KAPILABEN AMBALAL PATEL & ORS.versusSTATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.

                         [2020] 8 S.C.R. 1117                              1117


             KAPILABEN AMBALAL PATEL & ORS.                                A
                                   v.
                   STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
                   (Civil Appeal No. 6380 of 2012)
                            MAY 06, 2020                                   B
 [A. M. KHANWILKAR AND DINESH MAHESHWARI, JJ.]
       Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 – ss.6, 9,
10(1), 10(3), 10(5), 10(6), 11, 20(1)(a), 21, 33 – Appellants/land
owners are legal representatives of the original owner of the land
                                                                           C
in question – Possession of the surplus/excess land was taken over
under a Possession Panchanama dated.20.03.1986 – Eventually,
Power of Attorney holder of one of the land owner filed writ petition
challenging the Panchnama – Partly allowed by Single Judge –
Appeal filed by State Government – Meanwhile, the appellants filed
an independent writ petition in 2001 for the same relief – Appeal          D
filed by the State Government was allowed by Division Bench –
Writ petition filed by the appellants was allowed by Single Judge –
Order set aside by Division Bench – On appeal, held: Appellants
resorted to all possible pleas – Further, they chose to file the writ
petition only in the name of one of the land owner in the capacity of
                                                                           E
his Power of Attorney holder, little realizing that the authority given
by him came to an end after his demise – It was only after the other
appellants realised that the decision of the Single Judge was flawed
and was justly assailed by State Government on that count, they
filed the present writ petition – Appellants thought of the last attempt
to assail the Possession Panchnama itself without seeking any              F
further relief of declaration regarding the earlier proceedings which
had attained finality – Writ petition filed by the appellants after
lapse of 14 years was hopelessly barred by delay and suffered from
laches – Impugned order upheld – Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999.
                                                                           G
      Dismissing the appeal, the Court
      1.1 The appellants have resorted to all possible pleas. First,
the application for exemption under Section 20 of the Urban Land
(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 was moved, which was allowed
                                                                           H
                                 1117
1118            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A     by the competent authority on 6.3.1980, but the appellants chose
       to withdraw the same. That request was eventually granted by
       the competent authority on 1.2.1985. The appellants then waited
       till the notification under Section 10(3) of the 1976 Act was issued
       on 25.7.1985 and opted for remedy of exemption under Section
       21 by filing an application on 22.8.1985. That came to be rejected
 B
       on 15.12.1986 against which decision a review application was
       filed only by Devikaben Chandubhai Bhailalbhai (daughter of
       Chandubhai Bhailalbhai Patel, who in turn was son of Bhailalbhai
       Parsottambhai Patel- one of the five sons of original owner of the
       land in question, Parsottambhai Patel. The other four sons were-
 C     (i) Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel, (ii) Maganbhai Parsottambhai
       Patel, (iii) Babarbhai Parsottambhai Patel, and (iv) Ramanbhai
       Parsottambhai Patel) alongwith her three siblings, after lapse of
       two years. Nevertheless, the same was entertained by the
       authority concerned and after quashing the entire order in appeal,
       a remand order came to be passed on 19.9.1998. Even in review
 D
       proceedings, the fact of State authorities having taken forcible
       possession of the surplus/excess land on 20.3.1986 vide
       Possession Panchnama, was reiterated, as can be discerned from
       the order dated 19.9.1998. It is not clear as to why the appellants
       did not take clue at least from such unambiguous stand taken by
 E     the respondent and forthwith proceed to assail the stated stand
       of the State (of having taken over forcible possession on
       20.3.1986). Besides taking possession, the respondent had
       determined the compensation for which notice under Section 11
       was issued to the appellants on 17.5.1986. It is not the case of
       the appellants that they were unaware even about that
 F
       development until 2001. No such plea is taken by the appellants
       in the writ petition filed in the year 2001. It is only after the
       competent authority declined to issue No Objection Certificate
       vide order dated 19.5.1999, they thought of changing the track
       by taking advantage of the repeal Act having come into force on
 G     30.3.1999. However, they chose to file the writ petition only in
       the name of Kamleshbhai Parekh in the capacity of Power of
       Attorney holder of late Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel, being SCA
       No. 8402/1999, little realizing that the authority given by Ambalal
       Parsottambhai Patel had come to an end after his demise on
       31.12.1985 itself. No doubt the Single Judge was persuaded to
 H
     KAPILABEN AMBALAL PATEL & ORS. v. STATE OF                           1119
                 GUJARAT & ANR.

