KHATOON & ORS.versusTHE STATE OF U.P. THROUGH PRINCIPAL SECRETARY & ORS.
- Citation
- 2018 INSC 148
- Decided
- 15 February 2018
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- R K AGRAWAL
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the abadi‑plot allotment relief was confined to the writ petitioners and could not be extended to the appellants, who therefore have no right to claim it.
Summary
The State of Uttar Pradesh acquired large tracts of land for industrial development under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, prompting many landowners to file writ petitions challenging the acquisition. The Allahabad High Court, in Gajraj & Ors. v. State of U.P., upheld the acquisition but ordered additional compensation at 64.70% and the allotment of a developed abadi plot equal to 10% of each landowner's acquired land. While the additional compensation was later paid to all landowners, the High Court declined to extend the abadi‑plot relief to those who had not filed writ petitions, leaving the decision to the Authority's discretion. The appellants, who had not challenged the acquisition, sought the same abadi‑plot relief and appealed the High Court's refusal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s relief was expressly limited to the writ petitioners and that the Authority had rightly exercised its discretion by not extending the plot allotment, rendering the appellants without any legal right to the relief. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals, confirming that the additional compensation satisfied the substantive claim of the appellants.
Issues considered
- The extent to which relief granted in Gajraj & Ors. v. State of U.P. (additional compensation and abadi‑plot allotment) applies to landowners who did not file writ petitions.
- Whether the Authority was obligated to extend the abadi‑plot allotment to all similarly situated landowners under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
- Whether the appellants could invoke Article 14 of the Constitution to claim parity with the writ petitioners.
Legislation cited
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 17, s. 18, s. 4, s. 6
Subjects
Judgment
[2018] 10 S.C.R. 375 375
KHATOON & ORS. A
v.
THE STATE OF U.P. THROUGH PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 2127 of 2018) B
FEBRUARY 15, 2018
[R. K. AGRAWAL AND ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, JJ.]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – ss.4,6 and 17 – State acquired
hundreds of hectares of land situated in several villages – Aggrieved,
C
some landowners filed writ petitions – Lead judgment passed by
High Court in writ petition entitled Gajraj & Ors. v. State of U.P. &
Ors. – High Court though upheld the acquisition but directed the
State to pay enhanced provisional additional compensation to writ
petitioners at the rate of 64.70% for their acquired land and also
to allot each writ petitioner one developed abadi plot to the extent D
of 10% of their acquired land – Same was upheld by the Supreme
Court in Savitri Devi v. State of U.P. & Ors. – Fresh writ petitions
were filed by some other landowners-appellants, whose lands were
also acquired in these acquisition proceedings – They pleaded that
they were also entitled to claim the same reliefs, which were granted
E
to writ petitioners by the High Court – Additional compensation to
writ petitioners at the rate 64.70% was already implemented by the
State by paying compensation to all the landowners including the
appellants without any contest – Therefore, the only question
remained, whether the appellants are also entitled to claim the relief
of allotment of developed abadi plot to the extent of 10% of their F
acquired land – Relief declined by the High Court – On appeal,
held: Appellants not entitled to get the benefit of the relief of
allotment of developed abadi plot – High Court in earlier writ
petitions had, in express terms, granted the relief of allotment of
developed abadi plot confining it only to the landowners, who had
G
filed the writ petitions – Further, High Court had directed the
Authority to decide at their end as to whether they are willing to
extend the same benefit to other similarly situated landowners-
appellants or not – The Authority decided to extend the benefit in
relation to payment of an additional compensation, however, it
H
375
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 10 S.C.R.
A declined to extend the benefit in relation to allotment of developed
abadi plot to such landowners-appellants – Also, the Authority did
not extend the benefit regarding allotment of additional abadi plot
to even those earlier landowners-writ petitioners in whose favour
the original directions were issued by the High Court and when
landowners filed contempt petition the same was dismissed by the
B
Supreme Court – Therefore, landowners-appellants have neither
any legal right and nor any factual foundation to claim the relief of
allotment of additional developed abadi plot.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
C HELD: 1. It is not in dispute that out of the two directions
given by the High Court in the case of Gajraj & Ors. v. State of
U.P. & Ors., one direction, namely, award of additional
compensation payable at the rate of 64.70% to every landowner
was already implemented by the State/Authority and accordingly
payment was also made to the appellants notwithstanding
D dismissal of their writ petitions. In other words, the appellant
got the partial benefit of the order passed in Gajraj’s case even
without contest. [Para 36] [386-G]
2. Therefore, the only question that now survives for
consideration in these appeals is whether the appellants are
E entitled to get the benefit of second direction issued by the High
Court in the case of Gajraj, namely, allotment of developed abadi
plot to the appellants. [Para 37] [386-H; 387-A]
3. The appellants are not entitled to get the benefit of the
aforementioned second direction for the following reasons. First,
F the High Court in the case of Gajraj had, in express terms, granted
the relief of allotment of developed abadi plot confining it only to
the landowners, who had filed the writ petitions. In other words,
the High Court while issuing the aforesaid direction made it clear
that the grant of this relief is confined only to the writ petitioners.
