Holding

The Supreme Court held that the Schedule’s legume entries encompass both whole grain and split forms, so dal is a specified agricultural produce and market fee is payable without any additional notification.

Summary

The Uttar Pradesh Mandi Samiti levied market fees on the sale of dal (split legumes) produced by Ganga Dal Mill, arguing that dal was a specified agricultural produce under the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964. The respondents contended that only whole‑grain legumes were specified and that dal, being a processed product, required a separate notification under Sections 6 or 8 before market fees could be imposed. The High Court held that dal was not a specified agricultural produce and quashed the fee demand. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the definition of "agricultural produce" in Section 2(a) and the schedule of the Act, concluding that the schedule’s legume entries implicitly covered both the whole grain and its split form, making dal a specified agricultural produce without the need for a fresh notification. Consequently, the market fee was deemed payable. The Court allowed the appeals and remitted the matters to the High Court for consideration of other contentions.

Issues considered

Whether the term 'legume' as listed in the Schedule of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 includes its split form (dal) for the purpose of market fee liability.
Whether a separate notification under Section 6 or Section 8 is required to render dal a 'specified agricultural produce' after the Schedule was amended.
Whether the market committee has the authority to levy market fee on the sale of dal under Section 17(iii)(b) of the Act.

Legislation cited

U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964s. 12, s. 17(iii)(b), s. 2(a), s. 2(k), s. 2(t), s. 2(w), s. 4A, s. 5, s. 6, s. 7, s. 8, s. 9

Subjects

market feespecified agricultural producelegumedalU.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyamstatutory interpretationprocessed agricultural productnotificationsplit grain

Judgment

A
187
KlUSHI tJTPADAN MANDI SAMITI KANPUR, ETC .
•
v.
GANGA DAL MILL AND CO. AND ORS. ETC.
B
September 25, 1984

[D.A. DESAI, V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI AND V. KHALID, JJ.)
U.P. Kris/Ji Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam 1964, Secs. 2 (a) and 2 (I} &
State Government Notification dated January 20, 1982.
c
, 'legume' notified-•Specified agricultural Produce-Dwi Daliya Utpadan
-Whether comprehenJs both the whole grain of legumes and its split part
that is dal.

Words and Phrases •Legume'-'Dwi Da/iya Utpadan'-'Such items of
produce of agriculture as are specified in the Schedule' - Meaning of Secs. 2 (a) D
and 2 (I) U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam 1964.

Practice and Procedure : Disputed question of fact-Deci!ion by Supreme
Court-When permissible.

The Appellant-Market Committee levied market fee on the transac-
tion of sale of da/ of various legumes by the respondents, on the ground that E
they were •specified agricultural produce' and the transactions of sale in
respect of them by the respondents in the Market Area would be exigible to
the levy of market fee.

The respondents opposed the aforesaid leVy contending that they were
manufacturing in their factory dal from various iegumes and therefore, not
only they were not producers of agricultural commodities, but in view of the F
description of legumes set out in the Schedule of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan
Mandi Adhiniyam 1964, the dal of such legumes in the Processed form was
not a specified agricultural produce and therefore, a transaction of sale in
respect of them at the hands of the respondents even if it takes place in the
Market Area would not permit the Market Committee to levy market fee on
such transaction and that they were not liable to buy the same. It was
further contended that unless the agricultural produce specified in the
G
Schedule to the Act was notified as a specified agricultural produce in respect
of a particular Market Area, the Market C0mmittee having jurisdiction in
the Market Area would not be entitled to levy market fee on the transaction
of sale of such agricultural produce.
'
The respondents approached the High Court by filing writ petitions
under Art. 226 contending that the Market Committee continue to levy
a~ket fee on the transaction ofdaf and th'i\t it h1d no auth.Jrity t,J do so. R
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (198SJ 1 s.c R
A The High Court held that lengume in its split form was not the same thing as
legume specified in the Schedule and therefore, in the absence of a speci-
fication, dal of any of the legumes enumerated in the Schedule cannot b~ syid
to be specified agricultural produCe'. and therefore, any trr nsaction of s<ile
in respect of them was not exigible to the levy of market fee.

During the pendency of the aforesaid writ petitions the State Govern-
B ment issued in execise of the power conferred by Sec, 4.i\ of the Act, a noti-
fication dated 20th January, 1982 which substituted the split form of legume
for the legume whole grain as specified agricultural produce.

After the issuance of the aforesaid notification, a fresh batch of writ
petitions were filed challenging both the validity of the notification as also
the eligibility of the Market Con11nittee to levy market fee on the transaction
c of sale in respect of dal of legun1es. It was contended in the writ petitions
that merely amending or adding to the list of agricultural produce set out in
the Schedule by itself without anything more would not enable the Market
Committee to levy market fee on the sale of. such agricultural produce
because before levying market fee the agricultural produce has to be notified
as specified agricultural produce by issuing either a notification under Sec. 6
or addition or alteration in exyrcise of the power under Sec. 8 of the Act. It
0 was fu":"ther contended that after the amendment of the Schedule by the
impugned notification, fresh notification either under Sec 6 or Sec. 8 having
not been issued, the agricultural prod Lice introduced in the Schedule namely,
dal of various legumes have not becon1e specified agricultural produce and
therefore any sale in respect of such agricultural produce even in the Market
Area wi11 not enable the market Committe to levy market fee nor would it
E obJige persons or parties to the transaction of sale to pay the same.

The aforesaid contentions found favour with the IJigh Court which
allowed the writ petition5 and quashed the notice issued by the Market
Committee raising the demand for market fee. It further held that till the
agricultural produce under the heading •II Legumes' set out in the Schedule
since the amendment of January 20, 1982 are notified as specifi.e d agricultural
F produce, the f\iiarket Committee was not entitled to levy and collect market
fee on the transaction of sale of such agricultural produce.

Jn the appeals to this Court, on the question: whether legume, whcle
grain were notified as a specified agricultural produce within the meaning of
the expression in Sec. 2 (0 of th~ U.P. Krisbi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam
1964 would also comprehend its split folds or parts, commercially called dal
so as to enable the Mandi Samiti to levy market fee under Sec. 17 of the
G Act on the transaction of sale of dal of leaumes specified in the Schedule to
the Act.

