KUM. GEETHA, D/O LATE KRISHNA & ORS.versusNANJUNDASWAMY & ORS.

                   [2023] 14 S.C.R. 153 : 2023 INSC 964



                               CASE DETAILS

            KUM. GEETHA, D/O LATE KRISHNA & ORS.
                                         v.
                       NANJUNDASWAMY & ORS.
                       (Civil Appeal No. 7413 of 2023)
                             OCTOBER 31, 2023
            [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA AND
                  SUDHANSHU DHULIA, JJ.]

                                HEADNOTES

     Issue for consideration: Correct application of the principle
underlying the rejection of plaints u/Or.VII, r.11, Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, to the facts of the case and the legality of rejection of a plaint in part.
     Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.VII, r.11 – Rejection of Plaints
– Principle underlying – Application of – Plaintiffs and the Defendants
no.1-3 were members of a joint family owning properties mentioned
in Schedule A and B of the plaint – Plaintiffs filed plaint for partition
and separate possession – Defendants’ application for rejection of the
plaint u/Or.VII, r.11, CPC was dismissed by Trial Court – High Court
allowed the application in part, and rejected the Plaint with respect to
Schedule-A property observing that the property described therein was
sold way back in 1919 via a registered Sale Deed and the Plaintiffs did
not deny the sale – Legality:
      Held: The true test is first to read the plaint meaningfully and as a whole,
taking it to be true – Upon such reading, if the plaint discloses a cause of action,
then the application u/Or.VII,r.11 must fail – The plaint shall be rejected where it
does not disclose a cause of action – In the present case, High Court committed
error by examining the merits of the matter – It pre-judged the truth, legality and
validity of the sale deed under which the Defendants No. 4 to 14 claim title –
High Court could not have anticipated the truth of the averments by assuming
that the alleged previous sale of the property is complete or that it has been
acted upon – Approach adopted by the High Court is incorrect and contrary

                                       153
154           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 14 S.C.R.


to the well-entrenched principles of considering an application u/Or.VII Rule
11 – High Court erred in rejecting the plaint in part with respect to Schedule-A
property and permitting the Plaintiffs to prosecute the case only with respect to
Schedule-B property – This approach is impermissible – Impugned the judgment
passed in revision petition set aside – Application u/Or.VII, r.11 dismissed, the
suit even with respect to properties mentioned under Schedule A of the Plaint
restored. [Paras 7, 10-13]

      LISTS OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES

      Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (2020) 7 SCC 366: [2020]
5 SCR 694; Sejal Glass Ltd. v. Navilan Merchants (P) Ltd (2018) 11 SCC
780: [2017] 7 SCR 557; Madhav Prasad Aggarwal v. Axis Bank Ltd (2019)
7 SCC 158: 2019 8 SCR 1058 – relied on.
       OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
              ORDER AND APPEARANCES
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.7413 of 2023
    From the Judgment and Order dated 09.11.2015 of the High Court of
Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRP No.158 of 2010.
      Appearances:
    P V Yogeshwaran, M. A. Chinnasamy, Mrs. C. Rubavathi, C.
Raghavendren, V. Senthil Kumar, Devendra Pratap Singh, Ashis Upadhay,
Advs. for the Appellants.
     S. Nandakumar, Ms. Deepika Nandakumar, Ashok Kumar Singh,
Rajeev Gupta, Naresh Kumar, Advs. for the respondents.
       JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT

                                JUDGMENT

      PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.
      1. Leave granted.
      2. In this appeal, we are called upon to decide two questions. The
first relates to the true and correct application of the principle underlying
    KUM. GEETHA, D/O LATE KRISHNA v. NANJUNDASWAMY                          155
           [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J. ]