G [Paras 38, 39] [387-B-C}
4. Second, so far as the cases relating to second category
of landowners, who had not challenged the acquisition
proceedings (like the appellants herein) were concerned, the
High Court dealt with their cases separately and accordingly
H
KHATOON v. THE STATE OF U.P. THROUGH PRINCIPAL 377
SECRETARY
issued directions which are contained in condition No. 4(a) and A
(b) of the order. [Para 40] [387-C-D]
5. In condition No. 4(a) and (b), the High Court, in express
terms, directed the Authority to take a decision on the question
as to whether the Authority is willing to extend the benefit of the
directions contained in condition No. 3(a) and (b) also to second B
category of landowners or not. [Para 41] [387-D-E]
6. In other words, the High Court, in express terms,
declined to extend the grant of any relief to the landowners, who
had not filed the writ petitions and instead directed the Authority
to decide at their end as to whether they are willing to extend the C
same benefit to other similarly situated landowners or not.
[Para 42] [387- E-F]
7. It is, therefore, clear that it was left to the discretion of
the Authority to decide the question as to whether they are willing
to extend the aforesaid benefits to second category of landowners D
or not. [Para 43] [387-F-G]
8. Third, as mentioned supra, the Authority, in compliance
with the directions, decided to extend the benefit in relation to
payment of an additional compensation at the rate of 64.70% and
accordingly it was paid also. On the other hand, the Authority E
declined to extend the benefit in relation to allotment of developed
abadi plot to such landowners. [Para 44] [387-G]
9. Fourth, it is not in dispute, being a matter of record, that
when the Authority failed to extend the benefit regarding allotment
of additional abadi plot to even those landowners in whose favour F
the directions were issued by the High Court in the case of Gajraj
and by this Court in Savitri Devi, the landowners filed the contempt
petition against the Authority complaining of non-compliance of
the directions of this Court but this Court dismissed the contempt
petition holding therein that no case of non-compliance was made
out. [Para 45] [387-H; 388-A-B] G
10. The appellants have neither any legal right and nor any
factual foundation to claim the relief of allotment of additional
developed abadi plot. In order to claim any mandamus against
the State for claiming such relief, it is necessary for the writ
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378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 10 S.C.R.
A petitioners to plead and prove their legal right, which should be
founded on undisputed facts against the State. It is only then the
mandamus can be issued against the State for the benefit of writ
petitioners. [Para 46] [388-B-C]
11. Indeed, when the landowners, in whose favour the order
B was passed by the High Court for allotment of such plot, could
not get the plot then, in such event, there arise no occasion for
the appellants herein to claim such relief for want of any factual
and legal basis in their favour. [Para 47] [388-D]
12. There is no basis for the appellants to press in service
C the principle underlined in Article 14 in such cases for the simple
reason that firstly, Article 14 does not apply to such cases; and
secondly, there is no similarity between the case of those
landowners, who filed the writ petitions and the present appellants,
who did not file the writ petitions. Though the High Court, in
Gajraj’s case decided the rights of both categories of landowners
D but the cases of both stood on a different footing. It is for these
reasons, the appellants were not held entitled to take benefit of
condition No. 3 (a) and (b) of the case of Gajraj which was meant
for the writ petitioners therein but not for the appellants.
However, the appellants were held entitled to take the benefit of
E only condition No. 4 (a) and (b) of the said judgment and which
they did take by accepting the additional compensation payable
at the rate of 64.70%. [Para 50] [388-G-H; 389-A-B]
Mange @ Mange Ram v. State of U.P. & Ors. W.P. No.