quash the entire proceedings which had culminated with taking             A
forcible possession of the surplus/excess land vide Possession
Panchnama dated 20.3.1986, being vitiated and/or abated.
However, it is only after the other appellants realised that the
decision of the Single Judge in SCA No. 8402/1999 was flawed
and has been justly assailed by the State Government on that
                                                                          B
count by way of LPA No. 460/2002, they chose to file the present
writ petition (SCA No. 12602/2001). In the said writ petition,
however, no disclosure has been made as to why these appellants
did not assail the Possession Panchnama dated 20.3.1986 in earlier
point of time including when the existence of this document was
specifically pleaded by the respondent-State, in particular, in the       C
review application. [Paras 3, 15][1123-C; 1133-F-H; 1134-A-F]
       1.2 The earlier part of the writ petition deals with the factual
background and assertion that the appellants still continue to be
in physical possession of the stated land and was using it for
agricultural purpose, as can be noticed from the Revenue record.          D
Indeed, the Revenue record may have presumptive value, but
that can be rebutted, which in this case has been done by the
respondent-State by relying on the Possession Panchnama and
the subsequent proceedings including the application submitted
to the Mamlatdar, Baroda City in right earnest for entering the
name of the State Government in the Revenue records, dated                E
11.4.1986, and pursuant to which entries had been effected on
26.9.1989 and 15.2.2000 respectively. Obviously, therefore, the
appellants thought of the last attempt to assail the Possession
Panchnama dated 20.3.1986 itself without seeking any further
relief of declaration regarding the earlier proceedings which had         F
attained finality. The Division Bench therefore, was right in
concluding that the writ petition filed by the appellants after lapse
of 14 years was hopelessly barred by delay and suffered from
laches. The Court is in agreement with the said view taken by
the High Court in the peculiar facts of the present case. Further,
it is manifest from the acknowledgement produced by the                   G
respondent-State that the first notice under Section 10(5) issued
to Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel was duly served on 26.12.1985.
By the time second notice under Section 10(5) was issued on
23.1.1986, Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel had died (on 31.12.1985).
                                                                          H
1120           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A     The second notice was also issued to others, namely, Bhikhabhai
       Maganbhai Patel, son of deceased Maganbhai Parsottambhai
       Patel, Natvarbhai Bhailalbhai Patel, son of deceased Bhailalbhai
       Parsottambhai Patel and Jayantibhai Babarbhai Patel, son of
       deceased Babarbhai Parsottambhai Patel. [Paras 3, 15-18][1135-
       F-H; 1136-A-E]
 B
            Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar v. Deputy Collector and
            Competent Authority & Ors. (2012) 4 SCC 718 : [2012]
            2 SCR 219; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Hari Ram (2013)
            4 SCC 280 : [2013] 2 SCR 301; Gajanan Kamlya Patil
            v. Additional Collector and Competent Authority(ULC)
 C          & Ors. (2014) 12 SCC 523 : [2014] 1 SCR 1032;
            Mangalsen v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2014) 15
            SCC 332; M/s. Avanti Organisation v. Competent
            Authority & Additional Collector, Urban Land Ceiling
            Act, Rajkot & Anr. AIR 1989 Guj 129; Samrathben
 D          Manilal Chokshi & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Anr.
            (1994) 35 (1) GLR 203; Savitaben Ramanbhai Patel
            vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. (1999) 40(1) GLR 860;
            Darothi Clare Parreira (Smt.) & Ors. v. State of
            Maharashtra & Ors. (1996) 9 SCC 633 : [1996] 4
            Suppl. SCR 46; SouthIndia Corporation (P) Ltd. v.
 E          Secretary, Board of Trivandrum & Anr. AIR 1964 SC
            207 : [1964] SCR 280; Special Officer & Competent
            Authority, Urban Land Ceilings, Hyderabad & Anr. v.
            P.S. Rao (2000) 2 SCC 451 : [2000] 1 SCR 257;
            Ramanlal Bhailal Patel & Ors. v. State of Gujarat (2008)
 F          5 SCC 449 : [2008] 2 SCR 468; Har Pyari (Smt.) v.
            IInd Additional Judge, Moradabad & Ors. (2001) 10
            SCC 525; State of Assam v. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma &
            Ors. (2015) 5 SCC 321 : [2014] 14 SCR 1451; Larsen
            & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. (1998) 4 SCC
            387 : [1998] 2 SCR 339; State of Gujarat & Anr. v.
 G          Gyanaba Dilavarsinh Jadega (2013) 11 SCC 486;
            Madhusudan Bhanuprasad Pandya v. State of Gujarat
            & Ors. (2019) SCC Online SC 1050; Balwant Narayan
            Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat & Ors. (1976) 1 SCC 700;
            Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust v.
 H
     KAPILABEN AMBALAL PATEL & ORS. v. STATE OF                        1121
                 GUJARAT & ANR.

      State of Punjab (1996) 4 SCC 212; Tamil Nadu Housing             A
      Board v. A. Viswam (Dead) by Lrs. (1996) 8 SCC 259 –
      referred to.
                      Case Law Reference
[2012] 2 SCR 219                  referred to       Para 10
                                                                       B
[2013] 2 SCR 301                  referred to       Para 10
[2014] 1 SCR 1032                 referred to       Para 10
(2014) 15 SCC 332                 referred to       Para 10
[1996] 4 Suppl. SCR 46            referred to       Para 10
                                                                       C
[1964] SCR 280                    referred to       Para 10
[2000] 1 SCR 257                  referred to       Para 10
[2008] 2 SCR 468                  referred to       Para 10
(2001) 10 SCC 525                 referred to       Para 10            D
[2014] 14 SCR 1451                referred to       Para 12
[1998] 2 SCR 339                  referred to       Para 12
(2013) 11 SCC 486                 referred to       Para 12
(1976) 1 SCC 700                  referred to       Para 19            E
(1996) 4 SCC 212                  referred to       Para 19
(1996) 8 SCC 259                  referred to       Para 19
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6380
of 2012.                                                               F
      From the Judgment and Order dated 26.04.2011 of the High Court
of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Letters Patent Appeal No. 233 of 2006.
      Shyam Divan, Sr. Adv., Santhosh Krishnan (For Gaurav
Agrawal), Advs. for the Appellants.
                                                                       G
     Ms. Deepanwita Priyanka (For Aniruddha P. Mayee),
Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Advs. for the Respondents.



                                                                       H
1122                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A               The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                 A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.
              1. This appeal takes exception to the judgment and order dated
       26.4.2011 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat at
       Ahmedabad1 in Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) No. 233/2006, whereby,
 B     the writ petition being Special Civil Application No. 12602/2001 filed by
       the appellants came to be dismissed whilst setting aside the judgment
       and order dated 21.12.2005 passed by the learned single Judge of the
       High Court in the said writ petition. By the said writ petition, the appellants
       had sought following reliefs: -
 C               “8. The petitioners pray that this Hon’ble Court be pleased to
                 issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or
                 any other appropriate writ, direction and/or order and be pleased:
                 (A) to declare that the Panchnama dated 20.03.1986, (Annexure
                 D) and the purported action of the respondents to take possession,
 D               purported constructive or actual of the lands mentioned in para
                 (c) hereinabove is contrary to law and of no legal effect.
                 (B) to permanently restrain the respondents from disturbing or
                 taking possession of the petitioners lands admeasuring 12,385 sq.
                 mts. or any part thereof mentioned in Panchnama dated 20.03.1986
 E               (Annexure D).
                 (C) commanding the respondents to deliver back to the petitioners
                 possession of the said lands, if they are held to be in possession de
                 facto or dejure thereof.
                 (D) to restrain the respondents from taking any proceedings in
 F
                 respect of the said lands pursuant to the order dated 01.02.85 of
                 the Competent Authority.
                 (E) to restrain pending the hearing and final disposal of this Petition
                 the respondents from in any manner disturbing or interfering with
                 the possession of the said lands which are in joint possession of
 G               the petitioners and other joint holders.
                 (F) to grant such other and further reliefs as this Honourable Court
                 in the facts and circumstances of the case deems fit and proper.

