Supreme Court of India
KARNAIL SINGHversusSTATE OF HARYANA & ORS.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 424
- Decided
- 16 May 2024
- Disposal
- Case Allowed
Holding
The Court held that ignoring the Constitution Bench judgment in Bhagat Ram and taking a contrary view on vesting of land constitutes a material error manifest on the face of the order, warranting recall of the judgment.
Summary
The review petition challenged a Supreme Court judgment that had held that vesting of village common lands in the Gram Panchayat was complete upon mere assignment under Section 18(c) of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. The petitioner argued that this view ignored the Constitution Bench ruling in Bhagat Ram, which held that management and control vest in the Panchayat only after possession changes under Section 24, and that rights of landholders are not extinguished until then. The Court examined the scope of review jurisdiction, the reasoning of the Full Bench of the High Court in Jai Singh II, and the binding nature of the Constitution Bench decisions in Bhagat Ram, Ranjit Singh and Ajit Singh. It found that the earlier judgment had materially erred by disregarding Bhagat Ram and by not considering the High Court’s reasoning, constituting a manifest error. Consequently, the Court allowed the review petition, recalled the 7 April 2022 judgment, and restored the appeal to the file for fresh hearing.
Issues considered
- The applicability of the Constitution Bench judgment in Bhagat Ram to the vesting of common lands in the Panchayat under the Consolidation Act.
- Whether vesting in the Panchayat is complete upon assignment under Section 18(c) or only after possession changes under Section 24.
- Whether the judgment under review ignored binding precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis, constituting a material error.
- The scope of review jurisdiction and whether the error is manifest on the face of the record.
Legislation cited
- Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964
- East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948s. s.18(c), s. s.21(2), s. s.23-A, s. s.24
- Haryana Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961s. s.2(g)(6)
- Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 1949s. Rule 16(ii)
Subjects
ReviewScope of review jurisdictionMaterial error apparent on the face of the orderMiscarriage of justiceConstitution Bench judgment ignoredCommon pool of landUnutilized land not available for redistributionLand reserved for common purposes cannot be re‑partitionedVesting in the PanchayatDoctrine of stare decisis
Judgment
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 894 : 2024 INSC 424
Karnail Singh
v.
State of Haryana & Ors.
Review Petition (Civil) No.526 of 2023
In
(Civil Appeal No. 6990 of 2014)
16 May 2024
[B.R. Gavai* and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Judgment and order under review ignored the law laid down by the
Constitution Bench in Bhagat Ram & others vs. State of Punjab
& others which had a direct bearing on the issue in question and
took a view totally contrary thereto and held that the vesting in the
Panchayat is complete on mere assignment under Section 18(c)
of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of
Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was also held that the unutilized land
was not available for redistribution amongst the proprietors and
the land reserved for common purposes cannot be re-partitioned
amongst the proprietors only because at a particular given time, the
land so reserved was not put to common use and; once the land
has been reserved for common purposes, it cannot be reverted
to the proprietors for redistribution. Ignoring the law laid down by
the Constitution Bench in Bhagat Ram and taking a contrary view,
if would amount to a material error, manifest on the face of the
order. Also, non-consideration of the reasoning given by the Full
Bench of the High Court in Jai Singh II relying on the judgment of
the Constitution Bench in Bhagat Ram, if would also amount to
an error, apparent on the face of the record.
Headnotes
Haryana Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 – Sub-
clause (6) to s.2(g) and its explanation, as inserted by Haryana
Act No.9 of 1992 – East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and
Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 – ss.18(c), 23-A, 24
– Judgment under review (JUR), ignoring the law laid down
by the Constitution Bench in Bhagat Ram & others vs. State
of Punjab & others, took a view contrary thereto, if the same
would amount to a material error manifest on the face of the
order and needs to be recalled:
* Author
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 895
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
Held: Though this Court in the JUR referred to the Constitution
Bench judgments in Ranjit Singh and Ajit Singh, there is not even
a whisper about the Constitution Bench judgment in Bhagat Ram,
except in paragraph 11, though it had a direct bearing on the issue
in question – Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Bhagat
Ram in unequivocal terms held that the management and control
does not vest in the Panchayat u/s.23-A of the Consolidation Act
till possession has changed u/s.24 of the said Act – It further held
that, the rights of the holders are not modified or extinguished
till persons have changed possession and entered into the
possession of the holdings allotted to them under the scheme –
The specific contention raised by the State that the requirements
as contemplated u/ss.23, 24 and 21(2) of the Consolidation Act
were already complete and as such, the acquisition had already
taken place before the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment)
Act, 1964, was rejected – All these steps are subsequent to the
assignment u/s.18(c) of the Consolidation Act – In the light of these
findings of the Constitution Bench in Bhagat Ram, the finding of
this Court in the JUR that the vesting in the Panchayat is complete
on mere assignment u/s.18(c) of the Consolidation Act is totally
contrary to the findings recorded in the Constitution Bench judgment
in Bhagat Ram – It was also held in Bhagat Ram that since the
Panchayat would fall within the definition of the word “State” under
Article 12 of the Constitution, if the acquisition is for the purposes
of providing income to the Panchayat, it would defeat the whole
object of the second proviso and the Consolidation Officer could
easily defeat the object of the second proviso to Article 31-A by
reserving for the income of the Panchayat a major portion of the
land belonging to a person holding land within the ceiling limit –
Except the cursory reference in the JUR, this Court did not even
refer to the ratio laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court
in Bhagat Ram – A judgment of the Constitution Bench would be
binding on the Benches of a lesser strength – A bench strength
of two Judges could not have ignored the law laid down by the
Constitution Bench in Bhagat Ram – Ignoring the law laid down
by the Constitution Bench in Bhagat Ram and taking a view totally
contrary to it would amount to a material error, manifest on the
face of the order and would undermine its soundness – Further,
the non-consideration of the reasoning given by the Full Bench
of the High Court in Jai Singh II, which findings were given by
relying on the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court
896 [2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
in Bhagat Ram, and not showing as to how the findings therein
were erroneous in law, would also amount to an error, apparent
on the face of the record – Furthermore, the non-consideration
of the reasoning given by the Full Bench of the High Court in Jai
Singh II, that on account of more than 100 decisions rendered by
various Benches of the High Court, the doctrine of stare decisis
is applicable, would also be an error apparent on the face of the
record – Judgment and order of this Court dated 07.04.2022 in Civil
Appeal No. 6990 of 2014 is recalled and the appeal is restored to
file. [Paras 54-58, 46, 65, 67, 69]
Review Jurisdiction – Scope:
Held: Scope of review by this Court is very limited – Review
would be permissible only if there is a mistake or error apparent
on the face of the record or any other sufficient reason is made
out – Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original
hearing of the case – The review of the judgment would be
permissible only if a material error, manifest on the face of the
order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of
justice – Such an error should be an error apparent on the face
of the record and should not be an error which has to be fished
out and searched. [Paras 12, 13]
Case Law Cited
Bhagat Ram & others v. State of Punjab & others [1967] 2 SCR
165 : AIR 1967 SC 927 – followed.
Ranjit Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others [1965]
1 SCR 82 : AIR 1965 SC 632 – held inapplicable.
Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab & another [1967] 2 SCR 143 : AIR
1967 SC 856; Jai Singh & others v. State of Haryana (2003) SCC
OnLine P&H 409; State of Punjab v. Gurjant Singh and others
(2001) SCC OnLine SC 1488; Sow Chandra Kante and another
v. Sheikh Habib [1975] 3 SCR 933 : (1975) 1 SCC 674; Parsion
Devi and others v. Sumitri Devi and others [1997] Supp. 4 SCR
470 : (1997) 8 SCC 715; Kerala State Electricity Board v. Hitech
Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. and others [2005] Supp. 2 SCR
517 : (2005) 6 SCC 651; Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati and others
[2013] 11 SCR 25 : (2013) 8 SCC 320; Union of India v. Sandur
Manganese and Iron Ores Limited and others [2013] 2 SCR 1045 :
(2013) 8 SCC 337; Shanti Conductors Private Limited v. Assam
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 897
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
State Electricity Board and others [2019] 16 SCR 252 : (2020) 2
SCC 677; Shri Ram Sahu (Dead) through legal representatives
and others v. Vinod Kumar Rawat and others [2020] 11 SCR 865 :
(2021) 13 SCC 1 – referred to.
List of Acts
Haryana Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961; East Punjab
Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948;
Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964; Punjab Holdings
(Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 1949.
List of Keywords
Review; Scope of review jurisdiction; Material error apparent/
manifest on the face of the order/record; Miscarriage of justice;
Constitution Bench judgment ignored; View contrary to Constitution
Bench judgment; Common pool of land; “shamilat deh”; Unutilized
land not available for redistribution amongst the proprietors;
Common purposes; Land reserved for common purposes cannot
be re-partitioned amongst the proprietors; Reserved Land not put
to common use; Vesting in the Panchayat; Land reserved but
not earmarked for any common purpose under the Consolidation
Scheme; Proprietary body; Title of land vests in the proprietary
body; Management of the lands done on behalf of the proprietary
body; Bachat lands; Gram Panchayat; Lands within the ceiling
limit or not; Reservation of land for income of the Panchayat;
“acquisition by the State”; “modification or extinguishment of
rights”; Doctrine of stare decisis.
