Supreme Court of India
KANDIMALLA RAGHAVAIAH & CO.versusNATIONAL INSURANCE CO. & ANR.
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 901
- Decided
- 10 July 2009
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- D K JAIN
Holding
A complaint under the Consumer Protection Act is barred if not filed within two years from the date the cause of action accrues, which in a fire insurance case is the date of the fire, and the insurer’s refusal to issue claim forms does not extend the limitation period.
Summary
The appellant, a tobacco business, took a fire insurance policy for stock stored in a godown which was destroyed by fire on 22-23 March 1988. Although the insurer and the bank were notified, the appellant did not lodge a claim until 1992 and only sought claim forms, which the insurer refused, citing the claim as time‑barred. A complaint alleging deficiency in service was filed before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in October 1997, but the Commission dismissed it as barred by the two‑year limitation under Section 24A of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The appellant appealed, arguing that the cause of action should be deemed to arise when the bank filed its claim in July 1988 and that the insurer’s refusal should extend the limitation period. The Supreme Court held that the cause of action accrued on the date of the fire, that the two‑year limitation began on 23 March 1988, and that no extension is permissible; consequently, the complaint was time‑barred. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Issues considered
- Whether a complaint under the Consumer Protection Act is barred by limitation under Section 24A when filed after the two‑year period.
- When does the cause of action accrue in a fire insurance claim for the purpose of limitation.
- Whether the delay in filing the complaint can be condoned under Section 24A.
- Whether the bank’s claim on behalf of the appellant affects the limitation period.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Consumer Protection ActSection 24ALimitation periodCause of actionFire insuranceTime‑barred complaintClaim formsJoint policy
Judgment
. [2009] 10 S.C.R. 870
A KANDIMALLA RAGHAVAIAH & CO.
v.
NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 4962 of 2002)
JULY 10, 2009
B
[D.K. JAIN AND R.M. LODHA, JJ.]
Consumer Protection Act, 1986- s.24A - Held: Bars any
fora set up under the Act, from admitting a complaint, unless
C the complaint is filed within two years from the date on which
the cause of action arose - On facts, fire policy taken in
respect of tobacco lying in godown - Fire took place in the
godown in 1988 - Complaint filed in 1997, was clearly time
barred - Limitation.
D
Cause of action - Meaning of - Explained.
The appellant firm was in the business of tobacco.
On 4.12.1987, the appellant took out a Fire Policy in
E respect of tobacco lying in the godowns with the
respondent insurance company for the period 4.12.1987
to 3.4.1988. On 8.3.1988, appellant obtained loan from
respondent bank by hypothecating the tobacco stored in
the godowns. On 22.3.1988, fire broke out in the godowns
F allegedly due to electrical short circuit and entire stock
of tobacco was gutted. The said fact was brought to the
notice of the insurance company and the bank. The next
day bank lodged an FIR against appellant for intentionally
setting on fire the stock in order to lay false claim for loss
G of stocks. However after trial appellant was acquitted. On
14.7.1988, the bank filed claim with insurance company
but did not pursue the claim. On 6.11.1992, appellant
asked for claim form from the insurance company.
Appellant did not receive any response and on 26.10.1995
H 870
KANDIMALLA RAGHAVAIAH & CO. v. NATIONAL 871
INSURANCE CO. & ANR.
issued legal notice to insurance company. On 4.1.1996, A
appellant again asked for claim forms. On 21.3.1996,
insurance company replied to the legal notice denying
the fact of fire and refused to issue the claim form on the
ground that claim was time barred.
B
On 21.10.1997, appellant filed complaints before the
Commission, which were dismissed as time barred.
Hence the appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
c
HELD : 1. Section 24-A of the Consumer Protection
Act bars any fora set up under the Act, from admitting a
complaint, unless the complaint is filed within two years
from the date on which the cause of action has arisen.
\- The provision expressly casts a duty on the Commission, D
admitting a complaint, to dismiss a complaint unless the
complainant satisfies the District Forum, the State
Commission or National Commission, as the case may
be, that the complainant had sufficient cause for not filing
the complaint within the period of two years from the date E
on which the cause of action had arisen. [Para 11) [878-
8-C]
cl
(
~
State Bank of India v. B.S. Agricultural Industries JT
(2009) 4 SC 191, relied on.