Allowing the Appeals :

HELD: J. The High Court was in error in holding that the legume
whole grain as set out in the Schedule does not include its split form i.e. dal
and therefore, no n1arket fee was leviable on the transaction of sale of legume
JI in splitform. [8050]
i.ivmi SAMIT! v. G\NG< DAL r.iii.L 789

Rumesh Chandra etc. v. State of U.P. etc., [1980] 3 SCR 109, Kawai
A
Krishna Puri & Anr. y. Stole of Punjob & Ors., [1979] 3 SCR 1217 and State
of Gujarat v. Sakarwala Brothers, [1967] 19 STC 24, referred to.

Mis Ganesh Trading Co. Karna! etc. etc. y. State of Haryana & Anr. etc .• ,
A.LR. \974S.C. 1362 and Babu Ram Jagdish Kumar & Co. etc. etc. v. State of
Punjab & Ors. etc. etc., [1967] 3 SCR 952, in applicable. B
Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd., Modinagar & Ors. etc. v.
State ofU.P. & Anr., [1980] All. L.J.1137, reversed.

2. The entries under the heading 'legumes' in the Schodule ?f S~c. 2
(a) of the U.P. Kr.shi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam 1964 as it stood prior to
the amendment of January 20, 1982 through the notification issued under C
Sec 4·A comprehend both the \Vhole grain of legumes and its split part that
is dal. What was implicit has been made explicit and therefore no fresh
notification under Sec. 8 was necessary. [798 D·E]

3. It is an indisputable canon of construction that where an expres-
sion is defined in the statute, unless there is anything repugnant ·in the subject
D
or context, the expression has to be construed as having the same meaning
• assigned to it in the dictionary clause of the statute. [798G]

4. The definition of the expression 'agricultural produce' as set out
in Sec. 2 (a) of the Act cannot be construed by resort to decisions under
entirely different statutes such as the Sales Tax Laws to find out whether the
whole grain and split folds constitute the same product or two different and E
independ;;nt produ.;ts co.nmercially so r~-::ognised. An1lysing the definition
of the expression it would mean not only those items of produce of agricul-
ture as specified in the Schedule but will also include the admixture of two
or more of such items as also any such i tern in its processed form. [798 F; H]

5. •Agricultural produce' mean a produce of agriculture such as F
Gram as s~ecified in the Schedule and would also include Gram in its pro-
cessed form. Therefore, not only Gram is an agricultural produce but Gram
in its p<ocessed form is equally and agricultural produce. [799B]

6. When it is said in the definition •such items of produce of agricul-
ture as are specified in the Schedule'. it means that not only all those items
of agricultural produce which are set out in the Schedule will constitute
agricultural produce but also the admixture of two or more of such items of G
..... ·.fil produce of agriculture as set out in the Schedule as well as any such items
of agriculture produce in their processed form. [799B·C]

7. Legislative enactments in the State of Uttar Pradesh are enacted in the
Hindi language and its official and authentic translatirn in English is primarily
,, simultaneously published. The notification dated April 11, 1978 specified the
legumes therein enumerated as specified agricultural produce for various
H
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (198SJ 1 s.c.R.

A
Market Areas. The heading under which various legumes are enumerated is
'Dwi Da/iya Utpadan.' This tongue-twister was explained to mean that
legume itself is Dwi Dallya Utpadan i.e. the whole grain is made of two folds.
Ek da/iya grain is without a fold. Dwi Daliya is a grain composed of two
folds and certainly not many folds. On a strict construction, the two dais i.e.
two parts forming the whole grain both are comprehended in the expression
B 'Dwi Da/lyu Utpadan'. [199G-H; 800A]

8. While enumerating legumes in the Schedule and reproduced in the
1978 notification to make them specified agricultural produce, the farmers
intended to include both the grain as a whole and its split parts the dal. And
when the agricultural produce enumerated ·in the Schedule such as Gram
including its processed part is reproduced in the notification as Dwi Daliya
c Utpadan, the dal of each of the legumes therei1:< mentioned became specified
agricultural produce. [800D-E]
•.

In the instant case, it cannot be said that the respondents-factory
owners not being agricultural producers and not being in search of any pro-

D
tection of the Market Committee could not be subjected to the levy of •
market fee. In fact, the primary object of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi
Adhiniyam 1964 as far as the State of U.P. was concerned was regulation of
sale and purchase of agricultural produce irrespective of the character of the
party to the transaction save and except that as set out in sub-clauses (1) to
(4) of Sec. 17 (iii) (b). It is not a relevant consideration whether the factory
owners need any protection but the real question is whether people dealing
with them need protection. [802F-Hl

9. Redress of a grievance depending upon deciding a disputed question
E
of fact cannot b.: rendered in this Court when there is want of a pleading in
this behalf and want of a decision by the High Court on the point.

Ramesh Chandra etc. v. State ofU.P. tic., [1980] 3 SCR 104, referred to.

, Writ Petitions remitted to the High Court for examining contentions
other than those dealt with by this Court. [807E]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.10072-73 of
1983, 2283/84, 10074-76/83, 2281-82 of 1984, 2284-87 & 2525-27 of
•.'
1984

G Appeals by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated
the 28th January, 9th September, 20th December, 19th Dec. 1983
& 23rd February, 28th March, 1984 of the Allahabad High Court '
.. in c.M.W. Nos. 4275, 4523, 10343, 10228of1981, 6758/83, 2066/81,
12388, 12785, 12400, 12874, 1470, 6681, 1490 of 1983 .• 68 & 1475 of
1984.
H
. MANDI sAJ.irfi v. GANGA DAL MILL (Desai, i.) 791
t
A
A. K. Sen, R.P. Bhatt, E. C. Agarwala & V.K. Pandita for the
Appellants.