Case Arising From
INHERENT JURISDICTION: Review Petition (Civil) No. 526 of 2023
In
Civil Appeal No. 6990 of 2014
From the Judgment and Order dated 07.04.2022 of the Supreme
Court of India in C.A. No. 6990 of 2014
Appearances for Parties
B.K. Satija, A.A.G., Narender Hooda, Rameshwar Singh Malik,
Pradeep Kant, Sr. Advs., Dr. Surender Singh Hooda, Rahul Rathore,
Akshay Kjindal, Shiv Bhatnagar, Shaurya Lamba, Gautam Sharma,
Dr. Monika Gusain, Jitesh Malik, Chander Kiran, Rahul Govil, Varun
898 [2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Shobit, Raj Singh, Ashok Kumar, Ms. Beena, Satish Kumar, Ms.
Anubha Agrawal, Pardeep Gupta, Parinav Gupta, Mrs. Mansi Gupta,
Rakshit Rathi, Mrs. Shashi Verma, Dr. Mrs. Vipin Gupta, Sanjay
Rathi, Sanchya Bhardwaj, Mukesh Sansanwal, Rajiv, Ms. Megha
Gaur, Vibhav Mishra, Parmanand Gaur, Daya Krishan Sharma, D K
Sharma, Yashdeep, Mrs. Sunita Sharma, Rohit Vats, Piyush Goel,
Ankit Bhanot, Shubham Rana, Pushkar Vats, Ms. Simranjeet Singh
Rekhi, Shubham Kumar, Harsh Saxena, Ravindra Bana, Rajesh
Kumar, Ranbir Singh Yadav, Prateek Yadav, Puran Mal Saini, Ms.
Akansha Singh Yadav, Yogesh Yadav, Ms. Shivika Nehra, Chander
Shekhar Ashri, Ashok Kumar Singh, Shantwanu Singh, Rahul Dubey,
Raj Kishor Sinha, Ms. Pragya Singh, Sunny Singh, Akshay Singh, Ajay
Pal, Karan Kapoor, Manik Kapoor, Ms. Srishti Singla, Shrey Kapoor,
A. Venayagam Balan, Ankit Swarup, Advs. for the appearing parties.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
B.R. Gavai, J.
INDEX*
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND………… Paras 1 to 3
II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES Paras 4 to 11
III. CONSIDERATION ON THE SCOPE OF Paras 12 to 14
REVIEW JURISDICTION
IV. CONSIDERATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF Paras 15 to 21
THE FULL BENCH OF THE HIGH COURT
IN JAI SINGH II
V. CONSIDERATION OF THE CONSTITUTION Paras 22 to 58
BENCH JUDGMENTS OF THIS COURT IN
RANJIT SINGH, AJIT SINGH AND BHAGAT
RAM
VI. CONSIDERATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF Paras 59 to 65
THE FULL BENCH OF THE HIGH COURT
IN JAI SINGH II REFERRING ITS EARLIER
JUDGMENT IN GURJANT SINGH AND
SEVERAL OTHER JUDGMENTS
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 899
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
VII. CONSIDERATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF Paras 66 to 67
THE FULL BENCH OF THE HIGH COURT IN
JAI SINGH II WITH REGARD TO DOCTRINE
OF STARE DECISIS
VIII. CONCLUSION Para 68 to 69
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1. The present review petition has been filed by the original respondent
No.28 in the Appeal, seeking review of the judgment of this Court
passed on 7th April 2022, thereby allowing the Civil Appeal No. 6990
of 2014 filed by the State of Haryana against the judgement and
order passed by the Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana at Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as “Full Bench of
the High Court”) in Civil Writ Petition No. 5877 of 1992 dated 13th
March 2003
2. The bare necessary facts giving rise to the present review petition
are thus:
2.1 The State of Haryana, by way of Government Gazette
Notification dated 11th February 1992 (hereinafter referred to as
“Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992”) inserted sub-clause (6) to Section
2(g) of the Haryana1 Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act,
1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1961 Act”) along with an
explanation to the said sub-clause which received the assent
of the President on 14th January 1992. The sub-clause (6) to
Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act reads thus:
“2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires –
xxx xxx xxx
(g) “shamilat deh” includes-
xxx xxx xxx
(6) lands reserved for the common purposes of a
village under Section 18 of the East Punjab Holdings
(Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act,
1 For the word “Punjab” deemed to have been substituted w.e.f. 01.11.1966 vide Haryana Act No.15 of
2021, the Haryana Short Titles Amendment Act 2021 dated 05.04.2021.
900 [2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
1948 (East Punjab Act 50 of 1948), the management
and control whereof vests in the Gram Panchayat
under section 23-A of the aforesaid Act.
Explanation – Lands entered in the column of
ownership of record of rights as “Jumla Malkan
Wa Digar Haqdaran Arazi Hassab Rasad”, “Jumla
Malkan” or “Mushtarka Malkan” shall be shamilat
deh within the meaning of this section.”
2.2 Being aggrieved by the said amendment, the present review
petitioner along with similarly situated landowners, holding land
in villages, who contribute a share of their holdings to form a
common pool of land called ‘shamilat deh’, meant exclusively
for the common purposes of the village inhabitants filed a batch
of Writ Petitions before the High Court. Considering the matter
to be involving important questions of law, likely to arise in a
large number of cases and involving a large chunk of land; the
Hon’ble Division Bench, then seized of the matter vide Orders
dated 01st June, 1993 directed the papers of the case to be
placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice for constituting a Full
Bench of the High Court for determination of the vires of the
Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 and the explanation thereof. The
Full Bench of the High Court vide judgement dated 18th January
1995 allowed the batch of Writ Petitions, wherein the judgement
came to be recorded in CWP No. 5877 of 1992.
2.3 The State of Haryana challenged the decision of the Full Bench
of the High Court before this Court vide Civil Appeal No. 5480
of 1995; wherein this Court held that certain essentials of Article
31-A of the Constitution of India were overlooked and remanded
the matter back to the High Court for re-consideration of the
issues in light of Article 31A of the Constitution of India.
2.4 Accordingly, the Full Bench of the High Court vide judgement
and order dated 13th March 2003, partly allowed the petition in
terms of the following:
“In view of the discussion made above, we hold that:
(i) The sub-section (6) of Section 2(g) of the Punjab
Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961
and the explanation appended thereto, is only an
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 901
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
elucidation of the existing provisions of the said
Act read with provisions contained in the East
Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention
of Fragmentation) Act, 1948.
(ii) the un-amended provisions of the Act of 1961
and, in particular, Section 2(g)(1) read with
Sections 18 and 23-A of the Act of 1948 and
Rule 16(ii) of the Rules of 1949 cover all such
lands which have been specifically earmarked in
a consolidation scheme prepared under Section
14 read with Rules 5 and 7 and confirmed under
Section 20, which has been implemented under
the provisions of Section 24 and no other lands;
(iii) the lands which have been contributed by the
proprietors on the basis of pro-rata cut on their
holdings imposed during the consolidation
proceedings and which have not been earmarked
for any common purpose in the consolidation
scheme prepared under Section 14 read with
Rules 5 and 7 and entered in the column of
ownership as Jumla Malkan Wa Digar Haqdaran
Hasab Rasad Arazi Khewat and in the column
of possession with the Gram Panchayat or the
State Government, as the case may be, on
the dint of sub-section (6) of Section 2(g) and
the explanation appended thereto or any other
provisions of the Act of 1961 or the Act of 1948;
(iv) all such lands, which have been, as per the
consolidation scheme, reserved for common
purposes, whether utilized or not, shall vest with
the State Government or the Gram Panchayat,
as the case may be, even though in the column
of ownership the entries may be Jumla Mustarka
Malkans Wa Digar Haqdaran Hasab Rasad
Arazi Khewat etc.”
2.5 The Full Bench of the High Court also issued certain
consequential directions with regard to certain mutation entries
made by the Revenue Authorities.
902 [2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
2.6 Being aggrieved thus, the State of Haryana filed a Civil
Appeal No. 6990 before this Court, which came to be allowed
by judgement and order under review dated 07th April 2022
(hereinafter referred to as “JUR”); and the Writ Petition of the
Original Writ Petitioners was consequently dismissed.
2.7 Seeking review, the present Review Petition has been filed by
the review petitioner. This Court on 31st January. 2023 passed
the following order in the present Review Petitions:
“List this review petition for hearing in open Court.”
2.8 Subsequently, this Court on 10th April, 2023 passed the following
order:
“1. Permission to file review petition(s) is granted.
2. Delay Condoned.
3. Issue Notice on the I.A. (Diary) Nos. 69003
and 69005 of 2023 in Diary No. 14941 of 2022,
M.A. (Diary) No. 13972 of 2023 and on the review
petition(s), returnable on 24.04.2023.
