section
6 declaration in the local newspapers is 11 months
and 23 days i.e. almost one year. This slow pace at
which the government machinery had functioned in
processing the acquisition, clearly evinces that there
was no urgency for acquiring the land so as to warrant
invoking Section 17(4) of the Act.
38. In Para 15 of the writ petition, it has been clearly
stated that there was a time gap of more than 11
months between Section 4 and Section 6 notifications,
which demonstrates that there was no urgency in the
State action which could deny the petitioners their right
under Section 5-A. In the counter which was filed in
this case by the State before the High Court, it was
not disputed that the time gap between Section 4
notification read with Section 17, and Section 6
notification was about 11 months.”

16 [2011] 3 SCR 728 : (2011) 4 SCC 769
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Learned counsel for the appellants also placed reliance
on Devender Kumar Tyagi and Others v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Others,17 wherein, this Court, while dealing with a
post-notification delay of almost two years, held as follows:
“28. In the facts and circumstances of the present
case, it is clear that this Court, vide its order dated
17-8-2004 [(2011) 12 SCC 572], has issued a direction
to the respondents to relocate the bone mills and
allied industries causing environment pollution and
health hazards as per the recommendations of CPCB
and, inter alia, the respondents were also directed
to identify the area for relocation. Pursuant to this,
the respondents have filed an affidavit in the month
of December 2004 specifying the construction of
the Leather City Project at Hapur in Ghaziabad.
Subsequently, it was only after the lapse of two years,
the State Government had issued a Notification under
Section 4 on 3-7-2006 and the same was published
on 4-7-2006. Thereafter, the State Government took
more than 17 months in order to make a declaration
of the notification under Section 6 from the date of
publication of the notification under Section 4 of the LA
Act. In view of the above circumstances, it is crystal
clear that the government functionary has proceeded
at very slow pace at two levels, that is, prior to the
issuance of the notification under Section 4 and post
the issuance of the notification under Section 4, for
acquisition of the land for construction of the Leather
City Project, which undoubtedly is a public purpose.
Therefore, the above series of the events amply
exhibit the lethargical and lackadaisical attitude of
the State Government. In the light of the above
circumstances, the respondents are not justified in
invoking the urgency provisions under Section 17 of
the LA Act, thereby, depriving the appellants of their
valuable right to raise objections and opportunity of

17 [2011] 15 SCR 641 : (2011) 9 SCC 164
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1079

Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others

hearing before the authorities in order to persuade
them that their property may not be acquired.
Further reliance was placed on the case of Darshan Lal Nagpal
(Dead) by LRs. v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Others,18
wherein,this Court observed as below:
“36. It needs no emphasis that majority of the
projects undertaken by the State and its agencies/
instrumentalities, the implementation of which
requires public money, are meant to benefit the
people at large or substantially a large segment of
the society. If what the High Court has observed
is treated as a correct statement of law, then in all
such cases the acquiring authority will be justified
in invoking Section 17 of the Act and dispense with
the inquiry contemplated under Section 5-A, which
would necessarily result in depriving the owner of his
property without any opportunity to raise legitimate
objection. However, as has been repeatedly held by
this Court, the invoking of the urgency provisions can
be justified only if there exists real emergency which
cannot brook delay of even few weeks or months. In
other words, the urgency provisions can be invoked
only if even small delay of few weeks or months
may frustrate the public purpose for which the land
is sought to be acquired. Nobody can contest that
the purpose for which the appellants’ land and land
belonging to others was sought to be acquired was a
public purpose but it is one thing to say that the State
and its instrumentality wants to execute a project of
public importance without loss of time and it is an
altogether different thing to say that for execution of
such project, private individuals should be deprived
of their property without even being heard.”
(iv) That one of the grounds taken by the State for invoking the
urgency clause was that there were chances of unauthorized