Dr. Y.S. Chitale, Y.K. Jain and P.R. Agarwala
Respondents in C.A. Nos. 10072-73/84.
for the
...
B
F.S. Nariman and D.K. Garg for Respondents in CAs. 2286,
-1 3919 & 5342/84.
. ·1
· ··Shanti Bhushan and Pankaj Ka/ra for Respondent in CA •
. 2283/84.
c
·' S.N. Kacker, R.K. Jain, Suman Kapur, Ms. Sangeeta Agarwal
. and P.K. Jain, for Respondents in CA. 10076/84.

N.C. Talukdar and Ms.' Maya Rao for RR. in CA. 2581 of fl
1984•. 1. . . D

Sudama Jha and Ms. Maya Rao for RR. in CA. 2525/84.
I•

H.K, Puri for Respondent in c;:As. 10074-75183.
'1
Mrs. Sobha Dikshit for the State of U.P. E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DESAI, J. Whether the whole includes the parts is the core
question. Whether legume, whole grain, when notified as . a
· . . .'specified agricultural produce' within the meaning of the expression
'·in Sec. 2(t) of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964
I~ '\.-. ('Act' for short) would also comprehend its split folds or parts,
commercially called dal so as to enable . Mandi Samiti (Market

I
I
;
Committee for convenience of reference) to levy market fee under
. Sec. 17 of the Act on the transaction of sale of dal of legumes
. specified in the schedule to the Act, is the narrow question that falls
to be determined in this group of appeals. G

Appellant Market Committee levied market fee on the trans-
. action of sale of dal of various legumes by the respondents, asserting
°that they were specified agricultural produce and the transactions of
sale in respect of them by the respondents in• the Market Area !I
H
192 SOPRE~B COORT REPORTS li98si i s.c.ii.
A
would be exigible to the levy of market fee. The respondents con-
tended that they were manufacturing in their factory dal from
various legumes and therefore, not only they were not producers of
agricultural commodity but in view of the description of legumes
set out in the Schedule, the dal of such legumes in the processed ·'
B form is not a specified agricultural produce and therefore, a trans-
action of sale in respect of them at the hands of the respondents
even if it takes place in the Market Area would not permit the
appellant to levy market fee on such transaction and they were not •
liable to pay the same. The respondents contend that unless the
agricultural produce specified in the Schedule to the Act is notified
c as a specified agricultural produce in respect of a particular Market
Area, the Market Committee having jurisdiction in the Market
Area will not be entitled to levy market fee on the transaction of
sale of such agricultural produce. In short they say that even if •
legumes set out in the Schedule are specified agricultural produce,
D the da/ processed therefrom in the factory could not become
specified agricultural produce uni es s it is so specified and therefore,
the Market Committee had no authority to levy market fee on the •
transaction of sale of da/. The respondents approached the High
Court of Allahabad by filing writ petitions under Art. 226 of the
Constitution raising myriad contentions including the one as herein
E set out.

The High Court by its judgment dated January 28, 1983 held
that legume in its split form was not the same thing as legume
specified in the Schedule and therefore, in the absence of a specifi-
cation, da/ of any of the legumes enumerated in the Schedule cannot
F be said to be specified agricultural produce and therefore, any
transa;tion of sale in respect of them was not exigible to the levy of
market fee. In reaching this conclusion, the High Court took note
of the fact that apart from anything else the subsequent conduct of
the Government of U.P. in issuing Notification No. 383/12-5-600
(401)/81 dated January 20, 1982 substituting the entry under the
G
heading 'II Legumes' a description in the bracket against tile name
of each legume (Saboot Aur Dala Hua) dispelled doubt, if any,
lingering on the subject.

During the pendency of the writ petitions in the High Court,
it appears that the Govt. of U.P. probably out of panic or as con-
tended before us out of abundant caution issued in exercise of the
power conferred by Sec. 4A of the Act the Notification No. 383/12·
MANDI SAMI'tl v. GANGA DAL MILL (Desai, J.)

A
5-600( 401)/81 dated January 20, 1982 which reads as under :
"In exercise of the powers conferred upon him uLder
Section 4A of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi
• Adhiniyam, 1964 (U.P. Act No. 25 of 1964) the Governor
is hereby pleased to notify that with effect from the date of
publication in gazette of this Notification, in place of items B
mentioned under column (I) under the Heading (legume) in
the Schedule of Section 2(a) the following items shall be
substituted, namely--

Legumes Amended Krishi
(l
Utpadan Legume

1. Chana I. Chana (Saboot Aur Data Hua)
2. Matar 2. Matar (Saboot Aur Dali Hui)
3. Arhar 3. Arbar (Saboot Aur Dali Hui)
4. Urad 4. Urad (Saboot Aur Dali Hui) D
5. Moong 5. Moong (Saboot Aur Dali Hui)
6. Masoor 6. Masoor (Saboot Aur Dali Hui)
7. Lobhia (seeds1 7. Lobhia (Saboot Aur Dali Hui)
8. Soyabeen 8. Soyabeen
9. Khosari 9. Khosari (Saboot Aur Dali Hui)
E
10. Sanai (seeds) 10. Sanai (seeds)
11. Dhencha (seeds) 11. Dhencha (seeds)
12. Gwar 12. Gwar
13. Moth 13. Moth (Saboot Aur Dali Hui)
14. Kulthi 14. Kulthi."
F
After taking note of this notification, the High Court observed
that by the amendment of the relevant part of the Schedule to the
Act, the Government recognised and almost admitted that legumes •
whole and legumes split two different commodities and as now by the
notification both have become specified agricultural 'Produce, earlier
only the legume whole grain and not in the split form was the
specified agricultural produce and therefore, till the issue of the 0
notification the Market Committee was not entitled to levy market
fee on the transaction of sale of dal of various legumes.

' After the notification dated January 20, 1982 was issued, a fresh
batc11 of writ petitions were filed challenging both the validity of the
notification as also the eligibility of the Market Committee to levy
B
794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 1 s.c.il.