the ‘rejection of plaints’ under Order VII Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure,
19081, to the facts of the case. The second question relates to the legality of
rejection of a plaint in part. For the reasons to follow, we have held that the
High Court has committed an error in passing the order impugned, on both
counts. First, by misapplying the well-established principles informing Order
VII Rule 11 of the CPC, and second, by rejecting the plaint in part, which
is again contrary to the law on the subject. We have, therefore, allowed the
appeal and dismissed the application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC. We
will first indicate the necessary facts.
      3. Mr. P V Yogeshwaran, learned counsel appearing for the appellants,
assisted by Mr. M.A. Chinnasamy, Mrs. C Rubavathi, Mr. C Raghavendren,
Mr. V Senthil Kumar, Mr. Devendra Pratap Singh and Mr. Ashis Upadhay
submitted that the Plaintiffs along with the Defendants No. 1 to 3 are
members of a joint family owning properties mentioned in Schedule A and
B of the plaint. He has taken us through the plaint where it is averred that
the karta of the family, late Shri Munivenkata Bhovi had many properties
and was in a habit of temporarily mortgaging properties for raising finances
by executing what are referred to as ‘nominal sale deeds’. Once dues were
cleared, reconveyance deeds were executed. It is specifically averred that this
practice was adopted by the karta to maintain the family and the persons in
whose favour these documents were executed were also close acquaintances
of the family. As such, the possession of the joint family properties was
never parted. It is also pleaded that when the Plaintiffs asked for partition,
initially the Defendants did not deny it, but instead, only asked the Plaintiffs
to wait till the revenue records were updated so that actual partition could
be effected. Hence, Plaintiffs presented a plaint for partition and separate
possession.
      4. Four years after the suit was instituted, the Defendants filed a petition
seeking rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11, CPC. While the
Trial Court dismissed the application on the ground that the plaint does
disclose a cause of action, the High Court, by the impugned order, observed
that the property in survey No. 76/1 (described in schedule A of the plaint)



1    Hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’.
156              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                                  [2023] 14 S.C.R.


was sold way back in 1919 via a registered Sale Deed. The High Court
reasoned that the Plaintiffs did not deny the sale, but only urged that there
was a subsequent re-conveyancing of the property back to the joint family,
without a corresponding mutation of revenue records. Impressed by the fact
that the Plaintiffs neither produced any evidence to challenge the Sale Deed
from 1919, nor sought any declaratory relief against the Sale Deed, High
Court proceeded to allow the application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC
in part, and rejected the Plaint with respect to Schedule-A property. Shri
Yogeshwaran submitted that the High Court committed an error in allowing
the Revision and consequently, the application under Order VII Rule 11,
CPC.
      5. Shri S. Nandakumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents,
with the assistance of Ms. Deepika Nandakumar, Mr. Ashok Kumar Singh,
Mr. Rajeev Gupta and Mr. Naresh Kumar, on the other hand, supported the
reasoning and conclusion of the High Court.
      6. Before considering the legality of the approach adopted by the High
Court, it is necessary to consider Order VII Rule 11, CPC2 and the precedents
on the subject. The relevant principles have been succinctly explained in a
recent decision of this Court in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali,3
as follows:



2      11. Rejection of plaint.—The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases—
      (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
      (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the
      court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so;
      (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper
      insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to supply the
      requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so;
      (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;
      (e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
      (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9:
      Provided that the time fixed by the court for the correction of the valuation or supplying
      of the requisite stamp-papers shall not be extended unless the court, for reasons to be
      recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional
      nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the case
      may be, within the time fixed by the court and that refusal to extend such time would
      cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.
3     (2020) 7 SCC 366.
KUM. GEETHA, D/O LATE KRISHNA v. NANJUNDASWAMY 157
       [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J. ]

  “23.2. The remedy under Order 7 Rule 11 is an independent and special
  remedy, wherein the court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at
  the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting
  a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the
  action should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in this
  provision.
  23.3. The underlying object of Order 7 Rule 11(a) is that if in a suit, no
  cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under
  Rule 11(d), the court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily
  protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be
  necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial
  time is not wasted.
  23.4. In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi [Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi,
  1986 Supp SCC 315. Followed in Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja
  v. Vijaykunverba, 1998 SCC OnLine Guj 281 : (1998) 2 GLH 823] this
  Court held that the whole purpose of conferment of powers under this
  provision is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound
  to prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste judicial time of the
  court, in the following words : (SCC p. 324, para 12)
        “12. … The whole purpose of conferment of such powers is to
       ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove
       abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the court,
       and exercise the mind of the respondent. The sword of Damocles
       need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without
       point or purpose. Even in an ordinary civil litigation, the court
       readily exercises the power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose
       any cause of action.”
  23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is,
  however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order 7 Rule
  11 are required to be strictly adhered to.
  23.6. Under Order 7 Rule 11, a duty is cast on the court to determine
  whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinising the
  averments in the plaint [Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v.
  M.V. Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512] , read in conjunction with the
  documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law.
158           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 14 S.C.R.