4. In addition to normal mode of service, liberty is
granted to serve the Standing Counsel for the State.”
3. Accordingly, we have heard Shri Narender Hooda, learned Senior
Counsel and Shri Pradeep Gupta, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the review petitioner, Shri Pradeep Kant, learned Senior
Counsel and Shri B.K. Satija, learned Additional Advocate General
appearing for the respondent-State of Haryana.
II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
4. Shri Narender Hooda submits that the JUR is totally contrary to the
law laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of
Bhagat Ram & others vs. State of Punjab & others2 (hereinafter
referred to as “Bhagat Ram”). It is submitted that the JUR also does
not correctly consider the law laid down by the Constitution Bench
of this Court in the case of Ranjit Singh and others vs. State of
Punjab and others3 (hereinafter referred to as “Ranjit Singh”) so
2 [1967] 2 SCR 165 : AIR 1967 SC 927
3 [1965] 1 SCR 82 : AIR 1965 SC 632
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 903
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
also another Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the case
of Ajit Singh vs. State of Punjab & another4 (hereinafter referred
to as “Ajit Singh”).
5. Shri Hooda submits that after considering the provisions of Section
23-A and Section 24 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and
Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as
“the Consolidation Act”), this Court in Bhagat Ram has clearly held
that, till possession has changed under Section 24, the management
and control does not vest in the Panchayat under Section 23-A. It
has also been held that the rights of the holders are not modified or
extinguished till persons have changed possession and entered into
the possession of the holdings allotted to them under the scheme. He
therefore submits that the Full Bench of the High Court in the case
of Jai Singh & others vs. State of Haryana5 (hereinafter referred to
as “Jai Singh II”) has correctly relying on Bhagat Ram held that the
land which is reserved, but not earmarked for any common purpose,
would not come under the purview of Section 2(g)(6) of the 1961
Act, as inserted by Haryana Act No.9 of 1992.
6. Shri Hooda submits that the Constitution Bench of this Court in Ajit
Singh was dealing with the lands which were reserved for common
purposes such as khals, paths, khurrahs, panchayat ghars and
schools etc. It was held that in view of Rule 16(ii) of the Punjab
Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules,
1949 (hereinafter referred to as “the Consolidation Rules”), the title
still vests in the proprietary body, and the management of the said
lands is done on behalf of the proprietary body. It was further held
that the land was used for the common needs and benefits of the
estate or estates concerned. This Court held that a fraction of each
proprietor’s land was taken and formed into a common pool so that
the whole may be used for the common needs and benefits of the
estate as mentioned above. It has been held that the proprietors
naturally would also be entitled to a share in the benefits along with
others. In the facts of the said case, this Court held that all such
lands, which had been specifically earmarked in the Consolidation
Scheme for the purposes mentioned therein and were used for the
4 [1967] 2 SCR 143: AIR 1967 SC 856
5 2003 SCC OnLine P&H 409
904 [2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
purposes therein for the benefit of the proprietors among others,
would not amount to acquisition, but a ‘modification’ of the rights.
It was held that, by such ‘modification’, the beneficiary was not the
State and as such, would not be hit by the second proviso to Article
31-A of the Constitution of India.
7. Shri Hooda further submits that even in Ranjit Singh, the Consolidation
Scheme earmarked lands reserved under Section 18(c) of the
Consolidation Act for various common purposes. The Constitution
Bench of this Court held that the provisions for the assignment of
lands to village Panchayat for the use of the general community, or
for hospitals, schools, manure pits, tanning grounds etc. enures for
the benefit of rural population and it must be considered to be an
essential part of the redistribution of holdings and open lands.
8. Shri Hooda further submitted that in a catena of judgments, this
Court has held that the lands, though reserved but not earmarked
and put for any common purpose under the Consolidation Scheme
prepared under Section 14 of the Consolidation Act read with Rules
5 and 7 of the Consolidation Rules and entered in the column of
ownership as ‘Jumla Mustarka Malkan Wa Digar Haqdaran Hasab
Rasad Arazi Khewat’ and in the column of possession with the
proprietors, also known as Bachat lands, would not vest in the Gram
Panchayat or the State Government. Shri Hooda submits that based
on such judgments, thousands of transactions have been entered
into between the parties. It is submitted that, though invoking the
doctrine of stare decisis was not necessary, this Court in the JUR
has not even touched that aspect of the matter. All the judgments
which have been holding the field for decades and thousands of
transactions which have been entered into between the parties, have
been set at naught at the stroke of a pen by the JUR.
9. Shri Hooda further submits that in view of the JUR, the rights of the
parties which were crystalized by the judgments of the High Court
and which was affirmed by this Court by judgment dated 27th August,
20016 have also been adversely affected without such parties having
been heard. He therefore submits that the JUR needs to be recalled
and the appeals filed by the State deserve to be dismissed.
6 2001 SCC OnLine SC 1488 [State of Punjab vs. Gurjant Singh and others (CA Nos.5709-5714 of 2001
@ SLP(C) Nos.16173-16178 of 2000)
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 905
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
10. Per contra, Shri Pradeep Kant, learned Senior Counsel appearing
on behalf of the respondent-State of Haryana submits that the
present review petition itself is not maintainable. It is submitted that
the review applicant was a party respondent to the appeal and the
JUR has been delivered after hearing the learned counsel for the
parties. It is submitted that the scope of review is very limited. It is
also submitted that under the guise of a review, a party cannot be
permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already
been addressed and decided. He placed reliance on the following
judgments of this Court in support of his submissions:
(i) Sow Chandra Kante and another vs. Sheikh Habib7
(ii) Parsion Devi and others vs. Sumitri Devi and others8
(iii) Kerala State Electricity Board vs. Hitech Electrothermics
& Hydropower Ltd. and others9
(iv) Kamlesh Verma vs. Mayawati and others10
(v) Union of India vs. Sandur Manganese and Iron Ores Limited
and others11
(vi) Shanti Conductors Private Limited vs. Assam State
Electricity Board and others12
(vii) Shri Ram Sahu (Dead) through legal representatives and
others vs. Vinod Kumar Rawat and others13
11. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties, we have
scrutinized the material on record.
III. CONSIDERATION ON THE SCOPE OF REVIEW JURISDICTION
12. At the outset, we must reiterate that the scope of review by this
Court is very limited. The scope of review jurisdiction has been
delineated by this Court in a catena of judgments. We would not like
7 [1975] 3 SCR 933 : (1975) 1 SCC 674
8 [1997] Supp. 4 SCR 470 : (1997) 8 SCC 715
9 [2005] Supp. 2 SCR 517 : (2005) 6 SCC 651
10 [2013] 11 SCR 25 : (2013) 8 SCC 320
11 [2013] 2 SCR 1045 : (2013) 8 SCC 337
12 [2019] 16 SCR 252 : (2020) 2 SCC 677
13 [2020] 11 SCR 865 : (2021) 13 SCC 1
906 [2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
to burden the present judgment by reproducing all those judgments.
This Court in the case of Kamlesh Verma vs. Mayawati and others
(supra), after surveying the earlier law laid down by this Court has
summarized the principles thus:
“Summary of the principles
20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of
review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or
evidence which, after the exercise of due
diligence, was not within knowledge of the
petitioner or could not be produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the
record;
(iii) Any other sufficient reason.
The words “any other sufficient reason” have been
interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA 144
: (1922) 16 LW 37 : AIR 1922 PC 112] and approved by
this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most
Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [AIR 1954 SC 526 : (1955)
1 SCR 520] to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds
at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The
same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v.
Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. [(2013) 8 SCC 337
: JT (2013) 8 SC 275]
20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is
not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with
the original hearing of the case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material
error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines
its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 907
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise
whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and
corrected but lies only for patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject
cannot be a ground for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record
should not be an error which has to be fished
out and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is
fully within the domain of the appellate court,
it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the
review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief
sought at the time of arguing the main matter
had been negatived.”
13. It is thus settled that the review would be permissible only if there is
a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or any other
sufficient reason is made out. We are also equally aware of the fact
that the review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing
of the case. The review of the judgment would be permissible only
if a material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its
soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. We are also aware that
such an error should be an error apparent on the face of the record
and should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.
14. In the light of the aforesaid principles, we will have to examine the
present case.
IV. CONSIDERATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE FULL BENCH
OF THE HIGH COURT IN JAI SINGH II
15. The background in which Jai Singh II has been decided has already
been stated by us in the beginning. In the first round of litigation,
the High Court had held the provisions of Section 2(g)(6) of the
1961 Act to be unconstitutional being violative of second proviso to
Article 31-A of the Constitution of India. This Court in the first round
has set aside the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court and
remanded the matter for deciding the factual aspect as to whether
the lands in question were within the ceiling limit or not.
908 [2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
16. As such, the scope of the dispute in the second round was very
limited. The Full Bench of the High Court, after coming to a finding
of fact that the lands in question were within the ceiling limit, partly
allowed the petition. The operative part of the judgment of the
Full Bench of the High Court has already been reproduced by us
hereinabove in paragraph 2.4.