A market fee on the transaction of sale in respect of da/ of legumes.
It was contended that merely amending or adding to the list of
agricultural produce set out in the Schedule by itself without any- •
thing more would not enable the Mark-et Committee to levy market
fee on the sale of such agricultural produce because before levying
B market fee the agricultural produce has to be notified as specified
agricultural produce by issuing either a notification under Sec. 6 or
addition or alteration in exercise of power under Sec. 8 of the Act.
It was contended that after the amendment of the Schedule by the
impugned notification fresh notification either under Sec. 6 or Soc. 8
having not been issued the agricultural produce introduced in the
c Schedule, namely, dal of various legumes have not become specified
agricultural produce since the amendment of the Schedule and
therefore, any sale in respect of such agricultural produce even in
the Market Area will not enable ,the Market Committee to levy
market fee nor would it oblige persons or parties to the transaction
of sale to pay the same. This contention equally found favour with •
D the High Court. It was held that till the agricultural produce under
the heading 'II Legumes' set out in the Schedule since the amend-
ment of January 20, 1982 are notified as specified agricultural
produce, the Market Committee was not entitled to levy and collect
market fee on the transaction of sale of such agricultural produce.
E The High Court accordingly allowed the petitions and quashed the
notice issued by the Market Committee raising the demand for
market fee.

Hence these appeals by special leave.

F If the contention raised on behalf of the appellant in the first
batch of appeals is accepted, the judgment of the High Court in the
second batch of appeals will have to be quashed and set aside with-
out anything more. In view of this inter-connection between the
two batches of appeals, they were heard together though one after
the other and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

G To appreciate the very narrow contention arising in these
appeals, a glance at the relevant provisions of the Act is indispen-
sable.
•
The Act was enacted as its long title shows 'to provide for the
regulation of sale and purchase of agricultural produce and for t~e
establishment, superintendence and control of markets therefore Ill
H
MANDI SAMIT! v. GANGA DAL MILL (Desai, J.) 795

Uttar Pradesh.' 'Agricultural produce' is defined in Sec. 2(a) as A
under :

""agricultural produce" means such items of produce
of agriculture, horticulture, viticulture, apiculture, sericul-
ture, pisciculture, animal husbandry or forest as are speci-
fied in the Schedule, and includes admixture of two or B
more of such items, and also includes any such item in
processed form, and further includes gur, rab, shakkar,
khandsari and jaggery ;"

'Market Area' is defined in Sec. 2(k) to mean 'an area notified
c
as such under Section 6, or as modified under Section b.' 'Specified
agricultural produce' is defined in Sec. 2(tfto mean 'agricultural pro-
' duce specified in the notification . under Sec. 6 or as modified
under Section 8.' 'Sub-Market Yard' is defined in Sec. 2(w) to
mean 'a portion of a Market Area, declared as such under Section
7.' Sec. 4-A which was introduced in the Act by U.P. Act 10 01, D
• 1970 conferred power on the State Govt. to amend the Schedule.
It reads as under :

"4-A. The State Government may by notificotion in
the Gazette, add to, amend or omit any of the items of
agricultural produce specified in the Schedule, and there- E
upon the Schedule shall stand amended accordingly.''

Sec. 5 provides that a declaration of intention to regulate and
control sale and purchase of agricultural produce in any area.
Where the State Government is of the opinion that it is necessary or F
expedient in the public interest to regulate the sale and purchase of
any agricultural produce in any area, and for that purpose to
declare that area as a Market Area it may, by notification in the
Gazette, and in such other manner as may be prescribed, declare
its intention so to do, and invite objections against the proposed
declaration. Sec. 6 provides for the declaration of Market Area in
G
respect of agricultural produce set out in the notification issued
under Sec. 5 after considering the objections. A combined reading
of Section 5 and 6 would show that in order to be an effective
declaration, the notification must set out the Market Area that is its
• geographical boundaries as also the agricultural produce in respect
of which the Market Area is so declared. Sec. 7 confers power to
carve out Market Yar<! and Sub-Market Yards in a Market Area. H
' ' -··. '' '
196 SUPREME COURT REPORfS ' [1985] l S.C.R•

A Sec. 8 confers power on the State Government to alter Market
Area as also modification of the list of agricultural produce in
respect of each Market Area. If a change in the geographical
limits of a Market Area becomes necessary or addition or omission
.
in the list of agricultural produce in respect of a Market Area is
desired, Sec. 8 confers power on the State Government by a notifi·
B
cation to that effect in the Gazette to so alter the Market Area or
modify the list of agricultural produce. Every agricultural produce
set out in notification declaring a Market Area under Sec. 6 or
alterations made under Sec. 8 becomes speoified agricultural produce
for the purposen of the Act. Sec. 9 sets out the effects of a declar·
c ation of a Market Area, the principal being that no one within the
Market Area can set up, establish or continue or allowed to be set
up, established or continue, any place for the sale-purchase, •
storage etc. of the specified agricultural produce, except under and
in accordance with the conditions of a licec;ce granted by the Com-
mittee. Sub-sec. (2) confers power on the Market Committee to
D give licence to carry on business as a trader etc. in the Principal
Market Yard or Sub-Market Yard. Sec. 17 enumerates the powers
of the Market Committee which has to be set up for each Market
Area as required by Sec. 12, which inter a/ia includes the power to
levy and collect market fee in the circumstances therein mentioned.
E
The relevant portion of it reads as under :
"17. A Committee shall, for the Purposes of the Act,
have the power to-
...........................................................................
(iii) levy and collect:
F
(a)············· ···································
(b) market fee, which shall be payable on transactions of
sale of specified agricultural produce in the market
area at such rates, being not less than one percentum
and not more than one and half percentum of the price
G of the agricultural produce so sold, as the State Govern-
ment may specify by notification, and such fee shall be
realised in the following manner :-

(1) If the produce is sold through a commission agent the
commission agent may realise the market fee from the
purchaser and shall be liable to pay the same to the
H Committee
MAND\ SAMlTI v. GAl'GA DAL MILL (Desai, J.) 797

A
if the produce is purchased directly by a trader from a
producer the trader shall be liable to pay the market fee
to the Committee;