       1
 H         For short, “the High Court”
         KAPILABEN AMBALAL PATEL & ORS. v. STATE OF                            1123
           GUJARAT & ANR. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

          (G) to provide for the costs of this petition.”                      A
          2. The backdrop in which the writ petition was filed can be stated
thus.
        3. The appellants claim to be legal representatives of the original
owner of the land in question, namely, Parsottambhai Patel, who died on
28.1.1976 before the commencement of the Urban Land (Ceiling and               B
Regulation) Act, 19762 in the State of Gujarat i.e., with effect from 17th
February, 1976. He had five sons, namely, (i) Ambalal Parsottambhai
Patel, (ii) Maganbhai Parsottambhai Patel, (iii) Babarbhai Parsottambhai
Patel, (iv) Bhailalbhai Parsottambhai Patel and (v) Ramanbhai
Parsottambhai Patel. Family of the said Parsottambhai Patel filed              C
statements under Section 6 of the 1976 Act on 13.8.1976 in the name(s)
of (i) Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel, (ii) Bhikhabhai Maganbhai Patel,
son of deceased Maganbhai Parsottambhai Patel, (iii) Jayantibhai
Babarbhai Patel and Jethabhai Babarbhai Patel, sons of deceased
Babarbhai Parsottambhai Patel, (iv) Natvarbhai Bhailalbhai Patel, son
of deceased Bhailalbhai Parsottambhai Patel and (v) Ramanbhai                  D
Parsottambhai Patel as owners of land admeasuring 30385.10 square
meters bearing Survey Nos. 362, 378, 592, 593/1, 593/2 (Final Plot
numbers 280, 287, 108, 115 and 116) of Village Manjalpur, District
Vadodara in the State of Gujarat. The statements disclosed that other
persons were also interested in the stated land. Later, an application         E
came to be filed on behalf of the five brothers for exemption under
Section 20(1)(a) of the 1976 Act. That was granted vide order dated
6.3.1980/29.11.1980 by the Deputy Collector and Under Secretary,
Revenue Department, Government of Gujarat. On 8.6.1981, in response
to the draft statements, objections were filed in the name of Ambalal
Parsottambhai Patel through Power of Attorney holder - Ramanbhai               F
Parsottambhai Patel. Pursuant to request made by the land owners to
cancel the agriculture exemption, an order was passed by the office of
competent authority and Additional Collector (ULC), Vadodara on
7.11.1983. The competent authority, pursuant to the statements submitted
by the land owners and considering the objections to the draft statement,      G
issued final statement under Section 9 of the 1976 Act, declaring 12
persons as holders of surplus/excess land to the tune of 12385 square
meters, particulars whereof have been noted in the order dated 1.2.1985,
as follows: -
2
    For short, “the 1976 Act”                                                  H
1124             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A                            “Particulars of surplus land.
                          =========================

            Village        S.No.       Final Plot     Extent          Zone
                                          No.
 B         Manja lpur       362        280 Paiki      2672.3       Residential
               ”            378           287         3035.0            ”
               ”            592           108         2747.0            ”

               ”           593/1          115         1546.0            ”
 C
               ”           593/2          116         2385.0            ”
                                                     12385.3


 D                                                      12385 Square metres”
              The land owners were duly informed that the surplus/excess land
       referred to in the final statement will be acquired as and when required
       by the Government and till then, the holders may continue to remain in
       possession thereof. Thereafter, on 8.3.1985/21.3.1985, a notification under
       Section 10(1) of the 1976 Act was issued proposing acquisition of surplus/
 E
       excess land. The said notification included only four (4) names being
       Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel, Bhikhabhai Maganbhai Patel, Natvarbhai
       Bhailalbhai Patel and Jayantibhai Babarbhai Patel and excluded the names
       of eight (8) other joint owners, as referred to in the order dated 1.2.1985,
       who were also the legal representatives of the original owner and members
 F     of family of deceased Parsottambhai Patel. A follow up notification (dated
       31.5.1985) under Section 10(3) of the 1976 Act was published in the
       Gazette on 25.7.1985. Only after the issuance of notification under
       Section 10(3) of the 1976 Act, whereby, the surplus/excess land came
       to be vested in the State Government, an application for exemption under
       Section 21 of the 1976 Act was filed by Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel
 G
       and Tribhovandas Chotabhai Patel on 22.8.1985. While the said
       application under Section 21 was pending consideration, notification under
       Section10(5) of the 1976 Act came to be issued on 17.12.1985 to handover
       possession of the vacant land. The same was duly served upon Ambalal
       Parsottambhai Patel on 26.12.1985 as per the endorsement shown in
 H     Annexure A-11 and on Jayantibhai Babarbhai Patel on the same date as
      KAPILABEN AMBALAL PATEL & ORS. v. STATE OF                              1125
        GUJARAT & ANR. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