17. The State was not aggrieved with the findings on issue nos. (i), (ii)
and (iv).
By clause (i), the Full Bench of the High Court held that sub-section
(6) of Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act and the explanation appended
thereto is only an elucidation of the existing provisions of the said
Act read with the provisions contained in the Consolidation Act.
By clause (ii), it held that the unamended provisions of the 1961 Act
and, in particular, Section 2(g)(1) read with Sections 17 and 23-A
of the Consolidation Act and Rule 16(ii) of the Consolidation Rules
cover all such lands which have been specifically earmarked in a
consolidation scheme prepared under Section 14 read with Rules 5
and 7 and confirmed under Section 20, which has been implemented
under the provisions of Section 24 and no other lands.
By clause (iv), the Full Bench of the High Court held that, all
such lands in the consolidation scheme which were reserved
for common purposes, whether utilized or not, shall vest with
the State Government or the Gram Panchayat, as the case may
be; even though in the column of ownership the entries may be
‘Jumla Mustarka Malkans Wa Digar Haqdaran Hasab Rasad Arazi
Khewat’ etc.
18. The grievance of the State was only with regard to clause (iii),
wherein it has been held that the lands which had been contributed
by the proprietors on the basis of pro-rata cut on their holdings
imposed during the consolidation proceedings and which have
not been earmarked for any common purpose in the consolidation
scheme prepared under Section 14 read with Rules 5 and 7 and
have been entered in the column of ownership as ‘Jumla Malkan
Wa Digar Haqdaran Hasab Rasad Arazi Khewat’, and in the column
of possession with the Gram Panchayat or the State Government,
would not vest in the Gram Panchayat or the State Government but
continue to vest with the proprietors.
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 909
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
19. This Court in the JUR has held that conclusion no.(iii) arrived at by
the High Court was erroneous and not sustainable and accordingly
set it aside. It has been held that the unutilized land was not
available for redistribution amongst the proprietors. This Court
further held that the findings recorded by the different benches of
the High Court were clearly erroneous and not sustainable. This
Court held that the land reserved for common purposes cannot be
re-partitioned amongst the proprietors only because at a particular
given time, the land so reserved has not been put to common use.
This Court held that the ’common purpose’ is a dynamic expression
as it keeps changing due to the change in requirement of the
society and the passing times and therefore, once the land has
been reserved for common purposes, it cannot be reverted to the
proprietors for redistribution.
20. The limited enquiry that would be permissible for us in these
proceedings is as to whether the said finding is a material error,
manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or
results in the miscarriage of justice or not.
21. At the cost of repetition, we reiterate that it will not be permissible
for us to hear the matter as if it was an appeal arising from the JUR.
V. CONSIDERATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BENCH
JUDGMENTS OF THIS COURT IN RANJIT SINGH, AJIT
SINGH AND BHAGAT RAM
22. For considering the controversy, a reference to three Constitution
Bench Judgments of this Court would be necessary.
23. The first one is in the case of Ranjit Singh. In the said case, the
Constitution Bench of this Court was concerned with the consolidation
proceedings in which portions of land from those commonly owned
by the appellants therein as proprietors, had been reserved for
the village Panchayat and handed over to it for diverse purposes;
whereas, other portions had been reserved either for non-proprietors
or for the common purposes of the villages. In the said case, in the
village Virk Kalan, 270 kanals and 13 marlas had been given to the
village Panchayat for management and realization of income, even
though the ownership was still shown in village papers as Shamilat
Deh in the names of the proprietors; 10 kanals and 3 marlas had
been reserved for abadi to be distributed among persons entitled
910 [2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
thereto, and 3 kanals and 7 marlas had been reserved for manure
pits. Similarly, in village Sewana, certain lands were set apart for the
village Panchayat for extension of the abadi and to enable grants of
certain land to be made to each family of non-proprietors and certain
lands had been reserved for a primary school and some more for
a phirni. Similarly, in village Mehnd, land had been reserved for the
village Panchayat, a school, tanning ground, hospital, cremation
ground and for non-proprietors. The proprietors were not paid
compensation for the lands and as such, taking away and allotment
of the lands was the subject matter of challenge in those appeals
in the said case.
24. The appeals before this Court were heard and closed for judgment
on 27th April 1964. The judgment had to be postponed till after the
vacation. However, before the Court could reassemble after the
vacation on 20th July 1964, the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment)
Act, 1964 received the assent of the President i.e. on 20th June,
1964. Vide the said Amendment, a new sub-clause (a) in clause (2)
of Article 31-A was substituted retrospectively and added a proviso
to clause (1). The appeals were set down to be mentioned on July
20/23, 1964, and counsel were asked if, in view of the amendment,
they wished to say anything. However, neither of parties wished to
argue. The appeals were thus decided on the old arguments, though
it was clear to the Court that the amendment of Article 31-A, which
had a far-reaching effect, must have affected one or other of the
parties. The Constitution Bench upheld the judgment of the High
Court which had held that the transfer of shamilat deh owned by the
proprietors to the village Panchayat for the purposes of management
and the conferral of proprietary rights on non-proprietors in respect
of lands in abadi deh was not ultra vires Article 31 inasmuch as, no
compensation was payable.
25. It must be noted that the judgment of the High Court was rendered
by interpreting Article 31-A as it existed prior to the Constitution
(Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964. This Court though called upon
the parties to address the Court on the effect of the Constitution
(Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, no arguments were advanced.
As such, in Ranjit Singh, this Court did not have the occasion to
consider the effect of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment)
Act, 1964 by which the second proviso was added to Article 31-A
of the Constitution of India. In that view of the matter, the judgment
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 911
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Ranjit Singh will not have
a bearing on the present matter.
26. In the case of Ajit Singh (supra), again the challenge was to the
scheme made under the provisions of the Consolidation Act. One of
the grounds raised before the High Court as well as this Court was
that the compensation must be paid to the appellant for the land
reserved in the scheme for various purposes in accordance with
the second proviso to Article 31-A(1) inserted by the Constitution
(Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964.
27. It will be relevant to refer to the following paragraphs in Ajit Singh:
“6. Coming now to the third point raised by Mr Iyenger, we
may first mention that it was held by this Court in Ranjit
Singh v. State of Punjab [(1965) 1 SCR 82] that the Act was
protected from challenge by Article 31-A. It is necessary to
set out the relevant constitutional provisions. The relevant
portion of Article 31-A reads as under:
“31-A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in
Article 13, no law providing for—
(a) the acquisition by the State of any estate or
of any rights therein or the extinguishment or
modification of any such rights……….
shall be deemed to be void on the ground that
it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges
any of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article
19 or Article 31:
Provided that * * *
Provided further that where any law makes any
provision for the acquisition by the State of any
estate and where any land comprised therein is
held by a person under his personal cultivation,
it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire
any portion of such land as is within the ceiling
limit applicable to him under any law for the
time being in force or any building or structure
standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless
the law relating to the acquisition of such land,
912 [2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
building or structure, provides for payment of
compensation at a rate which shall not be less
than the market value thereof.
(2)(b) the expression ‘rights’ in relation to an
estate shall include any rights vesting in a
proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor,
tenure-holder, raiyat, under-raiyat or other
intermediary and any rights or privileges in
respect of land revenue.”
Relevant portions of Articles 19 and 31 may also
be set out because the learned counsel have
laid stress on the language employed therein.
“19. (1) All citizens shall have the right—
(f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property.
31. (1) No person shall be deprived of his
property save by authority of law.
(2) No property shall be compulsorily acquired
or requisitioned save for a public purpose and
save by authority of a law which provides for
compensation for the property so acquired or
requisitioned and either fixes the amount of
the compensation or specifies the principles
on which, and the manner in which, the
compensation is to be determined and given;
and no such law shall be called in question in
any court on the ground that the compensation
provided by that law is not adequate.
(2-A) Where a law does not provide for the
transfer of the ownership or right to possession
of any property to the State or to a corporation
owned or controlled by the State, it shall not be
deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition
or requisitioning of property, notwithstanding that
it deprives any person of his property.”
7. It would be noticed that Article 31-A(1)(a) mentions
four categories; first acquisition by the State of an estate;
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 913
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
second, acquisition by the State of rights in an estate;
third, the extinguishment of rights in an estate, and,
fourthly, the modification of rights in an estate. These four
categories are mentioned separately and are different.
In the first two categories the State “acquires” either an
estate or rights in an estate. In other words, there is a
transference of an estate or the rights in an estate to the
State. When there is a transference of an estate to the
State, it could be said that all the rights of the holder of
the estate have been extinguished. But if the result in the
case of the extinguishment is the transference of all the
rights in an estate to the State, it would properly fall within
the expression “acquisition by the State of an estate”.
Similarly, in the case of an acquisition by the State of a
right in an estate it could also be said that the rights of
the owner have been modified since one of the rights of
the owner has been acquired.