F
2. The term "cause of action" is neither defined in the
Act nor in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 but is of wide
import. It has different meanings in different contexts, that
is when used in the context of territorial jurisdiction or
limitation or the accrual of right to sue. Generally, it is G
described as "bundle of facts", which if proved or
admitted entitle the plaintiff to the relief prayed for. Pithily
stated, "cause of action" means the cause of action for
which the suit is brought. "Cause of action" is cause of
.I .
H
872 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.
A action which gives occasion for and forms the
foundation of the suit. In the context of limitation with
reference to a fire insurance policy, undoubtedly, the date
of accrual of cause of action has to be the date on which
the fire breaks out. (Para 13) [879-C-E]
B
Sidramappa v. Rajashetty & Ors. (1970) 1 SCC 186,
relied on.
•
3. It is clear from the correspondence between the
appellant and the Insurance Company that cause of
c action in respect of the special insurance policy arose on
22nd I 23rd March, 1988, when fire in the godown took
place damaging the tobacco stocks hypothecated with
the Bank in whose account the policy had been taken by
the appellant. Thus, the limitation for the purpose of
D Section 24A of the Act began to run from 23rd March, 'i
1988 and therefore, the complaint before the Commission
against the Insurance Company for deficiency in service,
whether for non issue of claim forms or for not
processing the claim under the policy, ought to have
E been filed within two years thereof. The complaint was
in fact filed on or after 24th October, 1997, which was
clearly barred by time. In the complaint before the
Commission, though there was an averment that the
Bank had not disclosed to the appellant whether any
F amount had been received by them from the Insurance
Company against the claim preferred on 14th July, 1988,
but appellant's categorical stand therein was that it was
because of the pendency of the criminal litigation that
they could not make a claim in respect of the policy for
G the loss suffered and time and again they had been
requesting the Insurance Company to send the claim
forms, which request was not acceded to by the
Insurance Company, and it shows that the appellant was
not depending on the claim stated to have been made by
H
KANDIMALLA RAGHAVAIAH & CO. v. NATIONAL 873
INSURANCE CO. & ANR.
" the Bank with the Insurance Company. [Para 18] [882-F- A
H; 883-A-D]
4. The finding by the Commission that the filing of
claim by the Bank on 14th July, 1988, would not have, in
any way, helped the appellant was correct. On their own B
showing, for the first time, only on 6th November, 1992
and then again on 26th October, 1995, the appellant had
requested the Insurance Company to issue claim form to
enable them to prefer a claim which request was declined
by the Insurance Company on 21st March, 1996. By no c
stretch of imagination, it can be said that Insurance
Company's reply dated 21st March, 1996 to the legal
notice dated 4th January, 1996, declining to issue the
forms for preferring a claim after a lapse of more than four
years of the date of fire, resulted in extending the period D
of limitation for the purpose of Section 24A of the Act.
The complaint filed on 24th October, 1997 and that too
without an application for condonation of delay was
manifestly barred by limitation and the Commission was
justified in dismissing it on that short ground. [Para 19)
E
[883-D-H; 884-A)
Case Law Reference:
JT (2009) 4 SC 191 relied on Para 12
(1970) 1 sec 186 relied on Para 13 F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
4962 of 2002.
From the Judgment & Order dated 17.4.2002 of the G
National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission at New
Delhi in O.P. No. 248 of 1997.
P.S. Narasimha, A.V. Rao, Prabhakar Parnam,
Venkateswara Rao Anumolu for the Appellants.
H
874 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 10 S.C.R.
A Ajay Kumar Misra, M.K. Dua, Kishore Rawat, Anuradha
Dueby Mishra, Vikram, Himanshu Munshi for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D.K. JAIN, J. 1. Challenge in this Appeal under Section
B 23 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 ("the Act", for short)
is to a common judgment and order dated 17th April, 2002,
passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission, ("the Commission", for short) in Original Petitions
No. 97 of 1996 and 248of1997, whereby the Commission has
C dismissed appellant's two complaints alleging deficiency in
service against two different insurance companies on account
of non-settlement of insurance claims made by the appellant,
on the ground that both the complaints were barred by limitation
under Section 24A of the Act.