per endorsement in Annexure A-12. After service of notification/notice        A
under Section 10(5) of the 1976 Act, Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel expired
on 31.12.1985. Despite that, another notice came to be issued on 23.1.1986
under Section 10(5) of the 1976 Act mentioning the names of Ambalal
Parsottambhai Patel, Bhikhabhai Maganbhai Patel, Natvarbhai Bhailalbhai
Patel and Jayantibhai Babarbhai Patel. In the said notice, it was mentioned
                                                                              B
that the date of handing over possession was fixed on 1.2.1986 at 11.00
hrs. and the addressees were called upon to remain present at the site
for handing over possession. According to the appellants, this notice
was issued only to Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel and not to other land
owners. The respondent-State has, however, countered this factual
narrative of the appellants and have relied on acknowledgments produced       C
alongwith Written Submissions in Annexure R-2. However, it is not
disputed by the respondent-State that the notice sent to Ambalal
Parsottambhai Patel was returned on 2.2.1986 with endorsement “said
owner has expired”. The possession of the surplus/excess land was
taken over under a Panchanama dated 20.3.1986 signed by two
                                                                              D
independent witnesses. On 11.4.1986, the Mamlatdar, Baroda City was
requested to enter the name of the State Government in the Revenue
record concerning the stated lands. Thereafter, notice dated 17.5.1986
under Section 11 of the 1976 Act was issued to Bhikhabhai Maganbhai
Patel being heir of the deceased Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel to appear
on 27.5.1986 for determination of compensation amount. The competent          E
authority determined the compensation amount on 6.8.1986. The
application filed by the land owners under Section 21 of the 1976 Act
came to be rejected on 15.12.1986.
       4. The above decision was challenged by the land owners through
their Power of Attorney holders Ramanbhai Parsottambhai Patel and             F
Tribhovandas Chotabhai Patel by way of appeal under Section 33 of the
1976 Act. In this appeal, the competent authority had filed reply on
4.4.1988, stating that the application under Section 21 was not
maintainable, as the land had already vested in the State Government, as
a consequence of notification under Section 10(3) of the 1976 Act. The
aforesaid appeal was rejected by the appellate authority on 28.8.1995.        G
However, one Devikaben Chandubhai Bhailalbhai (daughter of
Chandubhai Bhailalbhai Patel, who in turn was son of Bhailalbhai
Parsottambhai Patel) alongwith her three siblings filed review application
against the order passed by the appellate authority dated 28.8.1995 after
lapse of over two years i.e. on 29.4.1998. That review application was        H
1126                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A     allowed on 19.9.1998 and the proceedings came to be remanded to the
       competent authority for consideration afresh on merits.
               5. During the pendency of the remanded proceedings (arising from
       application under Section 21), the repeal Act, namely, the Urban Land
       (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 3 came into force from
 B     30.3.1999. The land owners then filed an application dated 30.4.1999
       before the competent authority to give No Objection Certificate to the
       effect that vide order dated 19.9.1998 passed by the Urban Land Tribunal/
       Ex-Officio Additional Chief Secretary, Revenue Department, Gujarat,
       all the earlier orders or notifications stood quashed and set aside and the
       land no longer vested in the Government in any manner. Pursuant to the
 C     said application, the competent authority vide order dated 19.5.1999,
       held that such No Objection Certificate cannot be given to the land
       owners, as the land had already been declared surplus and steps have
       been taken under Sections 10(1), 10(3), 10(5) and 10(6) of the 1976 Act,
       which have attained finality.
 D            6. After this decision, one Kamleshbhai Parekh, Power of Attorney
       holder of Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel was advised to file writ petition
       being Special Civil Application (SCA) No. 8402/1999, challenging the
       Possession Panchnama dated 20.3.1986. The learned single Judge, partly
       allowed the said writ petition vide judgment and order dated 5.12.2000.
 E     Feeling aggrieved by that decision, the State Government carried the
       matter in appeal by way of LPA No. 460/2002 before the Division Bench
       of the High Court on the ground, amongst others, that Kamleshbhai
       Parekh had no subsisting right or locus to file the writ petition on account
       of the death of Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel on 31.12.1985, as a result
       of which the authority to file such a petition had come to an end. When
 F     the said appeal was pending, the appellants herein were advised to file
       an independent writ petition for the same relief(s), being SCA No. 12602/
       2001. The reliefs in this writ petition have been reproduced in paragraph
       1 above.
              7. Finally, the appeal filed by the State Government being LPA
 G     No. 460/2002 came to be allowed by the Division Bench of the High
       Court on 16.8.2005, accepting the objection regarding maintainability of
       the writ petition by the Power of Attorney holder of the deceased Ambalal
       Parsottambhai Patel. However, all other questions were left open.

       3
 H         For short, “the repeal Act”
      KAPILABEN AMBALAL PATEL & ORS. v. STATE OF                                 1127
        GUJARAT & ANR. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