8. It seems to us that there is this essential difference
between “acquisition by the State” on the one hand and
“modification or extinguishment of rights” on the other
that in the first case the beneficiary is the State while in
the latter case the beneficiary of the modification or the
extinguishment is not the State. For example, suppose the
State is the landlord of an estate and there is a lease of
that property, and a law provides for the extinguishment
of leases held in an estate. In one sense it would be
an extinguishment of the rights of a lessee, but it would
properly fall under the category of acquisition by the State
because the beneficiary of the extinguishment would be
the State.
9. Coming now to the second proviso to Article 31-A, it
would be noticed that only one category is mentioned in
the proviso, the category being “acquisition by the State of
an estate”. It means that the law must make a provision for
the acquisition by the State of an estate. But what is the
true meaning of the expression “acquisition by the State
of an estate”. In the context of Article 31-A, the expression
“acquisition by the State of an estate” in the second proviso
to Article 31-A(1) must have the same meaning as it has
914 [2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
in clause (1)(a) to Article 31-A. It is urged on behalf of the
respondents before us that the expression “acquisition
by the State of any estate” in Article 31-A(1)(a) has the
same meaning as it has in Article 31(2-A). In other words,
it is urged that the expression “acquisition by the State
of any estate” means transfer of the ownership or right
to possession of an estate to the State. Mr. Iyengar on
the other hand urges that the expression “acquisition by
the State” has a very wide meaning and it would bear
the same meaning as was given by this Court in State of
West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose [(1964) SCR 587] ,
Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. Sholapur Spinning &
Weaving Co. Ltd. [(1953) 2 SCC 791 : (1954) SCR 674]
Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P. [(1955) 1 SCR 707] and
Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of
Bombay [(1958) SCR 1122] . In these cases this Court
had given a wide meaning to the word “acquisition”. In
Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. Sholapur Spinning &
Weaving Co. Ltd. [(1953) 2 SCC 791 : (1954) SCR 674]
Mahajan, J., observed at p. 704 as follows:
“The word ‘acquisition’ has quite a wide concept,
meaning the procuring of property or the taking of it
permanently or temporarily. It does not necessarily
imply the acquisition of legal title by the State in the
property taken possession of.”
He further observed at p. 705:
“I prefer to follow the view of the majority of the Court,
because it seems to me that it is more in consonance
with juridical principle that possession after all is nine-
tenths of ownership, and once possession is taken
away, practically everything is taken away, and that
in construing the Constitution it is the substance and
the practical result of the act of the State that should
be considered rather than its purely legal aspect.”
Bose, J., observed at p. 734 as follows:
“In my opinion, the possession and acquisition
referred to in clause (2) mean the sort of ‘possession’
and ‘acquisition’ that amounts to ‘deprivation’ within
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 915
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
the meaning of clause (1). No hard and fast rule
can be laid down. Each case must depend on its
own facts. But if there is substantial deprivation,
then clause (2) is, in my judgment, attracted. By
substantial deprivation I mean the sort of deprivation
that substantially robs a man of those attributes of
enjoyment which normally accompany rights to, or
an interest in, property. The form is unessential. It is
the substance that we must seek.”
10. Let us now see whether the other part of the second
proviso throws any light on this question. It would be
noticed that it refers to ceiling limits. It is well known that
under various laws dealing with land reforms, no person
apart from certain exceptions can hold land beyond a
ceiling fixed under the law. Secondly, the proviso says
that not only the land exempted from acquisition should be
within the ceiling limit but it also must be under personal
cultivation. The underlying idea of this proviso seems to
be that a person who is cultivating land personally, which
is his source of livelihood, should not be deprived of that
land under any law protected by Article 31-A unless at
least compensation at the market rate is given. In various
States most of the persons have already been deprived
of land beyond the ceiling limit on compensation which
was less than the market value. It seems to us that in
the light of all the considerations mentioned above the
words “acquisition by the State” in the second proviso
do not have a technical meaning, as contended by the
learned counsel for the respondent. If the State has in
substance acquired all the rights in the land for its own
purposes, even if the title remains with the owner, it cannot
be said that it is not acquisition within the second proviso
to Article 31-A.
11. But the question still remains whether even if a wider
meaning is given to the word “acquisition” what has been
done by the scheme and the Act is acquisition or not
within the meaning of the second proviso. In other words,
does the scheme only modify rights or does it amount to
acquisition of land? The scheme is not part of the record,
916 [2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
but it appears that 89B-18B-11B (Pukhta) of land was
owned by the Gram Panchayat prior to consolidation, which
was used for common purposes. Some further area was
reserved for common purposes as khals, paths, khurrahs,
panchayat ghars and schools etc. after applying cut upon
the rightholders on pro-rata basis. It does not appear
that any land, apart from what was already owned by
the Panchayat, was reserved for providing income to the
Panchayat. Therefore, in this case we are not concerned
with the validity of acquisition for such a purpose.”
28. A perusal of the aforesaid paragraphs would reveal that in paragraph
6, this Court reproduced the provisions of Article 31-A, as amended.
29. In paragraph 7, this Court carved out 4 categories covered by Article
31-A as under:
(i) acquisition by the State of an estate;
(ii) acquisition by the State of rights in an estate;
(iii) the extinguishment of rights in an estate; and
(iv) the modification of rights in an estate.
30. Analyzing the said provision, the Constitution Bench held that, in the
first two categories, the State “acquires” either an estate or rights
in an estate i.e., there is a transference of an estate or the rights
in an estate to the State. The Constitution Bench held that when
there is a transference of an estate to the State, it could be said that
all the rights of the holder of the estate have been extinguished. It
further held that, if the result in the case of the extinguishment is
the transference of all the rights in an estate to the State, it would
properly fall within the expression “acquisition by the State of an
estate”. It further held that, in the case of an acquisition by the
State of a right in an estate it could also be said that the rights of
the owner have been modified since one of the rights of the owner
has been acquired.
31. In paragraph 8, the Constitution Bench carved out the difference
between “acquisition by the State” on the one hand and “modification
or extinguishment of rights” on the other. It held that in the first case,
the beneficiary is the State while in the latter case the beneficiary of
the modification or the extinguishment is not the State.
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 917
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
32. In paragraph 9, this Court recorded that in the second proviso to
Article 31-A, only one category is mentioned i.e., “acquisition by the
State of an estate”. It observed that the law must make a provision
for the acquisition by the State of an estate. It went on to analyze
the true meaning of the expression “acquisition by the State of
an estate”. It was sought to be urged before this Court, that the
expression “acquisition by the State” has a very wide meaning and
it would bear the same meaning as was given by this Court in a
catena of judgments.
33. In paragraph 10, this Court recorded that the second proviso to
Article 31-A refers to ceiling limits. It was further observed that the
proviso provides that, not only the land exempted from acquisition
should be within the ceiling limit but it also must be under personal
cultivation. The Court held that the underlying idea of this proviso
was that a person who is cultivating land personally, which is his
source of livelihood, should not be deprived of that land under any
law protected by Article 31-A unless at least compensation at the
market rate is given. The Court held that the words “acquisition by
the State” in the second proviso cannot be given a technical meaning,
as was contended on behalf of the State. It held that, if the State has
in substance acquired all the rights in the land for its own purposes,
even if the title remains with the owner, it cannot be said that it is
not acquisition within the second proviso to Article 31-A.
34. In paragraph 11, this Court recorded the facts in the said case. It
recorded that some of the lands were owned by the Gram Panchayat
prior to consolidation, which was used for common purposes. Some
further area was reserved for common purposes as khals, paths,
khurrahs, panchayat ghars and schools etc. after applying a cut upon
the rightholders on pro-rata basis. It observed that apart from what
was already owned by the Panchayat, no other land was reserved
for providing income to the Panchayat. As such, the Court was not
concerned with the validity of acquisition for such a purpose.
35. It will also be relevant to refer to the following paragraphs of the
said judgment in Ajit Singh:
“12. Rule 16 (ii) of the Punjab Holdings (Consolidation
and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 1949, provides:
“In an estate or estates where during consolidation
proceedings there is no shamlat Deh land or such
918 [2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
land is considered inadequate, land shall be reserved
for the Village panchayat and for other common
purposes, under Section 18(c) of the Act, out of the
common pool of the village at a scale prescribed
by the Government from time to time. Proprietary
rights in respect of land so reserved (except the area
reserved for the extension of abadi of proprietors and
non-proprietors) shall vest in the proprietary body of
estate or estates concerned and it shall be entered
in the column of ownership of record of rights as
(Jumla Malkan wa Digar Haqdaran Arazi Hasab
Rasad Raqba). The management of such land shall
be done by the Panchayat of the estate or estates
concerned on behalf of the village proprietary body
and the panchayat shall have the right to utilise the
income derived from the land so reserved for the
common needs and benefits of the estate or estates
concerned.”
It will be noticed that the title still vests in the property
body, the management of the land is done on behalf of
the proprietary body, and the land is used for the common
needs and benefits of the estate or estates concerned. In
other words a fraction of each proprietor’s land is taken
and formed into a common pool so that the whole may
be used for the common needs and benefits of the estate,
mentioned above. The proprietors naturally would also
share in the benefits along with others.