D
2. The salient facts giving rise to the appeal are as follows:
The appellant firm was engaged in the business of tobacco
at Chelakaluripet, Guntur District, Andhra Pradesh. They
E constructed godowns in the premises of M/s Kandimalla
Venkateswarlu at Padripuram, in the same district for storage
of tobacco. On 4th December, 1987 the appellant took out a
Fire Policy 'C' with the National Insurance Company -
Respondent No.1 in this appeal (subject matter of O.P. No. 248
F of 1997), in the account of the Indian Bank - Respondent No.2
herein, against loss or damage by fire etc. for a period of 4
months from 4th December, 1987 to 3rd April, 1988 for a sum
of Rs.1,35,000/- and paid a premium of Rs.17,634/-. On 8th
March, 1988 the appellant obtained loan from Respondent No.2
G -Indian Bank by hypothecating the tobacco stored in the
godowns. In the intervening night between 22nd and 23rd
March, 1988 a fire broke out in the godowns, allegedly due to
electrical short circuit and the entire stock of tobacco was
gutted. The appellant reported the matter to the present
H contesting parties, i.e., both the Insurance Company and the
- KANDIMALLA RAGHAVAIAH & CO. v. NATIONAL
INSURANCE.CO. & ANR. [D.K. JAIN, J.]
875
>
I Bank. On 24th March, 1988 a Surveyor was appointed by A
Respondent No.1 - Insurance Company, who submitted his
report on 2nd April, 1988.
3. However, it appears that on 23rd March, 1988 i.e., the
date of the incident, Respondent No.2 - the Bank lodged First
B
Information Report (FIR) against the appellant firm and its
partners resulting in filing of Criminal Case No.72 of 1988
against them under Sections 380, 420, 423, 436, 457, 484
mad with Section 120 (B) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), inter
alia, alleging that they had intentionally set fire to the tobacco
stocks with a view to lay a false claim for loss of stocks. After
c
the trial, the accused were acquitted by the Sessions Judge,
Narasaraopet on 22nd August, 1991. Appeal filed by the Bank
against order of acquittal was dismissed by the High Court on
5th September, 1992.
D
4. In the meanwhile, on 14th July, 1988, Respondent No.2
- the Bank preferred a claim (subject matter of the present
appeal) with Respondent No.1 - the Insurance Company for
an amount of Rs.1,32,85, 760/-. It seems that the Bank did not
pursue the claim. On 6th November, 1992, the appe!!ant asked E
for the claim form from the Insurance Company - Respondent
No.1. Having,failed to get any response, on 26th October, 1995
~
issued a legal notice to Respondent No.1. On 4th January,
""' 1996, the appellant again asked for claim forms but still there
was no response. Ultimately, on 21st March 1996 the Insurance F
Company replied to the legal notice, denying the factum of fire
and refused to issue the 'claim form' on the ground that the
claim had become time-barred.
5. On 21st October, 1997, the appellant filed the complaint G
before the Commission. Before the Commission, appellant's
case was that they had asked for the 'claim form' from the
insurance company on 6th November, 1992, which was not
given although Respondent No. 2 -Bank being a 'co-insured'
H
876 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.
A
-
A had lodged a claim with the Insurance Company on 14th July,
1988, and they were pursuing their claim with the Insurance
Company on behalf of the appellant. Since the denial of the
Insurance Company in honouring the claim was received on
21st March 1996, the period of limitation to file complaint would
B commence from that date and therefore, their complaint before
the Commission was well within time.
6. As noted earlier, the stand of the appellant has not found •
favour with the Commission. The Commission has observed
that the cause of action occurred on the intervening night
c between 22nd/23rd March, 1988 when the fire broke out but
the complaint was filed only in the year 1997. The first action
by the appellant was in November 1992 i.e., after a gap of 4Y:!
years, when the appellant asked for the claim form. The
Commission finally held that both the complaints were barred
D by limitation and therefore, could not be entertained. According
to the Commission, cause of action could not be assumed to
continue till the date of denial of the claim. The delay in filing
the complaint was obvious in both the cases and there was not
even a prayer or an application for condonation of delay. Hence
E the present appeal.
