Holding

The amendment is not barred, constructive res judicata does not apply, and Section 25B is constitutionally valid.

Summary

The tenant Kewal Singh occupied premises under a lease when the landlord Lajwanti filed an eviction suit under the Delhi Rent Control Act invoking sections 14A(1), 14(1)(e) and 14(1)(f). She later withdrew the bonafide necessity and repair grounds, then amended the suit to re‑insert the 14(1)(e) ground. The tenant challenged the amendment, arguing that Order II Rule 2 of the CPC barred it, that the doctrine of constructive res judicata applied, and that Section 25B of the Act violated Article 14. The Supreme Court held that Order II Rule 2 does not apply because the causes of action were distinct, that constructive res judicata was inapplicable as there was no adjudication between the parties, and that Section 25B is a reasonable classification and constitutionally valid. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the plaintiff’s amendment to re‑insert a previously withdrawn cause of action is barred by Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Whether the doctrine of constructive res judicata bars the amendment.
Whether Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act infringes Article 14 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order II Rule 2
Delhi Rent Control Acts. 14(1)(e), s. 14(1)(f), s. 14A(1), s. 25B
Transfer of Property Acts. 107, s. 108, s. 109, s. 110, s. 111

Subjects

evictionDelhi Rent Control ActOrder II Rule 2constructive res judicataArticle 14landlord's bona fide necessityprocedural law

Judgment

854

A KEWAL SINGH "---..
v.
LAJWANTI
October 4, 1979
B (S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P. S. KAl:LASAM AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]
Frame of Suit-Whether earlier giving up a cause of action by deletion from
the plaint and later on again requesting for inclusion of the same cause is barred
by tile principle of Order II Rule 2 C.P.C.
Doctrine of constructive Res-judicata-When it applies-Whether deletion of
a cause of action from the plaint anti again a request for inclusion would amount
c to a bar of Res-judicata.
Delhi Rent Control Act, Section 25B-Whether violative of Art. 14 of the
Constitution.

The appellant was the tenant of respondent in Quarter No. IV-H/46 Lajpat
Nagar frqm 1-7~1967. On 2-6-1976, the respondent filed an application under
Sections 14A(l), 14(l)(e) and· 14{1) (f) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, for
D eviction of the appellant firstly on the ground that as. her husband was required
by the Government to vacate the Government quarters or pay the penal rent,
the husband of the respondent bad to shift ~o the house of his wife which was
in the tenancy of the defendant. A prayer was also made that even othemise
the premises were required for a bonafide necessity of the landlord and also
as the premises had become unfit for human habitation the respondent required
E the same for carrying out repairs which could not be done unless the premises
were vacated. On 3-6·76 the respondent filed :m application withdrawing the causa
of action mentioned by her regarding bonafide necessity and repairs as contempla-
ted by Section 14(l)(e) and 14(l)(f) of the Act. The Rent Controller according-
ly allowed the plaintiff to withdraw the two ca·uses of action mentioned in the
application since no notice was served at this time on the appeUant. Thereafter
•otice was served on the appellant. On 4-6-1976, the plaintiff again sought to
F amend her petition by deleting the cause of action mentioned under section
14A(l) of the Act i.e. requirement of the respondent because her husband had·
been directed to vacate the Government Quarter. On 13-8-1976 the appellant
appeared before the Rent Controller and filed an appliaction under section 25B, . ., •
,.
sub sections 4 and 5 requesting the Rent Controller to give him permission to- ~.'
defend the suit, on the ground that as the landlady was not a Government ser-
vant she was not entitled to maintain the eviction petition under Section 14A(l)
of the Act. On 6-10-76 the husband of the respondent filed an application for
G being impleaded a.~ a party, but this application was rejected on 22-11-76;
The resJ¥)ndent thereafter again filed another application on 27-1-77 praying for
amendment of her eYiction application by re-inserting the cause of action con~
tained in section 14{1)(e) of the Act and sought to claim eviction on the ground'
of bonafide requirement. .This application was contested by the appellant but
was allowed by the Rent Controller by his order dated 19-2-77 leaving open to·
the appellant to file his objection by a fresh application if he wanted to defend
B the suit. The appellant accordingly filed an application on 9-3-77 for permission
to defend the suit on the ground that the amendment sought for by the pl-aintiff
was uncalled for and illegal and could not be allowed. Ultimately, the Rent
KEWAL SINGH V. LAJWANTI 855

controller by his order dated 27-7-77 rejected the application for leave to appear A
and defend the suit and passed an order evicting the appellant from the premises.
The revision petition filed by the appellant under Section 25B(8) in the Delhi
High Court was dismissed on 6-4-1978 and hence the appeal by special leave of
the Court.

.. It was contended : (a) that the second application given by the respondent for
re-a mending her plaint by inserting the relief under section 14 (1 )(e) which she
B
J had given up at a prior occasion when she had based her suit under sectian ·
14A(l) was barred by the principles of Order II Rule 2 C.P.C. (b) that even if
Order n Rule 2 C.P.C., had no application, the second application filed by the
respondent was barred by the doctrfne of constructive res-judicata and (c)
Section 25B which lays down the procedure for disposing of the applications
filed by the landlord under the provisions of Section 14A and 14(1)(e) are
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution inoomuch as the provisions are arbi-
trary and discriminatory in nature, and seek tO provide tWQ different procedures
c
for tenants similarly situated.