18 [2012] 2 SCR 595 : (2012) 2 SCC 327
1080 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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construction/encroachments on the land subject to acquisition.
This stand was questioned by placing reliance on Radhy
Shyam, wherein this Court observed that it is highly unlikely
that the recorded tenure holders would encroach or allow
encroachments on their own land when they are admittedly
in the possession of the same. The relevant extract as relied
upon is quoted hereinbelow: -
“83. The apprehension of the respondents that
delay in the acquisition of land will lead to enormous
encroachment is totally unfounded. It is beyond the
comprehension of any person of ordinary prudence to
think that the landowners would encroach their own
land with a view to frustrate the concept of planned
industrial development of the district.”
(v) That there was no material before the State Government to
show the existence of any unforeseeable emergency warranting
invocation of the urgency clause under Sections 17(1) and 17(4)
of the Act, thereby denying the landowners of their right to file
objections against acquisition of their lands.
(vi) That the lands under acquisition were to be utilized for
commercial and residential purposes and such development
work, would take ample time in planning and execution, thus
there could have been no justification for the invocation of
urgency clause. Reliance in this regard was placed on the
following observations in Radhy Shyam:-
“80......Even if planned industrial development of the
district is treated as public purpose within the meaning
of Section 4, there was no urgency which could justify
the exercise of power by the State Government under
Section 17(1) and 17(4). The objective of industrial
development of an area cannot be achieved by
pressing some buttons on the computer screen. It
needs a lot of deliberations and planning keeping in
view various scientific and technical parameters and
environmental concerns. The private entrepreneurs,
who are desirous of making investments in the State,
take their own time in setting up the industrial units.
Usually, the State Government and its agencies/
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1081

Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others

instrumentalities would give them two to three years to
put up their factories, establishments, etc. Therefore,
time required to ensure compliance with the provisions
contained in Section 5A cannot, by any stretch of
imagination, be portrayed as delay that will frustrate
the purpose of acquisition.”
Reliance was also placed upon the decision of Anand Singh
and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others,19 wherein
this Court observed as follows: -
“46. As to in what circumstances the power of
emergency can be invoked are specified in Section
17(2) but circumstances necessitating invocation of
urgency under Section 17(1) are not stated in the
provision itself. Generally speaking, the development
of an area (for residential purposes) or a planned
development of city, takes many years if not decades
and, therefore, there is no reason why summary
enquiry as contemplated under Section 5-A may
not be held and objections of landowners/persons
interested may not be considered. In many cases,
on general assumption likely delay in completion
of enquiry under Section 5-A is set up as a reason
for invocation of extraordinary power in dispensing
with the enquiry little realising that an important and
valuable right of the person interested in the land is
being taken away and with some effort enquiry could
always be completed expeditiously.”
(vii) That the judgment of this Court in Radhy Shyam holds the
field on the issue of invocation of urgency clause in acquisition
proceedings for planned development for commercial, residential,
industrial purposes and the decision in Kamal Sharma has been
rendered while glossing over the law settled in Radhy Shyam.
(viii) That the right to be heard as provided under Section 5-A of the
Act is in the nature of a fundamental right and the same cannot
be dispensed with, so as to justify the lackadaisical approach
of the State Government. It was also contended that Section

19 [2010] 9 SCR 133 : (2010) 11 SCC 242
1082 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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5-A is not to be superseded ipso facto even if the provisions of
Sections 17(1) and 17(2) of the Act are being invoked. Reliance
in support of this contention was placed upon the decision
of this Court in the case of Dev Sharan v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Others,20 wherein it was held that even in cases
of ‘urgency’ or ‘unforeseen emergency’, enquiry contemplated
by Section 5-A cannot ipso facto be dispensed with and even
if the case is covered under sub-sections (1) or (2) of Section
17, sub-Section (4) of Section 17 would not necessarily apply.
The relevant extracts relied upon are as below:-
“32. In a recent judgment of this Court in Essco Fabs,
(2009) 2 SCC 377, this Court, after considering previous
judgments as also the provisions of Section 17 of the
Act held: (SCC P. 839, para 41)
“41. Whereas sub-section (1) of Section 17
deals with cases of ‘urgency’, sub-section (2)
of the said section covers cases of ‘sudden
change in the channel of any navigable river
or other unforeseen emergency’. But even in
such cases i.e. cases of ‘urgency’ or ‘unforeseen
emergency’, enquiry contemplated by Section
5-A cannot ipso facto be dispensed with which
is clear from sub-section (4) of Section 17 of
the Act.”
This Court, therefore, held that once a case is covered
under sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 17, sub-
section (4) of Section 17 would not necessarily apply:
(SCC P. 395, para 54)
“54. In our opinion, therefore, the contention
of the learned counsel for the respondent
authorities is not well founded and cannot be
upheld that once a case is covered by sub-
sections (1) or (2) of Section 17 of the Act,
sub-section (4) of Section 17 would necessarily
apply and there is no question of holding inquiry