      8. Be that as it may, the writ petition filed by the appellants herein     A
being SCA No. 12602/2001 was allowed by the learned single Judge of
the High Court vide judgment and order dated 21.12.2005 for reasons
noted therein. That decision was assailed by the State Government by
way of LPA No. 233/2006 before the Division Bench of the High Court,
which came to be allowed vide impugned judgment and order dated
                                                                                 B
26.4.2011.
       9. The Division Bench first proceeded to hold that the application
filed by the land owners under Section 21 of the 1976 Act was barred by
limitation having been filed after 1139 days from the date of
commencement of the 1976 Act. It ought to have been filed before
3.4.1979, whereas, it was filed on 22.8.1985 and there was no power              C
bestowed on the competent authority to entertain such delayed application.
Having said that, it went on to hold that all the land owners had not
challenged the decision of the competent authority. The appeal under
Section 33, however, was preferred only by Ramanbhai Parsottambhai
Patel and Tribhovandas Chotabhai Patel, the Power of Attorney holders            D
of Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel. No other appellant had preferred the
said appeal and thus they allowed the order dated 15.12.1986 rejecting
the application under Section 21 to attain finality. The Division Bench
then proceeded to consider the objection taken by the State regarding
delay in filing the subject writ petition by these appellants, to question the
Possession Panchnama dated 20.3.1986 after lapse of 14 years, in 2001.           E
While considering this objection, the Division Bench noted thus: -
       “41. The appellant-State has taken specific plea that the order
       taking possession was never challenged before the appellate
       authority or the reviewing authority. It was only challenged in the
       writ petition after a long delay. Though the aforesaid stand              F
       was taken before the learned Single Judge, it was not
       properly discussed.
       42. The appellant-State has taken specific plea that the order taking
       possession was never challenged before the appellate authority
       or the reviewing authority. It was only challenged in the writ            G
       petition after long delay. Though the aforesaid stand was taken,
       but not properly discussed by the learned Single Judge.
       43. In the case of Shivgonda Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra
       reported in AIR 1990 SC 2281 the Supreme Court while dealing
                                                                                 H
1128            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A           Sec. 10 of the Act held that the writ petition under Article 226 for
             reopening the proceeding on the ground that the competent
             authority had not taken into consideration certain fact, filed after
             ten years, after the excess land was vested in the State
             Government was rightly summarily dismissed by the High Court.
 B           44. While deciding the question of delay and laches in preferring
             the petition under Article 226, Supreme Court in the case of The
             Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig reported in
             JT 1999 (10) SC 336 held that the equitable doctrine, namely,
             ‘delay defects equity’ has its fullest application in the matter of
             grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The
 C           discretionary relief can be had provided one has not by his act or
             conduct given a go-bye to his rights. Equity favours a vigilant
             rather than an indolent litigant and this being the basic tenet of
             law.
             45. In the present case, we have noticed that possession of
 D           the land was taken on 20th March 1986. The order rejecting
             the application u/Sec. 21 reached finality on 15th December
             1986 against all the petitioners, except one Ramanbhai
             Purshottambhai Patel. The writ petition was preferred
             against the petitioners being not vigilant in exercise of their
 E           rights, learned Single Judge ought not to have entertained
             the petition against the order taking possession after such
             a long delay.”
                                                             (emphasis supplied)
              The Division Bench accordingly allowed the appeal preferred by
 F     the State and dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants herein by
       setting aside the judgment and order of the learned single Judge and
       declaring that the possession of the land has been rightly taken over by
       the competent authority of the State on 20.3.1986.
              10. Feeling aggrieved, the land owners have approached this Court.
 G     It is urged that there is no tittle of evidence to substantiate the fact
       asserted by the respondent-State that physical possession of the land in
       question has been taken over on 20.3.1986. It was merely a paper-
       possession in the form of Possession Panchnama. According to the
       appellants, de facto possession of the subject land as on the date of the
       repeal Act is crucial and entail in abatement of all the actions of the
 H
      KAPILABEN AMBALAL PATEL & ORS. v. STATE OF                                1129
        GUJARAT & ANR. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

State authorities under the 1976 Act. Mere issuance of notification under       A
Section 10(3) of the 1976 Act regarding deemed vesting of the land in
the State is not enough for the purposes of the repeal Act. Reliance has
been placed on Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar vs. Deputy Collector and
Competent Authority & Ors.4, State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Hari Ram 5,
Gajanan Kamlya Patil vs. Additional Collector and Competent
                                                                                B
Authority (ULC) & Ors.6 and Mangalsen vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
& Anr.7. The consistent view of this Court is that physical possession
must be taken by the State authorities, failing which the proceedings
shall abate on account of the repeal Act. The appellants have relied on
Revenue records to show that the continued possession remained with
the appellants/land owners even after the Possession Panchnama was              C
made on 20.3.1986. The Revenue entries have presumptive value and
the respondent State had failed to rebut the same. It is further contended
that the purported Possession Panchnama dated 20.3.1986 is not a reliable
document at all. It is vague and bereft of details. Its authenticity and
contents have been disputed by the appellants. It is intriguing that although
                                                                                D
the subject land is dispersed and not one continuous piece of land, yet
one common Possession Panchnama is drawn without any explanation
as to the manner in which the possession of five non-contiguous plots
came to be taken by the authorities concerned. Further, the Panchnama
does not bear any time. All these deficiencies lead to the only conclusion
that the Possession Panchnama was prepared by the officials sitting in          E
their office without visiting the site. Secondly, the Possession Panchnama
has not been signed by any of the twelve (12) land owners. The appellants
are also relying on the observations made by the learned single Judge
recording the factum of possession being in favour of the appellants to
hold that the Possession Panchnama was illegal. It is then urged that the
                                                                                F
authorities could not have recorded Possession Panchnama until the
application under Section 21 of the 1976 Act was finally decided by the
competent authority. Admittedly, the said application was filed on
22.8.1985 and was pending on 20.3.1986. This is impermissible in law
and the action is vitiated even on that count. To bolster this position,
reliance is placed on the dictum in Full Bench of the High Court in             G
M/s. Avanti Organisation vs. Competent Authority & Additional