13. In Attar Singh v. State of U.P. [(1959) Supp 1 SCR
928 at p 938] Wanchoo J., speaking for the Court, said
this of the similar proviso in a similar Act, namely, the
U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (U.P. Act 5 of 1954)
as amended by the U.P. Act 16 of 1957:
“Thus the land which is taken over is a small bit,
which sold by itself would hardly fetch anything.
These small bits of land are collected from various
tenureholders and consolidated in one place and
added to the land which might be lying vacant so
that it may be used for the purposes of Section 14(1)
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 919
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
(ee). A compact area is thus created and it is used
for the purposes of the tenure-holders themselves
and other villagers. Form CH-21 framed under Rule
41(a) shows the purposes to which this land would
be applied, namely, (1) plantation of trees, (2) pasture
land, (3) manure pits, (4) threshing floor, (5) cremation
ground, (6) graveyards, (7) primary or other school,
(8) playground, (9) Panchayatghar, and (10) such
other objects. These small bits of land thus acquired
from tenure-holders are consolidated and used for
these purposes, which are directly for the benefit
of the tenure-holders. They are deprived of a small
bit and in place of it they are given advantages in
a much larger area of land made up of these small
bits and also of vacant land.”
In other words, a proprietor gets advantages which he
could never have got apart from the scheme. For example,
if he wanted a threshing floor, a manure pit, land for
pasture, khal etc. he would not have been able to have
them on the fraction of his land reserved for common
purposes.
14. Does such taking away of property then amount to
acquisition by the State of any land? Who is the real
beneficiary? Is it the Panchayat? It is clear that the title
remains in the proprietary body and in the revenue records
the land would be shown as belonging to “all the owners
and other right holders in proportion to their areas”. The
Panchayat will manage it on behalf of the proprietors and
use it for common purposes; it cannot use it for any other
purpose. The proprietors enjoy the benefits derived from
the use of land for common purposes. It is true that the
non-proprietors also derive benefit but their satisfaction
and advancement enures in the end to the advantage of
the proprietors in the form of a more efficient agricultural
community. The Panchayat as such does not enjoy any
benefit. On the facts of this case it seems to us that the
beneficiary of the modification of rights is not the State,
and therefore there is no acquisition by the State within
the second proviso.
920 [2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
15. In the context of the 2nd proviso, which is trying to
preserve the rights of a person holding land under his
personal cultivation, it is impossible to conceive that such
adjustment of the rights of persons holding land under their
personal cultivation in the interest of village economy was
regarded as something to be compensated for in cash.”
36. In paragraph 12, after reproducing Rule 16(ii) of the Consolidation
Rules, this Court observed that the title still vests in the proprietary
body. However, the management of the land is done on behalf of
the proprietary body, and the land is used for the common needs
and benefits of the estate or estates concerned. It further held that a
fraction of each proprietor’s land is taken and formed into a common
pool so that the whole area may be used for the common needs
and benefits of the estate, mentioned above. It further held that the
proprietors naturally would also share in the benefits along with others.
37. In paragraph 14, this Court held that it was clear that the title remains
in the proprietary body and in the revenue records the land would
be shown as belonging to “all the owners and other right holders
in proportion to their areas”. This Court held that the Panchayat
would manage it on behalf of the proprietors and use it for common
purposes and that it cannot use it for any other purpose. This Court
held that the proprietors also enjoy the benefits derived from the use
of land for common purposes. It observed that the non-proprietors
also derive benefit but their satisfaction and advancement enures
in the end to the advantage of the proprietors in the form of a more
efficient agricultural community. The Panchayat as such does not
enjoy any benefit. This Court held, in light of the facts of the said
case, that the beneficiary of the modification of rights was not the
State, and therefore there was no acquisition by the State within the
meaning of the second proviso.
38. In paragraph 15, this Court, referring to second proviso, held that it is
impossible to conceive that such adjustment of the rights of persons
holding land under their personal cultivation in the interest of village
economy was regarded as something to be compensated for in cash.
39. It can thus be seen that in Ajit Singh, this Court was considering
the portion of lands which was taken from the proprietors; formed
into a common pool and used for common needs and benefits of
the estate or estates concerned. It was held that the said land could
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 921
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
not be used for any other purpose. It has further affirmed that the
proprietors also enjoy the benefits derived from the use of land for
common purposes.
40. It is further pertinent to note that in Ajit Singh, this Court held that
the words “acquisition by the State” in the second proviso cannot
be given a technical meaning. It has been held that if the State has
in substance acquired all the rights in the land for its own purposes,
even if the title remains with the owner, it cannot be said that it is
not acquisition within the ambit of the second proviso to Article 31-A.
41. Justice M. Hidayatullah (as his Lordship then was) in his minority
judgment disagreed with the majority view. He held that when the
State acquires almost the entire bundle of rights, it is acquisition
within the meaning of the second proviso and compensation at
market rates must be given.
42. The third judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court is in the
case of Bhagat Ram, which would be the most relevant for the
present purpose.
43. It will be relevant to note that judgments in both Ajit Singh and
Bhagat Ram were delivered on the very same day.
44. In the said case (i.e. Bhagat Ram), the Court was considering the
question, as to whether the reservation of land for income of the
Panchayat is acquisition of land by the State within the ambit of the
second proviso to Article 31-A?
45. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of the
Constitution Bench of this Court in Bhagat Ram in the judgment
delivered by Hon. S.M. Sikri, J (as his Lordship then was):
“2. The first question that arises is whether the scheme
insofar as it makes reservations of land for income of the
Panchayat is hit by the second proviso to Article 31-A. The
scheme reserves lands for phirni, paths, agricultural paths,
manure pits, cremation grounds, etc., and also reserves an
area of 100 kanals 2 marlas (standard kanals) for income
of the Panchayat. We have already held in Ajit Singh
case [(1967) 2 SCR 143] that acquisition for the common
purposes such as phirnis, paths, etc., is not acquisition by
the State within the second proviso to Article 31-A. But this
does not dispose of the question whether the reservation
922 [2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
of land for income of the Panchayat is acquisition of land
by the state within the second proviso to Article 31-A. We
held in that case that there was this essential difference
between “acquisition by the State” on the one hand and
“modification or extinguishment of rights” on the other
that in the first case the beneficiary is the State while in
the latter case the beneficiary of the modification or the
extinguishment is not the State. Here it seems to us that the
beneficiary is the Panchayat which falls within the definition
of the word “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution. The
income derived by the Panchayat is in no way different
from its any other income. It is true that Section 2(bb) of
the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention
of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, defines “common purpose”
to include the following purposes:
“… providing income for the Panchayat of the village
concerned for the benefit of the village community.”
Therefore, the income can only be used for the benefit
of the village community. But so is any other income of
the Panchayat of a village to be used. The income is the
income of the Panchayat and it would defeat the whole
object of the second proviso if we were to give any other
construction. The Consolidation Officer could easily defeat
the object of the second proviso to Article 31-A by reserving
for the income of the Panchayat a major portion of the land
belonging to a person holding land within the ceiling limit.
Therefore, in our opinion, the reservation of 100 kanals 2
marlas for the income of the Panchayat in the scheme is
contrary to the second proviso and the scheme must be
modified by the competent authority accordingly.”
46. It can thus be seen that, this Court held that there was an essential
difference between “acquisition by the State” on the one hand and
“modification or extinguishment of rights” on the other hand. It was
held that in the first case, the beneficiary was the State while in the
latter case, the beneficiary of the modification or the extinguishment
was not the State. This Court held that since the Panchayat would
fall within the definition of the word “State” under Article 12 of the
Constitution, if the acquisition is for the purposes of providing income
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 923
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
to the Panchayat, it would defeat the whole object of the second
proviso. This Court held that the Consolidation Officer could easily
defeat the object of the second proviso to Article 31-A by reserving
for the income of the Panchayat a major portion of the land belonging
to a person holding land within the ceiling limit.
47. The second argument which was advanced before this Court in
Bhagat Ram was that acquisition had already taken place before
the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964 came into
force and therefore the scheme was not hit by the second proviso
to Article 31-A. It was sought to be argued that the requirements as
contemplated under Sections 23, 24 and 21(2) of the Consolidation
Act were already complete and as such, the acquisition had already
taken place before the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act,
1964.
48. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court
in the majority judgment in Bhagat Ram while rejecting the aforesaid
submissions:
“4. It is clear from this affidavit that possession has not been
transferred in pursuance of the repartition. The learned
Counsel for the petitioners relies on this fact and says that
in view of Section 23-A and Section 24 the “acquisition”
does not take place till all the persons entitled to possession
of holdings under the Act have entered into possession
of the holdings. Sections 23-A and 24 read as follows:
“23-A. As soon as a scheme comes into force, the
management and control of all lands assigned or
reserved for common purposes of the village under
Section 18, shall vest in the Panchayat of that village
which shall also be entitled to appropriate the income
accruing therefrom for the benefit of the village
community, and the rights and interest of the owners
of such lands shall stand modified and extinguished
accordingly.