Dismissing the appeal by spcciai leave, the Court
HELD : 1. A perusal of order II Rule 2 C.P.C. would clearly reveal that
this provision applies to cases where a plaintiff omits to sue a portion @{ the
cause of action on which the suit is based either by relinquishing the cause of . D
action or by omitting a part of it. The provision has, therefore, no application
to cases where the plaintiff has based his suit on separate and distinct oauses of
action and chooses to relinquish one or the other of them. In such cases, it is
always open to the plaintiff to file a fresh suit on the basis of a distinct cause of
action [860 E-F]

In the instant cese, the second amendment application was not barred by the E
principles of order TI, Rule 2 C.P.C. The respondent had first based her suit on
three distinct causes of action, but later confined the suit only to the first cause
of action, namely the one mentioned in Section 14A(l) of the Act and gave up
the cause of action relating to section 14(1 )(e) and (f). Subsequently by virtue
of an amendment she relinquished the fir§.t cause of action arising out of section
14A(l) •md sought to revive her cause of action based on section 14(1 )(e). At
-the time when the respondent relinquished the cause of action arising out of p·
Section 14(1)(e), the appcl4'nt was not in the picture at all. Therefore it was
not open to the appellant to mise any objection to the amount sought by the
respondent. [861 G·H, 862 A-C]

Mohammed Khalil Khan and Ors. v. Mahbub Al!klwn and Ors., 75 I.A. 121
P.C_.; applied.

2. One of the essential conditions of res judicata is that there must be a G
formal adjudication between the parties (jfter fu11 hearing. In other words, the
matter must be finally decided between the parties. [862 c]'

In the instant case, the doctrine of constructive res-judicata has no application
whatsoever, since at the time when the respondent relinquished her first cause of
action, the appellant was no where in the picture and there was no adjudication
between the parties. The second amendment application wa'& ma<le in the same
H
proceedings on a cause of action that she was allowed to insert with the permis-
sion of the Court. Although both the parties went to the Court on the basis of
i5i SUPREME COURT RBPORTS [1~10] 1 S.C.R.

these facts, neither the her of r~sjudicata nor that ef Order • lbue 2 C.P.C.
was raised before the Rent Controller. [862 C, B) 1...
3. It is well settled that what Article 14 forbids is hostile iiserimination 8Bd
not reasonable classification. Discrimination may take place ill many ways and
what Article f4 require!'! i6 that equals must be treated alike. 1l equals and ·ua~
equals one also treated alike tlten also Article 14 is clearly attre.cted and diseri..
B mi11atioo reoUs. [862 F~G]
'
(b) A reasonable classification based oft JfOUnds havin& a eleer 11exua wita
the objective to be achieYed and grouping certain persona in a SeJ*"ate categOry
in view of their special peculiarities ., undoubtedly permiaaible. Of cowse,
clMsificatio.. shovld not be purely a class legislation. [86!1 G-11] J
(c) It i!'l also well settled that there i8 always a. pre&amptioll ill favour of 18e )

C sea~hNt1ow.lity of a statl!te and any party who seeks to cballeJIIe the leJ!illa-
tion oa the ground of. applicability of Article 14 must plead and prove the neMS-
SMf facti. 111 making a classification, the Court murt pre&\llllO matteM of
commoa knowledge, common report, history of the time ud tVHY ether HI...
vant fact. [862 H, 863 Al ..
Chiranjit Lal Chowqhari v. Union 01/lntlia and Ors., [1950] S.C.R. 1,9,
D State of We1t Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952} S.C.R. 284; Sri Ramkrilhna
·nalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tandolkar and Ors., [1959] S.C.R. 279 Mahant Moti
Das v. S. P. Sahi, the Special Offiper in charge of Hindu Religious Trusts and
Ors., [1959] 2 Supp. S.C.R. 563; A. C. Aggarwal, Sub Divisional Magistrate
Delhi and Anr. v. Mst. Ram Kali etc., [1968] 1 S.C.R. 205; referred to.
4. The Rent Control Act is a piece of social legislation _and is meant mainly
te protect the tenants from frivolous evictions. At the same time, in order to
E do justice to the landlords and io avoid such restrictions on 1heir right to evitt
the tenant so as to destroy their legal right to property certain salutary provisiGU
have been made by the legislature which give relief to the landlord. In fue
absence of such a legislation a landlord has a common law right to evict the
knant either on the determination of the tenancy by efflux of time or for default
in payment of rent or other grounds after giving notice under the Transfer of
Property Act. Their broad right bas been curtailed by the Rent Control Legiela-
F tion with a view to give protec.aoa to the tenants having regard to their genuine
and dire needs. [864 C~E]

While the rent control legislation has given a number of facilities to ~ 1'
tenants, it should not be construed so as to destroy the limited relief whick it .)..._
seeks to give to the landlord also. like the question of landlord•s bonafide ,er~
sonal necessity. The concept of bonafide necessity should be msaningfull7 oea-
G strued so as to make the relief aranted to the landlord real &ad practical. ..;.
{864 E~G]
Bega Begum end- Ors. v . .Abdul Al1mad Khan (dead) by 1. rs and •rs••
U979] 2 S.C.R. 1; referred to.

