Holding

Section 23 does not bar specific performance unless the sum named is intended as payment in lieu of performance; here the earnest money was security, so specific performance is granted.

Summary

The appellant, Kamal Kant Jain, entered into an agreement to purchase a property from the respondent, Surinder Singh, based on an authorisation letter that allowed a power of attorney holder to sell the land. The agreement required payment of earnest money, and both the authorisation letter and the agreement contained clauses about forfeiture and refund of that money, but the agreement did not expressly mention specific performance. When the respondent refused to execute the sale, the appellant sued for specific performance. The trial court, appellate court and High Court dismissed the suit, holding that Section 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 barred specific performance because the contract named a sum of money. The Supreme Court held that Section 23 only bars specific performance when the named sum is intended as a substitute for performance; here the earnest money was merely security to ensure performance. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower courts' judgments, allowed the appeal and ordered specific performance of the sale, with vacant possession to be given upon payment of the balance price.

Issues considered

The applicability of Section 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 to a contract that contains a liquidated damages clause but no explicit specific performance clause.
Whether the naming of earnest money in the agreement constitutes a sum in lieu of specific performance, thereby barring specific performance.

Legislation cited

Specific Relief Act, 1963s. 20, s. 23

Subjects

Specific performanceSection 23Liquidated damagesEarnest moneyContract of saleSpecific Relief ActOmission clauseProperty law

Judgment

[2017] 10 S.C.R. 1128

A KAMAL KANT JAIN
v.
SURINDER SINGH (D) THR. LRS.
(CivilAppea!No.17321 of2017)
B OCTOBER 27, 2017
[R. F. NARIMAN AND SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, JJ.]
Specific Relief Act, 1963 - s.23 - Liquidation of damages not
a bar to specific performance - Respondent authorised one 'H' to
C sell the property in question by way of an authorisation letter -
Accordingly, agreement to sell entered into between the appellmit-
buyer and respondent-seller, in terms whereof earnest money was
paid by appellant - Refusal by respondent to perform his part of
the agreement - Suit.for specific performance filed by appellant,
dismissed by Trial court - Appeal filed by appellant was dismissed
D - Second appeal filed by appellant, dismissed by before High Court
holding that s.23 barred the specific performance in the facts of
the case - On appeal, held: Mere naming of i:1 certain amounrwhich
may sound in damages is not good by itself to non-suit a person
seeking specific performance unless it is clear that the said sum
E was nmned in lieu of specific performance - In the instant case,
refund of earnest money with an equal amount as penalty was only
. to secure the performance of the contract and cannot be stated to
be a sum in lieu of specific performance of the contract - Mere
omission of a statement in the agreement to sell that specific
performance ought to be allowed would be of no consequence -
F Impugned judgment is set aside - Specific performance of the
agreement to sell is ordered - Vacant possession of the property in
question to be handed over to the appellant as soon cis Rs.JO crore.1·
is paid by the appellant to the respondent - Specific Relief Act,
. 1877 - s.20. . ·
G Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The legislature, in the new Section 23, Specific
Relief Act, 1963 explicitly provided that the mere naming of a
certain amount which may sound in damages is not good enough
by itself to non-suit a person seeking specific performance unless
H
1128
KAMAL KANT JAIN v. SURINDER SINGH (D) THR. LRS. 1129

it is clear on the facts that the said sum was named in lieu of A
specific performance; This is normally explicitly spelled out in
the agreement itself. [Para 9) [1133-B]
1.2 Further, paragraph 6 of the agreement to sell referred
to paragraph 6 of the authorisation letter and made it clear that
the refund of the amount of earnest money with an equal amount B
as penalty was only to secure the performance of -the contract -
and cannot be stated to be a sum in lieu of specific performance.
The mere omission of a statement in the agreement to sell that
specific performance ought to be allowed would, therefore, be of
no consequence. It is clear that in both para 6 of the. authorisation C
letter (which explicitly referred to specific performance) and para.
6 of the agreement to sell (which omitted reference to specific
performance) earnest money with equal amount as penalty/
damages remained the same, making. it clear that there was .no
- change in the position that this amount was only to secure
performance of th_!! contract, and is not in lieu of specific D
performance. [Para 15) [1140-B-D] -·
Dadarao and Am: v. Ramrao & Ors. (1999) 8 SCC 416
: [1999) 4 Suppl. SCR 356 - distinguished.
Man Kaur (Dead) by Lrs. v. Hartar Singh Sangha
(2010) 10 sec 512: [2010) 12 SCR 515; M.L. E
Devender Singh and Others v. Syed Khaja (1973) 2
SCC 515 : [1974) 1 SCR 312 - relied on.
P. D 'Souza v. Sho11drilo Naidu (2004) 6 SCC 649:
[2004) 3 Suppl. SCR186; P. S. Ranakl'ishna Reddy- v.
M. K. Bhagyalakshmi and Am: (2007) 10 SCC _231: F
[2007) 2 SCR 876 - referred to.
1130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] lO S.C.R.