4
  (2012) 4 SCC 718 (paragraphs 9 to 11)
5
  (2013) 4 SCC 280 (paragraphs 36-37)
6
  (2014) 12 SCC 523 (paragraphs 10 and 12)
7
  (2014) 15 SCC 332 (paragraphs 10 to 14)                                       H
1130             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                                 [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A     Collector, Urban Land Ceiling Act, Rajkot & Anr.8 and also on
       Samrathben Manilal Chokshi & Anr. vs. State of Gujarat & Anr.9
       and Savitaben Ramanbhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. 10.
       Reliance is also placed on the decision of this Court in Darothi Clare
       Parreira (Smt.) & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.11. Reliance
       is also placed on South India Corporation (P) Ltd. vs. Secretary,
 B
       Board of Trivandrum & Anr.12, wherein it is held that Sections 10 and
       21, both, fall under Chapter III of the Act, and thus, Section 21 operates
       “in spite of Section 10”. Reliance is also placed on Special Officer &
       Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceilings, Hyderabad & Anr. vs.
       P.S. Rao13, wherein it is observed that unless the quantum of excess
 C     land is determined, the land owner cannot be expected to surrender the
       excess land or seek exemption under Sections 20 or 21 or 22 of the 1976
       Act. Moreover, the period of filing the application under Section 21 ought
       to be reckoned from the date of withdrawal of the exemption under
       Section 20 of the 1976 Act and not from the date of commencement of
       the Act i.e. 17.2.1976, as such. It is urged that notice was not served
 D
       upon all the land owners in respect of action(s) under Section 10 of the
       1976 Act. Hence, the Possession Panchnama would be of no avail and
       is void and illegal. This Court in Hariram (supra) has expounded that
       requirement of giving notice under Section 10(5) and/or 10(6) is mandatory
       and failure to do so would entail in the land owner being dispossessed
 E     without notice, which cannot be countenanced. It is urged that the
       respective shares of the four (4) noticees are as follows: -
                    S.     Individual    Total land       Land       Excess
                    No.                   owned         permitted     Land
                                                       under ULC
                                          (sq. mt.)        Act       (sq. mt.)

 F                                                      (sq. mt.)
                    1.    Ambala l      7329.50       1500          5829.50
                    2.    Bhikhabhai    2613.50       1500          1113.50
                    3.    Natwarbhai    1546.40       1500            46.40
                    4.    Jayantibhai   1758.30       1500           258.30

 G
       8
         AIR 1989 Guj 129
       9
         (1994) 35(1) GLR 203
       10
          (1999) 40(1) GLR 860
       11
          (1996) 9 SCC 633 (paragraphs 5 and 6)
       12
          AIR 1964 SC 207 (paragraph 19)
       13
 H        (2000) 2 SCC 451 (paragraph 4)
         KAPILABEN AMBALAL PATEL & ORS. v. STATE OF                           1131
           GUJARAT & ANR. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

       Although the competent authority recognised twelve (12) land           A
owners, it chose to issue notice only to selected four (4) land owners.
The notice served on them cannot bind the other land owners. In absence
of notice, plea regarding vesting of land qua such land owners cannot
be countenanced. Reliance is placed on Ramanlal Bhailal Patel &
Ors. vs. State of Gujarat14 and Har Pyari (Smt.) vs. IInd Additional
                                                                              B
Judge, Moradabad & Ors.15. As regards Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel,
he had expired on 31.12.1985. As a result, notice issued to Ambalal
Parsottambhai Patel admittedly remained unserved on his legal
representatives. Further, Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel’s share is 5829.50
square meters of total surplus/excess land, which must be excluded and
no further action can be taken in that regard in view of the repeal Act.      C
In substance, the grievance is that the Division Bench ought not to have
interfered with the decision of the learned single Judge, which was a
well-considered decision and a just approach, considering the facts of
the present case.
       11. The respondent State, on the other hand, would urge that the       D
writ petition filed by the appellants was hopelessly delayed and suffered
from laches. The possession of the suit land was taken under the
Possession Panchnama dated 20.3.1986. That fact was within the
knowledge of the appellants as is evident from the record and in particular
from the stand taken by the respondent-State to oppose review application
in relation to application under Section 21 of the 1976 Act. It was clearly   E
stated by the respondent in the said proceedings that the appellants were
not entitled for any relief as possession has already been taken on
20.3.1986 and that the subject land had already vested in the State.
Thus, it was within the knowledge of the appellants being party to the
said proceedings. That fact has been recorded in the order dated              F
19.9.1998 in review application while remanding the application (under
Section 21) for reconsideration by the competent authority. The present
writ petition, however, has been filed only in 2001 without disclosing any
cause for such delay and laches, much less plausible explanation. The
Division Bench of the High Court was, therefore, justified in non-suiting
the appellants including on the ground of delay and laches in filing of the   G
writ petition. That finding is unexceptionable. It is urged that before
taking possession vide Possession Panchnama dated 20.3.1986, notices

14
     (2008) 5 SCC 449 (paras 27 and 29)
15
     (2001) 10 SCC 525 (paragraphs 3 and 4)                                   H
1132             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A     were duly issued to the land owners under Section 10(5) of the 1976
       Act. The first notice was issued on 17.12.1985 to Ambalal Parsottambhai
       Patel, Bhikhabhai Maganbhai Patel, Natvarbhai Bhailalbhai Patel and
       Jayantibhai Babarbhai Patel. This was duly served. The second notice
       dated 23.1.1986 was also issued to Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel,
       Bhikhabhai Maganbhai Patel, Natvarbhai Bhailalbhai Patel and
 B
       Jayantibhai Babarbhai Patel. The second notice sent to Ambalal
       Parsottambhai Patel returned with endorsement “said owner has expired”.
       However, the other noticees – Bhikhabhai Maganbhai Patel, Natvarbhai
       Bhailalbhai Patel and Jayantibhai Babarbhai were duly served with the
       second notice and their acknowledgments have been produced on record.
 C     Despite those notices, the concerned appellants failed to remain present
       for handing over the possession on the specified date. Therefore, after
       waiting for 30 days’ period, the authority proceeded to take forcible
       possession on 20.3.1986 vide Possession Panchnama. That is permissible
       in law and was the only course open to the authority to take forward the
       acquisition process of the excess/surplus land. It is urged that none of
 D
       the appellants challenged the said notices or the Possession Panchnama
       of 1986. Further, the appellants have not asked for further relief of
       declaration regarding the other proceedings, which have become final
       or for that matter that the entire proceedings stood abated in terms of
       the repeal Act, knowing fully well that such a plea would not be available
 E     to them in light of having lost possession of the surplus/excess land on
       20.3.1986.
              12. The respondent has placed reliance on State of Assam vs.
       Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma & Ors.16 and also on Larsen & Toubro Ltd. vs.
       State of Gujarat & Ors.17. According to the respondent, pendency of
 F     application under Section 21 of the 1976 Act is no bar for proceeding
       beyond Section 10(3) of the 1976 Act, as is contended by the appellants.
       This legal position is no more res integra and in fact, has been plainly
       rejected by this Court in Darothi Clare Parreira (supra). Moreover,
       the pendency of application under Section 21 is not saved by the repeal
       Act, as in those proceedings, the claim of the owners is for acquiring a
 G     right and not for enforcement of accrued right. Reliance is placed on
       State of Gujarat & Anr. vs. Gyanaba Dilavarsinh Jadega 18 and
       Madhusudan Bhanuprasad Pandya vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. 19.
       16
          (2015) 5 SCC 321 (paragraphs 13 to 17)
       17
          (1998) 4 SCC 387 (paragraphs 14 to 16)
       18
 H        (2013) 11 SCC 486 (paragraph 13)
       19
          (2019) SCC Online SC 1050 (paragraphs 14 and 16)
      KAPILABEN AMBALAL PATEL & ORS. v. STATE OF                             1133
        GUJARAT & ANR. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