Section 25B of the Delhi llettt Control Act was inserted in tlle statute by
Act 18 of 1976 and was aiven restrospective effect from 1-12-75, with the 88la
II o\;ttt of 1implify,ing the procedure for eviction of tenants in case tho Ian~•r•
requires the premisea bonafide for his personal occupation. Tho Legisla•
ia Hs wisdom thought that a short and simple procedure should be proWled
r
KIWAL SING~ v, LAJWAN~I
. ,
for those landlords who generally want the premises for their bcnafide necessity A
se that th:ey may be able to get quick and expeditious relief, [865 G-H, 866 A-Bl
Section 25B does not govern all grounds open to a landlord for evicting
the tenant but it h confined only to 'the. ground in liection 14A and proviso
to section 14U)(e). In other words, the bonafide ncce11sity of the landlord
ba:; been put in a separate class or category having regard lo the peculiar inci-
dents of his right. Section 14A also relates to ·a special situation where the
landlord under the Go\·ernment Rules is asked lo ~hift to his own bouse, if ' B
he has one or in a bouse that belongs to his spouse, failing which he bas to
pay a penal l'cn~ which al~ost takes away a major part of his salary. Thus.
1uch a landlord becomes a class by himself. The statute thus puts personal
.. necessity of the landlord as a special class requiring special treatment for quick
eviction of the tenant and cuts out delays and plugs all the loopholes, which
may ,cause delay in getting the relief by the landlord. The classificatioH nt_adc
by the legislature is in public interest and is in complete consonance with the ,
objectives sought to be achieved. The landlords having personal · necessity
.have been brought together as a separate class becaus'e of their spe-cial needs
and such a classification cannot be said to be unreasonable particularly Wllell
the legislature in its obvious wisdom feels th&t the landlords should get this
relief as quickly as possible. [868 A-E]
Even though a summary procedure has been evolved the tenant has been D
afforded full opportunity to defend the. application provided he can disclQSe
aood grounds for negating th:e case of "the landlord. No litigant has 'a riaht
to protract the legal proceedings by taking frivolous, irrelevant, iwitiorial or
uncalled for pleas. This is what Section 258 see~ to prevent. [86.9 E-F]
An appeal is pnrely a creature of tbe statute and this right has not be.<:n
given in order to cut out unnecessary delay. Indeed the highest Court oi tho
&tate has been given a wid·e power of revision where the said Court can_
examine the, case of the tenant and the landlord and the validity of the order :
passed by the Controller. The right of lhc tenant, therefore, is sufficiently
safeguarded by the proviso to sub section 8 of Section 25B of the Act. In order
to give the relief to the tenant against any apparent error of law or fact where
no revision l:$s. been filed in the High Court, the statute confers power of
review qn the Controller. [869 G-H, 870 A1
F
Thus, taking an overall plcture of the silu~tion, the circumstances under
which the landlord's n!eds have been .classified and the safeguards givl!n by rhc
statute it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that Section 25B and its
sub sections are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In fact, Section
25B contains valuable and ·sufficimt guidelines which completely exclude the
exercise of tmcanaliscd or arbitrary powers of the ·Rent Controller. [870 A-B] 1
. Section 25B is constitutionally va-lid. The leghlatl.~re has not taken: away the G
nght of ·the te.nant at all but has metely simplified the procedure for eviction
0f the tenant 10 case:. falling withiq the ambit of sections 14A and 14(1 )(e)
of the Act: A tenant can~ot challenge th'e validity of such a provision enacted
by the .legis~ature £:o~ wht:h the tenant itself derive such rights. If the Iegis-
Jature c?ns1dered m Its wisdom to confer certain rights or facilities on that
tenants, It could .due to changed circumstances curtail, modify, alter or even
take away such nghts or the procedure enacted for the purpose of eviction H
and leave the tenants to seek their remedy under the common law. [870 G-H
171 A, B-C] '
19-625 SCJ/79
858 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 s.c.a.

A CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1291 of 1970.

Ap~al by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
0-4-1978 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Revision No. 822/77.
Madan Mohan~ V. J. Francis and D. K. Garg for the Appellant.

B P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh, M. Mudgal ·and B. L. Verma for the
Respondent. '
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAZAL Au, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against
the judgment and order of the Delhi High Court dated the 6th April,
C 1978 dismissing the revision ~tition filed by the appellant against an
order of the Rent Controller. For the purpose of brevity and to! avoid
confusion the appellant shall hereafter be referred to as the Defendant
and the respondent as the Plaintiff.

The defendant appellant was inducted as a tenant by the plaintiff
D in Quarter No. IV-H/46, Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi on 1-7...1967. On
2nd June, 1976 the plaintiff filed an application under sections 14A(l)
14{1) (e) and 14(1 )(f) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, hereinafter
referred to as the Act, for eviction of t11e tenant firstly on th~ ground
that as the husband of the plaintiff was required by the Government
E to vacate the Government quarter or pay the penal rent the husband
of the plaintiff had to shift to the bouse of his wife which was in the
tenancy of the defendant. -- A prayer was also made by the plaintiff
that even otherwise the premises were required for a bonafide necessity
of the land-lady and also as the p~emises had become unfit for human
habitation the plain1iff required the same for carrying out repairs which
F could not be done unless the premises mre vacated. On the next
date, that is on 3rd June, 1976 the plaintilf filed an application with--
drawing the cause of action mentioned by her regarding bonafide
necessity and repairs as contemplated by sections 14(1) (e) and
14(1) (f)- of the Act. The defendant appellant at this time was
nowhere in the picture and no notice had yet been served on him. The
G Rent Controller accordingly allowed the plaintiff to withdraw the two
causes of action mentioned in the application. Thereafter notice was
issued to the defendant.. On the 4th. June, 1976 the plaintiff again
sought to amend her petition by deleting the cause of action mentioned
under section 14-A(l) of the Act, that is to say requirement of the
plaintiff because her husband had been directed to vacate the Govern-
H ment quarter. This was perhaps necessitated because there were
some amendments in the Government Rules oh the subject. On the
13th August, 1976 the defendant appeared before the Rent Controller
KEWAL SINGH v. LAJWANTI (Fazal Ali} J.) 859