      ...
      23.9. In exercise of power under this provision, the court would
      determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory
      law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the
      plaint at the threshold is made out.
      23.10. At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written
      statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would
      be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration.
      [Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137]
      23.11. The test for exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 11 is that
      if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction
      with the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree
      being passed. This test was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. &
      I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I [Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn.
      Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512] which reads as : (SCC
      p. 562, para 139)
            “139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is
            essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not
            must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said
            purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must
            be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments
            made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a
            decree would be passed.”
      23.12. In Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. [Hardesh Ores (P)
      Ltd. v. Hede & Co., (2007) 5 SCC 614] the Court further held that it
      is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it
      in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has
      to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without
      addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint
      prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an
      enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact. D. Ramachandran
      v. R.V. Janakiraman [D. Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman, (1999)
      3 SCC 267; See also Vijay Pratap Singh v. Dukh Haran Nath Singh,
      AIR 1962 SC 941] .
 KUM. GEETHA, D/O LATE KRISHNA v. NANJUNDASWAMY 159
        [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J. ]

     23.13. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit
     is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a
     right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising the power under
     Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.
     23.14. The power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by
     the court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint,
     or after issuing summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of
     the trial, as held by this Court in the judgment of Saleem Bhai v.
     State of Maharashtra [Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, (2003)
     1 SCC 557] . The plea that once issues are framed, the matter must
     necessarily go to trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar Hussain
     case [Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, 1986 Supp SCC 315. Followed
     in Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v. Vijaykunverba, 1998 SCC
     OnLine Guj 281 : (1998) 2 GLH 823].
     23.15. The provision of Order 7 Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. It states
     that the plaint “shall” be rejected if any of the grounds specified in
     clauses (a) to (e) are made out. If the court finds that the plaint does
     not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law,
     the court has no option, but to reject the plaint”
      7. In simple terms, the true test is first to read the plaint meaningfully
and as a whole, taking it to be true. Upon such reading, if the plaint discloses
a cause of action, then the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC
must fail. To put it negatively, where it does not disclose a cause of action,
the plaint shall be rejected.
    8. Following this clear principle, we will now consider the averments
made in the plaint. The relevant portions of the plaint are as follows:
     “The plaintiffs submit that the said joint family of late Muniventkata
     Bhovi was in the habit of raising finance whenever it was needed on
     the strength of the said land in survey number 76/1 later renumbered
     as 76/2 by executing nominal sale deeds and used to clear the same
     and used to get necessary reconveying documents... the same habit
     continued even after the death of late Munivenkata Bhovi by his wives...
     the said landing survey number 76/2 always continued to be and is in
     possession of the joint family of the plaintiffs...
160           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 14 S.C.R.


      The plaintiffs submit that many times even after clearing the debts
      due to the said financiers, there was reconveyance deeds or release
      deeds in favour of the plaintiffs joint family in its favour since they had
      immense confidence in Karibasappa’s family and there was no trouble
      regarding their joint possession of the said joint family properties...
      The plaintiffs submit that the attitude of defendants 1 to 3 towards
      plaintiffs’ welfare became disinterested and they started neglecting
      them ... some of the plaintiffs tried to make the defendants 1 to 3 to
      take some steps ... the said defendants 1 to 3 advised them and other
      plaintiffs to have patience as lot of documents and revenue entries
      have to be updated before dividing the suit schedule properties and
      give separate possession to each sharers including plaintiffs ...
      The plaintiffs submit that the said joint family has no debts and the
      suit schedule properties are available for partition ...
      Plaintiffs 1 to 6 submit that instead of partitioning the said suit schedule
      properties among the plaintiffs and the defendants 1 to 3, the said
      defendants have started making efforts to alienate the same to others
      in the month of May 2005 ... they even made it clear that the heirs of
      Karibasappa and themselves will create all sorts of problems to the
      plaintiffs for daring to question them and they claimed that several
      documents have been created in respect of the suit schedule properties
      and revenue records and built up in the names of their own man and
      they will cause all sorts of obstructions to the plaintiffs in realising
      their shares and even create third party interests therein and induct
      others into the possession thereof...”
      It is apparent from the above that, the Plaintiffs specifically pleaded
that various sales were executed through ‘nominal sale deeds’, but were not
acted upon. The plaint of the joint family property specifically addressed the
issue of the revenue records and averred that although the RTC records stood
in the name of the financiers, the joint family continued to be in undisrupted
possession of the property.
      9. If the statements in the plaint are taken to be true, the joint family
properties may enure to the benefit of its members and they may well be
available for partition. This is a matter of trial, the result of which would
    KUM. GEETHA, D/O LATE KRISHNA v. NANJUNDASWAMY 161
           [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J. ]