       13. It is urged that the State authorities have already taken         A
possession of the land as is evident from the Possession Panchnama
and also from the Revenue record, as the name of the State has been
entered therein qua Survey No. 362, Final Plot No. 280 on 26.9.1989
and for other surplus lands on 15.2.2000 pursuant to the request made to
the Mamlatdar, Baroda City vide communication dated 11.4.1986. This
                                                                             B
application was made much before coming into force of the repeal Act.
In other words, after the final statement was drawn on 1.2.1985, soon
thereafter notice under Section 10(1) was issued on 8.3.1985/21.3.1985
and under Section 10(3), on 25.7.1985 followed by notification/notice
under Section 10(5) of the 1976 Act, dated 17.12.1985 and again on
23.1.1986 before taking forcible possession on 20.3.1986. Soon thereafter,   C
request was sent to the Mamlatdar, Baroda City for entering name of
the State in the Revenue records on 11.4.1986. Pursuant thereto, the
entry in the name of the State was effected in the revenue record in due
course. Further, the fact of possession having been taken was noted
even in the Review proceedings in September, 1998 and despite that, the
                                                                             D
subject writ petition was filed only in 2001 to assail the Possession
Panchnama dated 20.3.1986. It is, therefore, urged by the respondent
that the appeal be dismissed and the decision of the Division Bench
ought to be upheld on this count alone.
      14. We have heard Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel for
the appellants and Ms. Deepanwita Priyanka, learned counsel for the          E
respondent.
       15. After cogitating over the rival submissions and the relevant
record, it is manifest that the appellants have resorted to all possible
pleas. First, the application for exemption under Section 20 of the 1976
Act was moved, which was allowed by the competent authority on               F
6.3.1980, but the appellants chose to withdraw the same. That request
was eventually granted by the competent authority on 1.2.1985. The
appellants then waited till the notification under Section 10(3) of the
1976 Act was issued on 25.7.1985 and opted for remedy of exemption
under Section 21 by filing an application on 22.8.1985. That came to be      G
rejected on 15.12.1986 against which decision a review application was
filed only by Devikaben Chandubhai Bhailalbhai alongwith her three
siblings, after lapse of two years. Nevertheless, the same was entertained
by the authority concerned and after quashing the entire order in appeal,
a remand order came to be passed on 19.9.1998. Even in review
                                                                             H
1134            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A     proceedings, the fact of State authorities having taken forcible possession
       of the surplus/excess land on 20.3.1986 vide Possession Panchnama,
       was reiterated, as can be discerned from the order dated 19.9.1998. It is
       not clear as to why the appellants did not take clue at least from such
       unambiguous stand taken by the respondent and forthwith proceed to
       assail the stated stand of the State (of having taken over forcible
 B
       possession on 20.3.1986). Besides taking possession, the respondent had
       determined the compensation for which notice under Section 11 was
       issued to the appellants on 17.5.1986. It is not the case of the appellants
       that they were unaware even about that development until 2001. No
       such plea is taken by the appellants in the writ petition filed in the year
 C     2001. It is only after the competent authority declined to issue No
       Objection Certificate vide order dated 19.5.1999, they thought of changing
       the track by taking advantage of the repeal Act having come into force
       on 30.3.1999. However, they chose to file the writ petition only in the
       name of Kamleshbhai Parekh in the capacity of Power of Attorney
       holder of late Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel, being SCA No. 8402/1999,
 D
       little realizing that the authority given by Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel
       had come to an end after his demise on 31.12.1985 itself. No doubt the
       learned single Judge was persuaded to quash the entire proceedings
       which had culminated with taking forcible possession of the surplus/
       excess land vide Possession Panchnama dated 20.3.1986, being vitiated
 E     and/or abated. However, it is only after the other appellants realised that
       the decision of the learned single Judge in SCA No. 8402/1999 was
       flawed and has been justly assailed by the State Government on that
       count by way of LPA No. 460/2002, they chose to file the present writ
       petition (SCA No. 12602/2001). In the said writ petition, however, no
       disclosure has been made as to why these appellants did not assail the
 F
       Possession Panchnama dated 20.3.1986 in earlier point of time including
       when the existence of this document was specifically pleaded by the
       respondent-State, in particular, in the review application. In the writ
       petition, the only assertion made regarding delay and laches can be
       discerned from paragraph 5, which reads thus: -
 G           “5. The petitioners have approached this Hon’ble Court without
             any delay or laches. The petitioners had remained under an
             impression that the matter was being looked after by the
             late Ambalal Purshottamdas Patel’s constituted attorney and
             that therefore it was not necessary for them to approach
 H           this Hon’ble Court in the matter. The petitioners are
      KAPILABEN AMBALAL PATEL & ORS. v. STATE OF                                1135
        GUJARAT & ANR. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