:and filed an application under section 25B sub-sections 4 and 5 request- A
ing the Rent Controller to give the defe'ndant perniission to defend the
· suit, on the ground that as the land-lady was not a Government servant
she was not entitled to maintain t~~ eviction petition under section
t4A(l) of the Act. The defenda'nt also raised some other conten-
tions. On 6-10-1976 the husband of the plaintiff filed an application
for being impleaded as a party, but this application was rejected on B
22-11-1976. The plaintiff thereafter again filed ano.t her application on
!
27-1-1977 praying for amendment of her eviction application by re-
-< ' inserting the cause of action contained in section 14(1 )(e) of the Act
.and sought to claim eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement.
This application was contested by the defendant but was , allowed by
the Rent Controller by his order dated 19-2-1977. The Rent Control- c
ler however left it open to the defendant to file his objection by a fresh
application if he wanted to defend the suit. The defendant accordingly
filed an application on the 9th March, 1977 for permission to defend
the suit on the ground that the amendment sought for by the plaintiff
was uncalled for and illegal and could not be allowed. Ultimately ' D
the Rent Controller by his order d ated 27th July, 1977 rejected the
application of the defendant for leave to appear and defend the suit
and passed ~n order evicting the defendant fr<?m the premises. Being
aggrieved by this order the defendant went up in revision to the Delhi
High· Court as no appeal or second appeal against the order passed
by the Rent Controller was maintainable under sub-section 8 of section E
25B of the Act. The revision ~tition was heard by Justice Prakash
Narain of the Delhi High Court who by his order dated 6th April,
.1978 dismissed the revision petition with costs. Thereafter, the peti-
tioner approached this Court and obtained special leave. Hence this
appeal.
F
On a perusal of the judgment of the Rent Controller and that of the
High Court prima facie it seems to us that the appeal was clearly con-
cluded by findings of fact inasmuch· as both the Courts had found that
the plaintiff had proved that she required the premises for her bonafide
necessity. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, raised three
points of law before us. In the first place, it was argued that the G
~econ~ applicati~n given by the plaintiff for re-amending her plaint by
Inserting the rehef under section 14 ( 1) (e) which she had given up
at a prior occasion when she had based her suit under section 14A(l)
was barred by the principles of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of avil
Procedure.
-). H
It was next contended that even if Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C. had no
application, the second application for amendment filed by the plainti1f
20--:-62S SCI/79
·'

860 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [1980) 1 S.C.R. ,

rA was barred by the doctrine of constructive res judicata. Finally, it was
argued that section 25B which lays down the procedure for disposing
of applications filed· by the landlord under the provisions of sections
14A and 14(1)(e) are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution
inasmuch as the provisions are arbitrary and discriminatory in nature,
and seek to provide two different procedures for tenant similarly
B situate.

So far as the first two contentions are concerned, we are of the
opinion that do not merit any serious consid~ration. Regarding the
question of the applicability qf Order 2 Ruld 2, C.P.C. too
argument

c
of the learned counsel for the appellant is based on serious miscon~
ception of law. Order 2 Ru1e 2 C.P.C. runs thus : - ) .
"2 ( 1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which
the plaintiff is entitled.to make in respect of the cause
of action but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion
of his claim in order to bring the suit within the juris-
D diction of any Court.
(2) Where a plaintiff omits to sue in P~spect of, or inten-
tionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall
· not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted
or relinquished".

E A perusal of Order 2 Rule 2 would clearly reVt~al that this provision
applies to cases where a plaintiff omits to sue a portion of the cause
of action on which the suit is· based either by relinquishing the cause
of action or by omitting a p~rt of it. The provision has, therefore,
no application to cases where the plaintiff basis his suit on separate
and distinct causes of action and chooses to relinquish one or the other
· F of them. In such cases, it is always open to the plaintiff to file a fresh
suit on the basis of a distinct cause of action which he may have re-
linquished.

In the case of Mohammad Khalil Khan & Ors. v. Mahabub Ali Mian
f .,.
& Ors. C) the Privy Council observed as follows : -
A
G
"That the right and its infringement, and not the ground ....
or origin of the right and its infringement, constitute the
cause of actiont but the cause of action for the Oudh suit
(No. 8 of 1928) so far as the Mahbub brothers are concern-
ed was only a denial of title by them as that suit was mainly
against Abadi Begum for possession of the Oudh property;
H
whilst in the present suit the cause of action was wrongful
-··-----
(1) 75 I. A. 121.
KEWAL SINGH v. LAJWANTI (Fazal Ali, ].) 8 GI

possession by the Mahbub brothers of the Shahjahanpur pro- A
perty, and that the two causes of action were thus different."
"Their Lordships are satisfied that there is no force in the
·contention that the plaintiffs in the present suit could not
reasonably commence an action in respect of the Shahjahan-
pur property while their right to mutation in the Revenue
registers was the subject of an appeal to the Commissioner
which had not been decided, or, in other words, that it was
not open to them to <lme the defendants in respect of the

.•
'1111

.(
Shahjahanpur property at a date earlier than October 29,
1928 and to include the Shahjahanpur property in the earlier
, suit No. 8 instituted on September 14, 1928". c
• "Th,~ principles laid down. in the cases thus far discussed
may be tlms summarized; (1) the correct test in cases falling
under 0. 2. r. 2 is "whether the! claim in the new suit is, in
fact, founded on a cause of action distinct from that which
was the foundation for the former suit. Moonshee Buzloor D
Ruheem v. Shamsoonnissa Begum e). (2) The cause of
action means every fact which will be necessary for the plain-
tiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to
the judgment Read v. Brown(2). (3) If the evidence to
support the two claims is different then the causes of action
are also different Brunsden v. Humphery(a). (4) The E
causes of action in the two suits may be considered to .be
the same if in substance they are identical. (Brunsden v.
Humphery). (5) The cause of action has no relation what-
soever to the defence that· may be set up by the defendant,
nor does it depend on the character of the 'relief prayed; for
by the plaintiff. It refers "to the media upon which the F
plaintiff askes the court to arriv~ at a conclusion in his
favour." Muss. Chand Kour v. Partab Singh( 4 ). This observa-
tion was made by Lord Watsoh in a case under s. 43 of
the Act of 1882 (corresponding to 0.2.r.2) where plaintiff
made various claims in the same suit''.
Applying the afores_aid principles !aid down by the Privy Council
yve find that none of the conditions mentioned by the Privy Council
are applicable in this case. The plaintiff had first based her suit on
(1) 11 Moo. I. A. 551, 605.
(2) 22 Q. B. D. 128, 131.
H'
(3) 14 Q. B. D .. 141J
' }
862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 S.C.R..