7521 of 2016 decided by Allahabad High Court; Gajraj
F & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. W. P. No. 37443 of 2011
decided by Allahabad High Court; Savitri Devi v. State
of U.P. & Ors. [2015] 7 SCR 512 : (2015) 7 SCC 21 –
referred to.
Case Law Reference
G [2015] 7 SCR 512 referred to Para 14
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2127
of 2018
From the Judgment and Order dated 01.08.2016 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petiton No. 7553 of 2016
H
KHATOON v. THE STATE OF U.P. THROUGH PRINCIPAL 379
SECRETARY
WITH A
C. A. Nos. 2134, 2145, 2139, 2142, 2140, 2141, 2135-36, 2137-38,
2143, 2146, 2144, 2128, 2130, 2129, 2131, 2133, 2132, 2148, 2193, 2192,
2190, 2171, 2170, 2147, 2149, 2152, 2165, 2153, 2150, 2156, 2151, 2162,
2163, 2167, 2154, 2161, 2157, 2155, 2164, 2158, 2159. 2160, 2195, 2172,
2173, 2177, 2182, 2168, 2175, 2166, 2174, 2176, 2181, 2187, 2183, 2179, B
2180, 2178, 2186, 2185, 2191, 2184, 2189, 2188 and 2194 of 2018.
S. R. Singh, Sr. Adv., Dr. Rajeev Sharma, Pankaj Dubey,
Dharmendra Sharma, Vipin Kumar Sharma, Raghuvir Sharma, Haji
Salimuddin, Ram Anugrah Singh, Bhanwar Lal Singh Jadon, Prasant
Sharma, Hara Prasad Sahu, Shiv Kant Mishra, Kamlesh Kumar Mishra, C
Goutam Kumar Upadhyay, Sunil Kumar Pandey, Pranaya Kumar
Mohapatra, F. I. Choudhury, Dhruv Paliwal, Mangal Prasad, Ms. Shweta
Yadav, Ms. Anita Tripathi, Yash Pal Dhingra, Ms. Shashi Kiran, Manoj
Jain, Satish Chandra, Sujit Kumar Jha, Advs. for the Appellants.
Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, AAG, Ravindra Kumar, Sanjai Kumar D
Pathak, Arvind Kumar Tripathi, Akhilendra Singh, Ankur Yadav, Anuvrat
Sharma, Ms. Alka Sinha, Raman Yadav, Syed Mehdi Imam, Akshay
Rana, Ms. Varnita Rastogi, Pawanshree Agrawal, Rachit Mittal,
Ms. Tanvi Aggarwal, Dr. Kailash Chand, Abhishek Baid, Anup Jain,
Praneet Das, Tanmaya Agarwal, Advs. for the Respondents.
E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals are filed against the final judgment and order
passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad on 01.08.2016 in
C.M.W.P. No.7553 of 2016 etc.etc. and other similar writ petitions on F
different dates by which the High Court dismissed the writ petitions filed
by the appellants herein in terms of the judgment dated 01.08.2016 passed
by the same two Judge Bench of the High Court in the bunch of matters
with the leading case (W.P. No.7521 of 2016 titled as Mange @
Mange Ram vs. State of U.P. & Ors.).
G
3. In order to appreciate the issues involved in this bunch of appeals,
it is necessary to set out the facts, which led to filing of these appeals.
4. In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 4 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), the
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380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 10 S.C.R.
A State of U.P. issued several notifications from time to time commencing
from the year 1976 till 2010 seeking to acquire a huge chunk of land
measuring hundreds of hectares situated in several villages of Noida
and Greater Noida in the State of UP. The acquisition was for a public
purpose, namely, “Planned Industrial Development”. The acquisition was
for the benefit of Greater Noida Industrial Authority (hereinafter referred
B
to as “the Authority”), which was to undertake its execution.
5. The aforementioned notifications issued under Section 4 of the
Act from time to time were followed by publication of several declarations
under Section 6 of the Act. The Government/Authority then took
possession of the acquired land by invoking urgency provisions contained
C in Section 17 of the Act. The State/Authority then developed the acquired
land in some villages.
6. Since a large chunk of land was acquired, which belonged to
several landowners, who were around hundred in numbers, some
landowners felt aggrieved and filed writ petitions in the High Court at
D Allahabad and challenged therein the legality and validity of the
notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act by which their
lands were acquired. These writ petitions were filed by the landowners
(individually and collectively in bunches) from 1976 to 2010.