24. (1) As soon as the persons entitled to possession
of holdings under this Act have entered into
possession of the holdings respectively allotted to
them, the scheme shall be deemed to have come into
924 [2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
force and the possession of the allottees affected by
the scheme of consolidation, or, as the case may be,
by repartition, shall remain undisturbed until a fresh
scheme is brought into force or a change is ordered
in pursuance of provisions of sub-section (2), (3) and
(4) of Section 21 or an order passed under Section
36 or 42 of this Act.
(2) A Consolidation Officer shall be competent to
exercise all or any of the powers of a Revenue Officer
under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (Act 17 of
1887), for purposes of compliance with the provisions
of sub-section (1).”
5. It seems to us clear from these provisions that
till possession has changed under Section 24, the
management and control does not vest in the Panchayat
under Section 23-A. Not only does the management and
control not vest but the rights of the holders are not modified
or extinguished till persons have changed possession and
entered into the possession of the holdings allotted to them
under the scheme. Mr Gossain, the learned Counsel for
the State, tried to meet this point by urging that by virtue
of repartition under Section 21, the rights to possession of
the new holdings were finalised and could be enforced. This
may be so; but this cannot be equivalent to “acquisition”
within the second proviso to Article 31-A.
6. In the result we hold that the scheme is hit by the second
proviso to Article 31 A insofar as it reserves 100 kanals
2 marlas for the income of the Panchayat. We direct the
State to modify the scheme to bring it into accord with the
second proviso as interpreted by us, proceed according
to law. There would be an order as to costs.”
49. It can thus clearly be seen that the Constitution Bench of this Court
in Bhagat Ram held that, upon reading of Sections 23-A and 24 of
the Consolidation Act it was clear that, till possession has changed
under Section 24, the management and control does not vest in the
Panchayat under Section 23-A of the Consolidation Act. It further
held that not only does the management and control not vest but
the rights of the holders are not modified or extinguished till persons
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 925
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
have changed possession and entered into the possession of the
holdings allotted to them under the scheme. Though the counsel
for the State tried to urge that, by virtue of repartition under Section
21, the rights to possession of the new holdings were finalized and
could be enforced, this Court held that this cannot be equivalent
to “acquisition” within the second proviso to Article 31-A of the
Constitution of India.
50. The Full Bench of the High Court in the case of Jai Singh II has
drawn a fine distinction between the land reserved for common
purposes under Section 18(c) of the Consolidation Act which might
become part and parcel of a scheme framed under Section 14, for
the areas reserved for common purposes, though they have actually
not been put to any common use and may be put to common use
in a later point of time on one hand and the lands which might have
been contributed by the proprietors on pro-rata basis but have not
been reserved or earmarked for common purposes in the scheme.
It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of the Full
Bench of the High Court:
“The land reserved for common purposes under Section
18(c), which might become part and parcel of a scheme
framed under Section 14, for the areas reserved for common
purposes, vests with the Government or Gram Panchayat,
as the case may be, and the proprietors are left with no right
or interest in such lands meant for common purposes under
the scheme. There is nothing at all mentioned either in the
Act or the rules or the scheme, that came to be framed,
that the proprietors will lose right only with regard to land
which was actually put to any use and not the land which
may be put to common use later in point of time. In none
of the sections or Rules, which have been referred to by
us in the earlier part of scheme envisages only such lands
which have been utilized. That apart, in all the relevant
sections and the rules, words mentioned are ‘reserved
or assigned’. Reference in this connection may be made
to sub-section (3) of Section 18 and Section 23-A. The
provisions of the statute, as referred to above, would, thus,
further fortify that reference is to land reserved or assigned
for common use, whether utilized or not.
*** *** ***
926 [2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
The lands which, however, might have been contributed
by the proprietors on pro-rata basis, but have not been
reserved or earmarked for common purposes in a scheme,
known as Bachat land, it is equally true, would not vest
either with the State or the Gram Panchayat and instead
continue to be owned by the proprietors of the village in
the same proportion in which they contribute the land
owned by them. The Bachat land, which is not used for
common purposes under the scheme, in view of provisions
contained in Section 22 of the Act of 1948, is recorded
as Jumla Mustarka Malkan Wa Digar Haqdaran Hasab
Rasad Arazi Khewat but the significant differences is
that in the column of ownership proprietors are shown in
possession in contrast to the land which vests with the
Gram Panchayat which is shown as being used for some
or the other common purposes as per the scheme.
We might have gone into this issue in all its details but
in as much as the point in issue is not res-integra and in
fact stands clinched by string of judicial pronouncements
of this Court as well as Hon’ble Supreme Court, there is
no necessity at all to interpret the provisions of the Act
and the rules any further on this issue.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhagat Ram and ors. Vs.
State of Punjab and ors. AIR 1967 Supreme Court 927,
dealt with reservation of certain area in the consolidation
scheme for income of the Panchayat. Brief facts of the case
aforesaid would reveal that a scheme made in respect of
consolidation of village Dolike Sunderpur was questioned
on the ground that in as much as it makes reservation
of land for income of the Gram Panchayat, it is hit by
second proviso to Article 31-A of the Constitution of India.
The scheme in question reserved lands for phirni, paths,
agricultural paths, manure pits, cremation grounds etc. and
also reserved an area of 100 kanals 2 marlas (standard
kanals) for income of the Panchayat. It was held as under:
“The income derived by the Panchayat is in no way different
from its any other income. It is true that Section 2(bb) of
the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 927
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, defines “common purpose”
to include the following purposes:
“… providing income for the Panchayat of the village
concerned for the benefit of the village community.”
Therefore, the income can only be used for the benefit
of the village community. But so is any other income of
the Panchayat of a village to be used. The income is the
income of the Panchayat and it would defeat the whole
object of the second proviso if we were to give any other
construction. The Consolidation Officer could easily defeat
the object of the second proviso to Article 31-A by reserving
for the income of the Panchayat a major portion of the land
belonging to a person holding land within the ceiling limit.
Therefore, in our opinion, the reservation of 100 kanals 2
marlas for the income of the Panchayat in the scheme is
contrary to the second proviso and the scheme must be
modified by the competent authority accordingly.”
The ratio of the judgment aforesaid would clearly suggest
that it is the land reserved for common purposes under the
scheme which would be saved, which, otherwise, would
be hit by second proviso to Article 31-A of the Constitution
of India. Surely, if the land, which has not been reserved
for common purposes under the scheme and is Bachat
or surplus land, i.e., the one which is still left out after
providing the land in scheme for common purposes, if it is
to vest with the State or Gram Panchayat, the same would
be nothing but compulsory acquisition within the ceiling
limit of an individual without payment of compensation
and would offend second proviso to Article 31-A of the
Constitution of India.”
51. As has been observed earlier, the Constitution Bench of this Court
in Bhagat Ram, in no uncertain terms, held that till possession has
changed under Section 24 of the Consolidation Act, the management
and control does not vest in the Panchayat under Section 23-A of
the said Act. It further held that not only does the management and
control not vest but the rights of the holders are not modified or
extinguished till persons have changed possession and entered into
the possession of the holdings allotted to them under the scheme.
928 [2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Construing this, the Full Bench of the High Court in Jai Singh II held
that, if the land which has not been reserved for common purposes
under the scheme and is Bachat or surplus land, i.e., the land which
is still left out after providing the land under the scheme for common
purposes; if it is to vest with the State or Gram Panchayat, the same
would be nothing but compulsory acquisition of land within the ceiling
limit of an individual without payment of compensation and would
offend the second proviso to Article 31-A of the Constitution of India.
52. It can thus be seen that the judgment of the Full Bench of the High
Court in Jai Singh II is based basically on the Constitution Bench
judgment of this Court in the case of Bhagat Ram, which clearly held
that, until possession has changed under Section 24, the management
and control does not vest in the Panchayat under Section 23-A of the
Consolidation Act. It further held that, not only does the management
and control not vest but the rights of the holders are not modified or
extinguished till persons have changed possession and entered into
the possession of the holdings allotted to them under the scheme.
53. In the JUR, except a cursory reference to Bhagat Ram in paragraph
11, this Court held that there was no dispute about the said proposition
in the present appeals.
54. With great respect, we may state that when the judgment of the Full
Bench of the High Court rested on the law laid down by the Constitution
Bench of this Court in Bhagat Ram, the least that was expected
of this Court in the JUR was to explain as to why the Full Bench
of the High Court was wrong in relying on Bhagat Ram. However,
leave aside the cursory reference in the JUR in paragraph 11, there
is no reference in the entire judgment to Bhagat Ram. Though this
Court in the JUR has referred to the Constitution Bench judgments in
Ranjit Singh and Ajit Singh, there is not even a whisper about the
Constitution Bench judgment in Bhagat Ram, except in paragraph
11, though it had a direct bearing on the issue in question.