A three distinct causes of action but later confined the suit only to the
first cause of action, namely, the one mentioned in section 14A(1) of
the Act and gave up the cause of action relating to section 14(1) (e)
and (f). Subsequently, by virtue of an amendment she relinquished
the first cause of action arising out of section 14A(l) and sought
to revive her cause of action based on section 14 ( 1 )(e) . At the
B time when the plaintiff relinquished the cause of action ·,·rising out of
section 14 ( l) (e) the defendant was not in the picture at all. There-
fore, it was not open to the defendant to raise any objection to the
amendment sought by the plaintiff. For these reasons, we are satis-
fied that the second amendment application was not -barred by the
principles of 0.2 r.2 C.P.C. and the contention of the learned counsel
c for the appellant must fail.

Secondly, as regards the question of constructive res judicata it
has no application whatsoever in the instant case. It is well settled
that one of the essential conditions of res judicata is that there must
be a formal adjudication between the parties after full hearing. In
.D other words, the matter must be finally decided between the parties.
Here also at a time when the plaintiff relinquished her first cause of
action the defendant was no where in the picture, and there being no
adjudication between the parti~ the· doctrine of res judicata do~s not
apply. The second amendment application was made in the same
proceedings on a cause of· action that she was allowed to insert with
E
the permission of the court. Although both the parties went to the
court on the basis of these facts, neither the bar of res judicata 'nOr
that of 0.2 r.2 ~ppear to have been raised befor~ the Rent Control).er.
For thesa reasons, therefore, the second plank of the argument put
forward by counsel for the appellant also must be rejected.

Lastly, we come to the question of the application of Article 14
to the provisions of ·the Act. This is undoubtedly a que,tion which
merit~ serious consideration. Before approaching this question we
might observe that it is well settled that what Article 14 forbids is
hostile di~crirnination and not reasonable classification. Discrimina-
G tion may take place in many ways, and what Article· 14 requires is
that equals must be treated alike. If equals and unequals are also ••
treated alike then also Article 14 is clearly attracted and discrimina~
tion results. A reasonable classification based on grounds having a
clear nexus with the objective to be achieved and grouping certain
persons in a separate category in view of their !Special pecularities is
B undoubtedly permissible. Of course, classification should not be
purely a class legislation. It is also well settled that there is always
a presumption in favour of the comstitutionality of a ~Statute and any
KEWAL SINGH v. LAJWANTI (Fazal Ali,!.) 863

party who seeks to challenge the legislation on the ground of applica~i A
lity of Article 14 must plead and prove the necessary facts. In makmg
· a classification t~ .~;ourt must presumed matters of common knowledge,
i
common report; u1story of the time and e'V'~ry other relevant fact.
~ the case of Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India
·. & OJIJL:1 ) this Court observed as follows.:- \ B
"The legislature undoubtedly has a wide field of choice
in determining and classifying the subject of its laws, and if
the law deals alike with all of a certai'n class, it is normally
not abnoxious to the charge of denial of equal protection;
but the classification should never be arbitrary. It must
always rest upon some real and substantial distinction bear- c
ing a reasonable and just relation to the things in re.,t;pect
to which the classification is made; and cla-ssification made
without any substantial basis should be regarded as invalid".
Same view was taken in the case of The Sta.te of West Bengal v. Anwar
Ali SarkarC). D
In the case of Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice .
S. R. Tendolkar & Ors. C) it was held that in determining whether
there is any intelligible differentia on the basis of which the petitioners
a'nd their companies could have been grouped together it is permis-
sible to look to the facts appearing in the notiftcation as also those E. ~

brought to the notice of the court.
1n the case of Mahant Moti Das v. S. P. Sahi, The Special Officer
in charge of Hindu Religious Trusts & Ors.(4 ) this Court held that
apart from there being a presumption in favour of the constitutiona-
lity of an enactment the burden is upon the party who alleges that
there has been a clear transgression of· the constitutional guarantee. F
..
__.._
It was further pointed out that the legislature correctly appreciated
' the needs of its own people and that its laws are directed to problems
made manife5t by experience and that any discrimi'nation made are
~based on adequate grounds as the legislature is fro~ to recognise
•• degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where
G
the need is d~emed to be the clearest.
These observations . clearly _justify the classification made by the
legislature in enacting the Delhi. Rent Control Act as we shall show
later. ·
(1) [1950] S. C. R. 869.
(2) [1952} S. C. R. 284. H
(3) [1959] S. C. R. 279. .,,
(4) [1959] 2 Supp. S.C. R. 563
864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 s.c.R.

A To the same effect is the decision m the case of Slzri A. C.
Aggarwal, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Delhi & Anr. v. Mst. Ram K~li
etc.C)

In the light of the principles enunciated by the decisions of this
Court we would now brlefly appr_oach the relevant provisions o,_ the
Delhi Rent Control Act which have been applied to the facts f'._ the ·
present case.