20 (2011) 4 SCC 769
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1083

Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others

or hearing objections under Section 5-A of the
Act. Acceptance of such contention or upholding
of this argument will make sub-section (4)
of Section 17 totally otiose, redundant and
nugatory.”
(ix) That the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court committed
grave error in law while placing reliance upon the judgment of
Nand Kishore, for denying relief to the landowners. That on a
conjoint reading of paras 3 and 96 of Nand Kishore, it would
become evident that the land in question therein admeasured
1604 Hectares, which was to be acquired for the construction
of the Yamuna Expressway itself and it is in that background
that the invocation of the urgency clause was upheld, whereas
the question as to the invocation of urgency clause to acquire
land for commercial, residential or industrial purpose was not
posed for adjudication in Nand Kishore,although it held the
acquisition to be for public purpose. Paras 3 and 96 of Nand
Kishore read as follows: -
“3. The High Court, in the judgment dated 30-11-2009
passed in Nand Kishore Gupta v. State of U.P. [ CMWP
No. 31314 of 2009 decided on 30-11-2009 (All)] ,
basically pointed out that out of 12,282 landowners,
11,397 had already received their compensation under
the agreement and the challenge related only to 21.03
ha out of 1604 ha of land. The High Court also took
the view that the scales of justice must tilt towards
the right to development of the millions who will be
benefited from the road and the development of the
area, as against the human rights of 35 petitioners
therein, whose main complaint was that they were
not heard before the declaration under Section 6 of
the Act. The High Court also declined to give any
direction to the State Government to consider to
exempt 21.03 ha of land relating to the 35 petitioners
therein on account of the fact that the construction
of the road had to be made in an alignment and
that alignment could not be changed. Identical view
was taken in another writ petition filed by one Balbir
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Singh. The High Court also expressed its concern
that any direction to exempt the land covered by the
construction might seriously jeopardise the Project.
The High Court also reiterated that the acquisition of
the land for interchange of the road was the essential
part of the Project, as also the construction of bridges,
culverts and interchanges, which were essential for
the fast-moving six-lane Expressway.
96. We are not impressed by the argument that the
encroachment issue was not a relevant factor. This
argument was based on the reported decision in Om
Prakash v. State of U.P. [(1998) 6 SCC 1] It must
be said that the actual scenario in that case was
different. In that case, the Court was considering the
acquisition of area of about 500 acres comprising
of 437 plots, whereas, in the present case, the area
to be acquired for the Expressway alone was more
than 1600 ha. This is apart from the 25 million sq
m of land which was liable to be acquired for the
purposes of development of five land parcels. There
was interlinking between the acquisition of land for the
highway and the acquisition of land for establishing
the five townships.”
(x) That the judgment in Radhy Shyam carves out a clear distinction
by observing that the judgment in Nand Kishore related to the
lands proposed to be acquired for construction of the expressway
itself and not to the lands acquired for commercial, residential,
and industrial purposes, for which the invocation of urgency
clause was held to be untenable and bad in law.
(xi) That neither the appellants have received any amount towards
compensation for acquisition of the lands nor have they parted
with the possession of the subject lands, and thus, quashing of the
land acquisition notification would not have any adverse impact
as no development has taken place on the lands in question.
(xii) That the mere ploy of the grant of adequate compensation to
the landowners with an escalation of 64.7% could not justify
the grave illegalities committed by the authorities under the
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1085

Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others

garb of urgent acquisition because the same cannot obviate or
supersede the substantive fundamental right of the landowners
to file objections against the acquisition of the privately owned
lands.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF YEIDA (RESPONDENT NO.3 IN
BATCH NO. 1):-
26. Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General of India, Shri Ranjit
Kumar, Shri Gopal Jain, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of YEIDA implored the Court to uphold the judgment passed in Kamal
Sharma and to reverse the judgment passed in Shyoraj Singh as
being unsustainable in the eyes of law. They advanced the following
pertinent submissions seeking the above relief:-
(i) YEIDA is a statutory authority formed under Section 3 of the
U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976, which has been
established to ensure planned development of the ‘industrial
development area’. In furtherance of this objective, YEIDA
prepared the Master Plan of 2021 and the Master Plan of 2031
with the intent to develop the eastern side of river Yamuna
by construction of a six-lane Expressway joining Noida to
Agra and also for integrated development of five distinct
regions along the said Expressway for residential, industrial,
institutional and recreational purposes. The construction of
the Jewar Airport is also a part and parcel of the very same
integrated project.
(ii) That a bare perusal of the Master Plan(Phase-1-2031) clearly
establishes that the land acquired for development across
Yamuna Expressway, is an integrated project. The land was
initially acquired for the Yamuna Expressway and thereafter,
for developing land parcels alongside the Yamuna Expressway
as residential townships, industrial areas, amusement zones,
etc. The development is strictly being carried out in accordance
with the Master Plan prepared by YEIDA.
(iii) The Yamuna Expressway is a vital project of seminal importance
providing access to millions of commuters by connecting
the National Capital to Agra and nearby areas. The Yamuna
Expressway is poised to become even more important with
the upcoming Jewar Airport. A project of this magnitude would
1086 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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require the involvement of the adjoining areas which would lead
to an overall development of the State.
(iv) That the legality of the acquisition of the lands in question by
YEIDA for integrated and complementary planned development
is no longer res integra as the same has been consistently
upheld by this Court vide various judicial pronouncements over
time, the landmark case being Nand Kishore.
(v) That the judgment in Nand Kishore squarely covers the
controversy at hand, wherein it was observed that the planned
development of 25 million square meter of land (2500 Hectares)
being acquired for creation of the five zones for industry,
residence, amusement zones, etc. would be complementary to
the creation of the Expressway and is a part of an integrated
project and it was urged that similarly in the present case, land
has been acquired for the planned development of the region.
(vi) That it is settled law that the decision on invocation of urgency
clause is an administrative decision requiring subjective
satisfaction of the State Government and scope of judicial
review in the matters of invocation of the urgency clause under
Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act is limited to the decision-
making procedure and not to the decision itself. The Court is
required to examine the record just to arrive at a satisfaction
regarding existence of material to form an opinion about invoking
the urgency clause.
(vii) That the controversy involved in the present case is adidem
to the facts of the case in Nand Kishore and the factors that
weighed with this Court in upholding the invocation of the urgency
clause in Nand Kishore, also exist in the present case, and
therefore, the invocation of the urgency clause in the present
case was fully justified. The Court’s attention was drawn to the
following factors:-
(a) Enormity of the project: The acquisition therein in ‘Nand
Kishore’ case, involved 1604 Hectares of land affecting
12,283 farmers. Similarly, in the present case, the
acquisition involves approximately 2,979 Hectares of land
affecting 12,868 farmers/landowners. Thus, the present
acquisition is of greater magnitude than the one considered
in Nand Kishore.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1087

Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others

(b) Likelihood of encroachments: The area for the expressway
alone exceeded 1600 Hectares, not including the 25 million
square meter parcel of land required for developing the
five additional zones. In the present case, out of the
2,979 Hectares of land acquired, only 456.74 Hectares
of land is under litigation. Therefore, there is an imminent
likelihood of encroachment on 2,522.26 Hectares of land
where landowners have already received compensation
and YEIDA has taken the possession.
(c) Number of Landowners to be heard: The total number of
landowners to be heard could delay the project further.
In the present case, 12,868 landowners would need to
be heard, significantly delaying the project. Only 140
landowners are before this Court (inclusive of both batches
of civil appeals @ special leave petitions), claiming they
were not heard before the issuance of notification under
Section 6 of the Act, whereas, the others have accepted
the escalated compensation of 64.7% directed to be paid
by the High Court in Kamal Sharma. Thus, hearing all
the landowners was bound to unnecessarily delay the
developmental works of great importance without causing
any real prejudice to the large number of landowners and
would also lead to escalation of cost of development.
(viii) That there was sufficient material before the State Government
to justify the invocation of urgency clause, and there was no
malice on part of the State Government in invoking the same.
Stress was laid upon the observations made in Nand Kishore,
wherein it was held that the executive’s subjective satisfaction in
dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A can be subjected
to judicial review only on the grounds of insufficient material to
justify dispensing with the enquiry or malice in the impugned
action, neither of these elements exist in the present case.
(ix) That the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in the case
of Shyoraj Singh clearly erred while relying upon the case
of Radhy Shyam to hold that the acquisition notifications are
bad in law and that the urgency clause was wrongly invoked.
That Radhy Shyam is not applicable to the lands acquired for
integrated planned development project at hand and is clearly
distinguishable on facts as the said judgment was passed in the
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context of an acquisition for private purposes, serving private
interests and the chunk of land was acquired in a standalone
exercise for development of residential, commercial and
industrial projects, unlike the present case where the acquisition
is being done in the national interest for a project meant to
create public infrastructure of huge magnitude. In this regard, it
was submitted that Nand Kishore was distinguished in Radhy
Shyam in the following terms: -
“76. In Nand Kishore Gupta v. State of U.P. [(2010)
10 SCC 282] the acquisition was upheld because the
land was urgently needed for construction of Yamuna
Expressway and by the time the matter was decided
by this Court, huge amount had been spent on the
project. As against this, the exercise of power under
Sections 17(1) and/or 17(4) for the acquisition of land
for residential, industrial and commercial purposes,
construction of sewage treatment plant and district
jails was held to be legally impermissible in Raja
Anand Brahma Shah v. State of U.P. [AIR 1967 SC
1081 : (1967) 1 SCR 373], Narayan Govind Gavate
v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 1 SCC 133 : 1977
SCC (Cri) 49], Om Prakash v. State of U.P. [(1998) 6
SCC 1], Union of India v. Krishan Lal Arneja [(2004) 8
SCC 453] , Essco Fabs (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana
[(2009) 2 SCC 377 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 537], Babu
Ram v. State of Haryana [(2009) 10 SCC 115 : (2009)
4 SCC (Civ) 69] and Anand Singh v. State of U.P.
[(2010) 11 SCC 242 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 423].”
(x) That this Court in Natthi v. State of U.P. & Ors.21 and Narendra
Road Lines Pvt. Ltd. v. State of UP and Others, 22 has
dismissed the SLPs preferred against the judgments passed
by the Allahabad High Court in the self-same acquisition while
relying on the law laid down in Nand Kishore, wherein it was
held that the acquisition in question in District Gautam Budh
Nagar through YEIDA is for planned development and the