A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.17321
of2017.
From the final Judgment and Order dated 29.04.2008 passed by
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in RSA No.1178
of 1996.
B V.K. Jhanjhi, Sr. Adv., Ms. Jyoti Mendiratta, Aastik, Ad vs. for the
Appellant.
Jayant Kumar Mehta, Shaurya Kuthiala, Sunil Fernandes, Nisheeth
Bhatt, Ms. Astha Shanna. Advs. for the Respondents.
C The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R. F. NARIMAN, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. The facts of the present case show that there was an
authorisation letter dated 08.03.1978 of the respondent to a certain power
of attorney holder namely, Harnam Singh, to sell the property in question.
D Paragraph 6 of this authorisation Jetter reads as foJlows:
"Purchaser should be warned that his earnest money will
stand as forfeited in my favour if he does not come forth to pay
the balance amount to have the sale deed registered. inspite of
my part being complete. Of course if! do not come forth before
E '(sub) registrar to have balance amount and to have s:ile deed
registered, the purchaser wiJI have the right to have his earnest
money back with equal amount as damages or to have sale deed
registered under specific performance and relief act in his own,
or his nominee's name."
F 3. On 05.06.1978, in pursuance of this authorisation letter, an
agreement to sell the said property was arrived at in a sum of Rs.
3,25,000/- out of which earnest money of Rs. 32,500/- was deposited
along with the agreement. The agreement to sell also contained para 6,
in which it was stated as under:
G " Should the bargain fail to materialize action.will be taken
in accordance with 6 or the seller's sale order dated 08.03.1978,
i.e.:-
(a) should the purchaser fail to come forth for payment of
balance amount and registration of the.sale deed, inspite of the
H seller's part being complete, the earnest money will stand as
KAMAL KANT JAIN v. SURINDER SINGH (D) THR. LRS. 1131
[R. F. NARIMA:N, J.]

forfeited in favour of the seller who would be at liberty to retain A
the house or to sell it to any body else he likes;
(b) should the seller back out from the deal, he will have to
refund the earnest money.with an equal amount as penalty for
non fulfilment of the contract in accordance with para 6 of the
sale order." B -
4. Some correspondence ensued between the parties, after which ~
it was clear to the appellant that the respondent was going to resile from
the agreement. Therefore, by a notice dated 11.01.1979, the appellant
called upon the respondent to specifically perform the aforesaid
agreement to sell. In February 1979, the respondent refused to do so, as c
a result of which the appellant filed a suit for specific performance dated
13.06.1979. The Trial Court framed three issues and found that the
agreement to sell stood proved and that the appellant was ready and
willing to perform his part of the agreement. However, on a construction
of Section 23 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 in the facts of the case namely, ·
that since paragraph 6 of the authorisation letter specifically contained D
the words "or to have sale deed registered under specific performance"
and the said words being absent in paragraph 6 of the agreement to sell
dated 05.06.1978, it would be clearthat this omission would indicate that
specific perfom1ance could not, therefore, be granted. The First Appellate
Court arrived at the same result on all counts and, therefore, dismissed E
the appeal:~ The High Court in second appeal also arrived at the same
conclusion, and relied upon a judgment in Dadarao and Anr. Vs. Ramrao
& Ors. 1999 (8) SCC 416; and following the aforesaid judgment,
therefore, held that Section 23 of Specific Relief Act would bar specific
performance in the facts of the present case. ,
F
5. The appellant has argued before us that Dadarao's case (supra)
is itself not to be considered as a precedent in the light of subsequent·
judgments of this Court. He further went on to state that except for
misconstruing Section 23 of the Specific relief Act, all findings w~re.
otherwise in his favour, namely that the agreement had been proved and
that he was ready and wi11lng t~ perfonn his part of the agreement. He, G ·
therefore, asked us to apply the later judgments of this Court, which on
a proper construction of Section 23 state that if there is any omission to
mention that specific performance of contract can be obtained, such.
omission would not be taken to mean that a suit for specific performance
cannot be filed, provided a sum was not named in the contract as damages H
1132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] I 0 S.C.R.