To begin with, it is not necessary for. us to deal with section
14A(l) because the cause of action contained in this section has been ¥ •

given up by _thr~ plaintiff-respondent. We would, therefore, confihe
c ourselves to the validity of section 14( 1)(e) and the procedure
prescribed to give relief mentioned in the aforesaid section in section
25B. Before discJ.Issing the relevant provisions of the Act it may be
necessary to observe that the Rent Control Act is a piece of social
legislation and is meant mainly to prgtect the tenants from frivolous
D evictions. At the same time, in order to do justice .to the landlords
and to avoid placing such restrictions on their right to . evict the
tenant as to destroy their legal right to property certain salutary
provisions have been made by the legislature which give relief to the
landlord. In the absence of such a legislation a landlord has a
common law right to evict the tenant either on the determination of
E· the tenancy by efflux of time or for default in payment of rent or
other grounds after giving notice under the Transfer of Property Act.
This broad right has been curtailed by the Rent Contro1 Legislation
with a view to give protection to the tenants having regard to their
genuine and dire needs. ·While the rent control legislation has given

.
/

a numb2.r of facilities to the tenants it should not be construed so as
to destroy the limited relief which it seeks to give to the landlord
also. For instance one of the grounds for eviction which is contain~
ed in almost all the Rent Control Acts in the country is the question
of landlord's bonafide personal 'necessity. The concept of bonafide
necessLty should be meaningfully construed so as to make the relief
granted to the landlord real and practical. In the case of Bega Begum
G & Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by.L.Rs and Ors.C) this Court
' to which one of us (Fazal Ali, J.) was a party and spoke for the
Court observed as follows :- \

"Moreover, section 11 (h) of the Act uses the words
H 'reasonable requirement' which undoubtedly postulate that
(1) [1968} 1 S. C. R. 205.
(2) [1979] 2 S. C. R. 1.
KEWAL SINGH V. LAJWANTI (Fazal Ali, J.) 865

there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere
desire or wish. · The distinction between desire and need
should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even
the genuine need as nothing but a desire as the High Court
has done in this case. It seems to us that the connotation
, '} of the term 'need' or 'requirement' should not be artificially
\ , ,~xtended nor its language ~o unduly stretched or strained as B
, to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the· landlord
to get a decree for eviction. Such a course would defeat the
very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction
~f the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds.
This appears to us to be the general scheme· of all the Rent
Control Acts prevalent in other States in the country. This C
Court has considered the import of the word 'requirement'
and pointed out that it merely connotes that there should be
· an element of need".
Coming back to the Delhi Rent Control Act it appears that section
25B was inserted in the statute by Act 18 of 1976 and was given D
retrospective effect from 1-12-1975. The statement of objects and
-reasons which formed part of the Delhi Rent Control Act run thus :
"There has been a persistent demand for amendments
to the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 with a view to conferr-
ing a right of tenancy on certain heirs fsuccessors of a ,deceas- E
ed statutory tehant so that they may be protected from evic-
tion by landlords and also for simp.lifying the procedure for
eviction of tenants in case the landlord requires the premises
bona fide for his personal occupation. Further, Government
decided on the 9th S>~ptember, 1975 that a person who owns
his own house in his place of work should vacate the Govern-
ment accommod<ftion allotted to him before the 31st
December, 1975. Government considered that in the cir-
cumstances, the Act requires to be amended urgently.

As the Parliament was not in session the Delhi Rent
Control (Amendment) Ordi'nance 1975 was promulgated G
on the 1st December, 1975. The Bill seeks to replace
tl)e said Ordinance".
I
(Emphasis ours)
This Act actually replaced the Ordinance which was promulgated on
1st December, 1975. The objects and reasons clearly reveal that the H
amendment has been made for simplifying the procedure for eviction
()f tenants- in case the landlord requires the premises bona fide for
866 SUPREME .COURT REPORTS [1980) 1 S.C.R.

A his personal occupation. It is a matter 0~ com~on know:edge ~at
even though ·the landlord may have an ·unmedia1e ~nd Jmpcrauve
necessity for vacating the house given to a tenant he 15 compelled to
resort to the time consuming any dilatory procedure of a suit which
takes yean; before the landlord is able to obtaiil tbe decree and in
most cases by the time the decree is passed either the landlord dies
B . or · the need disappears and the landlord is completely deprived of
getting any relief. It appears to us thM jt was for these reasons th.af
the legislature in its wisdom thought that a short and· simple procedure
should be provided for those landlords who generally want tbe premis-
es for their bo11a fide necessity so that they may be able to get quick
and expeditious relief. Section 25B of tbe Act runs thus:- _
c . .

"25.B (1) Every application by a bndlord for the re-
covery of po."scssion of any premires on tbe ground specified
in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-s~:ction .0) of section
14, or under section 14A, shnU be d~alt with in accordance
with the procedure specified in this section.
D
(2) The Controller shan. issue summons, in relation to
cvc:ry application referred in sub--section ( 1) in the form
spccifkd jn the Third Schedule.

(J)(;1) The Controller shall, in addition to, and simulta-
E neously with, the issu~ of summons for service on the tenant,
aho dir~ct the summons to be served by registered post,
acknowkdgC"mcnt due. addressed to the t~nant or his aoent ;;>
emro,\•::r~d. tn 0Ctt.'pt the service at the place where the
tenant or h1s agent ncttnUy and voluntarily rcsidc:!s or carries
0:1 busint~s or r·~rsonaUy works for gain and mn.y, if the .
F ~Trcumstnncl'S 0f th~ ca5:~ ~o rcq\Jirc; also direct tbe publica~
~1on o~ the t';Ununl)ho;; in <1 tl.:wspapcr cir<"ubtin~ in the locality
10 'vh1ch th·~ tenant is f:l~t knmvn to ll::l\'e r..:siJed or carr~: :I
on husincsl\ nr p:: r~('lnJHy work~d for g:1in.