21 SLP(C) No. 014705-014710 of 2011
22 SLP(C) No. 17808 of 2010
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1089

Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others

subject lands are contiguous to the land parcels, which were
acquired for the purpose of residential, industrial, amusement,
etc. along with Yamuna Expressway.
(xi) The attention of the Court was also drawn to the fact that the
SLP in Natthi v. State of U.P. & Ors.23 was dismissed on 9th
May, 2011, just a month after the decision of Radhy Shyam
which was delivered on 15th April, 2011.
(xii) That another Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in
the case of Yogesh Kumar v. State of U.P.24 considered the
applicability of Radhy Shyam on invocation of urgency clause
for planned development through YEIDA, and vide judgment
dated 1st March, 2013,it was held that in view of judgment in
Natthi v. State of U.P. Thru. Secr. Industrial Devp. & Ors.,25
the decision in Radhy Shyam will have no application on the
present acquisition. The decision of Allahabad High Court in
Yogesh Kumar was also affirmed by this Court while dismissing
the SLP26 by a Bench presided over by Hon’ble Mr. Justice
G.S. Singhvi (who authored Radhy Shyam) vide order dated
23rd September, 2013.
(xiii) That it was correctly held by the Division Bench of Allahabad
High Court in Kamal Sharma that the right of the tenure holders
to object against the acquisition provided under Section 5-A
of the Act cannot be said to be a fundamental right or a right
akin to fundamental right protected by the Constitution of India.
(xiv) That the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Kamal
Sharma has meticulously reviewed the material on record,
and held that the same justified the invocation of the urgency
clause, recording its conclusions as follows:
(a) The lands of nine villages were acquired through different
notifications issued over a span of two years between 26th
February, 2009 to 22nd March, 2011.

23 (Supra, Note 22)
24 CMWP No.10782/2013, hereinafter referred to as ‘Yogesh Kumar’
25 Writ-C No. 20585 of 2010, hereinafter referred to as ‘Natthi’
26 Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. CC 16505/2013
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(b) Majority of the declaration notifications were issued in a
gap of 3 to 4 months.
(c) It was specifically mentioned in the Certificate of the
Collector that the acquisition of different parcels of land
was being proposed as contiguous part of the project.
If an opportunity of hearing under Section 5-A of the
Act was granted, the same would have resulted in legal
proceedings and eventual non-availability of contiguous
land which would have hampered the execution of the
integrated project in a time bound manner. The original
record of the State provides categorical statements to
this effect.
(d) The aforesaid decision was taken on account of the
enormousness of the project in question and the area of
the land sought to be acquired.
He thus urged that the Division Bench of the Allahabad High
Court, therefore, rightly held that the invocation of the urgency
clause was not a mechanical exercise and was undertaken
pursuant to the subjective satisfaction of the State Government
being arrived at after due application of mind to material available
on record.
(xv) That the judgment in Shyoraj Singh does not lay down good
law and is liable to be set aside, since it failed to take note
of the earlier Division Bench decisions of the Allahabad High
Court in the cases of Natthi,27 Narendra Road Lines Pvt. Ltd.
v. State of U.P. & Others28 and Yogesh Kumar,29 wherein the
validity of self-same land acquisition for integrated planned
development by YEIDA was upheld. Ignoring an earlier judicial
precedent rendered by a Bench presided by co-equal number
of judges and taking a totally contrary view itself amounts to a
fundamental error rendering the subsequent view per incuriam
as held in case of Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana.30