A in lieu of specific performance. He, therefore, asked us to reverse the
findings of the courts below inasmuch as all findings of fact which are in
his favour ought to be affirmed and the finding oflaw reversed.
6. Mr. Sunil Fernandese, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent, on the other hand, stated that the concurrent findings in this
B case ought not to be disturbed at this length of time. He also stated that
only 10% of the sum had been paid and, therefore, on balance. specific
performance should not be decreed in favour of the appellant. According
to him, the justice of the case demands that, at this point of time, we
should not exercise our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution
of India in favour of the appellant. He has referred in detail to the
C reasoning of the Trial Court and the first Appellate Court and asked us
to adopt the same.
7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the
view that there has been a travesty of justice in the facts of this case as
has been pointed out by learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant.
D All factual findings are in favour of the appellant. We might only add
that this being the· case, it is clear ·that the respondent in refusing to
perform his part of the contract did so wrongfully.
8. We may now examine whether the courts below were correct
in their reading of paragaph 6 of the agreement to sell and Section 23 of
E the Specific Relief Act, which reads as under:
"23. Liquidation of damages not a bar to specific perforrnance.-
( 1) A contract, otherwise proper to be specifically enforced,
may be so enforced, though a sum be named in it as the amount
to be paid in case of its breach and the pa1ty in default is willing
F
to pay the same, if the court, ha')ing regard to the terms of the
contract and other attending circumstances, is satisfied that the
sum was named only for purpose of securing performance of
the contract and not for the purpose of giving to the party in
default an option of paying money in lieu of specific performance.
G (2) When enforcing specific performance under this section, the
court shall not also decree payment of the sum so named in the ·
contract".
This section was the subject matter of some debate, as Section 20
of the earlier Specific Relief Act, 1877 was in somewhat different terms,
H and read as follows:
KAMAL KANT JAIN v. SURINDER SINGH (D) THR. LRS. 1133
[R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

"20: A contract, otherwise properto be specifically enforced, A
may be thus enforced, though a sum be named in it as the amount
to pe paid in case of its breach, and the party in default is willing
to pay the same.''
9. The legislature, in the new Section 23. explicitly provided that
the mere naming of a certain amount which may sound in damages is B
not good enough by itself to non-suit a person seeking specific performance
unless it is clear on the facts that the said sum was named in lieu of
specific performance. This is normally explicitly spelled out in the
agreement itself.
10. In M.L.Devender Singh and Others Vs. Syed Khaja 1973 (2) c
SCC 515, this Court, after referring to Section 20 of the old Act and 23 .
of the present Act, stated the genesis (in English law) of this branch of
law as follows:
16. The position stated above is in conformity with the principles
found stated in Sir Edward Fry's "Treatise on the Specific D
Performance of Contracts" (Sixth Edn. At p.65) It was said
there:
"The question always is: What is the contract? Is it. that
one certain act shall be done, with a sum annexed, whether by
way of penalty or damages, to secure the performance of this E
very act? Or, is it one of the two things shall be done at the
election of the party who has to perform the contract, namely,
the performance of the act or the payment of the sum of money?
If the former, the-fact of the penal or other like sum being annexed
will not prevent the court's enforcing performance of the very
act, and thus carrying into execution the intention of the parties: F
if the latter, the contract is satisfied by the payment of a sum of
money, and there is no ground for proceedings against the party
having the election to compel the performance of the other
alternative.
From what has been said it will be gathered that contracts G
of the kind now under discussion are divisible into three classes-
(i) where the sum mentioned is strictly a penalty -a sum
named by way of securing the performance of the contract, as
the penalty is a bond;
H
1134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 10 S.C.R.