(b) \\'lh'n an n<:knfJwledgemC"nt pnrf'('rtin~ to be signed
G hy .t hr kn:l'nt or his ~Ig\'tlt i" n'ceivC'J by the C~ntroller o; the
r. .·.~·t-.,t·~r~J :Jrtid..: Ct)ntainrng the !iUmmons is received back
\VJth an. cndorst!m~nt purporting to ·have been m::tdc by a
P:J~.tal employee tn the. effect thnt the tenant or his agent
· or th regys' tercu arttc1e.
c.h.tJ rdu--cd to tak··- ddivery ~
.1 • tbe
(lflholkr ·muy uecli.\rc that there has bc~n a valid service of
Jl bUmmons. ~

( 4) The tcna'nt on wh h ·
(wh~::ther in th.. r . om t c summons is duly served,
~ or< 103 TJ w~y or by registered post) in the
.. -- ~ '
KEWAL SINGH V. LAJWANTI (Fazal Ali,/.) 867

form specified in the Third Schedule shall not contest the A
prayer for eviction from the premises unless he files an affi-
davit stating the grounds on which h~ seeks to contest the
application for eviction and obtains leave from the Control-
ler as hereinafter provided; and in default of his appearance
in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave,
the statement made by the landlord in the application for B
eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and
the applicant shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the
ground aforesaid.
( 5) The Controller shall give to the tenant leave to
contest the application if the affidavit filed by the tenant c
discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from
obtaini'ng an order for the recovery of possession of ~e pre-
mises on the ground specified in clause (e) of the p\oviso
to sub-section (1) of section 14 or under section 14A.
(6) Where leave 'is granted to the tenant to contest the D
application, the Controller shall commence the hearing of
the application as early as practicable.
. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2)
of section 37, the Controller shall, while holding an inquiry
in a proceeding to which this Chapter applies, follow the
practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes, includ- E
ing the recording of evidence.
( 8) No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an
ordt:=r for the recovery of possession of any premises made by
the Controller in accordance with the procedure specified in
t_his section; F
Provided that the High Court may, for the purpose of
satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller under
this sectio'n is according to law, call for the records of the
case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit.
(9) Where no application has been made to the High G
Court on revision, the Controller may exercise the powers
of review in accordance .with the provisi9ns of Order XLVII
of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
(10) Save as otherwise provided in this Chapter, the pro-_
ccuure for the disposal of an application for eviction on the H·
ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section
(1) of section 14, or under section 14A, shall be the same
I
~

868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 S.C.R.

A as the procedure for the disposal of applications by Control-
lers".

It is obvious that this section does not govern all grounds open to ·
a landlord for evicting the tenant but is confined only to the ground in
section 14A and proviso to sectio~ 14(1) (e). In other words, the ,.
il. bona fide necessity of the landlord has been put in a separate class
or category having regard to the peculiar incidents of this right. Section
r·,, ~
14A with which we are not concerned in this case also relates to a
special situation where the landlord under the Government Rules is t
asked to shift to his own house if he has one or in a house that belongs .... ~

to his spouse failing which he has to pay a penal rent which almost
·C takes away a major part of his salary. Thus, such a landlord be- •
come~ a class by himself. The statute thus puts personal necessity
of the landlord as a special class requiring special treatment for quick "
eviction of the tenant and cuts out all delays and plugs all the loop·
holes which may cause .delay in getting the relief by the landlord. It
is obvious, therefore, that the classification made by the legislature is
·D in public interest and is in complete consdnance with the objectives
sought to be achieved: The landlords having personal necessity have
peen brought together as a separate class because of their special
needs and such a classification cannot be said to be unreasonable
particularly when the legislature in its wisdom feels that the landlords
,1 should get this relief as quickly as possible. Sub-section (2), -of
section 25B enjoins on the Controller to is.sue summons as soon as an
application for eviction has been filed before the Rent Controller.
Sub-section 3 (a) further provides that along with the issue of sum-
mons in the ordinary way summons should also be served by regis-
tered post acknowledgement due addressed to the tenant or his agent
F empowered to accept the service. Sub-section 3 (b) provides that
when the acknowledgement due purporting to be signed by the tenant
m his agent is received by the Controller with an endorsement made
by a postal employee that the tenant or his agent has refused to take
delivery of the registered article the Controller may declare that there . '
•
~
has been a valid service of summons. This provision is designed to
·G cut out delays by the conduct of the d·~fendant in trying to evade
service of summons in a variety of ways. Sub-section ( 4) provides
that the tenant on whom the summons is served shall not be allowed
to contest an application for eviction unless he files a'n affidavit stating
the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction
and he has to obt~in leave from the Controller to contest the applica.:. r
'H tion. In case the tenant does not appear the Controller can presume
that the application for eviction shall be deemed to have been admitted
by the tenant. Sub-·section (5) provides that the Controller shall give
\
KEWAL SINGH v. LAJWANTI (Fazal Ali, J.) 869

to the tenant leave to contest the application if the tenant discloses A
such facts as would disentitle the lahdlord from obtaining an order
for the recovery of possession of the premises. This is also a very
salutary provision in order to prevent frivolous pleas taken by the
,..tenants. to avoid eviction. Sub-section (6) provides that where leave
If.._ to defend is granted to the tenant the Controller shall proceed to hear
;r. ~the application and in order to ensure a quick decision sub-section B
\,(7) enjoins that the Controller shall follow the practice and procedure
of the Court of Small Causes including recording of evidence. Sub-
I v .;">
section (8) bars appeal or second appeal against an order passed by
the Controller for recovery of possession of the premises: Never-
theless, the proviso to sub-section (8) confers on the High Court
a power of revision for satisfying itself whether or not the order made
c
by the Controller is according to law. Sub-section (9) confers a
power of review on the Controller where no application for revision
has been filed before the High Court. Sub-section ( 10) provides
that procedure mentioned above shall apply also to an application for
eviction on the~ ground as specified in clause (e) of the proviso to D
section 14 (1); That is to say bona. fide re4uirement of the landlord
in respect of the tenanted premises.