7. The challenge to the impugned notifications was on the grounds
E that firstly, there did not exist any case of urgency under Section 17 of
the Act. Secondly, dispensing of an enquiry under Section 5-A was,
therefore, illegal inasmuch as such dispension deprived the landowners
to file objections before the Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) to challenge
the acquisition proceedings. Thirdly, the acquisition proceedings were
F initiated by the State with colorable exercise of the powers; and lastly,
the entire acquisition proceedings were mala fide and arbitrary and hence
liable to be quashed.
8. The State denied the case of the writ petitioners. While
defending the acquisition proceedings, the State, inter alia, averred that
G the acquisition was done strictly in accordance with the provisions of the
Act and hence it deserves to be upheld.
9. Having regard to the nature of controversy involved in the writ
petitions and secondly, since a large number of writ petitions were filed
to challenge the acquisition proceedings, all the writ petitions (total 471)
were clubbed together for their analogous hearing by the Full Bench of
H
KHATOON v. THE STATE OF U.P. THROUGH PRINCIPAL 381
SECRETARY [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
the High Court. One of the reasons for referring all the writ petitions to A
the Full Bench was that the two Division Benches before whom some
writ petitions, out of the bunch, had come up for hearing, they took
divergent views on the issues involved in the writ petitons. It was,
therefore, considered proper to resolve all the issues arising in the writ
petitions by constituting the Full Bench. This is how all pending writ
B
petitions were posted for analogous hearing before the Full Bench.
10. The Full Bench then divided the writ petitions in several groups
“village wise” and accordingly disposed them of by one common judgment
dated 21.10.2011. The lead judgment of the Full Bench was passed in
writ petition (W.P. No.37443 of 2011) titled Gajraj & Ors. vs. State of
U.P. & Ors. C
11. One group of writ petitions was dismissed on the ground of
delay and laches. The other main group of writ petitions was disposed of
with directions in which the High Court though upheld the acquisition but
directed the State to pay enhanced provisional additional compensation
to the writ petitioners at the rate of 64.70% for their acquired land and D
also allot to each writ petitioner one developed abadi plot to the extent of
10% of their acquired land subject to maximum of 2500 sq.m.
12. These two directions were confined to those cases where it
was found, as a fact, that some development was undertaken by the
State on the acquired land. In other words, the benefit of these two E
directions was extended to those writ petitioners (landowners) on whose
lands some development had taken place.
13. However, so far as the acquisition of land situated in three
villages was concerned, where it was found that no development had
taken place despite taking possession, the High Court quashed the F
notifications in respect of such land and directed the State to restore the
possession of the land to the respective landowners. The operative part
of the judgment insofar as it is relevant for the disposal of these appeals
reads as under:
“3. All other writ petitions except as mentioned above at G
(1) and (2) are disposed of with the following directions:
(a) The petitioners shall be entitled for payment of
additional compensation to the extent of same ratio (i.e.
64.70%) as paid for Village Patwari in addition to the
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382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 10 S.C.R.
A compensation received by them under the 1997 Rules/
award which payment(9) shall be ensured by the Authority
at an early date. It may be open for the Authority to take a
decision as to what proportion of additional compensation
be asked to be paid by the allottees. Those petitioners who
have not yet been paid compensation may be paid the
B
compensation as well as additional compensation as ordered
above. The payment of additional compensation shall be
without any prejudice to rights of landowners under Section
18 of the Act, if any.
(b) All the petitioners shall be entitled for allotment of
C developed abadi plot to the extent of 10%of their acquired
land subject to maximum of 2500 sq m. We however, leave
it open to the Authority in cases where allotment of abadi
plot to the extent of 6%or 8%has already been made either
to make allotment of the balance of the area or may
D compensate the landowners by payment of the amount
equivalent to balance area as per average rate of allotment
made of developed residential plots.
4. The Authority may also take a decision as to whether
benefit of additional compensation and allotment of abadi
E plot to the extent of 10%be also given to:
(a) those landholders whose earlier writ petitions
challenging the notifications have been dismissed upholding
the notifications; and
(b) those landholders who have not come to the Court,
F relating to the notifications which are the subject-matter of
challenge in the writ petitions mentioned at Direction 3.”