27 Writ-C No. 20585 of 2010
28 Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 29682 of 2009, hereinafter referred to as ‘Narendra Road Lines’
29 supra
30 [2009] 11 SCR 470 : (2009) 8 SCC 539
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1091

Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others

(xvi) That there is no pre or post notification delay in the present
acquisition inasmuch as there are only three notifications, where
a period of nearly one year has been consumed in issuing the
Section 6 notification. For other seven notifications, Section 6
notification was issued within two to four months.
Learned Solicitor General concluded his submissions urging that it
is now futile to oppose the acquisition, particularly when the same is
unequivocally accepted by all except a few, inasmuch as the majority
of the landowners have accepted the enhanced compensation without
raising any further challenge to the acquisition. Learned Solicitor
General urged that the entire process was wholly transparent and
that there was pressing necessity for acquisition of lands, considering
the public purpose involved. He thus implored the Court to accept
the appeals filed by the YEIDA and dismiss the appeals filed by the
landowners.
27. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions
advanced at bar and have gone through the impugned judgments
and the material placed on record.
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS: -
28. The issues which arises for our consideration in the present batches
of appeal are as follows: -
(i) Whether the present acquisition is a part of the integrated
development plan of ‘Yamuna Expressway” undertaken by
respondent No.3-YEIDA?
(ii) Whether the application of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act
was legal and justified in the instant case, thereby justifying the
decision of the State Government to dispense with the enquiry
under Section 5-A of the Act?
(iii) Whether the view taken by the Division Bench of the Allahabad
High Court in Kamal Sharma validating the questioned
acquisition while relying upon Nand Kishore lays down the
correct proposition of law or whether the Division Bench in the
case of Shyoraj Singh was justified in applying the principles
laid down in Radhy Shyam and quashing the acquisition
proceedings in question?
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29. Before adverting to the above issues, we may take note of the fact
that the State Government had formulated a “Policy for Planned
Development along the Taj Expressway31” and the notification to
this effect was issued by the Infrastructure & Industrial Development
Commissioner, Government of Uttar Pradesh on 29th December, 2007.
The Policy dealt with the formation of Special Development Zone32
and the development thereof. As per clause 3.2 of the said Policy,
the land use of SDZ is divided in the following terms: -
“3.2. Land use of SDZ (special development zone)
The permissible break-up of the total land area under SDZ
for different activities shall be as under:

%age of total area of SDZ
A. Core Activity Sports Not less than 35%
(including road & open spaces)

B. Other activities

(i) Commercial Not more than 20%
(ii) Institutional & amenities Not less than 5%
(iii) Roads, open and Not less than 25%
Circulation areas
(iv) Residential including Not less than 15%
Group Housing and
Plotted Development

Area ”
30. A bare perusal of the aforesaid clause makes it clear that while
the development of roads and open spaces which was to constitute
35% of the land area was considered to be the core activity, the
allied activities such as commercial, institutional & amenities, roads,
open and circulation areas, residential including group housing and
plotted development areas were to constitute the remaining 65%
of the land under the SDZ. Hence, undeniably, the authorities were