7. Mr. P. Narasimha, learned senior counsel, appearing
for the appellant, argued that the Commission has erred in
,
F
holding that the complaint was barred by limitation inasmuch
F as it failed to appreciate that the policy in question was a "joint
policy" and Respondent No.2 - Bank was equally responsible
to make a claim for the loss covered under the policy on
account of the fire and as a matter of fact, it did lodge a claim
with the Insurance Company as far back as on 14th July, 1988,
G but failed to pursue the same, a clear case of dereliction and
deficiency in service towards the appellant was made out for
.
which they cannot be made to suffer. It was urged that at any
rate non-responsiveness of the Respondent - Insurance
Company towards the legal notices served upon them by both
H
KANDIMALLA RAGHAVAIAH & CO. v. NATIONAL 877
INSURANCE CO. & ANR. [D.K. JAIN, J.]
the appellant and the Bank and their repeated denial to issue A
the claim forms also amounted to deficiency in seNice towards
the appellant. It was, thus, pleaded that the Commission has
erroneously held the claim to be time-barred when the Bank as
a joint beneficiary, had preferred the claim with Respondent
No; 1 -Insurance Company within time on 14th July, 1988, B
particularly when because of false complaint by the Bank, the
appellant could not file the complaint. It was asserted that due
to deficiency in seNice of the Insurance Company as also the
Bank, the appellant has suffered a loss to the tune of Rs.1.35
crores besides facing a civil suit by the Bank for recovery of c
the loan, amounting to Rs.3 crores.
8. Mr. M.K. Dua, learned counsel appearing for
Respondent No.1 - the Insurance Company, on the other hand,
... supported the decision of the Commission and submitted that
D
the appellant's complaint was hopelessly time barred inasmuch
as the incident took place on 23rd March, 1988 and complaint
was filed by the appellant in the year 1997 i.e., after a lapse of
9 years. It was pointed out that except for intimating the
Insurance Company about the fire incident, the appellant did
E
not lodge any formal claim, supported by documents as was
required under the terms and conditions of the Policy. It was
thus, pleaded that since no claim was made by the appellant
in terms of the policy of insurance, the question of deficiency
in seNice did not arise.
F
9. The stand of Respondent No.2 - the Bank, in the
counter affidavit is that suit for recovery of Rs. 3. 76 crores has
already been filed against the appellant which is now pending
before Debt Recovery Tribunal, Vishakhapatnam and complaint
before the Commission was by way of a counter-blast to the G
4f
' said proceedings. A reference is also made to the
correspondence exchanged between the appellant and the
Bank from 1988 to 1999 to show that there was no deficiency
in seNice on their part.
H
878 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.
A 10. Thus, the short question for consideration is whether
on facts at hand, the Commission was correct in law in .....
dismissing the Complaint preferred by the appellant as barred
by limitation?
B 11. Section 24A of the Act bars any fora set up under the
Act, from admitting a complaint, unless the complaint is filed
within two years from the date on which the cause of action has
arisen. The provision expressly casts a duty on the
Commission, admitting a complaint, to dismiss a complaint
c unless the complainant satisfies the District Forum, the State
Commission or National Commission, as the case may be, that
the complainant had sufficient cause for not filing the complaint
within the period of two years from the date on which the cause
of action had arisen.
+
D 12. Recently, in State Bank of India Vs. B.S. Agricultural
Industries (1)1, this Court, while dealing with the same provision,
has Held:
"8. It would be seen from the aforesaid provision that it is
E peremptory in nature and requires consumer forum to see
before it admits the complaint that it has been filed within
two years from the date of accrual of cause of action. The
consumer forum, however, for the reasons to be recorded ,
in writing may condone the delay in filing the complaint if
F sufficient cause is shown. The expression, 'shall not admit
a complaint' occurring in Section 24A is sort of a
legislative command to the consumer forum to examine on
its own whether the complaint has been filed within
limitation period prescribed thereunder.· As a matter of law,
G the consumer forum must deal with the complaint on merits
only if the complaint has been filed within two years from
the date of accrual of cause of action and if beyond the
said period, the sufficient cause has been shown and
H 1. JT 2009 (4) SC 191.