      agriculturists and not conversant with the intricacies of law were        A
      not aware that on Ambalal Purshottamdas Patel’s death the
      Authority of his constituted attorney Kamlesh Parekh had come
      to an end. Though Kamleshbhai Parekh has informed the
      petitioners of the objections likely to be raised on behalf of the
      appellants in the said Letters Patent Appeal, he has also informed
                                                                                B
      the petitioners that he was not aware that he could not rely upon
      the power of attorney given by Ambalal Purshottamdas Patel after
      his death and in fact has regretted putting the petitioners in the
      awkward position. The petitioners submit that under the
      circumstances the time taken in the prosecution of the Special
      Civil Application No. 8402 of 1999 and the said Civil Application         C
      and the Letters Patent Appeal by the respondents be excluded in
      considering the time taken by the petitioners to approach this
      Hon’ble Court in the matter. The petitioners submit that they
      are approaching this Hon’ble Court as expeditiously as the
      circumstances of the case would permit. The petitioners
                                                                                D
      further submit that the delay, if any, on the part of the
      petitioners in approaching this Hon’ble Court has not in
      any manner caused any prejudice or detriment to the
      respondents. The petitioners submit that this Hon’ble Court
      be pleased to entertain the Petition and not to reject it on
      the ground of delay, acquiescence or laches.”                             E
                                                       (emphasis supplied)
       The earlier part of the writ petition deals with the factual
background and assertion that the appellants still continue to be in physical
possession of the stated land and was using it for agricultural purpose,
as can be noticed from the Revenue record. Indeed, the Revenue record           F
may have presumptive value, but that can be rebutted, which in this case
has been done by the respondent-State by relying on the Possession
Panchnama and the subsequent proceedings including the application
submitted to the Mamlatdar, Baroda City in right earnest for entering the
name of the State Government in the Revenue records, dated 11.4.1986,           G
and pursuant to which entries had been effected on 26.9.1989 and
15.2.2000 respectively.
       16. Obviously, therefore, the appellants thought of the last attempt
to assail the Possession Panchnama dated 20.3.1986 itself without seeking
any further relief of declaration regarding the earlier proceedings which       H
had attained finality.
1136             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A            17. The Division Bench, in our opinion, therefore, was right in
       concluding that the writ petition filed by the appellants after lapse of 14
       years was hopelessly barred by delay and suffered from laches. We are
       in agreement with the said view taken by the High Court in the peculiar
       facts of the present case.
 B            18. Strikingly, in this appeal by special leave, a vague ground has
       been raised to challenge the said conclusion of the Division Bench.
       Further, no substantial question of law has been formulated in the appeal
       by special leave in that regard. Furthermore, in the grounds all that is
       asserted is that the High Court erred in holding that there was delay of
       14 years in filing of writ petition and in not appreciating that the notice
 C     under Section 10(5) of the 1976 Act, dated 23.1.1986, was not served
       upon Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel as he had already expired on
       31.12.1985 and the notice sent to him was returned back on 2.2.1986
       unserved with remark “said owner has expired”. Further, the legal heirs
       of Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel ought to have been served with the said
 D     notice. From the factual matrix already stated hitherto, these grounds, in
       our opinion, are of no avail to the appellants. It is manifest from the
       acknowledgement produced by the respondent-State that the first notice
       under Section 10(5) issued to Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel was duly
       served on 26.12.1985. By the time second notice under Section 10(5)
       was issued on 23.1.1986, Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel had died (on
 E     31.12.1985). The second notice was also issued to others, namely,
       Bhikhabhai Maganbhai Patel, Natvarbhai Bhailalbhai Patel and
       Jayantibhai Babarbhai Patel. Be that as it may, we are not inclined to
       reverse the conclusion recorded by the Division Bench of the High Court
       that the writ petition filed by the appellants was hopelessly delayed and
 F     suffered from laches. That is a possible view in the facts of the present
       case.
              19. The respondents had additionally relied on the decision of this
       Court in Larsen & Toubro Ltd. (supra), wherein the Court adverted to
       the exposition in Balwant Narayan Bhagde vs. M.D. Bhagwat &
 G     Ors.20, Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust vs. State
       of Punjab21 and Tamil Nadu Housing Board vs. A. Viswam (Dead)
       by LRs.22 regarding the settled legal position that it is difficult to take

       20
          (1976) 1 SCC 700 (paragraph 28)
       21
          (1996) 4 SCC 212 (paragraph 4)
       22
 H        (1996) 8 SCC 259 (paragraph 9)
      KAPILABEN AMBALAL PATEL & ORS. v. STATE OF                                1137
        GUJARAT & ANR. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

physical possession of the land under compulsory acquisition. Further,          A
that the normal mode of taking possession is drafting the Panchnama in
the presence of Panchas and taking possession and giving delivery to
the beneficiaries is accepted mode of taking possession of the land.
Subsequent thereto, the retention of possession would tantamount only
to illegal or unlawful possession. Reliance is also placed on paragraphs
                                                                                B
14 to 16 of Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra). However, it is not necessary
for us to dilate on these aspects having agreed with the conclusion
recorded by the Division Bench of the High Court that the writ petition
filed in the year 2001 by the appellants with limited relief of questioning
the Possession Panchnama dated 20.3.1986, suffered from laches. The
Division Bench of the High Court noted that the learned single Judge            C
completely glossed over this crucial aspect of the matter, and we find no
reason to depart from that conclusion.
       20. In view of the above, it is not necessary for us to dilate on
other contentions raised by the appellants or by the respondent-State on
merits.                                                                         D
      21. Having said thus, it must follow that the present appeal is
devoid of merits and the impugned decision of the Division Bench of the
High Court ought to be upheld on the threshold ground of writ petition
being barred by laches.
      22. Accordingly, this appeal must fail. The same is dismissed             E
with no order as to costs. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall
stand disposed of.


Divya Pandey                                                Appeal dismissed.
                                                                                F




                                                                                G




                                                                                H