A (ii) where the sum named is to be paid as liquidated damages
for a 'breach of the contract;
(iii) where the sum named is an amount the payment of
which may be substituted for the performance of the act at the
election of the person by whom the money is to be paid or the
B act done.
Where the stipulated payment comes under either of the
two first-mentioned heads, the court will enforce the contract, if
in other respects it can and ought to be enforced, just in the
same way as a contract not to do a particular act, with a penalty
c added to secure its performance or a sum named as liquidated
damages, may be specifically enforced by means of an injunction
against breaking it. On the other hand, where the contract comes
under the third head, it is satisfied by the payment of the money,
and there is no ground for the court to compel the specific
performance of the other alternative of the contract."
D

17. Sir Edward Fry pointed out that the distinction between a
strict penalty and liquidated damages for a breach of contract
was important in common law where liquidated damages were
E considered sufficient compensation for breach of contract, but,
sums stipulated by way of penalty stood on a different footing.
He then said:
"But as regards the equitable remedy the distinction is
unimportant: for the fact that the sum named is the amount agreed
F
to be paid as liquidated damages is, equally with a penalty strictly
so called, ineffectual to prevent the court from enforcing the
contract in specie"
Having thus stated this genesis, the court found:
"20. The fact that the parties themselves have provided a
G . sum to be paid by the party breaking the contract does not, by
itself, remove the strong presumption contemplated by the use
of the words "unless and until the contrary is proved". The
sufficiency or insufficiency of any evidence to remove such a
presumption is a matter of evidence. The fact that the parties
themselves specified a sum of money to be paid in the event of
H
KAMAL KANT JAIN v. SURINDER SINGH (D) THR. LRS. 1135
[R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

its breach is, no doubt, a piece of evidence to be considered in A
deciding whether the presumptiQn has been repelled ornot. But,
in our opinion, it is nothing more than a piece of evidence. It is
not conclusive or decisive."
11. Next in chronological sequence comes the judgment in
Dadarao's case (supra), in para 6 of which it was stated as follows: B
,:'
,t:~,)':
"6.The relationship between the parties has to be regulated
by the terms of the agreement between them. Whereas the
defendants in the suit had taken up the stand that the agreement
dated 24th April, 1969 was really in the nature of a loan
transaction, it is the plaintiff who contended that it was an c
agreement to sell. As we read the agreement, it contemplates
that on or before 15'11 April, 1972 the sale deed would be
executed. But what is important is that the agreement itself
provides as to what is to happen if either the seller refuses to sell
or the purchaser refuses to buy. In that event the agreement
provides that in addition to the earnest money of Rs. 1,000 a sum D
of Rs. 500 was to be given back to Tukaram Devsarkar and that
"no sale deed will be executed:'. The agreement is very categorical
in envisaging that a sale deed is to be executed only if both the
parties agree to do so and in the event of any one of them resiling
from the same there was to be no question of the other party E
being compelled to go ahead with the execution of the sale deed .
. In the event of the sale deed not being executed, Rs. 500, in
addition to the return of Rs. 1,000, was the only sum payable.
This sum of Rs. 500 perhaps represented the amount of quantified
damages or, as the defendants would have it, interest payable on
Rs. 1,000/-." F

12. However, in two subsequent judgments namely P.D'Souza
. Vs. Shondrilo Naidu 2004 (6) SCC 649 and P.S.Ranakrishna Reddy
Vs. M.K.Bhagya\akshmi and Anr. 2007 (10) SCC 231, this Court
specifically adverted to two earlier judgments and distinguished Dadarao's
case by referring to the specific clause stating that "no sale deed will be G
executed." The Court.went on to hold in P.D'Souza (supra) in para 34,
as follows:
"34: In Dadarao-whereupon Mr. Bhat placed strong reliance,
the binding decision of M.L.Devender Singh was not noticed.
This Court. furthermore failed to notice and consider the H
1136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 10 S.C.R.

A provisions of Section 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The
said decision, thus, was rendered per incuriam."
This Court then went on to add, in paragraph 36, that Dadarao's
case (supra) does not constitute a binding precedent, having not noticed
the relevant statutory provisions and at least one earlier binding precedent.
B 13. This was reiterated in P.S.Ranakrishna Reddy (supra) in
paragraph 15:
"15. The decision of this Court in Dadarao whereupon reliance
has been placed by Mr. Chandrashekhar is wholly misplaced.
The term of the agreement therein was absolutely different.
c We need not dilate on the said decision in view of the fact that
in a subsequent decision of this Court in P. D'Souza v. Shondrilo
Naidu it has been held to have been rendered per incuriam,
stating: (SCC pp. 657-58, paras 34-36)
"34. In Dadarao whereupon Mr. Bhat placed strong reliance,
D the binding decision of M.L. Devender Singh was not noticed.
This Court furthermore failed to notice and consider the
provisions of Section 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The
said decision, thus, was rendered per incuriam.
35. Furthermore, the relevant term stipulated in Dadarao was as
E under: (SCC p. 417, para 2)
'2 .... "Tukaram Devsarkar, aged about 65, agriculturist, r/o
Devsar, purchaser (GHENAR) - Balwantrao Ganpa~rao Pantle,
aged 76 years, r/o Dijadi, Post Devsar, vendor (DENAR), who
hereby give in writing that a paddy field situated at Dighadi Mouja,
Survey No. 7/2 admeasuring 3 acres belonging to me hereby
F
agree to sell to you for Rs. 2000 and agree to receive Rs. 1000
from you in presence ofV.D.N. Sane. A sale deed shall be made
by me at my cost by 15-4-1972. In case the sale deed is not
made to you or if you refuse to accept, in addition of earnest
money an amount of Rs. 500 shall be given or taken and no sale
G deed will be executed. The possession of the property has been
agreed to be delivered at the time of purchase. This agreement
is binding on the legal heirs and successors and assigns. "'
Interpreting the said term, it was held: (SCC p. 418, paras 6-7)
'6. The relationship between the parties has to be regulated by
H the terms of the agr,.eement between them. Whereas the
KAMAL KANT JAIN v. SURINDER SINGH (D) THR. LRS. 1137
[R. F. NAR,IMAN, J.]

