KALIYAPPANversusSTATE OF KERALA & ORS.

                                      KALIYAPPAN
                                        ~   ".    '    '   •   l        .,

                                                  V,
                            STATE OF KERALA & OR,S.

                                    OCTOBER 28, 1988

1:'J.          [E.S. VENKAT;\RAMIAH AND M.H. KANIA, JJ.]

              Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Section llA-Period during which
        a_n award shall be made-Two years from date ~f section 6 declaration/
        two years of commencement of Amendment Act, 1984.

                 The. Kerala. St.ate Government, after. completion of preliminary
c       steps, published a declaration on. 18.1.1984. concerning the acquisition
        of petitioner's land ~or a public pµrpQlie. On 24.9.1984 the Land Ac-
        qu,isition (A.mendment) Act, 1984 came In.to. force whereby section 11-A
        was il)troduced into. the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 11-A
        provif;led that the Collector shall make. an award under section 11 of the
D       As\ within a period of two years from the date of publication of the
        declaration, a_nd in the case where the s_aid declaration had been
        pu,bli,s,l_ied before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amend-
        w.~n.tJ A,ct,_ 1984 within two years from such commencement.


             The Collector made the award on 23.9.1986. The notice of the
                                                                 •
        awa_rd was served on the petitio'1"r on J0.9.1986.

              The petitioner challenged the. award. before the High Court of
         Kerala on the grounds (I) that the notice of the award having been
        served on 3.0.9.1986, the. award was not made within the prescribed
        period of two years, and (ii). that there wu Inordinate delay in making the
F       award.

             Both the writ petition and· the writ appeal were dismissed hy the
        High Court.

              Dismissing the special Iea,ve petl~lon, i_t was,

              HELD: (1). In section 11-A the words "the. Collector shaU make
        an award within a· per~d, </ft:.r,</ y~a~,· f~om the date of the publication
      of the declaration" mean_ lh/lt the C11llector is empowered to make an
      award. till the. expiry of the last date of the period of two years irrespec-
      tlve of the date on. which the l)otice of the award is served upon. the
. Iii ~rsons
       . -~.. Interested
                -
                '        -
                             in the
                              ,',- . land. 'To make an
                                            •'          . award'  . in this sectio~:
                                                                   ''        '   '



                                                 648
      KALIYAPPAN v. STATE OF KERALA [VENKATARAMIAH, J.]            649

means 'sign the award', That is the ordinary meaning to be ascribed to
                                                                          A
the words 'to make an award'. [655C-D I

      (2) It is well-known that the meaning to be assigned to the words
in a statute depends upon the context in which they are found and the
purpose behind them.
                                                                          B
      (3) The object of and the reason for prescribing the period of
limitation under section ll·A are different from the object of and the
reason for prescribing the period of limitation under section 18 of the
Act and the consequences that would flow from the violation of the rule
of limitation in the two cases are also different. There is no analogy
between section 11-A and section 18 of the Act insofar as the above
question Is concerned. [654C-D; 655E]                                     c

      (4) It would be safer in such cases to rely upon the statute for
guidance as regards the maximum time that can be taken to make an
award, instead of proceeding to strike down acquisition proceedings on
the ground of delay in making the award by applying varying standards     D
to different cases even though the maximum time of two years has not
been exceeded. The time taken by the Land Acquisition Officer in this
case to make the award cannot be considered to be fatal to the acquisi-
tion proceeding. [656B-C]          ·

      Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition        E
Officer, [1962] 1 S.C.R. 676, distinguished.

      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No. 9096 of 1988.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 2.12. 1987 of the Kerala           F
High Court in W.A. No. 933 of 1987.

      P.S. Patti and E.M. Anam for the Petitioner.

      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                          G
      VENKATARAMIAH, J. A piece of land measuring ten and a
half cents situated at Kozhippathi Village of Chittur Taluk, Palghat
District, State of Kerala originally belonged to Indrani, wife of the
petitioner and it now belongs to the petitioner. Under a preliminary
notification issued under section 3(1) of the Kerala Land Acquisition
Act on 24.2.1981 the said piece of land along with some other lands       H
                                                                                .   '
    650         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
                      . -·
    was proposed to be acquired for a certain public purpose. Both Indrani
A   and the petitioner filed objections to the proposed acquisition. After
    overruling the objections the State Government published a declara-
    tion under section 6 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act on 19.1.1984.
    On 24.9.1984 the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 passed by
    Parliament ·came into force in the State of Kerala and some other parts
B   of India to which it applies. By section 9 of the Land Acquisition
    (Amendment) Act, 1984 a new section, i.e. section 11-A was intro-
    duced into the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as
    'the Act') which reads thus:

               "11-A. Period within which an award shall be made-The
               Collector shall make an award under section 11 within a
c              period of two years from the date of the publication of the
               declaration and if no award is made within that period, the
               entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall
               lapse:

D                    Provided that in a case where the said declaration has
               been published before the commencement of the Land
               Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be
               made within a period of two years from such commence-
               ment.