(3) if the produce is purchased by a trader from another
trader, the trader selling the produce may realise it from B
the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the market fee to
the Committee ; and
,.
(4) in any other case of sale of such produce, the purchaser
shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee;
c
Provided that no market fee shall be levied or collected on
the retail sale of any specified agricultural produce where
such sale is made to the consumer;·········''

The schedule appended to the Act enumerates various species D
of agricultural produce as required by Sec. (2) (a). Under the
heading "II Legumes' in the Schedule 14 different legumes such as (I)
Gram (2) Peas (3) Arhar (4) Urad etc: are specified for the purpose
of Sec. 2(a) and Sec. 4A.
'
E
On the date on which the first batch of writ petitions were
filed in the High Court, the relevant notification under Sec. 5 read
with Sec. 6 provided that with effect from May 1, 1978 the
agricultural produce mention in the Schedule 'kha' shall be
included in the list of agricultural produce of the Market Area
mentioned in Schedule 'ka'. Amongst others at plecitum (2) F
following entries are to be found :

"(2) Dwi Daliya Utpadan :

(1) Channa (2) Matar (3) Arhar (4) Urad (5) Moong
(6) Masoor (7) Lobhia (seed) {8) Soyabeen (9) Sanai G
(seed) (!OJ Dhencha (seed) (II) Ganwar."

set out in the Schedule which became specified agricultural
, produce by being included in the notification dated April 11, 1978
. could only be legume whole grain and not its split portions which
1 s the end product. of a manufacturing procecss. It was said that the

(/al which is obtained by applying a proce~s of manufacture to th~ '• ft
798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [198S] I S.C.R
A
whole grain of legumes is neither an agricultural produce and at
any rate it is not a specified agricultural produce. The High Court
charted an easy course by merely referring to the subsequent noti·
fication dated January 20, 1982 which substituted entry under
heading 'II Legumes' in the Schedule by putting into bracket
B words 'Saboot Aur Dala Hua' and concluded that if an amendment
by a notification became necessary to bring split folds of legnme
in the Schedule, by necessary implication they could not have been
included or deemed ever to have been included in the Scheduie "II
Legumes' prior to the amendment and therefore market fee could .,
not be levied on the transaction of sale of split folds of legume
c dal in a Market Area. We propose for the time being to ignore
this notification and concentrate on the entry in the Schedule as it
stood prior to the notification dated January 20, 1982 and the
definition of the expression 'agricultural produce' to ascertain
whether any of the enumerated legumes in the condition of whole
D grain or in the split folds were specified agricultural produce
comprehended with the terminological exactitude described as
Gram, Peas, Arhar Urad etc. In other words, if Gram, Peas, Arhar
Urad etc. is mentioned as specified agricultural produce . in the
notification either under Sec. 5 read with Sec. 6 or under Sec. 8,
would it mean only its whole grain or would it also taken in the
E product k~own as dal obtained by splitting the whole grain into •
its two folds.
To resolve this controversy, one will have to seek light from
the definition of expression 'agricultural produce' as set out in Sec.
2(a) of the Act and not by a resort to decisions under entirely
F different statutes such as the Sales Tax laws to find out whether
the whole grain and its split folds constitute the same product or
two different and independent products commercially so recognised.
It is an indisputable can-on of construction that where an expression
is defined in the statute, unleS5 there is anything repugnant in the
S'jbject or context, the expression has to be construed as having
t~e same meaning assinged to it in the dictionary clause of the
IG statute. This canon of construction is to well-recognised to necessi-
tate any reference to precedent.

Analysing the definition of the expression 'agricultural
produce', it would mean not only those items of produce of agri- •
culture as are specified in the Schedule, but will also include the
admb;tµr~ of two or more of such items as also any sµc]\ item in, it~
H .H
MANDI SAMITI v. GANGA DAL MILL (Desai, J.) 799

processed form, Let us re-write the definition by substitutic:; one A
of the items in the Schedule to make explicit what is i!llplicit
therein. Agricultural produce' means a produce of agriculture
such as Gram as specified in the Schedule and would also include
Gram in its processed form. Therefore, not only Gram is an agri·
.. cultural produce but Gram in its processed form is equally an
agricultural produce. When it is said in the ,definition 'such items B
of.produce of agriculture as are specified in the Schedule, it means
that not only all those items of agricultural produce which are
set out in tbe Schedule will constitute agricultural produce but
also the admixture of two or more of such items of produce
of agriculture as set out in the Schedule as well as any such c,
" ' items of agriculture produce in their processed form. Suppose
a producer selJs neither Gram nor Peas each by itself but mixes
Gram and Peas, according to the contention canvassed on behalf
of the respondents, this mixture would be not an agricultu·
• ral produce. The contention can be negatived by refferring to the
definition which says agricultural produce means such items of D
produce of agriculture (omitting the words wMch are not necessary
for the present purpose)"· as are •pecified in the Schedule such as
1• Gram and Peas as also an admixture of two or more of such items
i.e. admixture of Gram and Peas. A further step can be taken as
flowing from the definition itself. Agricultural produce means such
E
items of agricultural produce namely, Gram as specified in the
Schedule and it shall include any such items i.e. Gram in its processed
form. Even the respondents did not contend, on the contrary it was
the sheet anchor of their submission that a split legume is obtained
by a manufacturing process of whole grain of legumes, 'Sa boot' as
it is now described, and that dal i. e. the whole grain split into two F
folds is its processed form acquired by manufacturing process.
Even on their own submission dal of legume enumerated in tbe
s"chedule is any a~ricultural produce.

This very conclusion can be reached by a slightly different
route. As is well-known, the legislative enactments in the State of
l1.P. are enacted primarily in Hindi language and its official and G
authentic translation in English is simultaneously publi'shed. Bear.
ing this in mind, we turn to the notification dated April I J, 1978
specifying legumes therein enumerated as specified agricultural
produce for various Market Areas. The heading under which var·
ious legumes are enumerated is Dwi Daliya Utpadan .' This tongue
twister was explained to 11s to mean that legume itself is Dwi Da/iya
800 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1985] l S.C.R.