depend upon the evidence adduced by the Plaintiff. At this stage, we are
not concerned with the correctness of the averments, except to state that the
Plaintiffs have the carriage of the proceedings, and have to discharge the
heavy burden of proving their case. In so far as the application under Order
VII Rule 11 of CPC is concerned, this Court will proceed only that far, to
examine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action, and no further.
      10. The High Court committed an error by examining the merits of the
matter. It pre-judged the truth, legality and validity of the sale deed under
which the Defendants No. 4 to 14 claim title. This is not to say that the
Plaintiffs have any less burden to prove their case or even that their case is
probable. Simply put, the High Court could not have anticipated the truth
of the averments by assuming that the alleged previous sale of the property
is complete or that it has been acted upon. The approach adopted by the
High Court is incorrect and contrary to the well-entrenched principles of
considering an application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC. Under these
circumstances, we set aside the judgment and the order passed by the High
Court and dismiss the application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC, and
restore the suit even with respect to properties mentioned under Schedule
A of the Plaint.
      11. There is yet another reason why the judgment of the High Court
is not sustainable. In an application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC a plaint
cannot be rejected in part. This principle is well established and has been
continuously followed since the 1936 decision in Maqsud Ahmad v. Mathra
Datt & Co4. This principle is also explained in a recent decision of this Court
in Sejal Glass Ltd. v. Navilan Merchants (P) Ltd,5 which was again followed
in Madhav Prasad Aggarwal v. Axis Bank Ltd.6 The relevant portion of
Madhav Prasad (supra) is extracted hereinunder:
       “10. We do not deem it necessary to elaborate on all other arguments
       as we are inclined to accept the objection of the appellant(s) that the
       relief of rejection of plaint in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule
       11(d) CPC cannot be pursued only in respect of one of the defendant(s).


4     AIR 1936 Lahore 1021
5     (2018) 11 SCC 780.
6     (2019) 7 SCC 158.
162           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 14 S.C.R.


      In other words, the plaint has to be rejected as a whole or not at all, in
      exercise of power under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC. Indeed, the learned
      Single Judge rejected this objection raised by the appellant(s) by
      relying on the decision of the Division Bench of the same High Court.
      However, we find that the decision of this Court in Sejal Glass Ltd.
      [Sejal Glass Ltd. v. Navilan Merchants (P) Ltd., (2018) 11 SCC 780
      : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 256] is directly on the point. In that case, an
      application was filed by the defendant(s) under Order 7 Rule 11(d)
      CPC stating that the plaint disclosed no cause of action. The civil court
      held that the plaint is to be bifurcated as it did not disclose any cause
      of action against the Director’s Defendant(s) 2 to 4 therein. On that
      basis, the High Court had opined that the suit can continue against
      Defendant 1 company alone. The question considered by this Court was
      whether such a course is open to the civil court in exercise of powers
      under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC. The Court answered the said question
      in the negative by adverting to several decisions on the point which
      had consistently held that the plaint can either be rejected as a whole
      or not at all. The Court held that it is not permissible to reject plaint
      qua any particular portion of a plaint including against some of the
      defendant(s) and continue the same against the others. In no uncertain
      terms the Court has held that if the plaint survives against certain
      defendant(s) and/or properties, Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC will have no
      application at all, and the suit as a whole must then proceed to trial.
      ...
      12. Indubitably, the plaint can and must be rejected in exercise of
      powers under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC on account of non-compliance
      with mandatory requirements or being replete with any institutional
      deficiency at the time of presentation of the plaint, ascribable to
      clauses (a) to (f) of Rule 11 of Order 7 CPC. In other words, the plaint
      as presented must proceed as a whole or can be rejected as a whole
      but not in part...”
                                                          (emphasis supplied)
      12. In view of the above referred principle, we have no hesitation in
holding that the High Court committed an error in rejecting the plaint in part
with respect to Schedule-A property and permitting the Plaintiffs to prosecute
 KUM. GEETHA, D/O LATE KRISHNA v. NANJUNDASWAMY 163
        [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J. ]

the case only with respect to Schedule-B property. This approach while
considering an application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC is impermissible.
We, therefore, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court even on
this ground.
     13. For the reasons stated above, the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP
(C) No. 8147 of 2016 is allowed and the impugned judgment and order of
the High Court of Karnataka in Civil Revision Petition No. 158 of 2010
dated 09.11.2015, is set-aside.
      14. In view of the fact that the present proceedings arise out of a suit
instituted in 2005, we request the Trial Court to take up the trial and dispose
of the suit expeditiously.
      15. Parties will bear their own costs.


Headnotes prepared by:                                           Appeal allowed.
Divya Pandey