E                     Explanation-In computing the period of two years
                referred to in this section, the period during which any
                action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said
                declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be
                excluded."

F   The Land Acquisition Officer, i.e., the Sub-Collector of Palghat who
    was exercising the powers of the Collector under the Act made an
    award in respect of the land of the Petitioner on 23. 9.1986 which was
    filed in the office of the Collector on 24.9.1986. The notice of the
    award was served on the petitioner on 30.9.1986. The petitioner and
    his wife challenged the acquisition proceeding in a petition filed under
G   Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of
    Kerala in O.P. No. 1536 of 1987. The learned Single Judge, who heard
    the said petition overruled the objections of the petitioner and his wife
    and dismissed the petition. Aggrieved by the decision of the learned
    Single Judge the petitioner and his wife preferred an appeal before the
    Division Bench of the High Court in W.A. No. 933 of 1987. The said
H   Writ Appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench of the Kerala High
      KALIYAPPAN v. STATE OF KERALA IVENKATARAMIAH, J.]              651

Court. Aggrieved by the decision of the Division Bench the petitioner
                                                                            A
has filed this petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India
seeking special leave to appeal against the judgments of the Division
Bench of the High Court.

      The two grounds on which the acquisition proceeding was chal-
lenged by the petitioner and his wife before the High Court were:           B
(i) that the award not having been made within a period of two years
from the date of the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amend-
ment) Act, 1984, that is, 24.9.1984, as required by the proviso !o
section 11-A of the Act, the acquisition proceeding should be deemed
to have lapsed; and (ii) that the land acquisition proceeding was liable
to be quashed on the ground that there was inordinate delay in making
the award.                                                                  c

      The contention of the petitioner and his wife before the High
Court was that the notice of the award having been served on him on
30th September, 1986 it must be held that the award was actually made
on 30th September, 1986 and since more than two years had elapsed           D
from 24.9.1984, from the date on which the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984 came into force by the time the notice of
award was served on him, the acquisition proceeding should be
declared as having lapsed by virtue of the proviso to section 11-A of
the Act. In support of his contention the petitioner relied upon a
decision of this Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy       E
Land Acquisition Officer and Another, [ 1962] 1 S.C.R. 676 in which
this Court had taken the view that for purposes of calculating the
period of limitation prescribed for making an application requesting
the Collector to refer the question relating to the valuation of the land
acquired under the Act to the Civil Court under section 18 of the Act,
the date on which the notice of the award was served on the owner of        F
the land should be treated as the date of the award and that the period
of limitation should be counted from the date of the service of the said
notice. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the
High Court have declined to accept the said contention and we think
rightly. Before the insertion of the new section. i.e., section 11-A of
the Act there was no provision corresponding to it in the Act which         G
provided for the period within which an award should be passed by the
Land Acquisition Officer, that is, the Collector under the Act. Since in
a large number of cases there used to be abnormal delay in making the
award, Parliament stepped in and introduced section 11-A to the Act
which is set out above. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons
attached to the Bill introducing the Land Acquisition (Amendment)           H
     652         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