""
KANDIMALLA RAGHAVAIAH & CO. v. NATIONAL 879
INSURANCE CO. & ANR. [D.K. JAIN, J.]
dele:ay condoned for the reasons recorded in writing. In A
.. other words, it is the duty of the consumer forum to take
notice of Section 24A and give effect to it. If the complaint
is barred by time and yet, the consumer forum decides the
complaint on merits, the forum would be committing an
illegality and, therefore, the aggrieved party would be B
entitled to have such order set aside." [Also see: Union
of India & Anr. Vs. British India Corporation Ltd. & Ors. 2
\
and Haryana Urban Development Authority Vs. B.K.
Sooc:fl.]
c
13. The term "cau?e of action" is neither defined in the Act
nor in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 but is of wide import.
It has different meanings in different contexts, that is when used
in the context of territorial jurisdiction or limitation or the accrual
~
of right to sue. Generally, it is described as "bundle of facts", D
which if proved or admitted entitle the plaintiff to the relief
prayed for. Pithily stated, "cause of action" means the cause
of action for which the suit is brought. "Cause of action" is cause
of action which gives occasion for and forms the foundation of
the suit. (See: Sidramappa Vs. Rajashetty & On:. 4 ). In the
E
context of limitation with reference to a fire insurance policy,
undoubtedly, the date of accrual of cause of action has to be
the date on which the fire breaks out.
14. In the case before us, as already noted, fire in the
tobacco godown took place on 22nd/ 23rd March, 1988 and F
the Bank, in whose favour the stocks had been hypothecated,
was informed about it by the appellant on 23rd March, 1988
itself. Insofar as the appellant is concerned, the matter rested
there till 6th November, 1992, when for the first time, the
appellant addressed the following letter to the Insurance G
~.
1 Company.
2. (2003) g sec 5o.
3. (2006) 1 sec 164.
4. (1970) 1 sec 1a6. H
880 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.
A "To
The Brar.ch Manager,
National Insurance Company Limited,
Chilakaluripet.
Sir,
B
We did business in tobacco in the name and style
of Messrs. Kandimalla Raghavaiah and Company. Our
stock belonging to 1983-84 crop was kept in a key loan
to Indian Bank was insured with your Company.
C Subsequently, a fire accident occurred in the month of
March, 1988 in the premises of the Company and the
entire stock insured was gutted in the fire.
As the said stock was gutted in the fire accident and
the same was insured, we would like to make a claim with •
D
regard to the loss insured by us due to the fire accident.
So, you are hereby requested to give the claim
forms thereby enabling us to make a claim for the loss
occurred due to tl1e fire accident.
E
Our request may kindly be considered forthwith".
(emphasis supplied by us)
f
15. It is manifest from the letter that till that date the
F appellant had not made any claim whatsoever with the
Insurance Company for the loss suffered in the fire on 23rd
March, 1988. As a matter of fact, only on 6th November, 1992
they, for the first time, asked for supply of "claim forms" in order
to prefer a claim. By that time period of limitation for the
G purpose of Section 24A of the Act had expired. Further, even
thereafter, everything was quiet at both ends till 16th August, . -
1995 when the respondent - Bank, seemingly on the request
of the appellant, confirmed to the appellant that they had
H
KANDIMALLA RAGHAVAIAH & CO. v. NATIONAL 881
INSURANCE CO. & ANR. [D.K. JAIN, J.]
;
preferred claim for the loss on 14th July, 1988 (Annexure P-7). A
On 26th October, 1995, the appellant got a leg1I notice issued
• to the Insurance Company - Respondent No.1, narrating
sequence of events leading to their prosecution at the instance
of the Bank and their ultimate acquittal and dismissal of Bank's
appeal in the year 1992. The relevant portion of the legal notice B
reads as follows:
"5. And that thereafter my client addressed several
' letters to the authorities of National Insurance
Company with a request to send the claim forms c
to enable my client to prefer claim under the policy.
6. And that in spite of repeated requests neglecting
the customary· services fail.ed to attend and did not
send the claim form on request."
0
16. The legal notice was followed by yet another legal
notice dated 4th January, 1996 which was also on similar lines.
Vide reply dated 21st March, 1996 to the legal notice, the
Insurance Company refuted the .c!aim made by the appellant.