31 In short, ‘Policy’
32 In short ‘SDZ’.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1093

Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others

required to develop the entire SDZ in an integrated manner. This
aspect was precisely taken note of by this Court in the case of Nand
Kishore. The relevant extracts from the judgment of Nand Kishore
are reproduced hereinbelow for the sake of ready reference: -
“57. The Expressway is a work of immense public
importance. The State gains advantages from the
construction of an expressway and so does the general
public. Creation of a corridor for fast-moving traffic resulting
into curtailing the travelling time, as also the transport of
the goods, would be some factors which speak in favour of
the Project being for the public purpose. Much was stated
about the 25 million sq m of land being acquired for the
five parcels of land. In fact, in our opinion, as has rightly
been commented upon by the High Court, the creation of
the five zones for industry, residence, amusement, etc.
would be complementary to the creation of the Expressway.
58. It cannot be forgotten that the creation of land parcels
would give impetus to the industrial development of the
State creating more jobs and helping the economy and
thereby helping the general public. There can be no doubt
that the implementation of the Project would result in
coming into existence of five developed parcels/centres
in the State for the use of the citizens. There shall, thus,
be the planned development of this otherwise industrially
backward area. The creation of these five parcels will
certainly help the maximum utilisation of the Expressway
and the existence of an Expressway for the fast-moving
traffic would help the industrial culture created in the five
parcels. Thus, both will be complimentary to each other and
can be viewed as parts of an integral scheme. Therefore,
it cannot be said that it is not a public purpose.”
31. Learned counsel for the landowners sought to draw a distinction,
urging that Nand Kishore only dealt with the issue as to whether
the acquisition was for public purpose and not with the issue as
to whether the invocation of the urgency clause for commercial,
residential, industrial purpose was justified. However, we are of the
view that this contention is bereft of merit as no such distinction is
permissible.
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32. The core question which requires this Court’s consideration is whether
the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Shyoraj
Singh was justified in relying upon Radhy Shyam, so as to quash
the acquisition notification pertaining to the development of the land
adjoining the Yamuna Expressway. The relevant extracts from Radhy
Shyam which are reproduced supra would make it clear that in the
said case, this Court was considering a controversy relating to the
land acquisition for the purpose of planned industrial development
in District Gautam Budh Nagar through Greater Noida Industrial
Development Authority. Hence, the project did not contemplate
a planned and integrated development of an Expressway and
the adjoining areas. It was a standalone project pertaining to the
development in industrial Gautam Budh Nagar. However, it cannot
be gainsaid that Yamuna Expressway is a vital heartline providing
access to millions of commuters from National Capital Delhi to Agra.
The Expressway also connects the prestigious upcoming Jewar
Airport to adjoining areas. To assume that the Yamuna Expressway
is a simple highway without any scope for simultaneous development
of the adjoining lands for commercial, residential and other such
activities would be unconceivable. A project of such magnitude and
enormity would definitely require the involvement of the adjoining
areas which would lead to an overall development of the State of
Uttar Pradesh at large.
33. As observed above, the purpose behind the acquisition was
unquestionably the integrated development of lands abutting the
Yamuna Expressway. The acquisition of the lands for the Expressway
could not be isolated or separated from the acquisition of the abutting
lands. This was precisely held in the case of Nand Kishore.
34. It may be noted that the entire edifice of Shyoraj Singh is based on
Radhy Shyam, wherein a two-Judge Bench of this Court decided the
controversy arising from land acquisition pertaining to the planned
industrial development in the District Gautam Budh Nagar. Another
Division Bench of this Court considered the acquisition pertaining
to the Yamuna Expressway in the case of Natthi. Placing reliance
on Nand Kishore,the Division Bench of the same composition as in
Radhy Shyam vide order dated 9th May, 2011 rejected the special
leave petition(s) laying challenge to the invocation of the urgency
clause in the self-same acquisition proceedings.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1095

Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others

35. Much stress was laid by the learned counsel for the landowners
on the issue that the Division Bench while deciding the impugned
judgment in the case of Kamal Sharma could not have taken a
different view from Shyoraj Singh and if at all, there was any doubt
on the correctness of the view taken in Shyoraj Singh, then, the
question of law was mandatorily required to be referred to a larger
Bench. We feel that the said argument is fallacious on the fact of
it. Much prior to Shyoraj Singh’s decision, three different Division
Benches of the Allahabad High Court by detailed judgments in the
cases of Natthi, Narendra Road Lines and Yogesh Kumar had
already affirmed the validity of invocation of the urgency clause in
the land acquisition notifications for the integrated development plan
of ‘Yamuna Expressway’ by respondent No.3-YEIDA. It is trite to
mention that in Shyoraj Singh, the Division Bench failed to consider
the earlier Division Bench judgments in the cases of Natthi, Narendra
Road Lines and Yogesh Kumar. In thisbackground, the view taken
by the Division Bench in the case of Shyoraj Singh is per incuriam,
rather than that in Kamal Sharma.
36. At the cost of repetition, it may be mentioned that the Division
Bench judgments rendered by the Allahabad High Court in the
cases of Natthi, Narendra Road Lines and Yogesh Kumar have
been affirmed by this Court with the dismissal of SLPs assailing the
impugned judgments in those cases.
CONCLUSION
37. In the wake of the above discussion, we have no hesitation in
holding that the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court correctly
interpreted the legal position while deciding the batch of writ petitions
in the case of Kamal Sharma and the judgment in the case of
Shyoraj Singh does not lay down the correct proposition of law.
38. The issues framed above are answered in the following terms:
(i) Whether the present acquisition is part of the integrated
development plan of the ‘Yamuna Expressway’ undertaken by
respondent No. 3-YEIDA?
y Yes, the present acquisition forms part of the integrated
development plan for the Yamuna Expressway initiated
by YEIDA. As observed in the case of Nand Kishore,
the development of land parcels for industrial, residential,
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and recreational purposes is complementary to the
construction of the Yamuna Expressway. The objective of
the acquisition is to integrate land development with the
Yamuna Expressway’s construction, thereby promoting
overall growth serving the public interest. Consequently,
the Expressway and the development of adjoining lands
are considered to be inseparable components of the overall
project.
(ii) Whether the application of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act
was legal and warranted in the instant case, thereby justifying
the Government’s decision to dispense with the inquiry under
Section 5-A of the Act?
y Yes, the invocation of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was legal and justified in this
case. The urgency clause was applied in accordance with
the planned development of the Yamuna Expressway, as
held in Nand Kishore.
(iii) Whether the view taken by the Division Bench of the Allahabad
High Court in Kamal Sharma while relying on Nand Kishore
lays down the correct proposition of law, or whether the Division
Bench in Shyoraj Singh was justified in applying the principles
laid down in Radhy Shyam and quashing the acquisition
proceedings in question?
y The view expounded by the Division Bench in Kamal
Sharma, which relied upon Nand Kishore, sets forth the
correct proposition of law, and the judgment of the High
Court in Shyoraj Singh, which relied on Radhy Shyam,
did not present a correct legal interpretation. The judgment
in Shyoraj Singh is set aside as it does not lay down
good law and was passed while overlooking at the earlier
precedents, rendering it per incuriam.
39. The High Court while deciding Kamal Sharma extensively considered
the factual matrix and also examined the original records of the State
Government to arrive at the satisfaction that the invocation of the
urgency clause was absolutely justified with regard to the acquisition
in question. The High Court also exhaustively considered the entire
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1097