A Act, 1984 by which section 11-A was introduced into the Act it was
  stated that "the pendency of acquisition proceedings for long periods
  often causes hardship to the affected parties and renders unrealistic
  the scale of compensation offered to them". It was further stated in it
  that "it is proposed to provide for a period of two years from the date
  of publication of the declaration under section 6 of the Act within
B which the Collector should make his award under the Act. If no award
  is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition
  of the lan.d would. lapse". Pursuant to the above object section 11-A of
  the Act was enacted. It provides that the Collector shall make an
  award under section 11 of the Act within a period of two years from
  the date of the publication of the declaration and i.f no award is ma<;le
  wit\li.n that period the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land
c shall lapse. In the case where the said declaration has been published
  before the commencement of the Land Acquisition {Amendment)
  Act, 1984 the award shall be made within two years from such com-
  ll)encement. We are not concerned with the rest of the provisions of
  section 11-A of the Act in this case. The crucial words which require to
D be interpreted are "the Collector shall make an award" appearing in
  section 11-A and the words 'the award shall be made' in the proviso to
  section 11-A. The statute prescribes the maximum period of two years
  for making an award from the date of the publication of the declara-
  tion under section 6 of the Act and further attaches a condition that if
  the award is not made within the said period the proceeding for the
E acquisition of the land shall lapse. Similarly in the case where the said
  declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land
  Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 the award shall be made within
  two years from such commencement and if the award is not so made
  the proceeding for acquisition shall lapse. Thus it is seen that the conse-
  q9ence of not making an award within the period of two years from the
F date of the publication of the declaration or from the date of the
  cc;immencement of the Act, as the case may be, is that the entire
  project for which the land is acquired will have to be abandoned or if it
  is intended to proceed with the project for which the land had been
  originally notified for acquisition it would become necessary for the
  Government to restart the proceedings once again with the publication
G of a fresh preliminary notification under section 4 of the Act or the
  corresponding provision in any local statute in force in a State. If the
  date of the communication of the notice of the award to the person
  interested in the land is treated as the date of making the award then
  the maximum period prescribed under section 11-A of the Act for mak-
  fog the award would get reduced by the period for serving the
  notice of the award on the owner of the land. Such maximum period.
      KALIYAPPAN v. STATE OF KERALA IVENKATARAMIAH, J.]              653

may vary from one case to another. Even in the same land acquisition
                                                                             A
case if a notice of the award is to be served on two or more persons
interested 'in the land the maximum period for making the award may
vary from person to person interested in the property depending upon
the date of service of notice of the award on each one of them. If the
person interested in the land is an unwilling person who is interested in
defeating the land acquisition proceeding it is likely that it may not be    B
possible io serve him with the notice of the. award at l\ll within the
prescribed time and if he can avoid the service of said notice until the
period of two years is over from the date of the publication of the
deciaration under section 6 of the Act or the date of commencement of
the Land Acquisiiion (Aniendment) Act, 1984, as the case may be
insofar as his interest in the land is concerned, the proceedings for the
acquisition would lapse thus ~ecting seriously the public interest. It       c
would also lead to absurd· and inconvenient results since the acquisi-
tion proceeding may be v.alid against some persons and may become
invalid in the ·case of some others.

       It is no doubt tme that in Raja Barish Chandra's case (supra)         D
while construing section 18 of the Act this Court held by giving ah
extended meaning that the date of the award for purposes of calculat-
ing the period of limitation should be the date on which the notice of
the award is served on the owner of the .land. The said interpretation
was given by this Court on the principle that if a person is given a right
to resort to a remedy to get rid of an adverse order within a prescribed     E
time limitation should not be computed from a date earlier than that
on which the party aggrieved actually knew of the order or had an
opportunity of knowing the order and, therefore, must be presumed to
have the knowledge of the order. Under section 18 of the Act the
person on whom the notice of the award is served has to make an
application before the Land Acquisition Officer within six weeks from        f
the date of the award if such person was present or represented before
the Land Acquisition Officer at the time when he made his award and
in other cases within six ·weeks of the receipt of the notice of the
Collector under section 12(2) or within six months from the date of the
award whichever expires first. In a case where a person interested in
the land is not present at the time when the award is made by the            G
Collector he is entitled to make an application under section l8 of the
Act seeking a reference of the case to the Civil Court for the determi-
nation of the proper compensation within six weeks of the receipt of
the notice from the Collector under section 12(2) of the Act or within
six months from the date of the Collector's date whichever expires
first. Since the process of service of notice issued under section 12(2)     H
     654         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