14. Some landowners felt aggrieved of the aforesaid judgment of
the High Court and carried the matter in appeals to this Court after
obtaining special leave to appeal. This Court (Three Judge Bench), on
G 14.05.2015 dismissed all the appeals filed by the landowners and upheld
the judgment of the High Court. The lead judgment of this Court was
passed in the case of Savitri Devi vs. State of U.P. & Ors., (2015) 7
SCC 21. The operating part of the judgment reads as under:
“48. To sum up, the following benefits are accorded to the
H landowners:
KHATOON v. THE STATE OF U.P. THROUGH PRINCIPAL 383
SECRETARY [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
48.1. Increasing the compensation by 64.7%; A
48.2. Directing allotment of developed abadi land to the
extent of 10%of the land acquired of each of the landowners;
48.3. Compensation which is increased @ 64.7%is payable
immediately without taking away the rights of the
landowners to claim higher compensation under the B
machinery provided in the Land Acquisition Act wherein
the matter would be examined on the basis of the evidence
produced to arrive at just and fair market value.
49. This, according to us, provides substantial justice to
the appellants. C
Conclusion
50. Keeping in view all these peculiar circumstances, we
are of the opinion that these are not the cases where this
Court should interfere under Article 136 of the D
Constitution. However, we make it clear that directions of
the High Court are given in the aforesaid unique and
peculiar/specific background and, therefore, it would not
form precedent for future cases.
51………………………………
E
52. The Full Bench judgment of the High Court is,
accordingly, affirmed and all these appeals are disposed of
in terms of the said judgment of the Full Bench.”
15. The appellants herein, whose lands were also acquired in these
acquisition proceedings, then woke up out of slumber and filed the writ F
petitions for the first time on 15.02.2016 in the High Court of Judicature
at Allahabad out of which these appeals arise.
16. In the writ petitions, the appellants prayed that they being
similarly situated along with those landowners, who had filed writ petitions
and challenged the acquisition proceedings, are also entitled to claim the G
same reliefs, which were granted to the writ petitioners by the Full Bench
in the case of Gajraj (supra) and upheld in Savitri Devi (supra).
17. In other words, the case of the appellants (writ petitioners)
before the High Court was that the reliefs, which were granted to the
H
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 10 S.C.R.
A landowners by the Full Bench in Gajraj’s case (supra) and affirmed by
this Court in Savitri Devi’s case (supra) be also granted to the appellants
because their lands were also acquired in the same acquisition
proceedings in which the lands of the writ petitioners of Gajraj’s case
(supra) was acquired. In effect, the relief was prayed on the principles
of parity between the two landowners qua State.
B
18. It is, however, pertinent to mention that so far as the direction
of the High Court to award additional compensation payable at the rate
of 64.70% was concerned, the same was already implemented by the
State by paying the compensation to all the landowners including the
appellants without any contest.
C
19. In this view of the matter, the only question before the High
Court in the appellants’ writ petitions that remained for decision was as
to whether the appellants are also entitled to claim the relief of allotment
of developed abadi plot to the extent of 10% of their acquired land subject
to maximum of 2500 Sq.M. in terms of the judgment in Gajraj’s case
D (supra) and Savitri Devi’s case (supra).
20. This relief was declined by the High Court in the impugned
judgment to the appellants which has given rise to filing of the present
appeals by the unsuccessful writ petitioners (landowners) in this Court
after obtaining leave to appeal.
E
21. Therefore, the short question, which arises for consideration
in this bunch of appeals, is whether the appellants (landowners) are
entitled to claim the benefit of judgment dated 21.10.2011 passed by the
Full Bench of the High Court in the case of Gajraj (supra), which was
upheld by this Court in the case of Savitri Devi (supra) insofar as it
F relates to allotment of additional abadi plot to the maximum of 2500
Sq.M.
22. In other words, the question involved is whether the appellants
are entitled to claim additional abadi plot in lieu of their acquired land in
terms of judgment dated 21.10.2011 passed in the case of Gajraj (supra)
G and Savitri Devi (supra).
23. Learned counsel for the appellants mainly contended that when
the order was passed by the High Court (Full Bench) against the State
in relation to one acquisition proceedings for the benefit of some
landowners in the case of Gajraj (supra) then, in such circumstances,
H
KHATOON v. THE STATE OF U.P. THROUGH PRINCIPAL 385
SECRETARY [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
the benefit of such order should also be extended to all the landowners A
whose lands were acquired in the same acquisition proceedings regardless
of the fact whether such landowners challenged the acquisition
proceedings in the High Court along with others or not.