Kali Charan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others

sequence of judicial pronouncements in respect of the acquisition
in question before arriving at the aforesaid conclusion and acted
in an equitable manner while affirming the acquisition proceedings
and directing the grant of additional compensation. We appreciate
the endeavour made by the High Court to resolve the controversy
objectively and equitably and grant our full imprimatur to the judgment
in Kamal Sharma.
40. Now, we are called upon to consider as to whether the escalated
compensation formula as arrived at by the Division Bench of the
High Court in the case of Kamal Sharma would subserve the ends
of justice or the landowners whose lands have been acquired would
be entitled to better compensation.
41. It is pertinent to note that the overwhelming majority of landowners
have refrained from seeking judicial intervention in this matter, as
manifested by the fact that only 140 out of 12,868 landowners(covered
in both batches of civil appeals @ special leave petitions) have opted
to challenge the acquisition by approaching this Court. This indicates
that the majority of the landowners have accepted the escalated
compensation granted by the High Court in Kamal Sharma.
42. This Court, in the cases of Savitri Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh
and Others,33 Sahara India Commercial Corporation Limited
and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh,34 and Noida Industrial
Development Authority v. Ravindra Kumar and Others,35 despite
holding the invocation of the urgency clause under Sections 17(1)
and 17(4) of the Act to be illegal, nonetheless upheld the acquisition
proceedings and directed enhancement of compensation so as to
compensate the land owners. However, in the present case, we have
concluded that the action of the State in invocation of the urgency
clause is in consonance with the law.
43. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, while delivering
its decision in Kamal Sharma has already granted additional
compensation of 64.7% to the landowners, to be offered as ‘No
Litigation Bonus’ in consonance with the Government order dated 4th

33 [2015] 7 SCR 512 : (2015) 7 SCC 21
34 (2017) 11 SCC 339
35 [2022] 1 SCR 1113 : (2022) 13 SCC 468
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November, 2015, thus there is no scope to direct further enhancement
in compensation.
44. In light of the Government order dated 4th November, 2015 and
the precedents set in Savitri Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh36 and
Yamuna Expressway Industrial Authority v. Shakuntla Education
and Welfare Society,37 it is directed that 64.7% enhancement in
compensation shall apply in rem, ensuring uniform benefits to all
affected landowners under the present land acquisition.
45. The question of non-issuance of the final award and its effect on the
acquisition is left open ensuring that any affected party would retain
the right to challenge or seek appropriate remedy on this specific
issue independently, in accordance with law.
46. As a result of the above discussion, the appeals filed by the
landowners i.e. Batch No. 1, are dismissed, and the appeals filed
by YEIDA i.e. Batch No. 2, are hereby allowed.
47. No order as to costs.
48. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeals filed by the landowners are dismissed.
Appeals filed by YEIDA are allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey

36 supra
37 [2022] 5 SCR 1034 : (2022) SCC OnLine SC 655