Utpadan i.e. the whole grain is made of two folds. Ek daliya grain
is without a fold. Dwi Daliya is a grain composed of two folds and 1

certainly not many folds, Concise Oxford Dictionary specifies the
meaning of legume to be fruit, edible part pode, of leguminous
plant; vegitable used for food , 'and leguminous' to mean' like
B of the botanical family of pulse. And in common parlance 'pulse'
connotes legume and denotes dal of legume. Reverting however,
to the heading under which legumes are enumerated in 1978
notification, it must be confessed that it clearly connotes the mean-
ing to be given to the whole grain and denotes dal i.e. split folds
as specified agricultural produce. The Hindi protagonists used the
c expression 'Dwi Dalia Utpadan' meaning thereby double folded •
grain called Gram, Peas, Arhar, moong, etc. On a strict construc-
tion, the two dais i.e. two parts forming the whole grain both are
comprehended in the expression 'Dwi Dalia Utpadan'. There-
fore, it is crystal clear that while enumerating legumes in the •
D Schedule and reproduced in the 1978 notification to make them
specified agricultural produce, the framers ir.te_nded to include
both the grain as a whole and its splits parts the dal. And when
the agricultural produce enumerated in the Schedule such 'its Gram
including its processed part is reproduced in the notification as •
Dwi Dalia Utpadan, the da/ of each of the legumes therein men-
E . tioned became specified agricultural produce.

It was however, urged tha.t if the legume in the split form is
the same as legume as a whole grain, the Market Committee would
not be entitled to levy any market fee on the transaction of sale
F of legume in split form because market fee already having been
once levied in the form of the whole grain, a second levy on the
product is not contemplated by the Act. Reference in this connec-
tion was made to the decision in Ramesh Chandra etc. v. State of
U.P. etc.I" in which levy of market fee under the Act by various
Market Committee was challenged on diverse grounds, on such
being that if market fee is oaid on the transaction of sale of paddy
Q
!bough rice is separately enumerated in the Schedule, no market
fee could be !ivied on the transaction of sale of rice. This Court
has observed at page 130 that ,if paddy is purchased in a particular
market area by a rice miller and the same paddy is convertecl into
rice and sold then the rice miller will be ]jable to pay market fee Oil

ff (I} [1980) 3 S.C.R. 104,
MANOI SAMITI v. GANGA OAL MILL (Desai, J.) 801

his purchase of paddy from the agriculturist-producer under sub·
A
• clause (2) of section 17 (iii) (b). He cannot be asked to pay market
fee over again.under sub-clause (3) in relation to the transaction
of rice. Nor will it be open to the Market Committee to choose
between either of the two in the examplr just given above. Market
fee has to be levied and collected in relation to the transaction of B
paddy alone. Reliance was also placed on the observation at page
132 where the court observed 'if Catechu is a product of kbar
trees by some processing, as prima facie it appears to us to be so,
then i'. is plain that market fee can be charged only on the purchase
of khar wood and not on the sale of Catechu.' Reliance was also
placed on M/s Ashok Industries and Ors. v. State of Bihar' and Ors'" c
·where similar view appears to have been teken. We fail to see the
significance of this submission in these appeals because this conten·
tion was not canvassed before the High Court and the respondents
merely invited the High Court to decide that dal of legumes enu·
merated in tbe Schedule are not specfied agricultural produce. If D
the respondents are entitled to any relief on the view of the matter
taken in Ramesh Chandra's case they may obtain appropriate
relief, but as has been rightly observed by this Court that redress
of the grievance in this behalf depending upon deciding a disputed
question of fact cannot be rendered here for want of pleading in
this behalf and for want of a decision by the High Court on this E
point. Rut on this account it iS not possible to accept the submi·
ssion of the respondent that legume in the split form is not com·
prehended in the Schedule to the Act as well as in the notification
dated April II, 1978.

Mr. Shanti Bhushan for some of the respondents urged that F
the respondents have set up their factory for processing whole grain
of legumes into its split folds and the commodity known as dal is
' a well recognised identifiable commercial commodity distinct from
the legume whole grain from which it is derived by a manufacturing
process and as the Act was en"ct~cl for protecting the interest of
producers of agricultural produce, the factory owners being in no G
need of such protection cannot be subjected to the levy of market
fee on the transaction of sale of legume in split form. The sub-
' mission_ does not commend to us because it proceeds on an errone-
ous assumption that the Act was primarily enacted for the protec-
tion of producers of scheduled agricultural produce. In fact, as
(I) AIR 1979 Patna217. H
802 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985) ! S C.R.
A•
pointed out earlier, the Act was enacted primarily for the regu-
lation of sale and purchase of agricultural produce and for the
establishment, superintendence and control of markets therefor. In
the Statement of objects and reasons accompanying the Act, it is in
terms stated that the proposed measure to regulate the market in
B the State has been designed with a view to achieving the objects
therein enumerated, only one of them being to ensure that the
agricultural producer has his say in the utjlisation of market funds
for the improvement of the market as a whole. Agricultural
produce bas nowhere been mentioned in the nine objects set out
therein except as mentioned above. On the other hand, the Cons-
c titution Bench in Ramesh Chandra's case noticed that the 'Act was
enacted for the development of new market areas and for efficient
data col!ecton and processing of arrivals in the Mandis to enable
the World Bank to give a substantial help for the establishment of
various markets in the State of U.P.' The Act was compared with 'A

similar statutes in force in different States . and a distinguishing
D·
feature was pointed out that in other States the Act is mainly
meant to protect the agriculturist producer from being exploited
when he comes to the Mandis for selling his agricultural produce.
This Court observed in agreement with the High Court that certain
other transactions also have been roped in the levy of market fee
E in which both sides are traders and neither side is an agriculturist
and this has been done for the effective implementation of the
scheme of establishments of markets mainly for the benefit of
producers. Approving the observation in Kewal Krishna Puri &
Anr v. Staie of Puniab & Ors.'11 the Court further observed that the
fee realised from the payer has by and large to be spent for his
F special benifits and for the benefit of other persons connected with
the transaction of purchase and sale in various Mandis. Therefore,
it cannot be said that the respondents-factory owners not being
agricultural producers and not being in search of any protection of
the Market Committee could not be subjected to the levy of mar-
ket fee. In fact, the primary object of the Act as far as the State
G
of U.P. is concerned is regulation of sale and purchase of agricul-
tnral produce irrespective of the character of the party to the
transaction sRve and eJ<cept that character is relevant as set out
in sub-clauses (I) to (4) of Sec. 17 (iii)(b). It is not a relevant
consideration whether the factory owners need any protection but
the real question is whether people dealing with them need pro-