24. In other words, the submission was that once the order was
passed by the High Court in the acquisition proceedings, whether at the B
instance of one landowner or two landowners for his/their benefit, all
the landowners whose lands are acquired become entitled to claim the
same benefits which were granted to the landowners, who filed the writ
petitions.
25. Learned counsel then urged that, in any case, the Authority C
having resolved in their meeting to allot the additional land/plot to all the
landowners in terms of the order of the High Court regardless of the
fact whether such landowner was a party to the original proceedings or
not, the High Court erred in not granting the relief to the appellants. It
was contended that in the light of such resolution, there was no reason
as to why the appellants, who are similarly situated landowners alike D
others, should be deprived of the benefit of the judgment of the High
Court passed in the case of Gajraj (supra) insofar as it directed the
State to allot the developed abadi plot to each landowner.
26. It is essentially these submissions, which were adopted and
elaborated by all the learned counsel for the appellants (landowners) in E
their respective submissions in support of their appeals.
27. In reply, learned counsel appearing for the respondents (State
and the Authority) supported the impugned judgment including its
reasoning and the conclusion and contended that no case is made out in
these appeals calling for any interference in the impugned judgment. F
28. Learned counsel while elaborating his submissions pointed
out that firstly, the judgments of the High Court in the case of Gajraj
(supra) and this Court in Savitri Devi (supra) are confined only to those
landowners, who had filed the writ petitions in the High Court and civil
appeals in this Court which is clear from the judgment itself. G
29. In the second place, learned counsel pointed out that the High
Court had directed the State and the Authority to decide as to whether
they are willing to pay additional compensation at the rate of 64.70%
and to allot the plot out of developed abadi land to those landowners,
who did not challenge the acquisition proceedings. H
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 10 S.C.R.
A 30. It was pointed out that pursuant to the directions of the High
Court in Gajraj’s case (supra), the respondents (State and Authority)
resolved to pay the additional compensation at the rate of 64.70% to all
such landowners but expressed their inability to allot the plot to each
landowner including even to those in whose favour the order of allotment
had been passed for want of availability of additional land with the
B
Authority.
31. In the third place, learned counsel pointed out that the
respondents accordingly paid to each landowner including the appellants
(landowners) the additional compensation at the rate of 64.70%.
C 32. In the fourth place, it was pointed out that several landowners,
in whose favour the directions for allotment of additional plot was issued
by the High Court, did not get the plot and, therefore, they had filed
contempt petitions, which were dismissed by this Court holding that no
case for contempt is made out against the State/Authority. In other
words, this Court accepted the stand of the Authority of non-availability
D of additional land with them.
33. And lastly, learned counsel contended that in the absence of
any factual foundation and legal right in appellants’ favour, they are not
entitled to claim the relief sought in the writ petitions which was rightly
declined by the High Court.
E
34. It is these submissions, which were elaborated by the learned
counsel for the respondents.
35. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal
of the record of the case, we find no merit in the submissions urged by
F the learned counsel for the appellants (landowners).
36. As mentioned above, it is not in dispute that out of the two
directions given by the High Court in the case of Gajraj (supra), one
direction, namely, award of additional compensation payable at the rate
of 64.70% to every landowner was already implemented by the State/
Authority and accordingly payment was also made to the appellants
G
notwithstanding dismissal of their writ petitions. In other words, the
appellant got the partial benefit of the order passed in Gajraj’s case
(supra) even without contest.
37. Therefore, the only question that now survives for consideration
in these appeals is whether the appellants are entitled to get the benefit
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KHATOON v. THE STATE OF U.P. THROUGH PRINCIPAL 387
SECRETARY [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
of second direction issued by the High Court in the case of Gajraj (supra), A
namely, allotment of developed abadi plot to the appellants.
38. In our considered opinion, the appellants are not entitled to get
the benefit of the aforementioned second direction and this we say for
the following reasons.