A would occupy some time this Court was of the view that it would ]~ad
  to injustice if the period of limitation prescribed bys. 18 of the Act was
  computed from the date on which the award was actually made and not
  from the date on which the notice under section 12(2) of the Act was
  served on the person interested in the land as it would result in the
  reduction of the period of six weeks by the time required for serving
B the notice on the person interested in the land. There is no doubt a
  difference between the meaning given by this Court in Raja Harish
  Chandra's case (supra) to the words "date of the award" in section 18
  of the Act and the interpretation of the High Court of the words 'the
  Collector shall make an award' or 'the award shall be made' in section
  11-A of the Act but such a distinction had to be maintained because
  the object of and the reason for prescribing the period of limitation
C under section 11-A of the Act are different from the object.of and the
  reason for prescribing the period of limitation under section 18 of the
  Act. and the consequences that would flow from the violation of the
  rule of limitation in the two cases are also different. In the former case
  the period of limitation is prescribed for preventing official delay in
D making the award and the consequent adverse effect on the person or
  persons interested in the land but in the latter case the period of
  limitation is prescribed for providing a remedy to the persons whose
  lands are acquired to seek a reference to the civil court for the determi-
  nation of proper and just compensation. Secondly, while in the fo~mer
  case violation of the rule of limitation would result in the acquisition
E proceeding becoming ineffective, in the latter case such a violation will
  not have any effect on the validity of acquisition proceeding. Thirdly;
  while in the former case the period of limitation prescribed represents
  the outer limit within which an award can be made in the latter case we
  are concerned with the point of time at which the time to make an
  application Ul)der section 18 of the Act .will begin to run against the
F person interested in the land. The provisions of section 11-A have to
  be construed bearing in mind these points of difference. It is well•
  known that the meaning to be assigned to the words in a statute
  depends upon the context in which they are found and the purpose
  behind them.

G         Under section 11-A of the Act the Collector is empowered to
    make an award before the expiry of the period of two years from the
    date of the publication of the declaration under section 6 of the Act
    and in a case where the said declaration has been published before the
    commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984
    before the expiry of the period of two years from the date of its com·
H   mencement. If an award is not made within the prescribed period of
      KALIYAPPAN v. STATE OF KERALA IVENKATARAMIAH, J.]            655

two years in either case, it is open to the person interested in the land A
to approach the Collector and tell him that the acquisition proceeding
should be dropped unless the Collector is able to produce before him
an award made by him within the period of two years. He may also in
such a case question the continuance of the acquisition proceeding in
court. Thus no prejudice will be caused to the person interested in the
land. At the same time it would not be open to a person interested in B
the land to get rid of the acquisition of proceeding by avoiding service
of notice issued by the Collector within the prescribed period. We are
of the view that under section 11-A of the Act the words "the Collector
shall make an award ....•. within a period of two years from the date
of the publication of the declaration" mean that the Collector is
empowered to make an award till. the expiry of the last date of the
period of two years irrespective of the date on which the notice of the C
award is served upon the persons interested in the land. 'To make an
award' in this section means 'sign the award'. That is the ordinary
meaning to be ascribed to the words 'to make an award', An extended
or a different meaning assigned to the words 'the date of the award' by
this court in Raja Harish Chandra's case (supra) cannot be applied in D
this case since such an extended or different meaning is neither war-
ranted by equity nor will it advance the object of the statute. Similarly
under the proviso to section 11-A of the Collector, the Collector is
empowered to make an award within two years from the date of com-
mencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 irrespec-
tive of the date on which the notice of award is served on the person E
concerned. We do not find any analogy between section ll-A and
section 18 of the Act insofar as the above question is concerned. The
High Court was, therefore, right in rejecting the above contention of
the petitioner.

      We find very little substance in the other contention of the F
petitioner, namely, that the award was liable to be quashed on the
ground of inordinate delay since it had been made at the end of two
years from the date of commencement of· the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984. While we expect an award to be passed by
the Collector as early as possible without delaying till the close of the
period of two years prescribed by section 11-A of the Act, we do not G
see any good reason to set aside a proceeding for acquisition on the
ground of delay by applying our own standard of speed in the matter of
making awards even where the period occupied is less than two years
from the date of publication of the declaration under section 6 of the
Act as such an approach may drive the Collector to make awards
without giving adequate time to the claimants to adduce evidence in H
    656        SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

A   support of the valuation of the property proposed to be acqmred and
    without giving sufficient consideration to the material placed before
    him. It would be safer in such cases to rely upon the statute for gui-
    dance as regards the maximum time that can be taken to make an
    award, instead of proceeding to strike down acquisition proceedings
    on the ground of delay in making the awards by applying varying
B
    standards to different cases even though the maximum time of two
    years has not been exceeded. The very fact that section 11-A has
    prescribed the period of two years from the date of the commencement
    o{ the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 as the maximum
    period within which the award can be made suggests that the time
    taken by'the Land Acquisition Officer in this case to make the award
c   cannot be considered to be fatal to the acquisition proceeding.

          We, therefore, affirm_ the decision of the High Court and reject
    this Special Leave Petition.

    R.S.S.                                             Petition dismissed.