H <W [197913 s.c.R. 1711.
MANDI SAM!Tl v. GANGA DAL MILL (Desai, J.) 803

tection. Viewed from either angle, we find no merit in the A
submission. ·
Dr. Y.S. Chitale refered to M/s Ganesh Trading Co. Karna/
etc. etc. v. State of Haryana & Anr. etc."l, Babu Ram Jagdish
Kumar and Co. etc. etc. v. State of Punjab & Ors.etc. etcJ'\
State of Karnataka v. B Raghurama Shetty etc/'l and M/s Laxmi B
Chand Bad1 i Narain v. The Commissioner of sales Tax. M.P.i'l and
urged that dehusked paddy which is rice has· heen held to be not
• the same or identical goods but to distinct commercially known
commodities and they are separately enumerated and therefore,
one does not include the other. Jr, all the four judgments, the
question arose under the relevant Sales Tax law. The contention c
raised was whether paddy and rice can be considered as indenti-
cal goods for the purpose of imposition of sales tax ? Under
the relevant Sale Tax Act exemption from payment of sales tax
is provided if the very paddy in respect of which purchase tax
was levied was sold an.d not if that paddy is converted into rice n D
and sold. The contention was that paddy and rice are ide~tical
goods and therefore, when the law grants an exemption in respect
of paddy that exemption is also available to rice. It was urged
that rice is nothing but dehusked paddy and when the paddy is
dehusked, there is no change in the identity of the goods. This
contention was negatived in all the four cases depending upon E
provisions of the relevant Sales Tax Law. It was however &aid
that the ratio of the decision would assist us in understanding
what is the processed form of a particular agricultural produce.
Approaching the matter from this angle, it was urged that
though rice is produced out of paddy, this Court held that F
it is not true to say that paddy continued to be paddy even after
dohusking, and they are two different things in ordinary parlance.
This ratio cannot assist us at all for a very good reason. It was
not pointed out to us that the various provisions of the relevant
Sales Tax Law which came for consideration of this Court in those
four decisions did or did not have a definition such as we have of
'agricultural produce' in Sec. 2(a) of the Act. G
• •
In this connection, however specific reliance was placed
on the decision of Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. Modi-
(1) A.l.R. 1974' S.C. 1362.
(2) [1979] 3 S.C.R. 952.
(3) [1981] 3 S.C R. 280 ..
(4) A.LR. 1971 M.P. 74.
, e
804 SUPRBME COURT RBPoRTS [1985) I s.c.k.

iA nagar & Ors. etc. v. State of U.P. & Anr.' 1' wherein in the context
of the Act, it was held that 'cotton ginned and unginned, 'and there-
fore, it was held that no market fee was leviable on the transac-
tion of sale of cotton waste. In reaching this conclusion, a Division
Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that if 'cotton ginned and ~
unginned' was specified as an agricultural produce yet cotton waste
B which is a processed form of cotton was not so specified, the Legis-
lature indicated not to include the same in the specified agricul-
tural produce. The Court posed to itself a question : whether cotton
waste is processed from of cotton while posing to itself another •
question : is cotton processed for manufacture of cotton waste ?
· The Court than proceeded to observe that in Sec. 2(b) of the
c Cotton Ginning and Pressing Factories Act, 1925 'cotton' is defined
as "cotton ginned or unginned or cotton waste". While. in Sec~
2(b) of the Cotton Transport Act, 1923, 'cotton' has been defined
to mean every kind of unmanufactured cotton, ginned and unginned •
cotton, cotton waste and cotton seed. After referring to these
D definitions, the Court held that cotton waste is not included in
'cotton ginned or unginned.' In our opinion, the court has strained '•
the language to reach an unsustainable conclusion, holding th.at
cotton waste is not the processed· form of cotton but it is a bye-
product quite different form of cotton though containing cotton
fibre which cannot be used as ordinary cotton. As its name indicates,
E cotton waste appears to be droppings, stripping and other waste
product while ginning cotton. It cannot be said to be a bye-product •
of cotton but it is cotton none-the-less minus the removed seec'.
Jn other words it is residue of ginned cotton. We therefore, find it
difficult to agree with the view of the Bigh Court that cotton ,
waste is not comprehended in the item 'cotton ginned and '+ ·
F
unginned.'_
Lastly a reference was made to the State of Gujarat v.
Sakarwala Brothers."' The question that came up for consideration
before this Court was : whether Sales tax was payable in respect
c of sales of patasa, narda and alchidana? The contention arose in
the context of the provision contained in Sec. 5(1) of the Bombay
Sales Tax Act, 1959 in its application to the State of Gujarat which
provided that 'notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, but
subject to the conditions or exceptions (if any) set out against each
of the goods specified in column 3 of Schedule A, no tax shall be

(I) [1980] All. L.J. 1137.
H (2) [ 1967] 19 S.T .C. 24.