39. First, the High Court in the case of Gajraj (supra) had, in B
express terms, granted the relief of allotment of developed abadi plot
confining it only to the landowners, who had filed the writ petitions. In
other words, the High Court while issuing the aforesaid direction made it
clear that the grant of this relief is confined only to the writ petitioners
[see condition No. 3(a) and (b)]. C
40. Second, so far as the cases relating to second category of
landowners, who had not challenged the acquisition proceedings (like
the appellants herein) were concerned, the High Court dealt with their
cases separately and accordingly issued directions which are contained
in condition No. 4(a) and (b) of the order. D
41. In condition No. 4(a) and (b), the High Court, in express
terms, directed the Authority to take a decision on the question as to
whether the Authority is willing to extend the benefit of the directions
contained in condition No. 3(a) and (b) also to second category of
landowners or not. E
42. In other words, the High Court, in express terms, declined to
extend the grant of any relief to the landowners, who had not filed the
writ petitions and instead directed the Authority to decide at their end as
to whether they are willing to extend the same benefit to other similarly
situated landowners or not. F
43. It is, therefore, clear that it was left to the discretion of the
Authority to decide the question as to whether they are willing to extend
the aforesaid benefits to second category of landowners or not.
44. Third, as mentioned supra, the Authority, in compliance with
the directions, decided to extend the benefit in relation to payment of an G
additional compensation at the rate of 64.70% and accordingly it was
paid also. On the other hand, the Authority declined to extend the benefit
in relation to allotment of developed abadi plot to such landowners.
45. Fourth, it is not in dispute, being a matter of record, that when
the Authority failed to extend the benefit regarding allotment of additional H
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 10 S.C.R.
A abadi plot to even those landowners in whose favour the directions were
issued by the High Court in the case of Gajraj (supra) and by this Court
in Savitri Devi (supra), the landowners filed the contempt petition against
the Authority complaining of non-compliance of the directions of this
Court but this Court dismissed the contempt petition holding therein that
no case of non-compliance was made out.
B
46. In our view, the appellants have neither any legal right and nor
any factual foundation to claim the relief of allotment of additional
developed abadi plot. In order to claim any mandamus against the State
for claiming such relief, it is necessary for the writ petitioners to plead
and prove their legal right, which should be founded on undisputed facts
C against the State. It is only then the mandamus can be issued against
the State for the benefit of writ petitioners. Such is not the case here.
47. Indeed, when the landowners, in whose favour the order was
passed by the High Court for allotment of such plot, could not get the
plot then, in such event, there arise no occasion for the appellants herein
D to claim such relief for want of any factual and legal basis in their favour.
48. One cannot dispute that the Act does not provide for grant of
such reliefs to the landowners under the Act. Similarly, there is no dispute
that the State paid all statutory compensation, which is payable under
the Act, to every landowner. Not only that every landowner also got
E additional compensation at the rate of 64.70% over and above what was
payable to them under the Act.
49. The reliefs in the case of Gajraj (supra) were granted by the
High Court by exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution and keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances
F arising in the case at hand. They were confined only to the landowners,
who had filed the writ petitions. Even this Court in Savitri Devi’s case
(supra) held that the directions given be not treated as precedent for
being adopted to other cases in future and they be treated as confined to
that case only. .
G 50. That apart, there is no basis for the appellants to press in
service the principle underlined in Article 14 in such cases for the simple
reason that firstly, Article 14 does not apply to such cases; and secondly,
there is no similarity between the case of those landowners, who filed
the writ petitions and the present appellants, who did not file the writ
H
KHATOON v. THE STATE OF U.P. THROUGH PRINCIPAL 389
SECRETARY [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
petitions. Though the High Court, in Gajraj’s case (supra) decided the A
rights of both categories of landowners but the cases of both stood on a
different footing. It is for these reasons, the appellants were not held
entitled to take benefit of condition No. 3 (a) and (b) of the case of
Gajraj (supra) which was meant for the writ petitioners therein but not
for the appellants. However, the appellants were held entitled to take
B
the benefit of only condition No. 4 (a) and (b) of the said judgment and
which they did take by accepting the additional compensation payable at
the rate of 64.70%.
51. In our view, therefore substantial justice was done to all the
landowners including the appellants, as observed in para 49 of Savitri
Devi’s case (supra). C
52. In our opinion, therefore, there is no case made out by the
appellants for grant of any relief much less the relief of allotment of
additional developed abadi plot. If we entertain the appellants’ plea for
granting them the relief then it would amount to passing an order contrary
to this Court’s directions contained in para 50 of the order passed in D
Savitri Devi’s case (supra).
53. In the light of the foregoing discussion and on examining the
appellants’ case from any angle, we find no merit in the appeals, which
fail and are accordingly dismissed.
E
Ankit Gyan Appeals dismissed.
F
G
H
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