55. The Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Bhagat Ram in
unequivocal terms held that the management and control does not
vest in the Panchayat under Section 23-A of the Consolidation Act till
possession has changed under Section 24 of the said Act. It further
held that, the rights of the holders are not modified or extinguished till
persons have changed possession and entered into the possession
of the holdings allotted to them under the scheme. In the said case,
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 929
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
the specific contention raised by the State that the requirements as
contemplated under Sections 23, 24 and 21(2) of the Consolidation
Act were already complete and as such, the acquisition had already
taken place before the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act,
1964, was specifically rejected by this Court. Needless to state that,
all these steps are subsequent to the assignment under Section
18(c) of the Consolidation Act.
56. In the light of these findings of the Constitution Bench of this Court in
Bhagat Ram, the finding of this Court in the JUR that the vesting in
the Panchayat is complete on mere assignment under Section 18(c)
of the Consolidation Act is totally contrary to the findings recorded
in paragraph 5 of the Constitution Bench judgment in Bhagat Ram.
57. As already discussed herein above, except the cursory reference
in paragraph 11 in the JUR, this Court has not even referred to the
ratio laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in paragraph
5 in Bhagat Ram. No law is required to state that a judgment of
the Constitution Bench would be binding on the Benches of a lesser
strength. Bhagat Ram has been decided by a strength of Five
Learned Judges, this Court having a bench strength of two Learned
Judges could not have ignored the law laid down by the Constitution
Bench in paragraph 5 in Bhagat Ram.
58. We find that ignoring the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of
this Court in Bhagat Ram and taking a view totally contrary to the
same itself would amount to a material error, manifest on the face of
the order. Ignoring the judgment of the Constitution Bench, in our view,
would undermine its soundness. The review could have been allowed
on this short ground alone. However, the matter does not rest at that.
VI. CONSIDERATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE FULL BENCH
OF THE HIGH COURT IN JAI SINGH II REFERRING ITS
EARLIER JUDGMENT IN GURJANT SINGH AND SEVERAL
OTHER JUDGMENTS
59. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of the Full
Bench of the High Court in Jai Singh II:
“Division Bench of this Court, in which one of us (V.K.
Bali, J.) was a member, after referring to case law on the
subject from 1967 to 1997 in Bhagat Ram vs. State of
Punjab, (1967) 69, PLR, 287, Des Raj vs. Gram sabha
930 [2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
of Village Ladhot, 1981 PLJ, 300, Chhajju Ram vs. The
Joint Director, Panchayats, (1986-1) 89, PLR, 586, Gram
Panchayat, Gunia Majri vs. Director Consolidation of
Holdings, (1991-1) 99 PLR, 342, Gram Panchayat Sahara
(formerly Dhuma) vs. Baldev Singh, 1977 PLJ, 276, Baj
Singh vs. State of Punjab (1992-1) 101 RLR, 10, Kala
Singh vs. Commissioner, Hisar Division, 1984 PLJ, 169,
Joginder Singh vs. The Director Consolidation of Holdings
(1997-2) 116 PLR 116, Bhagwan Singh vs. The Director
Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, (1997-2) 116 PLR, 472
and Gram Panchayat, Village Bhedpura vs. The Additional
Director, Consolidation, (1997-1) 115 PLR, 391, held that
the Bachat land, i.e., land which remains unutilized after
utilizing the land for the common purposes so provided
under the consolidation scheme vests with the proprietors
and not with the Gram Panchayat”. It was further held that
“the unutilized land after utilizing the land earmarked for
the common purposes, has to be redistributed amongst
the proprietors according to the share in which they
had contributed the land belonging to them for common
purposes”. There is no need to give facts of the judicial
precedents relied upon in Gurjant Singh’s case (supra) as
the same stand mentioned already therein and reiteration
thereof would necessarily burden this judgment.
The decision of Division Bench of this Court in Gurjant
Singh’s case (supra) was tested, at the instance of the State
of Punjab, in Civil Appeal No. 5709-5714 of 2001. Only,
the general directions given in the judgment recorded in
Gurjant Singh’s case (supra) for distribution of land to the
proprietors were set aside and that too on the concession
of learned counsel, who represented the Respondents in
the case aforesaid. Order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court on August 27, 2001, reads thus:-
“Leave granted.
Mr. Harsh N. Salve, learned Solicitor General,
submitted that the State of Punjab takes objection
only in regard to the following observations made in
the impugned judgment:-
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 931
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
“This exercise, it appears, has not been done
throughout the State of Punjab and Haryana
and villages forming part of Union Territory,
Chandigarh, even though there is a specific
provision for doing that.
This exercise be done as expeditiously as
possible and preferably within six months
proceedings for repartition must commence.
Liberty to apply in the event of non-compliance
of directions referred to above.”
Learned counsel for the Respondent submits that they
had no objection in deleting the aforesaid portions
from the impugned judgment. We allow these appeals
to be extent of deleting of the above said passage
from the impugned judgment.
These appeals are disposed of accordingly.”
60. It is thus clear that the Full Bench of the High Court has referred to
the judgment of the Division Bench of the said Court in the case of
Gurjant Singh.
61. It is pertinent to note that in the case of Gurjant Singh, the Division
Bench of the High Court had noted a series of judgments delivered by
the said High Court relying on the law laid down by the Constitution
Bench of this Court in Bhagat Ram. All these decisions had held
that the land which remains unutilized after utilizing the land for the
common purposes so provided under the consolidation scheme
vests with the proprietors and not with the Gram Panchayat. It
was further held that the unutilized land i.e., the Bachat land, left
after utilizing the land earmarked for the common purposes, has to
be redistributed amongst the proprietors according to the share in
which they had contributed the land belonging to them for common
purposes.
62. It is to be noted that the JUR referred to the judgment in the case
of Gurjant Singh and the order passed by this Court in Civil Appeal
Nos.5709-5714 of 2001, wherein the State had objected only with
regard to the observations wherein the time limit was provided for
effecting redistribution of the Bachat land amongst the proprietors
according to their share.
932 [2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
63. It is thus clear that the State itself did not press the appeals with
regard to the directions for redistribution of the Bachat land amongst
the proprietors according to their share. Its only grievance was with
regard to the directions to do it within a specified period of time.
However, this Court in the JUR held that the doctrine of merger
would not be applicable. However, we do not wish to go into the
correctness of that finding since we are sitting in review jurisdiction.
64. The JUR referred to various judgments of the Punjab & Haryana
High Court which took the view that the Bachat lands are entitled
for redistribution. The JUR cursorily observed in paragraph 84 that
the findings recorded by the different Benches of the High Court are
clearly erroneous and not sustainable. When a catena of judgments
were delivered by the various Benches of the High court relying on
the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Bhagat Ram,
the least that was expected in the JUR was a reasoning as to how
the findings of the various Benches of the High Court including in
Gurjant Singh, relying on the judgment of the Constitution Bench
of this Court in Bhagat Ram, are erroneous.
65. In our considered view, the non-consideration of the reasoning given
by the Full Bench of the High Court in Jai Singh II, which findings
were given by relying on the judgment of the Constitution Bench of
this Court in Bhagat Ram, and not showing as to how the findings
therein were erroneous in law, would also amount to an error, apparent
on the face of the record.
VII. CONSIDERATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE FULL BENCH
OF THE HIGH COURT IN JAI SINGH II WITH REGARD TO
DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS
66. Thirdly, the Full Bench of the High Court in Jai Singh II in the
alternative held that, a consistent view has been taken in more than
100 judgments by the Punjab & Haryana High Court and applying
the doctrine of stare decisis, such a view cannot be upset. While
holding so, the Full Bench of the High Court has relied on various
judgments of this Court as well as the various High Courts. However,
in the JUR, there is not even a reference to the reasoning given by
the Full Bench of the High Court with regard to the applicability of
the doctrine of stare decisis. There are catena of judgments of this
Court explaining the doctrine of stare decisis and its application.
However, we do not propose to go into them since the scope in
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 933
Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.
review jurisdiction is limited. We do not wish to go into the question
as to whether the doctrine of stare decisis would be applicable in
the facts of the present case or not. However, the least that the JUR
was expected was to consider the reasoning given by the Full Bench
of the High Court and to consider as to how the said reasoning was
not sustainable in law. However, the JUR does not even refer to the
said discussion in its judgment.
67. In our considered view, the non-consideration of the reasoning given
by the Full Bench of the High Court in Jai Singh II, that on account
of more than 100 decisions rendered by various Benches of the High
Court, the doctrine of stare decisis is applicable, would also be an
error apparent on the face of the record.
VIII. CONCLUSION
68. In that view of the matter, we are of the considered view that the
JUR needs to be recalled on the aforesaid grounds mentioned by us.
69. In the result, we pass the following order:
(i) The Review Petition is allowed.
(ii) The judgment and order of this Court dated 7th April 2022 in
Civil Appeal No. 6990 of 2014 is recalled and the appeal is
restored to file.
(iii) The appeal is directed to be listed for hearing peremptorily on
7th August 2024 at Serial No.1.
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey Result of the case:
Review Petition allowed.
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "Review"Sign in to search