For the sake of ready reference, the material portion of the reply E
by the Insurance Company is extracted below:
"From the material available and from the information
secured, it became evident that your client, unable to
dispose of the old stocks, unable to discharge the
F
mounting debt to Indian Bank, resorted to mischievous and
criminal acts i.e. shifting the tobacco stocks from their
godowns and intentionally set fire to the tobacco stocks
after substitution by inferior quality tobacco either wholly
or in part with a view to lay a false claim for loss of the
G
stocks against my clients. The various methods and acts
'{ indulged in by your clients constitute a flagrant violation of
the terms and conditions of the policy. Probably realizing
that the acts and methods adopted by them, as stated
• H
882 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.
A above, constitute flagrant violation of the terms and
conditions, your clients have given quietus to the matter by
keeping quiet all these years. Your client is totally ..
disentitled for any claim for alleged loss against my client
under policy obtained from them. The claim for loss
8 alleged to have been sustained by your client, after a
lapse of seven years is totally barred by /imitation and
is futile in any respect. Under these circumstances,
sending claim forms to your clients as requested in your
notice does not arise.
c My clients further state that in case your client sustained
any loss in the year 1988 under the scope of the policy,
your client should have established such loss alleged to
have been sustained thereon and pursued (sic) the
matter well within time to enable my clients to act
D •
appropriately instead of asking for issuance of claim form
at such a belated stage."
(Emphasis sup~lied)
E 17. Although it is not clear from the record as to when the
said reply was received by the appellant, but the complaint by
the appellant seems to have been filed before the Commission
on or after 24th October, 1997.
•
18. It is, therefore, clear from the aforenoted
F
correspondence between the appellant and the Insurance
Company that cause of action in respect of the special
insurance policy arose on 22nd/ 23rd March, 1988, when fire
in the godown took place damaging the tobacco stocks
hypothecated with the Bank in whose account the policy had
G
been taken by the appellant. Thus, the limitation for the purpose
of Section 24A of the Act began to run from 23rd March, 1988
and therefore, the complaint before the Commission against
the Insurance Company for deficiency in service, whether for
H
/ KANDIMALLA RAGHAVAIAH & CO. v. NATIONAL 883
INSURANCE CO. & ANR. [D.K. JAIN, J.]
non issue of claim forms or for not processing the claim under A
the policy, ought to have been filed within two years thereof. As
noticed above, the complaint was in fact filed on or after 24th
October, 1997, which was clearly barred by time. It is pertinent
to note that in the complaint before the Commission, though
there was an averment that the Bank had not disclosed to the B
appellant whether any amount had been received by them from
the Insurance Company against the claim preferred on 14th July,
_..,
1988, but appellant's categorical stand therein was that it was
because of the p.Jndency of the criminal litigation that they could
not make a claim in respect of the policy for the loss suffered C
and time and again they had been requesting the Insurance
Company to send the claim forms, which request was not
acceded to by the Insurance Company, and it shows that the
appellant was not depending on the claim stated to have been
made by the Bank with the Insurance Company. D
19. A bare reading of the impugned order shows that all
these factual aspects have been duly taken into consideration
by the Commission and we are in complete agreement with the
finding by the Commission that the filing of claim u/ the Bank E
on 14th July, 1988, would not have, in any way, helped the
appellant. On their own showing, for the first time, only on 6th
November, 1992 and then again on 26th October, 1995, the
appellant had requested the Insurance Company to issue claim
form to enable them to prefer a claim which request was F
declined by the Insurance Company on 21st March, 1996. By
no stretch of imagination, it can be said that Insurance
Company's reply dated 21st March, 1996 to the legal notice
dated 4th January, 1996, declining to issue the forms for
preferring a claim after a lapse of more than four years of the G
date of fire, resulted in extending the period of limitation for the
purpose of Section 24A of the Act. We have no hesitation in
holding that the complaint filed on 24th October, 1997 and that
too without an application for condonation of delay was
H
884 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 10 S.C.R.
A manifestly barred by limitation and the Commission was .
iustified in dismissing it on that short ground.
20. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in
this appeal. It is dismissed accordingly with costs.
B D.G. Appeal dismissed.
•
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