defendant~ in the suit had taken uj:>the stand that the agreement A
dated 24-4-1969 w·as really in the nature of a loan transaction, it
is the plaintiff who contended that it was an agreement to sell.
As we read the agreement, it contemplates that on or before 15-
4~ 1972 the sale deed would be executed. But what is important
is that the agreement itself provides as to what is to happen if B.
either the seller refuses to sell or the purchaser refuses to buy.
In that event the agreement provides that in addition to the earnest
money of Rs. 1000 a sum of Rs. 500 was to be given back to
Tukaram Devsarkar and that "no sale deed will be executed".
The agreement is very categorical in envisaging that a sale deed
is to be executed only if both the parties agree to do so and in the c
event of any one of them resiting from the same there was to be
no question of the other party being compelled to go ahead with
the execution of the sale deed. In the event of the sale deed-not
being executed, Rs. 500 in addition to the return of Rs. 1000,
-was the only sum payable. This sum of Rs. 500 perhaps
D
represented the amount of quantified damages or, as the
defendants would h~ve it, interest payable on Rs: I 000. _ -
7. If the agreement had not stipulated as to what is to ~appen in
the event of the sale not going through, then perhaps the plaintiff
could have asked the Court for a decree.of specific performance
but here the parties to the agn::ement had agreed that even if the E
seller did not want to el',ecute the sale deed he would only -be ·
required to refund the amount of Rs ..1000 plus pay Rs. 500 in
addition thereto. There was thus no obligation on Balwantrao to
complete the sale transaction. '
36. Apart from the fact that the agreement of sale did not contain F
a similar clause, Dadarao does not create a binding precedent
-having not noticed the statutory provisions as also an earlier
binding precedent." (emphasis in original)" -
14. In a fairly recent judgment, in Man.Kaur <Dead) by Lrs. Vs.
Hartar Singh Sangha. 2010 00) SCC 512, afterreferring to some of the - G
earlier precedents , the law is stated thus:
"28. It is thus clear that for a plaintiff to seek specific
performance ofa contract of sale relating to immovable property,
and for a court to grant such specific performance, it is not
necessary that the contract should contain a specific provision H
1138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 10 S.C.R.

A that in the event of breach, the aggrieved party will be entitled to
specific performance. The Act makes it clear that if the legal
requirements for seeking specific enforcement of a contract are
made out, specific performance could be enforced as provided
in the Act even in the absence of a specific term for specific
performance in the contract. It is evident from section 23 of the
B
Act that even where the agreement of sale contains only a
provision for payment of damages or liquidated damages in case
of breach and does not contain any provision for specific
performance, the party in breach cannot contend that in view of
specific provision for payment of damages, and in the absence
c of a provision for specific performance, the court cannot grant
specific performance. But where the provision naming an amount
to be paid in case of breach is intended to give to the party in
default an option to pay money in lieu of specific performance,
then specific performance may not be permissible.
D 29. We may attempt to clarify the position by the following
illustrations (not exhaustive):
(A). The agreement of sale provides that in the event of breach
by the vendor, the purchaser shall be entitled to an amount
equivalent to the earnest money as damages. The agreement is
E silent as to specific performance. In such a case, the agreement
indicates that the sum was named only for the purpose of securing
performance of the contract. Even if there is no provision in the
contract for specific performance, the court can direct specific
performance by the vendor, if breach is established. But the court
has the option, as per Section 21 of the Act, to award damages,
F if it comes to the conclusion that it is not a fit case for granting
specific performance.
(B). The agreement provides that in the event of the vendor
failing to execute a sale deed, the purchaser wilt not be entitled
for specific performance but will only be entitled for return of
G the earnest money and/or payment of a sum named as liquidated
damages. As the intention of the parties to bar specific
performance of the contract and provide only for damages in
the event of breach, is clearly expressed, the court may not grant
specific performance, but can award liquidated damages and
refund of earnest money.
H
KAMAL KANT JAIN v. SURINDER SINGH (D) THR. LRS. 1139
. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] -