'
I
MANDI SAMti'i v. GANGA DAL MILL (Desai, J) 80)

payable on the sales or purchases ·of any goods specified in the A
Schedulf .' The relevant entry is the 'sugar as defined in Item No.
8 of the First Schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944.'
Affirming the decision of the Gujarat High Court this Court held
• that patasa, harda and alchidana were exempt from any tax payable
under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 because they are compre-
B
hended in the expression 'sugar' in the entry granting exemption.
This conclusion was reached holding that the expression 'sugar' in
.Entry 47 granting exemption will comprehend within its ambit all
• forms of sugar that is to say, sugar of any shape or texture, colour
or density and by whatever name it is called. If this line of
reasoning is adopted, legume whole grain will necessary compre- c
hend both folds of the whole grain. But we do not propose to rest
our decision on the approach to various commodities commercially
recognised distinct under relevant Sales Tax Law.
To sum up, for the reasons herein stated, the High Court was
in error in holding that the legume whole grain as set out in the
Schedule does not include its split form i,e. da/ and therefore, no D
market fee was leviable on the transaction of sale of legume in split
form. This conclusion disposes of first batch of appeals arising
from writ petitions filed prior to the issue of notification dated
January 20, 1982.
B
In the other batch of petitions which came to be filed after
• the notification of January 20, 1982, Mr. F.S. N•riman, learned
counsel appearing in C.A. No. 2286/84 urged that even if under
Sec. 4-A of the Act, the State Government had the power to add
to, amend or omit any of the items of agricultural produce specified
in the Schedule and if by the notification dated January 20, 1982, F
the State Government purported to substitute the Schedule under
the Heading 'legumes' by putting into bracket by the side of each
enumerated legume 'Saboot or Dala Hua', that by itself would not
make such agricultural produce 'specified agricultural produce'. It
was urged and in our opinion, rightly that before a transaction of
sale, as set out in Sec. l 7(iii)(b) of the Act, of an agricultural pro-
G
duce becomes exigible for the levy of market fee, the agricultural
' • produce has to be a 'specified agricultural produce' and that can be
done by an appropriate notification under Sec. 5 read with Sec. 6
or under Sec. 8 of the Act and until that is done the agricultural
produce even if it is so enumerated in the Schedule does not
become 'specified agricultural produce' and no market fee can be
levied on the transaction of sale of such agricultural produce. It
H
806 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] l S.C.R.

was urged that for steps have to be taken before an agricultural
produce becomes a 'specified agricultural produce' in respect of a
Market Area. Undoubtedly, when in exercise of powers conferred
by Sec. 5 the State Government publishes its intention to set up a
Market Area by a notification in the Official Gazette, the State •
B •Government is simultaneously under an obligation to specify not
only the Market Area that is its geographical limits or boundaries
but must specify the agricultural produce quay such Market Area.
After inviting objections both in respect of the Market Area and •
the agricultural produce, a furlher notification is required to be
issued under Sec. 6 making tl1c requi>ile declaration both in respect
c of the Market Arca as well as the agricultural produce. When
these tWo steps are taken, the agricultural produce set out in the
notification issued under Sec. 6 becomes specified agricultural. pro-
duce in relation to Market Area notified in the notification. Sec. 8 •
confers power to alter the Market Area or the agricultural produce
in respect of the altered Market Area. When these steps are taken
0
then alone those agricultural produces enumerated in the notification
under Sec. 6 or under Sec. 8 would assume and acquire the mark or
character of 'specified agricultural produce,' on the sale transac.tion
of which market fee can be levied by the Market Committee.
Proceeding along it was urged that even though a notification was
issued under Sec. 4-A on January 20, 1982 amending the Schedule
' legumes, in the absence of a notification under Sec. 8
in respect of •
making the agricultural produce so introduced in the Schedule as
specified agcicultutal produce, those agricultural produces would
not acquire the character of specified agricultural produces qua-
Market· Area and therefore, the respondents are not liable to pay
F any market fee thereon. If the amended Schedule introduced by
the notification dated January 20, 1982 introduces fresh agricultural
produces m the Schedule, tile contention of Mr. Nariman must
carry conviction because it was conceded that a fresh notification
under Sec. 8 in respect of the legumes has not been issued. But
the view which we have taken is that the entries under the heading
'legumes' 111 the Schedule as it stood prior to the amendment of
G January 20, 1982 comprehended both the whole grain of legumes
and its split part that is dal. What was implicit has been made
explicit and therefore, no fresh notification under Sec. 8 was
necessary. Therefore, the contention has to be negatived. As
that was the only contention canvassed before this Court in the
second batch of appeals as we find no merit in it, the· second batch
H of appeals will also have to be allowed.
MANDI S!MITI v. GANGA DAL MILL (Desai, J.) 801

A
Lastly, the respondents contended that if the view taken by
the Hi,gh Court on the question that split grain of legume, tb at is
dal was not comprehended in the whole grain of legume as set out
in the Schedule and therefore, the same was not a specified agri·
cultural is held not to be correct and accordingly the judgment of
the High Court would have to be upset, all the matters may be B
remitted to the High Court for disposing of other contentions
canvassed on behalf of the respondents who we.re petitioners in the
High Court as the High Court declined to examine them, as the
writ petitions were allowed' on this one narrow contention which,
according to the High Court went to the root of the matter. :,

Before the High Court, the respondents raised various con-
tentions. Most of them were repelled by the High Court, but the
• petitioners succeeded on the narrow contention as herein set out .
It was said by Mr. Shanti Bhushan referring to the writ petition in
which he appeared that there were other contentions which the ·,
respondents wanted to canvass but which the High Court declined D
to examine. It may be that there might be some other contentions
which the respondents wanted the High Court to examine and the
High Court having held in favour of the respondents on one point
may have declined to examine the same. Therefore, while allowing
the appeals, all the matters are remitted to the High Court. The
E
High Court may cxan:iine contentions other than those which were
dealt with in the judgment from which the present batches of
appeals were preferred. All those contentions which have been
negatived by the High Court and in respect of each one of them no
.__,,· ; attempt was made to support the judgment of the High Court
before tbis Court those contentions may not be permitted to be F
reopened. The remand is limited to those questions which find
their place in the writ petitions and which the High Court declined
to examine.

But as the respondents have failed on almost all major con- : .
tentions, they need not have the benefit of a discretionary order of
any stay against levy of market fee any more. With these limitations G
' the matters are remitted to the High Court.

All the appeals accordingly succeed and are allowed to the
extent herein indicated with costs.

N.V.K. Appeals allowed. H