The comments by the learned counsel for th·~ appellant are first -
that there was no reason to discriminate the landlord suing for personal
ne~essity by trying his application in a summary fasl\ion. We have E
already pointed out that the classification mad~ by section 2SB is a
reasonable classification and cannot be said to be in any way discri~
minatory or arbitrary. Even though a summary procedure has been
evolved the tenant has been afforded full opportunity to defend the
application provided he q1n disclose good grounds for negativing the'
case of the landlord. No litigant has a right to protract the legal
proceedings by taking frivolous, irrelevant, irrational or uncalled for
pleas. This is what the section seeks to prevent.
~ .
. - I
It was then argued by counsel for the appellant that where an
•• application has been allowed for eviction of the tenant, no appeal or G
second ap~al is provided by the Act. An appeal· is purely a creature
of the statute and this right has hot been given in order to cut out
unnecessary delay. Instead the highest Court of the State has been
given a wide power of revision where the said Court can examine the
case of the tenant and the landlord and the validity of the order
. passed by the Controller. The right of the tenant, therefore, is suffi- H
~iently safeguarded by the proviso to sub-section ( 8) of section 2SB
()f the Act referred to above. lrt order to give relief to the tenant

I
I ·.
870 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 s.c.R.

A against any apparent error of law or fact w:h.ere no revision has been
filed in the High Court the statute confers power of review on the
Controller.
Thus taking an overall picture of the situation, the circumstances
under which the landlord's needs have been classified and the safe-
B guards given by the statute it cannot be said by any stretch of imagi: "}k •
nation that section 25B and its sub-sections are violative of Articl~ J
14 of the Constitution of India, or that section 25B suffers from the
vice of excessive delegation of powers. In fact ~Section 25B contains
valuable and sufficient guidelines which completely exclude the exer-
cise of u:rltanalised or arbitrary powers by the Rent Controller. As
., .
c di~cussed above the rights of the tenants are sufficiently protected.
For instance if the tenant presents a plausible defence the plaintiff
can be no'n suited if the defence is accepted by the Controller. The
tenant however cannot claim a legal right to take all sorts of frivolous,
baseless or irrelevant pleas which alone the statute bars. We have
already indicated that summary procedure relates only to a particular
D ground on the basis of which the landlord can seek eviction and does
not apply to other grounds on which the tehant can be evicted.
There is yet another important aspect of the matter which may b~
mentioned here. Prior to the enactment of the Rent Control legisla-
tion in our country, the relationship of landlord and tenant · was
E governed by our common law viz. the Transfer of Property Act
'(Sections 107 to 111). The tenant was inducted with this tacit agree-
ment to be regulated by the conditions embodied in the contract and
could not be allowed to repudiate the agreement reached between
· him and the landlord during that period. The tenant was, therefore,
bound ih law to vacate the premises either voluntarily. or through a
F suit after he was given a notice as required by the Transfer of Property
Act under the terms and conditions of the lease. However, as a
piece of social reform in order to protect the tenants from capricious
and frivolous eviction, the legislature stepped in and afforded special
protection to the· tenant by conferrihg on him the status of a statutory
tenant who could not be evicted except under the conditions specified
G and the procedure prescribed by the Rent Control Acts. ·'l"hus to this
extent, the agreement of ]ease and the provisions of the Transfer of
Property Act stood superseded. At the Same time, the Rent Control
Acts provided the facilities of eviction to the landlord on certain
-s~ecified grounds like bona fide personal necessity or default in pay 4

ment of ren~ etc. Thus any right that the tenant possessed after the
H expiry of the lease was conferred on him only by vjrtue of the Rent
Control Act. It is, therefore, manifest that if the legislature consi-
dered in its wisdom to confer certain rights or facilities on the tenants,.
... .
KEWAL SINGH V. J,AJWANTI (Fazal Ali, J.) 871
. . .
it could due to changed circumstances curtail, modify, alter or even A
take away such rights or the procedure enacted for the purpose of
eviction and leave the tenants to seck their remedy under the commob
Jaw.
Thus, we do not sec how can the tenant crutllengc the validity of
such a provision enacted by the legislature from which the tenant itself
B
derived such rights.
In the instant cnsc, the legislature h:lS n ot taken away the right of
the tenant at all but has merely simpl:fi~d the procedure for eviction of
· tbe tcn:~nt in cases falling within the ambit of Sections 14A & 14(1)
(e) of the Act as discussed in the judgment. In these circumstances,
th~refore, any challenge by the tenant to the constitutionality of the c
Act · must necessarily fail and hence Scctio·o 25B is constitutionally
valid.
·. · For these reasons, therefore, all lhe .contentions raised by the
appellant fail nnd tbc appeal is dismi~ed. But in the peculiar circwn-
stances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Time till D
31-5-1980 is given to the tenant to hand O't-er peaceful and vacant
possession to tho landlord on filing an undert.aking to this Court within
a month accompanied by nn affidavit that be would do so on the date
tiled and shall not imluct any other person on the preoilies. The
temnt will, during this period, coutin~ to pay the compensation for
wrongful use of the premises equivalent to lhe nmount of the rent and E
clear all arrears.

V.D.K. Appeal dismi.tsed.