(C). The agreement of sale provides that in the event of breach A
by either party the purchaser will be entitled to specific
performance, but the party in breach will have the option, instead
of performing the contract, to pay a named amount as liquidated
damages to the aggrieved party and on such payment, the
aggrieved party shall not be entitled to specific performance. In B
such a case, the purchaser will not be entitled to specific
performance, as the terms of the contract give the party in default
ai:i_ option of paying money in lieu of specific performance.
30. In this case, Clauses 11 and 12 of the agreement deal with
consequences of breach. They are extracted below : .
c
"11. That in case the seller fails to perform his part of contract
of sale according to the terms a:nd conditions agreed upon in this
agreement to sell in matter of execution of the sale deed and its
registration, on the receipt of the balance sale price, he shall be
liable to pay double the amount of the earnest money received
by her from the purchaser. D
12. That in case the purchaser fails to get the transaction of the
sale completed by means cif executi~n and registration of sale
deed according to the terms of this agreement for sale, ·he shall ·
forfeit his earnest money of Rs.10,000/- advanced by the
purchaser to the said seller." E
31. The agreement does not specifically provide for specific
performance. Nor does it bar specific performance. It provides
for payment of damages in the event of breach by either party.
The provision for damages in the agreement is not intended to
provide the vendor an option of paying money in lieu of specific ··p
performance. Therefore, we are of the view that plaintiff will be
entitled to seek specific performance (even in the absence of a
specific provision therefor) subject to his proving breach by the
defendant and that he was ready and willing to perform his
obligation under the contract, in terms of the contract." - G
15. At this stage, it is necessary to point out-that the impugned
judgment referred to and followed only Dadarao's case (supra), which
we h'ave seen was stated to be per incuriam atleast in two other judgments
of this Court, apart from being distinguishable on fact~ in that the relevant
clause of the agreement in Dadarao's case (supra) contained a specific H
1140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017110 S.C.R.

A clause to the effect that in the event of breach, only damages would be
paid and no specific performance of the contract could be claimed. This
is, therefore, the basic infirmity in the impugned judgment under appeal.
Apart from that, as is clear from the judgment in Man Kaur's case
(supra), paragraph 6 of the agreement to sell refers to paragraph 6 of
the authorisation letter and makes it clear that the refund of the amount
B
of earnest money with an equal amount as penalty is only to secure the
performance of the contract and cannot be stated to be a sum in lieu of
specific performance. The mere omission of a statement in the said
clause that specific performance ought to be allowed would, therefore,
be of no consequence, as has been held in Man Kaur's case (supra). It
c is clear that in both para 6 of the authorisation letter (which explicitly
referred to specific performance) and para 6 of the agreement to sell
(which omitted reference to specific perfonnance) earnest money with
equal amount as penalty/damages remains the same, making it clear
that there is no change in the position that this amount is only to secure
D performance of the contract, and is not in lieu of specific performance.
16. We are, therefore, of the view that the impugned judgment
deserves to be set aside, as a result of which specific pe1formance of
the agreement to sell dated 05.06.1978 is ordered. We record the
extremely fair statement made by Mr. V.K.Jhanjhi, learned senior counsel
for the appellant, that given the large passage of time, he would be willing
E to pay an amount of Rupees ten crores (Rs. 10,00,00,000/- only) to the
respondent to be deposited with the registry of this Court within a period
of nine months from today. It is made clear that tl1e vacant possession
of the property in question must be handed over to the appellant as soon
as this amount is paid to the respondent.
F 17. In view of the statement made by learned senior counsel for·
the appellant, we are not calling upon the appellant to further pay the
balance amount of the sale price amounting to Rs. 2,92,500/- (Rs.
3,25,000/- less Rs. 32,500/-).
18. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.
G

Divya Pandey Appeal allowed.